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Abstract 
Using the BCRSP and BCSP certification schemes and their years of collective expertise in 
delivering competency assessments, this thematic paper will explore the following concepts: 
 
o The value of certification of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) professional 
o Certification of OSH Professionals through a Competency Assessment Model 
o The role delineation process  
o Certification scheme structures 
o Validity and reliability of competency-based examination models 
o The accreditation (ISO/IEC 17024) process and continuous improvement 
o How certification standards impact industry practices and OSH education 
o How certification standards promote lifelong learning of the OSH professional 
o Transportability and international influence 
Keywords: certification, OSH professionals, accreditation 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Both the Board of Canadian Registered Safety Professionals (BCRSP) and Board of Certified 
Safety Professionals (BCSP) have well-established and ISO accredited models of certification 
for occupational safety and health (OSH) professionals. The BCSP, established in 1969, and 
the BCRSP, established in 1976, have developed comprehensive certification schemes that are 
highly valued by OSH professionals and employers. Using the BCRSP and BCSP certification 
schemes and their years of collective expertise in delivering competency assessments, this 
thematic paper will explore some of the concepts and developments as they relate to the 
certification of OSH professionals. Particular attention is paid to the validation survey process 
and how this research supports the certification process, the use of competency-based 
examination models and the importance of validity and reliability measures within the context of 
certification, and how the psychometric analysis of examinations is useful to certification 
organizations. 
 
2.0 WHAT IS CERTIFICATION AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
Certification is defined as a “voluntary process by which a non-governmental entity grants a 
time–limited recognition and use of a credential to an individual after verifying that he or she 
has met predetermined and standardized criteria. It is the vehicle that a profession or 
occupation uses to differentiate among its members, using standards, sometimes developed 
through a consensus-driven process, based on existing legal and psychometric requirements.” 
(Knapp, J., et al 2006) Certification differs from certificate programs in that certification 
programs are designed to meet very different needs.  
 
Certification programs are a voluntary process in which a professional is evaluated against an 
established standard which is set through a defensible, industry-wide process (job analysis/role 
delineation) that results in an outline of required knowledge and skills. Certification programs 
award the use of a certification mark that is time-bound, and they require continuing 
professional development be reported on a set-cycle and to a defined minimum requirement.  
 
In contrast, a certificate program generally results from an educational process, is an indication 
of completion of a course or series of courses with a specific focus, is an end result (no 
continuing professional development required to maintain), and assessment tools are typically 
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not set through a standard setting process, rather they are established by the program instructor 
to measure knowledge of listed program outcomes. 
 
The Institute for Credentialing Excellence (ICE) also refers to the assessment scope of a 
certification program typically being broad versus a certificate program which may be narrow in 
focus. (ICE, 2015) 
 
3.0 VALUE OF CERTIFICATION 
Certification programs, which adhere to industry best practices, provide professionals, 
consumers, and government agencies an assurance of competency in a constantly changing 
world. In general, certification programs raise the bar within a profession and provide a 
benchmark of professionalism. For the professionals, there are a number of benefits typically 
identified and there are an increasing number of research studies being conducted on the value 
of certification to a profession. 
 
ICE has developed a theoretical model supporting certification that outlines the conditions 
necessary for value to be equated to the certification program. 
 
Necessary conditions related to objectivity, rigor, professional ethics and discipline, and continuing 
competence, if developed and communicated effectively, lead to observable value by certificants and by 
others. 
  Value 
Necessary Conditions Communication Seen by Certificants Seen by Externals 
· Objectivity 
· Rigor 
· Ethics/discipline 
· Recertification 
· Market need 
· Responsibilities to 
stakeholders 
· Marketing to 
stakeholders 
· Annual report 
· Candidate handbook 
· Directory 
· Greater confidence in 
professional 
competence 
· Increased autonomy 
in the workplace 
· Enhanced 
marketability 
· Employability, and 
opportunity for 
advancement 
· Improved monetary 
factors 
· Heightened job 
satisfaction 
· Required for 
employment 
· Required for 
advancement 
· Justifies salary 
differential 
· Investment to 
attain/retain 
certification 
· Better compliance 
with regulations and 
conditions of 
third-party payers 
· Raised public opinion 
· Lowered risk 
· Greater scope of 
practice 
Figure 1 ICE Theoretical Model Supporting Certification (Henderson, J , 2012) 
 
In 2011, the BCRSP undertook a research study on the Perceived Value of 
Certification amongst OSH Professionals. The findings in this research study are consistent with 
the ICE report. The key value statements identified by Canadian Registered Safety 
Professionals (CRSP) are that certification:  
 
· Is an indication of professional growth, 
· Enhances professional credibility, 
· Provides evidence of professional commitment, 
· Enhances employability and mobility, and 
· Increases earning potential. (ASI/BCRSP, 2011) 
 
Organizations that engage professionals that hold BCSP certifications reported benefits such 
as: 
 
· Improved competence in safety decisions, 
· Improved quality of safety inspections and audits, 
· Improved trust and confidence from clients in the ability to manage safety at job sites, 
· Continued professional development. 
 
The increased earning potential of certified professionals is also supported through salary 
survey data collected by both the BCRSP and BCSP. Employers recognize the value of 
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certification and this is reflected through increased salary, internal recognition and/or 
promotion.  
 
Many employers prefer or require applicants for OSH positions to be certified particularly for 
mid-career or senior level positions. Certification of OSH professionals provides employers and 
the public with the assurance that certified individuals possess the necessary skills, knowledge, 
and experience to perform competently. A pre-requisite for certified OSH professionals is also 
used as part of the procurement process for contractors and sub-contractors both in the private 
and public sector. 
 
With a robust, quality certification program there is also an opportunity for the profession to be 
able to achieve recognition within legislation to perform certain OSH functions. One example of 
this is the British Columbia WorkSafeBC - OHS Regulation – Part 9 Confined Space where the 
holder of either a CRSP or CSP are recognized as having adequate training and experience in 
the recognition, evaluation and control of confined space hazards. 
 
4.0 STANDARD SETTING & EXAMINATION DEVELOPMENT 
In North America, the certification of OSH professionals through the use of a standardized 
assessment tool (multiple choice examination) has been utilized for more than 40 years.  
 
The development of a quality credentialing or licensing program must follow logically sound and 
legally defensible procedures when developing examinations.  
 
Standardized tests ensure a consistent method of scoring/assessment and ensures legal 
defensibility. To achieve this, there are a number of steps undertaken during the psychometric 
process in order to establish a measurement tool that will objectively measure the skills and 
knowledge of the individuals being assessed. 
 
The examination development process includes the following key steps. 
 
· Role delineation 
· Validation Survey 
· Item Development 
· Cut Score 
· Statistical Analysis 
· Continuous Improvement 
 
4.1 Role Delineation 
Before an examination is developed, the scope of what is to be tested must be set. This process 
known as the role delineation or practice analysis process is the initial undertaking usually by a 
group of representative (geographically, industry and demographically dispersed) subject matter 
experts (SMEs) who are able to review and/or determine the domains, tasks, knowledge and 
skills required to practice in a field. In both Canada and the USA, for the OSH profession, this 
process is undertaken every five years by the BCRSP and BCSP respectively, to ensure that 
the competencies identified as critical to practice within the certification are reflective of the 
current practice of OSH professionals. 
 
At a global level, a similar exercise has been undertaken by the International Network of Safety 
& Health Practitioner Organisations (INSHPO) in the development of the Global OSH 
Competency Framework. The Global Framework defines the tasks, roles, and functions of the 
OSH professional from a global perspective. Once the INSHPO framework is finalized, it will 
require further validation to ensure it is reflective of the global profession and free of any country 
or region specific bias.  
 
4.2 Validation Survey 
The second stage, which is critical to the examination development process, is the validation 
survey. A representative sample of professionals in the field reviews and validates the work of 
the role delineation panel. This is typically conducted by survey in which the importance, 
criticality and frequency of each task is rated. The results of the validation survey are aimed to 
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provide guidance for the development and setting of the examination structure, such as the 
percentage ranges for examination questions within various domain areas.  
 
Once the competencies to be tested have been finalized, and the structure of the examination 
has been determined, the certification examination can be developed. An examination blueprint 
typically provides information on the structural parameters of an examination as well as a listing 
of the domains and competencies that may be tested. The final blueprint is then approved by 
the board or a committee authorized to do so. 
 
4.3 Examination and Item Development 
The development of an examination relies on the structural parameters within an examination 
blueprint to direct its creation. In addition to the examination blueprint, items in the examination 
bank may have statistical information associated with them from previous use which may be 
factored into the examination development process. Certification boards may also place 
‘experimental’ items on an exam that will not be scored but are statistically evaluated to 
determine future usability.  
 
Another ongoing part of the examination development process is the item development process. 
This process ensures that new items undergo initial review to ensure they are representative of 
current industry practice, and are fair and relevant to the profession. Items are written by SMEs 
utilizing applicable globally recognized resources and references, and these references are 
documented for each item. Items undergo multiple levels of review to confirm that the item is 
relevant, grammatically correct, and linked to the examination blueprint. During item review, it is 
also confirmed that the item is applicable to a global audience. 
 
In instances where a certification examination is being administered in more than one language, 
the item translation process may involve multiple steps to ensure there is no impact related to 
translation on examination candidates. In Canada, the CRSP certification examination is 
delivered in both English and French. The BCRSP is utilizing multiple stages within the 
translation process to minimize any impact of the translation. These steps include: initial 
translation completed by a professional translator; a review process by multiple bilingual SMEs 
in consultation with another professional translator; and finalization of the translation. Items are 
also reviewed during the initial item development stage to ensure that there are no perceived 
issues with translation related to the initial question content. Translation of questions can be 
challenging due to variations in technical terminology and grammatical structure as well as the 
non-existence of some technical terms in some languages.  
 
 
Figure 2 Item Development Process 
 
 
Item Creation 
Review Process 
for New Items 
(experimental 
items on exam 
and/or 
committee 
review 
process) 
Approval and 
Selection for 
Use  
Translation (if 
exam delivered 
in more than 
one language) 
Ongoing 
Statistical 
Analysis of 
Item 
Item Review, 
Revision, 
Elimination, 
and/or Re-use 
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4.4 Cut Score 
Every examination form goes through a cut-score setting process. The standard or pass mark is 
set in reference to the content and the difficulty of the examination questions. A generally 
accepted best practice for certification or licensure examinations for setting the cut score is the 
Angoff Method or Modified Angoff Method. A major advantage of using a (Modified) Angoff 
approach is that the determined pass mark is based on the content of the examination and not 
on group performance. 
 
Using these methods, a panel of representative content experts from various areas of practice 
reviews each examination question and produces ratings based on a common understanding of 
a competent professional who has met the minimum eligibility requirements of the certification 
board. The ratings are averaged for each item and then summed to obtain a panel-
recommended raw cut score. A variable on this is to instruct the SMEs to take the test and rate 
each item with the performance levels of the test candidates in mind. SMEs are then asked to 
provide estimates for each question of the proportion of borderline or “minimally acceptable” 
participants that they would expect to get the question correct. There are typically procedures in 
place in order to reach consensus on the rating of a question should the independent judging of 
an item range significantly.  
 
In addition to these ratings, a variety of relevant data (for example, information on the 
preparation of candidates, data on results from previously administered examinations) are 
carefully considered to ensure the standard that candidates must achieve on the examination is 
valid and fair. Based on this information, an appropriate standard or pass mark is set. This 
procedure is repeated for every newly-created examination form. The final cut score for the 
examination is then approved by the board or a committee authorized to do so.  
 
A number of factors contribute to the successful implementation of these standard-setting 
methods. An effective training session is essential in orienting the SME to the concept of the 
minimally competent candidate. As well, discussion and modification of extreme ratings help 
ensure that a defensible and valid cut score is established. 
 
4.5 Statistical Analysis 
One of the cornerstones of competency assessment examinations is the reliance on the 
statistical analysis not only of the exam forms but each individual item. A key determinant in the 
overall performance of a certification examination is the annual statistical report which is 
produced by a psychometrician and includes information on the reliability and validity of the 
examination forms, as well as other information regarding the overall health of the certification 
examination process (e.g. item bank statistics, program activities/initiatives undertaken towards 
process improvement, recommendations based on industry best practices, etc.). The 
importance of reliability and validity of assessment methodology is also a key component within 
the ISO/IEC 17024 Standard. Clause 9.3.5 of the standard requires that “appropriate 
methodology and procedures shall be documented and implemented in order to reaffirm, at 
justified defined intervals, the fairness, validity, reliability and general performance of each 
examination, and that all identified deficiencies are corrected.” (ISO/IEC 17024, (2012) 
 
Reliability is defined as an indicator of the extent to which examination scores are consistent 
across different examination times and locations, (ISO/IEC 17024 (2012), Clause 3.18) and 
validity is defined as evidence that the assessment measures what it is intended to measure, as 
defined by the certification scheme. ISO/IEC 17024 (2012), Clause 3.17) 
 
Put into context, both the BCRSP and BCSP produce annual reports that measure the validity 
and reliability of their respective certification examinations. Validity is whether the inferences 
being made about a candidate’s knowledge and skills in OSH are accurate. For reliability, while 
there are several ways to quantify reliability, the most commonly used method for certification 
examinations, and the method used by both the BCRSP and BCSP is internal consistency. 
Internal consistency is a measure based on the correlations among different items on the same 
test. It measures whether several items that purport to measure the same general construct 
produce similar scores. 
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4.6 Continuous Improvement 
The examination development process is an ongoing process in which the certifying body is 
constantly monitoring, measuring, and analysing key processes. Standardized review periods 
for the examination blueprint, ongoing item bank development and maintenance, and policy 
review cycles help ensure that the certification remains reflective of current professional 
practices. Certification bodies may also benchmark their policies and procedures to like 
organizations and certification industry best practices as published by organizations such as 
ICE or the Association of Test Publishers (ATP). 
 
5.0 ISO/IEC 17024 – INTERNATIONAL ACCREDITATION STANDARD 
Both the BCRSP and BCSP are accredited to the ISO/IEC 17024 standard through ANSI and 
SCC respectively.  Released in 2003, ISO/IEC 17024 is designed to harmonize the personnel 
certification process worldwide,  In the European Union ISO/IEC 17024 replaced EN 45013 
(1989), which was published in the UK as BS 7513:1989.  
 
The BCSP obtained accreditation in 2003 and the BCRSP obtained accreditation in 2005. 
ISO/IEC 17024 is generally recognized as the highest standard in personnel certification 
accreditation. The standard used by ANSI and SCC to accredit certification bodies is an 
international standard. Accreditation to an international standard is extremely important for 
certification bodies that have global operations or aspirations. Both ANSI and SCC follow an 
internationally recognized process for accrediting organizations. 
 
The accreditation process requires that the certifying body be able to prove compliance to the 
standard through an initial accreditation assessment including both material/documentation and 
on-site assessment as well as annual surveillance audits and a full reaccreditation audit every 
four (Canada) or five (USA) years.  
 
The key issues that ISO 17024 tackles can be summarized as: 
 
· Defining what it is you examine (the competencies - knowledge, skills, abilities) and 
standardized eligibility requirements  
· Examination must be independent from training/training providers 
· Examination must be a valid and reliable assessment tool 
· Certification scheme must safeguard impartiality 
· Effective Management System must be in place 
 
Accreditation to an international standard helps drive continuous improvement of the 
certification schemes both through the internal and external audit process as well as through 
changes instituted to the ISO/IEC 17024 standard itself. In 2012 a new version of the ISO/IEC 
17024 standard was released. The changes to the standard required both the BCRSP and 
BCSP to review their existing certification schemes to ensure compliance with the new version 
of the standard. As a result of the changes, the BCRSP and BCSP conducted a complete 
review of the standard against their systems and identified any process gaps that required 
addressing. The challenge of continually ‘raising the bar’ requires organizations to respond 
accordingly within their own programs.  
 
The internal audit requirement also creates an opportunity to generate continuous improvement 
initiatives and should be viewed as a tool to assist an organization in improving its processes 
and procedures.  
 
6.0 CERTIFICATION STANDARDS AND THE IMPACT ON THE PROFESSION 
Both the BCRSP and BCSP have a long history of setting the standard for the certification of 
OSH professionals in Canada and the USA respectively. There is evidence that the certification 
schemes may influence the practice of safety and health, as well as curricula of OSH 
educational programs.  
 
In the United States, the ANSI/ASSE Z590.2-2003 (R2012) Criteria for Establishing the Scope 
and Functions of the Professional Safety Position (2012) draws a correlation between the 
description of the professional safety position outlined in the standard and the BCSP’s 
comprehensive job analysis study of professional safety practice.  
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In Canada, the CRSP® Examination Blueprint has been utilized by a number of educational 
institutions as a roadmap for developing course curriculum. When an updated examination 
blueprint is released, the BCRSP has seen program modifications occur at colleges and 
universities with OSH offerings. While no OSH program level accreditation exists in Canada, 
eligibility of program graduates for certification is a market driver for programs to ensure 
graduates from the programs will meet the minimum formal education requirements as defined 
by the BCRSP. The BCRSP hosts a National Education Symposium that has been developed 
for OSH educators/program managers and is aimed at developing a network to foster continuing 
dialogue between the BCRSP and academic institutions through the sharing of ideas, concerns, 
and solutions to challenges facing students in OSH programs and identifying core subject 
matter essential to the development of sound OSH practices and principles. 
 
Similarly, in the USA, BCSP works with colleges and universities wishing to prepare their 
graduates to achieve certification.  Certain Qualified Academic Programs (QAPs) exist in these 
institutions that are accredited by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology 
(ABET).  Graduates of these programs earn a designation that serves as their first step toward 
certification.   
 
Each time the BCSP produces a new blueprint for a certification, the BCSP goes through a 
rigorous process of re-evaluating the curriculum of each QAP to determine whether or not it still 
substantially matches the new blueprint.  Those that do are allowed to keep their QAP status.  
However, those institutions whose academic programs do not substantially match the new 
BCSP blueprint must either modify their educational offering to come into compliance, or forfeit 
their QAP designation. 
 
In both Canada and the USA certification is often cited by employers, recruiters, and clients as a 
requirement for employment as an OSH professional. Employers view certification as a way to 
ensure that the individual they are hiring has proven their expertise in the field by demonstrating 
their competency through the certification process, is committed to continual learning, and is 
committed to compliance to a Code of Ethics. In Canada, preliminary research suggests that up 
to 70% of career advertisements for OSH professionals require or prefer a certified professional.  
 
Both the BCRSP and BCSP require their certificants to agree to and adhere to a Code of Ethics 
or Rules of Professional Conduct, and this practice of setting an ethical standard is common 
amongst certification boards. The purpose of Codes of Ethics is to provide guidance to ensure 
that each certificant adheres to high standards of integrity and professional competence. These 
Codes are fully enforceable through robust complaints and discipline processes and individuals 
who are found to have breached the Code of Ethics may have their certification revoked. 
Typically Codes of Ethics cover areas such as acting within the limits of ones’ competence, 
integrity and confidentiality, respect of others and other professionals, and compliance with the 
rules of the certification scheme. These codes contribute to the public’s view of the profession 
and the trustworthiness of the professionals involved.  
 
7.0 CERTIFICATION STANDARDS AND LIFELONG LEARNING OF THE OSH 
PROFESSIONAL 
As outlined earlier in this paper, one of the principle elements of a certification program is the 
requirement for continuing professional development to be reported on a set-cycle and to a 
defined minimum requirement. Continuing competence programs are an effective and well-
recognized method of recertification. They should provide a meaningful and relevant process 
that demonstrates certificants remain current in their field. Otherwise, the knowledge and skill 
determined at the time of initial certification would become outdated and, therefore, diminish the 
value of the certification to the public, employers, and certificants. (ICE Research & 
Development Committee , 2015, p.5)  
 
Both the BCRSP and BCSP have requirements for certified professionals to report every five 
years on their continuing professional development activities. Both programs require a similar 
minimum ‘point’ total be achieved within the five year cycle and accept professional 
development activities across a number of activity areas including completion of additional 
training, achieving additional certifications or degrees, and professional activities.  Failure to 
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comply with continuing competence program generally leads to suspension or withdrawal of 
certification of the individual. As many individuals have worked hard to achieve the initial 
certification, they will continue to work hard to maintain the certification in question. Through the 
requirements of these continuing competence programs, certification standards promote lifelong 
learning of the OSH professional. 
 
8.0 TRANSPORTABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
As industry becomes more global and as OSH professionals continue to move more widely and 
rapidly between countries, transportability and comparability of credentials becomes of 
paramount importance.  
 
International transportability of credentials takes the value of certification a step further. 
International transportability allows professionals who have earned a certification or met a 
competency standard in one country to practice in another country based on the certification or 
credential from the original country. International transportability of credentials is effective when 
a credential from one country is recognized as substantially equivalent and sufficient to qualify 
for practice in another country and to compete equally with someone holding a credential from 
the other country. (Brauer, Roger L , 2006) 
 
Organizations who certify professionals are able to analyse and equate their systems of 
certification (particularly if also accredited to the ISO/IEC 17024 standard) and develop 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to create opportunities for certified professionals to 
become certified in other jurisdictions. The BCRSP and BCSP have an MOU which provides for 
a streamlined process for individuals to become certified by the other organization.  
 
Due to the similarities between the structure of the certification schemes in both Canada and the 
USA, it is relatively easy to map processes, develop agreements, and determine the appropriate 
paths for individuals to obtain certification ‘across the border’ as well as around the world 
through MOU agreements with other OSH professional certification boards. 
 
Both the BCRSP and BCSP participate in the International Network of Safety and Health 
Practitioner Organisations (INSHPO). INSHPO is the global voice for the OSH profession. 
INSHPO provides an international forum for engagement on OSH-related matters and 
advancing the OSH profession through the exchange of evidence-based practices and the 
development of a harmonized framework for the profession. Its member organizations include 
OSH professional bodies from Canada, the USA, United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Korea and Mauritius. Through participation in 
INSHPO, and projects such as the OSH Professional Competence Framework, the BCRSP and 
BCSP are contributing internationally to the advancement of the OSH profession. 
 
9.0 CONCLUSION 
Using the BCRSP and BCSP certification schemes and the years of collective expertise in 
delivering competency assessments, this thematic paper has explored a number of concepts 
including the value of certification, the certification and standard-setting process, the impact of 
accreditation on the certification standards and how certification standards impact industry, the 
professional, transportability and international influence. Accredited certification programs not 
only add value for the professional, but also continually raise the bar for the profession.  
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Abstract 
Occupational health and safety exposures and incidents have been studied in several sectors 
and contexts in order to identify multiple types of risk and interventions that could minimize the 
impacts of work on the health of workers and on the operation of workplaces. The pork industry 
is growing globally due the high demand from customers while the production has become more 
concentrated into larger and more intensive operations. Likewise, one of the strategies used by 
companies around the world has been migrating from developed countries to developing 
countries in order to minimize general costs such as labor, logistics and installations. In fact, 
developing countries present lower operating costs, availability of feed, land, water, as well as 
less restrictive environmental policies. (KUNZ et al, 2008). Knowing that the pork industry has 
complex and dynamic operations, correlating high scale production and high potential to 
generate risks to health and safety, it was possible to evaluate that there is a lack of information 
about ways to manage the risks that influence the health of workers and the flow of the pork 
production despite the fact that increased corporate management has intensified the need to 
determine the variables that, directly or directly, may result in occupational accidents and 
trauma to workers and interfere with the performance and the quality of performed activities. 
Therefore, this paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by providing a framework that 
can be used for systematic analysis of risk in the sector in order to predict situations that can 
result in accidents, hazards and potential traumas to people in all steps of the production (from 
breeding to slaughtering). Methodologically, the research draws on insights from conceptual 
models that have been developed and applied to identifying and investigating sources of risk in 
other industrial sectors: the models created by Lipscomb et al (2006), Embrey (1992) and 
Windle et al (2008) to help identify the potential indirect and direct occupational hazards and 
risks which impact on the security of work, and the model elaborated by Attwood et al (2006) 
and applied to the oil and gas industry with a focus on how to define occupational hazards in 
specific environments or layers and how to understand the relationship between them as well. 
The model proposed by Attwood et al (2006) was adapted with input from the other models to 
create a conceptual approach that can be used to predict accident frequency through 
examination of potential factors that can generate risk in different segments of the industrial (as 
opposed to family-operated) pork industry. Knowing that the pork industry can take different 
forms in different countries and present different characteristics in the same country as well, this 
paper developed a framework through a review of the literature that incorporates elements of 
diverse characteristics of pork industries located in Brazil and Canada in order to identify the 
main and potential parameters that might affect occupational health and safety standard, the 
corporate safety culture and the management of organizations between the two countries.  
Keywords: Pork Industries; OHS procedures; Risk management; Occupational accidents 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Around the world, the pork industry has been increasing production due to expanding demand 
from new and current customers and technological and other innovations. The conscience of 
improving a safe environment through occupational health and safety parameters has been 
addressed as a crucial decision to mitigate consequences (injuries and illnesses) in all industrial 
contexts. Indeed, occupational safety guidelines can cause important changes in several 
scenarios: as Attwood (2006) mentioned, OHS outcomes are correlated to improvements 
directly connected to workers and their workplaces. Consequently, these modifications which 
are related to optimize health and safety on workplaces will also affect the quality of production 
(productivity), the performance of work and the growth of profits.    
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With the necessity of producing in large scale (in order to reach the required demand) the 
companies have been trying to minimize the costs of production and logistics migrating from 
developed to developing countries. In fact, developing countries present lower operating costs, 
availability of feed, land, water, as well as less restrictive environmental policies. (KUNZ et al, 
2008).  
In Brazil, for example, swine production is an important activity representing the fourth largest 
production sector, fourth largest export and the sixth largest consumer product inside the 
country (IBGE, 2006). In Canada, the number of hog farms is decreasing whereas the total 
number of pigs produced is increasing, indicating an overall trend of concentration of pork 
production into larger barns and fewer operations (TRASK et al, 2013). 
There are multiple and changing occupational health and safety risks associated with intensive 
pork production. Silveira et al (2008) pointed out that several risk factors are present in Brazilian 
swine houses  can affect the health of workers: heavy work operations, repetitive jobs, intensity 
of dust and gases and manipulation of toxic residuals can influence the capacity of workers and 
quality of work. Some of these can also affect the health of animals due the favorable breeding 
ground for pathogenic agents that affect them such as brucella, streptococcus, influenza virus 
and hepatitis E. With this situation the labor context is also affected by intensity of tasks in which 
workers must fulfill in order to follow the rhythm of production.  
In Canada, a research done in Saskatchewan and Quebec by Trask et al (2013), has 
demonstrated an increase of occupational diseases and accidents due to an increase in the 
amount of tasks per worker and the high rate of risk during the execution of each task.  
Respiratory diseases, high concentration of toxic substances, musculoskeletal symptoms are 
related in these studies as the most common diseases and injuries found in pork industry due 
the nature of work and lack of internal structure.  
A review of the literature on OHS in the pork industry and on the current situation with Pork 
Industry Management in key countries reveals a lack of information about the potential variables 
that can affect OHS outcomes as well as inform planning to reduce risk within organizations. 
This report seeks to address this gap in the literature. It provides a framework that can be used 
for systematic analysis of risk in the sector in order to predict situations that can result in 
accidents, hazards and potential risks to OHS in the pork industry. The frameworks draws on 
insights from several conceptual models developed in other industrial sectors and contexts 
including in poultry processing in North Carolina by Lipscomb et al (2006), by Windle et al 
(2008) for understanding risk in fisheries and by Embrey (1992) for evaluating an accident 
causation using hierarchical influence network. It seeks to visualize the direct and indirect 
factors that influence risk in the pork industry and the iterative effect (consequences) that 
sources of risks cause in this sector. The main model used was (created by Attwood et al (2006) 
and applied to an analysis of the risk of injury in oil and gas industries in Canada and the United 
States. This model presents a conceptual approach that can be used to predict accident 
frequency through examination of the potential factors that can maximize or generate risk. All 
these factors are allocated in three levels or layers: the direct layer, corporate layer and external 
layer.  Together, the three layers can be used to evaluate the real impact of all variables which 
affect OHS outcomes in different sectors and contexts such as the pork industry. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
This study is based on a literature review on the risks involved in swine production companies in 
Brazil and Canada, as well as variations existing between them and the rest of the world, as 
concern the OHS management policies. The literature studied was restricted to scientific articles 
from Brazil, Canada and United States including master's theses and doctoral dissertations 
where the use of international standards and safety standards is a basic premise for the 
assessment and / or implementation of new safety methodologies. 
All the literature that depicts the pig industry in Canada was obtained during a probationary 
period developed at the Research Centre for Occupational Safety and Health of the Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, located in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. 
The bibliographic references of Brazilian pig production industries were collected partly in Brazil 
(through sources and the library of the Federal University of Campina Grande) and elsewhere in 
Canada. 
Based on a bibliographical approach, the results of the application of the occupational safety 
system in Brazil and Canada were collected, analyzed and compared to the creation of the 
proposed model. The model present work deals with results from an adaptation of the model 
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previously designed by Attwood et al (2006) in this area of study and connected with other SST 
models created and applied in several areas of foreign companies. 
The study is also characterized as a descriptive analysis, since as Almeida (1996) states, the 
descriptive evaluation is done through observations, records and ordering of data, without the 
interference of the researcher (manipulation). In this sense, the central focus was to discover 
that a particular sequence does occur, its nature, characteristics, among others, in which case, 
the observation about the risk parameters and their behavior on swine production companies in 
Brazil and Canada. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1 Occupational Risk analysis based on Attwood’s model: External, Corporate and 
Direct layers 
Attwood et al (2006) has developed a model which presents a different concept about how to 
define occupational hazards in specific environments or layers and understanding the 
relationship between them as well. To the author, all the occupational risks can be created 
through a set of factors which allow the occurring of other occupational risks in a different 
environment (e.g. external risks might influence corporate decisions and occasioning in an 
occupational accident subsequently). Indeed, the risk can be generated externally the company 
and influence severity on its planning, which occasionally involves other problems in the 
process itself and finally affecting the worker in his workplace. 
The model explained by Attwood et al (p.210; 2006) suggests that:  
“Occupational accidents occur through a direct (unsatisfactory) interaction between worker and 
workplace, it is the basic premise of the presently proposed model that worker’s behaviors are 
influenced by corporate culture, and their workplace environment and procedures are controlled 
corporately. Furthermore, corporate decisions and actions are, in turn, influenced by external 
elements.” 
The schematic model is shown below: 
 
 
Figure 1- Basic Schematic of model. Adapted from Attwood et al (2006) 
 
The following sections will describe the details of each layer and the subsequent interaction in a 
pork industry. 
 
3.1.2 The Direct Layer 
In a pork industry, it’s common to observe the extreme interaction between the worker and the 
workplace. Several farms present a standard layout with segments which allow possible 
accidents or injuries which need to be carefully evaluated. In order to address the environment 
inside a pork industry through occupational guidelines it is necessary firstly evaluate the 
physical arrangement and the facilities behind the process. Thus, it will be possible to diagnostic 
the level of influence between the human activities (performed tasks) and the production, 
enabling a holistic view over the possible occupational risks and hazards which affect directly 
the industry. According to Attwood (2006), the direct layer considers the factors which affect 
accident likelihood. Analyzing the factors addressed over the two countries, it may be possible 
to describe the following specific elements considered in this model: 
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· Quality of personal protective equipment (PPE): all the personal equipment supplied by the 
company such as tools, boots, cloves, masks, aprons, waterproof paints, safety glasses 
and earplugs. 
· Quality of equipment and safety design – takes into account the level of safety design in all 
equipment utilized by workers during their work time. 
· Layout and Infrastructure: the correct disposition of the equipment and tools in order to 
guarantee the correct utilization of the space destined to the work (evaluation about the 
distances between workplaces, sequence of process, takt-time and lead-time).  
· Ventilation System: Current situation of ventilation inside the industry to minimize the 
concentration of gases during the breeding, farrowing and slaughtering. 
· Level of confinement: Degree of confinement and exposure to dust and gases inside the 
company. 
· Motivation at work: takes into account the safe manner of producing the product through 
the current management and supervisors (corporate level) trough means of positive 
reinforcement and penalties. 
· Attitude at Work: can be defined as the use of good safety attitudes in which can produce 
direct benefits and general improvement of overall safety culture. Evidently, attitude can be 
increased through corporate decisions and actions. 
· Weather (referring to the changing of the seasons): The condition of the weather during the 
production process may affect according to the changing of the seasons. Cold seasons 
combined with uncontrolled ventilation system may generate an increase the amount of 
gases potentially toxics. During the warm seasons, the greater risk to animals and workers 
from ventilation failure is heat stress from elevated temperature and humidity (DONHAM, 
2010)  
· Physical Capability: Physical capability integrates the level of coordination, fitness and lack 
of fatigue. All of them are correlated with the performing of the tasks. In pork industry, could 
be observed an intense necessity of coordination during the breeding and a high pick of 
fatigue from the workers in the slaughter process.   
· Mental Capability: It is related to the industrialization of animal farming systems and to the 
drastic intensification of work. It demands high level of knowledge about the tasks and 
intelligence as well. Through the literature review, it was evaluated that the major part of 
workers in Brazil and Canada are presenting symptoms of mental disorders such as: 
having strong feeling of anger, major changes in eating and sleeping habits, a growing 
inability to cope with daily problems and activities, feelings of extreme highs and lows, 
spending more time alone or avoiding others and so on. 
· Moral Capability: Moral capability refers to the situations connected to the work which affect 
morally the employees. Some of these situations such as the problem of smelling are 
examples of a profound cause of suffering that can only be partly relieved.  
· Level of occupational hygiene procedures: The intensity of occupational hygiene 
procedures is a relevant and crucial manner to minimize the impact of biological diseases 
inside the industry. The incorrect use of decontaminants and a lack of regular safety and 
hygiene maintenance in the workplace may increase the chance of contaminations in 
workers and animals.   
· Social Vulnerability: This parameter refers to the current influence of gender and age on 
the division of labor in the production. In a pork industry, some tasks need to be performed 
by specific workers (the major part of the tasks during the housing and the slaughtering are 
performed by young men) and tasks related to evaluation and quality of the product are 
executed by women. Actually, some of these characteristics have not been followed by 
several companies around Canada and Brazil which intensity the generation of risk due 
incompatibilities between the task and the capacity of the employers. 
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The specific elements mentioned above are listed in the figure 2: 
Figure 2 - Elements corresponding to the Direct Layer in Pork Industries. Adapted from Attwood (2006) 
 
3.1.3 The Corporate Layer 
Around the world, the pork production management has been evaluated by the capacity of 
producing in a large quantity, faster and with more quality. Indeed, through the review of the 
literature it was possible to note the intense preoccupation in producing as much as possible in 
order to attempt the overall consumers. As characterized as a stress type of work, Porcher 
(2010) pointed out that several diseases are presented because farmers and workers have to 
manage lean production.  
For example, in order to maximize equipment utilization, workers inseminate more sows than 
there are places available in the “maternity ward” in anticipation of insemination failures. By the 
corporate level, the workers has received the orientation to produce as much tonnage as they 
can – it’s important to observe the major part of employers ask their employees to think in terms 
of kilograms of meat produced by sows, not in terms of animals (PORCHER, 2010). At the 
same time, influenced by other external elements such as governmental guidelines and 
regulatory regimes, farmers are also asked to care for the animals “well-being” and to consider 
them as “sensitive” beings.  
These contradictory demands cannot be reconciled, which gives workers the painful feeling of 
never doing enough for the animals. Thus, based on the review of the literature, it was possible 
to analyze that most part of the countries in North and South America present methods to 
prevent the amount of occupational diseases and risks. Sequentially, other injuries are more 
equally distributed between short-term and long-term employees, suggesting these injuries may 
be prevented through instruction and training in animal handling and injection technique. (COLE 
et al, 2008).As the main problems detected into the four steps in the production process are the 
respiratory diseases, it is up to the employer try to implement a sequential prevention program 
in order to maintain the employees away from the risk. According to Ruth et al (2010), 
engineering and management practices may decrease the levels of gases, dust and 
contaminants. Some of the procedures related by the author are presented below:  
· Lower animal stocking densities to reduce airborne dust and bioaerosols; 
· Feeding systems enclosed as much as possible to decrease the amount of dust 
discharged into the building; 
· Delivery of feed into covered feeders rather than dropping it to the floor; 
· Feeders designed to allow animals easy access to the feed; 
· Oil sprinkled in barn to reduce dust, endotoxin, ammonia, and hydrogen sulfide levels; 
· Provide approved dust masks, or other respiratory protective equipment for employees 
to be used during tasks where elevated exposures may occur, such as feeding and 
animal handling. 
· Therefore, combining the model proposed by Attwood (2006), the guidelines which can 
be placed in a corporate layer are: 
· Corporate Safety Culture – The safety culture is created by the organization and 
managed by the employers. The company has to optimize its environment in order to 
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minimize the impacts of occupational diseases. The application of safety programs to 
eradicate the hazards as well as the consolidation of operational parameters (as 
described above) and evaluations inside the workplace may be crucial to workers’ 
health. Application of occupational health and safety committee has been crucial in 
order to manage OHS regulations, policies and legislations as well as recognize 
effectively hazards, possible accidents, injuries and illnesses before they occur. 
· Safety Training – As reported by Attwood (2006), the safety training must be oriented 
during the first days of the workers at work. It’s necessary to maintain regular training 
sessions in order to professionalize all the workers and, consecutively, diminish the 
generation of risks. 
· Procedures to minimize the risk – The total amount of procedures created by the 
company to minimize any types of risks. As mentioned by Ruth et al (2008) a prevention 
program based on education and industrial hygiene consultation has shown to be 
effective in improving producer knowledge of health and safety risks, and shifting 
attitudes towards protecting themselves and their employees. 
· Investors: The influence of investors and shareholders in pork industries has been 
increasing due the transition of the production from family farmers to big corporations. 
All the corporate decisions are being evaluated and controlled by a team and not by 
individual manager. Attwood et al (2006) pointed out that the pressure which comes 
from the shareholders is related to the degree to which the organization feels pressure 
from its owners to improve bottom line performance. 
· Shift Rotation: It is related to the way in which the corporation manages the execution of 
the tasks proportionally between the number of employees and the workplaces in order 
to minimize occupational hazards through rotation of the jobs and the work time 
available. On shift rotation other variables such as payment system, employment 
system, and seniority system and labor wage rates also affect OHS outcomes and need 
to be evaluated. 
Therefore, the specific elements which are present in the corporate layer are presented below 
hierarchically: 
 
 
3.1.4 The External Layer 
As Attwood (2006) pointed out in his paper, there are several situations which can influence 
corporate decisions. These situations are connected by influences of external environment or 
contexts which impact all the other layers of the model. One of these influences, as surveyed by 
Steinsfeld et al (2006) is the increasing of human populations which demand for animal-source 
food products.  
The intensification of pork production has been occurred because people who live in countries 
such as Brazil, Canada, United States and China have derived their dietary protein intake from 
food of livestock origin. The FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations) presented an overview which shows the intense raising of pork production from 2007 
to 2011 in tonnes: 
 
 
Figure 3 - Elements corresponding to the Corporate Layer in Pork Industries. Adapted from Attwood (2006) 
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Table 1 - Production of pork (pig meat) from 2007 to 2012 in tonnes. Source: FAOSTAT (accessed July 2015) 
Production/ 
year (in 
tonnes) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brazil 2,990,000.00 3,015,000.00 3,130,000.00 3,195,000.00 3,369,616.00 3,464,520.00 
Canada 1,898,000.00 1,947,830.00 1,943,420.00 1,925,930.00 1,968,880.00 1,998,430.00 
China 43,933,037.00 45,804,252.00 47,924,755.00 49,581,462.00 49,396,351.00 50,003,628.00 
USA 9,951,360.00 10,598,959.00 10,441,699.00 10,185,748.00 10,330,808.00 10,555,203.00 
 
Along the years, the ample growth for demanding pork products exerts pressures on the 
industry sector, mainly because the necessity of sub products to maintain the large-scale 
production. Another influence has been detected by the increase of grain prices (due the low 
level of crop production and international economic variances such as the inflation) which 
impacts directly the livestock production in overall sectors. The table 2 shows the increasing of 
pork producer prices (in USD/ton) between 2007 and 2011 in Canada, United States and China 
(FAO has not enabled the current situation in Brazil): 
 
Table 2 - Producer price (in USD/ton) to meat live weight from 2007 to 2011. Source: FAOSTAT (accessed July 2015) 
Producer Price (USD/ton) – meat live weight 
Canada 1,040.10 1,016.90 913.9 1,205.50 1,439.40 
China 1,814.50 1,761.50 1,765.70 1,561.30 1,733.70 
United 
States of 
America 1,027.00 1,036.00 917 1,193.00 1,440.00 
 
The strength of the inflation has also been affecting developing countries. Due the growth of 
inflation, livestock productions in Brazil, Argentina and Colombia are constantly presenting 
higher Producer Price Index (PPI) compared with other developed countries such as United 
States, United Kingdom, Spain and Canada. Based on the United States Department of Labor, 
the producer price index (PPI) is the first indicator of inflation annually or monthly. It is a 
measure of wholesale prices at the producer level for consumer goods and capital equipment. 
The influence of inflation occurs over the PPI when the grade reaches values beyond 100.  
 
Table 3 - Analysis of Producer Price Index (PPI) in developed and developing countries. Source: FAOSTAT (accessed 
July 2015) 
Countries 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Argentina 118.76 144.25 142.1 216.14 257.94 
Brazil 103.53 107.7 108.54 104.51 122.31 
Canada 89.41 84.36 81.22 97.03 111.4 
Colombia 108.22 130.17 129.13 129.78 129.63 
Spain 74.79 81.9 78.9 79.66 87.24 
United Kingdom 92.15 113.57 130.44 124.1 123.14 
United States of America 96.04 99.77 85.94 111.56 134.66 
 
According to Tripp et al (2008), the pork production businesses only increase in size to remain 
competitive. There are socioeconomic pressures to keep costs down and to produce a uniform 
high quality product, as well as political pressures which can add to the costs of production. 
Variables such as feed prices, energy costs, labor wage rates, workers’ compensation 
insurance, taxes and tough environmental regulations can all impact the costs of hog 
production.  
Indeed, the process of slaughtering has potentially increased along the years in the main 
countries which produce pork. In the table 4, the total amount of pork production 
(animals/slaughtered: head) is showed with 8% of growing in Brazil, 15,23% in China and 4,5% 
in United States. In Canada and Portugal the number of slaughtering along the years remained 
slightly constant. 
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Table 4 - Production of pork slaughtering in the main countries (Head (animals/slaughtered)). Source: FAOSTAT 
(accessed July 2015) 
 
Taking into account that pork production is inserted in feed quality management, the pressure 
due the food quality regulations also affect directly occupational health and safety outcomes. It’s 
important to note that these regulations are evaluated through the combination of other external 
parameters such as the customer pressure and the governmental policies. The specific 
elements considered to conclude the external layer are showed below: 
 
Figure 4- Elements corresponding to the External Layer in Pork Industries. Adapted from Attwood (2006) 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The pork industry has been getting relative importance to occupational health and safety 
society. The major part of the farms and companies need to improve their knowledge about the 
real external and internal impact of accidents and injuries on production and management of 
products due the intensification of the demand from the consumers.  
This study focused on finding all variables which can affect OHS outcomes as well as the 
results planned by the managers in order to predict, through safety management, sources of 
risks. However, it is truly necessary to measure the influence of each parameter in terms of 
financial, social and environmental damages. Future researches can apply this model in 
different regions or countries in order to determine ways to improve the implementation of safety 
and health outcomes through similarities and correlations (strengths and weaknesses on 
applying OHS guidelines) between them. 
Moreover, this report shows the consequences from the external to direct layer by linear model 
where the intensification of damages from the top (external environment) can affect 
characteristics present on the bottom of the structure (direct influences on the workplace). It is 
also necessary to evaluate if some of these variables can influence OHS outcomes and regimes 
through different directions, creating feedbacks and correlating causes and consequences as 
Windle et al (2008) pointed out in his paper (a model which describes a dynamic effect between 
indirect and direct consequences over occupational health and safety in several contexts). 
The pork industry has been getting relative importance to occupational health and safety 
society. The major part of the farms and companies need to improve their knowledge about the 
real external and internal impact of accidents and injuries on production and management of 
products due the intensification of the demand from the consumers.  
Countries 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Brazil 33.110.000,00 32.700.000,00 33.510.000,00 34.290.000,00 34.873.154,00 35.979.434,00 
Canada 21.269.100,00 21.706.300,00 21.806.500,00 21.296.500,00 21.262.200,00 21.282.600,00 
China 576.375.226,00 602.225.970,00 624.914.822,00 677.242.926,00 672.141.183,00 679.960.975,00 
Portugal 5.777.716,00 5.977.054,00 5.920.892,00 5.965.601,00 5.887.915,00 5.541.933,00 
USA 108.138.000,00 116.558.400,00 113.733.800,00 110.367.000,00 110.956.300,00 113.257.600,00 
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This study focused on finding all variables which can affect OHS outcomes as well as the 
results planned by the managers in order to predict, through safety management, sources of 
risks. However, it is truly necessary to measure the influence of each parameter in terms of 
financial, social and environmental damages. Future researches can apply this model in 
different regions or countries in order to determine ways to improve the implementation of safety 
and health outcomes through similarities and correlations (strengths and weaknesses on 
applying OHS guidelines) between them. 
Moreover, this report shows the consequences from the external to direct layer by linear model 
where the intensification of damages from the top (external environment) can affect 
characteristics present on the bottom of the structure (direct influences on the workplace). It is 
also necessary to evaluate if some of these variables can influence OHS outcomes and regimes 
through different directions, creating feedbacks and correlating causes and consequences as 
Windle et al (2008) pointed out in his paper (a model which describes a dynamic effect between 
indirect and direct consequences over occupational health and safety in several contexts). 
The three layers integrated can evaluate and address the potential about how occupational 
health and safety guidelines can mitigate illness and injury throughout the pork industries 
system management. Orienting the OHS conceptions over the external, corporate and direct 
levels (focused on minimizing the consequences due the nature of work), it might be possible to 
describe how social, environmental and financial drivers behave inside this sector and others as 
well. 
Therefore, the complete structure of the model (presenting all layers and the connections 
between them) is showed below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Model structure. Adapted from Attwood et al (2006) 
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Abstract   
This paper intends to promote discussion on the way the term “semi-quantitative” is currently 
being applied to risk assessment (RA) methods. For decades, RA approaches had been 
classified within two major categories: quantitative and qualitative. The paper starts with a brief 
historical review on both categories, explaining the evolution of techniques and associated 
concepts. After such introductory review, the author focuses on certain scored techniques and 
the ever more frequent term “semi-quantitative”. The use of such classification, however, is not 
consistent in terms of meaning and definitions. Just as it happened with other safety concepts in 
the past, this calls for common understanding and clarification. This paper encourages the 
debate among safety professionals and researchers, by setting out the question “how 
quantitative are “semi-quantitative” risk assessment tools?”. It also offers a possible answer to 
the question, by proposing that a fundamental notion behind the concept “quantitative” is that 
numbers, whenever used, need to have a mathematical or statistical real meaning associated 
with them. Otherwise, when numbers are assigned only to establish a scale or order (scores), 
the assessment would better be considered as a qualitative one, in which subjectiveness is still 
a relevant part of the scale. 
 
Keywords: risk assessment tools, risk matrix, scored methods, risk terminology 
 
1. INTRODUCTION    
The general term “risk assessment” (RA) has a wide scope and it embraces an endless field of 
application, ranging from complex, highly technological systems to the simpler day-to-day risks 
of working places. In both cases, however, national and international legal systems require that 
all kinds of risks be assessed and controlled, i.e., be kept at an acceptable level. Over time, this 
legal pressure has helped to promote change and to improve safety practices in all 
organisations. It also meant that assessing and “measuring” risk level became widespread and 
a routine activity in most organisations. Simultaneously, there has been a fast popping out of 
many proposals for new methods on how to perform risk assessments. As a result, the 
traditional categorisation into qualitative or quantitative methods is not enough to embrace all 
the new proposals. New concepts and new terminology appeared in the literature classifying 
certain methods as “hybrid”, “semi-quantitative”, etc. Such progression in the RA lexicon, 
however, is not consistent in terms of meaning and definitions, as they often depend on the 
(individual) interpretation and experience of their author(s). Just as it happened with other safety 
concepts in the past, this calls for common understanding and clarification.  
Discussing unclear concepts, encouraging debate and reducing potential confusion among the 
interested parties (e.g.: safety professionals, researchers, legislators, law enforcement agents, 
etc.) became the chief motivation for this paper, which frames de question: How quantitative are 
“semi-quantitative” risk assessment tools? 
 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION  
Countless risk analysis and assessment techniques can easily be found in the literature. For 
such reason, sections 2 and 3 are not intended to give a comprehensive review on such 
techniques, but rather be a short summary of the most relevant and best known, especially 
those that have survived the test of time. This brief historical background is intended to facilitate 
the distinction between strictly “quantitative” and “qualitative” approaches and give support to 
the discussion held here. The case with the “semi-quantitative” will be discussed later, towards 
the end of the paper.   
  
2.1 Risk assessment within industrial settings 
There is abundant evidence in the literature showing that assessment of industrial risk has been 
closely associated with reliability and that this relationship was intensified during World War II 
(e.g.: Hammer, 1989; Cox & Tait, 1991; Villemeur, 1992). Towards the end of the 19th Century, 
science had begun to make use of statistical and probabilistic techniques. These probabilistic 
approaches entered the safety and reliability fields during the war on a large-scale basis, as 
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attempts were made to operate electronic armament (Cox & Tait, 1991). During the following 
decades such techniques have multiplied and have been applied to other fields, such as civil 
aviation and the process industry, where larger and more hazardous chemical reactors became 
the first centre of attention; spatial, nuclear and the offshore oil industry followed immediately.  
In the 1950s reliability became a discipline in its own right, as a branch of engineering, and 
underwent rapid development particularly in the electronics field. The next decade witnessed 
the rise of new reliability and safety techniques as well as a wider variety of their applications; 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are examples of 
these new developments, which have been extensively used ever since (Villemeur, 1992). 
According to Villemeur, up to the end of the 1960s, these methods were intensively used, but 
only in a few “high-tech” industries. However, during the same decade, the Japanese industry 
made a significant effort to integrate quality and reliability concepts and methods, which led to 
Japan’s economic success in the 1970s. 
In contrast with the probabilistic tree-diagram techniques of the 1960s - 1970s, such as Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA), a couple of qualitative techniques (usually 
using tables to display results) were also developed for the analysis of industrial / technical 
systems, focusing on systems’ reliability or on their safety and operability condition. In the case 
of reliability, a well-known and surviving technique is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), which was further developed to FMECA (Jonhson, 1973, p.251; Villemeur, 1992; 
ISO/IEC/FDIS 31010, 2009); in the extended version FMECA, the “C” letter stands for 
“Criticality” [of the effects] and it adds the ability of ranking risk through a scoring system 
incorporated in the analysis; although also qualitative, FMECA allows ranking / categorisation 
into “severity classes” for prioritising intervention. The latter concerns the HAZOP technique 
(Hazard and Operability Studies), which it was developed in ICI Petrochemicals Division in 
1963, UK. The first published paper on HAZOP was from Herbert G. Lawley, in 1974 (IChemE, 
2002; p.24). HAZOP was developed for application in the process industry and is well 
documented by Kletz (1983 and after); this technique has survived the test of time and is still 
widely used as a qualitative approach in a variety of chemical and petrochemical plants.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the nuclear industry became an important contributor to the 
innovations introduced into industrial risk assessments. The first extensive risk assessment of 
an industrial site (two nuclear power plants in the USA) was published in 1975 and Professor 
Rasmunssen directed the study (Villemeur, 1992; Reason, 1990). This risk assessment 
included the human element for the first time. From this milestone onwards, the number of 
comprehensive (and costly) probabilistic risk assessments increased dramatically in high-tech 
industries, especially in nuclear power plants. During this period, the qualitative assessments of 
the past quickly shifted to the powerful quantitative (probabilistic) techniques of Quantified Risk 
Assessment (QRA), also called Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).   
Up to the late 1970s it was the era of the so-called “safety systems engineering”. In this epoch, 
reliability and safety science would typically be focused on hardware failure and, at most, on 
man-machine direct interface. The occurrence of several major industrial accidents during the 
late 1970s and 1980s, called for the need to improve safety and reliability, particularly in 
complex technical systems, through consideration and inclusion of all aspects of socio-technical 
systems. The 1980s marked this gradual transition from the technical/engineering to the socio-
technical approaches. The study of human aspects in systems’ reliability, through the 
psychological sciences, ergonomics and human factors engineering, has grown considerably 
since the 1980s (Rasmussen et al, 1987; Cox & Tait, 1991). Reason (1990) maps the 
development of cognitive science in this area and the probabilistic risk assessments of the 80s 
started to include the human element, i.e., the modelling of (probabilistic) Human Reliability 
Assessment (HRA) (Kirwan, 1996). 
After the “official” arrival of the safety culture concept in 1986, there have been calls for new 
assessment methodologies, which should include failures related to organisational factors, 
safety management and safety culture.  Advances in the 1990s, accounted not only for the 
inclusion of more factors into the analysis i.e., the socio-technical factors, but also for new 
developments at the level of mathematical modelling. By definition, risks are associated, to a 
greater or lesser extent, with uncertainty. Mathematical modelling deals with this uncertainty in 
an attempt to improve the confidence of prediction techniques. The advances in this field 
comprise further developments on both non-probabilistic (i.e. “possibility”) and probabilistic 
methods. Regarding the first category, Wang et al (1995; p.104) stated «the last decades have 
seen an explosion in research in the areas of non-probabilistic theories and their applications». 
These included Bayesian modelling with imprecise prior probabilities and the use of Fuzzy Sets 
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theory for the identification of hazards and modelling of risk, especially in complex technological 
systems.  
Both Bayesian and Fuzzy Sets methodologies use expert (subjective) opinions and provide a 
useful alternative in those situations where the distribution of variables, for use in probabilistic 
risk studies, is difficult or impossible to obtain (Wang et al, 1995; Coolen, 1996). Since the 
1980s, Bayesian models have been widely used in safety analysis for the assessment of rare 
events, such as catastrophic occurrences in complex technical systems (Coolen, 1996; Aven 
and Pörn, 1998). Quantified risk analysis of rare events is very difficult because there is not 
enough data on failures to calculate relative frequencies; hence the use of experts. More 
recently, another way of getting in-depth information is through the use of Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBN). This is a useful tool for the analysis of complex systems with many interactions 
between their components or functions (Jensen, 2001). The graphical network representation 
shows explicitly the dependence structure between the random variables considered in the 
system, which this brings a better understanding of the phenomena under analysis. Such 
characteristics led to a rapid expansion of this technique for the assessment and quantification 
of risks in various industrial contexts. A key advantage of BBN approaches is to allow the 
assessment based on historical data, expert opinion or a combination of both. The use of this 
technique has seen substantial increase (Trucco et al, 2008; Rizzuto et al, 2010). 
On the other hand, the use of fuzzy logic seems promising, as this approach does not require 
probabilistic data. Fuzzy Sets theory originated in 1965 as a result of the work of Zadeh (1965; 
1973), who also conceived many of its applications, the first of which was in the area of 
industrial controllers. Since then, fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic underwent a steady growth in other 
fields of application such as engineering, operational research, mathematics, and especially in 
computer science, for the development of “expert systems” (Sinha & Gupta (eds), 2000).  
Around 2000, fuzzy theory entered the field of risk and safety assessment (Wang, 2000; Sii et 
al, 2001). Subsequently, it has been recognised that application of fuzzy reasoning provides a 
systematic tool to deal with risk uncertainty, a reason why fuzzy theory has been increasingly 
used for risk quantification (e.g.: Zimmermann, 2004; Markowski et al, 2009). An updated 
guidance on quantitative risk assessment and methods to deal with uncertainty is given by 
NASA (2011).  
The turn of the millennium marks a new milestone for probabilistic techniques, when the Shell 
Group developed a new approach under the name of Hazard, Effect and Management Process 
(HEMP), which became known internally, and internationally, as the “bow-tie diagram” 
(Zuijderduijn, 1999). This concept gained popularity, as it offers a good overview of the different 
accident scenarios under analysis. The bow-tie technique combines FTA with ETA and it gives 
a graphical representation of the critical event (central nod), its causes (the fault tree on the left) 
and its possible consequences (the event tree on the right).  
In fact, the fundamental idea behind today’s bow-tie, i.e., the combination of tools in such a logical 
sequence (FTA – Critical Event – ETA), was proposed several decades earlier, as shown in the 
original MORT Manual (Johnson, 1973), of which an extract is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- The embryo of the bow-tie diagram in 1971 explained in MORT (reprint, Jonhson, 1973, p.252) 
 
With regard to the modern bow-tie approach of the 2000s, an important feature is that its 
diagram depicts safety barriers as well; thus it allows performing a barrier analysis, helping to 
identify missing or ill-designed barriers, which is a key-issue in today’s risk management. The 
bow-tie visibility has increased with the ARAMIS Project (Accidental Risk Assessment 
Methodology for Industries), in the framework of Seveso-II Directive (Delvosalle et al, 2003); a 
new integrated risk assessment methodology was created (Delvosalle et al, 2006), by 
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combining the strengths of different methods currently used in the European Countries. Such 
methodology, under the acronym of MIMAH (Methodology for the Identification of Major 
Accident Hazards), is supported by the bow-tie approach and the assessment of safety barriers 
and it focuses on industries within the framework of Seveso directives, i.e., on major industrial 
accidents. The bow-tie model is essentially a probabilistic technique, but in time it has 
developed in different versions, depending on the system under analysis. There have been 
attempts to combine the bow-tie diagram with fuzzy logics for the quantification of risk (e.g.: 
Markowski et al, 2009).  
Overall, it is apparent that modern systems’ approaches to industrial risk and global safety 
assessments require full integration of reliability concepts and its mathematical modelling, with 
human and organisational factors, management procedures and social/cultural values. 
Moreover, within complex industrial settings, the prevalent methods used are quantitative 
techniques, based on mathematical modelling of risk. A variety of such quantitative techniques 
often incorporate distinctive logic diagrams, e.g.: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), Bow-Tie, or Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN), to name a few (Fig. 2). 
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(Lu et al, 2015, p.126) 
 
 
 
Figure 2- The graphical elements of several quantitative techniques for risk assessment (generic examples) 
 
Despite the techniques illustrated above had been developed either as probabilistic or 
possibility tools (hence quantitative) the diagram feature can be used “per se” to help the 
analytical step, and to depict important relationships, even if the quantification step is not 
performed. Within the context of the current discussion, however, it is worth mentioning that 
such “partial application” of the techniques does not change the tools, i.e., it does not turn them 
into something else, neither “qualitative” nor “hybrid” tools. The technique is the same and its 
origin and nature remains the same, even though some analysts decide to use only part on the 
original technique.   
 
2.2. Assessment of occupational risk 
The debate on work conditions is perhaps the oldest one in safety science and yet it still is a 
central point of today’s agenda, under an ever-increasing social pressure towards prevention of 
accidents and ill-health. Although many risk assessment techniques have been originally 
designed for risks arising from high-tech systems, some of these methods (mentioned 
previously) are considered adequate to assess all kinds of risk, even those associated with 
“minor hazards”, which are common in any type of workplace or activity. This new section 
focuses the attention on methods that are commonly used for the assessment of occupational 
risk.  
Work environment have been a long-standing preoccupation. In and around 1920, for instance, 
at the time of Taylor’s “scientific management approach”, the precursor of JSA (Job Safety 
Analysis) was simply called Job Analysis (JA) or Task Analysis. Glenn (2011) made a historical 
review of JSA and explains how Heinrich, in his well known book of 1931, used the term JSA as 
a way of emphasizing the safety benefits of JA to support employee selection (Glenn, 2011, 
p.49), i.e., to select the «men best fitted to the peculiarities of the work» as a means to reduce 
unsafe acts and enhance performance. JSA is a qualitative approach using a table to display 
results; the method is still in use by today’s community of safety professionals, and its 
procedure is well covered in the several editions of “Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial 
Operations”,  printed by the US National Safety Council (e.g.: NSC, 1955 and newer editions).  
Since these early attempts, many approaches have emerged to assess workplace safety. 
Harms-Ringdahl (1993; 2013) described many methods, specifically to show how safety 
Top event 
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analysis can be applied in the field of occupational safety. It is argued that certain methods, 
such as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) and HAZOP (Hazard Operability Studies), 
in their original state, are not well suited to assess workplace hazards. FMEA, for instance, is 
much focused on hardware component failure, although it can be of use when assessing risks 
arising from machine operation (Harms-Ringdahl, 1993). With regard to the HAZOP technique, 
just as FMEA, it has limited usefulness in many working activities, since it is very much process-
oriented for the chemical industry. However, Harms-Ringdahl (1993; p.108) defends that 
HAZOP can be applied to batch production, in which case the analysis “can be structured so as 
to follow job procedures rather than different parts of an installation”; some of the guide-words, 
however, may need to be re-formulated as appropriate. In both cases, as already mentioned, 
these techniques use text descriptors, their results are displayed in a text table and they are 
qualitative by nature. 
In contrast with the above specifically-oriented techniques, other strictly qualitative but broader 
approaches were developed for use in occupational safety. The most popular are perhaps 
Energy Analysis and Deviation Analysis. The first appeared in the early 1960s and its origin and 
philosophy are well documented in relevant safety text books (e.g.: Hammer, 1989; Harms-
Ringdahl, 1993, 2013). The Energy Analysis approach is used essentially to identify hazards 
(hazardous energies) that may cause harm by “transference of energy” to the system or worker. 
This technique provides a structured check-list to assist the analyst; the final results are 
presented in an organised table, which relates the hazard (type of energy), its potential 
consequence (injury or loss) and the recommended barriers for controlling risk: either by 
avoiding the energy release, and/or by reducing the magnitude of the consequence.   
The Deviation concept, on the other hand, originated in Sweden for application to accident 
investigation and analysis (Kjellén, 1984), but it was later adapted by Harms-Ringdahl (1993) to 
the field of occupational risk analysis. The last version brings new details, namely the inclusion 
of “latent failures” within deviations (Harms-Ringdahl, 2013, p.117). This technique also includes 
a guidance check-list, this one organised into the THO fashion (Technical, Human and 
Organisational) risk factors. The main idea underlying the deviation analysis is that all systems 
can have deviations (from the standard procedure, or expected performance) that may, on 
certain occasions, lead to increase risk; therefore, all dangerous deviations need to be identified 
and dealt with. The basic concept of deviation is also present in FMEA or HAZOP, and 
therefore, the results are presented in relatively similar tables with qualitative information.  
The diagram tree techniques, e.g.: FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) and Event Trees, can also be very 
useful in the assessment of occupational risks, although they are more difficult to use as their 
construction requires training and expertise skills. Because they clearly show the relationship 
between causes and consequences, these two techniques have been successfully used in the 
workplace, not only for risk analysis, but also for post-accident analysis (Hammer, 1989; Harms-
Ringdahl, 1993). However, in occupational risk, the use of the diagram(s) to support the 
analysis is much more common than its probabilistic application. 
Different types of quantitative assessments are found in occupational settings, despite being 
less frequent than the simpler qualitative analysis. It should be noted that quantifying the risk of 
occupational accidents is becoming increasingly important since the output of such 
assessments must be used to prove that risk acceptance criteria is met. A study carried out by 
Kjellén & Sklet (1995, p.225) concluded that «there are no combinations of types of acceptance 
criteria and risk analysis methods that cover the full range of occupational accidents». As a 
consequence, they argue, it will be difficult to meet the requirements of risk analysis regulations 
in the area of occupational accidents. To fill this gap, Kjellén (1995) proposed a new risk 
assessment method called “Comparison Analysis”, which allows the prediction of the quantified 
LTI-rate (Lost-Time Injury rate), although the author recognised that improvements were still 
needed. 
The use of Fuzzy theory is another alternative and its practical application has entered 
occupational risk areas after 2000, where there is not a well-marked frontier between what is 
the “safe” and “unsafe” side regarding occupational exposure to a specific hazard. Examples of 
quantified applications are the use of fuzzy sets within occupational health risks (Nunes, 2007), 
or within occupational accident risks (Dağdeviren et al, 2008; Pinto et al. 2012). 
Even more recently, the bow-tie probabilistic model has also reached the field of occupational 
safety, through the European project WORM (Workgroup for development of the Occupational 
Risk Model), intended to decrease occupational accident rates in the Netherlands (Hale et al, 
2005). This workgroup uses the bow-tie approach to quantify risks of occupational accidents 
with the purpose of introducing a risk-based thinking into occupational safety. The project has 
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Figure 3 – Alternative grouping of methods proposed by Harms-
Ringdahl (2012, p.59) 
already produced ample evidence of progress by the work of, for instance, Hale et al (2007), 
Papazoglou & Ale (2007), Aneziris et al (2008); further evidence is given by Papazoglou et at 
(2015, online).  
Overall, it can be established that both qualitative and quantitative assessments are used in the 
field of occupational safety, but application of qualitative techniques prevail, as they are easier 
to learn and to apply and do not require quantified data for the assessments. Finally it should be 
noted that, preferably, methods can be grouped and combined, profiting from their individual 
focus and strengths; the combination is likely to provide a better holistic approach to the whole 
process. A summary of methods and a grouping strategy (Fig. 3) has been proposed by Harms-
Ringdahl (2013).  
The figure maps four stages of a 
risk assessment process and 
pinpoints the method(s) best fit for 
each stage. Many were already 
mentioned in Sections 1 and 2 of 
this paper. The fourth group is 
concerned with evaluations and 
decisions, for which Risk Matrices 
are considered a good option. 
Matrices are very popular among 
safety professionals and are well 
covered in the literature. 
Sometimes are classified 
“qualitative”, other times are 
“semi-quantitative” and quite often 
both terms are used 
interchangeably, without clear 
distinction. This is the point where 
the pertinent question arises: how 
quantitative are “semi-quantitative” risk assessment tools? 
Since the question is also the focus of this paper, risk matrices will be discussed in a section of 
their own (Section 4), only after some debate on the concepts of Risk Assessment versus Risk 
Management and on how the new standard ISO 31000:2009 defines quantitative, qualitative 
and semi-quantitative risk assessment approaches. 
  
3. RISK ASSESSMENT VS RISK MANAGEMENT – THE WHOLE PROCESS  
All risk perspectives, however different, have at least one common element: the distinction 
between reality and mere possibility (future occurrence). Almost all definitions comprise three 
elements: uncertainty (probability of occurrence), outcomes that have an undesirable effect 
(consequences) and a formula, or reasoning procedure, to combine both (Renn, 1998). These 
three elements, in turn, provide the basis for the concept of risk assessment, which can be 
defined as:«the scientific process of defining the components of risk in precise, usually in 
quantitative terms (…) In technical risk assessments this means specifying what is at stake, 
calculating the probabilities for unwanted consequences, and aggregating both components» 
(Renn, 1998; p.52). This definition, then, suggests a quantified probabilistic procedure.  
A simpler qualitative definition for application within occupational risk is: «the process of 
identifying hazards and evaluating the risks to health and safety arising from these hazards 
taking account of the existing risk controls (or, in the case of a new activity, the proposed risk 
controls)» (BS 8800, 2004; p.4). Risk management, in turn, refers to the process of reducing 
risks to a level deemed tolerable by the organisation or society and to ensure its control, 
monitoring and communication (Renn, 1998). A generic framework for illustrating the whole 
process of risk management (Fig. 4) is the one provided by the International Standard IEC 
60300-3-9 (Rouhiainen and Gunnerhed, 2002).  
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Figure 4 - Relationship between Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management (IEC 60300-3-9, cited by Rouhiainen and 
Gunnerhed, 2002; p.62) 
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More recently, the ISO 31000 (2009) adopts the same terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 
Guide 73, and establishes eleven key principles (2009, pp.1-2) for risk management. This new 
standard provides general guidance and brings higher visibility to human and cultural risk 
factors, to the dynamic nature of risk management and puts great emphasis on the continuous 
improvement principle. An interesting particularity of the new standard is that it does not include 
the term hazard within its general 
procedure; instead of hazard within the 
first stage of risk identification, it uses 
the term «sources of risk» (p.11). 
When it comes to the stage of risk 
analysis, the standard states explicitly 
«Risk analysis can be undertaken with 
varying degrees of detail (…) analysis 
can be qualitative, semi-quantitative or 
quantitative, or a combination of these, 
depending on the circumstances» (p.12). 
It suggests application of qualitative 
analysis as the first step to obtain an 
overall view, but also advises «when 
possible and appropriate, one should 
undertake more specific and quantitative 
analysis of the risks as a following step» 
(p.12). Risk analysis also means that 
«consequences can be expressed in 
terms of tangible and intangible impacts. 
In some cases, more than one numerical 
value or descriptor is required to specify 
consequences for different times, places, groups or situations» (p.12).  
Of particular interest for this discussion are the formal definitions given by the associated 
standard ISO/IEC/FDIS 31010 (2009, p.13). The key definitions are replicated below. 
Qualitative assessment defines consequence, probability and level of risk by significance 
levels such as “high”, “medium” and “low”; may combine consequence and probability, and 
evaluates the resultant level of risk against qualitative criteria. 
Semi-quantitative methods use numerical rating scales for consequence and probability and 
combine them to produce a level of risk using a formula. Scales may be linear or logarithmic, or 
have some other relationship; formulae used can also vary. 
Quantitative analysis estimates practical values for consequences and their probabilities, and 
produces values of the level of risk in specific units defined when developing the context.  
In the latter case, the standard also states (p.13) that full quantitative analysis may not always 
be possible or desirable due to insufficient information, lack of data, influence of human factors, 
etc., or even because the effort of quantitative analysis is not warranted or required. In such 
circumstances, they say, a comparative semi-quantitative or qualitative ranking of risks by 
specialists, knowledgeable in their respective field, may still be effective. 
From these definitions it becomes apparent that all techniques using scores (numerical ratings) 
can be classified as being semi-quantitative. There is no apparent distinction between 
scores/rates given by (merely) subjective judgments and scores based on quantified evidence, 
or underlying numerical data expressed in a specific unit; in the latter case the scores still hold a 
quantified meaning, although they are categorised in interval scales, to accommodate 
uncertainty.  
Despite availability the formal definitions, there is still room for different interpretations of what a 
“semi-quantitative” analysis really means; the next section of this paper will discuss how some 
of these diverse interpretations are quite old, whereas others arise from relatively new 
developments. 
 
4. SCORED SYSTEMS AND RISK MATRICES  
Amongst the oldest techniques using scored systems are FMECA, and “Mathematical 
Evaluations for Controlling Hazards”, also known as the Fine method (Fine, 1971; Fine and 
Kinney, 1971). The first was already discussed in Section 1; it was designed for reliability 
analysis of technical systems and it uses a risk index (RPN – risk priority number) to establish 
priorities. Considering the definition given by the ISO/IEC/FDIS 31010 (2009, p.81), “risk index” 
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is «a semi-quantitative measure of risk which is an estimate derived using a scoring approach 
using ordinal scales» (p.81); the standard also states that «Risk indices are essentially a 
qualitative approach to ranking and comparing risks. While numbers are used, this is simply to 
allow for manipulation» (p.81), and the recommendation is that in certain cases, «where the 
system is not well known, or not able to be represented, it is better to use a more overtly 
qualitative approach» (p.81). Astonishingly, one reads in two consecutive paragraphs (p.81) that 
a “risk index” is a semi-quantitative measure of risk and also that risk indices are essentially 
qualitative approaches. On this basis, it is difficult to know which term is best suited for risk 
index.  
The Fine method (Fine, 1971), in contrast, was aimed specifically at analysing safety, with the 
purpose of determining priorities. The Fine technique, which is also explained in the original 
MORT manual (Johnson, 1973, p.210), has gained visibility and became popular among safety 
professionals. It survived the test of time and this approach is currently part of the Technical 
Norms for Prevention (NTP 330) issued as guidance by the Spanish National Institute for Safety 
and Health at Work (INSHT, 1993). 
The original Fine report (Fine, 1971, p.1), states that «a formula is presented to calculate the 
risk due to a hazard, or to quantitatively evaluate the potential severity of a hazardous 
situation», which means that, at the time, this was viewed as a “quantitative” method. The 
referred formula is given by (Fine, 1971, p.4):  
«Risk Score = Consequences x Exposure x Probability, or, in its abbreviated translation: R = C 
x E x P» 
In fact, at least two variables of this “formula” (or evaluation rule) have rating scales based (at 
least partially) on “quantities”, either expressed in monetary units for losses ($US, for 
Consequences), or in time units (e.g.: daily and weekly; for Exposure).  Other ratings, however, 
represent the translation of nominal values, such as «extremely serious injury (amputation, 
permanent disability)» that are worth 50 points in the consequence scale [1-100], or «disabling 
injuries», worth 5 points in the same scale. The scale Probability rated [0.1-10], also uses 
nominal values and text descriptors, such as «is the most likely and expected result = 10 
points» or «would be an unusual sequence or coincidence = 3 points » (Fine, 1971, pp.4-6). 
Based on such formula, Risk Score may vary from 0.051 to 10 000 scores and its “action sheet” 
hierarchy comprises three main levels of intervention (p.16). The 1971 Fine method also 
provides a formula to determine (economic) justification recommended for corrective action(s). 
Once again, the variables used are expressed in either monetary units (Cost), or in relatively 
subjective criteria (Degree of Correction), and then translated into ratings to estimate the final 
score for Justification.   
On the other hand, the Spanish Norm NTP 330 proposes a final score for Risk Level within a 
scale [20-4000], which is associated with four levels of intervention ranging from “no 
intervention” to “correction is urgent”. The Spanish authorities state that «this methodology 
allows quantifying the magnitude of risk and, as a consequence, to establish a rational hierarchy 
for correction» (INSHT, NTP 330, 1993, p.2). 
The point taken is that both William Fine (in 1971) and the Spanish Institute (currently) classify 
this technique as “quantitative”, even though it uses ratings within an ordinal (interval) scale for 
grading risk. In the light of the definition provided by the new ISO/IEC/FDIS 31010 (2009, p.13), 
this method would be better classified as “semi-quantitative”, given that it relies on scores. 
Moreover, it is worth highlighting that, within the Fine Technique, these ratings/scores may, or 
may not have a “quantity” underlying them, or simply be given upon text descriptors and 
subjective criteria.  
Risk Matrices, on the other hand, may be based as well on rating systems and are of 
paramount importance in this discussion. They are frequently called “qualitative”, or “semi-
quantitative”, or even “quantitative” tools for assessing risk. This is perhaps the area in which 
terms and opinions seem to be ever imprecise and call for clarification and harmonisation.   
A very ample description on the general Risk Matrix process is given in Harms-Ringdahl’s most 
recent book (2013). Apparently, for this author, the risk matrix is «a semi-quantitative method» 
but he also acknowledges that the matrix «is applied in many different areas, and consequently 
the terminology and methodology vary quite a lot» (p.76). Moreover, Harms-Ringdahl (2013, 
p.87) draws attention to several critical problems associated with the use of matrices; to cite but 
a couple, 1) most users rely on implicit assumptions, which they presume to be shared by 
                                                          
1 R = CxExP; lower limit score (0.05=1x0.5x0.1); upper limit score (10 000=100x10x10)  
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everyone (without even referring to any guidance), and 2) the lack of, or absent meaning of the 
scales for probability and consequence, and their origins.  
In fact, the design, interpretation and detail of risk matrices vary immensely, to a point that it can 
create the false illusion of “quantification”, simply because numbers are often used, even if such 
numeric values are not associated with any quantity or unit. The ISO/IEC/FDIS 31010 gives a 
detailed description of this technique in its Annex B.29, in which it explains that «the 
consequence/probability matrix is a means of combining qualitative or semi-quantitative ratings 
of consequence and probability to produce a level of risk or risk rating (…) it is commonly used 
as a screening tool» (ISO/IEC/FDIS 31010, 2009, p.82). Despite this, it is still unclear in which 
cases matrices can be adequately classified as “semi-quantitative” tools, or when they should 
remain “qualitative”, even when ratings are used. Apparently, only matrices using exclusively 
qualitative text descriptors are universally accepted as qualitative. The best known example of 
strictly qualitative is provided by the British Standard BS 8800 (BSI, 2004), illustrated in Figure 
5. This British standard provides nominal values (text descriptors) for the several levels of 
“likelihood” and “consequence”, thus allowing for five levels of risk (ordinal scale) to establish 
the hierarchy of control measures.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Matrix 4x3 applying strictly qualitative criteria for ranking risk; 5 levels of risk (BS 8800:2004, p.26) 
 
On the opposite side of strictly qualitative, it is also clear that «Rating scales and a matrix may 
be set up with quantitative scales. For example, in a reliability context the probability scale could 
represent indicative failure rates and the consequence scale the dollar cost of failure» 
ISO/IEC/FDIS 31010 (2009, p.85). In this case, it is obvious that ratings are not merely ordinal 
entities for comparative purposes; these ratings establish specific interval scales with intrinsic 
meaning, because certain “quantities” (and units) are associated with each level of the scale. 
So, is this a semi-quantitative or a strictly quantitative approach?   
The problem: What happens in-between these two extremes? i.e., when rating scales use 
numerical values merely to set up a ranking/order for risk-level? The question is: in which case 
should matrices be considered “semi-quantitative” tools? The same question applies to risk 
indices based on ratings or to any other scored approach. Apparently, the trend in the literature 
is to call “semi-quantitative” to scored matrices in general, regardless of their numeric 
scores/rating scales having, or not, an underlying mathematical meaning or an associated 
quantity.    
A recent study by Carvalho & Melo (2014; 2015 in press) also classifies ranked Risk Matrices as 
“semi-quantitative” tools, even when the rated scales are nominal. The study was designed at 
measuring the reliability of these tools when applied by different analysts.  To this purpose the 
authors asked around 40 people to use four semi-quantitative risk matrices (in two different 
moments) to estimate and assess six occupational risks identified in two tasks associated with 
the production of Airbags. The Krippendorff’s Alpha coefficient (α-K) was the agreement 
measure selected to evaluate both inter-rater and intra-rater agreement. It was found that, in 
general, there was little agreement (αK < 0.6), which means low inter-rater reliability. This study 
demonstrates that different analysts can attain varying results (risk rates) and draw 
contradictory conclusions, due to difficulties in making objective judgements, which supports the 
recommendation that estimates should be made within team work. In the past decade, the 
advice of using risk matrices “with caution” seems to be consensual amid many authors; 
perhaps the strongest signal comes from Cox (2008), who claims that under certain 
circumstances «(…) the results can sometimes be ‘worse than useless’ leading to worse-than 
random decisions» (Cox, 2008, p.497).  
In the past decade much has been said on the use and misuse of Risk Matrix approaches (e.g.: 
Woodruff, 2005; van Duijne et al, 2008; Cox, 2008; Jacinto et al, 2010; Ni et al, 2010; Al-Anbari 
et al, 2015; Duijm, 2015; Lu et al, 2015). Regardless of being “pro” or “against”, most authors 
pinpoint the same type of advantages and similar limitations as well. Among the most referred 
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advantages are the following:  a) Easy to use, b) Promote robust discussion, with the discussion 
often being more useful than the actual rating, c) Allow decision makers to focus on the highest 
priority risks. In what concerns relevant limitations, the most frequent criticisms are: a) Difficult 
to define the scales unambiguously, b) There is a risk of semantic confusion of the names that 
are used for value labels on a scale, and c) It is difficult to combine or compare the level of risk 
for different categories of consequences.  
Possible solution: The above mentioned limitations provide strong motivation towards more 
objective criteria, preferably based on some measurable quantities. In other words: numbers 
assigned to scales should have a quantifiable meaning; in turn, this calls for a better 
discrimination between qualitative and semi-quantitative assessments.  
 
5. FINAL ARGUMENTS  
This paper provided evidence that confusing terminology appears in the literature classifying 
certain risk assessment methods as “hybrid”, “semi-quantitative”, etc.  Such evolution in the 
safety lexicon, however, is not consistent in terms of meaning and definitions. Just as it 
happened with other safety concepts in the past, this calls for common understanding and 
clarification.  
This paper intends to encourage the debate among safety professionals and researchers, by 
setting out the question “how quantitative are “semi-quantitative” risk assessment tools?”  
As a basis to start discussion, the author suggests that a fundamental notion behind the 
concept “quantitative” is that numbers, whenever used, need to have a mathematical or 
statistical real meaning associated with them. Otherwise, when numbers are assigned only to 
establish an ordinal scale (ranking scores), the assessment would better be considered as a 
qualitative one, in which case subjectiveness and individual interpretation are still a relevant part 
of the scale.  
As a consequence, it is also suggested that the term “semi-quantitative” be used only in 
situations where the scores can be associated to some kind of quantity, with measurable units. 
This principle applies to risk matrices and to all other methods using scored systems. Examples 
of quantified criteria for ranking scales are suggested in Table 1, some of which have already 
been used in studies using a risk matrix, sometimes in combination with other techniques (e.g.: 
Woodruff, 2005; Jacinto and Silva, 2010; Ni et al, 2010). 
 
Table 1 – Examples of quantified criteria (intervals of values) for rating probability/consequence matrices 
Probability / Likelihood (interval scales) Consequence (interval scales) 
Failure rates of equipment 
Accident rates (for a specific activity or sector), 
e.g.:   
incidence rate per 105 workers; frequency rate per 
106 hours  
Monetary units (e.g.: cost of damage 
and losses; % impact on budget) 
Accident distribution – relative frequency  
Number of occurrences – absolute frequency 
Days lost (absence from work due to 
accidents); accident ratios to fatal 
Time intervals (e.g.: exposure frequency, mean 
time between failures) 
Time intervals, Downtime (e.g.: recovery 
time of environmental damage in years; 
business interruption (hours) 
 
The metrics suggested in Table 1 are not exempted of errors and misjudgements; ranking 
probability/consequence scales based on quantified intervals is likely to reduce subjectiveness 
of the assessment, but only if each scale takes into account the specific risk scenario under 
assessment, i.e., the criteria (and quantities, intervals) established need to be representative of 
the situation, or activity in which the specific risk is being considered. 
To support this proposal, Figures 6 and 7 illustrate a couple of examples, in which the concept 
“semi-quantitative” matrix approach is associated with scales for probability and seriousness 
based on some kind of “quantity”, i.e., based on measurable units, with a mathematical 
meaning.  
The first example (Fig.6) depicts an approach to assess occupational accident risk in the activity 
sector ”ship building and repair”. The risk level was estimated using a Risk Matrix with real 
accident data of the mentioned activity sector. The likelihood/probability scale was established 
using the relative frequency distribution of accidents (variable contact), whilst severity of harm 
(consequence scale) was based on the variable days lost. 
 
29
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Combined use of Bow-Tie with a “semi-
quantitative” matrix (Jacinto & Silva, 2010, p.975) 
  Figure 7 – A risk matrix using tolerability limits proposed by 
Woodruff (2015, p.348) 
 
In the second example (Fig.7), also within occupational accident risk, the Risk Matrix was built 
using the British HSE upper and lower tolerability limits for risk resulting in fatal injury to 
individuals, to which have been assigned values of 1 in 1000 per annum and 1 in 1,000,000 per 
annum respectively. Woodruff (2005, p.352) claims that for most organisations it is sufficient to 
estimate risks based on a simple 3 level scale of high, medium and low, and that calculation of 
the absolute value of risk is unnecessary even if it were possible. 
The application of quantified criteria for establishing scored probability / consequence scales 
(inputs) is the main reason for calling these examples “semi-quantitative” approaches, as their 
original authors did. Naturally, if used in the wrong context, or in the wrong way, the results may 
be GIGO (Garbage In, Garbage Out), but when properly used in the specific context for which 
they had been assigned, then subjectiveness is expected to decrease and inter-rater reliability 
(agreement between different analysts) is likely to increase.  
The virtues of “qualitative” matrices (scored or not) are not at stake in this discussion; they have 
recognised and important benefits when adequately applied. The case made with this 
discussion regards solely the terminology, suggesting a way to discriminate more clearly 
between qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches with regard to risk matrices and other 
scored methods as well. Matrices, in particular, are currently so popular, and so widely used, 
that one can consider they have reached a maturity stage. The next improvement may well be 
an effort to establish harmonised terminology. 
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Abstract 
Industrial production organisations have transformed from single company organisations into 
multi-organisational networked systems. Hence, it is assumed that shared multi-organisational 
workplaces aggregate a wider repertoire of personal cognitive constructions about safety and 
organisational atmosphere than single company organisations. The increased complexity of the 
modern workplace poses new challenges for safety management. For this study, the 
researchers elicited the most common personal constructs about working in a large industrial 
park and the effects of its constructions to the safety and organisational atmosphere in the 
shared workplace. The study is based on the Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and the 
Repertory Grid Technique (RGT). The personal construct theory states that all individuals view 
their world, process information and make corresponding decisions on a purely personal basis. 
People model the world with personal constructs, which consist of comparisons of real-world 
events and items. Due to the personality of constructs, all people seek their own understanding 
of the world, and these constructs can be elicited only through personal interviews. Researchers 
applied the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) to interview 73 persons in five different companies 
in an industrial park. The interviewees were asked to compare changes that had occurred in the 
park, in their organisation and in the personal level of their work. During the interviews, 
researchers gathered 689 constructs. In addition, the interviewees specified the importance of 
each personal construct by evaluating the construct’s influence on safety and atmosphere. The 
most common safety and atmosphere related constructs were: clarity of work, working methods 
and attitudes towards work, professional skills, working methods and habits, responsibilities, 
investments for safety and managers’ commitment to safety, listening to employees and 
involving them in decisions, personal development, hurry, infrastructure and working 
environment, team spirit and cooperation, working hours, off-duty hours and distribution of work, 
information flow, fairness, equality and the same rules for all, confidence, acknowledgement and 
closeness to employees. The strongest positive safety impact was related to the high levels of 
investments in safety and managers commitment on safety. The most important positive effects 
on the atmosphere were related to the good team spirit and co-operation, confidence, 
acknowledgement and closeness to employees. The results also show that the industrial park 
reached positive development in safety and atmosphere, especially in managers' commitment 
on safety and in the personal development. 
Keywords: Personal Construct Theory (PCT), Repertory Grid Technique (RGT), safety culture, 
organisational atmosphere. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial production organisations have transformed from single company organisations into 
multi-organisational networked systems. Hence, it is assumed that shared multi-organisational 
workplaces aggregate a wider repertoire of personal cognitive constructions about safety and 
organisational atmosphere than single company organisations. The increased complexity poses 
new challenges for safety management. Safety research has traditionally been based on 
assessing predefined features, and the results inevitably involved only those predefined 
features. However, psychological and cognitional research have widely accepted that 
worldviews and corresponding behaviours are highly personal. We are constantly observing the 
surrounding world and making our own personal interpretations of it. We observe the world with 
our sensory system, and all information we gain must filter through our senses. Our mind then 
interprets this sensory data. From these observation-based interpretations, we make personal 
generalisations, which we use as guidelines when operating in the world. This way of making 
“rules of thumb” from the world and conducting our behaviour accordingly is considered a 
fundamental aspect of human behaviour (Nurius & Macy, 2012, p. 130). Berger and Luckman 
called this model of behaviour “habitualization” (1966, p. 70), by which they mean that any 
action, when repeated frequently, becomes cast into a pattern. However, because our previous 
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experiences affect our interpretation, two different people draw different personal 
interpretations, even from same event (Adams-Webber, 2003, pp. 52–53). Because all human 
behaviour is personal, each person’s ideas of safety and safety behaviour are also personal. 
This research paper will concentrate on the personal side of safety and reveal peoples’ personal 
constructs about safety. 
In a previous research project, the researchers completed inquiries at ten organisations and 
interviewed personnel in five different organisations in a large-scale industrial park, which 
comprises one of the biggest chemical industry complexes in Finland. The research was 
conducted from 2008–2013 and the aim was to find ways of diminishing accident rates while 
considering the special characteristics of the industrial park, where a group of independent 
organisations work in close co-operation. Because the organisations may have had connections 
through their manufacturing processes, auxiliary systems, supplies, manufacturing areas or by 
some other activity, there was the possibility of common working areas and communal systems, 
such as sewage systems or power production. Those special characteristics require safety. Our 
research covered all the major companies within the area. A questionnaire was distributed to 
ten companies with 794 employees total as potential respondents. The researchers received 
407 answers, making the response rate 51.3%. From the respondents’ answers, researchers 
defined a collective understanding of each organisation’s safety culture and created a picture of 
the safety culture of the entire area (Porkka, Mäkinen, & Vanharanta, 2013; Porkka, Salo-
Pihlajamäki, & Vanharanta, 2010). 
Our analyses showed that, according to respondents, the companies had addressed safety 
issues quite well (Porkka et al., 2013). The safety management systems, protective equipment 
and safety instructions were in good shape. Some safety related interventions were initiated 
according to the results of the questionnaires. In this phase, the participating companies wanted 
to deepen their knowledge about the employees’ own personal view of the safety and 
atmosphere in the companies. In this study, the researchers elicited the most common personal 
constructs about working in a large industrial park and the effects of the constructions to the 
safety and organisational atmosphere in the shared workplace. 
1.1 Personal Construct Theory (PCT) 
Kelly (1955) developed the Personal Construct Theory (PCT), which revolutionised ideas about 
the nature of being human (Fransella, 2003a). At the centre of this theory, the individual is 
working as a person and an active actor who makes his own interpretation from the world in 
order to operate in it. The PCT has a fundamental postulate—“A person’s processes are 
psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, 2003, p. 7)—
and eleven corollaries to illuminate the theoretical implications. To fulfil the fundamental 
postulate, a person requires means for anticipation. The construction corollary of the theory 
states that a person anticipates events by construing their replications (Kelly, 2003, p. 9). By 
using the term anticipate, Kelly cuts PCT free of the stimulus-response determinism (Kelly, 
2003, p. 8), where all people have the same response to the same stimulus. In the PCT, the 
psychological initiative is a property of the person. Therefore, in this sense, the PCT also has 
adhesion to cognitive-behavioural theories. The construed replications of reality are called 
constructs. A construct of a real world event is not the event itself, but how the person construes 
it. A construct is the meaning we give to the real world event. The construct is also a dimension 
of time because the meaning we ascribe to it is anchored in its antecedents and consequences 
(Kelly, 2003, p. 4). In short, the PCT states that people use personal constructs to anticipate 
events and these constructs affect our future behaviour. 
The constructions are simplifications from the real world and, as such, are basic elements of the 
individually experienced world. To operate in the first place, the individual must form 
simplifications of the surrounding world. The reality of the individual is based on the 
constructions, and the individual acts according to how he/she interprets phenomena and 
events through his constructions. The constructions affect the observations and in turn the 
observations to the constructions; therefore, the construction system is in a constant state of 
change. Furthermore, the constructions can be located in both the conscious and unconscious 
mind (Bannister 1977). 
The individuality corollary states that all persons differ from each other in their constructions of 
events (Kelly, 2003). The experience corollary states that a person’s construction system varies. 
Our experiences of the world around us, including events that take place or our understanding 
of people, including ourselves, are open to an immense variety of interpretations. Kelly argued 
that no one construct is a final or definitively accurate way of grasping the world (2003). Instead, 
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we can always create alternative constructs to better explain or represent that which we 
observe. A revised construct can increase our ability to comprehend the world around us and 
help us feel that we can predict or control it. Furthermore, Kelly (1969) remarked that the same 
events can strengthen several different constructions, and even the different incompatible 
events may strengthen the same constructions. 
In the PCT, several different data collection methods, all of which are based on some kind of 
questioning and interviews, may be used for eliciting personal constructs to fit different 
purposes. Kelly was sceptical of traditional psychologic tests, most of which were either 
objective or projective. “When the subject is asked to guess what the examiner is thinking, we 
call it an objective test; when the examiner tries to guess what the subject is thinking, we call it a 
projective device.” (Kelly, 1969). He suggested that, if you want to know something about a 
person, then ask and the person may tell you. Construct eliciting methods include the repertory 
grid technique (RGT), self-characterization sketches, bow-ties, the lying game, illuminative 
incident analysis, interviews about instances, snakes and rivers, metaphors and artefacts 
(Denicolo, 2003, pp. 125–131). 
1.2 Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) 
The Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) is probably the most widely known construct elicitation 
method (Bell, 2003, p. 95). It has been described as the key instrument of personal construct 
psychology (Denicolo, 2003, p. 123). The fundamental postulate of the PCT underpins the RGT. 
In the postulate, “the ways” refer to the constructs and the “anticipated events” are elements 
(Bell, 2003). The use of the RGT involves defining a set of real world elements, which are then 
compared. After eliciting a set of constructs that distinguish among these elements, each 
construct divides the elements into two different groups. According to Kelly (2003, p. 10), a 
construct is the basic contrast between two groups. The construct refers to the nature of the 
distinction between elements, and it enables us to put elements into arrays or scales. The PCT 
assumes that the reality is based in the opposites, not from absolute matters (Jankowicz, 2004). 
Kelly (2003) emphasised that the construct differs from the concept by being bipolar, whereas 
the construct is unipolar. The concepts can be used to describe events; however, the construct 
refers to similitudes or differences between the events. Thus, a construction can be used as a 
scale or indicator, to which the individual projects the events perceived by it. To define 
significance of the construction and the element it refers to, both ends of the construction must 
be known (Duck, 1994). Two individuals assessing “customer service” with the constructs “good 
– inadequate” and “good – bad” will offer significantly different views on the topic. Eden and 
Jones (1984, p. 779) clarified the matter: “We construe situations by seeking to differentiate 
them from others see them as similar to others; it is only through such a process that we give 
meaning to events, that they have significance, and so may become psychologically defined as 
problematic.” Comparison of real world elements or events is the key to achieving personal 
constructs. 
The repertory grid technique can be characterised as a semi-structured interview, where the 
respondent is in charge of producing both constructs and their rankings, while the interviewer’s 
role is to assist. Every grid consists of four components (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 10): 1) topic 
restricts the realm of discourse, and it is the only one the interviewer is responsible for, 2) 
elements are (usually) real world items, which are to be compared, 3) constructs are the 
personal structures, with which we construe the elements and 4) ratings express how constructs 
define the elements. 
The repertory grid can have one or more stages (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Holman, 1996, p. 
5). Firstly, the interviewer must decide on the grid’s focus. The focus restricts the number of 
constructs and must be within the focus of the research. Secondly, there must be a set of 
elements. The elements can be set by the interviewer, by the interviewee or the two can select 
the elements together. According to Fransella (2003, p. 21), the interviewer usually chooses 
both the topic and the elements. According to the personal construct theory, the constructs are 
defined as construals that people use to differ and group elements. 
The third stage is to elicit constructs from the elements by comparing elements and providing 
two words or phrases that best describe the different poles of the found difference. For example, 
Ilkka and Jouni are “effective” and Pasi is “a bit lazy”. As in the example, the comparison is 
usually made with the triad of elements (Easterby-Smith et al., 1996), by finding out a property 
which two of the elements share and the remaining third does not hold. While it is also possible 
to compare two elements (dyads), some differences were found in construct organisation 
measures compared to the triad (Caputi & Reddy, 1999). There were more variations in 
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construct type using the triadic method, and constructs produced with the dyadic method were 
less complex. However, for some people, it is easier to use dyads as children (Jankowicz, 2004, 
p. 53). There is nothing sacrosanct about triads; one must use the most appropriate method 
(Fransella et al., 2003). 
The fourth step is to link constructs to the elements. This is usually done with a grid or table. 
Elements are written in the top margin over the columns. On the side margins of each row, there 
are the “positive” and “negative” poles of each found construct. All the elements are then 
evaluated against the constructs. There are three ways to complete the evaluation. Elements 
can be grouped into two groups in such a way that all elements belong to either pole of the 
construct. This is simply a 2-point rating scale (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 54). Rating with a larger 
number, such as a 5-point scale, is the most common in evaluations. Ranking is possible when 
all the elements are ranked according to the construct. However, the ranking may make the 
comparison of different grids difficult if the rankings used are not equal (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 56). 
The fifth and final step is to elicit more constructs and go back to the third step. The elicitation of 
constructs continues as long as the interviewee can produce them. 
The PCT was originally developed to study mental disorders; therefore, it focuses solely on a 
person’s internal psychological factors. The PCT and RGT have been used in clinical 
psychological research successfully for over 50 years. In the 1980s, research in cognitive 
psychology made significant progress in understanding human expertise (Simon, 1991, p. 129), 
and the focus from purely behavioural stimulus-response theories turned to cognitional-
behavioural theories. The PCT has a major dissimilarity to cognitional-behavioural theories in 
that it focuses on a person’s internal actions, while cognitional-behavioural theories focus on 
external actions, namely behaviour. However, the PCT has the role of solving internal cognitions 
(constructs) that may reside behind the behaviour. The RGT has since been used in several 
branches of science and research. The RGT has been deployed in artificial intelligence 
research, education and learning. In management science, research has been conducted in 
several disciplines including policy dynamics, strategy, personal classification (Wright, 2006), 
marketing, making tacit knowledge explicit (Björklund, 2008), user experience (Karapanos & 
Martens, 2008), employee selection (Anderson, 1990) and business in general as well as in a 
safety context in reckless driving research (McNally & Bradley, 2014).  
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This research took place in a Finnish large-scale industrial park, which is utilised by the 
metallurgical and chemical industries. The park is one of the biggest chemical industry 
complexes in Finland, with 17 different companies operating in the area, five of which 
participated in the research. Of the five participating companies, two were main producers and 
the remaining three included maintenance, service and engineering companies. Interviewees 
from all the companies consisted of both workers and managers. 
The researchers chose the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) to elicit constructs. The 
fundamental idea in the RGT is not only to find out answers to questions, but also to achieve an 
understanding of the true meanings of the words the interviewee used. This can be achieved 
only by asking. The RGT offers a powerful way of quantifying people’s attitudes, feelings and 
perceptions (Easterby-Smith et al., 1996, p. 3). 
Researchers elicited 689 constructs from 73 different individuals during the interviews. The 
demographics of the interviews can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Number of interviews, constructs elicited and distribution according to company 
   Company ID  
 All 1 2 3 4 5 
Interviewees 73 10 12 19 21 11 
Constructs 689 96 96 141 244 112 
Avg. of constructs 9.45 9.60 8.00 7.42 11.62 10.18 
 
The number of respondents varied from 10 to 21, according to the size of the company. The 
average number of constructs per person was 9.45, which was rather normal. On a company 
level, the variation was from 8.0 to 11.6, where the greater amount belonged to companies with 
more highly educated personnel.  
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2.1. Repertory grid of this study 
The focus of our study was to find out the materialised changes in the organisations and to 
survey their impact on the employees on a personal level. Therefore, the researchers defined 
the main RGT elements: “past – now”. The actual time of the change was not recorded. The 
researchers elicited the constructions by giving the interviewees certain broad discussion topics 
(Table 2). In addition, they asked the interviewees to define any changes they have experienced 
within the subject. 
Table 2 - Discussion topics used in the grid 
SID Discussion topics Description, example 
1 Industrial Park Comparison of two companies from the park 
2 Respondent’s company  Changes in own company, timescale past – now  
3 Respondent’s own work Changes in own work, organisational changes 
4 Respondent’s ways of 
working 
Changes in own working habits, changes in 
person 
5 Co-workers’ ways of working Changes in co-workers working habits 
6 Management Actions of management, managers as individuals 
7 Other – respondent’s own 
choice Anything the respondent wants to compare 
 
When the eliciting process concerned the comparison of different companies from the industrial 
park (first row of Table 2), the eliciting process was conducted in a traditional manner, as 
described in chapter 1. The RGT elements were the companies from the park, and the 
constructs were elicited by comparing different companies. However, in the ranking phase, the 
researchers were not interested in how other companies could be ranked according to the 
construct. Instead, the researchers asked the interviewee to describe the effects of the construct 
for both the safety and organisational atmospheres. 
All other subjects from Table 2 were elicited by comparing a single RGT element in the 
timescale “past –now”. The researchers were interested in how the elements had changed in 
previous years. The timescale was not restricted to any given values, so it varied from months 
to several years. The elicited constructs were the poles of possible changes. Notably, neither 
poles elicited needed to happen. The changes were real, but the poles could express the 
biggest possible change the interviewee could imagine. This possibility was used, especially 
when defining the positive pole. As was the case in the comparison of companies, all other 
elicited constructs were assessed by the interviewee for their effect on safety and atmosphere. 
2.2 Interviews 
The interviewer’s role must be minimal to discover the true constructs of the interviewee 
(Fransella, 2003b, p. 106); however, the interviewer must guide and help the interviewee to 
elicit the constructs. Our interviewees were asked to look back and recall changes within 
the subjects. In the beginning of the interview, the table was totally empty, shown as as row 
0 in Figure 1. The first subject, “industrial park”, was different from the other subjects 
because there was no timescale involved when the interviewee compared two companies. 
The researchers asked the interviewee the question, “What kinds of differences are there in 
various companies?” In the example grid in Figure 1, rows one and two present answers to 
this question. The interviewee found that company A’s “operation patterns” were “more free” 
compared to company B, where there was more “supervision” and the “mode of action was 
restricted”. The words and terms are actual definitions made by the interviewee, and in the 
interview process, the grid was projected on the wall, with the interviewee seeing all that 
was written. On several occasions, the interviewee returned to a previously elicited 
construct and refined what he/she meant. 
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 Figure 1 - Example grid with real data 
 
In Figure 1, rows 3 to 8 consist of constructs where time is relevant. The interviewee explored 
and defined the kind of change the construct had gone through in time. Therefore, the 
interviewee gave values for the “Element-in-Time” columns “Past” and “Now”. The positive pole 
has a value of 5, and the negative pole a value of 1. In row 3, “Orientation to work” has a value 
of 2, so it is near the negative pole. It used to have a value of 5, meaning there was much “more 
learning by doing” in the past. In the middle column, between “Past” and “Now”, are the amount 
and direction of the change, which is the intersection of “Past” and “Now”. In the case of 
“Orientation to work”, the interviewee felt that it had a negative impact on the power of the three 
units. In row 4, the construct named “tools´ safety” shows that the progress has been positive; 
therefore, there are now enough “resources to tools and safety equipment”. 
The interviews were carried out in two phases. First, the interviewees and interviewers elicited 
and described the constructs and both poles of the constructs. Second, the interviewees rated 
the constructs. Studies have shown that constructs need not be symmetric; therefore, the 
interviewees were asked to evaluate both poles individually. The numeric values in this 
evaluation were from 0 (no affect at all) to 5 (significant affect). The interviewee rated the 
significance of the construct to safety (S) and atmosphere (A). The interviewee was given 
guidance to the rating “If the positive side of the construct would hold, what would be its impact 
on safety on a level of 0 to 5, where 0 is no effect at all and 5 would diminish accidents 
significantly”. On the negative side, a value of 5 meant that it would increase accidents 
significantly. The asymmetric characteristic of the constructs can be seen in all elicited 
constructs. In row 6, the element “culture of action” and “increased self-direction” have no effect 
on safety, but the negative pole, where “bosses take responsibility and guide” can increase 
accidents, according to the interviewee. Almost all interviewees also verbally validated the given 
number and provided explanations for choosing that given value. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The elicited constructs are extremely personal. However, to gain general results, some kind of 
synthesis must be achieved. According to Denicolo (2003, p. 125), the RGT produces a mass of 
rich, yet unstructured, data that requires skill to make it manageable through the identification of 
key themes, categories and patterns that are meaningful to all engaged in the task. 
Researchers classified the constructs into seven different main categories and several 
subcategories according to the content (or researchers interpretation) of the constructs. 
Categorization in psychology binds people into a strict concept and is therefore criticized 
(Warren, 2003, p. 392). It has been used in the PCT to classify the various constructs elicited, 
deriving several categories (Pope, 2003, p. 307). However, in this study, it is merely finding 
similarities in highly personal constructs. The researchers attempted to increase the validity and 
trustworthiness of our findings by deploying more than one investigator in the collection and 
analysis of data (Rothbauer, 2008, p. 893). Triangulation is a well-known method used to 
increase validity in safety research (Eeckelaert, Starren, Scheppingen van, Fox, & Brück, 2011, 
p. 27; Haavik, 2014). 
The classification did not follow the categories of the discussion topics for the interview, as 
presented in Table 2. The reason for this was the uneven distribution of elicited constructs. 
Three classes from categories of subjects, “respondent’s own work”, “respondent’s ways of 
working” and “co-workers’ ways of working” were united in the classification phase into one 
class called “Personnel”. “Information and its flow” and “Safety” rose from the constructs and 
were classified into their own classes. Industrial park, company, management and other were 
# SID Name of construct Positive S+ A+ Past +/- Now S- A- Negative
0
1 1 Operation pattern More free (Company A) 0 4 0 1 Supervision, mode of action restricted (B)
2 1 Activity at work Initiavity, commitment (C) 0 3 0 3 Passivity (D)
3 2 Orientation to work More learning-by-doing 3 4 5 -3 2 4 3 Too school-oriented
4 2 Tools' safety Resources to tools and safety equipment 5 3 2 3 5 4 2 Less resources
5 3 Course of action Designers responsible for their work 1 3 4 -2 2 1 4 Main designers' role increased
6 4 Culture of action Self-direction increased 0 4 1 2 3 3 2 Bosses take responsibility and guide
7 6 Concern management Local management has more power 1 3 3 -1 2 0 1 Situation bad, local managers' roles diminished
8 1 Occupational safety People hold to the promise 3 4 1 2 3 2 3 Promises and actions conflict 
Element-in-TimeCatalysts Inhibitors
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the same in the subject category and in the classification. Some constructs that the interviewee 
positioned into the subject class management were in the classification phase and relocated 
into the class “Company”. Only constructs concerning personal features were classified into the 
class management. Table 3 gathers some properties of the chosen classes. 
Table 3 - Classification of constructs (constr) and their impact on safety (S) and atmosphere (A)  
Class 
# Class 
# 
subclasses 
# 
constr % constr S+5 S-5 A+5 A-5 
1 Industrial Park 14 157 22.8 41 29 33 32 
2 Company 10 157 22.8 20 12 44 28 
3 Management  8 119 17.3 8 5 31 22 
4 Personnel 6 113 16.4 19 12 33 18 
5 Safety 5 73 10.6 32 21 16 9 
6 Information and 
its flow 
3 36 5.2 - 2 9 4 
7 Other  - 34 4.9 8 5 8 2 
 Total 46 689 100.0 128 86 174 115 
 
As we can see from Table 3, the distribution of constructs into classes is not even. The classes 
“Industrial Park” and “Company” hold the biggest number of both subclasses and constructs. 
The next two classes, which contain more constructs, relate to personal aspects of personnel, 
management and supervisors. Almost 10% of all constructs were directly related to safety. The 
lesser constructs were classified into “Information” and “Other”. 
The last four columns of Table 3 express the number of 5 values given by the interviewees to 
positive (+) and negative (-) poles of their given constructs. The number 5 was the highest value 
the interviewee could give to a pole of a construct. The column S+5 indicates the number of 
constructs, where the positive pole would happen and it would have a significant impact on 
preventing accidents. Column S-5 refers to constructs, where negative poles would happen and 
would increase accidents significantly. Letters S and A denote safety (S) and atmosphere (A). 
Therefore, the last four columns express the distributions of the most significant constructs in 
both preventing and increasing safety and atmosphere. 
Table 3 clearly shows that the constructs elicited may be, and some of them certainly are, 
asymmetric from their poles. If the constructs were symmetric, the number of positive and 
negative values would be same. Symmetry indicates that a construct would have the same 
effect on both positive and negative poles; therefore, the numbers should be the same. It should 
be noted that only 18 of the constructs related to “Industrial Park” (class #1) had a value of 5 in 
both their positive and negative poles. However, in the industrial park related constructs, there 
were 41 positive and 29 negative values of 5. Hence, 23 (41–18) constructs were positively 
asymmetric, meaning they had the positive side stronger than the negative, and 11 (29–18) 
were negatively asymmetric, having a stronger negative side than a positive one.  
According to Kelly (2003, p. 10), we should not consider a construct as another term for a 
concept. A concept can be defined as “an idea of what something is or how it works” (Merriam-
Webster’s, 2015). A concept is a definition, but the true personal meaning is built in everyone’s 
own mind. When concepts are assessed with a questionnaire and Likert-scale, the scale is 
always given by the researcher and is symmetric. Symmetry is presumed in interviews when the 
research focuses on concepts. Therefore, in this study, the researchers analysed the symmetry 
of all the constructs in more detail. The results show that only 46.1% of the constructs elicited 
were symmetric in safety and 38.1% were symmetric in atmosphere. In safety, 33.0% were 
positively asymmetric and 20.9% were negatively asymmetric. In atmosphere, there were twice 
as many positively asymmetric constructs (42.4%) as negatively asymmetric constructs 
(19.5%).  
The main idea of classification is to compile pieces of data into a more condensed form. 
Therefore, the researchers presented those subclasses that had the greatest number of 
constructs in Table 4. Fourteen subclasses had more than 20 constructs in them. In Table 4, the 
subclasses are ordered by the number of constructs they include, and the first column is the 
order of the class. The second column indicates the main class that includes the subclass. The 
third column includes the name of the subclass, followed by the number of constructs included 
in the subclass. The total number of interviewees was 73, and the fifth column indicates the 
percentage of all interviewees that had a construct, which was included in the corresponding 
subclass. Finally, we presented the column “Element-In-Time” (EIT), which indicates the 
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average of change of the elements “Past” and “Now”, the corresponding constructs in the 
subclass reference. The positive values indicate a positive change, and the negative values 
indicate undesirable change. Because the interviewees evaluated the change on a scale from 1 
to 5, the values in this column can vary from -4 to 4. 
Table 4 - Subclasses with the most constructs 
   # of % of  
# Main Class Subclasses constr. resp. EIT 
1 
Company 
Clarity of work: supervision of work, 
responsibilities, structures 53 72.6 -0.58 
2 
Personnel 
Working methods and attitudes towards 
work 35 47.9 0.50 
3 Other Other 34 46.6 0.61 
4 
Industrial Park 
Professional skills, working methods and 
habits, responsibilities 33 45.2 -1.50 
5 
Safety 
*Investments for safety and managers 
commitment to safety 30 41.1 2.05 
6 
Management 
Listening of employees and involving them 
in decisions 27 37.0 1.10 
7 Personnel Personal development 25 34.2 1.79 
8 Company Amount of personnel vs. workload (hurry) 25 34.2 -1.19 
9 Industrial Park Infrastructure and working environment 22 30.1 0.50 
10 Personnel **Team spirit and co-operation 22 30.1 0.88 
11 
Company 
Working hours, off-duty hours and 
distribution of work and  22 30.1 -0.89 
12 Information  Information flow 21 28.8 0.40 
13 Management Fairness, equality and same rules to all 20 27.4 0.30 
14 
Management 
***Confidence, acknowledgement and 
closeness to employees 20 27.4 0.91 
*SAverage = 4.13 (If company invests in the safety and managers commit on safety, it has positive 
effect on safety) 
**AAverage = 4.23 (Good team spirit and co-operation have positive effect on atmosphere) 
***AAverage = 4.05 (Confidence, acknowledgement and closeness to employees have positive 
effect on atmosphere) 
 
The greatest number of constructs was a collected to subclass “clarity of work”, which included 
supervision of work, responsibilities it holds and structures it has. Table 4 also shows that 10 out 
of the 14 subclasses changed positively over time. The result suggests that the industrial park 
reached positive development in safety. Especially, the subclasses “Investments for safety and 
managers commitment on safety” (EIT=2.05) and “Personal development” (EIT=1.79) changed 
substantially. The strongest positive impact on safety was related to the high level of the 
subclass “Investments for safety and managers commitment to safety” (SAverage=4.13). The most 
important positive effects on the atmosphere were related to high levels of “Team spirit and co-
operation” (AAverage = 4.23) and “Confidence, acknowledgement and closeness to employees” 
(AAverage = 4.05). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to elicit the most common personal constructs about working in a 
large industrial park and the effects of the constructions to the safety and organisational 
atmosphere in the shared workplace. From the methodological point of view, it is notable that 
the researchers did not give the construct to the interviewees. Instead, the interviewees built up 
their own constructions and the researchers captured the constructs to the repertory grid. 
Researchers classified the constructs and identified the most common safety and atmosphere 
related subclasses of the constructs: 
· clarity of work 
· working methods and attitudes towards work 
· professional skills 
· working methods and habits 
· responsibilities, investments for safety and managers’ commitment to safety 
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· listening to employees and involving them in decisions 
· personal development 
· number of personnel vs. workload (hurry) 
· infrastructure and working environment 
· team spirit and cooperation 
· working hours, off-duty hours and distribution of work 
· information flow 
· fairness, equality and same rules for all 
· confidence, acknowledgement and closeness to employees. 
The strongest positive impact on safety was related to the high levels of investments in safety 
and managers commitment on safety. The most important positive effects on the atmosphere 
were related to the good team spirit and co-operation, confidence, acknowledgement and 
closeness to employees. The results also show that the industrial park reached positive 
development in safety and atmosphere, especially in managers' commitment on safety and in 
the personal development. 
The results of this study deepen the understanding about individual differences and similarities 
of personal constructions about factors that affect safety and organisational atmospheres. The 
new results will be especially beneficial when companies develop their safety training and 
organisational atmosphere. In the future, the researchers will further analyse the differences of 
the constructions between the companies. In addition, the researchers will analyse how the 
constructions differ (if at all) from good safety management principles. 
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Abstract  
A Danish Toolbox training program aims to improve construction foremen’s knowledge and 
communication skills in regards to current work tasks and their related health and safety risks on 
site. The overall goal of the training program is to reduce physical attrition and improve injury 
and accident prevention, health and safety culture. The purpose of this article is to describe the 
study protocol and initial process evaluation results in this on-going study. The study is based 
on 32 foremen who participated in the training in three different groups during 2014 and 2015. 
The process evaluation utilized questionnaires, interviews, and participant observations. The 
process evaluation investigated: (1) whether the expected target population was reached; (2) if 
the program was implemented as intended; (3) how the participating foremen experienced the 
program; and (4) which contextual factors influenced the implementation.  
Participants received five classroom training days carried out over nine weeks and delivered by 
an external training consultant (100% dose-delivered). Initial results provided evidence that the 
training topics were relevant and useful for the foremen in their everyday interaction with their 
crews, colleagues, leaders, customers and other construction professions. Inclusion of health 
and safety in their daily planning and communication was seen as giving added value to their 
work and their projects. The foremen’s knowledge regarding health, attrition and communication 
increased and participants experienced a higher awareness to their role as foremen. However, 
not all training tools and skills were implemented as intended. The most common factors which 
hindered the implementation were lack of time, tight production schedules, lack of interest and 
high turnover among work crew members, language barriers and individual attitudes towards 
the Toolbox training. In conclusion, the program has the potential to add noticeably to 
developing vocational training for construction foremen and increasing safety communication as 
well as safety culture in the Danish construction industry.  
 
Keywords: Toolbox meetings, Toolbox talks, Tailgate meetings, safety training, safety 
communication 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Accidents at work and physical attrition continue to be major problems in the construction 
industry, and provide many challenges in implementing initiatives in prevention and safety 
culture (1, 14). Construction project Start-up meetings and risk evaluations are often carried out 
prior to engaging in projects and tasks, which include a focus on improving safety. However, the 
daily communication between a foreman and his work crew, colleagues, leaders, customers and 
other construction professions mainly addresses production issues and deadlines (8, 12). 
Toolbox meetings (Toolbox talks, Tailgate meetings, etc.) are a popular tool used in 
construction in many countries (9, 11), and a Toolbox training program is currently being 
developed in Denmark with focus on improving construction foremen’s knowledge and 
communication skills in regards to current work tasks and their related occupational safety and 
health (OSH) risks on site. Involving employees (colleagues, leaders, customers and other 
construction professions) in the daily planning process is a key element in the training and in the 
Nordic safety culture. The purpose of this paper is to describe the content and aims of the 
training program, as well as the design, methods and results of the process evaluation. 
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1.1. Aims and content of the training program  
Unlike Toolbox meetings, which involves a foreman’s preparation and delivery of a specific OSH 
topic with his crew (e.g. safe use of machines, PPE etc.), we developed a Toolbox training 
program which focuses on improving foremen’s knowledge and skills in safety communication, 
not only with their crew members, but also with their colleagues, leaders, other professions and 
customers. The overall goal of the training program is to reduce physical attrition & improve 
injury/accident prevention, OSH culture for all parties, while improving planning and safety 
communication at the same time. 
More specifically, the hypothesis of this study is that the approach will promote safety 
communication on a daily basis among the various parties. This will raise risk awareness among 
the various parties especially that of the work crew members, and increase their individual 
participation in OSH dialogue. Participation is proposed to then increase influence on planning 
and safety procedures, which improves the prevention of work accidents, health and safety 
culture on construction sites (see Figure 1) – and subsequently results in improved business.  
 
Figure 1-Toolbox-training: Core elements and expected pathways to improve occupational safety and health (OSH) and 
business. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1. Study population 
The study is based on 32 foremen who participated in the training in three different groups 
during 2014 and 2015. The foremen represented eight different construction companies 
covering two geographically different regions in Denmark (Jutland and Zealand), and who 
worked in various construction trades (e.g. earth and concrete, masonry, carpentry, scaffolding, 
demolition).  
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2.2. Toolbox training course  
A 22½ hour classroom program was developed by the project team and was carried out over 
nine weeks. It included two weeks of on-site training between each of the five classroom training 
days (4½ hours each day). The training included topics such as: foreman roles and 
responsibilities, communication (verbal and non-verbal), conflict management, planning 
systems, leadership and cooperation, prevention of injury and work related disease, as well as 
improving OSH on construction sites. Training was provided by an external training consultant 
and consisted of a mixture of theoretical lectures, practical casework and role-play, as well as 
assignments to be carried out during the two weeks between each classroom session. Training 
focused on the central role of the foreman and the importance of dialogue, influence and 
involvement of employees (and other parties) to improve the daily OSH communication and 
planning of specific and future tasks and the managing of work related OSH risks. Forman were 
to use the new skills and knowledge in their daily activities with their work crew. Two project 
researchers (authors 1 and 2) followed the training course and visited selected participants 
throughout the program period to facilitate the implementation.  
 
2.3. Aims and design of the process evaluation  
The study includes a detailed process evaluation of the training program which serves both a 
formative and a summative purpose. The formative purpose involves a continuous use of 
process data and feedback from the participating foremen for optimizing training through 
learning. The aim of the summative purpose is to determine whether the training was 
implemented as intended, and to provide guidance for future interventions.  
 
The process evaluation follows the framework introduced by Saunders and colleagues (2005), 
which is based on work by Steckler and Linnan (2002), Baranowsky and Stables (2000). 
According to the above-mentioned framework the following components are recommended to 
be included in process evaluations: fidelity (quality), dose-delivered (completeness), dose-
received (exposure), satisfaction, reach, recruitment, and context (barriers and facilitators).  
 
We defined the process evaluation components used in this study as follows:  
Fidelity was the extent to which the intervention was implemented as planned. In this study 
participants were to implement the training tools themselves during the two-week on-site 
training between each of the five classroom training days. Additionally, two project researchers 
followed the implementation process throughout the training period to facilitate implementation. 
Dose-delivered was the proportion of the Toolbox training days which was provided by the 
training consultant to the participating foremen. In this study five classroom training days were 
provided to each of the three training groups. Dose-received was the proportion of participants 
showing up for the training days. Satisfaction was defined as the foremen’s opinions and 
attitudes towards the Toolbox training, which was evaluated based on the level of satisfaction 
on a 3-point scale.  Reach was defined as the proportion of foremen who were approached for 
participation in the Toolbox training. In the present study the intended audience was Danish 
construction foremen with staff management responsibilities (e.g. to lead a work crew), and a 
certain level of financial as well as operational authority. Recruitment was defined as the 
sources and procedures used to approach and attract foremen for participation in the Toolbox 
training. All foremen were informed about the main objective and content of the research project 
and participated voluntarily. The course was free, and foremen participated during their working 
hours. Finally, Context was defined as factors which either hindered or facilitated the 
implementation of Toolbox training.  
 
We summarized the seven elements into four main research questions for the process 
evaluation:  
(1) Was the expected target population reached? (reach, recruitment), (2) Was the program 
implemented as intended? (fidelity, dose-delivered, dose-received), (3) How did the foremen 
and their work crews experience the training? (satisfaction), and (4) How was the 
implementation influenced by contextual factors? (context).  
 
By documenting all of these aspects of the implementation process we were to asses to what 
extent the implementation was successful. In the case of a successful implementation, we 
examined if our hypothesis (Figure 1) can be confirmed, that is, if the organizational intervention 
of the training program led to the expected organizational and individual changes and 
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intermediate outcomes. To carry out this process evaluation we used three data sources: short 
questionnaires for all participating foremen before and after the training, semi-structured 
interviews with selected foremen and their work crew members (and where relevant - leaders 
and colleagues) before, during and after the training and participant observations during the 
training days and on site. The information from these data sources were used to assess the 
implementation according to the above-mentioned framework. In the following, the main data 
sources for the process evaluation are explained more in-depth.  
 
2.4. Questionnaires for participating foremen  
We distributed a short online questionnaire to 25 participating foremen before and after the 
training (training group 2 and 3). The baseline questionnaire prior to the start of the training 
included questions about the respondents’ occupational experience and role, their knowledge 
about certain training topics and contextual factors, which influence OSH communication on 
site. The follow-up questionnaires were distributed directly at the end of the fifth training day, 
and assessed to what degree the participants gained new knowledge, new skills and to what 
degree the different training tools were experienced as useful on site. Additionally, the training 
consultants answered questions about the content and structure of the training course, and 
usability of methods and materials in order to optimize the program.  
 
2.5. Individual interviews with participating foremen  
Individual semi-structured interviews (about 19) with selected foremen were conducted before 
and after the training course (4 interviews with selected foremen). We assessed to what degree 
and why different training tools and skills were utilized, to what degree the foremen were 
satisfied with the training course, and whether the implementation was influenced by contextual 
factors. We asked to what degree the training materials were used and why, to what degree 
training knowledge and skills were transferred to crew members, how often foremen talked to 
their crew members, which topics they discussed and to which extent the foremen experienced 
a change in the communication, team work and OSH behavior of their work crews.  
 
2.6. Individual interviews with selected work crew members  
Individual semi-structured interviews (about 36) with selected work crew members were 
conducted before and after the training course. The data collection is still ongoing. We asked 
the selected crew members to which degree they felt involved in decisions, whether they had 
influence on their daily work tasks and whether they experienced a change in the foremen’s 
OSH communication and behavior. The interviews investigated whether crew members were 
sufficiently informed about OSH, to which degree they were satisfied with OSH communication 
and team work on site and if they recognized new information material (e.g. training templates) 
posted in the on-site hut.    
 
 
2.7. Participant observation  
The formative purpose of the process evaluation involved a continuous use of feedback from 
the participating foremen. We involved all participants and used their feedback to develop and 
optimize the content and length of the training course. During the five training days we observed 
foremen’s participation, engagement, behavior and attitude towards the training. We 
documented their feedback on the duration of the training, which training elements of the day 
were experienced as valuable, and which tools they said they would use the day after the 
training and during the 2-weeks break. We documented to what degree foremen completed their 
assignments, based on interviews and observations.  
 
As a supplement to the questionnaires and the interviews, two project researchers conducted 
observations on site before, throughout and after the training course. Prior to the start of the 
training we observed selected foremen’s Toolbox meetings between them and their work crew. 
We assessed the degree of safety communication, which materials (e.g. leaflets, copies) were 
distributed to the work crew and which type of communication was used. During the follow-up 
observation we investigated whether communication type (e.g. dialogue) and content had 
changed (e.g. safety and health topics), whether foremen used training tools on site and we 
linked foremen’s behaviour during the five training days to this utilization (dose-delivered to work 
crew members).  
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Table 1-Toolbox-training: Process evaluation data sources. 
 Before 
Toolbox-
training 
Throughout 
Toolbox-
training 
After 
Toolbox-
training 
Questionnaires to 
participating foremen 25  25 
Individual interviews with 
participating foremen 19  4 
Individual interviews with 
selected work crew 
members 
36  4 
Participant observation 
in classroom  32  
Participant observation 
on-site 4 15 4 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1. Recruitment, reach, dose-delivered, and dose-received 
Recruitment consisted of direct contact to several construction companies covering two 
geographically different regions in Denmark (Jutland and Zealand) and various construction 
trades (e.g. earth and concrete, masonry, carpentry, scaffolding, demolition). The research 
group approached the companies QHSE directors (Quality, Health, Safety and Environment), 
who distributed information onwards to construction site managers and their foremen. We used 
flyer for distribution and an article in a trade specific paper to attract participants. Eight out of 
fourteen companies sent foremen to participate in the Toolbox training course. Thus, reach was 
57%. Dose-delivered was 100%; that is, a training consultant delivered all five training days to 
each of the three training groups. Dose-received was 80% for the first group (7 out of 9); 100% 
for the second group (12 out of 12) and 90% for the third group (13 out of 14); that is, three 
participants only showed up for one or two training days.  
 
3.2. Fidelity, satisfaction and context 
High fidelity was given, if participants gained more knowledge, new skills and training tools were 
experienced as useful on site. The training and data collection are still on-going, however the 
initial results provided evidence that the training topics were relevant and useful for the foremen 
in their everyday interaction with their crews, colleagues, leaders, customers and other 
construction professions. Inclusion of OSH in their daily planning and communication was seen 
as giving added value to their work and their projects. Foremen were to a high or very high 
degree satisfied with the Toolbox training course. The preliminary results show that the degree 
of knowledge regarding health, attrition and communication increased, and that participants 
attention to their role as foremen and assignments of responsibilities increased from before to 
after the training (Table 2).  
 
One foreman responded during the training as follows: 
“I will calculate our overall noise level on site. I think there is much focus on work accidents, but 
after what we have talked about today, I want to focus more on occupational diseases.”  
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Table 2-Toolbox-training: Extent of new knowledge after training course. 
 
 
Moreover, the foremen utilized the given training materials in their daily work, for example, 
training templates were posted in the on-site hut or got used for joint reviews of work tasks 
together with the work crew. Participants used their communication skills just as much with their 
own leaders, colleagues and clients, as they did with their work crew. One foreman reported 
back as follows: 
 
 “After the Toolbox training I have become much more conscious about using open-ended 
questions and to ensure participation. Especially with conflict management – escalation and 
resolution [one of the training tools] has been good. It has been particularly useful, since I had 
to use it for negotiations with management about piecework contracts. But I also use it in 
everyday situations. For example, we have challenges with our foreign subcontractor, who is 
responsible for demolition, and in other cases we have issues with residents - in both cases I 
made sure to involve construction site management in solving the problem.”  
 
Foremen reported that they had a better understanding of their role as foremen, they felt more 
responsible to communicate and mediate information between management and crew 
members, and that they understood their position as role models to implement changes. 
Participants were also highly motivated to facilitate change, e.g. one foreman delivered an 
action plan on how to motivate and involve his work crew more frequently by giving his work 
crew more responsibility in making decisions. His crew members formed an internal working 
group to plan social activities (psychosocial working environment), and they chose a contact-
person in addition to the crew boss to reduce the work load on the foreman’s shoulders.  
In the beginning, foremen experienced that asking open-ended questions was awkward, but 
recognized the change in their work crews’ reactions and the positive consequence of a 
reduced work load. After completing an assignment on site one foreman reported the following: 
 
“Instead of delegating the work, I asked who would take care of it. There was a pause and that 
was somewhat awkward. I said this is up to you today. There was a person who volunteered… 
that it would be ok. One may take too much responsibility. If you can’t do that [let employees 
take initiative and responsibility] you will hang on the phone all day, it’s great when they [work 
crew] can [take responsibility]. It must also be good to take responsibility.” 
 
The selected work crew members reported back that they felt involved in decisions when the 
foreman asked them open-ended questions without giving answers beforehand, and when 
using the planning system tool together with the whole work crew. However, work crew 
members were not always included in the planning process, and not all foremen liked to ask 
work crew members for their input and opinions. One foreman used the planning system tool, 
but did not involve his work crew in the planning process. He did not feel that employee 
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involvement was necessary based on his understanding of a foreman as in-control organizer, 
who do not ask questions but give instructions. The participant’s individual attitude and opinion 
towards the training and need for change were contextual barriers, which hinder the 
implementation of the Toolbox-training. Another barrier was the high turnover among work crew 
members, as one foreman reported back that he borrows manpower from other foremen.    
 
“It is easier to use that [training tools] with people who are your own. It is a waste of time to use 
a personality type tool [HBDI training tool] or questioning techniques with them as they 
disappear again.”  
 
Selected work crew members experienced no evident change in foreman’s OSH communication 
and behavior, due to turnover among this work crew. The crew members did not know the 
foreman before he had participated in the training course, and were unable to comment on 
change in their foreman’s approach. Work crew members reported that other hindering factors 
which affected OSH dialogue and knowledge sharing negatively were lack of interest among 
their colleagues, tight time schedules, busy foremen talking on the phone and not being able to 
get their foreman’s attention.  
 
3.3. Discussion 
This project provided preliminary evidence that Toolbox training can be adapted to the Danish 
construction safety culture to successfully improve OSH dialogue among Danish foremen and 
other parties.  
 
The Toolbox training program was well-received among foremen and there are some indicators 
of improvements in safety communication among foremen and their crew members. Similar 
studies found that Toolbox meetings improved knowledge and behavior among employees (7, 
11, 12). Toolbox meetings with focus on fall prevention suggested that safety communication 
training had an effect not only on participating foremen, but also on young apprentices’ security 
practices and worksites that the foremen directed (12). Kines (2010) showed that construction 
site safety improves when foremen increased verbal safety dialogue (13). Foremen play a 
central role, when it comes to engaging work crew members actively in dialogue and problem-
solving discussion on site. They can help to optimize safety in an otherwise dynamic industry 
where people and processes change constantly. Given that feedback from foremen and 
recognition are amongst the most powerful incentives influencing job performance (17), 
construction foremen should be trained how to teach their crewmembers and provide feedback 
to affect their safety behaviours (12). 
 
A strength of this study is that we were able to address several construction trades and that we 
developed a manual for the Toolbox-training program (training the trainer), and therefore it can 
easily be delivered in various construction groups. In the present study we used different 
trainers with recent construction experience. Trainers with experience and relations within the 
construction industry increased the relevance of the Toolbox training.    
However, there were challenges within this study. We often trained very experienced foremen, 
who had been on several training courses and who had already a high degree of OSH 
knowledge. The preliminary results showed that 60% of the participants (Table 2) gained new 
knowledge about safety and work-related accidents to a small and very small extent. The 
foremen sample was drawn from eight different construction companies noted for their active 
safety engagement. Thus, the foremen's responses may not be representative of construction 
foremen in general. For the purpose of optimizing the program, the selected target group was 
well chosen and gave valuable feedback. All foremen reported a high degree of knowledge 
transfer within the group of participants due to their different occupational background (e.g. 
different construction companies and various construction trades).  In the future, we recommend 
recruiting more unexperienced and younger foremen, who are new to their role as leaders. We 
assume that the training course will have a higher impact on their safety knowledge and 
communication.  
 
A successful implementation is a prerequisite for testing the effect of Toolbox training as a next 
step, as intermediate outcomes and final effects cannot be expected if the implementation fails. 
If successful, the training program could be integrated into existing vocational and educational 
training structures, and thereby help to improve vocational training for construction foremen in 
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Denmark. This study will continue to investigate which barriers and facilitators hamper and 
trigger the implementation of Toolbox training, and the program will be optimized accordingly.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study identified training needs and opportunities for construction foremen and their work 
crews. Toolbox training was well-received among foremen, and their degree of OSH knowledge 
and safety communication skills increased. Safety communication between foremen and their 
work crews improved as selected work crew members’ participation in OSH dialogue increased, 
which made them feel more involved in decisions regarding work tasks. The present study 
suggests that work crews’ participation in safety communication and active employee 
involvement has a positive impact on planning and safety procedures. However, foremen did 
not utilize all learned training tools and skills after the training course and work crew members 
experienced no evident change in foreman’s OSH communication and behavior. Most common 
factors, which hindered the foremen to apply new knowledge, were tight production schedules, 
turnover and lack of interest among work crew members and individual attitudes towards the 
training. Communication barriers with foreign subcontractors were also experienced as a 
challenge and based on the present study we recommend to optimize the Toolbox training 
program addressing these language challenges in the future. 
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Abstract 
In EU, the transport sector has an incident rate of accidents at work of 40 per 1000 
employees. The transport sector is characterized by many small enterprises of which 97% of 
the enterprises in Denmark have less than 50 employees and 89% have less than 10 
employees. The safety problems for the employees are the activities carried out when 
loading, unloading or work with transport equipment carried out at many different work 
places. The main safety problems are falls, heavy lifting, poor ergonomic working conditions, 
hits or collisions with goods, falling objects, the traffic risk situations, work with animals and 
the risk of violence and robbery. 
To create a high level of safety in an enterprise is a difficult task that demands a great 
degree of management engagement. It is not only a question of having the right 
equipment, procedures and organization etc.; it is also necessary for everyone in the 
enterprise to have an understanding of safety and feel obligated to take responsibility for 
safety in all work at all times. 
Accident research shows that safety must be integrated in the whole enterprise and function 
on all levels of management, while it must also involve all employees in their daily work. It 
is important to emphasize training in safety, good communication, good order and a stable 
staff of employees. 
Pro-active accident prevention also involves process, communication and organization, 
where management plays a significant role, which includes its ability to involve both middle-
level management and employees in creating a high level of safety. These findings are mostly 
derived, however, from large enterprises. 
The research question is: “How can experiences from large enterprises regarding how to 
achieve good safety be adapted and applied to small enterprises in a branch such as the 
transport sector. 
The aim is to present tools and barriers for SME´s on how to integrate safety activities in the 
daily work fulfilled with other duties and few resources. 
An action based study for the prevention of accidents has been carried out in six SME transport 
enterprises over a three- year period. The study has been organized together with the employers 
to follow their plan for integrating safety into their basic work. The methods has been an action 
oriented research model, where together the researcher and the enterprises have developed and 
made experiences with the use of different tools for accident prevention. 
The result is a realistic strategy for integration safety, quality and environmental factors in an 
SME and procedures for how to go from strategy to action. Different tools were developed to 
fulfil the strategy ranging from risk identification, involvement of the employee and 
motivational activities. These tools are designed to simplify the safety management methods, 
but they were adjusted to a new focus and awareness for managers of small enterprises 
including documentation of the SME´s own internal costs of compensation for all damages and 
injuries. However, several factors create barriers for the SMEs’ efforts, even when there is a 
visible economical advantage to be gained. 
 
Keywords: Integration of Safety, Management in SME´s, The transport sector 
 
INTRODUCTION 
To create a high level of safety in an enterprise is a difficult task that demands a great 
degree of management engagement and its constant focus. It is not only a question of 
having the right equipment, procedures, organization, etc.; it is also necessary for everyone 
in the enterprise to have an understanding of safety and feel obligated to take responsibility 
for safety in all work at all times. 
Accident research shows that safety must be integrated in the whole enterprise and function 
on all levels of management, while it must also involve all employees in their daily work. It 
is important to emphasize training in safety, good communication, good order and a stable 
staff of employees (Cohen, A.; Smith, M.; Cohen, H., 1975; Smith, M.; Cohen, H.; Cohen, 
A., 1978; Glendon, A.I.; Clarke, S.G.; McKenna, E.F., 2007; Kjellén, U., 2000). 
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 Pro-active accident prevention also involves process, communication and organization, 
where management plays a significant role, which includes its ability to involve both middle-
level management and employees in creating a high level of safety. These findings are 
mostly derived, however, from large enterprises. (Hale A., 2005) ( Hale A.;Guldenmund F., 
2004) (Jørgensen, K., 2015) 
The transport sector is characterized by many small enterprises especially involved in the 
transport of goods on shore and has a high accident rate. The safety problems here are 
typically linked to the activities when loading and unloading, as well as work with transport 
equipment at many different workplaces. (The European Foundation for Improvment of 
Working and Living Condition, 2004) (Jørgensen, K., 2011) 
The transport sector is also characterized by the fact that managers have to lead from a 
distance. The drivers are on their own and very often alone in the lorry. The drivers’ working 
conditions are very often out of the managers’ hands, because they are determined by the 
conditions at the place where the goods are picked up from the suppliers and where they are 
delivered to the customer. 
The research question is: “How can experiences from large enterprises regarding how to 
achieve good safety be adapted and applied to small enterprises in a branch such as the 
transport sector. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology has been a combination of a theoretical view on how to integrate safety 
in the management of a company and an action-driven study of six small and medium-sized 
enterprises within the haulage contractor industry. The goal was first to create an 
understanding of how safety can be integrated in the management of a company and 
secondly try to see what could work in a transport company in practice. The questions asked 
were 1. What can motivate an employer in a small enterprise to participate and prioritize 
safety? 2. Is it possible to create a strategy and plan of action together with the employer 
that can be integrated with their wishes for their enterprises and the daily routine?  3. Is it 
possible to find and develop tools for safety activities that can identify risk, inform and 
motivate the employee, create training and awareness about safety, and reward good and 
safe behaviour? 
The action-driven study was carried out in close cooperation and dialogue between the 
researcher and the enterprises’ employers in 6 transport enterprises and run over 4 years. 
The enterprises participating in the project are haulage contractor businesses employing 
between 20 and 50 drivers. The administrative part of the business comprises of two to ten 
persons. The medium-sized enterprises have transport managers, who are intermediate 
managers between the employer and the drivers. The items that are transported are 
packages and goods, earth, gravel and building materials, waste and waste disposal, and live 
animals. 
The normal working day involves procuring jobs for the company and ensuring that they 
are carried out. When the drivers meet, they are told that they are to transport items from A to 
B; then, they are kept busy throughout the day with new instructions delivered over the 
phone. Most drivers have their "own" vehicles, i.e. they have a permanent vehicle for which 
they are responsible for with regard to maintenance and cleaning, but they must lend it to 
colleagues when they are off work. It is essential that the vehicles are out driving every day in 
order to generate revenue. 
An analysis of the details regarding accidents shows that the causes of the injuries are falls to 
lower levels and falls on the same level, contact/collision with moving or stationary objects, 
and being struck by falling or moving objects, as well as physical strain during manual 
operations (lifting/carrying) and inappropriate movements and working positions (Jørgensen, 
K., 2011). 
The transport industry's working conditions are generally poorer than the average for all 
industries, as risks are found in the surroundings with noise, dust, and dangers associated 
with hazardous goods and road traffic, vibrations, high and low temperatures, poor ergonomic 
conditions when loading and unloading and with the sedentary work as a  driver, work outside 
normal working hours and long working days. Also, a number of organisational risks are 
observed,  such as high job demands combined with a low level of self-inspection of the 
work and little potential for experience development on the job (The European Foundation 
for Improvment of Working and Living Condition, 2004). 
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 THE THEORETICAL VIEW 
To find a way of integrating safety in management we must look for what is needed for a 
company to survive and to grow; to see if we can integrate efforts for reducing injuries and 
losses in what else may be needed in a company. We could also look at what is of important 
for the employee´s, what they could be proud of to be. 
Others have seen the needs for integration of safety in production. Rasmussen showed us 
in 2000 that the managers’ wishes to obtain the most effectiveness organization and the 
employees’ wishes to ease the workload are two very strong drivers for the drift to danger. 
Dangers that can be invisible until the trigger appears for the accident to happen 
(Rasmussen, J.; Svedung, I., 2000) 
 
We must ask our self how we ensure that effectiveness includes safety and quality, and 
how we ensure that the easy way to perform the job also is the safe and qualified way. 
In 2004, Gillen wrote that a major obstacle to implementing safety initiatives is that it is not 
put into context with production and productivity. To operate safely should be an equally 
important part of an organization's mission as being a financial success (Gillen, M.; Kools, S.; 
McCall, C.; Sum, J.; Moulden, K.;, 2004). 
Research has found that the financial loss from accidents and errors in production can be 
tremendous for a company, but also that a high level of safety and quality assurance are 
related to high performance in production in the long run. Financial success is not only when 
you earn more money, but also when you minimize your losses ( European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work, 2010). 
In 2005, Hopkins wrote that an organizational culture can be detrimental to safety, not because 
management has chosen to sacrifice safety in relation to productivity, but because they have 
not focused on safety at all - if management has their attention on both productivity and 
safety, then the organization as the leader can exhibit a culture that has the potential to host 
both (Hopkins, A., 2005). 
Integration of safety and quality into all elements of an organization seems to be important. 
Let us try to see what that could look like: 
A business plan must describe the key services the company can offer their customers. 
Included are key activities, key resources, and values of the services, customer relations, 
financial structure and profit stream. Knowing that occupational accidents are expensive for 
society, the companies and the victims; we must ask the question of whether the business 
plan could include elements like: 
· That key activities can be completed without any mistakes or harm to people, goods, 
services, technology, customer's property, etc. 
· That key resources makes it possible to ensure the provision of key activities. 
· What you can offer the customer is something the customer can trust they will receive, 
on time and at the right price and without defects or damage. 
· That customer relations are of mutual trust and understanding of the value provided and 
paid for. 
· That the cost structure reflects the value of minimizing losses in production. 
· That profit will be increased not only by higher sales, but also by minimizing costs. 
 
We can look at an organization through the star-model of Galbraiht who looks at the 
organization’s strategy, structure, processes, reward system and human resources, and 
the connection between these elements (Kates, A.; Galbraith, J.R. ;, 2007). 
 
Strategy 
A strategy determines which direction the company is to develop in. It is here that one sets 
out the strategic goals and vision for the company, which will operate the business model and 
what are the company’s strategic objectives in relation to customers and employees. 
This of course applies to the service, product, etc., that you would like to deliver, but it could 
also apply to production having   a    high   standard    of   safety   and    quality   as    a    
responsible,    reliable    and    resilient    organization. In many companies injuries and 
accidents are considered as something that relates only to insurance issues and compliance 
with legislation or possibly a desire for a healthy work environment in terms of employees. 
However, why not make it clear that it is a business strategy of providing service to 
customers who are professionalized that is done safely and qualitatively correctly at the time 
agreed upon and at the right price. This also implies that employees are not sick or absent 
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 due to injury. Such a strategy requires considering what "safe and qualitatively correct" 
means in the company. For example, that there is no damage to services, products, 
customer's property, etc., but also that there is no damage to the technology or injuries to 
the employees, because these damages and injuries are losses that result in delays and 
costs that can only be determined on the price. 
 
Structure 
The structure of the company determines the power and dynamics of the work and tasks to be 
implemented with. They define the decision-making and collaboration. It includes the usual 
way to control how tasks come into the business, how they are being put in place for 
implementation, how they are implemented and how the task will be handed over to the 
customer. 
It is important that this structure supports the objectives of the company's strategy and vision, 
including the possibility that tasks can be completed safely and qualitatively correct. This 
applies to the acceptance of tasks that are said yes to and their qualifications to be 
implemented, it is in order to give the framework and conditions for performing the tasks and   
ensuring   that   tasks   can   and   will   be   resolved   on   the   basis   of   this   framework   
and    objectives. Time, resources, technology, etc., are included as conditions for these tasks 
to be solved, while structures must ensure that procedures. This also includes the need to 
carry out tasks safely and qualitatively. This would not be any good if a seller accepts a job 
that there is no time or resources to perform it in a responsible manner. It is also about 
how the company is organized with middle managers to manage tasks, plans, finance, sales 
and customer relations etc. In this context, it is important that you consider how visions, 
strategies and plans will propagate down through the organization. Middle managers are 
very important to carry out plans and strategies in their daily work. They must therefore 
understand what their role is in relation to integrating quality and safety, partly through their 
own management and in relation to other managers' functions. In this way a line management 
task cannot disclaim the responsibility for safety and quality to other people in the 
organization. 
 
Processes 
Processes include information flow and work processes, but can also include collaborative 
processes and processes to follow up on that objectives  and  strategies  are  being  
implemented,  i.e.  some  kind  of  monitoring  processes. Getting adjusted information and 
work processes requires that you have a feel for what is happening right at the front end of 
the performance chain. This can only be done by involving employees' knowledge and ongoing 
experience, both at management level as well as at executive level. No one else knows better 
what can go wrong and what actually goes wrong. 
It is also in control processes that you have the ability to pool knowledge and 
information that is useful for the assessment of the achievement of objectives and the 
impacts on the economy when things go wrong with safety and quality. Documentation is 
necessary to adjust and correct the state of affairs. It is also in the processes that managers 
can create motivation, learning, etc., through the involvement of all levels and through a 
mutual respect between and within all parts. 
 
Rewards 
Reward is about how to motivate employees to do the work, as expressed in the objectives 
and vision of the company's business. 
Some would say that employees receive their salary in order to do a proper job, but dedication 
and commitment is often what can push a business forward. Here comes the importance of 
what the company perceives as the right thing, what it means to be professional and good to 
work for and ultimately rewarded with a salary, possibly a bonus, with possible promotion, 
more responsibility, praise, blame, etc. Below it is important again that the company's goals 
and strategy set clear accents in this view. A goal of "safe and qualitatively correct," should 
be a value that is known in the employees' professional understanding of their own efforts 
and level. This happens only if it is clearly making itself known in the management value 
understanding of who they consider to be "the good and professional staff." 
 
Human resources 
It is crucial for a business platform that you have the right staff to ensure the execution of 
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 tasks, both those that govern the organization, as well as performing core tasks. Here it is 
about the employees having the right skills and the right understanding of the company's 
goals and vision. Competence and understanding of what good quality and good safety are 
have a significant impact on all employees. Make sure that employees have the necessary 
knowledge of the work required to perform it safely and qualitatively correct, they have the 
ability to do the job with the time and technology that is available and that they have the 
motivation to do the work within the goals and strategy that the company wants. Correlation 
between knowledge, abilities and motivation across all activities people perform, where skills,  
resources and motivation determines how well the tasks are performed. 
 
Connections between the 5 elements 
Examples of connections between these 5 elements concerning safety are pointed out from 
other safety researchers. Rasmussen argued that the effective coupling of professional players 
to their work depends on their professional competences and also mentions how working 
culture depends on factors such as cognitive style and management style. Furthermore, he 
showed us how the individual adaption of the actual action-response characteristics of the 
work environment poses a problem for risk management since adaption guided by short-
term process criteria such as work load or time spent will very likely override long-term risk 
criteria such as functional redundancy. This has to be avoided in a professional organization 
(Rasmussen, J.; Svedung, I., 2000). 
Zohar has also touched upon the problems of being in an organization where organizational 
leaders trade-of production- related policies and they are in direct conflict with safety which 
provides the message to employees what is most important. If productivity is favoured over 
safety across a variety of situations it implies a higher priority and employees will align their 
behaviour accordingly to the detriment of safety. From an employee standpoint it is the 
overall pattern and signals sent by the complex web of rules and policies across competing 
domains that ultimately must be sorted out in order to discern what role behaviour is expected, 
rewarded and supported (Zohar, D., 2010). 
As a matter of fact all our knowledge from a safety management system or high reliable 
organizations like Weicks 5 principles; to be preoccupied with failure, to be reluctant to 
simplify, to be sensitive to operations, to be committed to resilience and to have deference to 
expertise has to be taken into consideration for any organization, but it has to be integrated 
in the strategies, the structures, the processes, the reward system and the human 
resources (Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., 2007).. 
In the end it is about being professional towards finances, production, customers, qualities 
and safety. Back in 2000, Rasmussen said that where he referred to a fine definition of 
professionalism from the French Colas 1994. 
Professionalism aims to make actions more reliable by implementing 
appropriate work methods. Theses more thorough methods refer to intellectual 
analysis, diagnostics, choice of appropriate response, etc, and to culture 
perception and values accorded to safety and production and consequently to 
the willingness to act in a certain way which in turn flows from a state mind, 
attitudes and behaviour (Colas, A., 1994) (Rasmussen, J., 1995). 
They also listed the following dimensions for professionalism not only for the manager, but 
also for the employee (Colas, A., 1994) (Rasmussen, J.; Svedung, I., 2000). Principles for 
implementing professionalism application to management: 
 
1. Permanently ensure that there is an appropriate balance between the capabilities of 
personal, the resources assigned to an activity and the requirements of this activity. 
2. Draw up a contract for the performance of activities and define specifications for their 
execution. 
3. Ensure that the coordination and synchronization of actions between different players is 
well organized. 
4. Ensure that checks, verifications and validations are provided for and carried out. 
5. Motivate and encourage reviews of work and enhance fundamental experience. 
6. Establish and maintain a motivating work environment by setting an example, displaying 
quality in human relations and recognition. 
 
Principles for implementing professionalism application: 
1. A professional knows and respects their sphere of autonomy 
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 2. A professional always plans and prepare actions thoroughly and thus has a clear vision of 
what is to be done before taking any action. 
3. A professional manages the conditions governing the environmental and context in which 
they operate. 
4. A professional ensures reliability by cross-checking and varying dab sources and having 
every action verified. 
5. A professional gives priority to safety 
6. A professional improves their skills, enriches their experience and that of others; they act in 
a transparent manner. 
7. A professional pays attention to detecting and correction of non-quality 
8. As a human being, a professional is aware of their capabilities and limits and knows 
how to take the necessary safeguards when in a vulnerable situation. 
We may need to find new words and a new approach for minimizing the probability of 
occupational accidents. We have to make safety a part of the professionalism without 
making safety a separate issue, but as an integrated part of how the good and correct 
way to do things are. 
 
Safety in SME 
The challenge lies in finding out how to use the best from the approaches developed for large 
enterprises and adapting them to the day-to-day operations of small enterprises. Doing this 
creates more challenges, which makes it even more difficult to implement a safety practice. 
The small enterprise seldom experiences an accident among its own employees. If an accident 
occurs, it is often seen as an accident process outside the responsibility of the employer. By 
far the majority of accidents are so-called ‘trivial accidents’, such as falls, bumping into 
something, or muscle sprains during heavy lifting. The triviality lies first in the fact that the 
course of events is simple and subsequently easy to explain, and secondly in the fact that such 
accidents are strongly connected with people's behaviour and actions, while the conditions 
causing the accidents are perceived as everyday occurrences and not anything particularly 
dangerous. This implies that there is a lack of competence in the small enterprise to 
investigate and analyse accidents (Walters, D.;, 2001). All in all, the awareness of hazards, 
their possible consequences, and potential preventive measures, is generally low. 
It is well known that the managerial resources in small enterprises are limited. There is no 
need for large formal systems when things can just as well be discussed in the day-to-day 
situation. Therefore, informal and often ad hoc processes also characterize the organisation 
of work (Hasle, P.; Kines, P.; Andersen, L.P., 2009; Walters, D.; Lamn, F., 2003; Eakin, 
J.M.; MacEachen, E., 1998). 
Moreover, many small enterprises are characterized by tasks that are performed elsewhere 
than where the employer is located. This applies in such sectors as building and 
construction, commerce, agriculture, cleaning and transport. Therefore, the challenge is to 
make the employer aware of potential safety costs in relation to risks rather than actual 
accidents, so that the value of safety can be evaluated. Since the small business owner's 
resources are limited with respect to finances and time, low priority is given to activities 
considered to be peripheral in relation to deriving income (Brooks, B.;, 2008; Walters, D.; 
Lamn, F., 2003). In addition, the small business owner and employer possesses primarily 
professional knowledge with regard to the core activity of the business, not specific knowledge 
regarding safety and the working environment, nor are these the first topics such an 
employer tackles. Priority is given to such areas as finance and accounting, legal 
requirements, sales and customer contact (Hasle, P.; Kines, P.; Andersen, L.P., 2009) 
Knowledge about safety is not what is first on the list when hiring employees either. It is more 
important to have a few staff members to perform the tasks for which there are customers. 
Therefore, there can be resistance in small enterprises to investing in equipment and tools 
(Vickers, I.; Baldock, R.; Smallbone, D.; James, P.; Ekanem, I., 2003). Taking time to become 
acquainted with a new professional area, which is not product relevant, such as the working 
environment and safety, is not generally something the small employer has time and money for 
(Walters, D.; Lamn, F., 2003). Therefore, he needs to receive a plan and method developed by 
others with the necessary knowledge to fulfil his criteria: low cost, easy to use and maintain, 
and adapted to his tasks and the industry-related requirements (Vassie, L.; Cox, S., 1998). 
The conclusion is that the SME needs a good reason and motivation for making safety a high 
priority in its daily work. It is also necessary to create procedures and tools that are not 
demanding of time and resources, and the manager needs to feel convinced that such tools 
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 are useful for him to implement, because they fulfil several goals in a simple way. 
Furthermore, the manager must find tools to motivate and train employees to take safety more 
seriously. 
 
RESULTS 
The results present the tools and procedures for meeting the four goals presented in the method 
section. 
To find a motivating reason for the employer to participate and prioritize safety 
 
The most obvious motivational factor to focus on was the economic. Therefore, the very first 
step in the enterprise was to go through all the bills from the last year and calculate the total 
cost of all injuries and damages. These calculations focused solely on enterprises' own 
costs, which included: 
· Co-insurance, based on settlements according to the insurance claim list 
· Absence, based on the number of days of absence due to illness and the driver's average 
salary 
· Replacement or substitute of damaged goods 
· Repairs for damages not covered by insurance, especially minor damages 
· Repairs to damaged vehicles and compensation to customers and third parties for 
damages to property 
· Administration costs, based on number of working hours and the hourly price for the 
administrative employees. This calculation for the 6 enterprises showed that the costs for 
damages were from DKK 250,000 (EUR 35,000) and up to over DKK 700,000 (EUR 
100,000), which corresponded to between 20% and 100% of the different enterprise 
profits. 
After this new realization, the employer’s interest in participating in the project shifted from a 
general interest to a much more active attitude, which made the next step possible. 
To create a strategy and plan of action together with the employer 
The information about costs provided the basis and awakened interest for a dialogue 
regarding how to create a positive development in the business with fewer accident claims. 
The second step was thus a dialogue carried out regarding what each employer actually 
desired or their vision concerning precisely what their business could be known for. This 
had not previously been written down, but all the employers had thoughts about it. 
The question was put to the employer as a challenge for them to formulate in words what 
they most wished for their enterprise. On this basis, visions were formulated for the 
enterprises with the help of the researcher. 
To create understanding of how to transform a vision to a policy plan and a strategy 
The third step was to agree to stepwise action plans with the primary purpose of integrating 
the necessary initiatives into the entire enterprise’s objectives and mind-sets. The idea was 
to show that it was also a good idea for a SME to go through the following management 
steps: 
vision – policy plan and strategy – operational activities 
Through an intense dialogue with the employers, a number of general issues emerged as  
very important  for the company to focus on. All employers were able to recognize these 
issues (figure 1). 
 
Working environment, Safety, smoking, breaks, clothing, alcohol, health 
Technology/vehicles – 
responsibility/maintenance Quality of 
work in relation to customers, 
behaviour Environment, economy 
when driving and passive driving 
Colleagues, be a good colleague, respect, support, speed and attention 
The road as a place of work 
Figure 1. Issues for the haulage contractor company policies 
 
These issues were subsequently transformed into the following holistic approach for the 
company policies: 
· The work environment must ensure that employees are not injured in their work or have 
contracted an occupational disease. The work will also help to develop employees in 
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 their work and creating greater job satisfaction, including being a good colleague. 
· Technology / vehicles must be maintained in a safe and qualitative condition, and kept 
clean. It is a goal that all drivers need to understand the responsibility they have for the 
vehicle, both its maintenance and upkeep, but also that the vehicles are not damaged or 
to damage the property of others. 
· The quality of work must be such that customers can be sure that they get the product 
they have purchased, that it is delivered on time, at the right place and without the 
product being damaged. In addition, you can add the service to the customer, who must 
follow a supply of goods. 
· Environmental considerations must be related to the consumption of fuel, i.e. a goal of 
undertaking passive driving and to adjust the speed of traffic to minimize fuel 
consumption. This will also mean better road safety. 
· The traffic work places special demands on drivers' abilities and willingness to drive 
safely and take account  of other road users. High demands must be placed on 
employees' driving skills and motivation to do so. It should be such that there can be 
full confidence that employees understand the responsibility they have, that they have 
the necessary skills and that they are motivated to perform safe driving. 
From strategy to operational activities. 
The fourth step was to establish a process of implementation of the strategy, so that the 
policies gave meaning in the practical life of the company and could be communicated to the 
employees. 
The employer was asked to formulate what they considered the five most important rules for 
the employees to follow in their daily work. One example is shown in figure 2. 
 
Working environment, safety, smoking, breaks, clothing, alcohol 
1. Be sure to wear reflective work clothes and safety shoes and a hard hat. 
2. Be sure to have the necessary knowledge/training for the work you are doing. 
3. Be sure that your lifting equipment and vehicle are approved and in a good maintained 
condition. 
4. Be sure to think safety into your daily tasks (10 seconds). 
5. Give yourself time in traffic and for your tasks – do not press yourself and follow driving 
time rules. 
Technology/Vehicles – responsibility, maintenance 
1. Check the oil and water of the vehicle every morning. 
2. Check that the vehicle’s lights, lamps and mirrors are in order and clean every morning. 
3. Check that the tyres are in order every morning and make sure that the vehicle is generally 
well maintained. 
4. Check every morning that the especially sensitive parts of the vehicle are in order. 
5. Never drive with an overweight load. 
Quality of work in relation to customers, behaviour 
1. The customer is in the centre in relation to all jobs. 
2. It is your responsibility that the job is carried out in a professional manner. 
3. If the agreed time cannot be met, contact and inform the customer. 
4. Never discuss with the customer, but call the office if problems arise. 
5. Be calm, positive and accommodating. 
Environment, driving economy. Speed and passive driving. 
1. Drive evenly and calmly, max. 80 km/h – you will surely get there. 
2. Do not overtake; it disturbs other drivers. 
3. Respect driving in cities that demand particle filters and adhere to traffic regulations. 
4. Minimize driving in densely populated areas when possible. 
5. Be considerate of other drivers even if they are not considerate of you. 
Colleagues 
1. When you drive another vehicle, find out before what you should be aware of. 
2. Be sure to return a borrowed vehicle in the same condition as when you received it. 
3. Maintain good discipline when using a trailer and return it in a clean condition. 
4. If you have knowledge about special risks at a workplace where colleagues also come, 
inform them. 
5. Support your colleagues when you can, and they will also support you. 
The road as a workplace 
1. Always be sure to wear reflective work clothes when you work on the road. 
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 2. Be sure that there are good and clear signals of where you are working on the road in 
relation to other drivers. 
3. Be very aware of where you move and stand in relation to other drivers. 
4. Never expect other drivers to be considerate of you; there will always be some that won’t. 
5. Be sure you have had sufficient sleep when working on the road, especially when working 
at night. 
 
Figure 2. Example of 5 key points for each of the items in the strategy 
 
Mapping the problems/risk identification 
One of the first activities includes mapping the working environment problems at the 
company through the use of a simplified workplace assessment scheme. Also the conditions 
for the vehicles and the technologies should be evaluated, as well as how satisfied the 
customer is and also an evaluation of the drivers’ ability and competences for being a good 
driver should be examined. On the basis of the strategy and knowledge of the actual risks, 
the employer has made their baseline for a new change. 
  
The process 
A number of activities were initiated during the first half of the research period, some of which 
did not target the working environment. However, together with activities that were targeted 
the working environment they provide an overall picture that employers and drivers could 
identify with. Since many of the activities involve the drivers, they began to participate in 
the companies’ initiatives. Precisely this involvement is a part of the strategy to create 
co- ownership, involvement and communication between drivers and management. 
Figure 3 shows the range of activities initiated for the six haulage contractor businesses. All 
the activities aim to provide knowledge about safety through communication and information, 
guarantee the ability to behave safely through involvement and training, and motivate the 
employees to actually behave safely through rewards and dialogue. 
 
Structure 
Involvement of the middle manager, involvement of the drivers, Dialog and communication, 
planning of tasks, Time schedules, Resource allocation, availability of technology, training 
facilities, requirements for the clients 
Processer 
Information flows, Workflows, Collaboration, Processes control, Meetings, employee 
interviews, workplace assessments, newsletters, driver handbooks, ten seconds awareness 
Awards 
This year's driver, Bonus schemes, Praise and criticism through appraisal interviews, 
Gained skills and advantages, Elite status 
Human resources 
Employee’s knowledge, competences and motivation, the wish to be seen as a professional 
and to be respected and also to respect others. 
 
Figure 3. List of activities and the model showing the purpose of the activities 
 
Developing the newsletter/information 
A newsletter aims to ensure that all important information is disseminated through one channel 
to all relevant persons. Information may still be put up on a notice board, but not without it 
also being included in the newsletter, so that everyone knows where they can obtain a total 
overview of what is happening and what they need to know, including information about 
specific safety and health conditions at work. The newsletter should be developed according to 
needs, with new ideas and involvement of employees with regard to the newsletter’s content, 
structure and frequency. 
 
Meetings and involvement of employees 
A meeting was organized with all the employees to inform and involve them regarding the 
vision and its practical implications, emphasizing that they would be asked to take part in 
formulating how to carry out the vision and to achieve the strategic goals. 
Not everything can be communicated through a newsletter; there is always a need for 
management and employees to meet in dialogue. Space must therefore be created for 
holding regular, brief meetings – for example, once a month – with involvement of the 
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 employees who participate. It might not be necessary to make the meetings obligatory, but 
they should be used to carry on a dialogue regarding work, working conditions, and safety 
conditions, where employees have the opportunity to influence their own situation, and where 
management also has the opportunity to explain what behaviour they expect of the 
employees. It should not be that the only way to have influence is to participate in such 
meetings, but it should be a pleasant and positive experience, and maybe include something to 
eat and drink. 
 
Following up on costs for injuries and unexpected events 
There is a need to systematize and ensure full knowledge regarding the injuries and damages 
that occur and their causes and consequences. This applies to both injuries to persons, 
vehicle damage, and damage to the property of others. This information should be collected 
electronically in such a way that evaluations can be made of: 1) how much the damages and 
injuries cost the company; 2) which types of damages and injuries occur, where they occur 
and who is involved; and 3) which initiatives are taken to avoid similar damages and 
injuries, i.e. a follow-up of the calculations of costs mentioned earlier in this section. 
 
Employer-staff conversations/dialogue 
Indirect knowledge exists about the individual employee’s competences and capacity. A way 
is needed, however, to communicate personally with regard to what is good and bad, also in 
relation to safety behaviour. Personnel meetings between management and staff based on a 
regular procedure could form a sound basis for developing confidence in relation to the 
decisions made and communicating what is expected, also regarding safety behaviour. At the 
same time, individual needs could be clarified and satisfied. In this way, everyone can 
receive the praise and criticism that is necessary, and if any problem exists, it could be 
possible to clarify it and find a solution. Decisions should always be written down and 
accepted by both parties. 
 
Training by elite employees 
Different training demands are made in order to perform a job, but the job’s special 
character can only be learned through practical experience. Some are better at their job 
than others, with regard to quality, safety and stability. Workers who are really good can be 
titled elite employees and awarded the task of teaching those who are not on the same level, 
as well as new employees. This can be followed up by a form of continual training of the other 
employees, so that everyone is lifted to a higher level. 
 
Developed safety measures 
Safety meetings should be held once every quarter with an agenda and minutes. Solutions to 
significant risks should be discussed and initiatives taken, but some of these initiatives 
depend on producers/customers carrying them out. There are great differences in the 
conditions that producers/customers offer the companies’ employees, both in relation to the 
work at the customers’ places of business and transport to and from them. Greater focus is 
necessary in this respect, eventually with audits at the premises of the producers/customers. 
Efforts should also be made to create good relations with producers/customers, but in such a 
way that they understand that it is their responsibility that collecting and transporting their 
goods is carried out in a proper way. This includes, for example, clearing snow and ice in the 
winter and providing space for large vehicles to come in and out, proper transport space in 
front of buildings so that lifts, etc., can come in and out, good outside lighting, etc. 
 
Driver of the year awards 
A set of values should be drawn up for work as a driver, based on the vision, which can 
be realized in a series of measures that management can continually observe, register and 
make public, so that everyone knows where they stand. Such measures could have the 
following themes: 
· The ability to honour the demands for quality and safety in relation to customers 
· The ability to honour demands for safe behaviour 
· The ability to clean and maintain vehicles and drive without damage 
· The ability to cooperate and create good collegial relations 
The purpose of the driver of the year award is to make the good way of working visible, but 
also to reward the worker/workers who are stable, solid and contribute to fulfilling the 
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 company’s goals. Finally, it should also be a motivating factor for everyone to be the driver 
of the year, i.e. continually try to achieve the agreed goals. 
  
In this connection, it is important that the employees themselves are involved in defining 
the criteria for becoming driver of the year, as well as the way in which these criteria are 
measured and registered. The conditions must be known, and the justice of the system 
acknowledged. 
 
Collective rewards/consequences 
Some behaviour is not acceptable, but cannot be observed, because the employees are on 
the road on their own. Most drivers know who among them behave badly, but no one does 
anything about it, and the company incurs costs for damages caused by such bad 
behaviour. Sometimes this can be managed through dialogue, but collective responsibility, 
where employees influence one another, can also be a positive resource for regulating 
behaviour. 
 
Ten-seconds of consideration before the task is carried out – awareness 
There will always be a certain risk involved in work, especially when working on foreign 
ground using machines and driving on the roads. This is reinforced when the work is done at 
odd hours and through the night. It is therefore important that everyone involved is conscious 
of the risks and behaves in such a way that accidents do not occur. 
In this connection, the drivers can be introduced to the value of taking a breath before acting or 
doing a job just to think safety, with regard to their vehicle, themselves, and others – for 
example, by using ten seconds to think: 
· Is it a safety problem just for myself I should have under control? 
· Is it a safety problem for the vehicle? 
· Is it a safety problem for other people nearby? 
· Is it a safety problem in relation to the customer’s or others’ property? 
This requires this message being given to every driver and that the manager or owner them 
self continually reminds the drivers that they should think about safety for just ten seconds. 
However, it also demands that they know the risks involved. This knowledge can be 
gained from the above proposals for damage registration, as well as from elite 
employees. Finally, it is important that risks of various damage and injuries constitute a point 
on meeting agendas and are discussed in the newsletter. 
 
DISCUSSION 
All the employers knew about legal requirements. They had elected safety 
representatives, but kept formal safety meetings to an absolute minimum. They also adhered 
to rules regarding driving-rest time and traffic safety rules. 
It was a real motivational eye-opener for the employers to realize the costs of damage and 
injuries. We found that none of the enterprises had an overview of these costs beforehand, as 
it was not included in their financial accounts. 
None of the enterprises had any thoughts whatsoever regarding strategies or policies on 
safety or anything else. It was new for them to think in this more systematic way. Writing 
down the employers’ thoughts and wishes and helping to formulate and compile them in a 
professional way was a very positive experience for all parties, but they would never have 
done it without help. 
The same applies to the implementation of the various tools. It was possible to inform about 
them, but it became clear that they would not be used without help. The enterprises that 
participated most successfully in the process either found help from external partners or 
appointed one of their own employees to do the job. 
The extent to which it was necessary to discuss employee leadership with the employers was 
surprising, as well as the need to present arguments for why it is necessary to talk with their 
employees and involve them in decision making. There was clearly a lack of managerial 
latitude and competence. 
The employers have an overall need to understand the management task in relation to 
employees. The haulage contractor spends all their time getting work for the business and 
making agreements with customers, but exercising leadership toward employees and 
ensuring that they actually carry out the work as they are supposed to, also in a safe and 
qualified manner, does not lie within the haulage contractor's field of competency. It was 
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 therefore necessary to help them understand this part of their responsibility as an employer 
and illustrate how they could gain positive value from the effort. 
Many of the proposed initiatives were carried out in the enterprises, but acknowledging that it 
is a difficult task to create new forms of behaviour and basic conditions in a small enterprise 
has proven to be hard to maintain for the small employer, but in fact, it is not because they 
do not wish to change. 
The experience from this project is that the SME employers, at least in the transport sector, 
need management training and help to formulate their visions and transform this vision into a 
plan for how to achieve it, and they need support to turn the plan into action. This kind of 
training and help does not need to be costly or too time consuming, but it needs to be done by 
professionals. Most of the employers would never go for it themselves, but the authorities, 
the insurance companies, and the employer’s organisations could do a lot. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The research project has shown that it is possible to simplify and adapt management tools 
and methods to SMEs and thus create easily accessible activities that can set focus on safety. 
It can be difficult to maintain the companies’ attention in the long run, and there are periods 
when their resources cannot handle more than getting work in for the business. 
At least three issues have to go hand-in-hand: 
· The first is to get the employer interested and to prioritize safety together with quality. 
This is actually rather easy to do by calculating all the costs that are incurred when things 
go wrong. 
· The second is to help the employer understand what they can accomplish through small 
activities that involve the employees and are easy to implement. 
· The third and most difficult is to ensure that the employer gives constant priority to 
the activities that are initiated. 
· The employer can be interested and understand the problem and the solutions, but if their 
economic situation is critical, if they do not have the right technological resources, and if 
they do not have the proper staff and the right competences, then it is nearly impossible 
to begin to think of making changes in the social and cultural capital. Nevertheless, this 
is what they have to do. 
The advantage is that if this surplus is in place, then it is not far from understanding to decision 
making and implementation. Something actually results from a clear effort. The main 
conclusion is that there is a need to help small business employers understand what the 
management task involves and how they can develop themselves and their businesses in a 
simple way without any grand system. However, our results also show that safety efforts first 
become accepted when they are integrated into other efforts to form a visible whole in relation 
to the company's overall goals. 
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Abstract 
More and more enterprises are struggling with a relatively small amount of reported near-miss 
accidents which are the base of Heinrich’s pyramid and the source of knowledge of accidents 
causes. In order to prevent unwanted occurrences this knowledge is essential. The research, 
when conducted, focuses on managers’ activation in terms of safety culture and the reasons of 
employees‘ reporting negligence. Objectives. The aim of the study is to build the awareness 
concerning the importance of reporting any inconveniences/disturbances at workplace and, 
consequently, the implementation of prepared tools based on the research. Material and 
methods. The study was conducted on the corporate factory’s premises and involved around 
120 workers. The methods used included: questionnaires, interviews, work observations as 
well as literature analyses. Results and Discussion. The study confirms that managers’ 
activity has a huge impact on the engagement of their subordinates in the accident 
prevention. Conclusion. Permanent effects of developing system of health and safety 
management can be achieved if apart from improving techniques and organization of the 
workplaces, the organizations will care about building safety awareness among its employees. 
Safety culture depends on the extent of trust as well as effective communication in companies. 
 
Keywords: communication; awareness; safety culture; preventive measures 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the past few years there has been an increasing number of talks on safety 
conscience at numerous companies. Since there is not enough knowledge concerning all the 
real causes of accidents, different companies find it difficult to develop a safe workplace. 
Among the publications on building safety culture, we may find a wide range of publications on 
the influence of managers’ on building safety culture. Without any precise information on the 
source of problems, it is impossible to solve its factors, which is the indirect cause, initiating 
serious consequences of accidents. The main factories’ resources are blue-collar workers, 
who have a direct contact with work factors, which is equal to having knowledge about 
threats at workplace. The Main Statistical Office in Poland (GUS) summarized the quantity of 
accidents in industry manufacturing. The numbers are as follows: in 2012 there were 85 fatal 
accidents, 262 injury accidents and 33431 minor accidents. The year later the numbers were 
respectively: 60, 240, 29943 (GUS,2013,2012). Among the factors affecting the accident rate 
most often, one can distinguish: 
• no motivational system for the employees' to use personal protection measures (Tint P, Paas 
O, Reinhold K., 2010); 
• no continuous system of employee training (Tint P, Paas O, Reinhold K., 2010); 
• too little awareness among the employees of the importance of health and safety rules 
(Chaib R., Verzea I., Benidir M., Taleb M., 2012); 
• human errors (Ali H., Abdullah N.A.C, Subramaniam C., 2009; Goetsch D.L.,2002); 
• improper management practices in terms of safety at work (Ali H., Abdullah N.A.C, 
Subramaniam C., 2009); 
• insufficient level of operating machines and tools (Ali H., Abdullah N.A.C, Subramaniam C., 
2009; Vredenburgh A.G., 2002); 
• technological system failures (Ali H., Abdullah N.A.C, Subramaniam C., 2009; Vredenburgh 
A.G., 2002); 
• safety culture in the enterprise (Ali H., Abdullah N.A.C, Subramaniam C., 2009; 
Beckmerhagen I.A., Berg H.P, Karapetrovic S.V, Willborn W.O., 2003). 
There is no obligation in the Polish law to record so called near miss accidents, which 
could lead to injury if some circumstances appeared. However, more and more companies 
are trying to report those kinds of incidents according to the proverb, ‘prevention is better than 
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cure’. That is why the managers should be aware that ‘the lowest standards, which a boss 
tolerates become the highest standards of your employees’ (Marchel M., 2014, p.69). Due to 
the restructuring of companies, which is widespread in a market economy, there have 
been created system solutions that support the company's management (Dahlhe G, 2013, 
p.13). However, it requires to be constantly improved according to the PDCA cycle. In order to 
create an effective prevention system, the analysis of collected literature and the three-months-
research were conducted. The aim of the research was to analyse and evaluate the actions 
taken in the area of accident prevention, taking into account near miss cases (NMC) as well 
as unsafe acts/conditions (UA/UC) and to develop the concept of interpersonal and group 
communication, which activates employees to join the scheme in preventing potential 
accidents. The overall objective of Health and Safety Management system is to determine 
methods of collecting and transferring information about working conditions in order to avoid 
the costs (remuneration for the time not worked due to employee absences, production 
downtime, damage of machinery, equipment and products and the cost of health care and 
recovery (Dahlke G., 2013, p.13). 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
There has been put forward a hypothesis that top managers have a huge impact on the 
engagement of their subordinates in accident prevention. The research sample accounts for 
106 factory workers. While designing the system, there was gathered an accidents analysis in 
a corporate factory within four years. It concerned: the most common ways of reporting NMC 
and UA/UC as well as the reasons of accidents. Then, the presented juxtaposition (Table 1) 
shows significant differences between the analysis of traditional accidents causes, shown by 
OSHA (Occupational Safety&Health Administration), which was also used in the factory, and 
the MORT method (Management Oversight Risk Tree) which focuses not only on blue-collar 
workers mistakes but also on the negligence of management personnel (Karczewski J., 
Karczewska K., 2000). 
 
Table 1 – The comparision of OSHA and the MORT accident causes analysis. 
OSHA METHOD MORT METHOD 
Dangerous workers behaviour 85% Top managers failure 12.8% 
 Safety inspectors failure 15.6% 
 Technical services failure 18.4% 
Unsafe working conditions 15% Supervisor failure 24.7% 
 Dangerous workers behaviours 14.8% 
 Unsafe working conditions 13.7% 
Source: based on: Karczewski J., Karczewska K., Systemy zarządzania bezpieczeństwem pracy, 2000 
 
The project is based on the MORT accident analysis method in which a simple division of 
accidents’ causes were divided into the above mentioned elements. The number of dangerous 
behaviours decreased from 85% to 14.8% and also there is a small drop in the unsafe working 
conditions cause – from 15% to 13.7%. Furthermore, also the current situation was examined. 
Using a questionnaire containing 4 questions, 102 employees had an opportunity to 
anonymously express whether they understand ‘the near miss accidents’ statement, if they 
report them and if not, what the reasons are and what disturbs them in safe working. This tool 
recognized whether the terminology and rules of the procedure for reporting such incidents as 
NMC/UA/UC are familiar to the workers or not. The next method was the Method for Industrial 
Safety and Health Activity Assessment (MISHA). Both part B1 and B2 were selected to check 
the co-participation and communication in the factory from different organizational levels 
perspective. The tool assumes that the audits must be conducted by the staff at various levels 
of the organization: CEO, top management, middle management supervisors as well as blue-
collar workers (Kussito A., 2000, p.138). The last method used during the research was 
interviews defined as a form of casual exchange of opinions between an interviewer and 
respondents. The problem of fear report NMC/UA/UC was raised as well. Since the interviews 
were led by an external specialist, the received feedback is assumed to be highly relevant and 
sincere. 
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3. RESULTS 
Despite the fact that a number of reports concerning disturbances at workplace has 
aroused, it is still an undesirable quantity of records. For the company, it is important to 
expand knowledge about causes of those kinds of accidents in order to constantly develop the 
system and prevent the effects of accidents. The table below presents quantity of different kinds 
of accident  within 5 years. 
 
Table 2 – The summary of accidents reports. Source: Company research. 
 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
Accidents 19 14 10 12 20 
Near
 mis
  
3 7 2 8 24 
Unsafe 
behavior/ 
  conditions  
 
1002 
 
801 
 
3051 
 
1374 
 
1634 
 
Till this moment all employees have had an opportunity to inform about aroused occurrences as 
shown in the table below. 
 
Table 3 – The ways of reporting. Source: Company research. 
Means of reporting Year TOTAL 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mailbox 80 38 16 1 4889 5024 
Phone call 4 4 6 4 2 18 
Personal contact 39 38 51 26 20 174 
E-mail 11 8 11 13 6 49 
TOTAL 134 88 84 44 4917 5267 
 
The significant growth of records in 2013 was due to the campaign which engaged all 
employees to report NMC, UA/UC. In the remaining years the number of records is 
unsatisfactory. 
The chart presented below recognizes the reasons of accidents according to the general 
method (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 – General reasons of accidents. Source: Own research. 
 
The research proved that, according to the general method, the major reasons for accidents 
result from unsafe behaviours of employees. As it was written in the previous part, it does 
not take into consideration indirect causes which, when accumulated, lead to injuries while 
working. Then, obviously the worker is the one who fails. For this reason the system is based 
on the MORT method (Table 1). The results from another analysis – questionnaire are 
depicted in Figure 2. 
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1. What do you understand by ‘near miss accident’? 
2. Do you know how ‘near miss accidents’ are marked in your factory? 
3. Do you report it? If not, please write why. 
4. What disturbs you in safe working? 
 
Figure 2 – The questionnaire results –  safety awareness in the factory. Source: Own research. 
 
1. Approximately 12% of the respondents do not know what the “near miss accident” is. 
2. Most of the workers are not informed how “near miss accidents” are marked on information 
boards on the factory premises. 
3. Most of the workers do not report NMC. 
4. Most of the workers complain about working conditions and inconveniences. 
 
Following a more thorough analysis of the problem, more detailed results of point 3 and 4 are 
presented below. 
 
Figure 3 – Reasons of reporting negligence. Source: Own research. 
 
The fact that most workers declared that they had never witnessed near miss accidents 
circumstances can indicate a slightly dismissive attitude towards safety. The other essential 
reasons are: anxiety about being an unfriendly snitch –the opinion of co-workers values, too 
much bureaucracy connected with reporting as well as fear of loss of bonuses. These reasons 
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are result from misinformed employees on how their feedback will be used. Not only do they 
not receive any responds from their supervisors after reporting, but also they are worried about 
drawing the consequences solely on their behavioural basis – fear of being made the only 
person responsible for near miss accidents without considering intermediate causes. The 
added value of the questionnaire is the feedback from point 4 which covers disturbing aspects 
during work (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 – Factors causing disturbances at workplace. Source: Own research. 
 
The fast pace of work which is connected with deadlines of contracts, high temperature and 
noise as well as stress are at the top when it comes to the disturbances during work. These 
aspects can contribute to near miss or injury accidents. 
The subsequent tool analysis – the MISHA, in which the Manager of Health and Safety 
Department, the Manager of Production Line as well as blue-collar workers answered the 
following questions concerning: communication between worker-supervisor, development in 
teamwork, main communication procedures, information about shifts, suggestions for the 
development of actions and safety campaigns. The results reveal that the perception of 
the collaboration and communication between workers from different organizational levels 
vary considerably. 
 
Table 4 – MISHA results. Source: Own research. 
 Health and Safety 
Department Manager 
Production
 Lin
e Manager 
Blue-collar workers 
Evaluation 69% 52% 67% 
 
In Table 4 the evaluation of the effectiveness of participation and communication in the 
enterprise was calculated by the formula given in the MISHA method. It is worth mentioning 
that, for the purpose of the project, only a part of the MISHA questionnaire was examined (part 
B1 and B2). The other parts are not closely related to the subject of the study. The results 
show that unlike to the Health and Safety Manager, The Production Line Manager feels 
communication relations between other workers to the least extent. Among the respondents 
only H&S Manager does not see a need to improve the way of immediate response to 
proposals for improvement which come from workers. It indicates that Health&Safety 
Department can be unaware of their lack of feedback to workers who previously reported 
appeared disturbances. 
Last but not least there come the interviews. The interviewees often admitted that they do 
not report NMC, UA/UC because they do not receive any feedback. They feel neglected 
and tired of the reporting procedure which requires signatures which later can be used 
against them. The answers cover the questionnaire results. 
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4. DISCUSSION ABOUT THE CONCEPT 
Shaping the workers behaviour in potentially accidental events, prevention area can be defined 
as building approach in the organization towards Health and Life of the employees. This 
approach to Health&Life and the environment can be understood as: ‘A collection of 
psychological, social and organizational factors and other triggers which support measures to 
protect the health of both life and work, as well as activities aside from profession’ defined as 
safety culture (Studenski R., 2000, p.1). It is a part of the organizational culture, defined as 
:’any system of values and norms of behaviour, which are the part of every organization. 
Organizational culture shows the way of thinking and proceeding of educated and approved 
employees’ (Wyrwicka M., Stasiuk A., Drzewiecka M., Masadyński M.,2011, p.176). 
The presented above research facilitated the development of a concept of communication 
system which can activate workers to prevent from unwished events. There are several 
ways of shaping it. The system is based on following concepts: ‘4A’ and ‘7P’(Karczewski 
T.,W., pp.358-268). 
 
Figure 5 – ‘4A’ concept. Source: based on Karczewski T.,W.,2012, pp.358-268 
 
Every stage of the system must be well prepared by the company. Concept ‘4A’ distinguishes the 
most important elements affecting the success of the implementation ( Figure 5). Since the 
effectiveness of the measures will depend on the employees, it is necessary to build their 
acceptance in order to awake the sense of procedures in them. Firstly, we need to refer to the 
knowledge which is the base of Awareness. The next step is kind of a struggle to convince 
workers that reporting NMC is profitable. There are two common reasons: one is profits for 
workers concerning their health and life protection, and the other are profits for the factory, 
such as avoiding the cost of post-accident issues, for instance, compensation, repairs of 
machines, production standstills. The third ‘A’ stands for Application. The workers slowly start 
to report but they need the encouragement. At this stage of the system workers tend to 
forget about the importance of reporting NMC, so the involvement of top managers is 
essential. They should support, encourage and be role models for their subordinates. The last 
step is Assimilation. Since good habits do not immediately become a permanent part of the 
system, we need to ‘take care of them’ and constantly develop the prevention system. It is 
comparable to a flower that withers without watering (Karczewski T.,W., pp.358-268). It is a 
long process, so the benefits and financial effects may occur after some time. 
The process of building safety awareness should be discussed in four dimensions 
(Berkowska A., Drzewiecka M., Mrugalska B., 2014, p. 23): 
 
· self-knowledge on health and safety conditions. It should be shaped, for example, by 
trainings, 
· the obedience of safety at work regulations – it is crucial to persuade workers that the 
responsibility for safe working environment belongs not only to the employer or 
Health&Safety inspectors but also to themselves. Pursuant to the regulations, it is the 
employer who bears the responsibility for safety at work, however, all the people working 
in a given organization should be alert and obey safety rules at work, 
· the perception of how health and safety at work regulations are interpreted- whether both 
employers and employees are aware of technical and organizational aspects and their 
impact on health and safety at work, 
· attention – understood as due to diligence, taking special care of healthy and safe working 
conditions. The concept of building the awareness of health and safety at work is 
presented in Figure 6. 
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 Figure 6 - The concept of building the awareness of health and safety at work. Source: Own work based on Berkowska 
A., Drzewiecka M., Mrugalska B., 2014, p. 24; Gajdzik B., 2009 
 
A similar approach can be seen in the concept ‘7P’ ( Table ' 7P ' ). The development of desired 
safety habits requires time. Firstly, it is extremely important to build the sense of safety 
awareness among the workers. Only then it is possible to gain the approval of the project and 
its accomplishment. ‘7P’ concept covers (Karczewski T.,W.,2012,p.235): 
 
Table 5 – ‘7P’ concept. Source: based on Karczewski T.,W., 2012, p. 235 
No. Explanation 
1. The workers conviction of safety awareness (promotion campaign) 
2. A simple form + reporting procedure 
3. A positive first reaction of the supervisors 
4. Thanks and feedback 
5. Professional analysis of the causes of unwished occurrence 
6. Appropriate implementation of effective preventive and corrective measures 
7. Positive reinforcement – visualization of success and achievement of the system 
 
This concept is based on the development of collecting and transforming the information about 
NMC. 
As a result, a trainee program was prepared, for so called, ‘Safety Minutes’ which are 
practiced in most of corporation factories. Those are single issue meetings between 
production leaders and their subordinates. Each of the meeting aims to develop safety 
concerns in the workplace and build up safety awareness by discussing safety management 
best- practices (the ways how to perform in order to reduce the probability of unwished 
occurrences by maintaining the principles of quality and ergonomics). According to the 
feedback from workers (Figure 2) the employees do not know what the differences between 
injury accident and ‘near misses’ or unsafe conditions/acts are. So, in order to familiarize them 
with the topic, all workers were trained. The leaders are the ones liable for leading ‘Safety 
Moments’ and enhancing the consciousness of blue-collar workers. However, it should be 
doubtless that the person leading the training thoroughly understands the subject under 
discussion. For that reason, firstly the training material should be presented to the leaders and 
top-level managers by the external couch or Health&Safety inspector. An independent tutor 
often is more respected and listened to than a full-time employee, who is working close to 
the shop floor on a daily basis. Once, the leaders understand all issues they are able to train 
their subordinates. The training material consists of two parts: theoretical and practical. The 
theoretical part incorporates the analysis of accidents in accordance with the Heinrich’s 
pyramid, then ‘Safety Minutes’ participants analyse together three examples: the accident, the 
NMC and the UA/UC. The practical part is based on a team work. It is conducted in form of a 
test. Therefore employees work together on solving task which is not supposed to be a form of 
test – a stressful factor. Working in groups encourages brainstorming, integration and help to 
remember issues under discussion. After 15 minutes of teamwork, there is an open discussion 
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and clarification of any doubts. Understanding those terms enable them to notice incidents 
while working and report them afterwards. Moreover, the health and safety aspects cannot be a 
taboo. Safety topics should resonate through the factory’s premises by posters, campaigns 
etc. The workers need to be accustomed with safety culture. 
The next step of the project is reporting unwished events by specially prepared cards. In 
blank spaces the workers can mark: date, time, place, brief description and presumable 
reasons of an occurrence. There is also some space for signature which is not obligatory at the 
beginning of the system since the workers need to be convinced by the company that only the 
information about an occurrence, not to whom it happened, is essential. People, who show 
evident courage by signing the card will be praised by their supervisor. Thanks to that, workers 
are appreciated and feel satisfaction. 
After that, the project focuses on noticing admirable behaviour and rewarding workers. 
Appreciation is one of the most important motivation factor. People tend to see whenever 
something is done badly in order to: notice and perpetuate favourable actions. Any actions 
taken by the supervisors, which consists of praising their subordinates for a safe way of 
working helps creating safety work culture. It can involve: a constant safety way of working 
without admonishment, preventive actions like: reproving co-workers for unsafe actions, 
reporting any inconveniences and others. 
Finally, after each record of NMC, UA/UC the feedback given to the workers ought to be 
created since communication is not a one-sided process. Each record requires an analysis by 
a Health&Safety Inspector, Line Manager and others to whom the matter concerns. The 
presentation of the records’ results on a notice board indicates that the company cares about 
the workers and the development of a safe work environment. When the employees are 
informed about their records and see consequently that preventive and corrective measures 
are implemented, they become aware of the importance of their actions. 
Last but not least - the impact of words on behaviour should be discussed. The communication 
process can be considered effective if the recipient can interpret a message as intended by 
the sender. Not only do environmental conditions, or, means of delivering messages 
influence an effective interpretation of the message but also the way how the words are 
uttered. The same sentence can be pronounced in different ways and can create 
numerous different attitudes and behaviour. The table below presents some positive and 
negative impacts of communication (Urban H.). 
 
Table 6 – Positive and negative organizational communication. 
No. Ways of communication  
 + - 
1. Expressing gratitude and rewarding for safe working Treating workers contemptuously 
2. Asking about suggestions, prospects, opinion Ignoring 
3. Specifying managers’ expectations towards workers 
Permanent complaining about the work, 
behavior of subordinates 
4. Showing interest, offering help Speaking with higher tone of voice 
5. Calling by the first name Using obscene, rude language 
6. Encouraging, trusting Gossiping and threats 
7. Short, constructive criticism in private Sharp criticism among workmates. 
Source: Based on Urban H., Słowa mają moc, pp.171-172 
 
Irrespective of the position held, the workers have the same needs; to be respected and 
experience gratitude. The way managers communicate with their subordinates affects working 
atmosphere. 
The company which has already implemented the project also has changed the name of ‘near 
miss accident’ as the word ‘accident’ has a negative connotation (search of the guilty, after 
accident investigations, questioning). It suggests that something unwished will happen. The 
word does not reflect the essence of the problem which is searching for causes, not the guilty. 
The investigation needs to be focused on human mistakes which are natural – not workers’ 
fault. Commonly known organizations changed the name from ‘near miss accident’ to 
‘incident’, ‘safety defect’, ‘improve proposal’ and others. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
There are many factors which determine a company’s ability to work with safety culture and thus 
implement an effective strategy. It is a multistage process which requires time as attitude of the 
workers concerning inclination to any preventive activities has been shaped by their past 
experience as well as previous and current work environment. Therefore, presented study and 
tools should be considered while creating safety management concept. It contributes to 
ultimately sustainable working atmosphere in the long term. However, it should be stressed that 
the key to success is the awareness. More emphasis should be placed on safety training 
methods and internal communication. A gradual increase of engaged workers may also convince 
other workmates to preventive participation. Good habits do not immediately become a 
permanent part of the system. The top-managers play an important role. Their passive attitude 
leads to preservation of bad habits as lack of reaction is equal to perpetuation of hazardous 
behaviour. The reinforcement of the system requires approval of performing safe work, and in 
case of risky behaviour, constructive but unpretentious dialogue between leaders and their 
subordinates should be carried out. The system also focuses on changing the attitude of 
workers. They should have a positive attitude to safety issues, not treat them as chores. 
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Abstract 
The study it`s a research about history of health and safety legislation in Romania, about 
European tools, empowerment procedures, organisations and association in the field. 
It`s an overview about European tools to allow people free movements all around European 
Union (EU). The study presents tools which identifies the fundamental skills, the most important 
abilities and knowledge that people would need to be recognised, in order to allow free 
movements all around European employment market. The study is about possibilities to be 
voluntary recognised as a health and safety professionals across EU and why not, around the 
world.  It`s a brief list of ways of transfer and recognition of learning experiences in Europe, 
including vocational education and training, for a better understanding of qualifications from 
different EU countries. 
The research presents ENSHPO (The European Network of Safety & Health Professional 
Organisations) and EUSAFE (European project) voluntary certification procedures for 
occupational health and safety professionals (OHS) and where the Romanian practitioners are 
placed, if their qualifications could be recognised through Europe. 
The research presents the necessary characteristics for a well developed profession, as 
mentioned by Ferguson and Ramsay (2010) and also presents IOSH, the most valuable health 
and safety professional association and the necessary steps for Romanian OHS practitioners to 
build such a strong association. IOSH it`s the model of a profession and Romanian practitioners 
could learn to become Charted Members. 
The European Union single market - as well as the increasing number of companies operating 
across Europe that are applying a consistent set of safety and health standards to their work 
sites - has created a great need for safety and health managers with credentials that are 
recognised at a Pan-European level. The absence of a harmonised, agreed system for the 
mutual recognition of safety & health qualifications at a European level creates uncertainty 
about professional competence across countries within Europe and may create problems for 
multinational companies in the effective use of their safety and health expertise. It also forms a 
barrier for safety and health professionals wishing to offer their services across the EU.  
Knowing the level of training is necessary to determine the training needs of OHS practitioners, 
now that Romania has joined the EU in order to allow free movement of the work force. 
Knowing where to start and what needs to be improved, will allow the Romanian practitioners to 
be just as good and compete with their European colleagues. The study will show which of the 
Romanian empowerment procedures was better, with or without examinations, and whether 
practitioners were more prepared than these days. 
The research is part of a study that aims to thoroughly analyze the transformation in the 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) field in Romania following the major political, economic, 
social and cultural transformations that are necessary in the context of Romania`s accession to 
the European Union. The research evaluates the current experience and training needs of 
Romanian OHS professionals. A review of the changes in the legislation and qualification 
requirements in Romania will be presented and placed into the context of European legislation 
and standards. 
 
Keywords: health and safety; OHS practitioners, qualifications, OHS competence, training. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In the past 25 years, Romania has gone through major political, economic, social and cultural 
transformations, all necessary in the context of Romania`s accession to the European Union 
(2007). The admittance in the EU, the alignment of national legislation and OHS standardization 
across Europe, forces the profession to reach faster the European requirements for quality and 
competence; the question that arises and the project want to find out is: are the Romanian OHS 
professionals prepared? 
This research it`s a small part from a bigger study whose aims is to thoroughly analyze the 
transformation in health and safety field and present the current experience and training needs 
of Romanian OHS professionals, to help professionals to obtain answers about their daily 
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practices, that are best answered through systematic investigation, or the research process` 
(DePoy and Gitlin,1994). The purpose of the research is to understand the meanings, 
experiences of Romanian professionals through a naturalistic design, where the scope is 
exploration, understanding and description (DePoy and Gitlin,1994). The study is being 
undertaken by an insider, herself a practitioner, and therefore gains insights from experience but 
may be influenced by personal perception. 
OHS professional is a relatively new profession in Romania, dating from 1998 and having many 
changes since then. Ferguson and Ramsay (2010) reviewed the characteristics of a well 
developed profession and this research will evaluate training and career development, will 
discuss future steps that may be necessary. 
The objectives of the study include: 
1.To review the ways of becoming an OHS professional, through literature highlighting the 
legislative requirements and competences with the EUSAFE Project (2010-2012). 
2.To evaluate the perception of Romanian OHS  practitioners about the quality of their training 
and preference for delivering of future training (survey) 
3.To estimate the demand for development of a professional code of ethics for Romanian OHS 
professionals and to identify potential barriers (survey) 
4.To evaluate colleagues` professional experience and training level, in order to establish the 
current training needs of the Romanian OHS professionals. 
The project could be interesting for the OHS professionals from Romania, as the world is 
changing and practitioners must prepare themselves for the new challenges. The opening of 
labour market towards Europe could bring European OHS professionals to the country and this 
might create great competition for our experienced safety officers. The research will be 
interesting, also, for European OHS professionals, as they could find out who they are 
competing against in Romania and what the level of local competition is. 
 
2.1. MATERIALS 
In the Romanian literature, there are no studies regarding the OHS professionals, their 
preparation level or the ways of becoming one; this is why the researcher used the legislative 
provisions and the mandatory steps needed to become an OHS professional as literature 
review. The researcher learnt from Robson (2011) and proved that a research project could 
have three possible purposes traditionally recognized: to explore the background of how 
someone could become an OHS services provider, to describe the necessary steps and to 
explain one`s development as a professional in the field. Due to lack of scientific evidence about 
this topic, the researcher could only hope that this project will be important for the development 
of OHS practitioners, considering that all research is concerned with contributing to knowledge 
(Robson, 2011). 
 
2.1.1.History of health and safety legislation in Romania 
The first evidence of activity related to labour protection in Romania can be considered to be the 
1864 enactment of the Civil Code (inspired by Napoleon`s Code) which established the legal 
basis of the individual labour contract. Chronology of labour protection activities as presented on 
the website of the Ministry of Labour is: 
1890 - Servants Act 
1894 - Regulation  of unsanitary industries 
1902 - Trades Act  
1905 -  Law on Child and Women  Labour  
1907 - Trade Unions Act  
1912 - The first law of insurance in case of illness, accidents 
1920 - Establishment of the Ministry of Labour 
1927 - Setting up of Labour Inspection 
1932 - Establishment of work and pension contributions 
1945 - Trade Unions Act  
1946 - Law setting up the work day and work departments in court premises 
1949 - Law on Disease pension 
1954 - Introduction of the work groups 
1965 - Labour Protection Act No.5  in force until 1996 
1972 - Labour Code, Law No. 10  in force until 2003 
1989  The Romanian Revolution 
1996 - Law no.90 of labour protection (in force until 2006) 
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1998 - Order no.236 empowerment process of OSH specialists 
2002 - Law no. 346 of insurance in case of accidents at work and occupational diseases 
2002 - Order no. 251 changing the conditions regarding the empowerment of OHS specialists 
2003 - Law no. 53 Labour Code (in force) 
2004 - Order 167 changing the conditions regarding the empowerment of OHS specialists 
2006 - Law no. 319 Occupational Health and Safety Act (in force) modified in 2010. 
2007 - Romania joined the European Union  
 
2.1.2. Steps for empowerment of OHS provider in Romania, a history of legislative 
requirements  
The economic development of Romania has increased the attention given to work and 
everything related to the process. The history of health and safety is tightly connected to the 
qualification necessary to workers for facing the novelties brought over by the work 
technologies. The induction and training of employees was accompanied by the concern to 
provide decent work conditions and to enforce some measures to protect the components of the 
work system. 
Order no.236/12.05.1998 established, for the first time, the OHS external services` provider 
empowerment and the requirements for OHS consultant. The mandatory conditions for the 
authorization to provide services in the field of OHS, are: 
• (art. no 4) 5 years of experience in the field for those with university degrees, or 15 
years for those with pre university qualifications;  for the members of Labour of Ministry or local 
inspectorate, 4 years of experience are enough; 
• (art. no.6 point d) Technical university degrees and post university degrees with a 
duration of at least 6 weeks in the work protection field; 
The subscription folder should contain (according to art.no.6): the mandatory request form, 
Curriculum Vitae, diplomas and certificates from the work protection courses, the proof for  the 
years of experience in the work protection field and also in the economical domain  of  activity, 
for the empowerment authorization request (art.no.16 point d). 
The authorization procedure (art.no.9) included presenting a file with all the documents, passing 
a written exam and interview with representatives of the Labour Ministry. The validity of the 
certificate so obtained, was of 3 years (art.no.11); for renewing the certificate, a new 
examination was done after 3 years, with the specification that continuous professional 
development courses (CPD) had to be attended in the meantime.  
Order no. 251/01.07.2002 followed; it reduced the years of experience from 15 to 10 (art.no.14), 
for those with pre university qualifications and increased post university courses (art.no.4) from 
6 to 8 weeks. 
Order no. 167/16.04.2004 added new conditions, such as a recommendation from the Local 
Labour Inspectorate (art.no.24 point b), with mandatory examination by members of Labour 
Ministry or local Inspectorates (art.no.24 point b). 
Law no.319/26.07.2006 and the Government Decision no.1425/30.10.2006, changed matters in 
the field. The procedure was changed, the authorization (art.no.36) being made only after the 
analysis of a candidate`s file by a board of professionals from the local Inspectorate. Other 
changes were made: the name was modified from work protection, to external services for 
occupational health and safety (art.no.28) and also the minimum requirements for the 
employees and the leader of this external services (art.no.32 (1) and (2)). The empowerment 
was made now for a minimum of 5 years’ experience, without the mandatory requirement of 
having experience in any economical field of activity (art.no.37 point e); also, a declaration of 
confidentiality became mandatory (art.no.37 point i). Art.no.45 also stipulated a year for re 
authorization of all those empowered by the former legislation (Law no.90/1996), following to be 
done by a board of professionals from the local Inspectorate, named by Order 
no.754/16.10.2006. The validity of the certificate so obtained was of 3 years (art.no.41) – 
followed by a new examination of submitted files by the local inspectorate (art.no.36); also, 
health and safety courses needed to be attended (art.no.42) in those 3 years.  
 Two levels of training were introduced (art.51):  
• OHS technician (art.no.48) – with technical high school degree and health and safety 
courses of at least 80 hours; 
• OHS expert (art.no.50)– with an engineering degree, health and safety courses of at 
least 80 hours and also post graduate courses of 180 hours; 
The modifications brought by Government`s Decision no.955/2010 had the purpose of 
harmonizing the Romanian Legislation with the European Directive 2005/36/EC, in order  to 
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allow the free movement of OHS professionals within the European Union, Romania being a 
member since 2007. These modifications (art no.45 (1), 45 (2), 45(3),  said that any OHS 
professionals authorized in a similar way in any of the EU member states could practise in 
Romania, just by notifying the Empowerment Commission.  
For empowerment, there was no longer the requirement to prove experience in some 
economical area of activity (art.no.37point.g), but 5 years’ experience in the field of health and 
safety, to become the leader of the external service; the conditions referring to mandatory CPD 
(art.no.42) courses and the limited validity of the certificates (art.no.41) were dropped. All these 
changes brought a large number of new OHS practitioners on the market.  
For those OHS professionals authorized in a similar way in their own countries, there is a 
possibility of them practicing in Romania, if they were authorized in the same conditions as the 
local practitioners (art no 45(2)). These empowerment conditions require the submission of a file 
with the evidence papers to The Empowerment Commission from the local Labour Inspectorate 
(named by Order no. 455/14.06.2010), without any examination.  
The research is also a history of health and safety legislation in Romania, about European tools, 
empowerment procedures, organisations and association in the field. It`s an overview about 
European tools to allow people free movements all around European Union (EU). The study 
presents tools which identifies the fundamental skills, the most important abilities and 
knowledge that people would need to be recognised, in order to allow free movements all 
around European employment market. The study is about possibilities to be voluntary 
recognised as a health and safety professionals across EU and why not, around the world.  It`s 
a brief list of ways of transfer and recognition of learning experiences in Europe, including 
vocational education and training, for a better understanding of qualifications from different EU 
countries. 
The research presents ENSHPO and EUSAFE voluntary certification procedures for 
occupational health and safety professionals (OHS) and where the Romanian practitioners are 
placed, if their qualifications could be recognised through Europe. 
The research presents the necessary characteristics for a well developed profession, as 
mentioned by Ferguson and Ramsay (2010) and also presents IOSH, the most valuable health 
and safety professional association and the necessary steps for Romanian OHS practitioners to 
build such a strong association. IOSH it`s the model of a profession and Romanian practitioners 
could learn to become Charted Members. 
 
2.2. METHODS 
Questionnaires have been chosen for the research since it is important to be objective, while 
reflecting the values, perceptions and interests of the respondent (Gray, 2004). Questionnaires, 
by their very nature, can start to impose a structure on the answers and shape the nature of 
responses in a way that reflects the researcher`s thinking, rather than the respondent`s 
(Denscombe,2003); in order to avoid this limitation, the researcher used open questions for 
giving her colleagues enough freedom to express themselves. It is quite difficult to develop 
questionnaires that are valid, reliable and objective. Validity means that an instrument must 
measure what was intended to measure (Gray, 2004:219), in this research, the current 
experience and training needs of Romanian OHS practitioners. The research has to be very 
precise if the study wants to prove its external validity – the extent to which findings from a study 
can be generalised, as Gray (2004) suggests.  
A number of key attributes of a good questionnaire (Denscombe,2003) were incorporated into 
the design in order to ensure that: 
•Privacy was assured in this case the respondents` names are known only by the researcher; 
every questionnaire is identified by a number. 
•The respondent will have some knowledge on the topic - the respondents are participants 
because they have an active role – they are OHS professionals. 
•The proposed style of questions is suited to the target group – the target group consisted of 
OHS practitioners, members of ARSSM (Romanian Health and Safety Association). 
The participants have to answer 18 questions about their age, gender, years of experience in 
OHS domain, education and training, the year of their authorization by Labour Ministry as OHS 
practitioners, training needs, voluntary empowerment procedures, their opinion about code of 
ethics, ways of granting CPD. Ethical dilemmas around access, who and how are accessed, the 
fact that researcher must continually reflect around the data collected (Miller and Bell, 2002) and 
about their representativeness for OHS professionals, was resolved by working with and for a 
professional association. ARSSM`s voluntary members understood the necessity of the study 
75
 
 
and they freely agreed to participate by signing the consent form and filling in the 
questionnaires. 
Other reasons for choosing questionnaires in this study, because they are economical, low cost 
in terms of materials, money and time; they supply standardized answers, all respondents are 
asked exactly the same questions; they have a wide coverage; they  contain pre-coded data 
and they  eliminate the effect of personal interaction with the researcher (Denscombe, 2003). 
For this particular research, it was relatively easy to contact and arrange the participation of the 
respondents, because the questionnaires were filled in during the general meeting of ARSSM 
and the researcher had the opportunity to explain to the participants why the study was of high 
importance and all the steps for being part of the survey. 
Some disadvantages of using the questionnaires were anticipated at the designing stage. The 
questions were limited in length to four or six pages, to avoid the return rate being adversely 
affected or respondents give flippant, inaccurate or misleading answers (Gray, 2004). Another 
important potential limitation is the fact that attention is focused on topic that the researcher 
considers meaningful or important. The respondent has no freedom to negotiate the relevance 
of the attribution with the researcher (Cassel and Symon, 2004). Incorporation of open 
questions gave them the opportunity to express their own ideas about the topics. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The results of the research depict an image of Romanian OHS practitioners with their education 
and experience, wishes for improving the personal skills, outlining the portrait of a profession. 
The participant practitioners represent just a small part of all the OHS practitioners in the 
country out of a total of three thousands (Inspectia Muncii, HSE, 2014) but they are 
representative for Romania, being members of a nationwide professional association, ARSSM. 
Being member of a professional body, represents one of the steps for becoming a true 
professional (Ferguson and Ramsay, 2010) as this experience brings together voluntary 
members from all important cities of the country for learning from each other and sharing 
knowledge. This is an achievement as they are likely to be more reflective and evaluative about 
their profession. On the other hand this may introduce some achievements in place, as 
discussed above. 
The image of the Romanian OHS professionals can be seen in the results from the first nine 
questions. The age of the participants shows that the ones more interested in this research are 
of more than 50 years old (question no.1), a few of which are women (question no.2), with about 
20 years of experience in health and safety (question no.3), many of them have a university 
degree (question no.4) and  plenty of OHS courses (question no.5), a third of them are in this 
field before 1996 prior to Law no.90/1996 (question no.7), a third of them are full time OHS 
practitioners and more than a half have their own consultancy company (question no.6). 
Statistically 55,7% from Romanian population (Ziarul Gandul, The Thought Paper, 2013) are 
mature person (25-64 years) and this demographic result can be seen here as a sample of 
mature person having a profession. The high percentage is more than 50 years old category in 
this research, maybe as a result of empowerment conditions and necessary years of experience 
or maybe because of the lack of interest of young professionals about being member of a 
professional association like this.  
Statistically in Romania there are 51,4% women, but as OHS participants in the research are 
80% men, maybe OHS is seen as a male profession and is no likely to reflect the true gender 
balance of the wider population. 
There are 12 people with 10-20 years of experience in the field and this experience could reflect 
their age group, around 30-50 years old (q. no.1b), 1c)) and 7 people with more than 20 years 
experience among that one with more than 50 years age (q.no.1d)). 
Years worked in a regulatory body it`s a particular way of becoming OHS practitioners and 
reflect the situation of members of Local Inspectorates who didn`t have to have health and 
safety courses to became OHS practitioners; the legislation allowed the labour inspectors to be 
empowered as safety practitioners, without any exam, just through the submission of a file. 
There are 7 members of local inspectorates with more than 10 years experience in health and 
safety; one of them could be of the five empowered as OHS professionals before 1998, if we 
look at question no.7. 
About participants education`s, there are 25 people university graduate because having one 
was mandatory for doing post university studies (courses) with a length of 180 hours in health 
and safety. Former members of local inspectorate were mandatory of having university studies 
for being an inspector, so all HSE practitioners have a high level of training. 
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All of the participants have lots of health and safety courses but which one was more useful for 
their training will be seen in the answers from questions no.10 and 11. Having such an 
experience in doing OHS courses will help the researcher to rate which ones are more useful for 
their training needs. 
There are 8 participants with HSE master degree and one doctor. If extrapolated to the wider 
population of OHS practitioners, we can state that maybe, a third of them are highly educated. 
There are 25 from a total of 29 people university graduate because having one was mandatory 
for doing post university studies (courses) with a length of 180 hours in health and safety. 
Former members of local inspectorate were mandatory of having university studies for being an 
inspector, so all HSE practitioners have a high level of training. Seven of them graduate a 
second university and this is a good reason for stating they are educated. 
The Romanian OHS professional is also interested in continual professional development (CPD) 
and question no.13 proved this interest. If we are looking ways of granting credits and utility of 
selected ways for CPD we can check question no.14. These results could be the starting point 
for organizing CPD for OHS professionals in a different way than just doing another course. 
All the 27 participants who answered question no.14 agreed the granting credits system by 
participating to conferences and workshops, as a way of accumulating knowledge and credits 
simultaneously. We could allege that the wider population of OHS practitioners is interested and 
very happy about CPD, about learning from others through workshops and conferences.  
It was a time when attending courses was mandatory for CPD, but these days practitioners 
proved they have other wishes for improving their skills, knowledge and expertise. 
This represents a good way for ARSSM and other similar organisations for developing and 
growing the number of members or finding other people interested of becoming member of a 
professional association by organizing conferences, workshops and OHS meeting each others. 
There are a few comments who illustrate their position about this subject: `It’s Romania’s 
obligation as a EU member”; “They (EU) required so we can meet those special requirements of 
foreign employers”, ”Very useful because they permanently refresh the know-how with new 
methods in the area of activity”. 
The answers to question no.14 (figure no.1) looks at the various ways of training that could be 
delivered and asks participants to indicate the types of subject that they would like to attend. 
CPD could be achieved through inclusion in one or more of the options below and they 
indicated most important subject to study. These results shows that Romanian OHS 
practitioners are interested in CPD and have clear ideas about what would be needed for 
developing their knowledge and agreed granting credits for participation in conferences and 
workshops. There were given 14 tips of granting CPD and the participants are very clear about 
their wishes, the most voted (24 answers with 8 would attend and 15 certainly attend) was 
interactive workshops on a theme previously released before the meeting and discussed over 
several hours 14b). Some of them have even propositions about theme, like alternative method 
of risk assessment, organisation and ways of working of H&S internal services, collective 
protection for workplaces, quality of H&S providers. The participants are very interested about 
analysis of work accidents with (14i) human casualties and deceased (5 people would attend 
and 17 certainly attend), even if MOK trials are almost unknown in Romania. They consider this 
analysis a good opportunity in motivating staff to increase attention given to health and safety at 
work and they wish to learn new methods of determining the causes and consequences of work 
accidents. We can put here together the answers given to 14h) meetings with prosecutors or 
judges to present the steps of a process in criminal and/or civil practice related to work 
accidents (7 people would attend and 14 certainly attend) for proving their interest about the 
circuits of documents between involved organisations, tracking and social implications of a 
serious work accident. This result is a strong proof that people wants MOK trials even a few of 
them known that powerful organisations like IOSH (IOSH, 2014), organise such. 
Meetings with experts to answer questions regarding law enforcement (9 people would attend 
and 12 certainly attend), the impact of legal regulations on health and safety, meetings with 
members of Executive Health and Safety all over the country have 23 answers.   
Case studies to analyze legal requirements neglected 14e) is another new way of learning in 
Romania, but the participants shows their interest about with 8 “would attend” and 10 “certainly 
attend” and they have interest about employers liability in health and safety. 
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Figure no.1 Methods of obtaining continual professionbal development, CPD 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The OHS profession was born in 1998, so it is a relatively new in Romania, therefore, so far, no 
studies have been made about the professional`s level of knowledge and their needs. As 
outlined above in the study if we discuss haw to become real professional practitioners, ready to 
fight with our competing peers from the EU, we need a lot of studies about what the current 
preparation level is, what their training needs are, if any certification is needed.  
The participants are very interested in certification by an international organization like ENSHPO 
- knowing that ARSSM is an ENSHPO member and they agree with Ferguson and Ramsay 
(2010:28) that certification is viewed as credible evidence of skill and knowledge within a field of 
professional practice.  
ENSHPO believes there is a need for a voluntary standard for Occupational Safety and Health 
Managers (EurOSHM), which is accepted throughout the European Union. The EurOSHM 
standard meets that requirement. Furthermore ENSHPO has developed a second standard to 
reflect the level of competence required for those with a health and safety role either reporting to 
managers or working in lower risk industries as Occupational Safety and Health Technicians 
(EurOSHT). ENSHPO decided to introduce these voluntary standards for EurOSHM and 
EurOSHT, together with a process for assessing and recognising both national certification 
systems for these two levels of qualification and national schemes to assess individuals against 
these ENSHPO criteria” (ENSHPO, 2013).  
Minimum requirements and criteria for eligibility of individuals for EurOSHM are: 
• a university degree at least at Bachelor level 
• occupational safety and health training courses at a professional level, at least 250 study 
hours with a balanced coverage of the topics and with 150 hours examined  
• professional work experience for at least two years full-time since the completion of the 
occupational safety and health training 
• continuous professional development (CPD) 
The candidate shall be a full member of an ENSHPO national professional organisation or 
association. Renewal of the certification at three yearly intervals. The ENSHPO Certification 
Standard is voluntary. The candidate, by submitting the application form agrees to ENSHPO 
Certification Standard provisions and unconditionally accepts its rules and procedures, the 
ENSHPO Code of Conduct and the resulting duties and obligations. 
Among the necessary characteristics for a well developed profession, as mentioned by 
(Ferguson and Ramsay, (2010), should be: 
- A valuable service to society and Code of Ethics, the study shows their work is about learning 
others working safely and the second one is now missing. The Romanian OHS practitioners are 
aware about the necessity of a voluntary code of ethics and they express very clearly their 
support for developing and implementing of such a code. 
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- a specialized body of  skills and knowledge, the Romanian law requests health and safety 
courses, minimum years of experience, as seen in  the empowerment procedure and all these 
can be the proof for their skills. 
 They also should have: 
-  Academic qualifications, the study shows that many of them have one or two university 
degrees not at least Bachelor degrees. 
- CPD could be a challenge because it`s not mandatory at the moment and isn`t officially 
recognised as a way of learning. But all interviewed practitioners supported as a way of learning 
and agreed that is extremely useful.  
I can`t yet declare the OHS practitioners` profession as being a well developed one in Romania, 
looking (only) at the results of this research. The future necessary steps are known, as it has 
been suggested by Ferguson and Ramsay (2010:6): 
- The existence of an accrediting organization – could be ARSSM using ENSHPO or EUSAFE 
empowerment procedures. OHS practitioners were very interested about ENSHPO system of 
certification, they supported the idea of being recognised by an international organisation and 
many of them are fulfilling the requirements. The study shows that it is the proper time for this 
certification procedure, the practitioners desire such an empowerment procedure they have 
opportunity and evidence for being recognised as European OHS practitioners.   
- Establishes conditions for access (establishing a metric(s) that can discern the qualified from 
the unqualified) – steps for becoming an ARSSM member used these days (ARSSM, 2013), 
should be carefully revised, qualifications exists but are not mandatory. Future development 
might grow towards chartered status, where membership of a chartered organisation is required 
in order to practice. This system already exists in Romania for doctors, accountants, engineers 
and if we are looking for European models, we can fallow IOSH system of chartered safety and 
health practitioners (IOSH, 2014).  
- Establishes the professional associations with their roles: socialization/ collegiality; offering 
CPD training courses; lobbying for specific policy and legislation that affect the practice of the 
profession. Knowing, as an insider, the way of working of an association like ARSSM, the 
researcher thinks that there is a lot more work to do in order to grow and achieve the 
expectations of a mature, well-established association;   
- Establishes and enforces a professional code of ethics as a common characteristic of a 
profession. A proper and suitable way needs to be found, as the questioned members express 
their wish for having a code of ethics and they showed very clear that the proper time is now. 
To the 7th International Conference Workingonsafety.net (IOSH, 2014) 30 September – 03 
October 2014 Scotland, UK which I attended, it was a technical session,TS10, Competence 
Workshop, chaired by Jane White – IOSH, UK. In this session the speakers, Andrew Hale 
former chairman of Certification Committee of ENSHPO, Pam Pryor - Registrar of Australian 
OHS Education Accreditation Board, Australia and Luise Vassie, Executive Director- Policy, 
IOSH, UK have had some presentations about developing a global framework for the training 
and certification needs across the world. Speakers and participants have underlined the 
necessity of an international harmonisation of qualifications for the occupational health and 
safety practitioners and their presentations are the proof that OHS professionals from all around 
the world are interested to be international recognized. The common empowerment procedure 
should be acknowledged and encouraged by all OHS professionals and now days ENSHPO 
and INSHPO (International Network of Safety and Health Practitioners Organisations) (INSHPO, 
2014) are working together to a common framework. 
Future licensing of OHS professionals may rely on ENSHPO or EUSAFE or INSHPO 
competency schemes; one question arises: which is the best way to equate the years of 
professional experience with theoretical education (diplomas, certificates). Transforming 
professionals experience gained with or without studies, diplomas, recognized skills in the 
vocational training system and the ways to do so, represent a point of interest for the Romanian 
OHS practitioners and the research will present their opinions. 
The researcher is very positive about these results provide a great deal of useful evidence for 
future decision making on professionalisation of OHS, even if a generalization of the OHS 
practitioners can`t be done only by a single study; bearing this in mind, the researcher found out 
that practitioners are aware of their personal training needs, of CPD and the necessity of a 
voluntary code of ethics.  
Romania as a EU member should use the European tools:  
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• EQAVET and EQF are ways of recognizing the vocational learning all over the EU 
and could be used by Romanian OHS practitioners with the support of Labour 
Ministry, Education Ministry and professional associations;  
• ECVET a system to help the transfer and recognition of learning experiences 
including vocational education and training (VET) for those wishing to use this 
instrument in EU. 
• ECTS credit points; for example now, a university diploma has 240 credits. The 
system is simple and easy to understand.  There are 1500 -1800 hours of work for 
an academic year and 1 credit shows 25-30 hours of work, so this means 240 credits 
x 30 hours of work = 7200 h : 4 years of study= 1800  hours/year of study.   
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Abstract 
Accurate and smooth communication is necessary for train dispatchers to ensure railway safety. 
Railway companies are trying to introduce communication training for train dispatchers. 
However, it is not clear whether or not communication training actually improves the 
communication. It is important to verify the benefits of such training in order to keep introducing 
and implementing the training. Thus, we developed self-rating 45 communication attitude items 
to examine whether or not communication training improved communication attitude toward 
safety in a Japanese train operation control center. Thirty train dispatchers took part in our 
communication training for study. They rated the degree of the importance of these items using 
a seven-point scale (1. Not important at all - 7. Extremely important) immediately before and 
after the communication training. In addition, we asked both the dispatchers who took part in the 
communication training and those who didn’t (total 106 dispatchers) to rate the degree of 
practice of the 45 communication items in their everyday work approximately one or two month 
after the training. The results of ratings of the degree of the importance before and after the 
training showed that the average rating values of 12 items after the training were statistically 
significantly higher than those before the training. Moreover, the results of the rating of the 
degree of practice one or two months after the training showed that the dispatchers who took 
part in the training rated 18 items statistically significantly higher than dispatchers who didn’t 
take part in. These results suggested that the communication training actually improved the 
communication attitude toward safety and it affected dispatchers’ everyday communication 
practice even one or two months after the training. Although we neither studied the longer effect 
of the training nor observed the behavioural changes of communication, we confirmed that the 
communication training helps to improve communication for safety. The self-rating attitude 
measurement is one of the effective and easy tools to check the unobservable inner effects of 
communication training. 
 
Keywords: attitude survey; communication attitude; measurement of training effectiveness 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Train Dispatchers and Communication for Safety 
Accurate and smooth communication is necessary for train dispatchers to ensure railway safety. 
When a train accident happens, they have to gather information accurately from the train crew 
and the station staff, give proper instructions to them and share information smoothly with other 
dispatchers in order to make proper decisions. Train dispatchers traditionally make efforts to 
prevent commutation mistakes through repeating back what they receive and using 
standardized words. 
Moreover, in recent years, the Japanese railway field has been introducing trainings for 
activating communication of train dispatchers to improve response capability of abnormal events 
(e.g., Oshikoshi, 2003; Moriya,.Kishino, Wada, Abe, Ishibashi, 2011). 
However, effects of communication training have not been verified sufficiently yet in railway field. 
It is important to verify the benefits of such training from various aspects in order to provide 
training effectively. If benefits of the training are not verified, it is difficult to keep introducing and 
implementing the training. 
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Thus, this study examines whether or not communication training actually improves 
communication for safety in a Japanese train operation control center by using a self-rating 
attitude measurement. 
 
1.2. Communication Training for Safety  
Effective communication requires good communication elements such as “explicitness”, “timing”, 
“assertiveness”, and “active listening” (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton., 2008). To improve train 
dispatchers’ communication skill in their works, a communication training which encourages 
such communication elements in practical conditions is desirable. 
We can refer to CRM training in the aviation field for such communication training. CRM is the 
idea that crew members manage all the resources available including other crew-members, 
procedures, machine interface, and themselves to ensure safety and best performance (CAA, 
2014). Especially, Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), which is a core of CRM training, 
intended to simulate actual problem situations that require CRM skills including communication 
skill and let trainees discuss their operations using video recording of their operations in 
debriefing (Butler, 1993).  
In the railway field, training like LOFT seems also useful to encourage good communication 
elements in practical conditions. Thus, this study employs a simulation of abnormal events and 
discussion using video recording of their operations as a communication training to examine 
training effects for train dispatchers. 
 
1.3 Evaluation Measurement of Communication Training 
Evaluation techniques of CRM training are categorized in terms of reactions, learning, attitudes, 
behavior and organization effects (O’Connor, Flin, & Fletcher, 2002). Among these techniques, 
this study especially focuses on measurement of attitude. Though behavioural rating is also 
useful to detect effects of communication training, checking detailed behaviour during the 
training session or before and after trainings becomes a burden for training instructors. In 
addition, internal attitude is hard to capture by behavioural rating though forming internal 
attitude of putting high value on communicating accurately and smoothly for safety must be 
important for appropriate communication. Thus, we try to measure effects of our communication 
training by using self-rating communication attitude items instead of behavioural rating from 
training instructors. 
Previous studies about CRM training in other domains such as the aviation (Gregorich, 
Helmerich, & Wilhelm, 1990) and the medical field (Awad, Fagan, Bellows, Albo, Green-Rashad, 
Garza, & Berger, 2005) already have proved that CRM trainings improve communication 
attitude. Hence, attitude measurement is considered appropriate for measuring effects of 
communication training also in the railway domain. 
In this study, first, we develop self-rating communication attitude measurement items for train 
dispatchers. Then, we measure communication attitude toward safety immediately before and 
after training by using the communication attitude items. Furthermore, we measure 
communication practice in everyday work one or two months after the training to check practical 
effects and persistent effects of the communication training by using the similar self-rating items. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1. Developing Communication Attitude Measurement Items 
We developed communication attitude measurement items in the following procedure. 
First, we extracted communication errors of dispatcher from a previous study of dispatchers’ 
errors (Hayama & Miyachi, 2012) and classified the communication errors into three error 
patterns (i.e., “improper timing”, “not accurate information”, “not received or misunderstood.”) 
Second, we collected communication points to keep in mind about communication for safety 
from the various previous studies. Subjects of these previous studies include Japanese CRM 
skills behavioral markers in aviation (Iijima, Noda, Sudo, Muraoka, & Funabiki, 2003), non-
technical skills in British railway (Bonsall, 2012), Japanese Railway CMR training (Moriya et al., 
2011), Japanese fire-brigade (Shindo, Hosoya, Takai, Ymaguchi, Kobori, & Chiba, 2012), safety 
skills for workers in Japan (Cross-industrial safety research network, 2011) and general non-
technical skills guide (Flin et al., 2008). We organized these extracted communication points 
into three perspectives, that is, “proper timing”, “accurate information”, “appropriate response”, 
with the aim to prevent the three communication error patterns of train dispatchers. 
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Then, we discussed the communication points with dispatcher instructors and modified 
communication points so as to be suitable for train dispatchers. Finally, we developed 45 
communication attitude items as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Communication attitude items. 
Perspective Num Item 
Proper 
timing 
1 In a state of emergency, tell the most important thing first. 
2 Give instructions in a working sequence, not in a haphazard way. 
3 When you can predict disruption to train services, coordinate with related 
staffs before disruption actually occurs. 
4 Instruct one by one as much as possible. 
5 In a state of emergency, use strong voice. 
6 Correct your mistake as soon as possible when you notice it. 
7 Ask for help when you can’t manage it. 
8 When you find hard-pressed dispatchers, offer your help. 
Accurate 
information 
9 Don’t indicate an object only by using pronoun such as “that” or “this”, even 
when you think the indicated object is obvious. 
10 Convey all information correctly even in a state of emergency. 
11 Don’t use abbreviated and slangy words assuming that everyone may not 
know them. 
12 Speak with an appropriate loudness of voice and check that others can 
hear your voice. 
13 When you refer to numbers, clarify the unit of measurement. 
14 Talk face to face as much as possible. 
15 Distinguish between asking and instructing. 
16 Convey your intention clearly, even it seems obvious.  
17 Ask a clear question. 
18 Instruct what and by when operators should do. 
19 Don’t convey your intention only through gestures. 
20 In case sudden change happens, arrangement instruction should be 
conveyed carefully in details. 
21 Rephrase confusing words which have similar sounds. 
22 Tell clearly from the other person’s perspective. 
23 Ask to repeat back after you instruct. 
24 Ask to confirm if there are dubious points. 
25 Tell important information repeatedly.  
26 Pronounce each important word clearly. 
27 Call a receiver’s name and clarify who is responsible for. 
28 Give advice rather than blaming. 
29 Don’t rush others with an angry and loud voice. 
30 Tell your feeling of wrongness, even if you don’t have confidence of it. 
31 When you deny others’ opinion, add the reason why the opinion is wrong. 
32 When you don’t have enough time to answer questions, tell that you will do 
it later. 
33 Even if you receive an easy question, don’t make fun of the questioner.  
Appropriate 
response 
34 Repeat back certainly when you receive directions or reports. 
35 Respond to a question certainly. 
36 When you feel something wrong about directions or reports, confirm the 
intention through paraphrasing. 
37 Listen again if you can’t understand what others said. 
38 Listen again if you feel something wrong about directions or reports. 
39 When you are too busy to cope with a direction, tell when you can follow it.  
40 Listen to directions or reports until the end. 
41 When you find a lack of information, confirm the information without 
estimation even if it is trivial.  
42 Giving a reply when your name is called. 
43 Don’t deny any opinions without consideration. 
44 When there is a question about an instruction, ask the reasons of it. 
45 Listen to others in a calm way even when your opinion is denied. 
 
Additionally, we requested ten dispatcher instructors preliminarily to rate the degree of the 
importance of these communication attitude items using a seven-point scale (1. “Not important 
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at all”, 2. “Low importance”, 3. “Slightly important”, 4. “Slightly important”, 5. “Moderately 
important”, 6. “Very important”, 7. “Extremely important”). 
Their rating results of 44 items (1 item was excluded due to missing data) showed moderate 
interclass correlation coefficient (ICC = 0.73). This meant that rating of each item was almost 
consistent among the dispatcher instructors. The average values of 42 out of 45 items were 
higher than 5 point (moderately important). This result showed that attitudes of these items were 
actually important for railway safety. Although average rating values of three items (i.e., “Instruct 
one by one as much as possible.”, “Tell your feeling of wrongness, even if you don’t have 
confidence of it.”, “Talk face to face as much as possible.”) are less than 5 point, we didn’t cut 
the three items and used all 45 items to measure the effect of communication training in view of 
the fact that about half of dispatcher instructors rated these three items higher than or equal to 5 
points. We treated this attitude measurement like a checklist to check each attitude item rather 
than measurement of abstract constructive concepts or latent factors of communication attitudes. 
 
2.2. Measurement of Attitude Before and After the Communication Training 
We examined the effect of communication training by using developed communication 
measurement items. Thirty dispatchers took part in our communication training for study. The 
communication training was conducted ten times in July and September, 2014. Our 
communication training required three different dispatchers at one time, namely a crew and 
vehicle dispatcher, a traffic controller, and a vice-chief traffic controller. They dealt with an 
abnormal events scenario (e.g., railway vehicle trouble) in mutual cooperation. A facilitator and 
a responder handled this training. A facilitator assigned events and controlled the progress of 
the training; a responder played the roles of a driver, conductor and station staff and responded 
to dispatchers during training session. The scenario training session took about an hour. After 
dispatchers finished the training session, they discussed the way by which they communicated 
watching their video-recorded operations in training (Hatakeyama, Okada, Hayama, Kaburagi, & 
Miyachi, 2015). 
Dispatchers rated the degree of the importance of 45 communication attitude items using a 
seven-point scale as shown in Table 2 immediately before and after the training. 
We used two-version of communication attitude item lists for each of which the item order was 
different. The dispatcher rated each of the different item order lists before and after training. 
Besides, the rating order of the two lists before and after the training was counter balanced 
across training sessions. 
 
2.3. Measurement of Attitude One or Two Months After the Communication Training 
In addition, we studied the effect of the training on communication attitude in everyday work. We 
asked the dispatchers to rate the degree of practice of the 45 communication items in their 
everyday work approximately one or two month after the training. We modified the expression of 
the communication attitude items slightly to measure everyday practice. 
Both the dispatchers who took part in the communication training and those who didn’t (total 
106 dispatchers) rated the degree of practice of the 45 items in their everyday work using a 
seven-point scale (1. “Very untrue of me”, 2. “Untrue of me”, 3. “Somewhat untrue of me”, 4. 
“Neutral”, 5. “Somewhat true of me”, 6. “True of me”, 7. “Very true of me”). 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1. Communication Attitude before and after Communication Training 
We compared the rating values of importance of the items before and after communication 
training. Figure 1 shows average rating values of all 45 items before and after training. 
Paired t-tests indicated that the average rating values of 12 items after the training were 
statistically significantly higher than those before the training (ps < 0.05). Typical examples of 
higher rated items were “In a state of emergency, tell the most important thing first.”, “Don’t use 
abbreviated and slangy words assuming that everyone may not know the words.”, and “Tell 
clearly from the other person’s perspective." As shown Figure 1, these 12 items were relatively 
lowly rated before training. This suggests that the communication training improves the 
awareness of importance of communication attitudes items which are difficult for dispatchers to 
recognize as important in everyday work. 
On the other hand, items whose average rating values were not increased after training were 
highly rated even before training. This may have caused a ceiling effect which prevented 
training effects from being detected for high rated items especially over 6 points. 
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There were no items whose average rating values after training became statistically significantly 
lower than those before training. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Plots of average rating values of degree of importance of the communication items before and after training. 
 
3.2. Communication Attitude One or Two Months after the Communication Training 
In addition, we compared the ratings of the degree of practice of the items one or two months 
after the training between trained and non-trained dispatchers. Figure 2 shows average rating 
values of all 45 items rating of trained and non-trained dispatchers.  
T-tests indicated that dispatchers who took part in the training rated 18 items statistically 
significantly higher than dispatchers who didn’t take part in (ps < 0.05). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Plots of average rating values of degree of practice of the communication items of trained and non-trained 
dispatchers. 
 
This result revealed that the communication training affected dispatchers’ everyday 
communication practice even one or two months after the training. 
Besides, this result seemingly shows that the training effects were detected for more items one 
or two months after the training (18 items) than for those immediately after training (12 items), 
1 
2 
4 
9 11 12 
14 
18 
22 24 
26 
33 
4 
4,5 
5 
5,5 
6 
6,5 
7 
4 4,5 5 5,5 6 6,5 7 
A
fte
r t
ra
in
in
g 
 a
ve
ra
ge
 ra
tin
g 
va
lu
es
 o
f t
he
 it
em
s 
Before training average rating values of  the items 
1 
3 
5 
8 
9 
10 11 
13 
15 
16 
20 
22 
25 
28 
31 
34 
40 
41 
4 
4,5 
5 
5,5 
6 
6,5 
7 
4 4,5 5 5,5 6 6,5 7 
Tr
ai
ne
d 
di
sp
at
hc
er
s' 
av
er
ag
e 
ra
tin
g 
va
lu
es
 o
f i
te
m
s  
Non-trained dispatchers' average rating values of items 
■ = Items significantly higher after training (Numbers are cited from Table 1) 
◇= Items no difference between before and after training 
■ = Items significantly higher in trained dispatchers (Numbers are cited from Table 1) 
◇ = Items no difference between trained and non-trained dispatchers 
85
contrary to a general trend that CRM training effects are declining over time (O’Connor et al., 
2002). This may be because we measured not pure communication attitude but communication 
practice one or two months after training. This may have led to inhibiting a ceiling effect of the 
attitude measurement and enabling to detect wider effects of the training on everyday 
communication. 
However, only four attitude items detected the training effects commonly in both the cases: 
before and after training and between trained and non-trained dispatchers one or two months 
after the trainings. This may also stem from the difference between attitude measurement and 
practice measurement. The four items are “In a state of emergency, tell the most important thing 
first.”, “Don’t indicate an object only using pronoun such as “that” or “this”, even when you think 
the indicate object is obvious.”, “Don’t use abbreviated and slangy words assuming that 
everyone may not know the words.”, “Tell clearly from the other person’s perspective.” These all 
four items represent the idea that dispatchers should take perspectives of information receivers 
in terms of timing or explicitness. This suggests that the communication training is especially 
effective for developing the attitude of taking others’ perspectives which is useful for smooth and 
accurate communication for safety. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
These results described above suggested that the communication training actually improved the 
communication attitudes toward safety, especially an attitude of taking others’ perspectives, and 
it affected dispatchers’ everyday communication practice even one or two months after the 
training. Although we neither studied the longer effect of the training nor observed the 
behavioural changes of communication, we confirmed that the communication training helps to 
improve communication for safety. The self-rating attitude measurement is one of the effective 
and easy tools to check the unobservable effects of communication training. 
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Abstract 
Introduction: Vocational secondary education aims to ensure the acquisition of competencies 
required for the labor market. Young workers are in accordance with the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act particularly vulnerable group of employees. Because of their inexperience, lack 
of practical knowledge, lack of awareness about safety and health risks, the inadequate 
supervision by experienced workers, young workers get injured more often than others. For this 
reasons the employer shall be obliged to provide special occupational health and safety for this 
group for the purpose of preserving his unimpaired mental and physical development. For the 
purpose of minors’ safety and health protection at work, the employer shall be obliged to adjust 
conditions and working time organization.  
Objectives: Students, as future young workers to be, in the framework of educational program, 
learn about safety at work and gain their first practical experience in the practical workshops in 
school as well as in employer’s workshops. Are they ready to work to work independently from 
the standpoint of OSH?! Have they developed safety awareness? 
Methodology: Study was conducted in twenty eight secondary vocational schools in Croatia in 
which students study for professions: carpenter, chemical technician, agricultural technician, 
construction technician, graphic technician and forestry technician. The research was conducted 
through the questionnaire survey and included total of 896 students with the aim to exam 
awareness of students on OSH and application of OSH measures in selected schools. 
Results: The results of the survey indicated the need for additional investment in the 
development of students' safety culture. As a result of the project Croatian Institute for Health 
Protection and Safety at Work developed the educational posters for the classrooms and school 
workshops and educational booklets for young workers entering the labor market.  
 
Keywords: occupational safety and health protection, vocational schools, students, young 
workers, professional practice 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Young workers together with students belong to particularly vulnerable groups from the 
standpoint of regulations in the field of labour and safety at work. In support of the above going 
concern goes data on accidents at work that are part of both national (Croatian Institute for 
Health Protection and Safety at Work, Labour Inspectorate) and statistical reports of the 
European Union (Eurostat, ESAW). Graphic depiction 1 emphasizes the importance of the 
integration of occupational safety and health in the education system, especially when it comes 
to educational programs for high- risk occupations. Children and students need to develop a 
safety culture from their early age and make it a part of their pattern of behaviour when they 
became young workers and throughout their lifetime (EUOSHA, 2009.). Start of development of 
a safety culture cannot be timed to coincide with the beginning of work experience for young 
workers. Entering the world of work, young workers already must have awareness of the 
importance of safety and occupational health to protect themselves and others. The importance 
of integrating the content from this area in education was recognized in 2004. by the European 
Agency for Safety at Work (EU OSHA) through the project of integration of safety and health at 
work in education ( 'Mainstreaming occupational safety and health into education') The aim of 
the project was to  emphasize that occupational safety  must be part of lifelong education, from 
kindergarten to retirement. This implies that the fundamentals of occupational safety for children 
and pupils should be implanted through attitudes related to safety and health and need to 
generally develop a safety culture in schools and other educational institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Share of injuries at work for workers 
aged 18 to 30 in Croatia 
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2. METHODS 
For the study purpose, questionnaire for students in secondary vocational schools, composing 
of 13 questions was used.  Study was conducted in twenty eight secondary vocational schools 
in Croatia in which students study for professions: carpenter, chemical technician, agricultural 
technician, construction technician, graphic technician and forestry technician. Study included 
total of 896 students who were surveyed in order to examine their knowledge and experience 
on occupational health and safety issues. Research was conducted in the period of two years 
(2013-2015) by the Croatian Institute for Health Protection and Safety at Work (CIHPSW). 
Data from the research of valid filled questionnaires were entered into a computer database and 
statistical analysis of data was performed using the tools of statistical analysis within Microsoft 
Excel. 
 
3. RESULTS 
Students, as future young workers, in the framework of their educational program, learn about 
safety at work and gain their first practical experience in the practical workshops in school as 
well as in employer’s workshops. Most influence on the development of safety culture among 
students have their high schools teachers, practical training teachers and craftsmen where 
students perform professional practice. As part of the project, the presentations were held to the 
students in order to emphasize the importance of safety at work before they complete their 
education. Students were familiarized with the most often hazards, harmful events and 
consequences, general principles of prevention, basic and specific occupational health and 
safety rules, employer’s obligations and employee’s obligations and rights. Also, one of the 
results were posters created for each profession and  flyers created for students containing 
information on their rights, employer’s obligations, safety tips and useful contacts and web sites.    
In accordance with the curricula, all schools tested in the same educational programs have 
theoretical part of occupational safety taught in the first grades of the prescribed number of 
hours, after which the students take an exam that is equal for all directions. Later in the higher 
grades students get acquainted with the dangers and hazards related to the particular 
technology of work which is emphasized through practical training. Practical classes are held in 
the schools and  at employers (usually, craftsmen) but some of the schools that participated in 
the survey do not have this form of cooperation with craftsmen and a certain number of students 
with practical work meets only at school. None of the schools that participated in the survey has 
registered accidents at work during the training at the school as well as with employers or 
craftsmen. Despite this, in the questionnaires students report that there were cases of work-
related injuries during the practical training. 
 
3.1. Educational program for the profession carpenter 
Students who are being educated for future carpenters were interviewed in 3 vocational 
schools. Interest in this profession is constantly falling as evidenced by the small number of 
students who are students of final grades. A total of 24 students were surveyed. 
The survey showed that future young carpenters recognize general hazards and are able to 
identify efforts and harmfulness they may occur on their future work. The students say that they 
are familiar with the safety measures by teachers or leaders of practical training as well as by 
craftsmen where they go for practical training. In parallel, 60% of surveyed students consider 
personal protective equipment (PPE) to be the first measure of protection and only 4% as a 
measure that is applied only when the protection of workers at the workplace cannot be 
achieved with other measures. Even 24% of students consider that personal protective 
equipment is unnecessary. Availability and application of personal protective equipment in 
schools is positively evaluated according to 13 students and is considered to be inaccessible by 
5 students. Teachers and practical educators deny injuries at work (practice) but 20% of 
students said that there were some injuries during practical work. More than half of the surveyed 
students said that they do not want to gain additional knowledge about the occupational safety 
and health. 
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Figure 2 - Students attitude about the use of PPE                    Figure 3 - Students attitude about OSH 
 
3.2. Educational program for the occupation agricultural technician 
Students who are trained for the profession of agricultural technicians were surveyed in 5 
secondary vocational schools in Zagreb, Varazdin and Split. 147 students were surveyed from 
10 classes learning for avocations:  general agricultural technician, fitofarmaceut, agritourism 
and gardener. 
Final year students who participated in the survey are able to list the hazards related to their 
future profession. Students consider occupational safety and health very important and are 
familiar with the area, primarily through lectures in schools (Figure 4 and 5). Most of the 
students said that they are well-informed about safety measures and danger of their future 
profession. At the same time, 79% of students’ consider personal protective equipment to be the 
first measure to be applied in the workplace. The availability of personal protective equipment at 
the school was confirmed by 53% of students. 56% of students expressed their interest in 
finding out more about the safety measures and occupational health. 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 3 - Students attitude about the                                               Figure 4 - Introduction to health and safety 
                    responsibility for OSH                           
 
3.3. Educational program for the occupation chemical technician 
Study on awareness of students on occupational safety and health questions involved 80 
students who are studying for the profession of chemical technicians in 4 secondary schools. 
Similar to the previous two educational programs, students get familiar with OSH through school 
program, and this area is considered to be very important. 
Most of the students successfully recognize dangers, hazards and efforts specific to their 
profession. 80 % of surveyed students consider personal protective equipment to be the first 
safety measures and report that the same is provided and available in the school (31% of 
students) and in practice with the employer (18% of students).  
An equal percentage of students (39%) denies and confirms injury to students during practical 
training, while half of the students expressed an interest in additional education about safety 
measures. 
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 Figure 5 - Introduction to health and safety                                       Figure 6 - Students attitude about the use of PPE                                                
            
3.4. Educational program for the occupation construction technician 
Students who are being educated for construction technician were interviewed in 6 vocational 
schools in Croatia. A total of 226 students were surveyed. The survey showed that students 
recognize general hazards and are able to identify efforts and harmfulness that may occur on their 
future work. The students say that they are familiar with the safety measures by teachers or leaders 
of practical training as well as by craftsmen where they go for practical training. 86 % of surveyed 
students consider personal protective equipment (PPE) to be the first measure of protection, and 12 
% believe that this measure is often unnecessary. Most of the students agree (78 %) that 
responsibility for OSH should be divided between worker (student), employer and teacher. Teachers 
and practical educators deny injuries at work (practice) but 20% of students said that there were 
some injuries during practical work. More than half of the surveyed students (56 %) said that they do 
not want to gain additional knowledge about the occupational safety and health. 
 
 
Figure 7- Injuries at work during practical work                                                   Figure 8- Availability of PPE 
 
3.5. Educational program for the occupation graphic technician 
Students who are trained for the profession of graphic technicians were surveyed in 3 
secondary vocational schools. 66 students were surveyed. Final year students who participated 
in the survey were able to list the hazards related to their future profession. Students consider 
occupational safety and health very important and are familiar with the area, primarily through 
lectures in schools. Most of the students said that they are well-informed about safety measures 
and danger of their future profession. At the same time, 97 % of students’ consider personal 
protective equipment to be the first measure to be applied in the workplace. The availability of 
personal protective equipment at the school was confirmed by 97% of students. 64 % of 
students expressed their interest in finding out more about the safety measures and 
occupational health. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 8 – Interest of students for OSH education                                          Figure 9 - Students attitude about OSH 
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3.6. Educational program for the occupation forestry technician 
A total of 182 students were surveyed from 5 vocational schools in Croatia. The survey showed 
that future young workers in this field recognize general hazards and are able to identify efforts 
and harmfulness they may occur on their future work. The students say that they are familiar with 
the safety measures by teachers (80 %) or leaders of practical training as well as by craftsmen (8 
%) where they go for practical training. 92% of surveyed students consider personal protective 
equipment (PPE) to be the first measure of protection, and none of them as a measure that is 
applied only when the protection of workers at the workplace cannot be achieved with other 
measures. Availability and application of personal protective equipment in schools is positively 
evaluated according to 92 % students and is considered to be inaccessible by 8 % students. 
Teachers and practical educators deny injuries at work (practice) but 10 % of students said that 
there were some injuries during practical work. 78% of the surveyed students said that they do not 
want to gain additional knowledge about the occupational safety and health. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this research was to gain insight into the awareness of occupational safety and health 
protection of students in secondary vocational schools in Croatia and the application of measures 
in this area. The survey of students in the final grades in selected educational programs 
conducted in 28 high schools, showed similar trends. Final year students in the profession of 
carpenter, agricultural and chemical technician, construction technician, graphic technician and 
forestry technician gain theoretical knowledge on occupational safety and health protection in the 
first few grades. Afterwards they have to pass the theoretical exam and then they can take part in 
practical training. Although most of the students state that they are very familiar with the safety 
measures, the application of personal protective equipment was evaluated as the most important 
measure of protection, which actually shows that they have not adopted the basic OSH principles. 
In accordance with the rules of the profession, the risks to the safety and health of workers first 
should be  removed or reduced by applying the basic safety rules that apply to the means of work, 
and in addition by special safety rules that apply to workers, manner of operation and operating 
procedures. Collected data on the availability of personal protective equipment in schools and 
employers were students have their practice, as well as allegations of occupational injuries, are 
very controversial, even when it comes to the same schools. The study noted that there is a 
difference in the attitudes and awareness of the importance of safety at work with the leaders of 
practical training with experience in the real sector and those who do not have any experience in 
real sector.  The leaders of practical training expressed their desire and need for education in the 
field of safety and health at work. A bright spot is the perception of students that safety at work is 
very important and that the responsibility for the safety and health at work is divided between 
students, schools and employers.  
Safety and prevention culture are the basis of maintaining and improving the quality of work. 
According to European statistics, the rate of injuries at work of young workers is 50% higher than 
in the case of other age groups (5). The reasons for this are in addition to the physical and mental 
immaturity, lack of practical experience and level of awareness of the OSH importance. The 
students, as future young workers, must be prepared through theoretical and practical training, 
they should develop a safety culture starting from school desks, rather than entering into a 
working relationship. In this process, there is a common need to engage teachers, practical 
training managers and employers were students carry out part of their practical training. 
The aim of the vocational education is to gain the competencies needed for the labour market. 
Health and safety at work is a competence to learn, practice and develop, and without it, all 
other skills and competences could lose purpose and meaning. 
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Abstract 
It is a difficult task to avoid the “smart systems” topic when discussing smart prevention and, 
similarly, it is a difficult task to address smart systems without focusing their ability to learn. 
Following the same line of thought, in the current reality, it seems a Herculean task (or an 
irreparable omission) to approach the topic of certified occupational health and safety 
management systems (OHSMS) without discussing the integrated management systems 
(IMSs). The available data suggest that seldom are the OHSMS operating as the single 
management system (MS) in a company so, any statement concerning OHSMS should mainly 
be interpreted from an integrated perspective. A major distinction between generic systems can 
be drawn between those that learn, i.e., those systems that have “memory” and those that have 
not. These former systems are often depicted as adaptive since they take into account past 
events to deal with novel, similar and future events modifying their structure to enable success 
in its environment. Often, these systems, present a nonlinear behavior and a huge uncertainty 
related to the forecasting of some events. This paper seeks to portray, for the first time as we 
were able to find out, the IMSs as complex adaptive systems (CASs) by listing their properties 
and dissecting the features that enable them to evolve and self-organize in order to, holistically, 
fulfil the requirements from different stakeholders and thus thrive by assuring the successful 
sustainability of a company. Based on the revision of literature carried out, this is the first time 
that IMSs are pointed out as CASs which may develop fruitful synergies both for the MSs and 
for CASs communities. By performing a thorough revision of literature and based on some 
concepts embedded in the “DNA” of the subsystems implementation standards it is intended, 
specifically, to identify, determine and discuss the properties of a generic IMS that should be 
considered to classify it as a CAS. 
 
Keywords: complex adaptive systems, integrated management systems, properties, 
emergence, agents. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Winston Churchill once stated that ‘Out of intense complexities, intense simplicities emerge’. 
Although not a scientific novelty, the complexity construct has been recently increasingly 
addressed by a great deal of scholars due to, among others, the emergence of mathematical 
tools that deal with some and other way, seemingly impenetrable fields of research. Revolving 
around this construct one often finds concepts such as chaos, symmetry, entropy, modularity, 
hierarchy, nonlinearity, connectivity, synchronization, schemata, homeostasis (equilibrium), self-
regulation and self-organization. Inherent to this discussion lays the duality organization versus 
disorganization, or more accurately in the present case, organized MSs versus entropic or 
disordered (chaotic) MSs. A proper descriptive approach concerning this latter concept 
considers that a system “grows” in organization when the amount of information needed to fully 
describe it decreases. This notion may be accurately understood if one recalls the concepts of 
crystallinity (lattices- organized system) and amorphous materials (disorganized system) that 
were addressed at the Chemistry sessions in the yearly years of academic studies. The self-
organization construct considers the notion that organization is achieved through local 
interactions among the agents of a generic system that, on his own, do not have any awareness 
of their contribution to patterned emergent behavior developed by the whole system.  
 
The systems approach (and the nine complexity levels suggested by the general systems 
theory) is a paradigm of the current science and considers a minimalistic perspective of a 
system consisting in a set of elements and a set of relations (Chen and Stroup, 1993). This 
concept evolved after the realization by the academic and industrial communities that the 
decomposition of a system under study into smaller subsystems, or components, provides 
relevant information but not explain all the original system behavior. This seems to concur with 
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the notion that a system is more than the sum of its parts and, on this issue, one may quote 
Mainzer (1997) when he stresses that ‘Linear thinking and the belief that the whole is only the 
sum of its parts are evidently obsolete’. Concerning organizational systems and organizations 
as living and dynamic systems, Wheatley (1993) pointed out the outdated nature of several 
approaches stating that ‘Each of us lives and works in organizations designed from the 17th 
century images of the universe….We learned to manage by separating things into parts’. 
Several synergies could be developed when researching IMSs adopting a CASs approach. On 
one side, although the scientific context may differ from each identified CASs, they all share the 
same set of properties and, inherently, the methodologies to be adopted to deal with one of 
them may be valid to deal with all the others. In fact, the opportunity to extend the scope of the 
research of IMSs from the “claustrophobic” and classic management and systems engineering 
topics to a new “fresh” research field should not be wasted. On the other side, CAS academic 
community will certainly welcome the contribution from a new field with a remarkable diversity of 
agents often operating in turbulent environments and encompassing social, human and 
organizational nonlinear interactions. From our viewpoint, the following features characterize 
IMSs as CASs:   
- Multiple agents: An IMS encompasses multiple agents (people, organizational 
structure, equipment, customers, society, shareholders and regulatory 
requirements, etc.) interacting each other. 
- Learning: An IMS is an adaptive system, that is, past experiences condition 
present and future behaviour. 
- Evolutionary or co-evolutionary perspectives: IMSs evolve from external and 
internal stimulus, which, if one consider an appropriate implementation should 
promote the co-evolution of the MSs that comprise the IMS.  
- Emergence: The structures of an IMS emerge from patterns that have their 
source in the standards and experience.  In addition, some common features 
(or patterns) may be detected not being dependent on the geographic location, 
company dimension, activity sector or organizational culture. This emergence 
results in a structured higher hierarchical order of organization. New properties 
not identifiable in the subsystems that comprise the IMS emerge after MSs 
integration.  
- Modularity and redundancy which leads to resilience.  
- Complexity (encompasses several parts) and nonlinear behaviour: the 
interrelationships developed among its elements originate nonlinear emergent 
behavior in which the complexity is higher than the sum of behaviors of its 
parts. 
- Multi-dimensionality in the sense that many different elements interact on many 
different scales.  
- Non deterministic behavior, that is, several responses (outputs) from the system 
are possible given any cause. 
 
“Complex adaptive systems” is a research topic that encompasses the most different systems 
typologies either in dimension, degree of complexity, agents involved, physical or organic 
nature. One may state that there is not a peculiar research environment where this topic is 
studied and the contributions provided by the research into a distinct system typology may be 
valuable to other systems presenting different characteristics but encompassing the features 
that enable them to evolve as CASs. According to the literature, the term CAS has different 
meanings to different researchers and a consensual definition seems to be a difficult task 
among academic experts but it is possible to list the agreed properties that a CASs should 
present.  
 
The revised literature pointed out the adoption of CASs related methodologies to study 
ecological and biological systems, social systems, organizational systems and MSs, supply 
chain networks and information systems, among others. Table 1 and Figure 3 list some of the 
scientific domains and the correspondent bibliographic references where CASs have been 
identified and studied. 
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Table 1: Topics crossover concerning CASs. 
Topic References 
Social systems Antonacopoulou and Chiva, (2005b) Eidelson, (1997) 
Ecological systems 
Anand et al. (2010) 
Hartvigsen et al., (1998) 
Hulsman et al., (2011) 
Rammel et al., (2007) 
Biological systems Hegazi et al., (2009) 
Airline industry Igbo, (2013) 
Archaeology Kohler (2012) 
Healthcare 
Cordon, (2013) 
Edgren and Barnard, (2012) 
Martin, (2011) 
Martínez-García and Hernández-Lemus, 
(2013) 
McDaniel Jr. et al., (2009) 
Organizational systems, management, 
innovation and planning 
Akgün et al., (2014) 
Amagoh, (2008) 
Arévalo, (2013) 
Bolton and Stolcis, (2008) 
Bovaird, (2008) 
Champlin et al., (2013) 
Diment et al., (2009) 
Fabac, (2010) 
Monostori and Csáji, (2008) 
Nan et al., (2014) 
Øgland, (2008) 
Palmberg, (2009a,b) 
Prewitt et al., (2012) 
Rogers et al., (2005) 
Rowe and Hogarth, (2005) 
Schneider and Somers, (2006) 
Sutherland and van den Heuvel, (2002) 
Supply chain 
Choi et al., (2001) 
Isik (2011) 
Kanta and Zechman, (2014) 
Marchi et al., (2014) 
Pathak et al., (2007) 
Wycisk et al., (2008) 
Information systems and technology 
Kovács and Ueno, (2004) 
McCarthy, (2003) 
Montmain et al., (2015) 
Niazi, (2014) 
Phister Jr, (2010) 
Leadership Lichtenstein et al., (2006) 
Language Beckner et al., (2009) 
Product design development and management Chiva-Gomez, (2004) McCarthy et al., (2006) 
Psychology Barton, (1994) 
Economics Foster and Pyka, (2014) Harper, (2014) 
Law Kim and Mackey, (2014) 
 
Other papers dealt with the abstractive features of the CASs concept (Cornish et al., 2009; 
Holden, 2005; Kochugovindan and Vriend, 1998; Lansing, 2003), namely, listing the key 
elements (Ellis and Herbert, 2011), on how to control and efficiently manage them (Abbott, 
2007; Laszlo and Krippner, 1998), on the development of methodologies to assess them and 
their complexity (Avram and Rizescu, 2014) and on the identification of their mechanisms 
(Akgün et al., 2014). In addition, a significant number of papers focused CASs modeling such as 
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the one authored by Berry et al. (2002), the transfer of the theoretical concepts to a real world 
environment (Goldstone and Sakamoto, 2003; Pohl, 1999), the proposal of representational 
tools and improved visualization (Hmelo-Silver et al., 2015; Viste and Skartveit, 2004), the 
underlying mathematical theory to the concepts (Levin, 2002), how to engineer them (White, 
2010) and providing some theory concerning the mechanisms of failure (Woods and Branlat, 
2011). 
 
This paper follows with a brief description of the research methodology adopted. The next 
section, “Results and Discussion”, lists the properties or characteristics that were mentioned 
and adopted by the authors in the consulted bibliography to classify the most various focused 
systems as CASs. These same properties and characteristics are then targeted and dissected 
from the view point of the IMSs which, we expect, make our point concerning the classification 
of the IMSs as CASs. The “Concluding Remarks” section sum up the main topics addressed in 
the paper and points to potential further work considering scientific synergies between the two 
concepts (IMSs and CASs).      
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A thorough revision of literature was carried out in order to proceed with the identification of the 
main properties that are ascribed in the different published papers and studied systems in order 
to label them as CASs. Several queries were performed in the soundest data bases, such as 
the “Web of Science”, “Scielo” and “Scopus” and in the repositories of e-journals such as 
“Elsevier Sciendirect”, “IEEE Xplore”. “Springer” and “Taylor and Francis” containing academic 
bibliographic resources. The papers considered for analysis were the ones containing keywords 
such as “CAS”, “Complex adaptive systems” and “Complex systems” in the title. Furthermore, 
although the desirable contribution from several research domains, a theoretical sampling took 
place of the bibliographical resources considering the topics closely related to IMSs 
(Organizational systems, management, innovation and planning). In addition, a comprehensive 
analysis of the sections of the standards that assist in the implementation of the various 
subsystems commonly combined into an IMS (ISO 9001- Quality MSs, ISO 14001- 
Environmental MSs and OHSAS 18001- Occupational health and safety MSs) was developed.     
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
IMSs are systems of systems and, from a viewpoint of the CASs, are complex adaptive systems 
of systems (CASoS) a concept proposed and adopted by several authors and entities such as 
Brown et al. (2013) and Sandia (2015) that depict systems where the primordial components 
are themselves systems, CASs or not, with several agents interacting internally and some 
features interacting beyond the original boundaries with other features from other subsystem(s). 
Evolving from a single CAS to a CASoS demands a compulsory redefinition of the boundaries, 
the assessment of the newly interactions arisen, the identification of novel emergent features 
and of all the dynamics involved. IMSs encompass several agents such as people, entities and 
organizations among other (Domingues et al., 2012; Sampaio et al., 2012). Additionally, and as 
stressed by Almeida et al. (2014), IMSs are standardized and certifiable organizational systems 
implemented by companies that intend at the same time to fulfil several stakeholders’ 
requirements, usually, the customers’ requirements (according to the ISO 9001 standard), the 
environmental requirements (according to the ISO 14001 standard) and the employees safety 
requirements (according to the OHSAS 18001 standard). In addition to the implementation of 
these standards it is possible to find out IMSs that comprise other MSs seeking to fulfil several 
sector specific requirements such as the ISO/TS 16949, the ISO 50001, the ISO/IEC 27001, 
ISO 13485 and the ISO 22000 (Domingues et al., 2011). 
 
The properties identified and discussed in this section were pointed out in a sample of 58 
papers collected as described in the “Methodology and Methods” section. Figures 1 to 3 present 
the sample characterization concerning the year of publication, the typology of bibliographical 
resource and the topic or context where the study took place. 
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Figure 1: Bibliographical resources sample- Year of 
publication. 
Figure 2: Bibliographical resources sample- Typology. 
 
 
Figure 3: Bibliographical resources sample- Topic.  
 
As one may observe, mainly journal articles (Figure 2) and publications from the last 5 years 
(Figure 1) were considered. Regarding the main topic addressed by the bibliographical resource 
(Figure 3) one should point out that the topic encompassing the organizational systems, 
management, innovation and planning concepts accounts for approximately a quarter of the 
sampled resources. From our viewpoint, the relevant and diverse contribution of the sampled 
articles (regarding the year of publication, typology and main subject) assures and improves 
both the reliability and internal validity of the findings.   
 
3.1. IMSs as learning systems- How MSs learn? 
A common feature from all the reported subsystems usually combined into an IMS is the 
continuous improvement methodology. This methodology, if properly implemented, triggers the 
stimulus for the learning process requiring that the system “learns” from mistakes and make 
progress through the identification of the improvement opportunities. Figures 1 and 2 display the 
continuous improvement construct ascribed to Deming and the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) 
cycle attributed to Shewart, both considered two Quality gurus. In fact, not pursuing a detected 
non-conformity or an improvement opportunity is itself a mistake that will be pointed out in the 
following internal or external audit. This is commonly and widely reported in CASs related 
bibliography as the feedback loops. This concept will be addressed later on in this paper.  
  
Figure 1: Continuous improvement (Deming Wheel). Figure 2: P-D-C-A Cycle (Shewart). 
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Although from a background that relates mainly to the quality MSs the continuous improvement 
methodology was later adopted by the other MSs as a proper and suitable tool to assure the 
learning process.  
 
3.2. Agents that comprise the IMSs and their non-linear behavior- Which agents should 
be considered and which are the relationships between them? 
In opposition to companies operating solely with a MS, a company operating simultaneously 
with multiple MSs (Figure 3) encompasses different and not always convergent goals seeking to 
attend several stakeholders’ requirements. An IMS encompasses several agents and the 
relationships between them are not, at this moment, fully understood.      
  
 
Figure 3: Domain of integrated management. 
 
Among these agents, the individuals supersede the others. Beside the individuals, one may 
consider as agents, among others, the national bodies that manage environmental and OHS 
policies, the customers (other companies), the subcontractors, consultants and the company 
itself (its organizational culture that impacts on the employees, its strategic orientation, etc.). 
Several studies pointed out the lack of evidences concerning the relationships between the 
implementation methodologies adopted and the integration level attained (Bernardo et al., 
2011), the difficulties of integration and the integration level of MS human resources and the 
constructs of innovation and satisfaction (Simon et al., 2014b) and event if MSs integration by 
SMEs was advantageous (Olaru et al., 2014). In addition other papers stressed the lack of 
understanding of IMSs complexity, its integration levels and possibilities varies among 
companies (Mežinska et al., 2013). These results illustrate the typology of relationships that one 
may find when researching into IMSs although it is not fully clear if the relationships are 
effectively absent or if the instrument that is being adopted to measure the phenomenon is 
adequate and, if adequate, is reliable.    
       
3.3. Adaptive and (co)evolutionary perspective of the IMSs- How IMSs adapt to internal 
and external challenges? 
One should take into account that the most popular MSs implemented by the companies are, in 
fact, standardized MSs so they are exposed to the successive external revisions developed in 
the standards. A closer look at the standards revision process, namely on the inputs collected 
for the process, disclose other concepts widely reported in CASs- the feedback loops and the 
notion of different scales of a peculiar phenomenon. The revision process from the most popular 
MSs, namely that of the ISO standards, is developed from the inputs provided by ISO members 
being these, usually, appointed by the national bodies that coordinate the quality system in each 
country. Hence, the revision process is in fact a feedback loop at a macro scale considering 
IMSs.    
 
3.4. Emergent patterns and properties from the IMSs- What adds an IMS to an existing 
single MS? 
Some properties, not previously discernible in the subsystems, arise and emerge from the 
integration of MSs. Each of these properties are characterized by a certain number of features 
that add increased complexity and demands for an analysis of the system through different 
levels, usually described as micro-, meso- and macro levels. One of these properties is what 
one may address for as the holistic property. IMSs are autonomous systems but are dependent 
on the environment (universe that surrounds the boundaries) concerning two critical factors to 
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their evolution: resources and information exchanges, similarly, to the features pointed out by 
Oliveira et al. (2011) regarding horizontal inter-organizational networks.  
 
3.5. Modularity and resilience 
Several researchers pointed out that IMSs do have a modular nature or, at least, may be seen 
from a modular perspective. The main benefit to be collected from a system that has a modular 
nature is that although a module may be impaired regarding its performance that whole system 
is able to reconfigure in order to maintain its functionality, that is, the system has an improved 
performance when coping with change. Each MS that comprise the IMS has a structure that is 
common to the other MSs standards and some features that are specific. Concerning the 
environmental subsystems one can found the relevant feature of the identification and 
quantification of environmental impacts and regarding the OHSMSs one may found the 
systematic risk assessment concerning the menaces to the wellbeing of employees.    
 
3.6. IMSs and self-organization- How IMSs manage to self-organize and which are the 
evidences of it? 
Self-organization inherently arises from MSs integration if one consider, for instance, the audit 
function and the continuous improvement concept. When dealing with the follow up of a non-
conformity or an improvement opportunity, in an integrated context, one should consider the 
requirements from all the stakeholders that should be attended. This constrains the set of 
possible solutions which, in an integrated context, decrease the degrees of freedom to a 
hypothetical upgrade proposed to deal with that distinctive non-conformity or improvement 
opportunity. Thus, in accordance with the definition previously pointed out in the “Introduction” 
section concerning the construct “Organization”, the amount of information to describe the 
hypothetical solutions to deal with the non-conformity decreases, hence, the system self-
organize. To sum up, it is not farfetched the statement that local interactions between the 
subsystems promotes the emergence of properties, characteristic of each IMS, that were 
previously (before the integration process) absent.       
 
3.7. IMSs as complex systems 
Comparing with other complex systems IMSs are hardly classifiable as fractal systems, i.e., they 
are not self-similar at all scales. The different subsystems that comprise an IMS do have a 
common structure, known in the new 2015 revision of the standards as the high level structure 
(HLS), and this structure should be evidenced at the throughout all IMS levels but some low 
level elements that share intrinsically intimacy with the stakeholder to whom the standard 
addresses differ from standard to standard, hence, from subsystem to subsystem. The HLS acts 
as a command or control module and, due to this fact, the IMSs do not present the properties 
that are shared by other type of systems, on a related scientific domain, namely, the 
(hyper)networks (Johnson, 2010). Several strategies and methodologies have been adopted in 
the intent of “making sense” of the IMS phenomenon, namely, by “normalizing” them to enable 
comparison. Concerning this issue one may point out the development of maturity models by 
Domingues et al. (2014) and Idrogo et al. (2012) and several other models that sought to 
accommodate an increasingly number of stakeholders (Genaro and Loureiro, 2015; Rebelo et 
al., 2014).   
 
3.8. Multi-dimensional nature of the IMSs 
IMSs are systems of systems with both horizontal and vertical (top-down and bottom-up 
dynamics), i.e., taking into account an individual one may state that she (he) is affected and 
impacted by other individuals (horizontal dynamics) and affected by the group and organization 
where she (he) is inserted (e.g. organizational culture )- top-down dynamics. Nevertheless, it 
should be pointed out that both groups and organizations are developed based on individuals, 
on their beliefs, values, actions and aspirations (Johnson, 2010), i.e., one should consider also 
bottom-up dynamics to accurately model and characterize the whole state of a company. Figure 
4 displays the different levels of organization that one may find when researching into IMSs from 
a CASs perspective. It was adapted from a study concerning organizational learning but, from 
our viewpoint, suits accurately to the research field of IMSs and points out the notion that in the 
IMSs many different elements interact at many different scales. Although several other features 
that impact on the performance of the IMS (such as the culture adopted in the company and its 
mission) one of the most relevant, certainly, are the individuals that comprise it. These are in 
fact the ‘butterfly wings’ that may promote a “game changing” event. 
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Figure 4: Levels of organizational learning (adapted from Antonacopoulou, 2005a) 
 
3.9. Non-deterministic behaviour of IMSs 
At the time, and although some published studies pointing out some critical success factors 
seems that some of the features that favours integrated management over non-integrated 
management are not totally accomplished even if, apparently, the implementation conditions are 
the same. Hence, it is appropriate to state that to distinctive features of the IMSs implementation 
are ascribed with a remarkable uncertainty. Among those features one may point out the 
integration level to be attained by the MSs, the expected benefits to be collected, the degree of 
articulation between the MSs that comprise the IMS, the inertia from the IMS concerning 
external inputs and its flexibility regarding the adaptation to the revisions from the 
implementation standards. This latter issue is particular relevant due to the major revisions 
expected in 2015 of both the ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 standards. Other relevant feature is the 
development of the audit function that apparently, considering the findings of the study from 
Simon et al. (2014a), differ according to its own nature- internal or external.  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper intended to point out some of the properties of the IMSs that match the properties of 
a peculiar type of systems known as CASs. To our knowledge, this is the first time that IMSs are 
depicted and dissected from the view point of learning, adaptive and dynamic systems which, 
hopeful, can be a fruitful contribution and may “open doors” concerning the development of 
further synergic studies involving the two concepts. By one side the scientific and academic 
community that address IMSs may collect relevant insights and a new and fresh perspective 
from the CASs community. On the other side, the CASs or CASoSs scientific communities, 
more focused on the concept itself than on the scientific domain, will certainly benefit from the 
reports of a particular system that is singular, often turbulent and that encompasses several 
agents. Specifically, the occupational health and safety researchers will be particularly fortunate 
if one consider that seldom are the OHSMS that operate as the single MS in a company 
(Domingues et al., 2014). It is possible to conclude that IMSs are, in fact, CASoSs, i.e., systems 
of systems with the capability of adaptation in order to prevail and attain success in its 
environment. 
 
At the moment, there are several shortcomings that should be overcome so that they do not 
preclude the approach of IMSs from a CASs perspective. The major concerns are ascribed to 
the MSs integration phenomenon from an academic point of view, namely, the methodological 
issues to be adopted in the research design. The research approach concerning the integration 
of MSs should take into account that this is a contemporary and hardly controllable 
phenomenon, i.e., in opposition to other systems approached through a CASs perspective the 
IMSs are not transferable to a laboratory environment. Although the collection of the data and 
the development of grounded theory may be achieved by qualitative research methods some 
underlying quantitative mathematical concepts seem to be critical to attain successful outcomes. 
Other methodological related limitation is the fact that when dealing with IMSs research one 
deal with a domain closely related to that of social sciences. To other scientific domains that 
embrace mainly quantitative research methods and that deal with “more easily” measurable 
variables the notion of a construct (widely adopted by qualitative researchers) is somehow alien 
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and may be looked with suspicion. In our view, the notion of construct and how to translate it to 
a mathematical language may be crucial to the development of a IMSs research field backed up 
by CASs related methodologies. This, we believe, will be the challenge for the next years and 
quoting once again Winston Churchill ‘So, I have myself full confidence that if all do their duty, if 
nothing is neglected and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we should 
prove ourselves once more able… to outlive the menace …’ of ignorance regarding IMSs ‘…if 
necessary for years, if necessary alone.’.   
To conclude, and it seems an appropriate metaphor due to the addressed topic, like the flapping 
wings of a seemingly unaware butterfly that output a hurricane on the other side of the world we 
humbly hope that this paper may impact similarly.   
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Abstract 
Vehicles contain many accessory systems not specifically for driving, but for supplementary 
functions such as air conditioning, radio/multimedia, and more. Functions such as satellite 
navigation, hands-free cell phone, seat adjustments, and on-board computers are some other 
examples of functions actually available. As technology evolves, supplementary functions are 
added. Inevitably, the complexity of the function controls and their physical interfaces also 
increases, which can increase the probability of having an accident. This has been a great 
challenge for car manufacturers around the world, as they try to create the perfect solutions 
without compromising the driving safety. Driver distraction defines the deviation of focus from 
the primary task of driving a vehicle, to a secondary task, consequently diminishing the 
performance of the primary one. The causes for this distraction can be of unlimited sources, but 
they emerge from the effects of perturbation of certain human resources required for driving. 
There are three types of driver distraction that can affect drivers in different ways: (1) Visual 
distraction, tasks that require the driver to look away from the roadway to visually obtain 
information; (2) Manual distraction, tasks that require the driver to take a hand off the steering 
wheel and manipulate a device; (3) Cognitive distraction, tasks that require the driver to avert 
their mental attention away from the driving task. The tasks performed by drivers can be of one, 
two, or all three of these distraction types at a time. The main objectives of the present work 
were to understand: (a) How much are the actual automotive central consoles safe and helpful 
to the driving task; (b) How effectively can we measure the driver distraction while driving and 
performing tasks on the central consoles. It is expected that from this analysis some 
conclusions could be achieved that should lead to an improvement opportunity, that could result 
from a combination of the systems, or could even give opportunity to develop an alternative new 
solution or a good practice guide for future developments. The used methodology employed a 
driving simulator to present a highly immersive driving experience, with physics accuracy and 
telemetry exportation of the acquired driving data. The main metric indicators used were 
trajectory deviation, eyes-off-the-road time and self-perceived workload. The presented 
methodology was proven valid to evaluate in-vehicle systems that depend on human interaction, 
but the realism and immersion of the experience must be as high as possible. This methodology 
provides a way to relate the most important indicators about the driving performance and their 
retrieved data, in order to create a classification system that allows the definition of a system 
performance. This relation makes possible to evaluate human-machine interaction systems in 
terms of physical and psychological factors in a realistically simulated driving environment, 
without accident risk and with a low budget solution. The presented solution allows the 
acquisition of a large amount of data not only about the driving task itself, but also of all the 
associated tasks and systems that may be created and tested in a realistic driving environment. 
 
Keywords: Automotive interfaces; Mental workload; Driver distraction; Interface evaluation; Eye 
tracking. 
 
1- INTRODUCTION 
Inside the car there are a lot of considerations to take in account in order to develop a functional 
environment. Designing a vehicle involves the design, development and integration of a large 
number of systems and subsystems within a vehicle (Bhise & Pillai, 2006). This is a very 
complex process which involves multidisciplinary teams, working together in order to fit all the 
features within the existing limited space, nevertheless fulfilling the function for which they were 
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designed, providing the vehicle the ideal combination of all the needed attributes such as 
appearance, performance, safety, ride and comfort (Bhise & Pillai, 2006). 
 
One of the most complex assemblies within an automobile is the centre console. They are 
function populated areas where there are instruments and information systems, HVAC ducting 
and all interaction driver-vehicle features, all of them struggling for space and driver attention.  
A vehicle consists of many systems that are not specifically for driving, but are, instead, for 
supplementary functions such as air conditioning, radio/multimedia, and more (Jonghyun Ryu, 
Jaemin Chun, Gunhyuk Park, Seungmoon Choi, & Han, 2010). Functions as satellite navigation, 
parking help, cell phone hands-free and accessories, seat adjustments, ride adjustments, 
engine and mechanical adjustments, and on-board computers are other examples of functions 
actually available in the automobiles. 
As technology evolves, an increasing number of supplementary functions are added. Inevitably, 
the complexity of the function controls also increases. A recent solution for the problem has 
been the Driver Information System (DIS): a multifunctional system that provides a unified 
interface to control the vehicle electronics (Simões, 2011). 
All these systems need physical interfaces in order for being manipulated by the driver during 
various driving conditions. Ryu et al. (2010) also refers that these kinds of systems require the 
driver´s visual attention for selecting the desired functions, which can increase the probability of 
having an accident. 
Fai, Delbresine and Rauterberg (2007) (apud Simões(Simões, 2011)) Also refers that the most 
important concept in automotive industry is safety, and Simões (2011) refers that for that each 
component designed must be able to reduce injury to the occupants during a collision.  
Murata and Moriwaka (2005) also argue that the use of additional in-vehicle information 
systems to promote safer driving should avoid distracting the driver from their main sources of 
visual information outside the vehicle. As suggested by Burns, Harbluk, Foley and Angell (2010) 
is glances away from the road scene prior to critical events that predominate in real-world 
crashes and near-misses. 
 
1.1- Contemporary interfaces development 
This has been a great challenge for car manufacturers around the world, but until today there 
hasn’t been a consensus about the perfect solutions, and some solutions that seem ideal in 
some situations, became hardest or dangerous in other cases as suggested by Rydström, 
Broström, and Bengtsson, (2011) arguing that in terms of task completion time and the number 
of glances made to the display, there is not one input device that is always the best choice, 
since certain interaction devices are more suitable for certain kinds of tasks. 
So in this search for the balance for the perfect system, the carmakers developed their own 
ideal interaction interfaces.  
 
1.2- Driver distraction 
Driver distraction is a term that defines the deviation of focus from the primary task of driving a 
vehicle, to a secondary task, consequently diminishing the performance of the primary one. The 
causes for this distraction can be of an immense range of possibilities, but they emerge from the 
effects of perturbation of certain human resources required for driving, so they can be arranged 
in a few types.  
According to the National Highway traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) there are three types 
of driver distraction that can affect drivers in different ways (Department of Transportation, 
2014): Visual distraction: Tasks that require the driver to look away from the roadway to visually 
obtain information; Manual distraction: Tasks that require the driver to take a hand off the 
steering wheel and manipulate a device; Cognitive distraction: Tasks that require the driver to 
avert their mental attention away from the driving task. 
The tasks performed by drivers can be of one, two, or all three of these distraction types at a 
time. 
Torkkola, Gardner, Schreiner, Zhang, Leivian, Zhang, & Summers (2008) defined that in 
addition to interacting with on-board systems, drivers are also choosing to carry in mobile 
devices such as cell phones to increase productivity while driving. They argued that because 
technology is increasingly available for allowing people to stay connected, informed, and 
entertained while in a vehicle, many drivers feel compelled to use these devices and services in 
order to multitask while driving (Torkkola et al., 2008). As seen, drivers often engage in various 
parallel activities inside the car while driving, exploring the world of multifunctional environment 
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the cars provide nowadays. When using the central console interfaces to perform tasks, they 
give away very important part of their human driving resources. 
According to NHTSA the impact of distraction on driving is determined by, the type and level 
of distraction, the frequency and duration of task performance and the degree of demand 
associated with a task. Even if performing a task results in a low level of distraction, a driver 
who engages in it frequently, or for long durations, may increase the crash risk to a level 
comparable to that of a more difficult task performed less often (Department of 
Transportation, 2014). 
Authors hope to get clues where the centre consoles are getting badly designed, and thus a 
central console design guide could be further developed, in order to allow the carmakers, and 
designers to understand the main directions in creating a more user-friendly automotive 
environment, and to improve driving safety.  
 
2 - MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1 – Interface selection criteria 
In this study the physical interfaces were the chosen systems, because the objective was to 
measure how much the interaction with the interfaces can hazard the driving performance. In 
order to test a wide range of central console interfaces, the simulator must have a 
representation of a centre console in which should be mounted all the interfaces to be used 
during the tests.  
The centre console for this study had reunited all the major systems used in console interaction, 
and it was positioned in the simulator, with an ergonomically adjustable range of positions which 
combined with the seat adjustments, were the ideal conditions to match the subject’s 
anthropometric requirements.  
 
2.2- Driving simulators 
For the realism of the experience and to achieve more reliable results, a very good driving 
simulator is needed, with a highly immersive driving experience, physics accuracy and the 
ability to have telemetry to export the acquired driving data. The flexibility to customize the 
simulator is also one very important feature in order to control the driving environment and 
create an experience with a minimized influence from environment events.  
After some extensive testing it was decided that rFactor® was the best solution, because it has 
an engine that allows customization of a greater variety of factors than the other available 
options, and it was the only that allowed the level of customization and data acquisition needed 
for this study. Beyond all the programming capabilities, its physical outputs are very accurate 
and lots of professional race teams use it for testing and training (Birch, 2014). 
 
2.3- Metric indicators definition 
As suggested by Minin (2012) An indicator reflects driving performance when it detects the 
behavioural changes caused by the impact of a secondary task.  
As North Atlantic Threaty Organization (NATO) Geddie, Boer, Edwards, Enderwick, Graff, 
Pfender, Ruisseau and Van Loon (2001) supposed, two systems with the same level of overall 
performance may impose quite different levels of workload on operators. This suggests why is 
important to measure not only the driving performance, but also the workload users experience 
during the double task operations. As pointed by NATO, the workload data is evaluated by 
analytical techniques, which can be used already in the design phase of a system (Geddie et 
al., 2001). 
As suggested by Young, Regan and Hammer (2003) using a range of distraction measurement 
techniques, rather than a single technique, would be appropriate in evaluating HMI design 
concepts and prototypes in vehicles. 
In order to gather important information about this interaction between the driver and the central 
consoles, a relation between three very important indicators will be analysed: The driving line, 
the driver’s visual attention, and the perceived workload of the driver.  
As pointed by Minin et al. (2012) the primary effects on lateral position variations are drivers 
actions on the steering wheel, so the driving line is the major indicator to identify driving 
disturbance.  
Eye tracking, as indicated by Torkkola et al (2008) is the prevailing method for detecting driver 
inattention, using the camera to track the driver´s head or eyes. Curry, R., Greenberg, J., & 
Blanco, M., (2002) and Haigney, D., & Westerman, S. J., (2001) argued that eyes-off-the-road 
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time is a widely accepted and valid measure of the visual demand associated with the 
performance of a secondary task and is highly correlated with the number of lane excursions 
committed during secondary task performance. 
Hart and Staveland (1988) suggested that in comparison with other workload assessment 
methods, subjective ratings (as NASA TLX) may come closest to tapping the essence of mental 
workload and provide the most generally valid and sensitive indicator. 
To achieve this information without any life integrity risks, a driving simulator will be developed, 
where all the centre console interactions can be replicated, and where the interfaces would be 
tested in virtual environment. The simulator software allows a good data recording and 
processing, registering a lot of telemetry data that will give the main clues to understand drivers’ 
distraction caused by a certain interface. 
As pointed by Young et al. (2003) an important aspect to consider when measuring driving 
distraction is the selection of the appropriate baseline measure against which to compare 
driving performance when interacting with various devices. Thus, for this study, is assumed that 
the distraction provoked by a certain task involving the centre console, is defined by measuring 
the amount of trajectory deviation registered during that task, and correlating it with the “eyes-
off-the-road” mean time. Thus, this result is correlated with a workload measuring RAW NASA 
TLX method (RTLX), that gives us a result about the driver self perception of workload, and 
makes possible to relate if the recorded data, is compliant with the drivers feelings when 
exposed to double task danger situations. 
For the NASA RTLX procedure, the drivers will perform an enquiry about each task indicating 
the values of the self-percept workload. The task workload measure will be indicated by the 
mean resultant from the perceived workload values indicated. 
The most effective way to implement optimizations on minimising the interface-based distraction 
is to design the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) in an ergonomically ideal way. Using this 
combination of methods it is expected to obtain reliable data about the effectiveness and safety 
of the in vehicle interfaces on the automotive centre console, and then identify strengths and 
weaknesses in order to establish a guideline of good practices in automotive centre console 
interfaces design and development.  
 
2.3.1- Driving line deviation comparison 
Theoretically, the ideal trajectory in terms of safety is the centre of the driving lane, which is 
named in this study as “Theoretic driving line”. The normal everyday driving of the majority of 
the subjects is not accurate and everyone has his individual driving way, acting according to an 
infinite amount of causes and past experiences, causing them to use different approaches to 
every situation that happens on the road. These differences doesn’t mean they´re driving in a 
wrong way, but instead, that there´s an immense amount of correct ways do drive a car along a 
road. These approaches vary according to the driving perception and life posture of an 
individual, state-of-mind, self-respect, respect for life and integrity of others, monetary issues, 
and in an infinite way of safety affecting issues, that can be safer or dangerous for the driver, for 
the others, or for the surrounding environment. This issue and its problematic, takes us to the 
first lap of the test.  
In this first lap the habitual trajectories without performing tasks of each driver are recorded, to 
get the without task “real driving line reference” which represents their everyday driving with 
their everyday way of getting a vehicle along a road. This first lap is hereafter compared with the 
theoretic reference lap, which will give us the deviation of the everyday driving without tasks of 
the subject from the ideal theoretic line (centre of the driving lane). This deviation is afterwards 
subtracted to the second lap, to achieve to each test subject the “real deviation” that is 
performed in the tasks lap, and is representative of the task deviation from their normal 
everyday driving. Following, the second lap is compared to the “theoretic reference lap” to 
achieve the theoretic deviation when performing tasks, and to measure the maximum deviation 
from the centre of the lane, which will tell us if the extreme point of the vehicle will cross or not 
the roadside or the central line in the road that limits the traffic directions. This is needed in 
order to identify, whether or not, the drivers at some point of the circuit invaded the opposite 
traffic lane. If that happened, there is an imminent danger of collision. 
In all the trajectory deviation measurements, the deviation will be compared with the mean 
speed along the sectors, providing a way of understanding the effects of the speed on the 
deviations, and allowing to adjust the results and make them speed independent, comparable 
and valid between every test subject. This information is needed because the speed that the 
drivers use, along each task, wasn´t equal for everyone, and each test subject have different 
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approaches in terms of speed. Various studies suggested that the speed at which an individual 
drives, affects seriously the performance during tasks, and the faster a person drives, the more 
important is the far ahead part of the road, or lane keeping performance deteriorates (Knappe, 
Keinath, Bengler, & Meinecke, n.d.). 
2.3.1.1-The trajectory deviation measurement 
The trajectory deviation indicator is probably the most important indicator measurement that 
needs to be quantified in this study, because it will give the exact amount of distance a car 
travels laterally, in order to understand how negative the effects of the interfaces in the car 
path while driving are. The lateral deviation of the car, when surpassing certain values, is an 
indicator of imminent danger of collision, and injury to the vehicle, its occupants or to the 
surrounding world. 
To understand the trajectory deviation between telemetry exported files, an Excel Spreadsheet 
algorithm application has been developed that makes a comparison between the reference laps 
and the ones performed by the study subjects. The simulator software outputs the information 
about the mean deviation through each sector, the maximum deviation present in each sector, 
and outputs the information about the mean speed thorough the sector. 
The trajectory deviation is measured mathematically using a vector between two of the points of 
the reference lap, and using a perpendicular vector through the midpoint of that one, to intercept 
the deviated line, retrieving the value of the deviation (Figure 1). The sum of all deviation values 
is then related to the number of measured points through the sector distance, to have a mean 
deviation value. The amount of vectors used, is the amount of points present in each sector of 
the reference lap, and that value is sector size dependant and thus is fixed and is the same for 
every test that is compared to that reference lap. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Deviation measurement scheme. 
  
The maximum deviation value per sector is known, presenting the vector with the maximum 
value of them all inside that specific sector.  
The telemetry measures obtained are outputted in millimetres, which can be directly related in 
1:1 scale with the real world dimensions The measures were confirmed using a screenshot of 
the simulator, defined in a vehicle in the road situation with a good perspective that allowed a 
good perception of distances, and measures were obtained relating a vector with the vehicle 
width between mirrors, with a vector with the road size. Using a rule of three, the car vector was 
related with the road vector, achieving the approximate road width. The measurement was done 
as shown in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Vector measurement of the track width. 
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The maximum width of the simulator road in simulator units is 10000 units, which means each 
driving lane has 5000 units in the simulator. The out-of-towns mean road width in Portugal is 7 
meters, divided in 3,5 meters for each driving lane. The road used in the simulator was 
developed for the simulator with 10000 millimetres wide, which means each driving lane has 
5000 mm. The car was 1928 mm wide between mirrors according to the manufacturer’s owner’s 
manual. These measures were considered acceptable as they are not too far between the 
simulated drive, and the real world drive, and they allow compensation about the subjects’ lack 
of habitude of the simulated driving. 
 
2.3.2- The workload 
The workload experimented by an individual can be defined as the cost of accomplishment of 
certain mission requirements for the human operator (Hart, 2006) or the portion of human 
resources an operator expends when performing a specified task (Geddie et al., 2001). 
As humans, the operators are not perfect beings with machine performance, which in this case 
means that there are numerous factors that influence the difficulty of getting the tasks demands 
perfectly accomplished. Since humans cannot do everything perfectly done, perfectly fast, with 
no difficulties and no errors, there is a need to measure and understand the workload caused by 
systems and its interfaces, in order to get those who are interested in systems development and 
performance, in touch with the user’s difficulties. Understanding how a certain system demands 
resources from a human operator, and understanding how effectively he accomplishes them, is 
a crucial part of the design improvement process, as it allows researchers to understand which 
difficulties appear, and how strongly they affect the accomplishment of the task by the human 
operator. 
The driving task is one of the most demanding tasks, concerning human resources demand 
from the operators, as it requires physical, visual, cognitive, temporal and psychomotor 
resources, sometimes, all at once. Performing tasks during this situation is considered to be an 
extremely hazardous activity, as it decreases driving ability, and may cause traffic accidents.  
To understand the tasks performed while driving and how they affect the driving ability, there is 
the need to acquire data about the performance of the subjects during the tasks performed in 
the simulator test, expecting that the results will indicate if the workload caused by a certain task 
is directly related to the trajectory deviation, or the “eyes off the road” time. 
2.3.2.1- Methods for workload measurement 
Despite of its subjectivity, the process of acquiring workload data is somewhat scientifically 
explored, and in the past few years some methods reached notable success. For evaluation of 
workload under driving task situations, there are proper methods that better diagnose the 
workload of the user. A research made by NATO´s Research and Technology Organization 
(RTO) shown that “for human engineering testing and evaluation, subjective methods, 
especially rating scales, which access operator or observer judgements of a task, have many 
advantages and relatively few disadvantages in measuring operator workload compared to the 
other approaches”. These methods present high validity, minimal costs, easy implementation in 
a high variability of tasks, can be done by an external observer, and can be used preventively in 
development phases of a system design.  
NATO´s RTO, expresses as the most indicated methods to measure the workload of tasks while 
driving are: NASA TLX (Nasa Task Load Index), SWAT (Subjective Workload Assessment 
Technique), and ZEISS (Sequential Judgement Scale). All these methods have their strengths 
and weaknesses, which were analysed and compared in order to understand which one is the 
recommended to measure the workload while driving and performing tasks on the interfaces 
presented during the simulator tests. The choice for was the NASA TLX. 
2.3.2.2- NASA task load index (NASA TLX) 
The NASA Task Load index is a subjective assessment tool, which assesses the perceived 
workload of an individual while performing tasks, in order to evaluate system effectiveness, in 
terms of task completion and the human effort needed to accomplish it. 
The normal NASA TLX works with a two stage test structure: In the first part each user defines 
which weight has each contributing factor, to the workload of a specific task and this is made by 
a pair-wise comparison system.  
According to the NASA TLX manual (NASA - Human Performance Research Group, 2013), 
there are 15 possible pair-wise comparisons of the six scales. Each pair is presented on a card. 
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Subjects select the member of each pair that contributed more to the workload of that task. The 
number of times a factor is selected is its weight for the workload of that task.  
The second part is a set of six scales which represent six human factors relevant to the 
workload measurement. In each scale, the user must define how much workload they´ve 
experienced through the task and classify it in a 100 point scale which will give us a value in 5 
point steps. 
The final task score calculation of workload is computed by multiplying each rating by the weight 
given to that factor by the user. The sum of the weighted ratings for each task is then divided by 
the amount of weights: 15.  
2.3.2.3- The adapted NASA TLX: NASA Raw TLX (RTLX) 
The Original NASA TLX method uses a weighting process that has been criticised amongst 
different authors. A vast majority of new studies suggest that using an unweighted version of the 
test can lead to very similar results and better reliability.  
As suggested by Geddie et al. (2001) an increase in between subject variability could not be 
noticed in contrast to the assumptions of the authors of NASA TLX. Geddie et al. (2001) also 
argues that from the results obtained, the paired comparison can possibly be dropped. Nygren 
(1991) also suggests that the weighting process is ineffective and recommends ignoring it. 
Bustamante and Spain (2008) argued that NASA TLX lacked scalar invariance. Consequently, 
analysis of mean differences (between weighted and unweighted procedure) was meaningless 
and misleading (Bustamante & Spain, 2008). 
The removal of the weighting process with no major impact on the results is an advantage, 
because the validity and practicability of the test remains, while the application time and 
simplicity is severely improved. 
The test can be applied using a simple rating of the six scales of the second phase, and then by 
calculating the mean result of them all, the overall workload for that task can be achieved. 
This method can be applied with improved practicality, much faster, and much easier to the 
operator, with no impact at the results level. 
This method, as cited in various studies, will be mentioned as the NASA RTLX. 
2.3.3- Eye tracking method 
The test subjects of this study were evaluated about the total percent of “eyes-off-the-road” time 
while performing tasks in the centre console. The proposed method was doing the eye tracking 
manually with a high time cost but very low budget solution. 
The method used for gathering this data was using a video recording camera positioned in the 
central console, assembled with a custom made wood support fixed with Velcro to the console, 
and pointed to the driver’s head (needed adjustment to every subject in each test). The camera 
was connected using a firewire cable directly to the driving simulator computer for video date 
and time synchronization with the simulator telemetry plugin. This synchronization allows for 
better definition of the time intervals where the eye tracking would be performed. The data and 
time information were recorded in the video, so there could be no chance of losing the relation 
between the images recorded and the time information. The video was recorded in background 
in the same computer that was running the simulations using the camera native software 
(iSpy®), that is freeware, and is very low on consuming computer resources and assures great 
video quality with low file size and date info implementation on video images. As the simulator 
room needed the windows covered, and the light used was artificial fluorescent lighting due to 
console illumination issues, the video recording was performed using the infrared mode, in order 
to eliminate shadows in video. This mode produced images that enhanced the eye contours and 
iris, that allowed to a better identification and detection of the eye glances away from the road 
made by the drivers. 
The video recording was performed since the subjects entered in the simulator, and they were 
previously warned about being filmed. During the test, the telemetry software recorded at which 
time the driver entered the task sector, and at which time leaved, and that gives us the 
information about the time intervals to control and obtain the total eyes-off-the-road time 
measurements in each sector on the video. The total eyes-off-the road time is obtained by 
observation of the video while using chronograph software to analyse it. The total time of the 
eye glances in that sector, is then divided by the time that the subject took to complete the 
sector, giving us the percentage of eyes-off-the-road time for each sector. The chronograph 
software used is named Chronme®, and is a free tool available online that registers a list of the 
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glances away from the road, and allows an output of the recorded data in a Comma Separated 
Values (CSV) file. 
2.3.4- The inquiries 
When testing human factors, and when trying to understand how these human factors may or 
not be related with the results acquired, there is a need to acquire individual information about 
the subjects that will collaborate with the study. The most direct mean of obtaining this data is 
by performing enquiries to the individuals. 
2.3.4.1- Pre driving test inquiry 
In this phase, data about the age, gender, and experience, and data for identifying possible 
partial driving impairments like vision or hearing problems, information about their previous 
experiences with central consoles, opinions on difficulties or other issues was gathered. 
Information about their self opinion as drivers was also gathered in order to understand and 
compare their self perception to their general results of the test. As affirmed by Torkkola et al. 
(2008) “almost all the drivers rate their driving ability as superior than others,(...)They believe 
that they have sufficient driving control to take part of their attention away from the driving task 
and give it to multi-tasking”. This behaviour is understood as risky, and from this result of the 
inquiries some conclusions on this problematic are expected.  
2.3.4.2- Simulator validity test inquiry 
In order to understand how realistic the simulated driving experience was felt by the subjects, 
were carried out a series of questions about their self percept experience and how they felt it 
would be representative of their everyday driving style. Were posed some questions about the 
source of information they allocated more attention, about the instructor orders, about the 
ergonomics, the simulator equipment, if there were any surprising situations, and about the 
double task situation difficulties. This inquiry was only distributed randomly to some subjects in 
the first series of tests, just to understand how real the simulator experience was being 
perceived, and to try to understand if the whole testing procedure needed some further 
adjustments. This inquiry sheet was analysed right immediately after the subject left from the 
simulator room. 
2.3.4.3- After test inquiry 
A simple four question section was inserted, to perceive how well subjects understood the 
orders from the instructor, and how well they perceived the driving environment. They were also 
questioned if they had previous knowledge of the test roads, to ensure it was the first time 
subjects were driving them, and to keep possible simulator practitioners apart from the sample. 
2.3.4.4-NASA RTLX inquiry 
In order to obtain the perceived workload data, the NASA RTLX method was applied, and the 
subjects indicated in a scale of 1 to 20 how much they perceived each of the subscale 
measures. For each task, a group of 6 subscales considering the human factors that influence 
workload were presented to the subjects. 
 
3- RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
After the post processing of the tests collected data - route deviation, eyes-off-the-road time, 
NASA RTLX, and inquiries – it was performed a statistical analysis of the obtained results. The 
indicators results will be related directly between each other average results, creating a 
correlation for each task (Figure 3). These related results should be used to define the 
classification for each system. 
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 Figure 3 - Indicators interrelation. 
 
This method provides a way to relate what was found as the most important indicators about the 
driving performance and their achieved data, to create a classification system that allows the 
definition of a system performance in a mathematical way. This relation between indicators 
makes possible to evaluate human-machine interaction systems in terms of physical and 
psychological factors in a realistically simulated driving environment, with no dangerous 
situations associated and with low budget solutions, that allow the acquisition of a great amount 
of data not only about the driving task itself, but of all the associated tasks and systems that 
may be created and tested in a driving environment.  
3.1-Simulator validity 
The inquiry for validation of the simulator was delivered to 16 subjects, and the results were 
indicators that everything was OK for the test implementation. An important result was obtained, 
about the self-perception of the subjects, that 75% of them considered this test conditions to be 
very representative of their real driving behaviour (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 - Self-perception about the representativeness of the test. 
3.2-Subjects summary 
The field of subjects present in this study was composed by individuals of both genders, in the 
proportions of 70% Male individuals and 30% Female ones as seen in Figure 5. They were 
drivers with experience between 1 and 33 years of driving, representing respectively the 
proportions of 21% from 17 to 33 years of experience, and 79% between 0 to 16 years, leaving 
us with experienced drivers as well as younger ones, that will let us evaluate the influence of 
experience in the performance of tasks while driving (Figure 6). A percentage of 94% of the 
subjects have regular driving habits as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5 - Gender of the subjects’ field. 
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 Figure 6 - Years of driving experience. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Driving frequency of the subjects. 
 
The subject’s perception about their driving ability was questioned, and 91% of the drivers 
consider themselves as good drivers. Only 9% admit that they are not good drivers as reflected 
in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 - Self perception about driving quality. 
 
A majority of 80% of the subjects confirm to have habitual interaction with the central console 
while driving as seen in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Central console usage by subjects. 
 
The subjects in the field were all mobile phone users, and the kind of mobile phone used in the 
respective tasks was controlled, to split the phone tasks results in touch screen interaction 
phones, and the keypad ones. This information allowed having perception on which is the most 
dangerous kind of phone interaction while driving. The majority of the subjects presented a 
touch screen phone against 42% of the subjects with keypad ones (Figure 10). 
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 Figure 10 - Subjects mobile phone interfaces. 
 
The opinion of the subjects about their impressions of the most dangerous tasks while driving 
was inquired (Fig. 11) and the results show that Cell phone tasks were considered the major 
menace to the driving task. However, interacting with touch screen interfaces has not been 
mentioned as a major problem.  
 
Figure 11 - Subjects opinion about the most dangerous tasks while driving. 
 
 
4- CONCLUSIONS 
The development of a driving simulator is a valid method to evaluate in-vehicle systems that 
depend on human interaction, but the realism and immersion of the experience must always be 
as better as possible. The presented methodology provides a way to relate what was found as 
the most important indicators about the driving performance and their retrieved data, in order to 
create a classification system that allows the definition of a system performance. This relation 
between indicators makes possible to evaluate human-machine interaction systems in terms of 
physical and psychological factors in a realistically simulated driving environment, without 
accident risk and with a low budget solution. The presented solution allows the acquisition of a 
great amount of data not only about the driving task itself, but also of all the associated tasks 
and systems that may be created and tested in a realistic driving environment.  
Although this study provided relevant results, the methodology should be applied in more 
situations and alternative systems evaluation. Further studies should be made in order to 
improve its validity, and to confirm the applicability of the method on different systems inside the 
car, as well on different scales of participants. Authors already have applied this methodology to 
evaluate some of the systems used on an automotive cockpit, in order to have further validation 
of the method, results can be found elsewhere. 
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Abstract 
The number of migrant workers in Norway is continuously increasing. Polish workers are the 
largest group of migrant workers in Norway, and particularly well represented in the construction 
industry. Research and statistics show that migrant workers are more prone to occupational 
accidents than native workers. This difference is often attributed to poor communication and 
lack of lingual skills. There are however several other factors influencing the occupational safety 
of migrant workers, such as culture, organisational aspects and individual factors. A study was 
conducted to explore how the use of migrant workers in the construction industry influences 
communication and thus occupational safety with emphasis on culture and language. To get a 
broad perspective both migrant workers, represented by Polish workers, and native workers, 
represented by Norwegian workers were interviewed. It was found that the focus in the 
construction sector in Norway concerning migrant workforce is mainly on language as an issue, 
as most measures were found to be related to language. Culture is seen as a contributing 
factor, but is somewhat neglected and few measures are being implemented for cultural issues. 
Furthermore, Polish workers are often seen as a homogeneous group, whereas in reality there 
are large differences between individuals. Factors that affect occupational safety for migrant 
workers are compound, and must be seen together in a broader, more complex perspective. A 
sole focus on language is too narrow. To cope with these challenges and improve safety in the 
sharp end involvement of the governmental, organisational and individual level is needed 
throughout all phases of a project. 
 
Keywords: migrant workers; culture; language; communication 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A moving workforce is globalising the construction industry. After the expansion of the European 
Union (EU) in 2004, the number of migrant workers from the new member countries across 
Western-Europe rose. In this study, we wish to analyse the effects of this development for the 
risk of being involved in occupational accidents. Previous studies (Salminen, 2011; The 
Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority, 2012) have shown that foreign workers have an 
increased risk of being injured or killed at work. While we already know a great deal about the 
differences in risk for the afore-mentioned groups, we know less about the underlying factors 
causing these patterns in risk. It is the ambition of this paper to shed light on these underlying 
factors. 
In Norway, Poles represent the largest group of migrant workers. The number of Polish workers 
in Norway is continuously increasing, even after 10 years with open borders in Europe. A study 
carried out by Friberg and Eldring (2011) shows that 84 percent of the Polish men coming after 
2004 in Oslo are employed in the construction industry, which is also known to be one of the 
sectors with the highest risk for occupational accidents. More than one-third of the reported 
injuries among migrant workers in Norway in 2012 involved Polish citizens (The Norwegian 
Labour Inspection Authority, 2012) even though they only constituted 15 percent of the 
employed migrant workforce in Norway1. As a consequence of this, the present study focuses 
on Polish workers in the Norwegian construction industry. 
It is important to understand challenges concerning a more international workforce. The aim of 
the paper is to explore how the use of Polish workers influences occupational safety in the 
industry with focus on culture and language. Previous research on the field shows that language 
is affecting safety at a work place (Lindhout, Swuste, Teunissen, & Ale, 2012). When it comes to 
cultural influences some studies shows that culture does not play a decisive role for 
                                                          
1 Numbers from Statistics Norway (SSB), Employment among immigrants, register-based. Available from: 
www.ssb.no/en/statistikkbanken 
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occupational safety (Guldenmund, Cleal, & Mearns, 2013), other that different labour cultures 
and traditions, and different work habits of foreign workers are among factors that can affect 
occupational safety (Kartam, Flood, & Koushki, 2000). 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. The Construction Industry 
Construction projects are complex socio-technical systems that can take many different 
organisational forms. The industry is project-based and operates in an ever-changing 
environment (Lingard & Rowlinson, 2005). One dimension of the complexity is related to the 
many actors involved in a construction project, that all have impact on safety, e.g. authorities, 
clients, designers, specialist consultants, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers. Another 
dimension of the complexity is related to the labile characteristics of the portfolio of projects in 
the industry. Each project is unique related to type of project (a house, a railway or a bridge), 
ways of doing work, partners and techniques for construction. The interactions and 
collaborations between different project phases and involved actors are complex. Many different 
actors and stakeholders are involved with different rationalities, purposes and knowledge. For 
example a client’s main focus is on design and functionality of the end product rather than 
safety. Lack of focus on safety in design and planning is named one of the key challenges to 
safety management in the industry (Frijters & Swuste, 2008; Jørgensen, 2013). Behm (2005) 
made a study of fatal accidents in the construction industry that showed that the design of a 
project links to 42 % of fatalities reviewed in his study. 
Increased globalisation of workforce is one of the key contributing factors to the risk picture in 
the construction industry. The globalisation of the workforce is related to market mechanisms as 
well as periods of work peak where temporary appointments are applied.  
 
2.2. Migrant workers 
Worldwide, the labour market is affected by guest workers emigrating to work abroad. After the 
expansion of the European Union (EU) in 2004, the number of hired workers in Norway and the 
rest of Western Europe have grown rapidly. The trend with migrant workers is also present in 
United States, Canada, Asia and Australia. 
There are many reasons for both migration of workers and employment of migrant workers. For 
the hosting countries such as Norway, some of the reasons for employing migrant workers are 
lack of qualified workers in the local marked and more flexible and cheaper workforce. The 
migrant workers on the other side usually look for a job opportunity and a better salary. 
In Norway per 2013, 13% of the employed labour force are immigrants (Olsen, 2013) which is 
twice the number for 2002. The majority come from the EU-countries in Eastern Europe and 
Asia including Turkey. The largest group of migrant workers in Norway are from Poland, which 
in particular works in the construction industry. A study by Friberg and Eldring (2011) show that 
most of these are men over 35 years with family and they have on average lived in Norway for 4 
years. Most of them have limited language skills in Norwegian and English.  
International studies show that migrant workers have a higher risk for work-related accidents 
than native workers (e.g. Starren, Hornikx, and Luijters (2013)). Salminen (2011) has in his 
studies found that the risk of occupational injury is 2.13 times higher for foreign workers than for 
native workers. Numbers from The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (2012) show the 
same tendency; that foreign workers have a 1.46 times higher chance of severe accidents than 
native workers. Several studies point at communication, language and culture as significant 
contributing factors to safety challenges related to foreign workers. Lindhout et al. (2012) 
emphasise in particular lingual challenges, potential misunderstandings and low risk awareness 
as main challenges.  
Other studies have found that there is a relationship between safety and national culture 
(Helmreich and Merrit, 1998 in Mearns & Yule, 2009) and that different cultures have different 
risk perceptions and attitudes towards risk (Kouabenan, 2009). Håvold (2007) has found that 
national culture influences safety orientation. He also found that there are differences between 
national and regional cultures when it comes to safety factors. A study comparing Filipino and 
Norwegian seafaring professionals found that national culture seems to have impact on the 
probability of occupational accidents (Lamvik & Bye, 2004). A study on Pakistani construction 
workers based on Hofstede's theory shows that there is a strong correlation between cultural 
dimensions, safe work behaviour and risk perception which can be explained by attitudes 
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(Mohamed, Ali, & Tam, 2009). The study also revealed that the safety culture at work influence 
the safety of on-site behaviour. 
 
2.3. Framework conditions 
A first step in understanding why migrant workers are more exposed to occupational risk is to 
study the framework conditions influencing their work situation. The term framework conditions 
here refer to the "the conditions that influence the opportunities an organisation, organisational 
unit, group, or individual has to control accident risk" (Rosness, Blakstad, Forseth, Dahle, & 
Wiig, 2012)2. Framework conditions are external or contextual factors that influence the way 
work is performed, decisions are made and safety is upheld. Contractual relationships, 
economic incentives, the formal division of labour and distribution of power between groups are 
examples of framework conditions. In the construction industry the framework conditions will 
vary from project to project. There will be differences in contractual relationships, the number of 
subcontractors involved, the scale and timeframe of the project and so on. One will also find 
variations in the framework conditions of different actors within each project, as they can have 
different contractual and employment relationships. 
Research on migrant workers' occupational risk shows the importance of several such 
framework conditions. Guldenmund et al. (2013) claim that migrant workers are more involved 
in occupational accidents than local workers because they carry out more dangerous work, and 
are therefore exposed to higher risks. Paul (2013) relates the increased risk among migrant 
workers to long working hours, high work tempo and acceptance of questionable or dangerous 
working condition to the desire of work. Another aspect is on circumstances around the working 
conditions. As migrant workers often do not speak the language and want to keep their jobs, 
they do not complain about working conditions even if they are bad or unsafe (Guldenmund et 
al., 2013). Many also believe that if they report injuries or other things, and are staying illegally, 
they will be sent back to their country (Guldenmund et al., 2013).  McKay, Craw, and Chopra 
(2006) report that many migrant workers are recruited through agencies and are often paid less, 
have long working hours and have to work worse shifts. They also highlight that migrant workers 
get less opportunities than local workers, which show different treatment. In their studies they 
concluded that in some cases in England and Wales migrant workers were not offered safety 
training courses. Similarly Paul (2013) states that many migrant workers do not have any 
experience in the job sectors and they do not receive job training, which makes them prone to 
accidents.  
Many migrant workers are hired on a short-term basis, whether hired by contractors, 
subcontractors or recruitment agencies, they often change work places and employer and will 
therefore find limited opportunities of establishing social relationships at the work site. According 
to Mayhew and Quinlan (1997) temporary work arrangements may give higher risk of 
occupational injury. Numbers from The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (2012) show that 
most of the injured migrant workers were not employed on regular contacts, but either hired or 
temporary employed. 
Economic reward pressure, disorganisation, inadequate regulation and the lack of social and 
cultural integration are factors that are likely to influence occupational risk. Furthermore, 
temporary contracts can create ambiguity regarding responsibilities (Burgess & Connell, 2006) 
as there might be weaker relationship to the employer.  
 
3. CULTURE AND SAFETY 
The merging of the concepts of (organisational) culture and safety is usually credited the 
investigations performed in the aftermath of Chernobyl (e.g. IAEA, 1991). The interest in safety 
culture had an obvious predecessor in the research on safety climate (e.g. Zohar, 1980) and the 
seminal works of  Barry Turner (Turner, 1976, 1978). The broader field of organisational science 
saw a wave of research into organisational culture from the early 1980s and onwards, while the 
preceding work on organisational climate can be traced back to the 1960s (e.g. Litwin & 
Stringer, 1968). A common denominator in all these strands of research is that they treat culture 
or climate as intra-organisational properties in the sense that they are oriented at understanding 
the inner workings of organisations by describing their uniqueness as social systems. Apart 
from the research on professional culture the ways organisations are connected with their 
broader cultural context, is an under-researched field. In an increasingly globalised labour 
                                                          
2 Rosness and colleagues use the term "environmental conditions" instead of "framework conditions". Both terms 
translate into the Norwegian word "rammebetingelser" and are therefore treated as synonyms. 
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market, the possible influence of national cultures on organisational cultures will be an important 
topic for organisation science in general, and safety science in particular.  
In particular, the inclusion of multiple nationalities in single organisations and work groups is 
likely to create new dynamics related to communication and interaction. As such, it can 
introduce new challenges and opportunities for organisations' ability to maintain safety. This 
involves a slight change in focus for safety culture research, from describing the predominant 
frames of reference and social conventions within a presumed homogenous group, to 
describing the differences between the members of a given group or between different groups. 
In a workforce consisting of multiple nationalities, inter-cultural or cross-cultural communication 
becomes an important challenge. Hofstede (1984) is among the researchers describing how 
cultural differences between different nationalities make their presence felt in the world of work 
and organisation. Hofstede identifies six different dimensions along which different cultures can 
be classified (The hofstede centre, 2015). The dimensions are: 
1) Power distance (the degree to which the members of a culture accept and expect 
inequalities in the distribution of prestige, wealth and power)  
2) Uncertainty avoidance (the degree to which uncertainty in terms of rule orientation, 
employment stability and stress is tolerated) 
3) Individualism vs. Collectivism (whether the members of a culture expect to take care of 
themselves and no one else, as opposed to a preference for more collective values 
where society or groups have a responsibility for taking care of the individual) 
4) Masculinity vs. Femininity (the role distribution between the sexes and the degree to 
which traditional masculine ideals related to competition, achievement and 
assertiveness are valued) 
5) Long term vs. Short Term Normative Orientation (whether the members of a culture like 
to hold on to norms and traditions or are open for new knowledge to prepare for the 
future) 
6) Indulgence vs. Restraint (the extent to which the society have strict norms or  more 
freely allows to enjoy life according to desires and impulses) 
Hofstede's dimensions can be easily criticised for involving stereotypes painting generalised 
caricatures and overlooking obvious differences inside the groups that appear to be similar in 
Hofstede's classification. Nevertheless, his taxonomy points to the fact that cultures do vary and 
that multinational organisations and work places will have to deal with this variation in 
communication and interaction. In this paper we will explore the way this form of cultural 
complexity can influence on safety. 
Cultural differences based on nationality should, however, not be exaggerated. As has been 
shown by Wenger (1998)  and other researcher on so-called "communities of practice", being 
involved with the same activity and having the same craft can be a source of common identity 
and meaning. In other words, a multinational group of say carpenters will most likely be 
characterised by both differentiation and integration, where integration comes from sharing a 
profession and an activity. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative study was conducted to obtain knowledge that can shed light on the risk of 
occupational injuries among migrant workers in the construction industry. Data was collected 
through semi-structured interviews. The study involved migrant workers represented by Polish 
workers in Norway, and focused on Polish workers coming to Norway after 2004.  
 
4.1. Research design 
Scientific research papers were used as background information for the study. An interview 
guide was prepared with nine key categories of questions; background information, safety, 
cultural aspects, communication, training and follow-up, hiring and inclusion, responsibilities, 
measures and further work. The interview guide consisted of around 30 questions. Some 
questions were adapted according to the informant's position. The interviews were conducted 
as semi-structured interviews with open questions. The advantage with semi-structured 
interviews is the possibility of basing the questions on themes and asking additional questions 
according to information coming up (Bryman, 2012). 
Both migrant workers, represented by Polish workers, and native workers, represented by 
Norwegian workers, in different positions were interviewed. 
Reflecting on and describing aspects of culture requires an attempt to explicate frames of 
reference, norms and conventions that are to a large extent taken for granted. This is a 
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methodological challenge in many different respects (see Antonsen, 2009a, 2009b), but has 
particular implications when it comes to language. It is hard enough to explicate cultural 
assumptions within your mother tongue and likely to prove very hard to do so in a foreign 
language. To counter this challenge, all interviews were conducted in the informants' native 
languages, respectively Polish and Norwegian. 
The interviews were conducted in March 2014. The length of the interviews varied between 15 
minutes up to an hour, where the majority lasted around 30 minutes. Most of the interviews 
were recorded and then transcribed in form of a structured, detailed memo. Notes were taken 
during the interviews for the ones that were not recorded. Further the interviews where 
systematically analysed, resulting in main findings organised in the following four categories; 
lingual skills, communication, culture and safety. The data was treated confidentiality and 
published anonymously. 
 
4.2. Sample 
The informants were employed by contractors, sub-contractors and temporary working agencies 
in the construction industry. The sample consisted of 10 Norwegian and 8 Polish employees. 
Six companies were represented and the informants were employed in four different positions 
as presented in Table 1. The informants were recruited through a contact person in a 
construction company, via local contacts and also through "snowball sampling" with tips who to 
contact from other informants. Also "open sampling" was used as random informants available 
at the construction site were interviewed. These sampling methods together give varied and 
thorough data, and a saturation point was reached as several points of view were represented 
and no new concepts emerged from the interviews (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
 
Table 1: Informant sample 
Position Norwegian Polish 
Manager 4 1 
Supervisor 3 - 
Skilled worker 1 6 
Union 
representative* 
2 1 
          *Union representatives were also skilled workers 
 
4.2.1. Polish informants 
The Polish informants were between 35 and 55 years old and had all started to work in Norway 
after 2004. Most had been working in Norway between 7 and 8 years. The shortest work 
experience in Norway among the informants was 2 years, the longest 10 years. The skilled 
workers had technical school as education from Poland. 
The terms of employment varied between the Polish informants. Some were permanently 
employed for a contractor or a subcontractor, some had time-limited contracts and some worked 
in temporary employment agencies and were hired out. Most of the informants lived in Norway. 
Some were settled in Norway with family, others had their family in Poland. A few were 
commuting between Norway and Poland every second week. 
 
4.2.2. Norwegian informants 
The age of the Norwegian informants varied between 35 and 55 years. The education varied 
between technical school and higher education and the skilled workers had at least 15 years of 
experience in the industry. All the Norwegian informants were permanently employed by 
contractors. 
 
4.3. Translation 
Interviews transcribed in Polish were by the interviewer translated into Norwegian during coding 
of the data into categories. This was done to have a proper basis for comparison without 
language confusions. Translation of data can influence the sense and meanings of the data. 
Therefore the focus for the translations was on correct interpretation, rather than on a literal 
translation. The interviewers' cultural knowledge about Norway and Poland, and the lingual 
skills in both languages assure a good translation without meaning being reduced as the 
cultural contexts and language differences are well known to the interviewer. As the raw data 
were transcribed in Polish, it was possible to go back and find the exact wording if necessary. 
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4.4. Analysis 
Thirteen of the interviews were recorded and transcribed in form of a structured note. Five of the 
interviews were documented by notes taken during the interviews. The interviews were 
transcribed in Norwegian and Polish. 
The transcriptions were coded according to categories with subcategories based on "open 
coding" (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This allows for a structured comparison of the similarities and 
differences from the collected data. The data was systemised in a matrix of informants and 
categories and systematically examined. The study resulted in findings separated according to 
Polish and Norwegian informants. This data was structured in four main categories with 
subcategories as presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Codes for results 
Category Lingual skills Communication Culture Safety 
Subcategories About 
Norwegians 
About Poles 
Courses 
Language 
Common 
practice 
 
Understanding 
Behaviour/Attitudes 
Rules and 
procedures 
Compliance 
Reporting 
Hazards 
Training 
 
4.5. Transferability 
This study has looked at the case of Polish workers in the construction industry in Norway. 
Many of the findings coincide with other both Norwegian and international studies about migrant 
workers when it comes to issues arising when using migrant workforce. The findings have been 
validated against other articles and books; therefore the study is a reliable source of information. 
This study adds knowledge to previous Norwegian studies (Friberg, 2011; Friberg & Eldring, 
2011; The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority, 2012), and together they give a broad 
picture of the situation in Norway and in other European countries where Polish workers 
represent a large part of the migrant workforce. The study represents the construction industry, 
but may however be valid for other industries with migrant workforce and similar conditions. 
 
5. RESULTS 
The main results of the interview study are presented. The focus is on how communication 
influences safety when migrant workforce is used at constructions sites. Two main factors are 
emphasised; namely language and culture. 
 
5.1. Language 
Language is the most obvious source of difference between workers of different nationalities. It 
can create misunderstandings and usually influences the access to information, knowledge 
about work processes, rules and rights.  Norwegian and English language skills varied among 
the Polish informants in this study. The stereotype "migrant worker" conceals great variation 
within the group both related to language skills and integration in Norwegian society at large. 
English language skills depended highly on the age of the informant, where the younger 
generation had better English skills. The Norwegian language skills however, seemed to 
depend on several other factors more than on the age factor.  The skills in Norwegian of the 
Polish workers were highly depended on the informants’ expectations for their stay and their 
working arrangements. The informants with no Norwegian skills lived permanently in Poland 
and commuted to work in Norway every second week. There was no need for them to learn 
Norwegian as they mostly worked 12 hour shifts when they were in Norway, and did not need to 
communicate in Norwegian outside work. At work they had someone that could translate for 
them, or they knew the few basic terms needed to do their job. The informants that were 
originally planning to work in Norway only a few years to improve their economic situation and 
then to move back had some skills in Norwegian. The informants that had moved to Norway 
with their families and established spoke Norwegian on a higher level, even after only a couple 
years in Norway.  
Some companies organised language courses for migrant workers. Some of the informants had 
been to language courses, but found it demanding and time-consuming to learn Norwegian. 
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"The course was quite hard. It was after work in the evening, from 8 pm to 10 pm. You 
are tired after a whole day at work, and you need to wake up early the next day again to 
go to work". [Polish skilled worker] 
 
The level of integration in the work place and in society at large, as well as framework 
conditions was thus seen as a strong influence on whether the Polish workers were able to 
communicate in Norwegian. It is common practice to organise Polish workers together in teams 
with one supervisor that knows both Polish and Norwegian or English, and is used as translator. 
Non-verbal communication in form of drawings of pointing is also common. Written information 
is often available in Polish and English in addition to Norwegian. 
The impression the Polish workers themselves had, was that communication at work was okay, 
either they spoke Norwegian themselves or they had messages translated to them. Several 
informants mentioned that it is more important to be a good craftsman, than to know the 
language well for getting a job. In some cases those doing a very good job, have good careers, 
despite the lack of proficiency in Norwegian. In practice several qualities are valued, as the goal 
is to get the work done and lingual skills are just one of them. 
 
“The ones that know the job get to stay. The language is not the most important. A real 
professional worker will manage without language. Then it is enough with some words 
and gesticulation”. [Polish skilled worker] 
 
The interviews indicated that Norwegian workers at the sharp end perceive language barriers as 
a larger risk factor than Polish workers. Many of the Polish workers had the opinion that they 
had a satisfactory level of Norwegian to perform their work. Nevertheless, the opinion was that it 
would have been useful to have further skills in the Norwegian language. However, the 
informants clearly stated that communication became easier and language was less of a barrier, 
when colleagues know each other and have worked together before. 
 
5.2. Different kinds of "yes" - language and culture  
There is more to communication than only understanding words. Cultural differences can 
influence the way things are said and how things are understood. 
 
"One understood Norwegian very well and spoke Norwegian. He understood the 
terminology and the tone Norwegians use when they speak. Most of the others 
however, neither understood what I said, nor why I said it!" [Norwegian supervisor] 
 
Both Norwegian and Polish informants had experienced that their Polish colleagues had 
answered “Yes, yes”, without really understanding the question. One of the migrant workers 
admitted to having answered in this way when he did not yet speak and understand Norwegian 
well. Others said that they were asking if something was unclear. It was also pointed out that the 
Polish workers tend to answer "Yes", but there were different types of "Yes", for example said 
with a different tone, depending on if the message was understood or not. Several informants 
said it is important to reassure that the message is understood correctly by asking "what or how" 
questions instead of "yes or no" questions. 
The cultural differences are especially visible in the management hierarchy and understandings 
of each other's positions. For the Polish workers the manager has a lot of authority, whereas the 
Norwegian power structure is generally regarded as more flat. Both groups of informants agreed 
that the Norwegians and the Polish have different views when it comes to relating to superiors. 
Norwegian informants had observed that Polish workers like to call their superiors for "boss", 
whereas the Norwegian superiors were not comfortable with the term. For the Polish informant 
calling the superior for "boss" was a way to show respect for older and more experienced 
workers. Some of the Norwegians interpreted that as getting more responsibilities, which they 
did not want. However, after getting the explanation of the way Poles talk and the reasons 
behind it, some of the Norwegians got an understanding and were fine with being called "boss". 
 
"I think I have never been called boss before. Yes, boss. Like a cotton plantation. I am 
your supervisor, not your boss. You are your own boss for the next week. You have to 
plan your own week, not me. I can just help you arrange it and explain. The rest you 
have to do on your own". [Norwegian supervisor] 
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Similarly, as the management was observed to be more hierarchic among Poles, the 
communication patterns among Poles are also observed to be influenced by this top-down 
structure where information comes from the top. The Norwegian informants had an 
impression that communication with Polish workers needed to be harsh, which was quite 
unfamiliar with them. 
 
"He (a Polish supervisor) communicated with his guys in a very harsh manner as for 
me. We don't do that. We can speak loudly, but to me it seems wrong to yell and howl: 
"You should be finished HERE!" We are used to include and involve in planning in 
Norway. "What do you think, and how?" But with the guys from Poland we need to 
communicate in a totally different way. More like a loudmouthed control centre. That is 
totally wrong to me". [Norwegian supervisor] 
 
The Norwegian informants had observed that Polish workers must get specific orders to perform 
their job, whereas Norwegian workers were by themselves described as more used to doing 
things on their own. However, the perception from the Polish workers themselves was not in 
accordance with the Norwegian workers' perception. According to some of the Polish workers 
they were more observant and solution-orientated, and thus able to do things alone.  
 
5.3. "What the boss says, the boss gets" - rules and compliance 
Polish informants described that HSE and work with safety is seen as important and performed 
seriously in Norway. Several underlined that safety comes first in Norway. All workers had been 
on HSE-training arranged by developers and contractors and some also from their own 
company. Regulations and procedures from developers, contractors and sub-contractors were 
perceived as strict and clear. Most of the Polish informants perceived regulations and 
procedures somewhat looser in Poland, though many commented that they had not been 
working in Poland for several years, and did not know how it actually is today. 
According to the Polish informants they were respecting and complying with rules and 
regulations. However, examples given show that certain behaviour was regarded as accepted, 
even though it was breaking the rules. The Norwegian informants had different opinions 
regarding Polish workers' compliance; some said it varies among Polish workers, as it does 
among Norwegians, some said Polish workers comply well, others said it was terrible. Several 
said that rules needed to be repeated, but after some time the Polish workers got better on the 
compliance. It was also pointed out that if they were confronted, they usually listened at once. 
 
"When you confront them with it; "You need to wear PPE", they do it at once. So that is 
not a problem. I believe they are quite afraid for their job and that if they don't act as 
they are told, they might lose it". [Norwegian union representative] 
Reasons given by the Polish workers for complying with rules and regulations varied between 
taking care of own safety and to not to get consequences for non-compliance. Several of the 
informants mentioned keeping their job as a reason for complying with rules and regulations 
before taking care of their own safety as a reason. 
Examples of non-compliance of safety regulations included not using PPE if it was hindering 
work accomplishment. Other examples were short-cuts as using a ladder instead of scaffolding 
if time was short. 
 
"Sometimes all the PPE is an obstacle. For example if you need to weld something, and 
you cannot reach the place with a helmet on because there is not enough space, then 
you need to take the helmet off to be able to stick your head up. But that are sporadic 
incidents". [Polish skilled worker] 
 
Another example that might affect safety linked with culture and communication is that Polish 
workers usually do not say "no" to the manager. Both Norwegian and Polish informants agreed 
that mostly Polish workers have a focus on getting the job done, especially if the boss required 
it. For this reason safety considerations may have to give way to work execution. 
 
"Polish mentality is a bit different. What the boss says, the boss gets. Poles are more 
loyal. If there is a job that must be done, we do it without excuses". [Polish skilled 
worker] 
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However, expectations from superiors also play a role in safety concerning migrant workers. A 
Polish informant had experienced that expectations were higher towards him to perform risk 
related work because he was a migrant worker. 
 
"They are used to Polish workers doing everything, and mostly not saying no. 
Sometimes the employer also expects it. The employees are scared to lose their jobs, 
so they do what they are told". [Polish skilled worker] 
 
5.4. Snitching and incident reporting 
Both Polish and Norwegian informant pointed out that Polish workers were not very good and 
did not like to write discrepancy reports, as that was perceived as snitching. Some had clearly 
understood that there are differences in how Poles and Norwegians perceive reporting. 
 
"Polish mentality is like, we don't like to snitch or report others. They (the Norwegians) 
simply look at it differently. For them it is not snitching but about safety, while we 
perceive it different". [Polish skilled worker] 
 
However, one of the informants had after some time in Norway adapted to the safety culture at 
work and started to report. Another informant also reports that attitudes and behaviour change 
after being in Norway some time. 
 
"I usually write notes, because after a while I realised that it is not accusation or 
reporting, it is about safety. And there is a prize draw". [Polish skilled worker] 
 
"The attitudes differ between different groups of workers. A person who came to 
Norway to work for the first time ever, doesn't understand that HSE is very important in 
Norway". [Norwegian manager] 
 
5.5. Safety measures 
The differences between different nationalities were recognised as a challenge to safety 
management. However, most of the measures aiming to deal with challenges related to migrant 
workers had to do with language. The informants reported that the most common measure at 
the work site were translations (of documentation, safety courses etc.) and language courses. In 
most cases workers were also set together in working groups based on mutual language and 
had one person translating work instructions and other information to the rest. The authorities 
also use translation as a measure, e.g. The Norwegian Inspection Authority has available 
information in four languages on their web-pages. Additionally they have a phone service 
available in Polish in addition to English and Norwegian. They have also has given out a 
brochure with information about the most important workplace regulations and information about 
rights and obligations as employees in Norway. The brochure is called “Welcome to Norway as 
a new employee!” and is mainly made for building and construction sector and given out in 8 
languages. For Norwegian employees The Norwegian Inspection Authorities has given out a 
language guide on communication with migrant workers in Norwegian (The Norwegian Labour 
Inspection Authority, 2014). 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Communication is in a large degree influenced by cultural factors such as norms, beliefs, 
perceptions and customs, and language can therefore be seen in close relation to culture. 
Ultimately, language is about conveying meaning between actors. Language consists of a 
system of signs to which a certain meaning is ascribed. Thus, a sign always signifies something. 
As famously stated by Saussure (1983), the relationship between the sign and the signified is 
"arbitrary" in the sense that it is established by social convention. This is most likely what is in 
play when Norwegians are frustrated when experiencing that Polish workers say "yes" when 
they mean "no", and when Polish workers state that there are "different kinds of 'yes'". The sign 
is the same (the word "yes"), but the meaning of the sign is difficult to grasp without knowledge 
of the cultural background of the person using the sign. Also Trajkovski and Loosemore (2006) 
point out that messages or hints can be hidden in the speech. This may seem like splitting hairs, 
but can actually make a big difference in the way safety challenges are framed. Often, the 
challenges involved with having multiple nationalities working together at a construction site are 
seen as language issues. They are seen as problems related to signs in the sense that the 
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simple solution is language training or having all nationalities communicating in English. This, 
however, is only solving one half of the problem. The problem should also be recognised as a 
problem of meaning, that is, as a cultural challenge. 
Another example of culturally influenced communication is the way some Polish workers call 
their supervisor for "boss", where the Polish see it as a form of respect, while the Norwegian 
foremen at first glance do not appreciate the term, as for them it is associated with negative 
characteristics. Positions and statuses are perceived in very different ways in the two cultures. 
This is also indicative of a asymmetrical power relationships, in the sense that the perception of 
being subordinated the authority of others can be perceived as barriers towards communicating 
worries related to safety, or even as pressure towards taking undue risks (Antonsen, 2009c). 
Similarly, it is described by a Norwegian supervisor that the way of communicating between a 
Polish supervisor and a Polish worker was very harsh and direct. These are also signs that are 
culturally determined; as you need to know the culture to understand the way of communicating 
and to be able interpret the meaning in the right way. A harsh and direct communication from a 
superior is a way to show power and control. This can further be related to the more hierarchic 
management seen in a Polish working group, where there are expectations of clear leadership 
with a designated "boss". Examples were given that Polish workers do not say "no" to their boss 
and that Norwegian superiors expect workers to have an option. These examples clearly show 
that managers' knowledge about culture and communication affects safety of migrant workers. 
Norwegian managers expect workers to speak out if work tasks collide with safety, whereas 
Polish workers rather put the instruction first.  
From Hofstede's theory about cultural dimensions that includes "power distance" as an aspect 
to classify cultures, it can be seen that there is a quite large difference when it comes to the 
power distance in Norway and Poland (The hofstede centre, 2015). Norway scores low which 
according to Hofstede testifies a culture with decentralised power where decisions in large 
degree are taken together with employees rather than by the boss alone. On the other hand, 
Poland scores higher on the scale, clearly showing that the society is hierarchical, where 
subordinates are expected to get clear instructions. The cultural dimension theory can be 
argued on and is by several criticised (Gerhart & Fang, 2005; Guldenmund et al., 2013) to be 
too generalising; however the described aspects can give a better understanding about 
common factors within a national culture. 
Nevertheless, individual differences should not be neglected. The differences within a country 
might be larger than between countries (Gerhart & Fang, 2005) and individual differences also 
play an important role. The interviews of the Polish informants show that there are huge 
differences between individuals, as do the interviews and statements of the Norwegian 
informants as well. Very often Polish workers in Norway are looked at as a homogeneous 
group. There are however differences in life situations, age, lingual skills, education and 
practical skills. Some are keen to learn the language fast, others not all. Some comply with all 
safety rules, others do not. This shows that there are individual factors influencing behaviour 
and practices and underline the importance of resisting the temptation to create cultural 
stereotypes of different work groups. Previous research (Bust, Gibb, & Pink, 2008)  however 
shows that people from different cultures understand health and safety differently. This points to 
the importance of meaning in understanding the relationship between culture and safety: There 
may be important differences in the practices, rules and decisions which stand out as 
meaningful ("makes sense") for members from different cultures. This makes communication 
and safety management more complex (Bust et al., 2008), and thus communication will need to 
be adapted to the receiver of the communicated message. 
 
6.1. Implications 
As already indicated, most of the safety measures aiming to deal with the multinational nature of 
a construction site are aimed at overcoming language difficulties. The analysis presented in this 
paper suggests that this only solves part of the problem. Understanding the words in a language 
is important, but the cultural aspect that comes with it must also be considered. Culture must not 
be simplified to be treated as a lingual issue, but this is often the case. A Dutch study by 
Schubert and Dijkstra (2009) for instance show that cultural issues tend to be neglected. The 
study points out the tendency of safety mangers to deny cultural differences, not to discriminate 
and to treat everyone equally, as the Dutch social ideal desires. That might be one reason why 
cultural challenges have received less attention in Norway as well. Another reason might simply 
be that the cultural challenge is more demanding to deal with, and that it is not entirely clear 
what measures to take to deal with this challenge.  
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In safety management, however, the cultural aspect cannot be neglected as it in high degree 
influence safety through for example behaviour. Managers need cultural competence not to fall 
into the pitfalls that are created by cultural differences. By stressing and being aware of cultural 
aspects and the complexity different aspects together generate, this awareness can be applied 
in safety management tasks such as safety training, participation in the execution of Job Safety 
Analyses and learning processes after minor and major incidents. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
The factors behind safety challenges arising from the use of migrant workers are complex. 
Some of them are closely related to the construction industry, which is characterised by its 
dynamic nature, temporality, variability and uniqueness of each project. Other safety challenges 
are directly related to the use of migrant workers independent of industry, concerning 
communication, individual factors and organisational factors. 
The presented study focused on aspects related to culture and language as underlying factors 
for accident risk at work in multicultural work sites. Communication is an important contributing 
risk factor with lack of lingual skills as one of the most obvious reasons. Culture is however at 
least as important, though more ambiguous and harder to recognise, i.e. you realise you do not 
understand each other if you speak different languages, but cultural misunderstandings are 
harder to perceive as they might be more hidden. 
Lingual problems are emphasised by safety managers in the industry and most measures 
implemented in the sector concern language. Common measures are translation of documents, 
use of translators and language courses, which in many cases are only short term solutions. For 
cultural challenges there are not as many measures. Developing and implementing lingual 
measures is easier than trying to change cultural aspects. However, focusing solely on 
language as a problem might take away the focus from other important causes. Solving lingual 
issues is only one of the many solutions, and will therefore not solve the whole problem. 
Therefore a focus on cultural differences is as important.  
Neither Polish migrant workers, nor migrant workers in general, are homogenous groups where 
all members are alike. They have a certain culture, a common language and a set of attitudes 
and habits, but there are also large individual differences. This should also be taken into 
consideration. The interviews indicated other underlying factors concerning the use of migrant 
workers and occupational safety. These were influencing factors such as individual factors; age, 
education, experience, family circumstances, level of integration in Norway, and organisational 
factors; terms of employment and training. These factors are not stressed enough and should 
be elucidated further. 
Safety challenges in relation to migrant workforce mainly appear in the sharp end. Nevertheless, 
the challenges must be dealt with at all levels of the construction industry, from the authorities 
via the organisational level and down on individual level. 
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Abstract 
Efforts to prevent major accidents are of great importance to safety and health for company on-
site employees, contractor on-site personnel, emergency responders as well as local citizens. 
There is ample evidence that improving government regulation, industry self-regulation, and 
safety management could be proactive means. With industrial areas including logistic hubs, 
harbors and larger groups of individual firms, negotiation with communities and interest groups 
becomes an additional means of preventing major accidents and emergency response and 
thereby protecting the workforce and the neighbors. 
This paper assess two innovative approaches for preventing major accidents and improving 
emergency response to determine if, in addition to protecting the public, whether they can also 
have the effect of more effectively safeguarding workers. The first approach is an enhanced 
state regulation model and the second a negotiated agreement model with both approaches 
involving engagement between companies and local stakeholders. Our objective is to explore 
how risk can be managed and conflicts avoided with risk governance fostering company 
engagement with its workforce as well as with the local community in a collaborative effort. The 
empirical basis for the analysis is comprised of three case studies; two involve state  regulation 
of industrial harbor developments and logistics hubs in urban areas in Norway and one involves 
negotiations regarding a petroleum refinery in a US city. The findings and discussion underpin 
that the two approaches we have assessed for managing industrial risks of concern to host 
communites and their diverse stakeholders can coexist and serve as complementary 
components of risk governance for communities that host hazardous industrial activities. Each 
approach calls for close cooperative engagement of the parties and has potential for improving 
the safety and health of communities and on-site employees, contractor on-site personnel, and 
public sector emergency responders. Both approaches are logical extensions of progressive 
policies that aim at improving corporate social responsibility to the public and the workforce and 
can remedy the deficiencies of conventional regulation.  Although they differ in structure and 
mode of implementation, they have many common features such as transparency of 
proceedings, local stakeholder involvement, information sharing, and respect for community 
concerns and local knowledge.  
 
Keywords: Hazardous industry, risk governance, negotiated contracts. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Hazardous industrial activities pose risks of major accidents and the history of major accidents 
shows that workers are the most endangered persons. As shown by major accidents at 
petrochemical plants at AZF-Toulouse (2001), BP-Texas City (2005) and Chevron-Richmond 
(2012) and in offshore operations Piper Alpha (1988) and Macondo (2010), three categories of 
workers are usually among those injured or killed by major accidents; company on-site 
employees, contractor on-site personnel, and public sector emergency responders. Norway and 
the US have many worker safety regulations, but these are not primarily directed at preventing 
major accidents and are more narrowly focussed on existing workplace conditions involving 
exposure to chemicals, electricity, noise, heat, etc. Norwegian and US laws also empower 
unions to negotiate with employers about improving workplace conditions, but the improvements 
sought also address workplace exposure issues and often given lower priority than wage and 
job security issues. Nor do they  sufficiently encompass non-union contractors and public 
emergency responders. In this paper we have analyzed two innovative approaches for 
preventing major accidents and improving emergency response to determine if, in addition to 
protecting the public, whether they can also have the effect of more effectively safeguarding 
workers: an enhanced state regulation model and a negotiated agreement model with both 
approaches involving engagement between companies and local stakeholders. The empirical 
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basis for the analysis is comprised of three case studies; two involve state  regulation of 
industrial harbor developments and logistics hubs in urban areas in Norway and one involves 
negotiations regarding a petroleum refinery in a US city.  
       
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Risk governance (Renn 2008, Aven and Renn 2010) is made up of many types of social 
controls, including regulation, self-regulation, liability law, values and behavioral norms, and 
decision-making by investors, insurers, and consumers. Each of these controls is a dynamic 
subsystem of risk governance that co-exists with, but does not necessarily complement the 
other controls, and some are international in scope, such as the collective wisdom of experts in 
a particular knowledge domain who contribute to the development of standards and industrial 
safety management systems (Baram and Lindøe 2014). Our research framework and analysis 
combine an enhanced state-managed regulatory model enforcing safety management and a 
negotiated agreement model involving local stakeholders such as workers, emergency 
personel, citizens groups, etc. Characteristics of the industry actor’s involvement include its 
property rights, relationships with suppliers, investors, and customers, its membership in an 
industrial sector with other industry actors, and its management of risks for regulatory 
compliance and for going beyond compliance within economic and technological parameters. 
The local stakeholders can be similarly characterized, especially with regard to their 
organizational membership, risk burdens, legally established rights to property and safety, and 
their resources and capacity to engage with companies.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates our analytical framework with the three entities and their relationships.  
 
 
Figure 1. Analytical framework 
 
The left side of the figure represents the state as regulator with enforcement authority based on 
laws and regulations, and as provider of resources for industrial use and of state services 
regarding preparedness for public emergencies (1). The state as regulator constitutes the most 
highly institutionalized form of social control for hazardous industrial activities. For many 
industrial sectors, national regime co-exists with global regimes. Regulators develop and 
enforce rules and standards as mechanisms of control and impose sanctions on non-compliant 
industrial actors, based on their legitimate role in society (Baldwin, et al. 2012). Their role can 
be characterized as compensating for market failure in handling risk, informing public opinion by 
influencing political priorities and decisions, and influencing stakeholders and their power 
structure (Hood, et al. 2001). 
 
The right side of the figure represents the stakeholders affected by the risk, foremost in-house 
and contracted personnel, but also citizens groups and other civil society entities. The legitimate 
role of these actors in proactive risk management depends on the legal frame of laws and 
regulation as well as administrative practise at national, regional and local levels (2) (Bevir, 
2011). The third relationship is the proactive role of stakeholders in negotiating an agreement 
that we call a new social contract with the industry or enterprises (3). Response to the perceived 
risk from these stakeholders could be reactive with protests or complaints directed to regulators 
  
State as regulator  
Hazardous 
industrial areas and 
companies 
Stakeholders at 
risk 
(3) Negotiated 
approach 
(2) Legitimization 
of roles 
(1) Enforcement by 
laws and regulations 
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and industrial enterprises. The basis, content and effectiveness of such contracts depends on 
the legal rules (1) and the power-bases and legitimate role of the stakeholders (2).  
Given this understanding of the inter-relationship of the actors, our research examines the 
enhanced model of state regulation designed by the International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) and the negotiation of a social contract model as a supplement to state regulation. The 
first approach, based on the IRGC-frame and the two Norwegian cases addresses the state-
managed regulatory process and its potential for preventing accidents and thereby improving 
workforce safety. The second, negotiation approach, is based on social contract experience in 
the US and a US case study. 
 
3. IRGC-APPLIED TOWARDS THE NORWEGIAN CASES 
3.1 The IRGC-framework 
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) framework, has received considerable 
attention and approval as a paradigmatic approach for conceptualizing and conducting risk 
governance processes. The “Core Risk Governance process” contains four phases as 
presented in figure 2: (1) pre-assessment, (2) appraisal, (3) characterization and evaluation of 
risk and (4) risk management. Communication is involved in all phases of addressing and 
handling risk. However, the sequence of phases and steps is primarily logical and functional and 
will not always correspond to how the process works out in reality. A more detailed description 
of the content of the framework is presented on the IRGC-homepages:// http:irgc.org. 
The framework includes the wider institutional and societal context within which the risk 
governance processes take place. Four contextual layers add to the “Core Risk Governance 
Process” (Renn, 2008 p.353); Organizational capacities at different levels, within the involved 
actor network (enterprises, stakeholders, regulators, NGO’s etc.), political and regulatory 
culture, and social climate (e.g. level of trust in society, risk appetites etc.).  
 
Phases: Core Risk Governance Process  
 
Pre-
Assessment 
Problem framing: What the major actors (e.g. governments, 
companies, the scientific community, and the general public) see 
as risks 
Early warning: Systematic search for hazards and threats             
Screening or monitoring of risk-related information  
Scientific conventions for how risk assessment and concerns are 
defined 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Communi-
cation 
 
Risk 
Appraisal 
Hazard (threat) identification of potential events  
Cause and consequence analysis, including assessments of 
exposures and vulnerabilities  
Risk description, quantitative and qualitative  
Concern Assessment including (1) perceptions, (2) social concerns 
and (3) socio-economic impacts  
Tolerability 
and 
Acceptability 
Judgement 
Risk characterization includes (1) the creation of a risk profile 
(expressed by probabilities and expected values) and (2) judgment 
on the seriousness of the risk.  
Risk Evaluation where societal values and norms are applied to the 
judgment on tolerability and acceptability. 
 
Risk 
Management 
Implementation of the (1) option realization, (2) the monitoring and 
control of the consequences and (3) the collection of feedback from 
risk management practice. 
Decision Making includes (1) option identification and generation 
and (2) option assessment interdependent with the tolerability and 
the acceptability judgment step 
Figure 2. The IRGC Risk Governance Process (adapted from IRGC 2005: 13) 
 
A radical OHS regulatory shift took place within the European countries in the 1970s. The 
change was inspired and based on the Robens Report (1972) recommending that, rather than 
specifying standards and procedures to ensure the safety of workers, legislation should specify 
the OHS goals to be reached and require employers to ensure the safety of their workers. The 
Nordic legislation adopted these principles as well as strengthened the emphasis on 
participation of the workforce and thereby strengthening their legitimate position and role in risk 
management. A common feature of Nordic OHS regimes, introduced concurrently in the Nordic 
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countries in the 1970’s, is the in-house use of an “occupational health and safety organisation” 
that offers three different collaborating structures (Karlsen and Lindøe 2006). First, “working 
environment committees” provide opportunities for employer and employees to meet and 
discuss relevant issues. Second, there are independent and autonomous «institutions» in the 
form of “safety deputies” elected by the workforce. Third, there are OHS expertsas either an in-
house service or as external consultants. This modus, often referred to as a «Nordic Model», 
was different from the European continental tradition, where the parties have a lesser pull with 
the regulation and where the legislation has greater importance as the regulatory instrument. 
These regulatory principles from the Nordic countries, UK, and the offshore petroleum activity in 
the North Sea gave input to emerging efforts by the European Union to guide its members to 
introduce «risk assessment» and “participatory approaches”, as seen in the Norwegian 
Framework Directive 89/391 (Vogel 1994). Fifty years later the industrial environment in many 
European countries is radically changed. A fragmentation of prescriptive labour market 
arrangements and increasing levels of part-time employment and temporary employment are 
distinctive features.  
 
Public and citizen involvement in risk governance is safeguarded through the Seveso Directive 
obliging member states to ensure that operators have a policy in place to prevent major 
accidents. Further adaptation of the provisions on major accidents occurred on 4 July 2012 with 
publication of a replacement directive - 2012/18/EU, which member states have had to 
transpose and implement by the 1 June 2015. Important new elements in the revised version 
are: (1) Better access for citizens to information about risks resulting from activities of nearby 
companies, and about how to behave in the event of an accident, (2) more effective rules on 
participation, by the public concerned, in land-use planning projects, (3) access to justice for 
citizens who have not been granted appropriate access to information or participation and (4) 
stricter standards for inspections of establishments to ensure more effective enforcement of 
safety rules.  
 
When regulators and companies fail sufficiently in addressing these issues, a troubled 
relationship develops and impairs company performance and community well-being. As a result, 
the community may impose more stringent local requirements for company operations, revoke 
or deny a company’s permit to operate, individuals may bring lawsuits and groups may engage 
in negative campaigns against the company. In a growing number of communities the company 
and local stakeholders have taken the proactive approach of engaging in negotiation of an 
agreement that provides for company implementation of mutually-acceptable risk-reducing 
measures in addition to their compliance with applicable state regulations. In some cases, the 
negotiated agreement is contractual and enforceable, in other cases the agreement is one 
based on trust.  
In a parallel development since the 1970s, public concern about social control of risk has 
become a global issue and led to a vibrant discourse about modes of regulation and industrial 
responsibilities, and to a proliferation of activist environmental and human rights NGO’s which 
continuously challenge national regulators and industry sectors with their demands (Beck 1992). 
Increasingly, they bring emerging concerns about corporate social responsibility and climate 
change by means of political and legal processes to regional and global institutions such as the 
EU and the UN. The outcome of these political and legal processes are new laws and 
regulations that promote public and occupational health and safety, safeguard public 
infrastructure, and protect natural resources and the environment. Thus, in addition to 
negotiated agreements between companies and local stakeholders, policies promoting 
corporate social responsibility grow in importance. 
 
3.2 The Norwegian cases 
The two Norwegian cases involve hazardous industry activities such as production, storage and 
transport of gas, oil and chemical products where leakage, loss of control, and other 
foreseeable circumstances could lead to explosion, fire, and harmful discharges resulting in loss 
of lives, injuries and severe health consequences among workers and citizens. The cases differ 
in some respects as shown in the table below. 
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Case: Risavika, Sola South Harbor, Oslo 
Activity LNG-production, storage of goods, 
harbor and passenger terminal. 
Storage and transport of 
chemicals, gas and oil products 
Industrial 
structure  
LNG producer and many minor 
companies.  
Many major and minor 
companies 
Governmental 
actors 
LNG-producer and harbor owned by 
inter-municipal enterprises. Local 
planning authority. State regulators. 
Harbor owned by municipal 
enterprise. Local planning 
authority 
Several state regulators. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Norwegian cases 
 
Risavika, Sola  
Risavika is a regional, national and international logistics hub in Sola municipality at the 
southwest coast of Norway. It is covering 400,000 square meters and including more than 120 
enterprises, including a base for the offshore industry, and some 8,500 workplaces.  A new ferry 
terminal operates international ferries for goods and passengers. In 2005, the Lyse Group, 
which is a large energy company owned by 16 municipalities in the south area of Rogaland 
County, informed Sola municipality (one of its owners) about the Group’s plans to establish an 
LNG plant in Risavika, and the plan was approved in December 2006. Protests and complaints 
raised by citizens during the public consultation process requested more specific analyses of 
possible impacts and risks. Formal complaints were addressed to the County Governor and 
state agencies, notably the Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), which is responsible for the 
fire and explosion legislation and for coordinating the enforcement of the Seveso directive, as 
the plant would clearly be subject to these regulations. Series of meetings, consultations, 
complaints and decisions took place involving a number of actors, from local citizen groups to 
responsible ministries and even the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). The public debate in 
the press between these key actors opened a public space for risk communication and 
mobilized more stakeholders in the local community (Vinnem 2010). Lyse engaged experts 
organizing public consultations in which focus group meetings were organized, including 
residents living close to Risavika, enterprises located in the area, emergency services, and 
experts on risk appraisal and evaluation. Criticisms spanned the whole spectrum of conditions, 
decision-making processes, and perceived risks. In particular, the quality of the initial risk 
assessments was questioned in terms of assumptions and scope, and the availability of 
information and the involvement of stakeholders in the process were severely criticized. 
Contracted risk experts reviewed the existing risk assessments and how the planned and 
implemented measures would reduce the risks to a presumably tolerable level (Vatn 2010).  
 
South Port, Oslo 
The South Port of Oslo is located just south of the city centre, with well-established residential 
areas to the south, and a large residential area is in progress to the north. The port comprises 
most of the industrial activities in the Oslo harbor area as; the largest container port in Norway, 
the largest terminal for the storage and distribution of petroleum products with 40% of the 
national consumption of road traffic fuel. The  South Port is thus one of Norway’s most important 
logistics and transport hub.   
The South Port comprises some 35 firms with port-related activities. Apart from the oil and 
container terminals, these include a variety of industries, such as the import of cars, building 
materials, cement, fertilizers, salt, etc. Some 1,600 ships arrive each year, half of which carry 
dry bulk, one-third carry containers and one-fifth carry petroleum products. Nearly 7,000 trucks 
transport products from the port area every week, of which nearly 2,000 are container trucks 
and some 1,500 are tankers. Jet fuel is transported by train to the Oslo Gardermoen airport. 
Approximately 2 640 000 m3 of petroleum products were transported from the South Port in 
2012. Some 800-900 people (mostly employees) stay in the South Port area during ordinary 
working hours and approximately 1,500 people live in the residential area to the south, whereas 
the emerging residential area to the north will include some 4-5,000 apartments. The distance to 
downtown Oslo is about 3 km. The downtown area comprises a number of workplaces (some 
20 000) and several thousand visitors during the day. No survey of risk perceptions of the 
neighboring populations has been carried out. Risks related to the petroleum activities have not 
been on the agenda. Missing surveillance has been explicitly addressed by the emergency 
services, such as the fire service and the police, not only for detection purposes, but also to 
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provide updated and knowledge-based information in the case of an emerging situation in order 
to to facilitate adequate response.  
 
3.3 Lessons learned from the state-managed appraoch 
Analysis of the Norwegian cases underpin that frameworks for addressing risk often fall short of 
addressing complex and trans-boundary features that characterize many risk domains. Risk 
management models as well as statutory regulation normally address the individual enterprise 
or organization, leaving inter-organizational issues in a vacuum where the risk often exceed the 
boundaries of single policy domains and regulations. The IRGC framework facilitates a broader 
depiction of challenges when dealing with more complex and trans-boundary risk issues as 
found in the cases. Lessons learned can in particular be related to four interrelated features 
(Lindøe and Kringen 2015). 
Firstly, multiple and partly conflicting goals, as critical aspects of both cases and in particular at 
the level of local government, may create role conflicts. As ports are normally part of 
developmental schemes and ambitions for municipalities, the tradeoff between benefits and 
risks must be addressed, as value creation and socio-economic considerations may tend to 
overshadow risk concerns. Secondly, the conditional and potentially controversial nature of risk 
assessments represent critical challenges in terms of both the normative and factual/scientific 
issues. Critical considerations exceed organizational boundaries and public attention creates 
challenges in terms of trust and competence. Contested views on risk does not only reflect a 
simple lay-expert divide, as one of the cases illustrates, but also an expert-expert divide. Thirdly, 
mechanisms and thresholds for triggering public attention seem to be highly variable, and 
stakeholder engagement may only incidentally reflect risks, to the extent that these can be 
described in any comprehensive and objective manner. Therefore, risk communication and 
stakeholder involvement cannot be conducted in any straightforward manner but must be 
adapted to the particular social climate. Finally, industrial areas and harbors as logistic hubs 
involves many actors and weak mechanisms for coordination and addressing overall risk 
challenges. Fragmentation exists in the institutional hierarchy where actors are subject to 
different legal rules and regulations enforced by different agencies. Therefore, regulators should 
be addressed as having the prime coordinating and proactive role in the governance process 
including the overall risk challenges.  
In sum, the complexity of technical, economic, organizational, and political conditions underline 
that one cannot characterize risk independently of established institutional and practical 
arrangements in the local context. The multifaceted and complex risk governance processes in 
hazordous industrial areas represents a challenge. Important issues are if theres is sufficient 
governmental and industrial capacity to integrate all concerns and how the workforce and other 
affected stakeholders could be empowered by having a legitimate role in the process.  
 
4. THE  NEGOTIATION APPROACH 
Negotiated agreements have been used by local stakeholders in many US communities 
addressing industrial companies risks to public health and safety.  Such agreements could 
include emissions and accidental discharges of toxic pollutants, impacts on water supply, 
hazardous material spills, fires and explosions, and to also have companies improve pollution 
monitoring, do safety audits, provide access to company risk information and inform residents 
about operational changes. (Kenney et al., 1998; Macey 2003,2004; Murdock et al., 2002; 
Spitzer et al, 2009; and Gotlieb, 2012). Negotiation typically involves addressing a cluster of 
concerns over diverse risks and impacts, unlike traditional risk regulation that requires a 
separate agency-managed proceeding for each risk or impact. It therefore requires more 
extensive company preparedness and transparency, and often involves demands for company 
internal information that exceed what is required in regulatory proceedings. It draws the 
attention of the media and the entire community. Agreements with such commitments have 
been negotiated with many types of companies, including global majors with US facilities such 
as Shell, Rhone-Poulenc, and Chevron. 
  
4.1 Good Neighbor Agreements  
One illustrative example of the negotiation approach is “Good Neighbor Agreements” (GNA’s) 
between companies and community groups (Lewis and Henkels, 1998; Sexton, 2002; Macey 
and Susskind, 2003; Kenney et al, 2004). This approach has been used to address many 
concerns about proven as well as perceived risks and impacts, requests for information about 
company operations and management functions, and financial needs of a community that 
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arise from company activities. GNA studies are informative about the types of company 
commitments agreed upon and the extent of their implementation. For example, the GNA 
between Rhone-Poulenc and an environmental NGO regarding the company’s chemical plant 
in Manchester, Texas was negotiated in the aftermath of an SO2 release, which caused 27 
residents to be hospitalized. Written agreement could include the company’s commitments to 
pay for an independent environmental and safety audit by an expert selected by a committee 
whose members are chosen by the community.  Issues could be to: Putting company 
documents on its hazard and risk assessments, accidents and near misses, corrective actions 
taken, and waste management practices in the town library for public review; subsequently 
“negotiate in good faith on the audit recommendations”; to allow citizens to accompany the 
auditor and inspect the facility; to monitor SO2 offsite; and to accept that the GNA agreement 
will be legally-binding. Over 90% of the commitments in this GNA were met by the company. 
(Lewis and Henkels, 1998).  
Some GNA’s have a much broader range of company commitments and have encountered  
implementation problems. For example, the GNA negotiated by Unocal and three citizens 
groups regarding operation of the company’s refinery in Rodeo, California followed two 
accidental releases, one lasting sixteen days, the other involving deadly hydrogen sulfide gas 
that sickened children and teachers at a school. As challenges to the permits sought by the 
company for its expansion, lawsuits, and other adversarial activities by labor and residents 
commenced, Unocal reluctantly agreed to negotiate. Several other groups joined the difficult 
negotiations over eight months of weekly meetings, and the county government decided to 
make the GNA outcome a condition for its granting permits to the company (op.cit). 
The negotiated GNA includes Unocal commitments to pay for a medical clinic and the medical 
needs of the injured, fund several emergency service improvements and a study of public health 
impacts. Furthermore it pay for an independent safety audit of the plant overseen by a 
community committee and determine whether and how to implement its recommendations, 
develop an advanced air monitoring system and stop “fugitive emissions” of certain air 
pollutants, reduce traffic impacts and contribute several millions to fund local road 
improvements. Approximately 60% of the commitments have been met after several years. 
Overall, studies of GNA’s show that a majority or more of company commitments were 
implemented, especially commitments which focused on preventing the recurrence of a prior 
injurious event and improving emergency response services. Perhaps the most notable 
achievements of many GNA’s are informational and involve company commitments to allow and 
pay for independent health and safety audits of the company’s operations, to act upon audit 
recommendations for improvements, and to accept public involvement in the audit process and 
public review of relevant documentation (Macey et al., 1998).  
 
Given this legacy, the negotiated agreement model shows that bringing about the direct 
engagement of a company with its host community and local stakeholder groups for risk 
reduction can be an effective supplement to government risk regulation. It follows that when 
such negotiations improve community safety and health, they usually improve the safety of on-
site workers and emergency responders as well as their quality of life in the community. 
However, improvements are needed to make negotiation a more effective approach to risk 
reduction and major accident prevention. 
 
4.2 The Chevron, Richmond case 
The huge Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California has had many incidents that threatened 
public health and safety. Reports on its operations from 1992-1994 showed an average of 45 
“episodes” (accidental releases and spills) per year (Macey 2004). An explosion and fire at the 
plant in March 1999 resulted in authorities issuing “shelter in place” orders and hundreds of 
residents exposed to the pollutants sought medical attention. In 2007, a corroded pipe failed at 
the Refinery, “shooting 100-foot flames into the sky for 10 hours. Thousands were ordered to 
shelter in place because toxic gas was released” (Rogers 2013).  
These incidents occurred despite several agreements on improving operations that had been 
negotiated between Chevron and local stakeholders since the early 1990’s, despite numerous 
US and California regulations applicable to the plant, and despite Richmond’s adoption of an 
Industrial  
Safety Ordinance (ISO) in 2000.The city’s ISO requires Chevron to:  
 
· Submit a Safety Plan to Contra Costa Health Services  
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· Comply with the Human Factor Guidance Document developed by Contra Costa Health 
Services 
· Perform a “root cause analysis” for chemical accidents or releases 
· Submit to incident investigations by Contra Costa Health Services  
· Comply with the California Accidental Release Prevention Program 
· “Consider Inherently Safer Systems for new processes or facilities”  
· Submit to routine audits, inspections, and review of all submitted safety plans by county 
and city officials 
 
In 2012, another major fire at the refinery sent exposed workers and thousands of residents to 
local hospitals and triggered public outrage, lawsuits, and intensive investigations by regulators 
including the state’s workplace safety agency (Cal/OSHA). The US Chemical Safety Board 
(CSB 2014)) found that a small leak was observed in a corroded carbon steel pipe containing 
hydrocarbon process fluid. The plant manager had responded by calling in Chevron technicians 
to troubleshoot the leak but did not shut down operations. After several repair attempts failed, 
the decision was made to shut down the refinery; however, prior to shutdown, “hot work” repairs 
on the corroded pipe caused an explosive release of a vapor cloud that immediately ignited, 
engulfing 19 Chevron employees. While the employees made it to safety, the fire continued to 
burn for over four hours, sending “a large plume of unknown and unquantified particulates and 
vapor traveling across the Richmond, California, area” (CSB 2013 [2]). Nearby residents were 
instructed to shelter in place with their windows and doors closed (SFGate 2012). 15,000 people 
from the surrounding community and the exposed workers subsequently sought medical 
attention for respiratory complications due to the fire (CSB 2013 [2]).  
The CSB investigation went further. It determined that the ruptured pipe had been installed in 
1976 and had failed due to sulfidation corrosion, a frequent problem at refineries of which 
Chevron was well aware, especially regarding the effect on its carbon steel pipes. Moreover, the 
CSB learned that the pipes in the Richmond Refinery had been inspected and recommended 
for replacement several times in the preceding years, but had never been replaced. The CSB 
concluded that “the pipe should have been replaced much earlier with an inherently safer 
corrosion-resistant alloy” (CSB 2013 [1]). Ultimately, the CSB concluded that the core problem 
was the deficient safety culture at the Chevron Richmond Refinery.  
Richmond residents recall that hearing the results of these investigations after the 2012 fire was 
“a jaw dropping moment for them.” Though they were used to occasional incidents at Chevron, 
people assumed that Chevron was serious about safety; after the 2012 investigations, however, 
they started to see the refinery as “literally duck-taped” together. In 2014, an RPA activist 
described the daily public anxiety of living within range of such industry as the “toxicity of being 
scared.” 
A year after the fire, CSB produced a report calling for Inherently Safer Systems, and 
proposed  major regulatory reforms not just for the Chevron refinery but also for the City of 
Richmond, county government, California state regulators, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, and Chevron USA (CSB 2013 [2]). In a public meeting in Richmond on January 15, 
2014, the CSB explained that they believed that “we have a fundamental refinery safety 
problem in the United States,” that refineries are the most incident-prone of all facilities 
regulated by the EPA, and that such refinery incidents in Europe were far less frequent. They 
recommended that U.S. and state agencies act in coordination to adopt a “Safety Case 
regime” based on the approach taken by the U.K.  This model, which has been shown to have 
certain inadequacies and excludes transparency in the U.K., is being considered by state and 
federal officials and faces opposition. The CSB investigation has also sparked intense 
discourse in Richmond about many aspects of safety management at the Refinery, including, 
for example, the need to improve inspection and the inclusion of workers, unions, and 
communities in safety decisions (CSB 2014 [2]; Rogers 2014).  
City residents also demand that Chevron be more committed to running their refinery with a 
strong culture of safety. Because of the 2012 fire and prior incidents, the community has lost 
trust in Chevron’s commitments to safety. The Chemical Safety Board’s reports were particularly 
damning; not only did they show that the pipes that failed were known to be compromised for 
several years, but their reconstruction of the sequence of events found that recommendations to 
shut down the Refinery on the day of the fire were overruled until it was too late (CSB 2013 [2]). 
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4.3 Lessons learned from the negotiation approach 
The negotiated agreement between a company and its host community or group should be 
designed to serve as a supplement to other social controls over risks and impacts in the 
community (such as regulations, municipal ordinances and permits, property rights, and self-
regulation). Safety and health risks to be addressed should either be proven, or considered to 
be plausible on the basis of monitoring data, audits of company activities, or information on 
community or group exposure levels, or local knowledge; and commitments for  addressing 
them must not conflict with or undermine existing federal, state and local regulations.  
The negotiation process needs to be inclusive of diverse stakeholders, many of whom have 
been previously disregarded by the company and regulators, such as the low-income residents 
commonly living in close proximity to the facility, and respect local concerns, values, grievances, 
and local knowledge. It requires that company-held information and plans be shared and 
explained, with special arrangements to ensure the confidentiality of information that is 
proprietary or essential for security. Sound ethical principles need to be followed by the 
company and community participants, especially to ensure that financial donations offered by 
the company are not used to divide the local participants or secure compromises on significant 
risks that have been proven. Finally, to avoid situations leading to outrage and mistrust, as in 
the Chevron case, the company must be prepared to meet local expectations regarding their 
safety performance and accept stakeholder oversight and monitoring  progress on its 
commitments. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The paper has identified two approaches for managing industrial risks of concern to  different 
stakeholders. Each approach calls for close cooperative engagement with the parties and has 
potential for improving the safety and health of communities and on-site employees, contractor 
on-site personnel, and public sector emergency responders. Both approaches are logical 
extensions of progressive policies that aim at improving corporate social responsibility to the 
public and the workforce and can remedy the deficiencies of conventional regulation.  Although 
they differ in structure and mode of implementation, they have many common features such as 
transparency of proceedings, local stakeholder involvement, information sharing, and respect 
for community concerns and local knowledge. Thus, they can coexist and serve as 
complementary components of risk governance for communities that host hazardous industrial 
activities. 
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Abstract 
The Danish offshore industry at the North Sea has a strong tradition of safety and of reducing 
work-related accidents, and new policies and practices are continuously developed. A major 
challenge is to implement new policies into practice. In particular, routines, norms and cultural 
perceptions may be difficult to alter in the process of implementing new policies. This study aims 
to explore the implementation process of a new safety mindset in a Danish oil company and 
focuses on 1) the contents and methods of the mindset (programme) and 2) how employees 
perceive the new safety mindset. The results of study showed that the implementation of the 
programme was successful in some areas, but there were also some challenges. The 
employees perceived the programme as positive, particularly because they felt that it respected 
their everyday work routines and that their perspectives were taken into account. However, 
cultural changes take time and are further complicated by frequent staff transitions. In addition, 
one disadvantage was that there was a lack of resources to follow up on all activities introduced 
through the programme. Moreover, safety representatives indicated that they lacked concrete 
and systematic tools to promote and improve safety. 
 
Keywords: Accident prevention, offshore, safety culture 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Work accidents and injuries can have serious consequences for victims, for the environment 
and for society. The societal pressure to prevent accidents and improve safety in the oil and gas 
industry is strong, and the industry has correspondingly had a strong tradition of safety in the 
workplace. Major disasters, such as Chernobyl in 1986 and Piper Alpha in 1988, gave reason to 
focus attention on management systems, procedures, organisational factors and safety culture 
(Hale & Hovden, 1998). Improvements in safety and accident prevention can be performed on 
micro (individual attitudes and behaviour toward safety practices); meso (the structure, culture 
and practice of local organisations); and macro (national and international legislation related to 
minimising hazards, design improvement and employee protection) levels.  
The most common approach in the oil and gas industry is the behaviour-based approach (BBA), 
which focuses on, among other issues, training employees in safety (Tharaldsen, Olsen, & 
Rundmo, 2008; Tharaldsen, 2011). However, the latest research provides evidence that a BBA 
is not sufficient to improve safety (Lund & Aaro, 2004). A review by Aaro and Lund found that 
the most effective improvement in safety includes both structural changes within the 
organisation and employee training (Lund & Aaro, 2004).  
Currently, the concept of a safety culture is widely used within safety research and is a 
promising step toward understanding the social processes that takes place at the meso level, 
(for example, when new safety practices are implemented) (Antonsen, 2009; Cox & Flin, 1998; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1999). 
The oil and gas company involved in the present study had until recently primarily used BBA to 
improve safety. Their safety performance has increased from when the company first started 
production, but for the last 10 years, the rate of injuries has been stable and not subject to 
further decrease. The company therefore decided to try another approach toward safety that 
focuses on changing the organisational culture rather than merely being concerned with 
changing individual behaviours. Viewing the change in a theoretical framework based on 
organisational culture, this study aims to explore the implementation process of the new safety 
mindset and focuses on 1) the contents and methods of the mindset (programme) and 2) how 
employees perceive and practice the new safety mindset. These insights will be discussed in 
relation to the challenges faced when implementing new safety practices in organisations. 
 
2.  THEORY 
Implementation of a new policy, practice or idea has been approached differently over time. 
Traditional information campaigns rely on the presumed causality between knowledge, attitude 
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and behaviour—the so-called KAB model (Bettinghaus 1986). However, information campaigns 
have proven inefficient to truly change individual behaviour because they fail to acknowledge 
and address individual preferences, meanings and the social, cultural and political environments 
that individuals are part of (Chambers 1997). A comprehensive review of implementation 
research concludes that there is evidence that information dissemination and training alone are 
ineffective implementation methods (Fixsen et al. 2005). There is, however, a lack of evidence 
for what is effective. There are suggestions that the success of implementation of a new policy, 
practice or idea depends largely on the system and organisational factors, the contents of the 
policy, how meaningful it is to the inhabitants of the setting, and whether time and resources 
allow inhabitants to adapt to it (Ibid). The adaptation of new ideas by a community is illustrated 
in a diffusion of innovation theory, which identified 5 factors that influence the speed and 
success of an innovation: the characteristics of potential adopters, the rate of adoption, the 
nature of the social system, the characteristic of the innovation, and the characteristics of 
change agents (i.e., individuals who are advocating for change) (Rogers 1983). Over the last 
decade, a variety of implementation models have been developed to address local 
environments, organisations, specific groups or smaller settings where behavioural changes are 
needed. These models commonly acknowledge that unless a community recognises that a 
change is needed and does not conflict with existing norms, the innovative policy is likely to fail 
(Petersillia 1990). The benefit of knowing the needs and strengths of organisations in 
implementation processes guides our attention to participation. Collaboration or participation by 
community members is crucial to gain a community’s trust and knowledge of its characteristics. 
Participation is, however, a contested concept (Cooke and Khotari 2001). While it is promising 
in the sense that it allows us to access local knowledge and thus adjust policies to the local 
context, it challenges the ways we approach and understand a local community (Ladekjær, 
Larsen & Stock 2010).  
 
The concept of organisational culture is broad and can be approached in different ways. For 
example, a key perspective is the distinction between functionalist and interpretative 
approaches (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). According to functionalist approaches, an 
organisational culture exists as an ideal that organisations should try to achieve. The primary 
function of an organisational culture is to support management strategies, systems, and goals. 
This approach is thus expert-driven and gives little attention to member’s perspectives. The 
interpretative approach, on the other hand, understands organisational culture as a complex 
phenomenon that aims to assist members of the organisation in interpreting their collective 
identities, beliefs, and behaviours. Organisational culture is not the property of any one group or 
individual but is created by all members of an organisation. The interpretative approach is more 
likely to be considered a “bottom-up” approach and allows for the existence of subcultures 
within organisations (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Several other perspectives of organisational 
culture can be identified in the existing literature, including the integration perspective, where 
culture is viewed as the ‘glue’ of an organisation and a ‘compass’ that provides direction to its 
members who share cultural understandings (Alvesson, 2002; Antonsen, 2009; Richter & Koch, 
2004), and the differentiation perspective, which focuses on the coexistence of subgroups within 
the organisation and attempts to uncover conflicts and power relationships within organisations. 
While the integration perspective focuses on consistency, the differentiation perspective focuses 
on inconsistency among different aspects of the culture of an organisation (e.g., differences 
among words, action, official values, and real-life practices). This inconsistency could be 
compared with Goffman’s concepts of the front stage and back stage of social life (Antonsen, 
2009; Goffman, 1959).  
Finally, the fragmentation perspective views an organisational culture as a “web of individuals, 
sporadically and loosely connected by their changing position on a variety issues” (Martin 
1992:153). In this perspective, members of an organisation construct their own definition of 
reality, and there is no predefined cultural script that provides guidance for behaviour 
(Antonsen, 2009). In summary, organisational culture is more or less shared by and shaped by 
its members. The organisational culture has a significant impact on how safety is practiced in 
organisations. This is known as safety culture, which is:  
 “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns 
of behaviour that determinate the commitment to and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management. Organisations with a positive safety are 
characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures” (Advisory 
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Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations(Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear 
Installations (ACSNI), 1993).  
This definition acknowledges that culture is shared by and shaped by its members and thus is 
building upon an approach that calls for member participation in the implementation processes.  
The understanding of organisational culture has a significant influence on how the 
understanding of safety is practiced and perceived and thus affecting how safety programmes 
are designed and implemented. Our approach in this study follows the safety culture definition, 
which allows us to investigate the relationship between a safety programme and workers’ 
comprehension and practices of that programme.  
 
3. METHODS AND DATA 
The current study is a qualitative, in-depth study of the processes related to the implementation 
of a new safety mindset in a Danish oil company. The study focuses on 1) the contents and 
methods of the mindset (programme) and 2) how employees perceive/practice the new safety 
mindset.  
One operating company in Denmark was included in the study. Data collection took place 
onshore at the University, at the company onshore and in one interview at an airport. The 
reason for only collecting data onshore was that the present study is a follow-up study with 
limited time available. The first author has been on the installations in connection to the 
previous study and has knowledge and understanding of the work on offshore installations.      
The data are drawn from several sources:  
· Six interviews lasting from 30 minutes to 1 hour were conducted: 
o Three individual interviews with management onshore  
o Three focus group interviews with management level and regular offshore 
employees   
· Observations of onshore safety meetings (18 meetings) 
· Four 4-hour workshops with offshore employees onshore: 
· In total, 40 offshore employees participated in the workshop. During each workshop, 
employees were divided into two groups (employees from the same installation were 
not assigned to the same group if possible).  
· Documents: internal journal that is published 4 times a year from the period 2011-2014; 
safety programmes from the period 2011-2014. 
The interviews were carried out following a semi-structured interview guide on the following 
topics: mindset evaluation, communication, attitude toward safety, management’s commitment 
to the programme, procedures, accident prevention and the near-misses system. The first 
author conducted interviews from October to December 2014. The interview participants were 
chosen based on their position in the company, represented different departments both onshore 
and offshore and were from different levels in the organisations (i.e., management, supervisor). 
In addition, observations of 18 safety meetings were carried out onshore; representatives from 
offshore participated by video conference. Observations were made during two workshops 
about mindset organised by the company and four workshops organised by the first author. The 
goal of the workshops was to speak with offshore employees about their experiences with the 
new mindset and their attitudes toward safety, safety culture, and procedures. The participants 
signed up for the workshops voluntarily. One of the challenges of the voluntary format is that 
some respondents will be very positive and engage, while others can be critical. The 
respondents who participated in workshops came from different departments, representing 
different jobs and positions at the installation; however, there were few volunteers from 
contracting companies.  
All interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded with NVIVO 10. The observations, 
workshops and documents such as safety programmes and the internal journal were also 
entered into NVIVO 10 (Bazeley & Jackson 2013).   
The interviews and data from workshops were coded through open coding. Then, the open 
coding underwent a focused coding, and relevant categories were merged together. 
Data analysis of the documents identified key terms of the mindset by performing an initial open 
coding followed by merging the categories.  
 
3.1. Setting description 
The oil and gas production started in Denmark in 1972. The production contains 19 oil and gas 
production fields in the Danish sector of the North Sea, with 55 offshore production installations, 
10 of which are manned. A total of 10 companies contribute to the Danish production, but only 
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three of the companies serve as operators (DEA, 2012). The oil and gas industry in Denmark is 
subject to different legislations. On an international level regulation is in the form of directives 
from the European Union, while on the national level, regulation is in the form of legislation and 
executive orders. One of the main pieces of legislation is the offshore safety act, which aims to 
promote high standards of offshore safety and health (DEA 2012). The oil and gas industry has 
a different organisational structure than onshore organisations. In Denmark, there are three 
operating companies that carry out exploration and recovery of hydrocarbons. The operating 
company participating in this study is responsible for day-to-day operations of an offshore 
installation. However, the operating company does not provide all staff at the installation; some 
of the jobs are performed by contracting companies. The operating company provides the core 
crew, which includes management of the installation, supervisors, and technical employees in 
the control room, while the rest of the employees come from contracting companies. The 
number of employees from contracting companies varies and is dependent on activity on the 
installation. The Danish oil and gas industry is characterised by offshore production, whereas 
the management, planning, and support of the production are established onshore. The 
onshore installation is divided into different units, such as support for offshore sites, exploration, 
production and the Health, Safety and Environmental Department. The main responsibility on 
the installation belongs to the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM), which is also an 
administrative function; the OIM reports to the onshore management. The crew consists of 
different groups, all of which have a supervisor/foreman. The education of offshore employees 
ranges from uneducated employees to highly specialised technicians. Most offshore employees 
work shifts of two weeks offshore and three weeks at home. The production on the installation is 
a constant and on-going process, which means that there are employees present for 12-hour 
day or night shifts year round. Due to the complicated operations and risk of explosions, the 
focus is very much on safety. Employees must follow specific procedures at work and are 
required to conduct a risk assessment before every task. One of the most important elements of 
the work offshore is the permit to work. The permit to work system ensures that the work tasks 
are conducted safely and that the employees follow procedures and conduct proper risk 
assessments. Many of the tasks, which are categorised as high risk, require a valid permit to 
work. This means that the employees have to complete a form in which they describe the work, 
assess the risk and describe how the risk can be avoided or minimised. The permit to work has 
to be signed by the management at the installation; without it the employees are not allowed to 
proceed with the task.  
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Programme/mindset description 
The company involved in the study introduced a new mindset/programme in the beginning of 
2011. The programme consists of an introduction, an intervention and maintenance. During the 
introduction, all employees participated in a one-day workshop that presented the idea of new 
mindset. The intervention consisted of several local activities at installations and increased 
focus on the new mindset. The last part of the programme was launched in early 2015 with a 
refresh workshops for all employees; this part is still on-going and is not part of this follow up 
study.  
The aim of the mindset/programme was to change the existing organisational culture toward a 
better safety culture. The programme should establish a culture in which: 
· the employees take responsibility for themselves and their colleagues, so no one is 
getting hurt  
· strong relations are created among colleagues at the work place, which supposedly 
drives employee safety  
· employees can talk freely and discuss and report incidents without fearing the 
consequences 
· follow up is conducted on good ideas and suggestions 
· an attitude that all accidents can be avoided is promoted 
· safety behaviour is recognised and rewarded 
Overall, the programme emphasised the responsibility for the employee’s own and for his/her 
colleagues’ safety, which also meant intervening when someone is not following safety 
procedures. Moreover, the focus is on acknowledging individual vulnerability and the 
importance of risk assessment before and during the job and on the importance of always 
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having a valid permit to work. Implementation of the programme began in 2011 and is on-going. 
The programme implementation was divided into three parts: 
· Introduction to the programme 
· The change process 
· Maintaining the programme 
Introduction to the programme started in 2011 with the goal of introducing a new way of thinking 
about safety within the organisation. All employees from both the operating company and the 
contracting companies participated in a one-day workshop that explained the new programme 
and new principles. Supervisors received additional training to help them create the dialogue in 
the organisation. The goals of the first part of the implementation were to make the programme 
visible in the organisation; motivate the employees and management to share ideas, worries 
and thoughts; prevent accidents; and promote safety. 
The intent of the second part of the implementation process was to continue with engagement 
of and motivation for the programme. The goal was to improve safety performance and ensure 
that every employee had knowledge of the importance of safety.  
The third part of the implementation focused on maintenance of the programme, learning from 
incidents and positive dialogue. 
 
4.2 Overall perceptions of the programme 
The employees responded positively to the programme. It is expressed in the following 
interview excerpts: 
 
We have engaged employees and programme ambassadors, we have decreased the number 
of incidents, it is allowed to report (incidents), the programme has changed the culture, the 
culture is not the same at it was before. 
 
It is really good, it (the programme) had a good influence, focus on safety, it caught it all. 
 
People have trust and believe that everybody means this, and it is necessary to do it to create a 
different focus on safety. 
 
During the workshops, the employees emphasised that the biggest success of the programme 
was that they could see the involvement of the management and that for the first time they felt 
that the management team was very serious about safety. As one interviewee said: 
 
There was commitment from top management, of course we had some external consultants to 
help, but the biggest thing was commitment from top management. We did workshops, which 
were conducted by our own employees, and management was involved all the time and 
presented at workshops explaining that this is important.  
 
The success of the programme according to respondents was that it was targeted and that the 
focus was on process and not on results: 
 
It is a journey you have to take on your own, it is the first time we have focused on process 
instead of results.” 
Several employees at the workshop and during the interviews mentioned that the programme 
introduced a new way of approaching safety and had more focus on changing the overall 
attitude towards safety. 
 
The aim of the programme was to create a different focus on safety, we could see in the 
statistics that the last 15-20 years there had been no big change, the programme focuses on 
two areas: process safety and behaviour, but in a different way, we think about taking 
responsibility for each other, on the soft values, it is something new, we have observed good 
results and awareness became better in the organisation, we discuss things in a different way, it 
is a process which never ends, we are on a journey. 
 
It is an enormous change in how people think, people have a different attitude and they take the 
new employees with them. 
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One of the new focus areas within company, which was introduced with the programme, was 
the focus on “soft values.” Soft values refers to the social environment of the workplace, 
indicating that personal relationships, the well-being of employees, and consideration of work 
conditions when planning the tasks are of great importance in establishing a sustainable safety 
culture. The focus on soft values was mostly presented in the internal journal but also 
mentioned in some of the interviews:  
 
In the last year, safety changed to the better after the implementation of the programme. The 
programme mindset focus means that we are aware of the soft values to a higher degree.  
 
Table 1 shows the results of the data analysis on the overall positive perceptions of the 
programme. The results indicate that, at the organisational level, there was a focus on attitude 
changes and the importance of personal relationships. As mentioned before, the focus on 
personal relationships was a new approach in the organisation. This shows a change toward 
more soft values and an increased focus on the organisation’s culture. In this sense, the new 
mindset is based on the safety culture approach; i.e., that a safety culture is the result of 
common norms and values and social interactions rather than individual behaviour changes. 
Other findings emphasised open dialogue, ownership and social well-being, which correspond 
with participatory approaches that invite members of an organisation to be engaged.  
 
Table 1 Perceptions of the programme 
Organisation’s description of the programme Employees’ descriptions of the programme 
Changes in attitudes 
Importance of personal relationships 
More open dialogue 
Fewer accidents 
Change of mindset 
Ownership 
Common responsibility 
Feelings 
Increased reporting 
Changes in attitudes 
Management really means it 
Visible and engaged management 
More open dialogue 
Greater focus on safety 
Changes in management styles 
Common responsibility 
 
4.3 Perceived challenges of the programme 
As mentioned, the programme focused on values, understanding the present to achieve a better 
future, knowledge, learning and improvement. However, real-life implementation does not 
always fit the aims of the model. As one the respondents stated: 
 
We succeeded in some places but not in others. 
 
The employees and managers who were interviewed mentioned several areas that were not 
successful. One was lack of follow up and evaluation of activities and tools to develop the 
programme further. One of the responders said: 
 
We realised that you can change peoples’ mindset, and you can be clear about your 
expectations of them towards safety, but you have to give them tools as well, you can’t tell 
people that you expect some things of them but not give them means to do it, (…) we have 
successfully moved some minds, but we really have not given people tools to back it up. 
 
The participants at the workshops had similar opinions. Safety representatives in particular 
emphasised that they lacked tools to be able to address the changes of attitude that occurred.  
Another challenge was the level of communication. One of the respondents said that the 
communication about the programme could be better. Some of the employees mentioned that 
the programme was formulated quite broadly, which sometimes confused employees; it was 
difficult for them to determine the main focus of the programme. Moreover, the amount of 
information was insufficient as the programme was not easy accessible on the company’s 
website. The intensity of the programme implantation also changed, from being very intense in 
the beginning to being almost non-existent: 
It was a good process, but it is about focus and maintaining the programme all the time and that 
can be difficult. 
It is a challenge, what worked yesterday does not necessarily work today. 
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The challenge is to keep the programme going and to engage employees to continue their 
involvement. As one of the respondents mentioned, the challenge is in defining what the aim of 
the programme is in the future: 
 
Is it about the path we are supposed to take in the future, or is it changing the mindsets or about 
what things move us forward? 
 
The discussions about the programme’s future are still on-going, and there is no common 
understanding of the aim of programme in the future.  
The programme was mostly implemented offshore, and there was a gap between 
implementation of the programme offshore and what happens onshore where projects are 
planned. Some of the respondents describe it in the following way: 
 
We should have the programme in mind when we make the important decisions onshore, but 
we have not seen it yet. 
 
We should have the programme also onshore and at the corporate level, we focus very much 
on personal safety, but we do not have enough attention on those huge mistakes that can 
cause an installation to explode. 
 
Do we make risk assessments of the right things; do we make decisions based on the right 
background? We are not there yet. 
 
One of the focuses of the programme is on learning from incidents and learning from the past to 
improve the future; this part was not very successful. The company still has problems with 
learning from incidents. 
We are trying to be a learning organisation; I think we learn from serious incidents, the 
investigations are conducted when there is a serious incident, especially in process safety, but 
learning from incidents related to personal behaviour we don’t learn.  
Another challenge connected to the implementation of the programme is the number of new and 
inexperienced employees from contracting companies, as they were not properly integrated into 
the programme. The workforce has expanded rapidly during the past few years, and many new 
employees do not have the same level of experience or knowledge as longer-term employees. 
This was challenging for more experienced employees, who felt they had to work harder to 
compensate: 
I don’t know where they are finding those new employees (..), they don’t know anything. 
 
They think that they can send slaughterhouse employees for a three-week course and that that 
makes them competent, but it is not true, they don’t have the right attitude and we have to 
struggle with them offshore. 
 
The worst thing with some of the new employees is that they don’t care at all; carelessness is 
very dangerous for safety. 
 
In summary, employees found the greatest challenge to be a clear communication strategy, 
particularly concerning maintenance and continuation of the programme. Another major concern 
was the involvement of the new and inexperienced employees as well as short-term contract 
employees who appeared to be less engaged in safety issues that concerned the entire 
organisation.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The results of this study showed that the company to some degree succeeded with the 
implementation of the new programme. The participants emphasised that they felt supported by 
management, particularly noting that management took employee safety seriously. 
Management support and engagement in safety is very important for creating a positive safety 
culture and improving safety; the evidence of this can be found in many studies (Pidgeon & 
O'Leary, 2000; Reason, 1997; Mearns & Flin, 1995; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; 
Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Mearns, Rundmo, Gordon, & Fleming, 2004; Mearns & 
Flin, 1999). Moreover, the employees appreciated the emphasis on the soft values; the 
programme thus acknowledged that social well-being at work is an important component in 
143
being able to practice safety procedures. For example, one of the programme’s key messages 
is that employees should intervene when safety is at risk. The underlying notion is that if 
employees do not trust or feel comfortable with each other, they are less likely to intervene. It 
may be argued that this notion is part of the participation paradigm mentioned in the theory 
section, which calls for a broader perspective in policy implementation and is rooted in locals’ 
everyday life (Chambers 1997). The success of implementation is thus dependent on how well it 
fits the setting in which it is being implemented and how well the existing culture is 
characterised by shared ideas and norms (ACSNI, 1993). One important result stands out as 
causing challenges to the success of the new programme: the number of new and 
inexperienced employees. According to some of the participants in this study, inexperienced 
employees jeopardised safety with carelessness and lack of skill. It may be argued that the new 
employees were not considered proper ‘members’ of the culture and therefore did not share the 
‘new safety culture’ represented by the mindset. This result indicates that more attention should 
be paid not only to better educating new employees on the content of the mindset but also to 
integrating them in the existing work teams, emphasising reciprocity regarding trust and well-
being among all employees. This may promote the ‘sharedness’ of the cultural norms. 
The programme has been successful in changing attitudes among the employees and has 
improved safety. However, the intensity of the programme implementation has been 
decreasing. It is important to maintain the programme because awareness usually is highest at 
the beginning of the intervention and slowly disappears over time (Zohar & Luria, 2003). 
Changing a culture is a slow process, and it is important to recognise the existing culture, what 
the opportunities are to change it, and who should be involved (Antonsen, 2009; Richter & 
Koch, 2004). Aaro and Lund have found that the most affective change is a mixture of structural 
changes and training based on a behavioural approach. It appears that the company 
represented in this study lacks both a clear structure, particularly regarding communication and 
maintenance, and a clear educational focus for contract and other short-term employees. 
The challenge in changing the culture is who is involved and how much power the company is 
willing to give its employees. The study has shown that the challenge was that employees did 
not have enough tools to be able to change the culture.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The study has shown that building a safety culture as a component in safety and accident 
prevention programmes is a promising but challenging process. It is crucial that there is a 
transparent communication strategy throughout the programme so it is clear to the employees 
what the aim of the programme is and how it can be achieved. Moreover, it is critical to pay 
attention to the subgroups existing within the organisation to target the programme to all 
employees, including new hires and short-term employees. Another important issue is an 
understanding that cultural change takes time, and it is important to maintain focus and 
encourage employees for changes to take effect.  
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Abstract  
Every day, millions of workers in Europe are exposed to noise in the workplace, and all the risks 
that entails. In Europe, one in five workers have to raise his voice to be heard it for at least half 
the time he is working, and 7% have hearing problems related to their work. According to 
available data, the hearing loss caused by noise is the most common occupational disease in 
the European Union.  
 
Many times, the noise does not have to be too high to cause problems in the workplace. It can 
interact with other risk factors and increase the danger to which workers are exposed, for 
example, increasing the risk of accidents to neutralize the acoustic warning signals; interacting 
with exposure to certain chemicals to multiply the risk of hearing loss; or being a trigger of 
workplace stress. 
 
An appropriate work place design and layout must allow minimize the number of people 
exposed to noise and the exposure of workers. The noise reduction must be achieved not only 
through the use of equipment emitting the least possible noise but also by providing places and 
workers with appropriate elements to minimize noise transmission, both through air and solid 
structures. Reducing airborne noise emitted by work teams can be achieved, for instance, using 
noise absorbing materials in the walls of the room. 
 
Furthermore, the accumulation of waste and the need for waste management are also 
becoming more and more pressing. In Europe the amount of wastes in the different production 
stages of the ceramic industry reaches some 3–7% of its global production meaning millions of 
tons of calcined lays per year that are just landfilled. With the increasing restrictions on landfills 
in the European Union area, the cost of deposition will increase and the industries will have to 
find ways for reusing their wastes. Although the reutilization of ceramic waste (CW) has been 
practiced, the amount of waste reused in that way is still negligible. Hence, the need for its 
application in other industries is becoming absolutely vital. Construction industry as the end user 
of almost all the ceramic materials is well posed to solve this environmental problem which is 
partially its own. The nature of construction industry, especially the concrete industry, is such 
that ceramic wastes can be used safely with no need for dramatic change in production and 
application process. 
 
The scope of this investigation is to develop a new sound absorbing material mainly composed (80 
% p/p) of CW that can be applied as part of noise reducing devices with the aim of reducing 
accidents and diseases due to exposure to noise. The characterization of the product has been 
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carried out by measuring the sound absorbing (sound absorption coefficient at normal incidence by 
using a Kundt tube), physical (open void ratio and density) and mechanical (compressive strength) 
properties of the recycled product. Additionally, since the noise absorption is strongly related to the 
open porosity of the product, the influence of the particle grain size of CW on the properties of the 
final product has been analyzed, as well as the influence of the specimen thickness on the acoustic 
absorption. The results have been compared to a porous concrete made of crushed granite 
aggregate as a reference commercial material used in similar applications. 
 
According to the results obtained, compositions with coarse particles showed greater sound 
absorption that compositions made with finer particles, besides presenting similar sound 
absorption, or even better, to the porous concrete used for the same application. On the other 
hand, the open void ratio tended to increase as the particle size become larger, and the 
opposite tendency was observed with the density. Since the internal structure becomes more 
porous when coarse particles are used, the compressive strength of the recycled product tends 
to decrease. The sound absorbing product showed lower density and compressive strength 
than the porous concrete which it was compared to. Thereby, CW can be potentially recycled by 
developing a new sound absorbing material with similar results to other products traditionally 
used in similar applications. Besides that, the thickness of the final product can be selected in 
order to reach the best sound absorption at the required frequencies that characterize the 
specific noise. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Noise is one of the most common occupational hazards. In the United States, for example, 
approximately 35% of workers are exposed daily to average levels equal to or greater than 80 
dBA [1]. These noise levels are potentially hazardous to the hearing and can also produce other 
harmful effects. It is likely that the levels are somewhat higher in less developed countries, 
where not much use engineering controls, and slightly lower in other countries with control 
programs more stringent noise, such as Sweden and Germany. 
 
The hearing loss is the most known harmful effect of noise and probably the most serious, but 
not the only. Other adverse effects including tinnitus (ringing sensation in the ears), interference 
with speech communication and the perception of alarm signals, changes in work performance, 
are other harmless and extra-auditory effects [2]. 
 
Once the source of noise in an industrial process is identified, the next step should be to choose 
between the available noise control options. The standard model used to control almost all 
health risks is to examine the various control options applied at the source, in the transmission 
medium and receiver. 
 
The first step in the noise control process should be to try any treatment of the source, but often 
it is not feasible remodeling processes or equipment, or modifying the sound sources. Also, 
there are situations in which it is virtually impossible to identify the cause of the noise. In such 
cases, the second step should be the adoption of control measures for the treatment of the 
sound transmission path as an effective means of reducing the total noise level. The two main 
measures of suppression transmission routes are acoustical enclosures and barriers, which 
should be selected with the appropriate material based on the frequency spectrum of the noise 
source [3]. 
 
When some of the measures are impossible or insufficient, as a third step, personal protective 
equipments should be used. Moreover, the impact of using personal hearing protectors is 
unclear. Wearing hearing protection by workers with a substantial noise-induced hearing 
impairment reduces the possibility of hearing moving sound sources, warning signals, or 
colleagues shouting and hampers localization of moving sound sources because of reduced 
capacities to determine the direction of a sound source [4]. 
 
In the field of prevention of occupational risks, new ideas and techniques of intervention are 
being generated, which should make possible the effective protection of workers health. This 
study is focused in this line. The scope of this investigation is to develop a new sound absorbing 
material mainly composed (80% p/p) of ceramic waste, reaching a two-fold environmental 
advantage. To the extent possible, the sound absorbing spectra at different frequencies was 
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analyzed with the aim of adapting the sound absorbing properties of the material to an specific 
noise spectra and reducing the sound level exposure of the workers. 
  
EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM 
In this study, ceramic waste (CW) from a construction and demolition waste plant in Spain has 
been combined with ordinary Portland cement type II 32.5N (PCII). The test specimens were 
manufactured following a simple, low-cost procedure. CW was separated into three different 
particle sizes in order to analyze the influence of the grain size in the properties of the final 
product. The solid components were placed in a concrete mixer and were mixed until a 
homogeneous mixture was achieved. Then water was added to the mixture and it was re-mixed 
until a homogeneous paste was obtained. When the mixing was completed, the paste was 
placed in moulds (34 mm diameter, of variable thickness) and was compacted twice using a 
vibrating table. The pastes were then taken out of moulds after 24h and left to cure at ambient 
conditions for 28 days. 
 
Test methods 
When a sound wave strikes a material, a portion of the sound energy is reflected back, another 
portion is absorbed by the material while the rest is transmitted. The absorption coefficient, α, is 
the ratio of the absorbed energy to the total incident energy. To determine the acoustic 
properties of the products, the sound absorption coefficient was determined by the impedance 
tube method [5]. The circumferential edge of the test sample was carefully sealed with vaseline 
as recommended by the ISO-10534-2, to ensure a good fit between the sample and the tube. 
Each value represents the average value obtained after testing three samples. The Noise 
Reduction Coefficient (NRC) was then obtained by calculating the arithmetic mean of the 
absorption coefficients at 250, 500, 1000 and 2000 Hz, in order to have single numeric data 
about the sound absorption to make comparisons. 
 
The open void ratio has been measured because it is strongly related to the acoustic behavior 
of the products. The method of vacuum water saturation has been followed in the determination 
of open void ratio (VR %) [6]. The samples were oven-dried at 105±5ºC. Subsequently, they 
were weighed (W1) and left under water in a vacuum vessel until saturation was reached. After 
24 hours they were removed and weighed again (W2). The open void ratio was calculated by 
VR (%)=VW/VS·100, where VW is the volume in the sample occupied by water and VS is the 
total volume of the sample. The volume of water can be found as VW=(W2-W1)/ρw, where ρw 
is the density of water. 
 
The density (ρ) of the mortars was calculated by weight and volume (dimensions) 
measurements. The compressive strength (CS) of the test samples was found based on the 
ASTM-C39/C39M-05e2 [7] using a compression test machine (Supezcar, MEM-102/50t). Each 
result was obtained by testing three specimens. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSION 
In order to analyze the influence of the particle grain size in the properties of the products made 
of ceramic waste, specimens with different grain size of CW were manufactured, and compared 
to specimens of typical porous concrete (HP) [8]. Table 1 shows the nomenclature, composition 
and water content of the samples manufactured, as well as the results of the physical and 
mechanical properties measured.  
 
Table 1. Composition (wt%) and properties of CW specimens and porous concrete 
 CW-Coarse CW-Medium CW-Fine HP 
CW (%) 80 80 80 - 
PCII (%) 20 20 20 20 
Coarse aggregate (%) - - - 80 
Particle size (mm) 2.5<dp<4 1.25<dp<2.5 dp<1.25 3<dp<9 
Water/solid (%) 25 28 35 9 
Open porosity (%) 30 18 9 26 
Density (kg/m3) 1180 1230 1500 1730 
Compressive strength 
(MPa) 2.9 3.5 4.3 4.1 
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The water/solid ratio increased when the particle size decreased due to the effect of the 
fineness of the particles on the workability of the mix. Lower particle size increases the surface 
area which then requires more water to lubricate the particles [9]. On the other hand, the open 
porosity of the mortars tended to rise when the particle size was larger. In consequence, CW-C 
was the product with highest open porosity, followed by HP, CW-M and CW-F, which presented 
very low open porosity. The density of the products increase as the particle size becomes fines. 
Although CW-F showed the lowest porosity, it was the densest of the CW products. The porous 
concrete used as a reference has a void ratio close to CW-C; however, it presented a high 
density due to the greater specific gravity of the coarse aggregate (2.69 g/cm3) than the specific 
gravity of the ceramic waste (2.15 cm3). The mechanical properties of the CW products showed 
that the compressive strength of the mortars decreased when the open void ratio increased. 
Therefore, porous materials had the weakest compressive strength. 
 
The variation of the acoustic absorption coefficient in the different CW products and porous 
concrete is shown in Figure 1. The results of the sound absorption coefficient are represented in 
octave bands. The sound absorption of a porous material is related to the energy loss by friction 
produced in the walls of its holes. As a result, CW mortars with higher open porosity have given 
better sound absorption coefficients in the whole range of frequencies. Compared to the porous 
concrete, it had similar sound absorption coefficients to CW-C, as it happened when comparing 
the open porosity. The maximum peak of the sound absorption coefficient registered for CW-C 
appeared at 800Hz, which is positive taking into account that noise at frequencies lower than 
1000 Hz are the most difficult to reduce. 
 
Figure 1. Normal incidence sound absorption coefficient 
 
 
On the other hand, the acoustic absorption of a material depends on the thickness of the 
specimens tested. Tests on how the thickness on the acoustic properties influences the material 
were carried out by testing the same compositions of CW products with different thicknesses. 
Figure 2 shows the sound absorption coefficient curves for 40 (L1), 80 (L2) and 120 mm (L3) 
thickness of CW-C specimens. The acoustic absorption spectra of CW-C specimens shifted 
towards lower frequency levels as the thickness of the specimens changed, although the 
magnitude of the peak absorption coefficients remained practically uniform. This phenomenon 
could be due to the relationship between the peak frequency and the thickness of the 
specimens, which can be expressed by an equation obtained from the concept of the absorbing 
mechanism of a porous material [10].  
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Figure 2. Influence of the thickness of CW-C on the sound absorption coefficient 
 
𝑓𝑃 · 𝑙 = (2𝑛−1)𝑐4 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡                                              (1) 
 
Where fP is the frequency at the peak, n is the number of peaks (constant), c is the sound speed 
of air (fixed for temperature), and l is the thickness of the specimen. Therefore, there is a 
chance for designing a specific thickness in order to develop a sound absorbing material which 
reduces a specific noise. The same tendency were observed in the results of CW-M and CW-F, 
although in the case of CW-F the sound absorption is so low that very little differences were 
found in the variation of the thickness. 
 
The Noise Reduction Coefficient (NRC) was calculated in order to clearly identify the effect of 
the particle grain size of the coarse aggregate and the thickness of the specimen tested in the 
Kundt tube, see Table 2. The same tendency as the sound absorption coefficient curves was 
observed for the NRC, and this effect was repeated for all the CW compositions. 
 
Table 2. NRC of CW-C, CW-M, CW-F with different thickness 
 CW-C CW-M CW-F HP 
L1 – 40 mm 0.30 0.18 0.05 0.27 
L2 – 80 mm 0.39 0.25 0.05 - 
L3 – 120 mm 0.48 0.30 0.06 - 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main goal of this experimental study was to develop a product composed mainly by ceramic 
waste that presented good noise absorption characteristics. In the course of the study the 
following conclusions were reached. 
 
- The grain particle size of CW influenced the acoustic behavior and the physical and 
mechanical properties of the products made from CW. The best sound absorption coefficients 
were measured in products made from the larger CW particle sizes, which developed a more 
porous matrix. On the other hand, good mechanical properties have been found in the products 
made from the finest particles.  
 
- The acoustic absorption coefficient spectra depend on the thickness of the specimen tested. 
The principal maximum of the absorption coefficient displaced to lower frequencies when the 
thickness increased. 
 
- Ceramic waste could thus be recycled as part of sound absorbing materials in view of the 
results obtained. Moreover, there is a chance of designing a product with specific grain size and 
thickness with absorbs a concrete noise, which means noise levels at certain frequencies. 
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Abstract 
Learning from successful operations has received less attention than learning from accidents 
and near misses, both among practitioners and researchers. The paper reports intermediate 
results from a project aimed at reducing this gap. We discuss (1) criteria to identify an operation 
as successful with regard to safety, (2) implications concerning successful operations that can 
be derived from current organisational theories of safety, (3) how learning from successful 
operations can take place in practice and (4) challenges related to learning from successful 
operations. The paper is based on document studies, qualitative interviews with personnel in 
two drilling companies, initial observations at a drilling simulator centre and from a workshop in 
an oil company operating on the Norwegian continental shelf. The criteria used in the research 
literature to identify successful operations are mainly related to the absence or low frequency of 
adverse outcomes. This may be problematic because organisations may experience accident-
free periods even during the incubation period before a major accident. It is possible to derive a 
broad array of theoretical perspectives to account for successful operations from current 
organisational theories of safety. Learning from successful operations can take place either 
through spontaneous mechanisms or through mechanisms deliberately put in place by 
management. Managed mechanisms for learning include reporting systems; debrief sessions in 
simulators and the real world, and workshops. An example of a workshop concerning a 
successful operation is presented in the paper. Paradoxically, whereas learning from successful 
operations has received limited attention in the safety science literature, learning from 
operations that are perceived to be successful appears to take place all the time in the real 
world. However, the outcome of such learning is not necessarily improved safety. We have 
therefore identified several challenges related to learning from successful operations. 
Characterising an operation as successful may be problematic, since the absence of adverse 
outcomes does not necessarily imply that the risk was well controlled. When describing and 
analysing a successful accident, it is easy to get captured by "the official version" as prescribed 
in rules and procedures. As a consequence, learning processes may maintain current dogma 
and practices rather than trigger new insight and improvements. Successful operations rarely 
lend themselves to rigorous approaches for establishing causal connections between how 
operations are performed and the degree of success. 
 
Keywords: safety management; managed learning; spontaneous learning; success; recovery. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
A rich array of methods exists to analyse the causes of accidents and critical events, and a 
great effort is put into such analysis and dissemination of results by the industries and national 
authorities world-wide. There is, in contrast, a scarcity of methods for analysing successful 
operations. The project "Learning from successful operations" was initiated to correct some of 
this shortcoming. The objectives of the project are to provide (1) new scientific approaches to 
study successful operations, (2) documentation of cases of successful operations that can be 
used for educational purposes and meta-analysis, (3) new theoretical accounts of successful 
operations, and (4) methods and guidelines that can be used by companies to analyse and 
learn from successful operations (e.g. in incident investigations and safety audits). "Success" 
and "successful" here refers to the safety aspects of an operation.  
The paper summarises insights that we have reached at an intermediate stage of the project 
related to the following issues: 
152
 
 
1. What criteria can be used to identify an operation as "successful" with regard to safety? 
2. To what extent can implications for learning from successful operations be derived from 
current organisational theories of safety? 
3. How can learning from successful operations take place in practice? 
4. What are the challenges related to learning from successful operations? 
 
The study was primarily concerned with prevention of major accidents (sometimes referred to as 
process safety) rather than minor accidents (sometimes referred to as personal safety). 
 
1.2. Previous research on successful operations 
An important early contribution to the understanding of successful operations is Weick's 
observation that "reliability is a dynamic non-event" (Weick, 1987). Reliability is invisible in the 
sense that "nothing happens". People do not know how many mistakes they could have made 
but which they did not make. From the outside, what can be observed are constant outcomes; 
there is nothing to pay attention to. Weick's statement also implies that reliability "is an ongoing 
condition in which problems are under control due to compensating changes in components" – 
for instance operators improvising to compensate for substandard technical equipment. Such 
compensations are not necessarily codified in procedures or discussed explicitly; adaptations 
may evolve and be maintained through "reflection-in-action" rather than "reflection-on-action" 
(Nathanael & Marmaras, 2008).  
HRO (High Reliability Organisations) researchers argue that certain organisational properties 
and practices make an organisation prone to success when it comes to safety. Early studies of 
HROs addressed complex systems that delivered remarkably reliable performance, such as 
aircraft carriers (Rochlin, LaPorte & Roberts, 1987; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991), nuclear 
submarines (Bierly & Spender, 1995) and nuclear power plants (Schulman, 1993a). Early 
accounts of successful performance include use of redundancy to derive highly reliable 
performance from imperfect human beings (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991), a capacity of the 
organisation to reconfigure spontaneously during crises (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991); the 
emergence of a collective mind through heedful interrelating (Weick & Roberts, 1993), the 
successful exploitation of slack, including conceptual slack and the right to veto decisions 
(Schulman, 1993b), and cultures of requisite variety, facilitating information flow (Westrum, 
1993). More recently, Weick & Sutcliffe (2001) proposed that prominent characteristics of HROs 
can be captured by the notion of "mindfulness", i.e. a capacity for anticipation and awareness of 
the unexpected as well as a capacity to contain the unexpected.  
Contributors to the emerging field of resilience engineering have insisted on the need to account 
more symmetrically for successful adaptations and accidents (Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 
2006; Woods, 2006; Hollnagel, Pariés & Woods, 2011). They have also argued that it is 
necessary to learn from normal operations in order to maintain and improve safety in systems 
that experience very few accidents. Normal operations will always involve variability, and the 
study of safety requires the study of normal variability. However, the methodical side of the 
study of normal operations is still in its infancy. This research gap will be targeted by this 
project.  
Successful operations may encompass handling of serious disturbances. Studies of operations 
where situation control has been successfully regained and a dangerous sequence of events 
stopped are therefore also of relevance to the understanding of successful operations. Reason 
(2008) discussed cases of "heroic recovery" where human interventions have prevented 
disasters. Reason argued that Weick's notion of collective mindfulness needs to be 
complemented by a notion of individual mindfulness. Carthey et al. (2003) studied 'behavioural 
markers' of surgical excellence in Arterial Switch Operations, i.e. the characteristic behaviour of 
surgical teams and team members with outstanding results. Adaptive strategies, improvisations 
and negotiations undertaken by actors to achieve reliable performance in highly dynamic 
settings have also been explored in Mesman's study (2009) of a neonatal intensive care unit 
and Marc & Rogalski's study (2009) of a French medical emergency centre.  
Although a variety of methods have been developed to support accident investigations (e.g. 
Sklet, 2004), we are not aware of any method that addresses successful operations, nor are we 
aware of any method to identify and analyse successful operations. However, based on 
theoretical contributions on resilience and empirical studies of successful recovery of high-risk 
incidents, Størseth, Albrechtsen & Eitrheim (2010) established a suite of so-called “Contributing 
Success Factors (CSFs) for building resilience”. 
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1.3. Conceptual framework and research issues for the project 
A simple conceptual model for the study is shown in Figure 1. The model may be summarised 
as follows: Safety outcomes in terms of successful operations and adverse events are strongly 
influenced by how individuals, groups and organisations anticipate, prevent, detect, interpret 
and handle disturbances that may lead to accidents. These outcomes form a basis for 
organisational learning, or more specifically for how individuals, groups and organisations 
describe, analyse and learn from successful operations. These learning processes may change 
(or maintain or reinforce) the way in which individuals, groups and organisations anticipate, 
prevent, detect, interpret and handle disturbances that may lead to accidents. Learning 
processes may also lead individuals, groups or organisations to change the environmental 
conditions for their safety work. By “safety work”, we refer to all efforts to keep the risk of major 
accidents and work environment risk under control. According to this definition, safety work is 
not limited to tasks performed by safety specialists. A technician carrying out his/her daily work 
in a safe manner and a company board allocating adequate resources to safety critical 
investments are examples of safety work in action. Environmental conditions influence the 
opportunities an organisation, organisational unit, group, or individual has to control the risk of 
major accidents. 
 
              
 
Figure 1 – Conceptual model for the present study. 
 
The conceptual model does not intend to show all possible causal influences. It is restricted to 
the relations that are of interest to the current study. The analysis of theoretical perspectives on 
successful operations in Section 4 below is based on issues derived from the conceptual 
framework. 
The term "successful" refers to the safety aspects of the operation. Possible criteria to distinguish 
successful operations from less successful operations are considered in the Section 3.  
 
2. APPROACH 
We have identified different empirical research strategies that we believe are relevant to the 
study of learning from successful operations: 
1. Studies of normal operations. These are studies where the researchers do not claim to 
have identified operations that are particularly successful with regard to safety. The 
objective is to investigate how people go about to "produce safety" in "normal" or "routine" 
work situations. (In this context, "normal" means "typical" or "everyday", rather than "in 
accordance with specific norms".) 
Environmental conditions (e.g. 
hardware/technology, procedures, 
competence) 
How individuals, groups and 
organisations anticipate, prevent, detect, 
interpret and handle disturbances that 
may lead to accidents 
Outcomes in terms of accident-free 
performance 
How individuals, groups and 
organisations describe, analyse 
and learn from successful 
operations 
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2. Studies of successful operations. These are studies where the researchers claim to have 
identified operations that are particularly successful with regard to safety. The researchers 
typically set out to explain why the identified operations are particularly successful. 
3. Studies of successful recovery. These are studies of situations where a system was 
headed for disaster and where this trajectory was interrupted through human intervention. 
4. Studies of how people (individually or in collectives, e.g. organisations) make sense of 
successful operations or successful recovery. The focus is not on the researcher's account 
of successful operations, but rather on the ways in which people involved in the operation 
themselves account for success. Such knowledge is important as a basis for understanding 
and improving organisational learning from successful operations.   
 
The project applies an abductive approach in the sense that the cases are "interpreted from a 
hypothetical overarching pattern, which, if it were true, explains the case in question" (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2009:4). Abduction involves a mutual interaction between theoretical 
interpretations and observations, where both are adjusted and refined. The initial interpretation 
should thus be strengthened and refined by new observations. In accordance with this, we start 
with a broad and open-ended theoretical framework, and gradually narrowed the theoretical 
focus in accordance with the results. We adopt multiple perspectives on resilient organisations 
(Rosness et al., 2010), e.g. a barrier-perspective, a HRO-perspective and an information 
processing perspective (Turner, 1978). We also seek to be sensitive to the dialectics between 
prescribed and actual work practices (Nathanael & Marmaras, 2008).  
We further employ a case study design to explore the nature of successful operations and the 
way they can be analysed, described and utilized for learning purposes. Case studies allow us 
to investigate "a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 1994: 13). A case 
study design also allows us to explore ambiguities and conflicting interpretations of phenomena.  
We utilise a combination of observations, interviews and document studies. Since interview data 
is dependent on the level of reflection of the informant, it is crucial to gain first-hand information 
of operations, meetings and situations which are subsequently discussed in interviews. This 
combination serves as a countermeasure to the "taken-for-granted-ness" that characterizes 
normal operations, and the hindsight bias that will always be present when a situation is 
retrospectively described.  
During observations of work practice, the researchers mainly act as interactive observers (Tjora, 
2009). Our role as researchers is acknowledged and we communicate with subjects when we 
consider this helpful for our understanding and compatible with the work situation. The obvious 
problem with this approach is the so-called Hawthorne effect - that subjects may modify their 
behaviour when they know they are being watched. We try to minimize this effect by clarifying 
that the study is not an audit, and by studying a wide variety of situations.  
The interviews involve the whole span of involved actors, both horizontally (offshore and 
onshore, across professional domains) and vertically (different hierarchical levels). The 
documents they relate to and produce, such as procedures, risk matrixes, drilling programmes 
and end of well reports, also provided insight into the incentives for and effects of the work 
carried out.  
Research tools, such as observation guides, interview guides and guides for analysing 
successful operations, were developed in an iterative manner, reflecting both insights from the 
literature study and from initial empirical work. The development of research tools is seen as the 
first step towards developing tools that can be used by practitioners. We employ methods and 
theoretical constructs that allow the analysis of actions by human and non-human actors within 
a common framework.  
 
3. DEFINING "SUCCESS" 
It may seem straightforward to think of "success" as the opposite of failure. However the notion 
of "success" may be ambiguous. Several different criteria have been used to identify an 
operation as successful with regard to safety in the research literature: 
1. Absence of adverse consequences. An operation may be labelled successful if it did not 
directly lead to an accident. This view of success seems to be implied when Hollnagel 
(2013) argues that much more data will be available if we turn from looking at "what goes 
wrong" to looking at "what goes right". This criterion does not always distinguish between 
operations that are accident-free due to "pure luck" and operations that are accident-free 
due to excellent safety work. An organisation may experience a prolonged accident-free 
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period even during the incubation period before a major accident (Turner, 1978; Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997). The incubation period is characterised by danger signals that pass 
unnoticed or are misunderstood. 
2. Lower frequency of adverse consequences than other similar operations under similar 
conditions. We may think of this as a benchmarking perspective. Success implies that an 
individual, team or organisation performs an operation with fewer instances of adverse 
consequences than other units performing the same operation under similar conditions. For 
instance, Carthey et al. (2003) identified surgical teams that performed Arterial Switch 
Operations with particularly low frequencies of adverse outcomes. This criterion is difficult 
to apply when the frequency of adverse events is very low, because prolonged observation 
or a high number of analysis units will be necessary to find statistically significant 
differences in frequencies of adverse outcomes. 
3. Low frequency of adverse consequences in an absolute sense or compared to a broader 
range of operations. This can be exemplified by Hale and Heijer's (2006) study of Dutch 
railways. These were characterised as "ultra-safe" with regard to passenger fatalities, 
based on a very low number of passengers killed per person-kilometre compared to other 
means of transportation such as air transport, private cars or buses. For rare events, such 
as major accidents, extended observations and/or a high number of analysis units will be 
necessary to argue convincingly that the frequency of adverse consequences is very low. 
4. Lower frequency of adverse consequences than would be expected, taking into account 
the nature of the operations. This seems to be the understanding of success in early 
studies of high reliability organisations (HROs), as suggested by the title "Working in 
practice but not in theory" (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). The argument seems to be that 
HROs have fewer accidents than one would expect, taking into account the hazards, the 
complexity, intensity and small margins involved in the operations. Again, extended 
observations and/or many analysis units are needed if the adverse events are rare. 
5. Successful coping close to the boundary. An operation is labelled successful if the actors 
manage to operate with very small safety margins without experiencing an accident. In Roe 
and Schulman's study (2008) of the management of the California electrical grid, the label 
"high reliability management" is apparently based on the capacity of operators to cope 
successfully close to the border of system breakdown. This view of success also seems to 
be implied in some HRO studies of aircraft carriers (Rochlin, LaPorte & Roberts, 1987; 
LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
6. Successful recovery from an imminent danger. An operation may be labelled successful if 
the actors managed to recover from a potentially disastrous trajectory of events. One may 
prefer to speak of "successful recovery" rather than "successful operations" in this case. 
Examples of this kind of success stories can be found in Reason's (2008) compilation of 
stories of heroic recoveries.  
 
We can also think of a few additional categories of "success" that we have not found in the 
reviewed literature: 
7. Maintenance of a broad safety margin. An operation may be labelled "successful" to the 
extent that a broad safety margin was maintained throughout the operation. We have not 
noted any instance in the literature where maintenance of a broad safety margin has been 
labelled "success". However, we include this category because the maintenance of 
adequate safety margins seems to be a central safety strategy in, e.g., commercial air 
traffic.  
8. Maintenance of an effective barrier structure. An operation may be labelled successful if an 
adequate set of barriers against adverse event sequences was in place throughout the 
operation. This category resembles "maintenance of a broad safety margin", but may allow 
for more straightforward operationalization in some contexts, such as oil well interventions 
or maintenance work in a process unit.  
9. Maintenance of adequate and/or improved safety throughout a prolonged period of time. 
One may think of this as the successful prevention of drift into failure. This conception of 
success implies a learning perspective. Over time, the system will have to adapt to 
changing conditions, and it will also have to explore the safety consequences of such 
adaptations.  
 
The diversity of criteria for success implies that the identification of an operation as "successful" 
with regard to safety is not a matter of simple, "objective" classification. The sensemaking 
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process involved when practitioners or researchers label an operation as "successful" is an 
important aspect of learning from successful operations. As researchers, we should be sensitive 
to how practitioners go about identifying successful performance, but we should also consider 
the possibility of eliciting new insights by exploring alternative criteria for success.  
Most of the criteria used in the literature are related to outcomes, i.e. the absence of or low 
frequency of adverse events. However, criteria 7 and 8 are related to processes that are 
assumed to be closely related to the potential for adverse outcomes. These criteria may be 
applied to a single analysis unit (operation), whereas many of the outcome-related criteria 
require extensive observations.  
A common pitfall when characterising an operation as successful is to generalise from one 
category of accidents to other categories of accidents that are only weakly correlated. As has 
been repeatedly pointed out (e.g. Hopkins, 2000, 2008), successful prevention of lost time 
incidents does not necessarily imply that the risk of major accidents (process accidents) is well 
controlled.  
There is a tension between criteria 5 and 7, since coping close to the boundary implies 
accepting a narrow safety margin. Criterion 5 seems applicable to systems that have to operate 
close to the boundary in order to deliver their services (e.g. some cases of brain surgery), 
whereas criterion 7 seems more relevant to systems where maintenance of a broad safety 
margin is compatible with adequate performance on other dimensions (e.g. civil aviation). This 
raises the question of the practices and environmental conditions that are needed for successful 
coping close to the boundary are different from the practices and environmental conditions that 
are needed for maintaining a broad safety margin. Another issue is whether both criteria 5 and 7 
can coexist in a single system without creating a double bind situation.  
 
4. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS 
In order to profit from the extensive research literature on organisational aspects of safety, we 
took as a starting point six perspectives on organisational accidents and resilient organisations 
proposed by Rosness et al. (2010): 
1. The barrier perspective 
2. Normal Accident Theory 
3. High Reliability Organisation (HRO) 
4. Conflicting objectives: Risk taking, adaptation and drift  
5. The information processing perspective 
6. Resilience Engineering 
 
Table 1 summarises an analysis of the six perspectives with regard to successful operations. 
The first column provides central references and a summary of the core principles underlying 
each perspective. A more extensive presentation of the perspectives can be found in the 
literature referenced in Rosness et al. (2010) and in the references included in Column 1 in 
Table 1. The other three columns show possible answers derived from the theoretical 
perspectives to three analytic issues derived from the conceptual framework in Figure 1: 
· How do individuals, groups and organisations anticipate, prevent, detect, interpret and 
handle disturbances that may lead to accidents?   
· What environmental conditions are conducive to successful operations?  
· How can practitioners describe, analyse and learn from successful operations? 
 
It is obviously impossible to do justice to the rich literature on organisational aspects of safety 
within a small table. However, the table shows that it is possible to derive a broad array of 
hypotheses about preconditions for successful operations from this literature. Such derivations 
should be done with caution, because an adequate account of success needs to include 
conditions or mechanisms that are not commonly used in accounts of failure. Accounts of failure 
are often focused on failure to restrict variability, whereas accounts of success should consider 
how systems achieve requisite variety to handle disturbances that occur during an operation 
(Ashby, 1981).  
We have used results from this kind of analysis to develop observation guides, debriefing 
guides and interview guides for our own empirical work. We will also explore the feasibility of 
using such results to develop tool for practitioners for learning from successful operations. 
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Table 1 – Organisational perspectives on successful operations. 
Perspective, 
references, core 
principles 
How can 
individuals, 
groups and 
organisations 
anticipate, 
prevent, detect, 
interpret and 
handle 
disturbances that 
may lead to 
accidents? 
What environmental 
conditions are 
conducive to 
successful 
operations? 
How can 
practitioners 
describe, analyse 
and learn from 
successful 
operations? 
Energy and barrier 
perspective  
(Haddon, 1970; 1980). 
Accidents occur when 
vulnerable targets are 
exposed to harmful 
amounts of 
uncontrolled energy. 
 
Identify potential for 
vulnerable targets 
to be affected by 
harmful 
uncontrolled energy 
flows and put in 
place measure to 
prevent or divert 
such energy flows 
or to minimise their 
impact. 
 
Successful operations 
take place in a well-
designed context with 
requisite barriers in 
place, and without 
unnecessary sources 
of potentially harmful 
energy. 
Explore how the 
actors (including 
operators) go about 
to identify hazards 
and put in place 
requisite barriers. 
Utilise experience 
with occurrences of 
barrier impairment. 
Information 
processing 
perspective 
(Turner, 1978; Turner 
& Pidgeon, 1997).  
Major accidents occur 
due to failure in the 
organisation's 
processing of 
information on 
physical events that 
may turn into 
accidents. 
Organisations 
should monitor and 
improve their 
processes for 
collection, 
dissemination and 
interpretation of 
information. Weick 
and Sutcliffe 
(2001:159ff) 
provide several 
examples of 
practices that aim 
to enhance 
awareness and 
anticipation, e.g., 
"Restate goals in 
the form of things 
that should not 
happen". 
 
Organisational 
structures and 
incentives that promote 
sharing of information 
including "bad news". 
A good safety culture, 
which may promote 
and be promoted by 
senior management 
commitment to safety, 
shared care and 
concern for hazards.  
Focus on conditions 
and 
processes/actions 
that ensure adequate 
collection, sharing 
and interpretation of 
information. 
Challenge the 
labelling of 
operations as 
"successful" based 
on the hypothesis 
that the organisation 
might be in the 
incubation phase of 
the next accident. 
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Perspective, 
references, core 
principles 
How can 
individuals, 
groups and 
organisations 
anticipate, 
prevent, detect, 
interpret and 
handle 
disturbances that 
may lead to 
accidents? 
What environmental 
conditions are 
conducive to 
successful 
operations? 
How can 
practitioners 
describe, analyse 
and learn from 
successful 
operations? 
Normal Accident 
Theory 
(Perrow, 1984).  
System accidents may 
occur in decentralised 
systems with tight 
couplings and in 
centralised systems 
with high interactive 
complexity. 
The likelihood of 
system accidents 
can be reduced by 
limiting the amounts 
of dangerous 
energy, by reducing 
interactive 
complexity, by 
loosening couplings 
and by adapting the 
degree of 
centralisation to the 
coupling and 
complexity of the 
system. 
 
Low interactive 
complexity and loose 
couplings. Centralised 
control structures in the 
case of tightly coupled 
systems, decentralised 
control structures in the 
case of loosely coupled 
systems. 
In tightly coupled 
systems, focus on the 
achievement of 
adequate 
coordination. 
In systems with high 
interactive 
complexity, focus on 
detection and 
handling of 
anomalies, including 
successful 
improvisation. 
  
High Reliability 
Organisations 
(LaPorte & Consolini, 
1991). Some systems 
deliver extremely 
reliable performance 
even under periods of 
very high peak 
demand. Explanations 
for such performance 
include organisational 
redundancy, flexible 
organisation structure 
and exploitation of 
slack.  
Flexible 
organisational 
structure and 
interaction style that 
changes between 
(1) routine mode), 
(2) high tempo 
mode and (3) 
emergency-
response mode. 
Redundancy is 
used to build 
reliable systems 
from less reliable 
components, both 
technical and 
human.  
 
Organisational 
redundancy. Clear 
operational goals 
expressed through 
Standard Operating 
Procedures. 
Resources devoted to 
socialization efforts 
aiming to foster 
agreement on the 
organisation’s mission. 
Organisational culture 
supporting flexible 
decision-making, 
commitment to 
reliability. 
 
Use narratives used 
for experience 
transfer among 
operators. Explore 
the contributions of 
organisational 
redundancy and 
flexible organisational 
structures to success.  
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Perspective, 
references, core 
principles 
How can 
individuals, 
groups and 
organisations 
anticipate, 
prevent, detect, 
interpret and 
handle 
disturbances that 
may lead to 
accidents? 
What environmental 
conditions are 
conducive to 
successful 
operations? 
How can 
practitioners 
describe, analyse 
and learn from 
successful 
operations? 
Conflicting 
objectives: Risk 
taking, adaptation 
and drift  
(Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rosness, 2009; 
Vaughan, 1996).  
Under the pressure of 
conflicting objectives 
activities/operations 
tend to migrate toward 
the boundary of 
acceptable 
performance. 
Repeated handling of 
anomalies under 
production pressure 
may lead 
"normalisation of 
deviance". 
 
Make boundaries to 
unacceptable 
performance or 
unsafe states 
visible and 
touchable. Train 
personnel in 
boundary handling. 
Establish "counter-
pressures" that 
favour safe 
performance. 
Arrange for 
effective 
information 
exchange in 
situations where 
each actor has a 
limited overview of 
the overall situation. 
Visible and touchable 
boundaries of 
acceptable 
performance.  
Adequate balance 
between production 
pressures/incentives 
and 
pressures/incentives 
promoting safety. 
 
Reflect on questions 
such as: How can the 
boundary of 
acceptable 
performance be 
identified? Is safety 
affected by 
boundaries and 
gradients of other 
objectives? Can 
safety boundaries be 
made visible and 
touchable? 
Is it possible to 
identify a set of 
typical decision 
contexts, and 
describe how safety 
boundaries are 
conceived and 
represented in these 
contexts? 
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Perspective, 
references, core 
principles 
How can 
individuals, 
groups and 
organisations 
anticipate, 
prevent, detect, 
interpret and 
handle 
disturbances that 
may lead to 
accidents? 
What environmental 
conditions are 
conducive to 
successful 
operations? 
How can 
practitioners 
describe, analyse 
and learn from 
successful 
operations? 
Resilience 
Engineering 
(Hollnagel, Woods & 
Leveson, 2006; 
Hollnagel, Pariés & 
Woods, 2011).  
Failures and success 
are seen as outcomes 
of the same underlying 
processes of 
necessary 
performance variability 
and efficiency-
thoroughness trade-
offs. Successful 
operations are 
distinguished by the 
magnitude of 
functional resonance 
between the functions 
and by the 
management of this 
resonance.  
 
Resilience can be 
managed through 
"The four 
cornerstones of 
resilience 
engineering": 
1. Knowing how to 
respond to regular 
and irregular 
disruptions and 
disturbances.  
2. Knowing what is 
or can become a 
threat in the near 
term.   
3. Knowing how to 
anticipate future 
developments, 
threats, and 
opportunities. 
4. Knowing how to 
learn the right 
lessons from the 
right experience - 
successes as well 
as failures. 
 
Instead of constraining 
variability of 
environmental 
conditions, ensure 
requisite variety to 
adapt to and manage 
the variability, and 
hence to dampen 
functional resonance. 
 
Practitioners should 
not limit themselves 
to address things that 
go wrong, but also 
explore why things go 
right and strengthen 
mechanisms that 
contribute to 
successful 
adaptations. 
 
 
 
5. HOW CAN LEARNING FROM SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS TAKE PLACE IN 
PRACTICE? 
 
5.1. Managed learning from success – an example 
By "organisational learning" we understand processes where organisations change as a 
consequence of experience (Argote & Ophir, 2002). Organisational learning can be managed or 
spontaneous to various degrees, and may in principle both improve and weaken safety 
(Rosness, Nesheim & Tinmannsvik, 2013; Rosness et al., 2014, see also Nathanael & 
Marmaras, 2008). Learning from successful operations can thus take place either through 
spontaneous mechanisms or through mechanisms deliberately put in place by management. 
Some examples of managed mechanisms include reporting systems, debrief sessions in 
simulators and the real world, and workshops. Companies may also recruit persons they 
consider successful for critical or difficult tasks, based on the assumption that these persons will 
repeat their success. Spontaneous learning, however, comprises small adaptations and 
adjustments of work practices taking place all the time (ref. Section 5.2). 
We shall present one example of an effort to learn from successful operations in more detail. 
This is a workshop that was designed to allow the participants to explore the boundaries 
towards unacceptable risk and the forces driving actors towards that boundary (Størseth, 
Rosness & Guttormsen, 2010). The workshop was inspired by the "Conflicting objectives" 
perspective outlined in Table 1. The operation that was discussed took place on an offshore 
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drilling rig located on the Norwegian continental shelf, and included the preparations for a 
possible disconnection of the riser during a storm, as well as the decision about whether or not 
to disconnect when wave height was approaching the disconnection criterion for the rig at that 
specific location. The necessary preparations for a riser disconnection take several hours. The 
disconnection itself only takes a few minutes to perform, but reconnection takes several days, 
and involves significant economic loss due to downtime both for the rig owner and for the 
operating company hiring the rig. 
In the case discussed at the workshop, the well had not yet reached hydrocarbons under 
pressure, so blow-out risk was not an issue. The rig manager planned and prepared for 
disconnecting the riser in collaboration with the onshore organisation. The offshore personnel 
monitored the peak storm development closely. They registered two heaves that exceeded the 
six meter disconnection criterion before the waves subsided. Due to the expectation that the 
strong part of the storm would last for a very short time, the rig manager concluded that the 
equipment would be strong enough to handle the situation and he decided not to disconnect. 
The workshop lasted for one day (lunch to lunch) and included the following main parts: 
1. An introduction, where the facilitators emphasised the ambition to build a comprehensive 
understanding based on contributions from participants with different background. This 
point was stressed by titling the workshop "Share and Win". The value of disagreement 
was emphasised, and the groups were urged to record divergent points of view, rather than 
striving for consensus. 
2. The groups constructed graphical representations of the event sequence (STEP-diagrams; 
Hendrick & Benner, 1987). This process elicited extensive sharing of knowledge between 
group participants. 
3. The groups discussed possible outcomes and consequences related to the riser case, 
including the scenario that the rig did not disconnect and the riser was torn off. Several 
participants were surprised to see how many and how serious consequences were 
associated with the different scenarios.  
4. The groups discussed the appropriate formulation and interpretation of the disconnection 
criterion, trying to take the involved decision makers' point of view; e.g. should the rig 
manager push the button on 5.9 meters or at 6.1 meters? This discussion brought up the 
issue of whether the criterion was given in a guideline or a formal procedure.   
5. The participants identified possible improvements, defined follow-up actions and evaluated 
the workshop. They noted with some surprise that they had very different opinions on the 
issues that were discussed, but that they were able to discuss a controversial safety critical 
issue without clashing together. A few months after the workshop we were informed that 
the follow-up actions had been implemented unusually promptly, and without any need for 
reminders. 
 
A more detailed account of the workshop is given by Størseth, Rosness & Guttormsen (2010). 
The workshop was not originally framed as an effort to learn from successful operations, but 
rather as an effort to investigate safety critical decision-making. The operation could be labelled 
a "success", and more specifically "successful coping close to the boundary", based on the 
argument that no physical harm occurred, and by not disconnecting, the rig manager saved the 
rig company and the operating company from the cost of several days of downtime. The rig was 
prepared to perform a disconnection if needed, and the rig manager acted in accordance with 
his formal procedures, since the six meter disconnection criterion was included in a guideline 
and not a formal procedure. However, from the viewpoint of the company HSE staff, the 
operation was problematic, because the six meter criterion in the bridge document was 
exceeded, and this criterion was based on an analysis of the mooring arrangement at that 
specific location. These experiences suggest that workshops can be used as arenas for learning 
from successful operations.  
 
5.2. Spontaneous learning from success – a paradox 
Paradoxically, whereas learning from successful operations has received limited attention in the 
safety science literature, learning from operations that are perceived to be successful appears 
to take place all the time in the real world. Spontaneous learning mechanisms range from tacit 
experimentation and adaptation at the individual level (sometimes labelled "intuition" or 
"reflection-in-action") to informal reflection and coordination at the level of work groups 
("interpretation", "coordination", "reflection-on-action"). Such learning processes will by definition 
take place whether or not they are desired and promoted by management. We should therefore 
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expect spontaneous learning to take place all the time in organisations. This raises two 
questions; (1) can we expect spontaneous learning from operations perceived as successful to 
consistently lead to improved safety, and (2) is it possible to influence spontaneous learning 
processes to increase the likelihood that they lead to improved safety?  
Theories of drift (e.g. Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997; Snook, 2000; Dekker, 2011) and 
Vaughan's (1996) related theory of cultures of deviance point to a problematic aspect of 
learning from success. Many unsafe conditions will only trigger or contribute to an accident 
under specific circumstances. If the absence of accidents is taken as an indication of success, 
then there is a potential for unsafe conditions and practices to be confirmed, reinforced and 
repeated, so that they may contribute to an accident on a later occasion. Learning from 
successful operations thus concerns not only securing and promoting the positive lessons that 
may be learned. It is also a matter of influencing processes that may lead to drift into failure. 
The identification of an operation as successful is a critical aspect of learning from successful 
operations. A possible strategy for influencing the outcome of spontaneous learning processes 
is thus to promote efforts to critically scrutinise the apparent success of operations, for instance 
by checking whether requisite barriers were in place at all times during the operations.  
It should be emphasised that spontaneous learning processes do not necessarily lead to 
impaired safety. Dekker (2011, p. 186) argued that complex systems may drift into success as a 
consequence of "complex interactions among multiple, diverse, interconnected and 
interdependent agents who mutually affect each other". He therefore advocated building 
preconditions for diversity, attending to relationships that can help bring fresh perspectives to 
the fore. We propose that so-called high reliability professionals (Roe & Schulman, 2008) 
contribute to learning from successful operations by sharing their positive experiences within 
their professional networks.  
 
6. CHALLENGES RELATED TO LEARNING FROM SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS 
We have identified several challenges related to learning from successful operations: 
1. Characterising an operation as successful may be problematic, since the absence of 
adverse outcomes does not necessarily imply that the risk was well controlled. There is 
thus a need for alternative criteria or approaches to distinguishing between successful and 
less successful operations. 
2. It is easy to get captured by "the official version" or "work as imagined" when describing a 
successful operation and explaining the success. Those aspects of successful performance 
that are not included in "the official version" may remain tacit, either because people are 
not aware of them, or because they lack the language for expressing them, or because 
they may fear sanctions for deviating from "the official version" as prescribed in rules and 
procedures. As a consequence, learning processes may maintain current dogma and 
practices rather than trigger new insight and improvements. 
3. Successful operations rarely lend themselves to rigorous approaches for establishing 
causal connections between how operations are performed and the degree of success, 
such as true experimental designs. 
4. Strategies that contribute to successful operations in one class of sociotechnical systems 
may prove detrimental in sociotechnical systems with other properties. For instance, 
success in some systems depends on rapid and decisive interventions, whereas other 
systems call for careful deliberation before actions are taken (Schulman, 1993a). 
Centralised management structures that work well in tightly coupled systems with mainly 
linear interactions may, according to Perrow (1984) fail to control hazards in systems with 
complex interactions.  
 
From the challenges mentioned above we can derive an agenda for further applied research on 
learning from successful operations: 
1. There is a need for criteria and methods for critically assessing the success of a given 
operation. Such methods should aim to counteract phenomena such as "practical drift" and 
"normalisation of deviance". 
2. There is a need for techniques or approaches that help organisations create accounts or 
narratives about successful operations in ways that go beyond "the official version" or 
current dogma.  
3. There is a need for research approaches that help us scrutinise the plausibility of proposed 
causal connections between how operations are performed and the degree of success.  
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4. There is a need for criteria to help practitioners and researchers in judging when 
generalisation from successful operations in one context can be plausibly transferred to a 
different context. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper summarises insights reached at an intermediate stage of a project aiming to promote 
learning from successful operations. 
It is not straightforward to define what constitutes a successful operation with regard to safety. 
The criteria used in the literature mainly refer to the absence of adverse outcomes. However, an 
organisation may experience an accident-free period even during the incubation period before a 
major accident.  
It is possible to derive a broad array of hypotheses about preconditions for successful 
operations from current organisational theories of safety. Such derivations should be done with 
caution, because an adequate account of success needs to include conditions or mechanisms 
that are not commonly used in accounts of failure, e.g. adaptive capacity. 
Learning from successful operations can take place either through spontaneous mechanisms or 
through mechanisms deliberately put in place by management. Managed mechanisms include 
reporting systems, debrief sessions in simulators and the real world, and workshops. 
Paradoxically, whereas learning from successful operations has received limited attention in the 
safety science literature, learning from operations that are perceived to be successful appears 
to take place all the time in the real world. However, the outcome of such learning is not always 
improved safety. A possible strategy for influencing the outcome of spontaneous learning 
processes is to promote effort to critically scrutinise the apparent success of operations. 
We have identified several challenges related to learning from successful operations. 
Characterising an operation as successful may be problematic, since the absence of adverse 
outcomes does not necessarily imply that the risk was well controlled. Learning processes may 
maintain current dogma and practices rather than trigger new insight and improvements. 
Successful operations rarely lend themselves to rigorous approaches for establishing causal 
connections between how operations are performed and the degree of success, such as true 
experimental designs. Environmental conditions or practices that contribute to successful 
operations within one category of systems may prove detrimental in systems with other 
properties.  
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Abstract 
The development of technology based on nanomaterials has led to the emergence of new risks 
associated with working with nanoparticles, with consequences for the safety and health of 
workers hitherto unknown. The need to regulate working with nanoparticles is arising recently. It 
is necessary to have standards incorporating best practices and other recommendations to 
protect the safety and health of workers handling these materials. Within these practices and 
recommendations, individual risk protection (personal protective equipment or PPE) is 
especially relevant. Moreover, compliance with standards (CE marking of conformity or any 
other mandatory standards) does not guarantee user protection in any situation. In fact, the 
protection offered by certain PPE during exposure to nanomaterials is a matter of debate and 
study nowadays. The question is whether there are specific PPE whose effective protection 
against nanoparticles has been demonstrated. Unfortunately there is not an affirmative answer 
yet. Beginning with the skin protection and focusing on clothing and gloves, currently existing 
standards collect various tests to determine the resistance of PPE against the permeation and 
penetration of chemicals and solid particles, leakage to the interior, and material degradation. In 
relation to the personal protective devices (masks and filters), the tests contained in the existing 
standards focus on the evaluation of three parameters: the penetration of particles through the 
filter, the inward leakage and clogging of the filter. But these tests are not designed to particle 
sizes of nanometers. Therefore, there are currently no published standards developed 
specifically to check levels of PPE protection against nanomaterials. However, there is wide 
work in the field of research and experimentation, which allows the extraction of valuable 
conclusions and practical recommendations. Research and experimentation in the field of skin 
protection shows that the conditions for conducting the tests should simulate actual conditions 
of use clothing and gloves instead of "copying" the conditions of forced flow testing of 
respiratory material, because the latter conditions lead to a result distorted by excess. In turn, 
the influence of the type of material is tested by the evaluation of parameters such as fibre 
diameter, number of pores and their size and volume, air permeability and thickness of the 
material. Regarding respiratory protection, trials of penetration through the filter show a great 
variation in the effectiveness according to the particle size, and a maximum penetration size is 
detected (MPPS: "Most Penetrating Particle Size"). Other aspects that have been evaluated are 
the influence of flow, the type of mask and the inward leakage factor. Despite everything said, 
there are specific standards engaged to nanotechnologies that follow the scheme presented in 
these lines: collecting results of research and experimentation to date of publication, as well as 
recommendations for risk management in the workplace. Therefore, these documents also fail 
to set standardized tests to ensure levels of protection for risk control measures. At present, the 
NanoRISK Project is being carried out, including the development of protocols for evaluating the 
effectiveness of PPE against Nanos. This protocols could be considered on future standards. 
 
Keywords: Nanoparticles, personal protective equipment, skin protection, respiratory 
protection, standardized tests. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of technology based on nanomaterials has led to the emergence of new risks 
associated with working with nanoparticles, with consequences for the safety and health of 
workers hitherto unknown. Because of this and the rise in its use, nanotechnology and the use 
of nanomaterials have been classified as an emerging risk within the European Union (EU) 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007). 
Given this situation, the need to regulate working with nanoparticles is arising recently 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2012). It is necessary to have standards 
incorporating best practices and other recommendations to protect the safety and health of 
workers handling these materials. Within these practices and recommendations, individual risk 
protection (personal protective equipment or PPE) is especially relevant, because although it is 
the last of the preventive measures that should be implemented (after elimination of risk, control 
in the origin and collective protection), the ease of implementation of PPE makes them widely 
applied in the workplace. 
 
2. CURRENT SITUATION OF STANDARDIZATION 
The effectiveness in protecting using PPE is linked to the selection of an appropriate equipment 
and proper fit, use and maintenance (Instituto Nacional de Seguridad e Higiene en el Trabajo 
(INSHT), 2015). Regarding the selection, protective equipment must comply with European 
standards of manufacturing and marketing (CE marking of conformity) or any other mandatory 
standards from a place outside the EU (Instituto Nacional de Seguridad e Higiene en el Trabajo 
(INSHT), 2015). However, compliance with these standards does not guarantee user protection 
in any situation. In fact, the protection offered by certain PPE during exposure to nanomaterials 
is a matter of debate and study nowadays (Instituto Nacional de Seguridad e Higiene en el 
Trabajo (INSHT), 2015). 
Regarding accident prevention it is vital to know the efficiency of PPE against nanoparticles 
because if we are not certain of their degree of protection, we cannot ensure that they avoid 
damage to the health of workers. And the compliance of certain standard tests should be 
verified to manufacture successfully PPE with known protection levels. The question is whether 
there are specific PPE whose effective protection against nanoparticles has been demonstrated. 
Unfortunately there is not an affirmative answer yet. 
Beginning with the skin protection and focusing on clothing and gloves, currently existing 
standards collect various tests to determine the resistance of PPE against the permeation of 
chemicals, penetration of liquid and spray, penetration of solid particles, leakage to the interior, 
and material degradation, and there are certain parallels and similarities between the standard 
tests at European level and internationally (American Society for Testing and Materials, ASTM). 
Table 1 shows the European standard that includes the strength test of the gloves to 
permeation by chemicals, international American standards (ASTM) and internationals 
(International Organization for Standardization, ISO) which would be equivalents in terms of the 
property tested. 
 
Table 1 – Protective clothing. Permeation. European standards vs. International standards. 
European 
Standard 
Description International 
Standard Description 
UNE-EN 374-3 
Protective glove against chemicals 
and micro-organisms. Part 3: 
Determination of resistance to 
permeation by chemicals 
ASTM F739 Standard Test Method for 
Permeation of Liquids and 
Gases through Protective 
Clothing Materials under 
Conditions of Continuous 
Contact 
 
 ASTM F1194 Standard Guide for 
Documenting the Results of 
Chemical Permeation Testing of 
Materials Used in Protective 
Clothing 
 
 ASTM F1407 Standard Test Method for 
Resistance of Chemical 
Protective Clothing Materials to 
Liquid Permeation—Permeation 
Cup Method 
  ASTM F1383 Standard Test Method for Permeation of Liquids and 
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Gases through Protective 
Clothing Materials under 
Conditions of Intermittent 
Contact 
 
 ISO 6529 Protective Clothing. 
Determination of Resistance of 
Protective Clothing Materials to 
Permeation by Liquids and 
Gases 
 
 ASTM F2815 Standard Practice for Chemical 
Permeation through Protective 
Clothing Materials: Testing Data 
Analysis by Use of a Computer 
Program 
 
Table 2 shows the European standards that includes the strength test of the clothing to 
penetration by liquids and solid particles and the resistance to degradation by chemicals, and 
international American standards (ASTM) and internationals (International Organization for 
Standardization, ISO) which would be equivalents in terms of the properties tested. 
 
Table 2 – Protective clothing. Penetration and others. European standards vs. International standards. 
European 
Standard 
Description International 
Standard Description 
UNE-EN ISO 
6530 
Protective clothing. Protection 
against liquid chemicals. Test 
method for resistance of materials 
to penetration by liquids 
ASTM F903 Standard Test Method for 
Resistance of Materials Used in 
Protective Clothing to 
Penetration by Liquids 
UNE-EN ISO 
17491-3 
Protective clothing. Test methods 
for clothing providing protection 
against chemicals. Part 3: 
Determination of resistance to 
penetration by a jet of liquid (jet test) 
ISO 13994 Clothing for protection against 
liquid chemicals. Determination 
of the resistance of protective 
clothing materials to penetration 
by liquids under pressure 
UNE-EN ISO 
17491-4 
Protective clothing. Test methods 
for clothing providing protection 
against chemicals. Part 4: 
Determination of resistance to 
penetration by a spray of liquid 
(spray test) 
ASTM F1359 / 
F1359M 
Standard Test Method for Liquid 
Penetration Resistance of 
Protective Clothing or Protective 
Ensembles Under a Shower 
Spray While on a Mannequin 
 
 ISO 17491-5 Test methods for clothing 
providing protection against 
chemicals. Part 5: Determination 
of resistance to penetration to a 
spray of liquid (manikin spray 
test) 
UNE-EN ISO 
13982-1 
Protective clothing for use against 
solid particulates. Part 1: 
Performance requirements for 
chemical protective clothing 
providing protection to the full body 
against airborne solid particulates 
(type 5 clothing) 
ASTM F2053 Standard Guide for Documenting 
the Results of Airborne Particle 
Penetration Testing of Protective 
Clothing Materials 
UNE-EN ISO 
13982-2 
Protective clothing for use against 
solid particulates. Part 2: Test 
method of determination of inward 
leakage of aerosols of fine particles 
into suits 
  
EN 374-4 
Protective gloves against chemical 
and micro-organisms. Part 4: 
Determination of resistance to 
degradation by chemicals 
ASTM F1154 Standard Practices for 
Qualitatively Evaluating the 
Comfort, Fit, Function, and 
Integrity of Chemical-Protective 
Suit Ensembles 
 
In relation to the means of respiratory protection (masks, half masks, and filters), the tests 
contained in the existing standards focus on the evaluation of three parameters: the penetration 
of particles through the filter; the inward leakage (facial leakage through the contact surface 
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between the face and the facepiece); and clogging of the filter. Again there is similarity in trials 
at European and American level (proposed for equipment certification by NIOSH, National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health), without full equivalence in the certified protection 
level. Table 3 shows the same comparison of standards for respiratory protective devices. 
 
Table 3 – Respiratory protective devices. European standards vs. International standards. 
European 
Standard 
Description International 
Standard Description 
UNE-EN 
13274-1 
Respiratory protective devices. 
Methods of test. Part 1: 
Determination of inward leakage 
and total inward leakage 
42 CFR part 
84 
Approval of respiratory 
protective devices. 
Subpart I: Gas masks. 
Subpart K: Non powered air 
purifying particulate 
respirators. 
Subpart KK: Dust, fume, and 
mist; pesticide; paint spray; 
powered air-purifying high 
efficiency respirators and 
combination gas masks. 
UNE-EN 
13274-7 
Respiratory protective devices. 
Methods of test. 
Part 7: Determination of particle 
filter penetration 
  
UNE-EN 
13274-8 
Respiratory protective devices. 
Methods of test. 
Part 8: Determination of dolomite 
dust clogging 
  
UNE-EN 143 
Respiratory protective devices. 
Particle filters. Requirements, 
testing, marking 
 
 
 
But these tests were designed to particle sizes or aerosols of the order of millimeters or 
microns, in some cases hundreds of nanometers, but not for sizes of the order of units or tens of 
nanometers. Therefore, there are currently no published standards developed specifically to 
check levels of PPE protection against nanomaterials. Consequently, you can only make 
reasoned recommendations based on the known protective characteristics of certain PPE and 
its applicability to the exposure to nanomaterials. Then, without specific standards, what is the 
solution for testing PPE against the Nanos? 
Fortunately, there is wide work in the field of research and experimentation, which allows the 
extraction of valuable conclusions and practical recommendations (see Gao et al., 2011; Park et 
al., 2011; Rengasamy and Eimer, 2011; Rengasamy et al., 2008; Rengasamy et al., 2007; and 
Wang and Tronville, 2014). These papers guide the way forward to further progress in 
understanding the nature of the risks associated with nanomaterials and nanoparticles and in 
the control of these risks. 
Research and experimentation in the field of skin protection shows that the conditions for 
conducting the tests should simulate actual conditions of use clothing and gloves instead of 
"copying" the conditions of forced flow testing of respiratory material, because the latter 
conditions lead to a result distorted by excess (Gao et al., 2011). In turn, the influence of the 
type of material is tested by the evaluation of parameters such as fiber diameter, number of 
pores and their size and volume, air permeability and thickness of the material, with the next 
conclusions for "nonwoven fabrics"(Gao et al., 2011): 
• The existence of smaller voids in the tissues leads to less penetration (test based on the 
European standard EN ISO 6529); 
• Dry working conditions give less penetration than wet working conditions. 
• By increasing the fiber size, volume and pore size, porosity and air permeability, increased 
penetration is observed; 
• By increasing the material thickness, decreases penetration; 
• The reduction of fiber size, of the pores and porosity, can compensate for small thickness of 
material, reducing penetration; 
Similarly, for this type of nonwoven materials and as to the influence of particle size, the size of 
maximum penetration into the fabrics is in the vicinity of 300 nm (Gao et al., 2011), being 
particles lower and upper to this size more easily retained by different mechanisms, such as 
diffusion. 
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Finally, regarding the type of tested material for gloves (latex and nitrile), it has not been 
detected penetration although clusters was detected in the glove surface. In addition, no 
differences were observed between the dry and wet conditions (Park et al., 2011). 
Should be mentioned that the development of standards for protective clothing is entrusted to 
the Working Groups of the Technical Committee 162 of the European Committee for 
Standardization. Currently these groups work on the line to define requirements and tests 
applicable to a new type of protective clothing that covers the risk exposure to nanoparticles. 
The preliminary ideas are based on adapting clothes to certain tests coming from the field of 
respiratory protection. 
Regarding respiratory protection, penetration trials through the filter show (see Rengasamy and 
Eimer, 2011; Rengasamy et al., 2008; Rengasamy et al., 2007): 
• A high variation in the effectiveness according to the particle size, and a maximum penetration 
size was detected (MPPS: "Most Penetrating Particle Size"). 
• The penetration increases with the increasing flow. 
• Finally, the full mask offers greater protection than half masks and masks (in fact, masks do 
not protect against NP). Although filters coupled to half mask or masks have a low-medium level 
of penetration (MPPS 40-50 nm), in the market there are few models with this protection level. 
In the case of the larger sized particles, the influence exerted on efficacy by the inward leakage 
is greater than the influence exerted by the penetration through the filter. It is noteworthy that, 
unlike what happens with protective clothing, standardization committees for respiratory 
protection are not considering drafting rules for specific assay for nanoparticles. 
Despite everything said, there are specific standards engaged to nanotechnologies (technical 
report the case of the European standard). Next tables show the European standard and the 
American standard related to Nanos and Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S). 
 
Table 4 – European and American standard related to Nanos and OH&S. 
Standard Description 
UNE-ISO/TR 12885 
IN 
Nanotechnologies. Health and safety practices in occupational 
settings relevant to nanotechnologies 
ASTM E2535 Standard Guide for Handling Unbound Engineered Nanoscale Particles in Occupational Settings 
 
These standards follow the scheme presented in these lines: collecting results of research and 
experimentation to date of publication, as well as recommendations for risk management in the 
workplace. 
The recommendations of the technical report UNE-ISO / TR 12885: 2010 is based on the 
conclusions of UENanosafe2 Project. These recommendations regarding the protective clothing 
are: 
• The NP can penetrate through gloves available in the market, so the use of double gloves is 
recommended. 
• 'Nonwoven' fabrics are more effective against penetration, so it is recommended not to use 
cotton fabric clothing. 
Regarding respiratory protective devices are: 
• For many of the tested filters, MPPS is around 300 nm; in N95 filters, MPPS is between 30 
and 100 nm; and in P100 filters, MPPS is between 100 and 200 nm. 
• In workplaces with NP is recommended to use full mask with high efficiency filter. 
• The facial leakage is the determining factor of the efficiency of respiratory protective PPE. 
• The device with supply and purification of air provides maximum protection, since it creates 
positive pressure in the mask. 
In this area also include a recent study by the Instituto Nacional de Seguridad e Higiene en el 
Trabajo (INSHT) of Spain, published in April 2015, which considers progress achieved in this 
field in recent years. Result of this work, some recommendations for the use of PPE have been 
proposed, with no reference to standardized tests. 
 
3. FINALS REMARKS 
As evidenced by the studied documentation, there are no standards to ensure protection levels 
for risk management measures. 
Currently, it is conducting the NanoRISK Life Project - Best Practices Effectiveness, Prevention 
and Protection Measures for Control of Risk Posed by Engineered Nanomaterials (LIFE12 
ENV/ES/178). The main objective of the project is to define proven Risk Management Measures 
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(RMMs) to prevent or minimize exposure to engineered nanomaterials (ENMs) during the 
specific workplace situations of the polymer nanocomposite industry, as well as to support 
standardization activities concerning the certification of the adequacy of PPE and Engineering 
Controls (ECs) to protect workers from the risk posed by use of ENMs. 
Within this context, the concept of the project in to ensure a high level of protection of human 
health and the environment from the risks that can be posed by the use engineering 
nanomaterials.  
On the basis of this concept, the following activities are included in the set of the activities 
carried out at the present: 
• To analyze the adequacy of current international standards (ISO /CEN /ASTM) to evaluate the 
effectiveness of PPE and collective protection measures; 
• Design and development of an aerosol testing chamber prototype for the standardized 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the working procedures, prevention and protection measures 
to control the risk posed by engineered nanomaterials. 
• Define methods and protocols for evaluating the effectiveness of Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) and industrial devices for ventilation and filtration. 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of PPE available on the market, based on defined protocols, and 
using the test chamber developed in this project. 
If the results of the experimental phase are favourable, protocols tested will be considered as a 
basis for future standards. 
Based on these objectives, the protocols related to PPE that have been defined to date are: 
• Respiratory protective devices. Procedure to determination of inward leakage of nanoparticles 
• Respiratory protective devices. Procedure to determination of total inward leakage of 
nanoparticles 
• Respiratory protective devices. Procedure to determination of particle filter penetration by 
nanoparticles 
• Protective clothing. Procedure to determination of inward leakage of aerosols of nanoparticles 
into suits 
• Protective clothing. Procedure to determination of resistance to penetration by spraying a 
liquid solution of nanoparticles 
At the current phase of the project, the tests of PPE available on the market are being 
conducted, according to the defined protocols. These tests are aimed at validating the protocols 
and verify the protection level of the devices against nanoparticles considered in this project. 
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Abstract 
The College of Engineering and Informatics of NUI, Galway has recently moved into its new 
engineering building. Management wishes to improve the state of health, safety and quality 
issues within the College laboratories. For that reason a bona fide laboratory safety 
management system was required. This project firstly surveyed the attitudes to health and 
safety levels within engineering laboratories by conducting a safety climate questionnaire and 
interviews and developed a laboratory safety checklist. The safety climate questionnaire was 
adapted from one that was created by a joint industry and UK Health and Safety Executive 
research project on the assessment of safety culture in offshore environments (HSE 1999). Our 
research also resulted in the development of the checklist mentioned above, and a standard 
operating procedure template that also focuses on environment and process procedure and 
recommendations to create databases of equipment, chemicals, vaccinations and safety 
training. All of these if taken together will give management the information they need to bring 
the safety, process procedures and environment to an acceptable level within the College. 
 
Keywords: Laboratory Safety, Safety Management, Environmental management, Safety 
Climate Questionnaire. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Audits of the engineering laboratories which included an inspection of over five hundred pieces 
of equipment and the risk assessment of over ninety pieces of equipment raised concerns with 
respect to housekeeping, maintenance, risk assessment, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs), and the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), (Broggy and Gaffey 2008). This 
led management to see the need for a practical and bona fide Laboratory Safety Management 
System (LSMS). Such a system would incorporate documented operations, demanding record 
keeping, and regular quality and safety audits. This task was a challenge due to very specific 
nature of laboratory work itself and diversity among the laboratories within the College. Before 
the work on the development of the LSMS could start the identification of what is a good and 
standard practice in terms of laboratory work had to be made. For that reason an extensive 
literature review was conducted on this topic. The first step in the development of a LSMS is to 
understand the organisation and its culture. In this study it was decided to conduct a 
questionnaire survey of the two groups working in laboratories: technical staff and research 
staff. The questionnaire used was a tool prepared by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 
the UK in conjunction with the oil industry. The next step in the process was to develop a safety 
management system that could be used for all the laboratories within the College collectively. 
This task involved the development of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) template and 
testing it on a number of procedures and pieces of equipment. Finally, the last step involved 
issuing recommendations to the College’s management for the implementation of a Laboratory 
Management System. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Challenges in Laboratory Safety 
One of the difficulties in establishing an effective Laboratory Safety Management System is the 
nature of work in laboratories. The tasks conducted there are quite diverse, and often change. 
The equipment is frequently made-up or adapted. The people working in laboratories are 
typically very competent and are likely to be strongly goal oriented, often to the unintended 
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 elimination of other aspects (Furr 1990). Also researchers work on varied products with a great 
deal of independence (Kapin 1999), which makes it hard for a safety officer to encompass 
everything that is ongoing in the laboratory. Kim et al. (2005) in their article concerning safety in 
the newly opened research centre noted that while in theory, everyone moving to the new 
building should have been experienced in the various health and safety requirements and would 
need no retraining or assistance in setting up their new spaces in a safe manner. In practice, 
there was concern that “health and safety amnesia” would set in during all of the activity 
associated with getting labs up and running. Some researchers found that even if the laboratory 
staff abide by chemical safety rules often general safety issues such as fire safety, electrical 
safety, emergency preparedness, and others are generally ignored and neglected (Kapin 1999).  
 
2.2. Good Laboratory Practice 
There are numerous publications on laboratory safety, including whole books dedicated to this 
theme (Furr 1990; Committee on Prudent Practices for Handling Storage and Disposal of 
Chemicals in Laboratories 1995; Fleming 2000), journal articles (Kapin 1999; Foster 2003; Kim, 
Furr et al. 2005), theses (Connolly 2004) and many internal manuals (Doolittle, Esparsen et al. 
1995; The Office of Environmental Health and Radiation Safety 2008). It is outside the scope of 
this document to go into detail on specific laboratory safety practices, but the main areas where 
safety rules need to be applied are chemical safety, equipment safety, standard operating 
procedures, biological safety, noise and vibration, ergonomics, psychological issues. 
 
2.3. Safety Management Systems 
Managing the risks associated with an organization’s operations has been a subject of 
increasing importance over recent years (Santos-Reyes and Beard 2002). Different OHSMS-
based standards have been developed (HSE 1997; OHSAS 1999; AS/NZ4801 2001; ILO 2001; 
PN 2001; BSI 2004) within the public, and private sectors and many have been adopted by 
workplaces. The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2001) discussed the 
advantage of strong occupational health and safety management systems as being that bigger 
companies reduced their numbers of work accidents and, through that, the working time lost. 
HSE (1997) is of the opinion that safety should be integrated as part of sound management. 
Implementing a safety management system reduces accident rates and improves the 
company’s productivity and economic and financial performance (HSE 1997; Smallman and 
John 2001; Rechenthin 2004). However, very little work has been done in academic institutions 
to define what constitutes an effective Safety Management System. There are still no well 
defined and established criteria that could help to develop such SMS (Santos-Reyes and Beard 
2002). There is also literature available on the application of the management system to a 
laboratory environment.  Kapin (1999) points out that completion of a Laboratory Safety Plan will 
identify health and safety needs for that lab, provide appropriate documentation, and outline 
required activities and training.  
 
2.4. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a vital process in making policy decisions for risk management. The 
identification of hazards and measures to control them provides the base for a safety program 
and effectively determines the extent, content and complexity of a successful occupational 
health and safety management system (Mearns and Flin 1995; Makin and Winder 2008). 
Hazards should be controlled on a regular basis in order to ensure that the risks associated to 
them do not increase above an acceptable level (Kuusisto 2000). 
 
2.5. Safety Culture and Climate 
Organizational culture is generally accepted to have an influence on an organization’s success 
or failure (Donnellan 2003). Many industries around the world are showing an increasing 
interest in the idea of ‘safety culture’ as a way of reducing the probability of major disasters, and 
accidents related to everyday tasks (Cooper 2000). Turner and Pidgeon (1997) said that the 
problem of safety culture was, what is it and “how do you become one?”, is perhaps the key 
issue in modern thinking about safety.  The distinction should be made between safety culture 
and safety climate. The latter ought to be distinguished from safety culture, where the former is 
a symptom or ‘snapshot’ (Flin, Mearns et al. 2000) of the latter (Guldenmund 2000). The 
concept of safety climate was introduced by Zohar (1980). He defined the climate as ‘a 
summary of moral perceptions that employees share about their work environment’. During the 
last two decades renewed interest has emerged in the role of safety climate in accident and 
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 injury prevention. Guldenmund (2000) identified ten studies on safety climate that were 
published during the 1990s, in contrast to only two articles that appeared in the decade when 
Zohar (1980) published his article.  
 
2.6. Safety Climate Assessment 
In safety culture research a safety climate questionnaire has been the main measurement tool 
(Collins and Gadd 2002). In the past years significant effort has been put into the construction of 
a valid and reliable safety climate questionnaire and plenty articles were published on that topic 
(Zohar 1980; Davies, Spencer et al. 1999; Cox and Cheyne 2000; Flin, Mearns et al. 2000; 
Guldenmund 2000; DeJoy, Schaffer et al. 2004; HSE 2005; Guldenmund 2007; Tsung-Chih 
Wua 2007; Hahn and Murphy 2008). Workplace safety climate has been assessed in many 
different industrial sectors including construction (Matilla, Rantanen et al. 1994), manufacturing 
(Zohar, 1980), airport ground handling (Diaz and Cabrera 1997) and more recently in various 
health care settings (Gershon, Karkashian et al. 1999). Many different questionnaire designs 
have been used as well, ranging from very simple and short (Gillen, Baltz et al. 2002; Hahn and 
Murphy 2008) to multidimensional scales (Diaz and Cabrera 1997; Carroll 1998; Gershon, 
Karkashian et al. 1999). In this study the “Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit” (HSE 1999) was 
used. It was initially tested in one organisation involved in hydrocarbon production (Davies, 
Spencer et al. 1999; Cox and Cheyne 2000). Cox and Cheyne (2000) have extensively piloted 
the questionnaire. The initial analysis showed the tool to be reliable in terms of what it 
measures, and sufficiently sensitive to reveal differences between occupational groups. The 
feedback also suggested that the questionnaire is easy to administer and profile. Although the 
toolkit has been developed in association with the oil industry, specifically for use in offshore 
environments, in general the process could be applied in other industry sectors, subject to 
industry-specific modification (Davies, Spencer et al. 1999).   
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Safety Climate Questionnaire 
 
3.1.1. Population and Sample 
There were about eighty employees directly involved in laboratory work within the College. 
Sixteen i.e. twenty percent, were technical staff and the remainder were researchers. 
Participation was entirely voluntary and anonymous. No monetary or other incentives were 
provided. Laboratory workers from all five departments were surveyed.  Sixty questionnaires 
were personally distributed to employees who were available at the time. Respondents were 
given thirty minutes to complete the questionnaire.  Fifty eight questionnaires were returned 
giving a response rate of ninety seven percent. 
 
3.1.2. The Instrument 
This research adopted the Safety Climate Questionnaire developed by HSE (1999) to collect the 
data. The questionnaire consisted of forty three questions. The scale was used to measure the 
employee's perception of safety climate in nine dimensions, including management 
commitment, communication, priority of safety, safety rules and procedures, supportive 
environment, employee’s safety involvement, personal priorities and need for safety, personal 
appreciation of risk and work environment. Each question was a complete narrative statement. 
Based on their actual experience and feeling, respondents rated each of the questions using a 
five-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree).  
 
3.2. Safety Culture Interviews 
A series of five informal interviews were conducted with members of technical officers and 
researchers. The interviewees were chosen randomly and their answers were recorded 
anonymously. The purpose of this task was to gather information about the views of the 
employees on the deficiencies in health and safety practices in the College’s laboratories and 
their ideas on how to improve matters.  
 
3.3. Development of a Laboratory Safety Management System 
The aim of this paper was to develop elements of a Safety Management System for the College 
laboratories. From interviews conducted with technical officers it was apparent that ideally such 
a system should be practical and would not create much paperwork. For these reasons the 
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 main feature of the system developed is an electronic database. The database is contained in a 
single folder and consists of a number of spreadsheets. The first spreadsheet is for the 
management of equipment (inventory, risk assessment, maintenance, servicing, Portable 
Appliance Testing (PAT) testing schedules). The next contains an inventory of chemicals and 
waste management records. The third and fourth spreadsheets are for vaccination and training 
records respectively. Apart from the database there was a need for the development of the 
laboratory safety checklist, risk assessment procedure and standard operating procedure 
template. All the above are discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs.  
 
3.3.1. Development of the Laboratory Safety Checklist 
The Laboratory Safety Checklist is an aid in the assessment of laboratory safety status at the 
beginning of the development of the Laboratory Safety Management System and later for 
periodic audits and updates. The laboratory safety checklist was tested in three laboratories. 
The aim of this exercise was to make sure that the checklist covers all the health and safety 
issues in laboratories where very different activities are performed. The key to the selection of 
laboratories was to try the checklist out in varying types of working environments. 
 
3.3.2. Risk Assessment 
The template for this task was adopted from the guidelines contained in British Standard 
8800:2004 (BSI 2004). The Risk assessment matrix and some elements included are shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Elements contained in the Risk Assessment:- 
Example of Hierarchy of Controls required for a Milling machine 
Engineering:  
· Install an Interlocking Guard on the mill work area 
· Fit an Emergency Stop 
Administrative: 
· Provide induction training about the machine 
· Have Standard Operating Procedures for the use of the machine in place 
PPE:  
· Procedure includes the required PPE in Pictorial media. 
The risk assessment matrix for Severity and Likelihood are: 
 
      Severity: 
1= Slight Harm, 2= Moderate Harm, 3= Extreme Harm 
 
Likelihood: 
1= Very Unlikely/Yearly,  
2= Unlikely/During a Semester,  
3= Likely/Weekly,  
4= Very Likely/Daily 
 
Figure 1. Risk assessment matrix and key elements (adopted from BS8800). 
 
3.3.3. Standard Operating Procedures 
The key to a practical and functional SOP is the way it provides the user with appropriate data. 
The information should be concise, easily understood and communicated in basic technical 
terms. Particular attention was given to making the SOP as short and easy to read as possible, 
as during interviews it was discovered that people don’t usually tend to read overly long 
instructions. The first part of the SOP (example shown on the Figure 2) is meant for the pictorial 
communication of hazards present for the particular task or piece of equipment, instructions for 
the use of PPE and Engineering Controls. The interviews with laboratory workers revealed that 
they find that it is easier and quicker for them to read information represented pictorially. The 
fact that the large group of researchers come from non-English speaking countries 
substantiates the use of pictograms. 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 
1    
2    
3  X  
4    
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 Hazards    
Personal Protective Equipment 
Required   
 
Engineering Controls    
Figure 2. Example of pictorial description of hazards, PPE and Engineering Controls for an SOP. 
 
The second part of the SOP contains information on document number, member of staff that 
prepared the SOP, date and the review due date. It also includes the outcome of the relevant 
risk assessment. The third and last part of the SOP is made up of ten paragraphs containing 
information on scope of the activity, reference documents, specific safety and environmental 
hazards, Personal Protective Equipment required, engineering controls, equipment needed to 
run a process, materials used to complete the task, lab procedure, waste products and 
maintenance requirements. The Standard Operating Procedure template was tested on two 
pieces of equipment and on two laboratory procedures. The template proved to be adequate for 
both procedures and pieces of equipment. All processes and laboratory procedures are to be 
documented. 
 
3.3.4. Portable Appliance Testing 
Portable Appliance Testing (PAT) is now required by Irish Safety, Health and Welfare at Work 
(General Application) Regulations, (2007). Depending on the usage and deterioration rate of a 
given piece of equipment, the frequency of testing will differ. PAT testing schedules should 
ideally be included in a database.  
 
3.3.5. Equipment Maintenance and Servicing Schedule and Database 
The regular maintenance and servicing of equipment is vital for its safe operation and also is 
required by the 2007 regulations. To ensure the timely and adequate maintenance and 
servicing, a database of all the equipment and schedules needs to be developed. Also the 
‘tagging’ of equipment should be introduced. The database should contain information on name, 
asset number and location of equipment and also on all due dates of maintenance, service and 
PAT test. Also there should be appropriate reference to documents such as risk assessment, 
service or PAT testing certificates.  
 
3.3.6. Vaccinations 
According to the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Biological Agents) Regulations, (1994) 
where there is a risk of being infected by microorganisms at work, the employer must make 
vaccinations available to their personnel. Since potentially infectious organisms are handled in 
the environmental laboratory, staff and students working there need to get vaccinations.  To 
keep track of vaccinations due dates, a database is needed.  
 
3.3.7. Training  
Provision of appropriate training is a legal duty of employers to their employees as required by 
the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and General Application Regulations, 2007. 
The safety training should cover at minimum the following areas: manual handling; safe use of 
chemicals; safe handling of biological agents; workshop safety; safe work with certain laboratory 
equipment (e.g. autoclaves or centrifuges); first aid essentials; Emergency procedures. 
Induction training should be introduced for new students or staff, covering the basics of safe 
laboratory work. 
 
3.3.8. Chemical Purchasing and Inventory 
Inventory should be kept up to date and one person should be in control of it to avoid 
purchasing excessive amounts of chemicals. It is also important to keep track of expiry dates of 
substances, especially those that are forming peroxides with time. The designated person shall 
also take care to store chemicals appropriately. For example flammable substances must be 
kept in special cabinets and only compatible chemicals may be stored together.  
 
3.3.9. Hazardous Waste Management 
Examples of hazardous waste include biologically contaminated waste (might also contain 
animal waste or human blood), radioactive waste, waste or expired chemicals, solders, used 
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 batteries, etc. The contractors for safe disposal of any of the above types of waste should be 
carefully chosen and all safe procedures for handling those types of waste should be assessed 
and followed cautiously. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Safety Climate Questionnaire 
Fifty eight laboratory workers out of eighty (i.e. 72.5%) took part in the Safety Climate 
Questionnaire and the results of the assessment are presented on a radar plot graph where 
each of the dimensions represented on the radar plot was scored on a standardized scale 
(Figure 3). Overall, the assessment process didn’t reveal any significantly weak areas in the 
perception of employees, as nearly all average results were higher than 6.0 on a scale of 0 to 
10. There were some weaknesses in the areas of Management Commitment (with a 
standardized mean of 6.0) and Safety Rules and Procedures (with a standardized mean of 6.0) 
and they are most in need of improvement. The questionnaire survey also highlighted some 
Communication issues (with a standardised mean of 6.5), the Work Environment (with a 
standardised mean of 6.6) and Priority of Safety (with a standardised mean of 6.6). The 
interviews supported these findings.  
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
Management Commitment
Communication
Priority of Safety
Safety Rules and Procedures
Supportive EnvironmentInvolvement
Personal Priorities and Need for Safety
Personal Appreciation of Risk
Work Environment
 
Figure 3. Safety Climate Questionnaire results for the College. 
 
4.2. Safety Culture Interviews 
Five informal interviews were conducted with members of both technical officers group and 
researchers group. The main findings of these sessions are as follows: 
• Most people find the available safety training is not sufficient for the needs, especially 
for researchers and undergraduate students doing final year projects.  
• The interviewees felt that there is lack of good communication and information sharing 
between personnel on safety topics.  
• Some personnel thought there should be formal, written procedures in place for use of 
equipment, emergencies, chemicals purchasing and hazardous waste management 
and that they should be enforced. 
• Generally people felt that the house keeping within the laboratories is inadequate and 
that this poses a health risk for the users.  
 
4.3. The Laboratory Safety Checklist  
The laboratory safety checklist was tested in three laboratories. The results at that time were as 
follows: 
• Some work practices were not performed safely. For example the PPE was not used by 
all employees. 
• There were no written procedures for emergency actions, experiments or waste 
disposal. 
• There is no adequate training for new employees. 
• Heavy objects were stored above head level in inappropriate locations. 
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 • Standard Operating Procedures were not developed for use of hazardous chemicals, 
equipment or for experiments. 
• Harmful chemicals were seen to be used outside of the fume hood. 
• There are no decontamination procedure established and no autoclave performance 
checks completed monthly. 
• The housekeeping appeared poor. 
• There was no guarding on some machines. 
• There was no record of regular maintenance or PAT testing of most of the equipment. 
 
Since the move to the new engineering laboratories these issues have been and continue to be 
addressed. 
 
4.4.  Risk Assessments 
In total there were ninety one pieces of equipment risk assessed. The results of the risk 
assessment show that the most often encountered hazards were the occurrence of flying 
particles or material, exposure to noise, burning or scalding, cuts and abrasions and 
entanglement. Also the inhalation of vapors or fumes was encountered in case of nearly twenty 
pieces of equipment. The most serious hazards, or in other words posing the gravest risk, were 
entanglement, crushing, cuts and entrapment of body parts. It was also noted again during this 
task that some pieces of equipment did not have suitable controls in place. In most instances a 
guard would be needed to alleviate the risk. Appropriate recommendations were given on these 
risk assessment sheets and where practicable all machines were fitted with guards. Some old 
machines were decommissioned as they could not be upgraded economically. Risk assessment 
must be carried out frequently to ensure that the required management actions are implemented 
and that any changes to process or procedure are incorporated in the risk assessments. 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
5.1. Conclusions 
 
5.1.1. Safety Climate Questionnaire and Safety Culture Interviews 
A questionnaire proved to be a useful tool for the assessment of the safety climate. It was 
relatively easy to administer and profile and also to provide reliable results. The key findings of 
the survey were that generally the laboratory workers are quite comfortable with the safety 
climate in their workplace, however there is a strong feeling that there is too little commitment 
from the management to safety issues and that the safety rules and procedures are not fully 
adequate. Consequently these two areas are most in need of improvement. In comparing some 
key areas of this research with Cox and Cheyne’s study is can be see that in their study 
performance differences were as follows: Management commitment was up 20%, Safety Rules 
and Procedures up 15%, Work Environment up 25% and Management style was up by 15%, 
whereas the college performed better in Supportive Environment by 15%, Involvement by 20%, 
and Personal Priorities by 5%. The areas of Communication and Appreciation of Risk were 
roughly the same in both studies. This comparison clearly shows the areas where improvement 
is required. Safety culture interviews were the tool that allowed elaborating more on the findings 
of the questionnaire. The main findings of the interviews were that the biggest deficiencies are 
in the areas of training, housekeeping, communication, and safety procedures. Some of these 
areas were addressed in the move to the new engineering building i.e. Work Environment, 
Safety Systems, Housekeeping, and Communications. Others are getting management 
attention now especially in the area of risk assessment and the development of SOP’s. Machine 
guards have been fitted to several pieces of equipment and any equipment that was deemed to 
be at an unacceptable risk level has been removed from service until the required modification 
are made. The ongoing development of a culture shift is a matter for University management 
and can be addressed by training, communications, and by management commitment to safety. 
 
5.1.2. The Laboratory Safety Checklist 
The laboratory safety checklist proved to be a useful tool to assess health and safety matters in 
any kind of laboratory. The testing of the checklist in three laboratories uncovered many health 
and safety deficiencies. The most serious inadequacies were the lack of proper housekeeping, 
Standard Operating Procedures, and not using PPE as required as a result of improper 
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 information or wrong attitude towards safety, the lack of any noise survey records and no 
evidence of maintenance or service records for equipment.  
 
5.1.3. Standard Operating Procedures 
The SOP template was developed to aid users to work with laboratory equipment and 
procedures in a safe way. The SOP’s also provide information on quality and environmental 
management requirements. Four Standard Procedures were developed for two pieces of 
equipment and two laboratory procedures that differed in the degree of complication and by the 
various hazards they represent. This task did not reveal any deficiencies in the template. 
Interviews with staff also confirmed the adequacy of the proposed SOP form. The integration of 
safety, quality, and environmental requirements into one simple procedure will lead to a more 
efficient management system with less paperwork and greater use of pictograms. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
 
5.2.1. Safety Climate Questionnaire and Safety Culture Interviews 
The recommendation for further study would be to survey the laboratory workers within other 
Colleges of the University and maybe even outreaching to other Universities. Obtaining such 
results would allow for the comparative studies between many different laboratories. It could 
also highlight other issues not discovered and explored in this research as despite a uniform 
legislative basis each University/Organisation operates in slightly different conditions and safety 
climate and culture depends on the specific environment developed over the years of 
management practice.  
 
5.2.2. Final remarks 
It was our intention to focus primarily on the practical documents that can be easily incorporated 
into health and safety practice and records of each of the laboratories. It is also suggested that 
this template of LSMS would be approved for use in all of NUI, Galway’s laboratory facilities and 
should be maintained uniform, to present a consolidated approach to health and safety issues 
and to provide transparency and ease of monitoring as much as possible and practicable. This 
research has a character of a once-off, limited in scope report; however it points out the areas 
that should be developed further. It is also the authors’ belief that once this approach to safety 
and environmental management is approved and adhered to, it will form a live action plan that 
will constantly monitor and improve safety climate, culture and attitude to advance the working 
environment in NUI, Galway’s laboratories and effectively eliminate any dangerous occurrences.  
The integration of safety, environment and process related detail in one standard operating 
procedure will reduce the amount of paperwork and is easier to manage and keep up to date. 
Management commitment and communication is a critical part of maintaining the management 
system. 
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Abstract 
Professional drivers are at risk of poor health, thus, research on potential antecedents of health 
such as safety climate and time pressure has valuable practical implications. Professional 
drivers are remote/lone workers that lack face-to-face supervisory oversight and access to 
immediate support from others. In this context safety climate would act as a frame of reference. 
To date, research on the relationship between safety climate and employees’ wellbeing is 
scarce and has been mainly conducted in traditional settings rather than remote-working 
situations. Time pressure also arises as a critical antecedent of drivers’ wellbeing due to work 
intensification and “just-in-time” management. However, previous research has mainly focused 
on more general conceptualizations of stressors such as job demands or workload rather than 
time pressure. Finally, several theoretical frameworks suggest that organizational climate 
influences job design. Safety climate is a facet specific climate and time pressure a relevant job 
demand. Thus, safety climate may be accompanied of lower time pressure that, in turn, will 
mediate the relationship between safety climate and drivers’ wellbeing. To date, research on 
this issue is scarce. Previous research has mostly focused on the relationship between safety 
climate and safety, and the intervening variables in this relationship.  
This study examines the relationship between perceived safety climate and drivers’ wellbeing 
(burnout and general health), and the mediating role of time pressure in this relationship. 
Sample was composed of 367 professional drivers and structural equation modeling was used 
to test two competing models: full and partial mediation. Findings showed that safety climate 
was beneficial for drivers’ wellbeing whereas time pressure was detrimental. The association 
between perceived safety climate and drivers’ general health and burnout was partially 
mediated by time pressure. 
Findings extend previous research providing insights into the mechanisms underlying safety 
climate-employees wellbeing linkage, and supporting theoretical arguments on the influence of 
organizational climate on job design. In addition, it encourages future studies to address the 
single effect of specific job demands that are crucial for specific work environments. 
 
Keywords: Safety climate, time pressure, general health, burnout, professional drivers 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Professional drivers are at risk of poor health. They are more likely to suffer work intensification, 
strain, and higher exposure to psychosocial risks (European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions –Eurofound-, 2014). A 32% of respondents from the transport 
sector reported feeling a negative effect of work on health; this proportion was higher than in the 
rest of sectors (Eurofound, 2014 ). Thus, research on how to prevent professional drivers’ poor 
health has relevant practical implications for policymakers across Europe. 
This study examines the relationship between safety climate and drivers’ wellbeing (burnout and 
general health), and the mediating role of time pressure in this relationship. Previous research 
has mostly focused on the relationship between safety climate and safety-related outcomes, 
and the intervening variables in these relationships (e.g., Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 
2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabet, Lee, & 
Murphy, 2013a; Huang, Robertson, Lee, Rineer, Murphy, Garabet, & Dainoff, 2014;  Mooren, 
Grzebieta, Williamson, Olivier & Friswell, 2014; Öz, Özkan, & Lajunen, 2013; Zohar, Huang, 
Lee, & Robertson, 2014). Although it is true that some studies address the safety climate-
employees’ wellbeing association (e. g., Clarke, 2010; Fogarty & Buikstra, 2008; Golubovich, 
Chang, & Eatough, 2014; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011; Siu, Phillips, & Leung, 
2004), in many cases, this relationship is not the main focus of the study (e. g., Clarke, 2010; 
Fogarty & Buikstra, 2008; Siu et al., 2004). 
In addition, previous research on safety climate has been mainly conducted in traditional 
organizational settings rather than remote-working situations (Huang et al., 2014). Instead, this 
study has been conducted using professional drivers who are regarded as lone/remote workers; 
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they work alone and without in-person direct supervision and access to immediate support from 
others (Huang, et al., 2013a).  
 
1.1.  Psychological Safety Climate, Time Pressure, and Professional Drivers’ 
Wellbeing 
This study addresses the influence of psychological safety climate and time pressure on drivers’ 
wellbeing (burnout and general health). Regarding psychological safety climate, it refers to 
individual perceptions (James & James, 1989) of policies, practices, and procedures focused on 
safety (Christian et al., 2009; Zohar, 2010); and their interrelationship with those related to other 
competing goals (e. g., safety vs. productivity or efficiency) that establish the relative priority of 
safety (Zohar, 2003). This study focuses on safety climate at the individual level of analyses in 
accordance with other studies based on lone workers (e.g., professional drivers, utility/electrical 
workers…) (Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabert, Murphy, & Lee, 2013b). 
Psychological safety climate is expected to promote employees’ wellbeing by means of showing 
concern for employees’ health and safety, and providing advice and support. Safety climate has 
been associated with decreased burnout (Clarke, 2010; Nahrgang et al., 2011), psychological 
strain (Fogarty, 2005; Siu et al., 2004), frustration (Golubovich et al., 2014) and poor general 
health (Clarke, 2010; Fogarty & Buikstra, 2008; López-Araújo & Segovia, 2010). Based on 
these arguments, hypothesis 1 was formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Psychological safety climate will be negatively related to burnout and poor 
general health 
Time pressure refers to the lack of time to complete job related tasks (Kinicki & Vecchio, 1994), 
and it is a well-established job demand (e. g., Karasek, 1985; Kristensen, Bjorner, Christensen, 
& Borg, 2004). Job demands are defined as “those physical, psychological, social, or 
organizational aspects of the job that require sustained physical and/or psychological (cognitive 
and emotional) effort or skills and are therefore associated with certain physiological and/or 
psychological costs” (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007; pp. 302). Role ambiguity, role conflict, and 
workload are most important job demands (Bakker, Demerouti, & Sanz-Vergel, 2014; Alarcon, 
2011). Time pressure is an indicator of quantitative workload (e.g., Sonnentag & Bayer, 2005; 
Spector & Jex, 1998) which has been regarded as crucial amongst professional drivers (Dorn, 
Stephen, Wåhlberg, & Gandolfi, 2010; Paillé, 2011). 
Job demands-resources (JDR)’ model (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007) establishes that prolonged 
exposure to high demands (such as time pressure) is detrimental for employees’ health and 
increases burnout (Bakker et al., 2014; Alarcon, 2011). In contrast, job resources will counteract 
job demands, and stimulate personal growth, learning, and development. This study focuses on 
the job demands hypothesis. It is noteworthy that job demands are more strongly related to 
burnout than job resources do (e.g., Bakker et al., 2014). 
To date, research on time pressure correlates is scarce and inconclusive (van den Tooren and 
de Jong, 2014). Its role has been mainly examined through composite measures of job 
demands (e.g., Consiglio, Borgogni, Alessandri, & Schaufeli, 2013; Demerouti, Bakker, 
Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001) and workload (Bakker, Demerouti, & Euwema, 2005). Contrary 
to expectations, van den Tooren and de Jong (2014) found the relationship between time 
pressure and general health was non-significant. They argued that time pressure may act as an 
stimulating rather than as a energy-depleting demand. Nonetheless, empirical evidence 
supports the negative effect of job demands on employees’ burnout (Alarcon, 2011; Consiglio et 
al., 2013) and its positive association with strain (Presseau, Johnston, Johnston, Elovainio, 
Hrisos, Steen et al., 2014). Seemingly, workload has been also positively associated with 
burnout (Alarcon, 2011; Bakker et al., 2005). Following Job demands-resources (JDR)’ model 
(Bakker & Demerouti, 2007) and empirical evidence on job demands and workload hypothesis 2 
was formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Time pressure will be positively related to burnout and poor general health 
 
1.2.  Psychological Safety Climate and Professional Drivers’ Wellbeing. The Mediating 
Role of Time Pressure 
Previous research has mostly focused on the effect of psychological safety climate on safety 
(e.g., Beus et al., 2010) rather than its influence on employees’ wellbeing and the intervening 
variables in this relationship. This study contributes to this research gap by means of testing the 
mediating role of time pressure in the relationship between psychological safety climate and 
employees’ wellbeing. 
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Safety climate is expected to be negatively associated with time pressure for several reasons. 
First, it is defined as a specific facet of organizational climate which has been regarded as an 
antecedent of job demands (e.g., time pressure) (Hemingway & Smith, 1999; Morgeson, 
Dierdorff, & Hmurovic, 2010; Wilson, Dejoy, Vandenberg, Richardson, & Mcgrath, 2004). 
Morgeson et al. (2010) argues that “… in an organization with a strong safety climate, 
incumbents may be more attuned to the physical features of the job (e.g., physical demands, 
equipment use)” (p. 355). Thus, policies and practices will guide managers to value safety 
against other organizational goals such as production or time pressure, thus, they will attempt to 
make time pressure manageable. 
Second, according to social information processing approach (Slancik, & Pfeffer, 1978) safety 
climate would make any information related to safety more salient and would set expectations of 
low time pressure at work: time pressure would be minimized because pressure toward cost-
effectiveness may lead to safety degradation (Rasmussen, 1997; 2000).  
As regards to the empirical evidence, whereas the influence of safety climate on job demands 
remains unexplored, the impact of other facet-specific aspects of organizational climate have 
been examined (e.g., Idris, Dollard, Coward, & Dormann, 2012). For instance, several authors 
(Dollard, Opie, Lenthall, Wakerman, Knight, Dunn, et al., 2012) provided longitudinal evidence 
on the cross level positive effect of climate for psychological wellbeing on workload (Dollard et 
al., 2012), work pressure (Dollard & Bakker, 2010), and emotional demands (Dollard & Bakker, 
2010; Idris et al., 2014). In contrast, other studies found inconclusive results (Idris et al., 2012). 
This study showed partial support for the influence of team climate for psychological wellbeing 
on workload, psychological (e. g., work pace) and emotional demands. However, none of the 
other climate measures included in the study (team psychological climate and climate for 
physical safety) were associated with job demands. Seemingly, to date, the mediating role of 
time pressure in the relationship between psychological safety climate and employees’ 
wellbeing remains unexplored. Thus, hypothesis 3 reads as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Time pressure will mediate the relationship between psychological safety climate 
and drivers’ general health and burnout. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1. Sample and Procedure 
The sample consisted of 34 Spanish road transport organizations of a total of 107 companies 
contacted to participate in this study (response rate of 31.8%). Most organizations were small 
organizations (less than 25 employees) (41.4%) or medium organizations (less than 250 
employees) (44.8%). Only 13.8% were large ones (more than 250 employees). Fifty-nine per 
cent of the organizations were dedicated to the transportation of goods and 41% to passenger 
transportation. Survey was administrated at 367 employees (drivers). In most of cases, the 
questionnaires were collected by means of group sessions during working time. In every group 
session, researchers explained the purpose of the research project and assured confidentiality. 
Nonetheless, in some organizations, surveys were sent by post together with stamped 
addressed envelopes. The survey was accompanied by an instruction letter detailing the 
purpose of the research project and the main researcher contact information. Eighty-seven per 
cent were male. Sixty per cent were between 35 and 55 years of age, 30% were less than 35 
years old, and 10% were 55 years old or over. Regarding academic level, 16.3% did not hold 
any academic title, 51.7% had completed primary education, 30.5% secondary education, and 
1.5% were university graduates. Most drivers had previous experience in the road sector 
(56.5%). 
 
2.2. Measures 
Time pressure.  Drivers’ shared perceptions on time pressure were measured using three items 
adapted from Semmer, Zapf, and Dunckel (1995; 1999). Drivers answered using a 5-point scale 
(“1. Never”, “5. Always”). An example item was “Regarding your recent work, how often do you 
feel pressured due to the lack of time?”. Cronbach’s alpha was .87.  
Psychological safety climate. Drivers’ perceptions of safety climate in the organization were 
measured using a 3 items adapted from existing questionnaires (Cox, & Cheyne, 2000; Mearns, 
Whitaker, & Flin, 2003). Items were accompanied by a 5-point rating scale, ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Sample items include “In this company safety is first 
priority”. Cronbach’s alpha was .82.   
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Burnout.  Burnout was measured using three items from the Spanish translation of the Maslach 
Burnout Inventory (MBI; Maslach & Jackson 1986). Each item corresponded to one burnout 
dimension: emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and personal accomplishment. Emotional 
exhaustion was measured with the item: ‘I feel tired when I get up in the morning and have to 
face another day at work.”. Cynicism was measured with the item: “I don’t feel interest for my 
job”. Professional efficacy was measured with the item: “I feel I work well at my job”. Responses 
to the last item was reverse-scored, so that high score indicated burnout. Respondents 
answered using a 5-point scale (1= never, 5= always). Cronbach’s alpha was .70.  
General  health. One single item measure obtained from the Work Conditions Survey (CIS, 
1997) was used to assess self-reported health (“In general, I think my health is...”). Self-
reported health was assessed using a 5 point scale ranging from 1 (Very bad) to 5 (Very good).  
 
2.3. Data Analysis 
We performed structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques. First, we tested the 
measurement model, including psychological safety climate, individual perceptions of time 
pressure, and individual burnout items. Next, we tested several competing structural models in 
order to confirm the hypothesized model (see Figure 1). First, we tested a partial mediation 
model that posited that safety climate had both direct and indirect influences on both individual 
burnout and health. Then, we compared the fit of the partial mediation model with the fit of an 
alternative model, the full mediation model, that posited that safety climate did not have a direct 
influence on both individual burnout and health. The input for the analysis was covariance 
matrix, and the method of estimation used (maximum likelihood method) assumed multivariate 
normality. In all the causal models, drivers’ age and organizational tenure were used as control 
variables (De Jonge, Janssen & Breukelen, 1996). Considering that the item distributions 
departed from normality, we computed the chi-square fit statistic corrected for non-normality. 
We also computed an absolute measure of fit, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RSMEA), and a relative measure, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Means, standard deviations and bivariate zero order correlations are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations. 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age 3.05 1.01 -      
Organizational tenure 4.55 1.58 .46** -     
Safety climate 3.67 .91 -.02 -.12** -    
Time pressure 2.72 1.05 -.09 .02 -.33** -   
Perceived health 4.04 .67 -.15** -.14** .35** -.25** -  
Burnout 2.24 .91 .00 .15** -.33** .56** -.42** - 
                                                                * p<.05; ** p<.01 
 
To test our hypotheses, a partial mediation model was tested. The partial mediation model 
showed a good fit to the data (c2 = 79.454, df = 46, SRMR= .048; RMSEA = .049; CFI = .976). 
The fit of the partial model was compared to the fit of a full mediation model (see Table 2).  The 
fit of the full model yielded worse fit indices than the partial mediation model (c2 = 90.454, df = 
48, SRMR= .053; RMSEA = .054; CFI = .969), and its SRMR and RMSEA values were 
marginally above the reference values that indicate an acceptable fit. The chi-square difference 
test confirmed that the partial mediation model provided a better fit to the data than the full 
mediation model (∆c2 = 11.000, ∆df = 2, p< .01).  
Estimated parameters are displayed in Figure 1. As expected (Hypothesis 1) safety climate 
showed a positive relationship with general health (g = 0.20, p < 0.01) and a negative 
relationship with drivers’ burnout (g = -0.15, p < 0.05). Both associations were statistically 
significant. These findings are congruent with previous theoretical arguments and empirical 
studies (Clarke, 2010; Fogarty & Buikstra, 2008; López-Araújo & Segovia, 2010; Nahrgang et 
al., 2011) that support the benefits of safety climate on employees’ wellbeing. 
As stated in hypothesis 2, time pressure was significant and negatively associated with general 
health (g = -.31, p < 0.01), and significant and positively associated with burnout (g = 0.70, p < 
0.01). These findings provide insights into previous research on the single effect of time 
pressure on employees’ wellbeing which is scarce and inconclusive (van den Tooren & de Jong, 
2014). Results are congruent with Job demands-resources (JDR) model (Bakker & Demerouti, 
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2007), and previous empirical studies that have shown job demands (Alarcon, 2011; Consiglio 
et al., 2013; Presseau et al., 2014) and workload (Alarcon, 2011; Bakker et al., 2005) to be 
detrimental for employees’ wellbeing. 
Finally, the relationship between safety climate and drivers’ health indicators was partially 
mediated by time pressure (Hypothesis 3). The estimation of the standardized indirect effect 
was .17 (p < 0.01) for general health, and -.39 (p < 0.01) for burnout. Safety climate showed a 
negative relationship with time pressure (g = -0.56, p < 0.01). These results extend previous 
research in several ways. First, to our knowledge the mediating role of time pressure in the 
relationship between psychological safety climate and employees’ wellbeing has not been 
previously explored. Second, results provide empirical evidence that supports Morgeson et al. 
(2010)’s postulates on the influence of organizational climate on job design. Results are also 
aligned with social information processing theory (Slancik & Pfeffer, 1978) that suggest that 
safety climate would make safety information more salient, and would set expectations of low 
time pressure at work because time pressure could be counterproductive for safety. 
 
Table 2 - Goodness of fit indicators of the two competing models. 
 χ2 df SRMR RMSEA 90% CI for RMSEA CFI 
1. Partial mediation 79.454 46 .048 .049 .03 - .067 .976 
2. Full mediation 90.454 48 .053 .054 .037 - .071 .969 
 
 
Figure 1. Structural equation modeling results: Partial mediation model. * p<.05; ** p<.01. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Findings support the postulated hypotheses; psychological safety climate (hypothesis 1) was 
negatively associated with poor drivers’ general health and burnout, whereas time pressure 
(hypothesis 2) was positively associated. The psychological safety climate-employees’ 
wellbeing relationship was mediated by time pressure.  
These findings are congruent with previous research and have relevant theoretical implications. 
First, results evidenced time pressure is a relevant job demand amongst professional drivers; 
and encourage future studies to address the single effect of specific job demands that are 
prominent in the work environment under study. Second, this study support Morgeson et al. 
(2010) theoretical developments on the influence of organizational climate on job design. 
Findings encourage future studies to test these postulates in different types of facet-specific 
climates. Finally, the mediating role of time pressure in the relationship between psychological 
safety climate and employees’ wellbeing sheds light into the mechanisms underlying this 
relationship. Previous research has mainly focused on the intervening variables in the 
relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes. 
In addition, this study has relevant practical implications for policy makers within the transport 
industry. Notice that professional drivers are at higher risk of poor health, thus, research on its 
antecedents is crucial. This study suggests that organizational policies fostering safety climate 
may decrease time pressure and, subsequently, contribute to employees’ wellbeing. Policies on 
safety climate are especially relevant in the transport sector. Compared to traditional work 
environments, professional drivers lack face-to-face supervisory oversight. In remote-working 
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situations psychological safety climate will become their frame of reference (Huang et al, 
2013b). 
Finally, this study has several limitations. This is a cross-sectional study based on self-reported 
data. In order to reduce common method bias, respondents’ anonymity was assured and 
different scale formats were used (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). In addition, 
burnout was measured using three items without distinguishing between its dimensions. 
 
Table 2. Goodness of fit indicators of the two competing models. 
 χ2 df SRMR RMSEA 90% CI for RMSEA CFI 
1. Partial 
mediation 79.454 46 .048 .049 .03 - .067 .976 
2. Full 
mediation 90.454 48 .053 .054 .037 - .071 .969 
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Abstract 
Introduction: The work of transport and handling of goods at the port is collectively executed 
and so it requires good coordination among workers to deal with the usual and unexpected 
situations of daily work (Dejours, 1993). Communication is fundamental so that they can cope 
with the variability of work, that is, communication is a component of the activity (Silva, Brito and 
Athayde, 2004) and are used to plan, monitor, modify, coordinate, negotiate, discuss, evaluate 
the practical action thus serves to guide the useful knowledge for the actions (Navarro, 1993). 
The strong ties built in the work in ports have a very peculiar culture. Thus, the body language 
as well as the oral are important components of maintaining health and safety at work. In many 
situations, the workers point out the importance of communication for ensuring safety at work, 
which happens to be in their own hands, supported by bonding activities (Queiroz, Moreira and 
Dalbello-Araújo, 2012). There are collective construction reports and important partnerships for 
the implementation of activities, and several indicatives insinuate the necessary familiarity with 
the universe of the port for the effectiveness of the various activities in the sector (Queiroz, 
Moreira and Dalbello-Araújo, 2012). Objective: To analyze how communication take place 
between port workers and their importance for the preservation of health and safety for 
operators. Methodology: The research is the result of a case study conducted in a port located 
north of Portugal, where the movement of goods, representing 25% of Portuguese external 
trade by sea. This port is responsible for transporting various types of loads, such as wood 
chips, scrap, glass, wind parts, verguinha, metal rollers, stone, wheat flour, containers and 
vehicles. The research included dock workers of a private company, providing services in the 
container terminal and general cargo terminal. It involved systematic observations of work 
activity on the pier and boats, completed with semi-structured interviews and individual and 
collective refunds. Individual and collective refunds served to deepen some aspects identified 
during observations, fundamental to the knowledge of subjective experiences of these workers. 
Results and Discussion: During the investigation each port worker was observed not as an 
isolated individual but inserted into working relations with other port workers, who perform other 
functions, such as boarding, stevedores, inspectors, crane operators, among others. These 
interactions among workers take place through various forms of communication: gestures, 
movements, looks, facial expressions, verbal or printed information, operative codes. In the 
observations was possible to register some forms of communication that does not necessarily 
passed through oral communication between team members (whether by the distance between 
the elements, either by noise of the machines working on the docks and in the cellars). Thus, 
there was the use of horn, in the examples of situations: 1) the port worker uses horn to inform 
traffic workers (ground) when there are locked containers preventing the landing. These, in turn, 
point to the crew (on board) through gestures and shouts, which immediately unlock the said 
container. 2) in bulk flour landing, crane operator uses a crane to transfer the ship's cargo to a 
huge funnel, in soil, where it is deposited in trucks. The traffic worker regulates the load to be 
placed in each truck using a horn to inform the driver of the truck when it has to move forward or 
when he has to leave if the load is already complete. However, if the horn is broken he hits a 
piece of iron to make himself understood. The use of gestures with upper limbs and hands 
(every gesture has a meaning) in the examples: 1) the gangway, when performing its function, 
for example the transport of verguinha, uses radio communication, but also gestures and 
movements to inform the crane operator to tell where to deposit the load or when interrupting 
the operation (fist arms or bent arms forming a cross) respecting the planning of the ship's 
officer and the safety of colleagues in the hold of the vessel, as stevedores. 2) in the transport 
of containers, the gangway, working on the ground or boarding the ship, according to the need 
and gestures tells the portico of the workers when they need to pick up or deposit any local load 
that does not allow its view, so gangway acts as the eyes of the crane operator. In this case, 
boarding gestures might include: fist up and down means container with merchandise; flat hand 
up and down is indicative of empty container. The use of oral communication, in the example of 
the situation: 1) to move enormous wind machine parts in the basement of the vessel the 
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coordinator does not see the stevedore (the other side) and has to rely on verbal information 
provided by the same, during the placement of braces which will then be hauled back out of the 
vessel by the crane worker. Conclusions: performing work activity involves the introduction of 
different ways to communicate and it is essential to rely on the information that is received and 
that is sent out. The impact of these communications is visible at several levels: the possibility of 
meeting deadlines; the quality of their work; and also for the safety of all those involved in work 
situations. There are variations in communication according to the type of load to be carried, but 
also according to the function of each team member. Communication related to security issues 
are closely related to working communication, no safety behaviors may be considered distinct 
from work behaviors. 
 
Keywords: health, safety, port worker, communication; 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The loading and unloading work in merchant ships dates to the Antiguity for the water transport 
was the first to be used commercially by humanity (Medeiros, Silveira and Dantas, 2000). In the 
huge context of port operations and complex logistic system with its variety in operations, in port 
layout, in meteorologist, labor conditions, the biomechanics factors and the operational ways of 
workers (D´Elia and Silva, 2014), the port worker performs his duties in a dangerous 
environment and, many times unhealthy, and the risks increase in relation to the load being 
around, exposing workers health to permanent danger. (Soares et al, 2008). 
 
Even the dock workers emphasize the need for team effort to conduct an activity recognized as 
of  collective work , which presupposes confidence in partners as teammates and security as 
the technical ability of each one in the activity performed ( Machin , Couto and Rossi , 2009) . 
The main form of social interaction in this collective activity is by cooperation, a consensual 
adjustment of the organization as directed. For this, those who strive to work together as a team 
need to reorganize the division of labor and human resources by creating practical rules , 
accepted and respected by all ( Dejours, 2013) . 
 
On the other hand, regulations and controls established to prevent the free interpersonal 
communication is a hinder perceived as a major limitation to freedom in the workplace 
(Seligmann -Silva, 1994). 
 
Dalbello-Araujo (2001) in a study with port workers found that the forms of gestural 
communication and mutual aid were essential to prevent many accidents from occurring while 
performing the work. Queiroz, Moreira and Dalbello-Araújo (2012) report that both the body 
language and oral are important components of maintaining health and safety at work . 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
The study is characterized as a case study and ran from January to September 2014. The 
empirical research was conducted in a public port located north of Portugal, which moves 16 
million tons of goods per year, representing 25% of Portuguese Foreign Trade by sea. The main 
types of cargo transported, which could be observed during the research included: wood chips, 
scrap glass bran, wind pieces verguinha, metal rollers, stone, wheat flour, containers and 
vehicles. 
 
There was consent to the research by the private company responsible for the management of 
labor of the designated port workers, which provides services to the container terminal and 
general load terminal. 
 
Participated effective port workers, contractors and temporary workers, who performed the 
following duties: engineer, lecturer, stevedore , gantry worker / crane operator, ground worker, 
gangway. Almost every workday, they are designated to perform different jobs, so they can be 
considered multifunctional workers. Work teams are variable with respect to the number of 
workers (between 8-11 members) and there may be several teams working simultaneously, 
depending on the amount of ship holds and loads to be moved. 
 
There were systematic observations of collective work and the different forms of communication 
in the pier area and boats. It was complemented with semi-structured interviews (made 
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immediately after the observation period ) and four individual and two collective returns (one for 
the direction of the company and the union and another for workers). 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The process and the organization of the port operations raise interactions between the subjects 
in everyday working relationships, where the various forms of communication founded the 
collective and are important to account for the variability of work in the port. This form of the port 
worker context of the organization has relations of this subject-worker with the world around and 
creates ways of thinking, acting, living in a constant process of transformation of oneself and the 
world of work. 
 
Although teams can have a varying number of members and each of the workers can be 
expected to perform a different function, these port workers work fixed for one of the companies 
providing services at the port: general load terminal and container terminal. 
 
This form of work organization can establish itself as a facilitator for the preservation of health 
and safety because they know the different elements that can make their team as well as the 
different functions that are performed. Moreover, according to Queiroz, Moreira and Dalbello-
Araújo (2012) it is the ability to stay longer together around the same activity that allows the 
building of trust and solidarity in the port. 
 
Thus, knowing their pairs and familiarity with port operations lead to forms of very subtle and 
diversified communications, integrated closely in the activity, may be shown as looks, gestures, 
movements, facial expressions, verbal information or operational codes. 
 
The strong bonds built between port workers in different forms of communications are so 
important ingredients for the maintenance of health and safety. 
 
One of the non-oral communication strategies refers to the horn of port machinery, as will be 
illustrated in the following examples: 1) the horn is used by the port worker to inform traffic 
workers (ground) when there are containers locked preventing the landing. The reaction of the 
worker on the ground is immediate: signals with gestures and shouts to the crew who are on 
board the need to unlock the said container. Only, thus, will it be possible to continue the 
unloading of load, in compliance with deadlines. But the horn could also be used by these 
professionals for the sake of security, because when moving the gantry, the noise signal acts as 
a warning to port workers in soil, seeking thereby to avoid accidents. 2) The horn is also used 
by traffic worker in bulk flour unloading, resource that belongs to the control booth of that 
operator. The product of the ship is carried by the crane operator depositing it into a huge funnel 
on the ground. Subsequently, the flour is transferred to trucks, which will lead to the storage 
area. The traffic worker regulates the load to be placed on each truck using the horn to tell the 
truck driver when he has to move forward or when the load is complete and can break. 
However, when the horn does not work, the traffic worker beats with a piece of iron in the cabin 
window to signal to drivers. Thus, this communication tool is to ensure continuity of production. 
 
Another form of communication of the port work refers to performing gestures with their arms 
and hands: 1) In the transport of verguinha (thin metal structure used for construction) the 
gangway figure, performs his duty on deck or in the hold of the ship, being away from the crane 
operator that must guide. For this orientation usually uses the radio communication, but also 
adds gestures and movements to tell the crane operator where you can /must deposit the load 
or when you must stop the operation (fist in the air or crossed arms in the form of a cross). It is 
noticed that there is on the part of a trader a concern to meet the request by the officer of the 
ship, but also to maintaining the security of colleagues on board, for example, to signal the 
location of dockers to prevent the load being placed over his fellows. Communication via radio 
is well complemented with gestures, to strengthen guidance and to confirm what was stated 
verbally. 2) In container shipping, the gangway, on the ground or on board the ship, gestures to 
inform the port workers, when they need to pick up or deposit load in any place you cannot see 
entirely or in part. The gangway works in such cases as the "eyes" of the crane operator. The 
gangway of gestures may include: fist up and down which means container with goods; flat 
hand up and down is indicative of empty container. But gestures can also be used to indicate 
other important information for crane operator like; whether it should go further to the left / right, 
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up / down, you have someone around if the pins were removed / placed in containers. In this 
sense, the gangway plays an important role not only for the quality of services provided on 
schedule, but also to preserve the health and safety of other staff members who operate and 
move in the same workspace. 
 
In addition to the use of tools like the horn and use of gestures for communication at a distance, 
oral language remains a need to achieve the team goals: 1 ) to move huge wind parts, imported 
from Germany, the coordinator works with the stevedore in the hold of the vessel. However, to 
put the straps on parts, to be hoisted, working at heights and the engineer cannot see the 
stevedore, who is in the opposite side of the part and has to rely on verbal information provided 
by him, to then inform the crane operator when it is time to carry t/he part. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In conducting the port activities there are different forms of communication, known, understood 
and used by all members of the work team. Such communications may vary according to the 
type of load to be carried and according to the function that each staff member is performing at 
that time. It is vital that there are trust bonds between the elements that make up this teamwork, 
not only for the preservation of health and safety but also in the quality of services, in 
compliance with deadlines. Communications related security issues are closely related to work 
communications, with no safety behaviors that can be considered distinct from work behaviors. 
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Abstract  
Earlier research has shown that safety resources are scarce on cargo vessels with low public 
attention, low price rates and flags with limited regulation. This study sheds light on how working 
conditions are affected by environmental stressors through qualitative data from 15 Norwegian-
owned coastal cargo vessels in three sectors. Bulk, general cargo and live fish vessels operate 
in markets with different degrees of attention, rates and regulation. In this paper their varying 
working conditions are presented. The analysis elaborate on and modify earlier research: high 
rates, attention and regulation lead to both more and less safe working conditions, because 
immaterial conditions (like time and competence making discretionary space) influence more 
than emphasized in the literature. The crews’ descriptions of their working conditions also 
indicate that a high level of regulation moderates negative environmental stressors; when 
money talks, regulation can make safety noticeable. However, market and regulation are not 
easily separated, as companies that do not afford their regulatory demands can register their 
vessels in states with lower demands. Under these circumstances, this study suggests that 
improvement of immaterial working conditions can be an affordable safety measure. Also, the 
international society or nations include more vessels in quality regulation or make sure 
customers have joint responsibility to ensure safe working conditions on sea cargo vessels. 
 
Keywords: maritime industry; working conditions; environmental stressors; market; regulation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Money talks in maritime transport. When I know which coach I want, I buy it as cheap as 
possible, so without knowing I probably choose the manufacturer with the lowest transport 
expenses. The transport market is fierce, and maritime transport most be cheapest to be 
chosen, even though it is safer than road transport (Haram, Hovi, & Caspersen, 2015). Safety 
means to control working conditions “to avoid accidental side effects causing harm to people, 
environment, or investment,” which is often complicated by conflicting priorities from the 
organization and environmental stressors (Rasmussen, 1997, p. 184). Research shows that 
safety resources are scarce on cargo vessels with low public attention (Lindøe, Engen, & Olsen, 
2011), low rates (Soma, 2004) and flags with limited regulation (DeSombre, 2008; Størkersen, 
Bye, & Røyrvik, 2011). This indicates that public, financial or regulatory pressures are drivers for 
safe conditions on the vessels, and if so that environmental stressors could be as important as 
organizational differences.  
In this paper I want to explore examples of how working conditions are affected by 
environmental stressors in Norwegian coastal cargo vessels. The goal is to advise policy 
makers and managers how safety can be afforded. The mean is to compare descriptions from 
crew on 15 Norwegian-owned coastal cargo vessels from different Norwegian sectors: bulk, 
general cargo and live fish vessels. Live fish carriers transport living salmon to and from fish 
farms, are locally registered and receive a certain amount of attention and income. Other cargo 
vessels, such as bulk or general cargo, operate with nearly no attention or profit, and, although 
Norwegian owned, many are registered in low regulation states. When transferring the 
introduced research to Norwegian-owned coastal cargo vessels, we get the assumptions that 
(1) environmental stressors such as high rates, regulation and attention (at live fish carriers) 
turns into safety resources and, thereby, safe working conditions, while (2) low rates, regulation 
and attention leads to few safety resources and unsafe conditions (for bulk and general cargo 
vessels). These assumptions are evaluated in this paper. 
To find examples on how environmental stressors influence working conditions, I present 
descriptions of Norwegian coastal cargo in Section 2; the study in Section 3; the cargo crews’ 
stories in Section 4; and then compare the working conditions, assumptions and environmental 
stressors in Section 5. This study is the first to delve so deeply into coastal cargo work. 
In contrast to the assumed explanations, the comparison shows that high level of attention, 
rates and regulation have both positive and negative influences on these vessels, as immaterial 
resources leading to discretionary space are more important than emphasized in the literature. 
Further, this study indicates that regulation – where it is present – can hinder economical 
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stressors to rule. Crew’ descriptions show that when money talks, regulation is especially 
important.  
 
2. CARGO ON THE NORWEGIAN COAST 
Maritime transport is a substantial part of Norwegian trade. In 2013, 1,344 maritime cargo 
enterprises were registered in Norway with 16,127 employees and a turnover of 18,441 billion 
USD (Statistics Norway, 2015c). This paper is concerned with coastal cargo between 
Norwegian ports, which is not easily accounted for since much activity is in private ports, and 
many vessels and crews are registered in foreign countries. Even though Norwegian registered 
vessels are highly regulated, the industry is fragmented and mostly market-driven. Every actor 
hiring sea transport services is called a charterer. The charterer directly contacts the relevant 
maritime transport companies, which normally are Norwegian controlled and have one to ten 
vessels of different sizes and flag/registration. 
It is common to divide cargo vessels into types such as general cargo and bulk vessels 
(Statistics Norway, 2015a). The vessel types operate in different markets with contracts of 
different lengths and criteria. General cargo vessels are pallet, container, roro vessels, vehicle 
carriers, etc. Bulk vessels include gas and oil tankers, chemical, food, cement, sand, etc. Some 
bulk and general cargo vessels operate a steady route over decades, for oil companies, 
governmental constructors, public cargo handlers or manufacturers. However, live fish carriers 
are atypical bulk vessels, as they often are new, Norwegian-registered and operate between 
private fish farms with sophisticated technology to keep the fish safe and alive. Live fish carriers 
are often built by a fish farmer who charters it for years. Vessels of all kinds have spot contracts 
commissioned for one voyage. For information about the life on the coastal cargo vessels, see 
Section 5. 
In Norwegian governmental ports there were 36,722 port calls in 2014 by Norwegian owned 
vessels, of which 18,040 port calls were by cargo vessels (Statistics Norway, 2015b); see 
Figure 1. Of those, 77 % were general cargo vessels. Live fish carriers and bulk vessels mostly 
go between company owned remote quays or fish farms.  
 
 
Figure 1: Number of port calls in Norwegian ports by Norwegian registered or controlled cargo vessels (Statistics 
Norway, 2015b).   
 
Although accidents in maritime transportation are fewer and with less consequences than those 
in other transport forms (Statistics Norway, 2009), the annual number of ship accidents has 
increased. Therefore measures for safe working conditions are important for everyone involved. 
Ship accidents are accidents involving a vessel, such as groundings, collisions or engine 
breakdowns (not personnel injuries). As Figure 2 shows, in 2000−2014 general cargo vessels 
were involved in 453 accidents, bulk vessels had 195 accidents and live fish carriers had 80 
accidents (Maritime Authority, 2015). Normalization has proven problematic as it is difficult to 
calculate the vessels’ activities and whereabouts (Størkersen et al., 2011). We know that 77.3% 
of the Norwegian cargo port calls in 2014 were by general cargo vessels, but we also know that 
many bulk vessels and almost all live fish carriers operate in private areas where “port calls” are 
not counted. It seems impossible to use the port and accident statistics as an indication of which 
cargo vessel type is most accident prone, but general cargo vessels had 69.9% of the bulk and 
general cargo accidents in 2000−2014. 
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Figure 2: Number of ship accidents on cargo vessels in Norwegian waters 2000−2014 (Maritime Authority, 2015). 
 
All vessels operating in Norway can be inspected by the Norwegian Maritime Authority. Vessels 
of Norwegian registration (NOR) must comply with Norwegian regulations. Norway ratifies 
international conventions, so these are included in Norwegian regulations (see Table 1 for 
examples of rules). Foreign vessels in Norwegian ports might get port state inspections that 
control whether they comply with international minimum regulation. Regulations similar to those  
mentioned in Table 1 should apply here since international regulation involves technical, 
managerial and organizational factors (ILO, 2013; IMO, 2015; Paris MOU, 2015), but in practice 
the port state inspections primarily cover technical working environment (Størkersen, 2015). 
 
Table 1: Norwegian regulation for work hours, resting periods, manning, professional competence and safety 
management. 
Work hours Regular work hours on board should be 8 hours/day. (§ 23, Norwegian Ship 
Safety Act). Exemptions are normal. 
Resting 
period 
The resting period of a day can be split in two, where one period has to be at 
least six hours. (§ 23, Norwegian Ship Safety Act) Monthly resting period forms 
are handed to the Maritime Authority. 
Manning A ship must be «manned in a safe manner» (§ 15, Norwegian Ship Safety Act). 
The company and master are to consider the need for additional manning (§12, 
Regulation of manning of Norwegian vessels) 
Professional 
competence 
The «ship master is to make sure the navigation and handling of the ship is 
done in accordance with good seamanship». (Norwegian law on navigation § 
132) 
Safety 
management 
Every vessel must have a safety management system that is adapted to its 
activities. Shipmaster and crew must contribute to the content and function of 
the safety management system. (§ 7, Norwegian Ship Safety Act, from the 
International Maritime Organization’s International Safety Management Code) 
 
3. LITERATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSORS, SAFETY AND DISCRETIONARY SPACE 
How an actor can perform tasks depends on surrounding actors. We know from Rasmussen 
(1997) that work is a part of a socio-technical system with organizational levels affected by 
environmental stressors (see in particular Figure 3). The working conditions for operational staff 
are influenced by resources provided from the management, company, etc., and directly and 
indirectly, by environmental stressors. Environmental stressors are, for example, political 
climate, public awareness, market conditions and financial pressure. Rosness, Blakstad, 
Forseth, Dahle, and Wiig (2012) introduce the understanding that an actor during work 
“receives” (faces) conditions that are intentionally or unintentionally “sent” (created) by other 
levels of the organization, in other organizations, markets, etc. In the current study, the cargo 
crews are receivers of safety resources, manning, schedules, etc., from the management and 
regulators, and of environmental stressors such as customer demands, prices, regulations from 
the market and politicians. These are conditions that indirectly affect how safely work can be 
done, through influence on discretionary space, cooperation, incentives, power, communication 
and decision-making on all levels (Rosness, 2009; Rosness et al., 2012). Thus, environmental 
stressors influence how risks of accidents can be controlled (Rasmussen, 1997; Rosness et al., 
2012). 
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In order to perform tasks, personnel receive resources from their upper levels. Yet, conditions 
related to the market often lead both managers and crews to prioritize production instead of 
safety and protection in daily work or business decisions (Hollnagel, 2009; Reason, 1997; 
Størkersen, 2012; Vaughan, 1997). Safety is sometimes left to market forces, also among 
maritime policy-makers, who leave safety regulation development paralyzed because of global 
competition, costumers' and industry's propensity to profit, and the political fear of out-flagging 
(Størkersen, 2015). In two surveys on Norwegian-owned cargo vessels, crewmembers describe 
various working conditions, frequent violations of procedures, and hazardous work due to 
efficiency demands (Fagerholt, Kongsvik, & Størkersen, 2014; Størkersen et al., 2011). 
Especially when it comes to the opportunity to rest, there are large differences between 
registration states: 61.5% of the crews on vessels with flags of convenience report to be so tired 
during work hours that it conflicts with safety, and only 4.1% of the Norwegian crewmembers 
agree (Størkersen et al., 2011).  
To actually be able to work safely, the personnel not only need material resources from the 
upper levels, but also space or agency to make decisions after their own values and 
competence. Rasmussen (1997 and earlier works) calls it a space of possibilities where the 
actors have degrees of freedom to perform the tasks after subjective preferences. Dekker 
(2012, p. 81) calls it a discretionary space that can be "filled with ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
moral choices." A certain space is necessary to be able to anticipate and understand what can 
prevent accidents and how to handle the unforeseen (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006; 
Reason, 1997). As Rasmussen and Svedung (2000, p. 5) put it: “Due to human flexibility and 
creative intellectual powers, a human organization presents a particular potential for such an 
adaptive control, given the right conditions—people are a very important safety resource, not 
only an error source.” An organization should be clear about the frames or borders for the 
discretionary space for each level, group or individual since responsibility without the space and 
authority to make decisions creates unfair double binds (Dekker, 2012). Sufficient resources 
and discretionary space can lead to safe working conditions. However, a combination of too few 
degrees of freedom and inadequate resources is common, for instance, a complex set of 
procedures or strict leadership. Too many rules and minimal freedom can lead to fear of 
sanctions and limited trust, and certainly not safer, thought-through actions [e.g., Almklov, 
Rosness, and Størkersen (2014); Bieder and Bourrier (2013); Dekker (2014); Kongsvik, 
Antonsen, and Størkersen (in review); Vandeskog (2015); Walters and Bailey (2013)]. Safe 
actions are not created by employees afraid of sanctions if they do not handle their discretionary 
space correctly, but by empowered employees involved in discussions about their own 
discretionary space (Dekker, 2012, p. 81). Therefore, the upper echelons must find a way to 
decide on the right type of resources that can lead to safe operations if paired with the right 
degrees of freedom (Grote, 2012).  
Figure 4: Environmental stressors and 
working conditions constitute the 
personnels’ discretionary space. 
Figure 3: Levels and stressors 
involved in risk management 
(Rasmussen, 1997). 
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In sum, the literature shows that environmental stressors, internal resources and discretionary 
space together constitute the working conditions in which actors can make more or less safe 
decisions (see Figure 4).  
 
4. MATERIAL AND METHOD  
This study examines working conditions on 15 vessels that mainly sail in Norwegian coastal 
waters between Norwegian ports (see Table 2). All the vessels have Norwegian owners. Ten of 
the vessels are flagged in Norway. The other five vessels are registered in Malta, Faroe Islands, 
Togo and St. Vincent Grenadines; countries that are listed on the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation’s list of Flags of Convenience, which implies that they are minimally 
regulated with the option to employ cheap global and non-union labor (ISF, 2015).  
 
Table 2: The data material. 
Vessels Vessel 
age 
Vessel size  
(BT/DWT) 
Crew 
members 
 interviewed 
Vessels NOR 
registration 
Other 
registr. 
Bulk (tank, self-
dischargers) 
1967-
2007 
522/800-
3859/4447 
17 3 2 1 
General cargo (incl. 
fodder) 
1971-
2008 
1560/1278-
4636/4380 
36 6 2 4 
Live fish carriers 1997-
2013 
458/700-
3893/5500 
17 6 6  
Total   70 15 10 5 
 
Initially, there was no intention to compare the vessel types or registration, so the selection was 
not made as a balanced comparison base, only to get perspectives from crews sailing on the 
Norwegian coast at the time of data collection.  
Data was collected as observation and interviews of 70 crewmembers in 2010 and 2013. In the 
fall of 2010, one researcher was on voyages of one to three days on ten of the vessels, where 
we participated in operations and the life on board. On board each of the ten vessels we also 
had two to four interviews with one individual or groups of the crews. The crewmembers of the 
last five vessels were interviewed at the ship-owners’ company offices in 2013. All interviews 
were semi-structured research interviews with a prepared interview guide about conditions in 
the transport industry. The quotes in Section 5 are from the interviews.  
This study is abductive, comparative and exploratory in combination. Interview transcripts and 
field diaries were manually analyzed to find patterns of similarities and differences of working 
conditions and environmental stressors. The findings from 2010 and 2013 are similar, 
suggesting only small changes in the Norwegian cargo industry the last years. There were many 
similarities between the groups, so the results are categorized in types of working conditions 
with subsections about differences in vessel types or regulation (Section 5). The discussion 
includes a descriptive section (6.1), an assumption evaluation (a light form of hypothesis testing) 
(6.2), and further exploration of the nested environmental stressors (6.3). In this paper officers 
and ratings together are called sailors or crewmembers. 
Since this study is limited, the results cannot be generalized. Yet, they give examples of working 
conditions and environmental stressors on cargo vessels in Norway and illuminate how some of 
them affect work safety. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This paper investigates how working conditions on coastal cargo vessels are affected by 
environmental stressors. Each subsection starts with a description of the working conditions, 
then group comparisons (before discussing in Section 6 how the conditions are affected by 
environmental stressors). The analysis in this section is summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Summary over working condition similarities and differences between the vessel types and regulation 
 Shared 
descriptions 
 
15 vessels  
(70 
crewmembers) 
Fish carriers 
Higher rates 
and public 
attention 
6 NOR 
vessels 
General 
cargo 
Low rates 
and public 
attention 
2 NOR + 4 
other 
Bulk 
Low rates 
and public 
attention 
2 NOR +1 
other 
All vessels with 
minimal 
regulation 
 
5 vessels 
Basic 
conditions 
(watch, 
resting and 
schedules) 
Little rest for 
personnel with 
tasks under 
sailing and ports. 
Want more 
manning or less 
work. 
Both short 
and long 
voyages. 
Short and 
frequent 
port calls, 
short 
passages, 
exhausted 
crews. 
Some relaxed 
days; 
sometimes 
longer 
voyages and 
time to rest. 
Working 
periods are 
markedly 
longer. One 
company has 
system so 
navigators get 
more rest. 
Conditions 
for sailing 
(navigation, 
engine, 
maintenance, 
reports) 
Difficult to plan 
and perform 
navigation with 
professional 
competence 
(seamanship) with 
many 
disturbances. 
Much 
disturbance 
from 
interested 
parties. 
Much 
disturbance 
from 
interested 
parties. 
More calm 
sailings due 
to few and 
silent 
charterers. 
The three 
watch company 
has no bridge 
paperwork. 
Still, many are 
too tired to 
concentrate. 
Conditions 
for ports 
(loading/ 
discharging, 
maintenance, 
reports) 
Poor ports 
conditions, so 
crews perform 
operations under 
dangerous 
circumstances. 
Practicalities 
are 
prioritized 
before safety 
to keep the 
schedule. 
Practicalities 
are 
prioritized 
before 
safety to 
keep the 
schedule. 
Few and longer 
port calls gives 
time for safe 
work in many 
situations. 
Practicalities 
are prioritized 
before safety to 
keep the 
schedule, and 
not questioned. 
Overall  Not best 
conditions of 
the vessel 
types (in 
contrast to 
ass. 1). 
Maybe 
worst 
conditions of 
the vessel 
types (like 
assumption 
2). 
Not worst 
working 
conditions (in 
contrast to 
assumption 
2). 
Worst working 
conditions in 
the data 
selection 
(like 
assumption 2). 
5.1 Basic working conditions 
The crews’ opportunity to divide their days and nights into rest and work depends largely on 
basic working conditions:  manning, frequency of port calls, amounts of maintenance, and the 
crew members’ shared competence and experience. Data material about this is presented in 
this section. On larger ships, the crews are manned so that two persons share a position during 
night and day, but on the coastal cargo vessels this is considered an unaffordable luxury. 
Usually, the officers in charge (navigators) plan work and rest for the crew when they get 
information about the next port calls. Some personnel are supposed to work under port 
operations and other personnel during voyages, and they rest when they do not work. Important 
under sailing are the navigators on navigating watch, engineers, and ratings on lookout watch. 
Important under loading and discharging are ratings, stewards, engineers or navigators working 
as machine-operators. All vessels in the study have one engineer or part time engine man on 
board. He or she often monitors the running engine and is the only one to do all maintenance 
and repairing of the engine and technical equipment. Only when they are sure that no one 
listen, some engineers talk about their situation:  
Normally I work 8 to 17 hours, but I’m on standby all the time, also standby at nighttime. 
Sometimes 16 or 24 hours when it’s necessary. I’m alone here, and sometimes it’s very 
difficult. (Engineer, general cargo, minimal regulation) 
198
Also, navigators have to work in port, either with loading or administration (more about 
paperwork in Section 5.2 Working conditions during sailing). 
It’s not always I’m able to sleep. I’ve to send and report all kinds of things; it cuts into 
the resting period. I can’t do those things under watch-keeping. And I’m the only person 
able to send it. (Navigator, general cargo, Norwegian regulation) 
Most sailors want the company to reduce administrative tasks on board or to add a crew 
member. Yet, most understand that the companies are not in a position to utilize such 
resources.  
Of course we’d want to be six men, with our sailing frequency. When everything’s okay, 
it’s okay, but some days are very hectic and things do happen. We have a continuous 
operation and things arise. (Navigator, live fish carrier, Norwegian regulation) 
5.1.1 Basic differences between regulation types 
While most Norwegian-registered vessels have working periods of four weeks, most vessels 
with other flags have working periods of four months or more. Especially the crews on the 
limited-regulated vessels in this study have much unpaid overtime, stress and noncompliance 
with resting periods. They describe accumulated sleep deficiency. One master at a limited-
regulated vessel says: 
Every month you get more tired. The first month each crewmember is 10 % tired. The 
second month you’re 25 % tired, the third month you’re 45 % tired and the fourth month 
you’re 60 % tired. That gives a lot of risk. I’m nervous about the human factor. We need 
to know more. (Navigator, general cargo, minimal regulation) 
These crews seldom complain about the long working periods and fatigue since it is normal and 
many have short working contracts that they want to get renewed. 
Many minimal regulated vessels have low food fares since they are expected to take in 
supplies in low-cost areas, so foodstuff can be scarce some periods. Most of the vessels are old 
and have outdated technology and equipment. They are often in need of repairs, but have low 
maintenance budgets. However, note that most bulk and general cargo vessels – regardless of 
regulation – are old, with minimal rates mostly covering fuel and regular expenses. 
 
5.1.2 Basic differences between vessel types 
Another difference is that the vessel types have substantially different voyage lengths. The bulk 
vessels in this study (one tank ship and two self-dischargers) have few port calls per day, some 
over-night stays and relatively long sailings in between. They usually can rest several times 
during the day, although the resting periods can be short here too. 
We usually have six hours or more continuous resting period, but it can be three or four. 
(Crewmember, bulk vessel, Norwegian regulation) 
On the other end of the scale is general cargo, with several port calls per day and primarily short 
sailings in between. This often results in much stress and administration, brief resting periods 
and too little sleep with the accumulated sleep deficiency described last section. Live fish 
carriers also have short sailings and much stress in periods. 
 
5.2 Working conditions during sailing 
In the interviews, the crews report that most important under sailing is professional competence 
and opportunities to plan and work without disturbances, and this is what this section is about.  
During sailing, the navigator needs discretionary space, but many of the navigators do 
not appear to have the time or the freedom to navigate according to their professional criteria 
because of numerous administrative tasks and disturbances. All navigators in our study say 
they have to answer phones and email, and do much administrative work while on watch-
keeping duty, but the amount of time under navigation is different between the vessel types, as 
we will see in next subsection. Generally, a small part of the administration is valued positively 
(for example electronic reporting of rest period forms), but paper work is most considered 
negative. Administrative tasks are seen as indifferent for the operations, only distorting the real 
work, without a natural position on board.  
The problem is that no one sees the use [of paperwork]. And that reflects on the 
motivation. It’s meaningless, only filling out forms. (Navigator, general cargo, Norwegian 
regulation) 
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The “useless” administrative tasks lead to a division between professional competence – 
seamanship – and paperwork. The administration makes the sailors unable to fulfill what they 
view as their core tasks. 
My job’s to take care of the cargo and the vessels, but I’m a safety officer and fire chief, 
loading and discharging man, and partly purchasing manager and flushing out that Al 
Qaida. Oh, yes, and I’m to steer the boat. (Navigator, bulk vessel, Norwegian 
regulation) 
As mentioned, navigators often have to choose between doing paperwork during resting periods 
or during voyages. Most navigators oppose doing it under navigation, especially in coastal 
waters, since it is easy to lose track of the navigation. Some say in interviews that they 
sometimes discover that they have done reporting for a long time without looking out or paying 
attention to the sailing. This is viewed as bad seamanship and considered very risky. Several 
navigators report that they would rather use their entire resting period once a week to fulfill 
administrative duties.  
About documentation, I often must take a free watch to do it. It might be because of my 
structure, but it lets me work in peace. I can sit with my back against the view. 
(Navigator, general cargo, Norwegian regulation) 
 
5.2.1 Differences between regulation types during sailing 
The low regulated vessels with three watch system for their navigators are also special when it 
comes to administration; when they have three navigators on each vessel, paperwork can be 
done by an officer on administrative watch. This ship-owner deliberately does not have office 
stations on its vessels’ bridges.  
Still, the majority of the crews on these and other vessels with limited regulation 
emphasize that they are too sleepy to concentrate properly some weeks into their working 
period. 
 
5.2.1 Differences between vessel types during sailing 
We know that more frequent port calls and shorter sailings mean more paperwork and less time 
to do it. Some of the masters in this study describe a minimum of two hours administrative work 
per port call. Our three bulk vessels have fewer port calls and longer voyages than the general 
cargo and live fish carriers, so the bulk vessel navigators complain less about administration.  
The bridge is a communication hub in the chain of logistics, and especially general 
cargo vessel crews describe their bridge as a joint hotel reception and a staff recruitment 
agency, in addition to a place for safe navigation. As we have seen, the navigator’s 
concentration is often interrupted during sailing. A large part of the work load for navigators on 
live fish and general cargo vessels consists of dialogue with charterers, ship-company, pilot, 
government and other sailors, about cargo and personnel logistics.  
We have to deal with someone above us. The client has a tendency to call here, and if 
the information flow is slow it’s easy to make a slip, to promise more than we can keep. 
We can do that, and the company also can do that. It goes both ways. But we’re aware 
over where we’re in the system, and we do what we can to get to everything we’re 
ordered to. Of course, we often would want more time to prepare it all, but that’s not 
how it is. (Navigator, live fish carrier) 
Interviewees explain that the number of actors involved fragments their responsibility and 
complicates their planning. 
In a situation during our field study, four alternative voyage plans were discussed and 
negotiated between three charterers, the ship-owner and the ship master. To reach a 
conclusion on the voyage plan, these actors’ preferences were important, in addition to 
regulations and keeping the time schedule. The master sighed and explained: 
You say that the master is responsible of the ship, but it’s not as easy as that. 
(Navigator, live fish carrier) 
In significant contrast to the live fish carriers and general cargo vessels, the bulk vessel 
navigators report that their charterers and costumers seldom “bother” them during navigation 
and planning. Although the bulk vessel navigators get some phone calls and do have their 
share of administrative tasks, they report that a manageable number of charterers and 
management personnel want to get ahold of them.  
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5.3 Working conditions in port operations 
This section deals with the need for resources such as equipment and manning, and the crew 
members’ improvisation when the environmental stressors are not adequate.  
Many Norwegian ports are improved to satisfy security regulations, but still are without 
light, moorings or personnel. When they are also exposed to rough weather, it becomes difficult 
to set fast the vessel, not to mention to load or discharge safely. Similar conditions can be 
expected on fish-farm rafts or netcages, but they mostly have lights and sometimes manning. If 
a vessel operate large ports they get to throw the moorings to terminal operators that set the 
vessel fast, but a large part of the cargo vessels’ port calls happens without help on poorly 
equipped quays. 
Many places the quay doesn’t fit our size. The boats have gotten larger and larger, but 
the ports are not changed. (Crewmember, general cargo, Norwegian regulation) 
The sailors in this study put in much effort to keep the schedule. Practically all the interviewed 
crewmembers reveal that they do short cuts to keep the schedule, especially when they come 
alongside unmanned quays or fish-farm rafts. If no one is at the quay, they have to jump from 
the vessel to be able to do the mooring. Crewmembers who are conscious about the 
procedures say they are not supposed to leave the vessel before it is made fast, but this is 
sometimes impossible. They underline that accidents seldom happen, but one sailor says he 
has fallen in the water between the quay and the vessel. When asked if the procedures say 
anything about entering unmanned quays, he says: 
Yes, I guess they do, but we still have to do what we have to do. (Crewmember, bulk 
vessel, Norwegian regulation) 
Often the crewmembers also go through with loading and discharging even though they 
experience the operations as unsafe due to stress, sleepiness, scarce manning or worn-out 
equipment. Most of the sailors describe situations where they wished to stop, but did not to keep 
the schedule and not create economical loss for the company. They comprehend their 
companies’ weak financial situation and choose to compromise with their own feelings of safety 
to keep the schedule and the business going. 
It’s about the equipment you have to help yourself with and that the margins are so 
small before something happens. So you go further than you should, yes, you do. 
(Navigator, live fish carrier, Norwegian regulation) 
A few sailors say that they have stopped operations because of harsh weather:  
If [our charterer] doesn’t get fodder [our company] gets fines. So you almost feel it’s 
your fault if you don’t try to approach. We say no in the end, but we have in our minds 
that we must try so they don’t run empty. (Crewmember, general cargo, Norwegian 
regulation) 
Interest from the charterer about working conditions and reporting systems to learn between the 
vessels is not described on any vessel, even though the hard working conditions generate 
injuries and sick leave. As two coworkers describe: 
[Our charterer] is not very engaged in the things that happen onboard the boats, but it 
would’ve been nice to have something like that [reporting and learning about accidents] 
on the boats, if something is similar across the boats, for example. (Crewmember, 
general cargo, Norwegian regulation) 
For example, could we have seen the reason for all the sick leaves on the boats, maybe 
opened the eyes and seen that something has to be done.  (Crewmember, general 
cargo, Norwegian regulation) 
 
5.3.1 Differences between regulation types in port operations 
The unsafe working conditions associated with port operations are emphasized on vessels from 
all the branches and with all types of regulation in this study.  
However, awareness about safety and possible risk prevention varies. The feeling that 
safety is degraded is most substantial on vessels with minimal regulation, but here the efficiency 
demands and possible measures are seldom questioned. The notion that practicalities are 
prioritized before safety and that this could have been avoided is stronger on Norwegian 
regulated vessels. 
It’s clear that it’s many assignments we’ve taken, that we, from my point of view, 
obviously should’ve said no to. It can be because of the conditions, too bad weather so 
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the margin you have if something happens … [When we have taken the assignment …] 
no matter the conditions, it’s expected that we do it. (Navigator, live fish carrier, 
Norwegian regulation) 
Crews with long contracts and strict regulation are used to being a part of their organizations’ 
decision making, and they want to be able to give their opinion to charterers too, although this 
co-decision-making between organizations is not common in coastal cargo. 
Much of the small accidents could’ve been avoided if we could participate in the 
decisions. With 100 meter longer tubes we could’ve saved many operations. 
Cooperation between [the costumer] and the supplier would’ve been for the best. 
(Crewmember, general cargo with some fodder in bulk, Norwegian regulation) 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
In light of the foregoing descriptions, I will now discuss how environmental stressors affect the 
working conditions on these coastal cargo vessels, and how safety resources can be increased.  
Generally, with the terminology of  Rasmussen (1997) and Rosness et al. (2012), the crews 
express how they face conditions that are primarily created or shaped by the upper levels of the 
safety management chain, such as their management, owners and regulators, but that they also 
get input directly from charterers and the public – and preserve their conditions themselves 
through their work and acceptance of the situations. The empirical data further suggests that the 
upper levels receive strong influence from each other and the environmental stressors of market 
and financial pressure, which they translate and send further to the sharp end of the 
organization as their working conditions. This is consistent with earlier research of maritime 
regulators and company management that also show how they are heavily influenced by 
economics, in addition to politics and the public (Almklov et al., 2014; Lindøe et al., 2011; Soma, 
2004; Størkersen, 2015). 
6.1 Similarities in the working conditions 
The studied crews express how they need immaterial and material resources to have safe 
working condition. For example, to safely make sailing plans the navigators need material 
resources such as functional technology, but as important are immaterial resources such as 
competence, procedures, information and time. Another example is when the crewmembers 
need to jump from the moving vessel to the quay, they could have needed material resources 
such as terminal personnel or equipment, but a safe alternative could include immaterial 
alternatives such as time and possibility to follow regulations and rather abort the operation. 
Both material and especial immaterial resources are important to have discretionary space to 
make safe decisions. Often all types of resources are scarce, which is a common phenomenon 
(Reason, 1997; Vaughan, 1997) that Dekker (2012) describes as unfair double binds.  
Most of the interviewed crewmembers have some kind of respect of their companies' resource 
saving instead of spending on safety measures. The crews ambiguously report of time pressure 
and a wish to increase the company's profit by performing operations fast without delays – 
either they are on a vessel in a sector with little or much attention, high or low prices, or less or 
more regulation. This is in line with survey results from some of the same crews, where a third 
of the crewmembers say they experience situations where they put themselves in danger to get 
the job done, and 40 and 36.5% admit to often violate procedures to get the job done, especially 
because of efficiency demands (Størkersen et al., 2011). In this sense, the personnel safety is 
given a lower priority than the economical investments in daily situations; the crews are efficient 
instead of making safe decisions to thoroughly avoid all side effects (Hollnagel, 2009; 
Rasmussen, 1997, p. 184). All the crews interviewed in this current study say they often choose 
production before protection (as it is put by Reason, 1997), although earlier research of live fish 
carrier loading operations show that it is easier to stop operations with reference to their live 
product, which also protects the personnel (Størkersen, 2012). 
6.2 Differences in working conditions – evaluating the assumptions 
Even if the crews on the different vessels emphasize similar aspects of the working conditions, 
the groups are affected if different degree (see Table 3 at the start of Section 5 for a summary). 
Most important for basic and port conditions are contracts and port frequency, while sailing 
conditions vary after disturbances. In Section 1 two assumptions about vessels working 
conditions are presented based on earlier research: (1) the live fish carriers might have 
relatively safe working conditions, and (2) the bulk and general cargo vessels of Norwegian or 
other registration might have more unsafe working conditions. 
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As supposed in the first assumption, the empirical analyses in Section 5 display that the vessels 
with high rates, regulation and/or attention often have better material working conditions than 
the others. The live fish carriers have better equipment and are newer than most bulk and 
general cargo vessels since they are made by a rich industry. However, better material 
conditions do not automatically result in safer working conditions. The live fish carriers also have 
charterers and managements with high demands of efficiency and high expectations of 
communication with the navigators during navigation. In addition, Norwegian-regulated vessels 
are certified with safety management systems, that often leads to much administration on the 
vessels [more about this in, for example, Almklov et al. (2014); Kongsvik et al. (in review)]. It is 
difficult to use ones competence to plan and perform navigation with many disturbances, so 
immaterial conditions are inadequate on live fish carriers. A simplified overview is made as an 
illustration in Figure 5. 
The same conclusion goes for the second assumption (that low regulation, attention and rates 
lead to worse conditions): It seems to be correct with regard to accessibility of material 
resources and wrong because immaterial aspects are at least as important for the working 
conditions. The studied bulk and general cargo vessels are often old with outdated technology, 
low maintenance budgets, low food fares and few or non-existing support personnel on shore. 
However, on the low paid bulk vessels, the disadvantages also go hand-in-hand with benefits 
not accounted for in the assumptions; longer voyages and port calls and less interruptive 
customers give freedom for the crews to concentrate on tasks, and to rest. Such discretionary 
space is important to make safe decisions, that potentially also comply with procedures (Dekker, 
2012; Rosness, 2009, etc.).  
There also are large differences between the vessels affected by the second assumption. 
Compared to the crews on Norwegian-regulated vessels, the sailors on the vessels with low 
regulation say they are more tired and have more stressful days. (This difference is established 
through statistical analysis as well (Størkersen et al., 2011).) On the interviewed Norwegian-
registered vessels, the crews tell they have long contracts with employers and more often 
demand safety resources from the managements, alert the management of unsafe conditions, 
or abort unsafe operations. Both the current qualitative and the earlier quantitative data 
therefore indicate that the crews on the low regulation vessels operate within worse structures in 
terms of too much work and too little rest for long working periods. The regulation differences 
seem to be general across the sectors of bulk and general cargo vessels, and the variance is 
even larger compared to the all Norwegian-regulated live fish carriers. All in all, the differences 
in working conditions might be larger between regulation than between vessel types/industry 
branch, or with regulation in combination with low cargo rates and minimal attention.  
This evaluation shows that both assumptions are partly wrong because immaterial aspects, 
such as number of port calls and length of voyages, seem to be more significant than previously 
assumed. In contrast to the assumptions, the data comparison suggests that poor economy and 
low attention can be both positive and negative for safe working conditions, but that minimal 
regulation is basically negative: Regulation seems to be an important environmental stressor for 
safety. This gives a foundation to discuss the relationship between the environmental stressors 
important for the studied vessels.  
 
6.3 Nested environmental stressors 
In the small selection of this study (see Table 2), the safety resource level in general are higher 
on the vessels with Norwegian registration than on the vessels registered in other states. Some 
differences seem to be results of different regulation of those vessels. Regulation can be viewed 
as an environmental stressor because it is mainly made by politicians and the industry 
(Størkersen, 2015). The safety regulation and inspection regime is stricter for the Norwegian-
registered vessels. Other studies have shown that comprehensive regulation serves to heighten 
some safety resource levels (Knapp & Franses, 2009; Kongsvik et al., in review) and make the 
gap even larger to low regulation states that implement international conventions minimally or 
not at all (DeSombre, 2008; Knudsen & Hassler, 2011). On the other side, regulation can be 
associated with less safe conditions if it is not adapted to the work context (Grote, 2012) and 
rather leads to proceduralization that reduces the crews’ discretionary space to act according to 
competence (for example Almklov et al., 2014; Bieder & Bourrier, 2013; Dekker, 2014; Kongsvik 
et al., in review). This study’s data material does not include the ship-owners’ reasons for 
choosing minimal regulation, but it is not surprising if it is related to low rates and little public 
attention. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say how important regulation is as long as companies 
have the option of choosing registration states, and thereby regulation type. One can say, 
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though, that in spite of extreme market forces in the maritime industry – and that regulation and 
market stressors are nested – regulation plays an important role for sure. 
Market is the most directly mentioned environmental stressor in the cargo crew descriptions. 
Market-related industrial differences can be another reason for the unequal working conditions 
on the vessels in this study. Market aspects might be a reason for the ship-owners’ out-flagging, 
and industrial conditions also can directly reduce the managements’ financial potential to 
implement safety measures. For example, the bulk vessel crews recognize that their rates do 
not leave room for more than their fuel and regular expenses. Even if ship owners moved their 
vessels to Norwegian registers, they might not have the option of raising the rates and earn 
enough to heighten the safety level. We also know that the regulation is severely influenced by 
industry and market forces (Størkersen, 2015), so the borderlines are blurry, and it is difficult to 
say if it is really regulation or market stressors that most influence the working conditions on 
cargo vessels in Norway. Some of this complex relationship is illustrated in Figure 5. Therefore, 
this investigation can only state that market and regulation affect the working conditions 
severely, not whether regulation trumps market stressors with its safety demands or if 
Norwegian regulated vessels just operate where market stressors allow for safe working 
conditions.  
 
 
Figure 5. Possible relations between environmental stressors and working conditions on Norwegian live fish carriers. 
 
7. MONEY TALKS, BUT SAFETY COULD SHOUT 
In this paper I have explored the influence of environmental stressors on working conditions in 
Norwegian coastal cargo and found that market forces affect safe working conditions both 
positively and negatively, but that regulation – where it is present – can hinder economical 
stressors to rule. This study is the first to delve so deeply into the details of the Norwegian 
coastal cargo work. The text began with assumptions based on earlier research results (Lindøe 
et al., 2011; Soma, 2004; Størkersen et al., 2011): that cargo vessels in sectors of high 
attention, price rate and regulation (live fish carriers) might have safe working conditions, while 
vessels in sectors of low attention, rate and/or regulation (bulk and general cargo vessels) might 
have less safe working conditions. An analysis of the crews’ working conditions shows that the 
assumptions were partly wrong because immaterial resources that give the crews discretionary 
space (such as time and concentration) are more important for the working conditions on these 
vessels than is emphasized in the literature. As the studied vessels with less regulation are 
more exposed to the market stressors of low rates, minimal resources, fast pace and 
accompanying lack of discretionary space, they have the worst working conditions. 
The results can be used as examples of how environmental stressors can influence maritime 
working conditions and how important it is to allow for crews’ discretionary space. Not least, the 
results can empower actors that struggle to make maritime safety a priority. Managers now 
know that discretionary space is an important safety measure that they can provide for the 
crews without going bankrupt: Time to rest, calm and competency to make safe decisions are 
not free, but possible to consciously accumulate over time without large financial investments. 
Policy makers and customers – the public – are in charge of the conditions most important for 
the crews’ work safety: Regulation, rates, and attention. Customers can show willingness to pay 
for cargo services provided by companies that implement safety measures. When I buy a 
coach, I can demand to know how it is transported, and thereby create a pressure for social 
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responsible corporations to invest in safe transportation. Since regulation can heighten the 
safety resources, regulators and policy makers can work for transport companies to be able to 
choose – or be forced to use – high-quality regulation. As long as it is possible to register a 
vessel in a state where it is not operating, policy makers can implement joint responsibility so 
transport costumers and charterers are made responsible for the crews’ conditions. The 
traditional power struggle is turned; the people are costumers, voters and pressure groups. We 
can raise safety levels and make safety unneglectable. 
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Abstract 
International institutions, as the European Commission, have enhanced the importance of the 
inclusion of occupational health and safety awareness in the academic programs at University. 
In this sense, member states of the European Union have developed occupational health and 
safety strategies that include educational issues at the university level. In the case of Spain, the 
integration of occupational risk prevention contents in the academic programs at university titles 
was included in the national occupational health and safety strategy for the period 2010-2012. 
This work has the aim to include a basic knowledge of occupational health and safety in the 
academic curriculum of the students of the High Technical Engineering School of the University 
of Seville (ETSI). The inclusion of occupational health and safety contents in the engineering 
degrees allows to promote an occupational risk prevention culture in the future for both 
employees and employers. To do this, the Chair of Occupational Risk Prevention of the 
University of Seville offers a new optative subject titled Analysis and Prevention of Occupational 
Risk to the students. 
The subject consists of a training program that meets the requirements set out in the RD 
39/1997 Spanish regulation. It consists of five modules: (I) basic concepts of occupational 
health and safety; (II) general risks, description and prevention; (III) specific risks, description 
and prevention in the industrial sector, (IV) basic tools for risks prevention management and (V) 
first aid. After passing the course, the students get an official title on basic occupational risk 
prevention. This title will allow the students to assume some rules in occupational risk 
prevention. E.g. they will assume, both as worker or employer, the risk managements in a small 
company. 
The teaching process was design under a practice paradigm. The theoretical knowledge and 
the tools presented are employed in practical lessons. Teachers have a high qualification in 
Industrial Safety, Hygiene, and Human Factors. The subject program includes seminaries with 
external professional experts and technical visits to industrial plants. Students have to pass 
several partial tests throughout the course. Also, to get the official title, they have to attend 80% 
of classes at least. 
The subject was offered to the students of four different degrees of the ETSI (Industrial 
Technology Degree, Civil Engineering Degree, Chemical Engineering Degree and Aerospace 
Engineering Degree), at the 2013-2014 course, and 58 students chose it. At the 2014-2015 
course, the subject was included in the programme of three degrees more (Energy Engineering 
Degree, Management Engineering Degree and Telecommunication Engineering Degree) and 
129 students chose it. A pass ratio of 99% was observed at both academic courses. Regarding 
the first four degrees in which the subject was offered, an enhancement of 72.4 % is observed 
in the number of students. Attending this results, it can be concluded that the basic occupational 
health and safety awareness training subject is being successfully implemented in the different 
engineering degrees of the ETSI.   
 
207
Key words: Risks prevention culture, basic risks prevention knowledge, engineering degree 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last years, occupational accidents have been reduced in the countries members of the 
European Union as consequence of the improvement in both production process and the 
occupational risk prevention management. Figure 1 show the Incidence Index by productive 
sectors in Spain in 2007 and 2013 [GS, 2007, GS, 2013]. It can be see a significate reduction of 
the accident in all the productive sectors but the agricultural. But also is shown that accidents 
still happen in all of them.   
 
 
Figure – 1. Incidence Index by productive sectors in Spain in 2007 and 2013.  
 
In order to reduce the accidents, two different approaches have been used by companies and 
administrations. The technical improvement of both the process and the safety tools have 
involved a big reduction of the number of occupational accidents. But this approach need to be 
complemented with the promotion of an occupational risk prevention culture in all levels of the 
company [ISSA, 2015; Iberdrola, 2015; UPC, 2014; FIOH, 2013; DGUV, 2012; EASHW, 2011]. 
In [Reason, 1997] four characteristics are described for a positive safety culture of an 
organization:  
1. A reporting and informed culture. People readily report problems, errors and near misses.  
2. A just culture. Justice and reliable information generates credibility and confidence. 
Everybody knows what is acceptable or unacceptable behavior.  
3. A flexible culture. The culture have to allow adaptation to changing conditions or new 
requirements.  
4. A learning culture. People want to improve the occupational health and safety, and have the 
capacity to reflect on their own behavior and that of others. 
It is clear that, to reach each of these characteristics, a minimum knowledge about occupational 
health and safety is required for all the member of the organization. The intensity of this 
knowledge will depend on the responsibilities in this area. 
With the aim to reach a 25 % reduction in the total incidence rate of accidents at work by 2012, 
the European Commission published in 2007 the Community strategy 2007-2012 on health and 
safety at work [EC, 2007]. The integration of health and safety into education and training 
programmes was included in this strategy as a tool for promoting changes in behaviour. 
According to this strategy, a risk prevention culture should be developed in training programmes 
at all levels of education, including at university.  
In the case of Spain, the integration of occupational risk prevention contents in the academic 
programs at university titles was included in the national occupational health and safety strategy 
for the period 2010-2012 [GS, 2010]. But in this strategy, only the specific titles directly related 
with the occupational health and safety are included. In the region of Andalusia, the necessity of 
general improvement of the occupational health and safety training at University was included in 
the occupational health and safety strategy for the period 2010-2014 [GA, 2010]. 
In this framework, the Chair of Occupational Risk Prevention of the University of Seville was 
created in 2010 with the support of the Government of Andalusia. One of the main objectives of 
the Chair is to introduce a risk prevention culture in the young students. This is done with the 
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aim that these students will promote in the future, as employees or employer, good practices 
and behaviours in their companies or work places, spreading the preventive culture. With this 
object, the chair promotes teaching, research and dissemination activities in the field of 
occupational health and safety.  
On other hand, the skills and formation required for the exercise of preventive functions, is 
regulated in Spain in the RD 39/1997 [GS, 1997]. The preventive capacities and the required 
formation for theses are divided in three level: basic (50 hours training), intermedium (300 hours 
training at least) and superior (60 hours at least). 
In order to promote an occupational risk prevention culture in the university students, this work 
is focus on the inclusion of a basic occupational health and safety awareness training for 
engineering degree students. To do this, the Chair of Occupational Risk Prevention of the 
University of Seville offers to the students of the Haigh Technical Engineering School (ETSI) a 
new optative subject titled Analysis and Prevention of Occupational Risk. Passing the course, 
the students get the Basic Level Accreditation in Occupational Risk Prevention. Holding this title, 
these future employees and employers will have the competencies listed below [GS, 1997]:  
a) Promotion of: safe behaviours, correct use of both occupational and protective equipment 
b) Promotion, monitoring and control of the basis risk prevention strategies as: order, 
cleanliness, signage and general maintenance   
c) Collaboration in the Occupational Risk Assessment of the Company by visiting the 
occupational places, addressing complaints and suggestions, data registration and others 
activities. 
d) Management of the firsts actions in emergency case and first aid 
e) Cooperation with the Occupational Health and Safety Services 
f) In this work, the academic program for the new subject offered is described. Also the 
teaching methodology and the evaluation system. Finally, the results obtained in number of 
student that selected de subject and the pass ratio were analysed for the first two courses 
in which the subject was offered. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The subject was designed from a practice point of view and including all the topics required in 
the Spanish legislation for the Basic Level accreditation in occupational risk prevention: (1) 
basic concepts of occupational health and safety; (2) general risks, description and prevention; 
(3) specific risks, description and prevention in the industrial sector, (4) basic tools for risks 
prevention management and (5) First aid [GS, 1997]. After pass the course, the students get an 
official title on Basic Occupational Risk Prevention. This tithe will allow the students to assume 
some rules in occupational risk prevention. E.g. they will can assume, both as worker or 
employer, the risk managements in a small company. 
Initially, the subject was offered to students of four different engineering degrees of the ETSI in 
the course 2013-2014: Industrial Technology Degree, Civil Engineering Degree, Chemical 
Engineering Degree and AED Aerospace Engineering Degree. In the course 2014-2015, the 
subject was included in the programme of three engineering degrees more: Energy Engineering 
Degree, Management Engineering Degree and Telecommunication Engineering Degree.  
The teacher team consists of University teachers and external professionals. Teachers for 
topics related to Safety, Hygiene and Human Factors have high qualification in both engineering 
and occupational health and safety. For topics related to Occupational Medicine and First aid, 
teachers are experienced medicine professionals.   
To pass the subject, the students have to assist to the 80 % of the classes at least. Also they 
have to pass the partial exams with a score of 5 over 10 at least. These exams consist of two 
sections. First one, focused on the theoretical knowledge about the topic, based on both 
multiple election and short question.  In the second one, the students have to solve a practical 
case. To solve the case, they have to do a basic risk assessment, including the necessary 
preventive actions.  
The subject consist of 50 hours distributed in five theoretical modules, practice classes and one 
technical visit. The content of the course is showed below. 
 
• Module I. Basic concepts of occupational health and safety (6 hours classroom)  
This module consists of a description of the normative framework and legislation in the matter of 
occupational health and safety. Both basic concepts and definitions included in the Spanish 
legislation are introduced to the students. Also a brief description of the focus of the different 
disciplines involved in occupational health and safety are included. These disciplines are: Safety, 
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Hygiene, Human factor and Ergonomics, and Occupational medicine. The module consists of 
two themes: 
o Theme 1: Basic normative framework in the matter of prevention of risks at work. Rights and 
obligations 
o Theme 2: Introduction to occupational health and safety 
• 2.1. Health and work. Basic concepts  
• 2.2. Damages relates to work 
§ 2.2.1. Occupational accidents. Safety   
§ 2.2.2. Occupational diseases. Hygiene  
 
• Module II. General risks and their prevention (17 hours classroom)   
In this module, both the most typical risks and some tools for the prevention and control of them 
are introduced to the students. Risks are identified according to their origin. Depending on the 
factor that promotes the risk, each risk is studied under one of the different four disciplines cited 
before. For example: same level fall, fall from eight and electrical risk in safety; chemical, 
physical and biological risks in hygiene; burnt out stress and occupational fatigue in human 
factors; musculoskeletal disorders in ergonomics. Some tools for risk prevention and control are 
included. At the end of the module, the occupational medicine is showed by an external 
professional in this matter. The module consists of next six themes: 
o Theme 3: Risks related to safety 
• 3.1. General risks  
• 3.2. Relevant risks (electrical, machine related, fall from height, etc.)  
o Theme 4: Occupational environmental risks   
• 4.1. Chemical risks (I) 
• 4.2. Chemical risks (II)  
• 4.3. Physical risks 
• 4.4. Biological risks  
o Theme 5: Risk related to psychosocial and ergonomic factors   
• 5.1. Ergonomic risks  
• 5.2. Psychosocial risks 
o Theme 6: Risk control systems. Collective and personal protection 
o Theme 7: Emergency and evacuation plan 
o Theme 8: Workers health control 
 
• Module III. Specific risks management in Industry (6 hours classroom) 
This module consist of five sessions. Each session is focused in the specific risks of one 
different industrial sector. The sessions are conducted by experimented professionals and 
include cases of real companies. The industrial sectors have been selected taking into 
consideration the different degrees of the students. 
o Session 1. Specific risks management in the aeronautic sector 
o Session 2. Specific risks management in the civil work sector 
o Session 3. Specific risks management in the electrical sector 
o Session 4. Specific risks management in the mechanical sector 
o Session 5. Specific risks management in the chemical sector 
 
• Module IV. Basic knowledge on occupational risk management (3 hours classroom)  
This module is mainly focused on the requirements for the management systems included in the 
Spanish normative. The occupational risk management system proposed in OHSAS 18001 is 
described. Also national and international institutions related to the occupational health and 
safety are presented. The module consists of two themes: 
o Theme 9: Institutions and Organizations related to occupational health and safety   
o Theme 10: Occupational risk prevention management systems and their auditory  
 
• Module V. First aid workshop (6 hours) 
This module covers first aid basics such as choking, bleeding and CPR. Teachers are expert 
professional of heath and first aid. The workshop includes theoretical and practical training. 
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• Practical classes (6 hours classroom) 
Consists of four 1.5 hours classroom sessions. A different practical case must be solved in each 
session. The students have to do a basic risk assessment. It has to include the risk control 
strategies in order to reduce the more important risks to acceptable values. 
 
• Oil refinery visit (6 hours) 
Students are brought to a real oil Refiner. There, an Occupational Health and Safety manager 
shows them most interesting aspect about risk prevention and control in this kind of industrial 
facility. In this way, students can be see a real use of the acquired knowledge before along the 
course.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 1 shows the number of students by degree for the two courses that the subject has been 
offered. The total number of students increased from 58 in the course 2013-2014 to 129 in the 
course 2014-2015. This represents an increase of 122 %. Regarding on the first four degrees in 
which the subject was offered, an increase of 72.4 % is observed in the number of students. 
This increase is mainly due to the high increase of the number of student of the Industrial 
Technology Degree that chose the subject. The number of student of the Industrial Technology 
Degree is approximately four times the number of student of the rest of degrees in the ETSI, so 
the capacity of increase respect to the first year was higher for this degree. No significant 
changes can be observed in el number of students of the other three degrees in which the 
subject was offered firstly. 
 
ITD (Industrial Technology Degree), CED (Civil Engineering Degree), CHED (Chemical Engineering Degree), AED 
(Aerospace Engineering Degree), EED (Energy Engineering Degree), MED Management Engineering Degree, TED 
(Telecommunication Engineering Degree. 
Figure 2 - Evolution of the number of students by academic course and by degree. 
 
Figure 2 shows the scores obtained by the students in the courses 2013-2014 (left) and 2014-
2015 (right). The pass rate in both courses was of 99 % and 88 % respectively. It represents a 
decrease of 11 % in the pass rate. But regarding to the students that followed the subject until 
the end, by suppressing the 11 % that correspond to not taken, the pass rate for the course 
2014-2015 was of 99 % again. Also it can be observed the high quality of the scores, most of 
them higher than C in both courses. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Scores obtained by the students in the courses 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Attending the exposed results, it can be concluded that the basic occupational health and safety 
awareness training subject is being successfully implemented in the different engineering 
degrees of the ETSI. The engineering students of the ETSI have shown a great interest for the 
subject, getting high scores.  
It is expected that the promotion of the preventive culture in the engineering students, by 
offering of the subject described in this job, will help to create a general culture that values 
health and risk prevention. 
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Abstract    
This study explores commitment to a Zero Accident Vision (ZAV) in 27 companies, located in 
seven countries. We used a questionnaire to asses both how people perceive the commitment 
of the organisation, and how they are committed to ZAV themselves. In addition, the survey 
referred to safety climate, learning and communication.  
Results show that two groups of companies could be distinguished with different levels of ZAV 
commitment, based on the scores on individual and organisational commitment. The group 
scoring highest on commitment scored significantly higher on all other safety dimensions in 
comparison to companies in the other group. These findings could indicate the importance of 
ZAV commitment on workplace safety and also suggest their impact on safety dimensions such 
as learning, communication and culture.  
This study is a first attempt at measuring ZAV, and to measure it in relation to safety dimensions 
of culture, learning and communication. Although the findings raise many additional questions, 
this study lays a foundation for research into ZAV, by exploring not only ZAV in combination 
with other safety aspects, but also by exploring it in such a wide range of companies and 
countries. Moreover, the combination of approaches used in this study proved useful in studying 
ZAV, and may be used in future studies 
 
Keywords: accident prevention; culture, safety learning, safety communication, safety climate 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Accident prevention and identification of effective measures for accident prevention have been 
major topics of interest for many years. Both researchers and practitioners from industry are 
continuously trying to minimise the number of accidents and to minimize the consequences. 
Important aspects in improving safety and thus in preventing accidents are a culture of 
openness and trust (Guldenmund 2000; Reason 1997), learning (Akselsson et al. 2012; 
Drupsteen and Guldenmund, 2014; Kletz 2001) and commitment (Michael et al. 2005, Petersen 
1998). A specific commitment strategy that is gaining increasing attention is the Zero Accident 
Vision (ZAV) (Rasmussen 2013, Young 2014, Zwetsloot et al. 2013). ZAV is a vision that 
originates from industrial practices (MacCormack 1997; Liska, Goodlow and Sen 1993), in 
which the basic assumption is that all (serious) accidents are preventable, and that companies 
should do as much as possible in preventing accidents.  
So far, only a few studies have explored the effects of ZAV commitment. These studies did 
demonstrate that the commitment to Zero Accidents results in better safety (Aaltonen 2007; 
Hinze 2002). Yet, an exact understanding of the mechanisms and success factors behind ZAV 
still lacks. This paper aims to shed further light on the underlying mechanisms of the 
relationship between ZAV commitment and improved safety by exploring several companies 
committed to ZAV. Specifically, the study investigates the levels of self-reported personal 
commitment to ZAV and the perception of organizational commitment through a survey, and 
relates this to measures of safety climate, safety learning, and safety communication. 
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Aim and research questions 
The overall aim of this project – as part of a larger research project on ZAV -  is to gain an 
increased understanding of ZAV committed companies. To do so we aim to answer the 
following research question: Are scores on safety dimensions different for companies with 
higher commitment to ZAV?  
 
2. METHODS 
Overall research design 
The overall research project into ZAV is carried out in joint collaboration with seven European 
research institutes, with a total of 27 participating companies. The research project used three 
main approaches to study ZAV within organisations:  
1. A brief questionnaire that gives information on company size, development of accident 
frequencies over the past years and on ZAV implementation and goals on a company level. 
These questions were completed by a single company representative such as the HSE 
manager.  
2. A questionnaire study that builds on existing questionnaires, and measures the aspects: 
ZAV commitment, learning, safety climate and safety communication on an organisational 
and individual level.  
3. Interviews with key actors for each of the participating companies, to provide context for the 
quantitative results.  
In addition to these measures a focus group was organized in each country with representatives 
from the participating companies. These focus groups had a twofold aim: for the companies to 
share their experiences and good practices, and for the researchers to identify common factors 
that characterize ZAV companies. In the given investigation we mainly focus on the findings 
from the second questionnaire.  
 
Participants 
The project was carried out by research task partners from seven countries: Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. Each task partner 
recruited companies in their own country for this project. In the Netherlands and Finland, 
companies were recruited from the zero accident networks in those countries. In the other 
countries, such a network did not exist at the time of data collection and companies were 
recruited through the networks of the task partner. Altogether, the task partners recruited 27 
companies that had adopted a ZAV-type approach in recent years.  
 
Individual ZAV Questionnaire  
The questionnaire was developed as part of the overall research project, primarily using items 
from already established measures:  
· Nordic Safety Climate Questionnaire NOSACQ (Kines et al. 2011) 
· learning from incidents survey (Drupsteen, Groeneweg and Zwetsloot, 2013) 
· questionnaire on learning conditions (Jerez-Gómez, Céspedes-Lorente, Valle-Cabrera 
2005).  
The resulting survey consisted of 72 items in eleven dimensions, covering questions about 
organisational and individual commitment to ZAV, safety learning (learning actions and safety 
learning in general), safety culture/climate (consisting of empowerment, priority, justice and a 
group level measure) , safety communication (by managers and on individual level), and 
resilience. The resilience dimension is not used in this specific part of the overall research 
project, thus 10 dimensions are included in the analyses. Cronbach alpha’s were calculated to 
verify the validity of the eleven dimensions. Generally Cronbach alpha is considered acceptable 
above .67 and good above .7. All scales had a Cronbach alpha higher than .7 (ranging from .71 
to .92), except for one dimension. This scale originally had a Cronbach alpha of .57, but this 
was raised to .705 by dropping one item.  
Commitment to ZAV was explored in the questionnaire through two dimensions: individual 
commitment to ZAV (5 items), and organizational commitment to ZAV (2 items). Statements that 
were used to assess the individual commitment were e.g.: ‘I think that all accidents (injury-
people & damage-objects) can be prevented’; ‘I am personally committed to a zero accidents 
vision (preventing all accidents - injury to people and damage to objects )’ and ‘I think that 
safety performance can always be improved’. To assess organizational commitment to ZAV, we 
asked each participant to respond to the statements: ‘Our workplace is committed to a zero 
accidents vision (preventing all accidents - injury to people and damage to objects)’ and ‘The 
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Management in our company is truly committed to a zero accident vision (preventing all 
accidents - injury to people and damage to objects)’.  
 
There were four answering categories for each of the items in the questionnaire ranging from 
(1) ‘strongly disagree’, (2) ‘disagree’, (3) ‘agree’ to (4) ‘strongly agree’. For some items in some 
of the other 9 scales a 'don’t know' option was provided. The survey, in English, was translated 
into the native language of each country, and filled in either electronically or in a paper format. 
We asked the companies to have the questionnaires completed by a representative sample of 
their company, with  a minimum of 40 completed questionnaires, of which 75% or more should 
be completed by operating personnel. A total of 8819 questionnaires were returned. After 
deleting the respondents that completed less than 50% of the questions, 7972 respondents 
remained for analysis. Table 2 shows the number of respondents used in the analysis for each 
country.  Participants in the surveys and the interviews were identified dependent on selection 
from and by the companies, and the process varied between the 27 companies. In some cases 
all members of staff were invited to participate in the survey, whereas in other cases 
convenience sampling was used until reaching the minimum limit of 40 respondents. Therefore, 
it is not possible to calculate the participation rate for all 27 companies. 
 
Table 1: Zero Accident vision in 27 companies: overview of respondents by country 
Country (Number of companies) Respondents in analysis 
Belgium (3) 251 
Denmark (3) 982 
Finland (4) 487 
Germany (3) 1448 
Netherlands (4) 3169 
Poland (5) 470 
United Kingdom (5) 1165 
Total 7972 
 
 
Analysis  
To answer the research questions scale scores were calculated for ten dimensions, by taking 
the average of the item scores. However, we only calculated the scale score if the respondent 
had filled in at least half the scale and no less than 3 items (with an exception for the 
dimensions ZAV_organisation that had only two items). 
In addition, the companies were categorised into two groups, based on the response on the two 
dimensions for ZAV commitment –ZAV_Organisation and ZAV_Individual. For both dimensions, 
scores are categorized in three categories: low commitment (indicated by a score between 1 
and 2.5; see answering categories 1 to 4 above), strong commitment (indicated by a score 
between 2.5 and 3.5), and very strong commitment (indicated by a score between 3.5 and 4). 
Since in all companies ZAV has already been introduced for some time, we expected that most 
organisations would have high scores on commitment. This expectation was confirmed as 
indeed few respondents fell in the low commitment category (10% or less of the respondents 
per company). Therefore we differentiated only between companies with a strong or very strong 
commitment. As cut-off it was decided that if on average 50% or more of the respondents fell in 
the upper category for both dimensions (meaning 3.5 or more on both dimensions), the 
company was categorised as being very strongly committed to ZAV, otherwise it was 
categorised as being strongly committed. As a consequence 14 companies (N = 3472 
respondents) were categorised as being strongly committed to ZAV, and 13 companies (N = 
4313) as being very strongly committed to ZAV.  
 
3. RESULTS 
Overall, respondents indicated that both themselves and their organisations were strongly 
committed to ZAV (MZAV_Individual = 3.46, SD =.55, and M ZAV_Organisation = 3.39, SD = .41, 
respectively on a scale of 1 to 4). Furthermore, the reported individual commitment to ZAV had 
a strong correlation with the reported commitment to ZAV of the organisation (r = .379, p < 
.001). In other words, respondents who reported a high personal commitment to ZAV likely also 
experienced a high commitment to ZAV from their organisation and vice versa.  
To explore the relationship of the concept of ZAV commitment with other safety dimensions, 
these were analysed with regard to groups of companies that were strongly committed and very 
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strongly committed. These groups were based on a combination of  organisational and 
individual commitment, as explained in the methodology section of this paper. Table 2 shows 
that companies who had a very strong commitment to ZAV scored consistently higher on every 
dimension related to safety dimensions.  
 
Table 2. Comparison on safety dimensions between companies with a strong or a very strong commitment to a Zero 
Accident Vision. (M=mean on scale of 1-4) 
 ZAV 
Commitment 
category 
N M SD F DF P 
Communication        
Communication - 
Management 
Strong 3573 3.02 0.48 247.35 (1. 
7883) 
.000 
 Very strong 4311 3.19 0.49    
Communication - 
Individual 
Strong 3614 2.87 0.45 207.89 (1. 
7929) 
.000 
 Very strong 4316 3.02 0.47    
Safety Culture and 
Climate 
       
Climate priority Strong 3546 2.99 0.47 293.04 (1. 
7863) 
.000 
 Very strong 4318 3.17 0.47    
Climate justice Strong 3258 2.88 0.42 284.93 (1. 
7233) 
.000 
 Very strong 3976 3.07 0.52    
Safety 
empowerment 
Strong 3517 2.92 0.49 380.79 (1. 
7730) 
.000 
 Very strong 4215 3.14 0.50    
Safetyclimate - 
group level 
Strong 3441 3.03 0.40 104.29 (1. 
7599) 
.000 
 Very strong 4159 3.13 0.39    
Learning        
Learning - actions Strong 3376 2.29 1.19 131.76 (1. 
7426) 
.000 
 Very strong 4051 2.59 1.08    
Safety learning Strong 3562 3.06 0.44 189.61 (1. 
7872) 
.000 
 Very strong 4311 3.20 0.45    
 
Additionally, we explored whether respondents from seven countries differed significantly on the 
commitment dimensions. The mean values for organisational and individual commitment by 
country are summarised in Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates that in Danish, Dutch, Polish and UK 
companies, there was a significant difference between organisational and individual 
commitment (p<.05). This means that respondents in the companies in those countries 
perceived the commitment of the organisation to be higher than their own individual 
commitment to ZAV.  
We compared scale scores between countries for both organisational commitment and 
individual commitment. One-way ANOVA analyses showed significant group differences 
between countries on both dimensions. (Organisational commitment: F(6, 7957) = 74.54, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .05; individual commitment: F(6, 7374) = 34.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .03). The most 
prominent difference coming forth from the Bonferroni Post-hoc analysis was the fact that 
respondents from the UK companies reported significantly higher commitment to ZAV on both 
the individual (M = 3.60, SD = .39) and organisational (M = 3.64, SD = .52) level, compared to 
the other countries (means between 3.27 to 3.42 and 3.35 to 3.52 respectively).  
For organisational commitment other significant differences exist between Danish companies 
and the rest: the Danish companies perceive organisational commitment to be significantly 
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higher as do the companies in other countries (except UK). Organisational commitment in Dutch 
companies was also significantly higher than in Belgian and German companies, but not 
significantly higher than in Finnish and Polish companies.  
For individual commitment, the differences were less clear. As listed before, scores are 
significantly higher in the UK companies than in companies in all other countries. However, 
scores in Belgian, Danish and Finnish companies did not differ significantly from each other, but 
were all higher as in German and Polish companies. Scores in Danish and Finnish companies 
were also significantly higher than in Dutch companies, but differences between Belgian and 
Dutch companies were not. The companies in Poland had the lowest scores on individual 
commitment, which were significantly lower than in companies in all other countries except 
Germany.  
 
 
Figure 1: Zero Accident Vision - mean values for individual and organisational commitment by country (Scale 1 to 4). 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
This research explored ZAV commitment across 27 companies from 7 different European 
countries and revealed that companies with a very strong ZAV commitment as compared to 
lighter committed companies also yielded higher scores on safety dimensions such as 
communication, climate and learning.  
The investigation presented was part of a broader research project on ZAV success factors that 
addressed samples of all members of staff by questionnaires , interviews and focus groups. The 
questionnaires from nearly 8.000 participants revealed that ZAV dimensions such as 
organisational and individual commitment to ZAV were correlated. This suggests that a concept 
like ZAV commitment requires both organisational anchoring and support as well as individual 
comprehension, conviction and implementation. Unfortunately, based on the questionnaires, it 
has not been possible to further investigate interdependencies between organisational and 
individual commitment. Interview data is required to further clarify these findings. 
Results also show that, based on a combination of scores on individual and organisational 
commitment, two groups of companies could be distinguished with different levels of ZAV 
commitment. The group scoring highest on commitment scored significantly higher on all other 
safety dimensions – safety learning, climate and communication - in comparison to the other 
companies. Overall, also in the companies showing lighter commitment, scores on these safety 
dimensions were high. These findings appear to support the notion that commitment to ZAV 
contributes to better safety dimensions in the organisation. However, it remains difficult to 
attribute the safety successes to ZAV, since this study lacks a comparison group of companies 
that are not committed to ZAV. Also, whereas this study emphasises the possible effect of ZAV 
on the safety dimensions, ZAV commitment could also be considered as an outcome, where 
ZAV commitment is strengthened by the above described activities. A future study that 
compares ZAV committed companies to other companies, preferably companies that are safety 
1 
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2 
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3 
3,5 
4 
Organisational commitment 
Individual commitment 
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oriented (proactive) and companies that are not (reactive), would be necessary to differentiate 
the effect of ZAV commitment from general safety commitment. In addition, such a study could 
further investigate the differences between the now identified two groups, and aim to clarify the 
main distinction between strong and very strongly commitment means in practice. Possibly the 
difference between the two groups could be explained by their ability to translate ZAV into 
effective safety measures. Another possible hypothesis is that companies that have a longer 
commitment to ZAV fall into the highest category, whereas companies that recently committed 
to ZAV fall into the other category. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The main aims of this study were to explore levels of ZAV commitment and to explore the 
relationship to safety communication, climate, and learning. This study was performed in ZAV 
committed companies in seven European countries, as part of a broader research project on 
ZAV success factors. Having discussed the findings and limitations of this study, it can be 
concluded that although many questions remain, the findings support the importance of ZAV 
commitment for workplace safety. Since the group of companies with a very strong ZAV 
commitment - as compared to the group of companies that showed lighter commitment- yielded 
higher scores on safety dimensions such as communication, climate and learning, the study 
also seems to indicate that some of the differences in safety dimensions could possibly  be 
explained by the level of ZAV commitment. Taken together, this study highlights possible 
directions for research into ZAV and  lays a foundation for such research by exploring  ZAV in 
combination with other safety aspects, in  a wide range of companies and countries. Moreover, 
the questionnaire used in this study proved useful in studying ZAV, and may be used in future 
studies.  
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Abstract 
The Construction Industry is traditionally considered an industry that develops hazardous activities, 
in view of the high incidence of accidents and especially those fatal ones. Given this scenario, 
Portugal and Brazil have legislated on the various aspects of health and safety in this atypical 
industrial sector. The current study presents a literature review and empirical research from semi-
structured interviews with various players from this area in Portugal and Brazil. The central 
objective of this research was to compare the laws of both countries on health conditions and 
occupational safety in small construction sites, in order to identify possible future contributions to 
improve the analysed sites. The results demonstrate that, in practice, much remains to be 
investigated for safety requirements and occupational health in small construction sites to be 
covered. It was concluded that either countries have a consistent legislative corpus, which one can 
withdraw contributions both to Portugal and to Brazil. 
 
Keywords: Construction industry,  Small construction sites, Legislation, Portugal, Brazil. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Construction industry is a sector that presents specificities within the productive universe of 
economy, whether in Portugal or Brazil, playing a key role in the development of both countries. 
Currently, in Portugal, the number of jobs in the Construction industry increased by 3% from the 3rd 
to the last quarter of 2013, from 288.9 to 298.1 thousand workers. The contribution of public works 
in construction industry for the Portuguese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 0.9% in 2013 
(INCI, 2014). In Brazil, this sector has already represented about 10% of its GDP in the early 2000s 
(Araújo and Meira, 2001), and more recently, in 2013, it accounted by itself for 5.4% of Brazil’s 
GDP, with more than 3.5 million workers among the formal employment with a signed labor card 
(Apeop, 2015). 
However, the construction sector - in both countries - also stands out for presenting high levels of 
work-related accidents. In Portugal, according to the Authority for Working Conditions (ACT), in 
2014 there were 308 serious accidents in work activities and of these, 88 were in the Construction 
Industry, as well as from the 135 fatal accidents, construction held 41 cases, remaining in the 1st 
position among all other activities in the last three years. Data from the Superior Labor Court (TST, 
2015) show that, in Brazil, in 2010, there were 54,664 accidents in construction, making this sector 
the second in number of accidents and, according to the Social Welfare, in 2013, as the second 
activity in accidents with fatalities. 
Towards this context, Brazil and Portugal have revised and/or created laws in order to change 
these statistics and, above all, ensure safety and health for all involved workers. In Brazil, the 
pertinent legislation comprises a set of Regulatory Norms (NRs), while in Portugal these are 
through Decrees. 
To characterize the small construction sites in Portugal and Brazil - the focus of this present work, 
legislations were analyzed, observing all conditions led to characterize and define the concept of 
small construction site. The present paper aims to compare the legislation on occupational health 
and safety in the small construction sites in Portugal and Brazil, in order to identify possible future 
contributions. 
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This comparative analysis may result in concrete indications of how a country can benefit from the 
positive experience from the other.. 
 
2. THE BRAZILIAN PANORAMA 
 
2.1. Data From the Sector 
According to the Brazilian Chamber of Construction Industry (CBIC, 2015), in August 2014, the 
average cost of construction increased by 0.26% in the country, being Southeast (where the largest 
cities are concentrated: São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), and the Central West the regions 
registered as the highest increases. If in 2010 the GDP of the construction sector in Brazil had 
grown by 13.1%, in 2014 this percentage was negative, with a 2.6% decrease. These are the 
reference data of construction for the Brazilian economy and, more specifically, the construction 
industry has still a strong presence, both in the number of companies and workforce. 
However, it is important to stress that, in the field of construction, recruitment is generally made by 
subcontractors and, as pointed out by Lima Júnior (2005), has specific characteristics, such as high 
turnover, combined with a low-skilled professional, as well as nomadism and short duration of the 
works 
In this regard, even the construction sector thus offering fewer jobs in 2014, according to official 
data, it is essential to remember that these data do not include the majority of employees from 
small construction sites. Since, many of these contractors do not work with a formal contract and, 
therefore, do not make part of the formal employment universe, do not contribute to Social Welfare 
and, therefore, do not make part of the formally "employed personnel" universe of the construction 
sector. 
 
2.2. Current Legislation  
The labor legislation in Brazil was firmed with the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT), in the 
government of Vargas, in 1940 (Decree Law no. 5452, from May 1, 1943). Chapter V of Title II of 
CLT refers to the safety principles and occupational health, topics that have been improved in 
1967. 
Since then, the protection instruments of workforce were improved but, when it comes specifically 
to the  construction industry, the legislation was only consolidated in the 1970s, with the publication 
of the Regulatory Norms (NRs). 
The NR-18 refers to the construction industry, and regulates the construction, demolition and repair 
works: establishes administrative and organizational guidelines, focusing on the implementation of 
control measurement and preventive safety systems in processes, conditions and working 
environment of the construction industry. According to Cruz (1998), NR-18 brought innovations in 
its formulation and in how it was consolidated, sticking to the requirements of the International 
Labor Organization. Since them this normative has been through 21 amendments in its text, in 
order to improve the safety regulation and occupational health in Construction, being the first 
change in 1992 and the latest in May 2015. 
Most NRs are somehow interrelated, i.e., directly or indirectly, with NR-18. It is worth mentioning 
the NRs that are explicitly mentioned in the NR-18 are the NR number 03, 05, 06, 09, 17 and 35. 
Specifying, the NR-5 relates to the Internal Commission of Accident Prevention (CIPA), which aims 
to make the workforce more participative in the category accident prevention and health damage 
(whose last update was in 2011). As for NR-6, it is important for dealing with Personal Protective 
Equipment (EPI) (updated April 2015). With regard to NR-7 (updated in 2013) and NR-9 (changed 
in 2014), regards to the Program for Medical Control of Occupational Health (PCMSO) and the 
Program for Environmental Risk Prevention (PPRA), respectively. The NR-8, the NR-10 and up to 
NR-16 norms, regard more specific aspects of the work process. The NR-17 addresses 
ergonomics, which refers to the debate on the problems in work environment and processes that 
will depend on how the activity is structured, and the NR-35 addresses working at heights (created 
in 2012 and amended in 2014), it considers, for purposes of its own application, the activity 
performed above 2 meters. Thus, it is clear that the Regulatory Norms are well elaborated and 
specific to the safety and working conditions within the construction site.  
 
2.3. Characterization of the Small Construction Work 
It is a difficult task to characterize the small construction work, exactly because of its nomad, 
invisible and temporary characteristic, according to Lima (2008). This type of construction work is 
related to renovations, demolition, painting, cleaning and maintenance, creating work relationships 
that, in turn, are also temporary and precarious. 
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Importantly, the NR-18 establishes, through its Article 18.3, the Conditions and Working 
Environment in the Construction Industry Program (PCMAT) (last updated in 2011). However, this 
program is only required in establishments with 20 or more workers. It can be concluded, therefore, 
that if the knowledge of NR-18 and its compliance is compulsory for all  construction work. This 
regulation, by stating that companies with up to 19 employees must follow the PCMAT, is actually 
leaving a serious gap regarding safety and health precepts on small construction sites, which 
sometimes have few people working, or even a single individual. Thus, these sites are subject to 
the law by not having a practice and simplified guidance of minimally acceptable conditions of work 
in construction, established by the NR-18. 
Formally, the small construction works are those in which the number of employees in the 
establishment, regardless of the work stage, is up to 19 workers. The most common type of this 
small construction works are those of residential, construction or renovation and are linked to the 
NR-18, however without the aforementioned requirement for a PCMAT (Gomes, 2011). 
In Brazil, due to these characteristics, the employment relationship takes place, as a rule, with no 
formal contract and, for the most part, only with an agreement between the parties. It is in this 
precariousness work relationships that worker safety conditions are weakened, leading often to 
error, failure and accident and therefore the lack of workers' health in small construction sites. 
In this sense, the Brazilian legislation, although advanced and detailed, still lacks a simplified tool 
for the small work sites, even with its characteristics of nomadism and temporality, to become 
visible, either by the contractor, either by the labor inspection and especially, by an increasing 
dissemination of basic safety principles in construction. This notion has been outlined, albeit 
isolated and independently, in Brazil, with the development of state and local laws, in order to 
formalize players who are working in small construction sites and their responsibilities towards 
these small works to ensure the labor safety and worker’s health. 
 
3.THE PORTUGUESE PANORAMA  
 
3.1. Data from the Sector 
In recent years, there has been a sharp activity contraction in construction sector in Portugal, either 
in public or private works. The central, regional and local administration levels have seen their 
budgets constrained, which limited the opening of more public construction works. Due to the 
general decline in housing demand in the country, the construction works of residential buildings 
was greatly affected and the construction activity was greatly reduced in this sector too. Also, due 
to the widespread crisis that has developed in the country, investment in non-residential buildings, 
including trade and services, was also very low. 
According to FEPICOP, although the Portuguese GDP has registered in 2014 the first growth of the 
past three years, the downfall of construction sector has not stopped yet, even though it softened. 
The GVA of construction sector in 2014 fell by 4%, while in 2013 it had reduced from 13.1% and in 
2012 from 14.7%. 
The level of oriented demand for the sector has been declining. In public works, when comparing 
the first two months of 2015 with the same period in 2014, falls of 56% are observed in the value of 
public tenders and 37% in signed contracts. In residential buildings, in January 2015 there was an 
increased of 8.2% of new construction permits and a decline of 17.6% in rehabilitation work 
permits, if compared to January 2014. As for housing loans granted in January 2015, an increase 
of 39.3% was observed compared to January 2014, yet the volume of credit granted is still at 
historically low levels. In non-residential buildings, in January 2015 there were breakages in 
permits for new construction by 15.7% and breaks in the licenses of rehabilitation works by 27%, in 
relation to January 2014. 
 
3.2 Legislation of Labor Safety and Health in Portugal 
In Portugal there is enough legislation on occupational safety and health, much of this legislation 
results from transposition of European Directives. Following, the structuring Portuguese law, 
regarding safety and labor health in construction: 
a) The Law 102/2009 of September 10th, amended by Law 3/2014 from January 28th, is often called 
the Framework Law, since it is the basis of all legislation on safety, hygiene and health at work, 
which it followed. Defines the general principles and the prevention system of occupational risks, 
the general obligations of the employer and workforce, the requirement for consultation, information 
and training of workers, and the mandatory election of representatives of workforce for safety. It 
requires the genetic heritage protection, defines the prohibited or conditioned activities in general, 
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for pregnant or breastfeeding workers, as well as for minors. It defines the organization and the 
functioning of labor health and safety services. 
b) Decree Law 273/2003 from October 29th, establishes general rules of planning, organization and 
coordination to promote safety, hygiene and health at construction sites and transposes into 
national law Directive 92/57/CEE, of the Council, from June 24th, concerning the minimum safety 
and health requirements for work which apply for temporary or mobile construction sites. 
There are however some legislation on labor safety and health of construction that did not result 
from the transposition of European Directives, including: 
c) Decree 41821 from August 11th, 1958, that publishes "safety regulation in the work of 
construction", establishing a minimum level of safety procedures for the implementation of several 
high-risk activities. 
d) Decree 46427 from July 10th, 1965, that publishes "regulation of temporary facilities for staff 
employed in the works" establishing minimum requirements for health and comfort for workers, 
which should be considered in the work site planning and during the execution of the construction 
work. 
e) Law 98/2009 from September 4th, which regulates the repair regime of occupational accidents 
and occupational diseases, including rehabilitation and reintegration of professionals. 
f) Law 42/2012 from August 28th, establishes the regime of access and the performance of 
occupational safety senior technician and occupational safety technician, the issuance of the 
respective professional qualifications and professional training of these technicians. 
 
3.3. Characterization of Small Dimension Work Site 
Although, in the Portuguese legislation there is no clear definition of what a small construction work 
site is. However, taking into account Article no 5 and 15 of Decree-Law 273/2003, it may be 
understood as a construction work site whose size and other characteristics does not require the 
preparation of a "health and safety plan", neither the "prior notice of the site opening". 
In paragraph 4 of article no 5, states: 
"The safety and health plan is obligatory in construction works subject to project and which involves 
activities implying special risks referred in Article 7 or the prior notice of the site opening. 
In paragraph 1 of article no 15 of DL 273/2003, states: 
"1 - The work site owner must give advance notice of the site opening to the General Labor 
Inspectorate when it is foreseen that the execution of work involves one of the following situations: 
a) A total deadline superior to 30 days and, at any time, the simultaneous use of more than 20 
workers; 
b) A total of 500 working days, corresponding to the sum of work days from each worker." 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
Methodologically, the study consists of two aspects. One of literature review and the other was a 
survey of aspects of occupational health and safety in both countries. Another aspect is an 
empirical research based on semi-structured interviews with professionals from various fields of 
training and performance in the  construction industry in Portugal, in order to analyze their 
understanding about the political and health legislation on small work sites. 
For the empirical work, a qualitative research was chosen, in order to hear the different voices of 
those who work in the  construction industry in Portugal. Given that the directives of the European 
Community brought a cohesive legislative body for all countries, from the developed to those with 
less economic and/or financial conditions, these regulatory norms have served to suit all participant 
nations that Community, standardizing the minimum necessary for promoting health and safety at 
work in the  construction industry. Thus, when electing the Portuguese case as better than the 
Brazilian one,  it was assumed that the present qualitative research would bring important elements 
that could be also applied in Brazil. Accordingly, in line with Minayo (2004), the development of this 
small sample framework of what the workforce feel about the small construction work in Portugal, it 
was intended to analyze and understand how the health and safety policies work in these small 
work sites. Being this a qualitative analysis, sought to content analysis, to find the units of meaning 
in the speech of the respondents. 
The research was conducted in three cities (or municipilaties) of Portugal: Porto with nearly 
240,000 inhabitants; Braga, with 177,000 inhabitants; and Guimarães, with 162,000 inhabitants 
(INE, 2010). This diversity has allowed a more comprehensive view of the small construction work 
in medium and small cities of the country – which, although experiencing a fall in execution of 
construction works due to the crisis that now is perceived across the EU, we can see a higher 
concentration of small construction work - focus of research. In addition, due to the knowledge of 
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the authors with construction works and the persons associated with them. It was intended to 
diversify at most the interviewed categories specifically to obtain the widest possible universe of 
perspectives on construction sites and on the occupational health of  construction workers. 
In general, it is very difficult to get the confidence from lowest grade workers, so that they can 
express what they think of their labor reality – there is a great fear that those critiques could 
jeopardize their employment or work. However, it was also important to interview people who direct 
and guide the construction works, to make possible, after all, to form a bigger picture of the group 
of people involved in a construction work, once the goal of this study was precisely to find the flaws 
that lead to the precariousness of occupational health and work injuries in construction. Therefore, 
it was opted for semi-structured interviews with various professional categories, following a guiding 
script that to understand the perception of the subjects on the characteristics of a small work site. 
This script was previously elaborated and has been through certain adjustments after a survey with 
some respondents. The interviews were not recorded and all respondents were informed of the 
survey content, being explained that they would not be identified. 
The central focus was to verify how these respondents saw the differences between large and 
small work sites, with emphasis on knowledge of the Regulatory Norms (NRs)and legislation; in the 
protection practices; in the most common failures; in the differences of protection, inspection and 
surveillance according to the size of the construction works; in the perception regarding the 
protection equipment; in the understanding of the causality of the most frequent accidents on 
construction sites and in the practices of prevention as well as the State's role in the supervision of 
working and safety conditions in the workplace. 
Persons responsible for supervision, professionals from different categories that operate in the 
sector or are directly involved in the small work sites processes, as well as workers were 
interviewed. In all, there were twelve people, distributed as follows: three labor inspectors, two civil 
engineers from small construction work; two architects from small construction work; a work safety 
technician; two people in charge of small work projects; a union in connection with employees; a 
member of employers' association linked to the area players. The interviews were carried out at the 
construction sites or in their offices, as in the case of labor inspectors.  
The current study considered that the sample of 12 respondents is broad enough to include 
different professionals, directly or indirectly involved in the construction industry; and that the 
responses found would permit outlying a research overview in which "the assessment of theoretical 
saturation from a sample is made by a continuous process of data analysis, begun in the early 
collection process” (Fontanella, 2008). A comprehensive reading of the entire field material was 
performed and, from there, the most significant contents were sought within the records, which 
were analyzed as relevant issues. 
 
5. RESULTS 
For the respondents, as a rule, the Portuguese construction work still requires a more specific look, 
although it is recognized that the legislation covers the fundamental aspects. Besides, it was clear 
that, for medium and large companies, there is no doubt left as to what needs to be done in terms 
of worker health and safety in small construction yards. However, when it comes to a small 
construction site, not only in Brazil, but also in Portugal communication is precarious, the inspection 
struggles to track these small construction yards, often invisible and temporary, so that today an 
employee may be doing a little repair in a residence and tomorrow will be in another, either through 
a small business or by their own, as an autonomous - and therein lies the difficulty of applying 
regulatory norms, as analyzed by the authors and respondents. 
Different conceptions of small work site 
For a civil engineer, a small construction work site “has up to 50 employees”. By the understanding 
of the person in charge of the small work site, "around 30 employees." The safety technician 
affirmed that "a small work site has up to 100 employees", while the union representative believes 
that the small construction work site "has between 100 and 200 workers." 
This divergence among respondents reveals an absence of specific parameter based on some 
classification criteria in the literature, in addition to express unawareness of the rules.  
Occupational health and safety in small work sites 
Respondents had also different understandings regarding safety in small work sites, which leads to 
the fragility of occupational health. Formally, most of respondents expressed their understanding 
through comparisons with the large scale work and ended up giving more emphasis to the use of 
Personal Protective Equipment, ignoring other forms of work safety. Explicitly or implicitly, referred 
that in small work sites there is no safety policy, attributing this deficiency to various reasons. 
Occupational accident and its causality 
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There are still few studies available in academic literature on the percentage of the construction 
workers suffering some kind of occupational accident (considering that the official data refer only to 
those formal contract employees, as general rule, in larger construction work sites and almost 
never in small work sites). 
Thus, it may be affirmed, it is the task content - the pace, the production of the work - that cause 
accidents, according to some respondents. Both the employee in charge and the architect declare 
"the pace of work is different when it comes to small or large construction work and therefore the 
logic is another". 
State's role 
It was found that, with respect to public policy, all respondents pointed out that the state has 
worked to minimize the failures in supervision. For labor inspectors, the state has been contributing 
with information campaigns in order to facilitate access to safety procedures in any activities that 
generate risks to workers. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
6.1. Small construction work site - Brazil versus Portugal 
For Brazil, the main regulatory norm is NR-18, which should be known by all and must be followed 
regardless of the size or temporality of the work being performed. However, the PCMAT must only 
be applied in work sites with more than 20 workers, and those with fewer shall be exempted to 
present a program regarding labor conditions. It is noteworthy that, in Brazil, it is considered 
workplaces with fewer than 20 employees. It also characterizes what is meant by small 
construction work site. 
In Brazil, until recently (before 2013), nothing required the owner (contractor) of a small work site, 
with one or few temporary workers, to report to anybody the future realization of a construction 
work in an office, a store, or in a residence. Strictly speaking, a small construction work site. Just 
recently, laws and decrees at the state and municipal levels are being developed (with no coverage 
throughout the country), in order to regulate small construction sites. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, 
the State Law no 6,400/2013, which determines the inspection of both internal and external 
(facades) work sites, the Complementary Law 126/2013, which requires inspections of buildings 
every five years, and the municipal Decree no 37,426/2013, which establishes the technical 
inspection in constructions of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The creation of similar laws and decrees in 
other Brazilian states and cities are under study.Rio de Janeiro (both state and city), for its large 
number of infrastructure projects, has also a large number of smaller, residential or private 
construction works that were not under any NR, precisely for being small work sites and of few 
workers. 
In Portugal, if to perform a work it is not necessary to establish the "safety plan and health", neither 
the "prior notice of the site opening", one shall consider to be a small construction work. However, 
questions arise in the interpretation of legislation, including: 
The analysis of paragraph 4 of Article 5 from DL 273/2003, it is necessary to know when the 
construction works are "subject to project," but this is not clear in the Portuguese legislation, nor is 
it public works, or particular works. 
The analysis of a) and b) of paragraph 1 of article 15 from DL 273/2003, in order to assess whether 
a particular work may or may not be considered as a "small work", there needs to be a detailed 
schedule of its execution, once without it one might not know the deadline, nor the daily load of 
workforce, or the total amount of work required to perform the work. 
From it arouses two new questions: 
- Do businesses make a sufficiently detailed planning of the work execution, supplying the 
necessary information to be able to assess the need to do or not to "prior notice of the site 
opening"? 
- Does the Portuguese legislation requires such detailed planning of the works? 
Regarding the first question, it is considered important to analyze two scenarios. First, if the small 
work is done by a medium or large company, once these have a significant technical and 
administrative structure, it is very likely that a detailed planning of the works to be performed will 
arise. Second, if the small work is made by a minor company, as its structure is based almost 
exclusively on production, it is less likely that a detailed planning of the works will arise. For the 
same reasons, it is even less likely than in microenterprises a detailed planning of the works will 
arise. 
Regarding the second question, it is considered that in public works a detailed schedule of 
execution is necessary, however in private works that's no longer the case. The Legal system of 
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Urbanization and Building regulates private works and, in paragraph 1 of Article 11, Decree 
232/2008, reports the elements necessary to the licensing applications for construction works. The 
only required element concerning deadlines for project execution, workforce load, or the work 
required to carry out the works is in its paragraph i), in which is only required one "timing of the 
work implementation;". In practice, it leads to any agenda to be accepted by the majority of 
municipalities, although with no technical basis, or the necessity to inform or not “prior notice of the 
site opening”. 
In Portugal, in accordance with DL 273/2003, even a small work, for which it is not necessary to 
establish the "safety and health plan", if the activities present special risks referred in Article 7, is 
an obligation to keep records of safety procedures, in accordance with Article 14ºl in order to avoid 
accidents. 
Finally, if in Portugal the requirement lies in the temporality of work, in Brazil, characterizing the 
small work does not refer to any deadline for its implementation. It remains as standard equality, 
that in both countries a small work is the one that has less than twenty employees, a criterion that 
does not contribute to promoting the necessary health and safety measures for the small work 
sites. 
 
6.2. Health and Safety Legislation - Brazil versus Portugal 
In Brazil, as described above, there is only one Regulatory Norm (NR 18) that although referring to 
other standards is simply the main document that aims to detail all the procedures necessary for 
the health and safety processes and in the workplace. This makes it a too prescriptive and detailed 
norm for its correct applicability, especially in small work sites. 
In Portugal, however, there is a number of decrees and laws that, for being more diverse and 
punctual, allow a better understanding of safety procedures. Regarding that, it is noteworthy what 
is described in DL 273/2003 on the characterization and definition of roles of the main players 
responsible for the aspects of safety and health at construction sites, such as safety coordinators; 
the developer; director the work site; subcontractors; etc .. aspects whose are not made explicit in 
the Brazilian standard. 
It still must be considered that Portugal, a member of the EU, by outlining policies common to all 
countries in the bloc benefits from this exchange of information among the other countries. This 
fact allows to closely monitor how each country, from the 28 EU members, has adapted these 
guidelines to its national law and what has reached to minimize accidents in their own construction 
sites. 
 
7. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
From these results, it is possible to verify that, in Brazil, the inspection in small works is still often 
ineffective - either by the size of the country and the great number of limited work sites to homes, 
offices and facades, where the nomadic nature makes it difficult for the health and safety aspects 
to be observed - and that, in Portugal, inspection appears to be more frequent and possibly more 
effective. 
This study had an investigative character, in which it sought to recognize what legislation and the 
health and safety practices of the construction industry might contribute to this issue, when it 
comes to small works. It is urgently needed to elect committees that will seek solutions to ensure 
that small works will be communicated, authorized to open their sites, and inspected, especially in 
Brazil, which can learn from Portugal some guidelines from their legislation, which in practice can 
work in order to have greater safety, even in small works, and more health to workers. 
It is believed that technical cooperation between engineers, lawyers, administrative staff of workers 
safety and health area can bring some light to this subject. However despite seeking solutions for 
the worker from small work site, is still insufficient. Especially by the volatility of this work carried 
out in private homes, shops, or offices, for the speed with which they are done - making it difficult to 
supervise - and for dealing in these situations with workers outside health and safety precepts at 
work. 
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Abstract 
Introduction: In the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) literature labour endowments 
influence the direction of technological knowledge, which, in turn, drives the wages of skilled 
and unskilled labour. The SBTC literature has been interpreting the rise in the skill premium as a 
result of the market-size effect. We analyse the direction of technological knowledge in a 
dynamic setting where, in line with the literature on scale effects, the scale effects are removed. 
Moreover, we follow reports of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
which point out that the capability to innovate and to bring innovation successfully to market will 
be a crucial determinant of the global competitiveness of nations over the coming decade. 
Indeed, there is growing awareness among policymakers that innovative activity is the main 
driver of economic progress and well-being as well as a potential factor in meeting global 
challenges in domains such as the environment and health. It is reported in literature that the 
influence of R&D intensity on firms’ growth is an issue of great interest and complexity. R&D 
investment increases absorptive capacity, i.e. the capacity to absorb knowledge created from 
the relationships formed with agents outside the firm, as well as the capacity to use that 
knowledge to increase firm performance. In consequence, firms have to adjust their priorities 
regarding the investments namely in the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH). 
Objective: This paper proposes a lab-equipment vertical R&D endogenous growth model to 
explain, for innovative countries, the co-movement of the respective R&D intensity, economic 
growth and the firm-size growth, by exploring the short-medium-run and the long-run growth 
effects. 
Methodology: Bearing in mind some recent literature, it is possible to improve the R&D 
technology by considering that R&D is more labour intensive through time as complexity 
increases. It also possible to do that by introducing risk assessment, that the diffusion of 
designs is affected by coordination, organizational and transportation costs, and that a potential 
entrant will come up with the right idea is reduced because of the presence of a larger number 
of entrants. Results and Discussion: We show that when the economy is not initially on steady 
state, it can take a saddle path towards the unique and locally saddle-path stable interior steady 
state. The transitional dynamics and the steady state behaviour of our model are then 
consistent with, respectively, the time-series and the cross-sectional evidence. 
Conclusions: Instead of the market-size channel emphasised by the SBTC, we propose 
another explanation for skill-biased technological knowledge. By removing the scale effects, we 
propose a new mechanism by which the pool of labour increases the rate of technological-
knowledge progress and thus determines the technological-knowledge bias. Indeed, through 
the price channel, the technological-knowledge bias increases but at a decreasing rate until it 
reaches its new higher steady state. Concerning wage inequality, we find that an increase in 
skilled labour causes an immediate steep drop in the skilled premium since its relative supply 
decreases its relative wage. This immediate effect is reverted in the transitional dynamics 
towards the constant steady-state skilled premium, due to the stimulus to the demand for skilled 
labour resulting from the technological-knowledge bias. Moreover, we note also that with a 
sufficiently strong technological-knowledge-absorption effect, the steady-state high-skilled 
premium is greater than the previous one. 
 
Keywords: R&D technology, Economic growth, Occupational Safety and Health. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the European Commission (2010) Europe's average growth rate has been 
structurally lower than that of our main economic partners, largely due to a productivity gap that 
has widened over the last decade. Much of this is due to differences in business structures 
combined with lower levels of investment in R&D and innovation, insufficient use of information 
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and communications technologies, reluctance in some parts of our societies to embrace 
innovation, barriers to market access and a less dynamic business environment. 
As new technologies and globalisation reduce the importance of economies of scale in many 
activities, and larger firms downsize and outsource more functions, the weight of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the economy is increasing. The potential of small 
enterprises has been recognised and it is appreciated that employment and economic growth to 
a large extent depend on these enterprises. Both political and scientific interests in OSH in small 
enterprises have grown considerably during the last decade. In terms of OSH, small businesses 
present a challenge: they are difficult to regulate, as they are heterogeneous, geographically 
scattered, lack cohesive representation and have a short life cycle. The need to focus OSH 
research on small businesses is now recognised, but effective mechanisms to reach, assist and 
impact these companies continue to be a challenge. To date, most OSH research and 
interventions have been primarily focused on large companies (EU-OSHA, 2014). 
For reasons of simplicity, we reflect in R&D technology all these concerns, by making use of the 
concept risk assessment, which represents an entry cost. In particular, we consider that the 
difficulty in conducting R&D is proportional to the size of the market measured by the stock of 
labour, which results in a ‘permanent-effects-on-growth’ specification (see, e.g., Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom, 1999) because the technological-knowledge progress and economic growth are 
endogenous. In this case, however, the chain of effects is induced by the price channel, by 
which there are stronger incentives to improve technologies when the goods that they produce 
command higher prices, i.e., technologies that use the scarcer labour are favoured. 
In order to understand the mechanism, we model a standard (in endogenous R&D-growth 
theory) economic structure. The production of perfectly competitive final goods uses labour 
together with quality-adjusted intermediate goods, which in turn use innovative designs under 
monopolistic competition. In particular, each final good can be produced by one of two 
technologies: one uses high-skilled labour together with a continuum set of high-specific 
intermediate goods; the other brings together low-skilled labour and a continuum set of low-
specific intermediate goods. 
The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA, 2014) promotes good safety 
and health at work environments as an integral part of the smart and inclusive growth objectives 
of Europe 2020. This model meets the priorities for occupational safety and health research in 
Europe for the years 2013-2020, which includes keeping people healthy and active for long 
periods, having a positive impact on global productivity and competitiveness. Thus, OSH 
research have a role to play in delivering smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Reaching the 
high-level goals of Horizon 2020 and the overall EU policies for the next decades will depend on 
the success of new enabler technologies such as those needed for new energy policies, climate 
adaptation and future manufacturing. However, new technologies will succeed only if the 
benefits are clearly visible and the potential risks are regarded as acceptable by society. This 
requires identifying and addressing stakeholder and public expectations and responding to their 
concerns in order to build trust and confidence and to show that the new technologies are ‘well 
under control’. This in turn requires identifying and assessing the safety and health risks 
associated with new technologies and integrating OSH aspects in the development of new 
technologies and processes, as well as strengthening risk communication and OSH 
communication. 
According to reports of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2007), undoubtedly the capability to innovate and to bring innovation successfully to market will 
be a crucial determinant of the global competitiveness of nations over the coming decade, which 
is accommodate by our model. There is growing awareness among policymakers that 
innovative activity is the main driver of economic progress and well-being as well as a potential 
factor in meeting global challenges in domains such as the environment and health. It is 
reported in literature that the influence of R&D intensity on firms’ growth is an issue of great 
interest and complexity. R&D investment increases absorptive capacity, i.e. the capacity to 
absorb knowledge created from the relationships formed with agents outside the firm, as well as 
the capacity to use that knowledge to increase firm performance. In consequence, firms have to 
adjust their priorities regarding the investments, namely in the OSH domain. In fact, firms are 
dealing with limited financial resources, and as a consequence, they need to make decisions 
about financial resources, being the management strategies for productive process often 
dissociated from OSH issues. 
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OSH shall contribute to research and development (R&D) related to anticipating, recognising, 
evaluating and controlling health hazards in the working environment with the objective of 
protecting worker health and well-being. 
The economics of occupational safety and health (OSH) has been viewed for many little more 
than “how can better working conditions be made profitable for business?” (Dorman, 2000). 
Certainly, the financial costs and benefits involved in OSH are an important aspect of economic 
analysis, but above all, economics is a social science; its perspective is that of society as a 
whole, which includes workers, their families and their communities as well as enterprises, and 
it recognizes that not all the effects of ill-health show up in monetary transactions. 
According to Dorman (2000), broadly speaking, there are three general purposes that 
economics can serve for OSH. Firstly, identifying and measuring the economic costs of 
occupational injury and disease can motivate governments to take these problems more 
seriously. This is true at all levels; the enterprise may be only dimly aware of the toll that worker 
ill-health takes on its performance and national governments may not realize the impact of OSH 
problems on economic growth and development. Secondly, understanding the connections 
between the way firms and markets function and the types of OSH problems that arise are 
crucial for the success of public policies. Finally, the author refers that the protection of worker 
health and wellbeing is not the only objective of OHS in a modern society. Economic analysis 
can help to show when safeguarding working conditions are also complementary to other social 
goals, and it can enlighten the trade-offs if they exists. 
According to ILO (2013) the OSH becomes ever more important during an economic crisis 
because it can protect and promote better health and this can lead to increases in labour supply 
and productivity. Also, historically, health has been a major contributor to economic growth. 
Therefore it is important to assess what impact there has been on OSH management during the 
global economic crisis, as well as to determine the impact further economic decline and other 
organizational issues may have on OSH. 
To our knowledge, McDermott (2002) was the first in the literature on endogenous growth to 
emphasize the benefit of industrial diversification, or a greater variety of intermediate production 
inputs, for human capital accumulation. According to Agénor and Dinh (2015) links between 
social capital, human capital, and product imitation are studied in an overlapping generations 
model of economic growth with endogenous time allocation. Social capital promotes imitation 
and there is a two-way interaction between imitation and human capital. Building social capital 
(which brings direct utility) requires time and access to infrastructure. Because life expectancy is 
endogenously related to human capital, time allocation between market work and social capital 
accumulation is also endogenously determined. 
In the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) literature – e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) – 
labour endowments influence the direction of technological knowledge, which, in turn, drives the 
wages of skilled and unskilled labour. The SBTC literature has been interpreting the rise in the 
skill premium as a result of the market-size effect. We analyse the direction of technological 
knowledge in a dynamic setting where, in line with the literature on scale effects (e.g., Jones, 
1995a, b), the scale effects are removed. 
Moreover, we follow reports of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2007), which point out that the capability to innovate and to bring innovation 
successfully to market will be a crucial determinant of the global competitiveness of nations over 
the coming decade. Indeed, there is growing awareness among policymakers that innovative 
activity is the main driver of economic progress and well-being as well as a potential factor in 
meeting global challenges in domains such as the environment and health. It is reported in 
literature (see, e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; De Jong and Freel, 2010) that the influence of 
R&D intensity on firms’ growth is an issue of great interest and complexity. R&D investment 
increases absorptive capacity, i.e. the capacity to absorb knowledge created from the 
relationships formed with agents outside the firm, as well as the capacity to use that knowledge 
to increase firm performance. In consequence, firms have to adjust their priorities regarding the 
investments namely in the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH). 
In fact, firms are dealing with limited financial resources, and as a consequence, they need to 
make decisions about financial resources, being the management strategies for productive 
process often dissociated from OSH issues. 
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2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1. Final goods sector 
Following the contribution of Afonso (2006), each final good n Î [0, 1] can be produced by the 
L-technology, which uses unskilled labour, L, complemented with a continuum of L-intermediate 
goods indexed by j Î [0, J], or by the H-technology’s, which uses skilled labour, H, 
complemented with a continuum of H-intermediate goods indexed by j Î ]J, 1]. The output of n, 
Yn, at time t is, 
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A>0 represents the level of productivity, dependent on the country’s institutions. The integrals 
sum up the contributions of intermediate goods: the quantity of each j, x, is quality-adjusted – 
the constant quality upgrade is q > 1, and k is the highest quality rung at time t. The expressions 
with exponent a Î ]0, 1[ represent the role of labour. An absolute productivity advantage of H 
over L is captured by h > l ³ 1. A relative productivity advantage of either type of labour is 
captured by n and (1-n), which implies that H is relatively more productive in final goods indexed 
by larger ns, and vice-versa. 
Plugging the demand for the top quality of each intermediate good j by the producer of n 
into (1), the supply of final good n is 
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are two aggregate quality indexes, measuring the technological knowledge in each range of 
intermediate goods, adjusted by market power that is the same for all monopolistic producers; 
the ratio D º QH/QL is the relative productivity of the technological knowledge used together with 
H; and pn(t) and p(j, t) are the prices of n and of j, respectively. 
We define the aggregate output, i.e., the composite final good, as: 
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where we normalise its price at each time t to one. Resources in the economy measured in 
terms of aggregate output, Y, can be used in production of the intermediate goods, X, in the 
R&D sector, R, or consumed, C; i.e., )()()()( tCtRtXtY ++= . 
 
2.2. Intermediate goods sector 
Since Y in (4) is the input in the production of j Î [0, 1] and final goods are produced in perfect 
competition, the marginal cost is one. Since the production of j requires a start-up cost of R&D, 
profits at each date need to be positive for a certain time in the future. For this, there is a system 
of intellectual property rights that protect the leader firm’s monopoly, but the technological 
knowledge on how to make j tends to be public.  
The profit-maximisation price of the j firms yields )1/(1),,( a-== ptjkp , which is a mark-up, 
since p > 1. This mark-up is stable over t, across js and for all qualities, which makes the 
problem symmetric. Since the leader firm is the only one legally allowed to produce the highest 
quality, it will use pricing to wipe out sales of lower quality.  
Such as Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 4), for example, we assume that limit pricing 
strategy is binding and then is used by all firms, so that qp = . Since the lowest price that the 
closest follower can charge without negative profits is 1, the leader can capture all market by 
selling at a price slightly below q.  
 
2.3. R&D sector 
The value of patent relies on the profits at time t, and on the duration of the monopoly. The 
duration, in turn, is governed by the probability of successful R&D, which creatively destroys the 
current leading-edge design. The probability of success is thus at the heart of the model. Let 
),,( tjkpb  denote the instantaneous probability at time t – a Poisson arrival rate – of 
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successful innovation in the next quality intermediate good j, k(j, t)+1, which complements m-
type labour (where m = L if 0 £ j £ J and m = H if J < j £ 1). Formally, 
 )(),,(),,( 1),(1),(
1
jfmqqtjkrstjkpb tjktjk ××××= ---
-azb , where: (5) 
rs(k, j, t) is the flow of aggregate final-good resources devoted to R&D; 0, ),( >bb tjkq , 
represents learning by past R&D, being b the coefficient on past successful R&D experience, 
where a greater b depicts a better innovation capacity; ,,),(1
1
0q tjk >
--- zz a  is the adverse 
effect, i.e., cost of complexity, caused by the increasing complexity of quality improvements, 
being z the fixed cost of R&D; m–1 is the adverse effect of market size, capturing the idea that 
the difficulty of introducing new quality-adjusted intermediate goods and replacing old ones is 
proportional to the size of the market measured by the labour employed. That is, for simplicity, 
the costs of scale increasing are reflected in R&D due to risk assessment, coordination among 
agents, processing of ideas, informational, organisational, marketing and transportation costs, 
as suggested by works such as Becker and Murphy (1992), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), Ramos et al. (2013), Ramos et al. (2015), Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1999). f ( j) measures an absolute advantage of H over L in R&D and we consider 
that 
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2.4. Consumers 
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived household who consumes and collects income 
from investments in financial assets and from inelastically supplying labour. We also assume 
that household has perfect foresight concerning the technological-knowledge progress over 
time and chooses the path of final-good consumption to maximise discounted intertemporal 
lifetime utility. Thus, the infinite horizon lifetime utility is the integral of a discounted CIES utility 
function, 
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where: (i) c (a , t)  is the amount of consumption of the composite final good at time t; (ii) r > 0 is 
the homogeneous subjective discount rate; and (iii) q > 0 is the inverse of the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution. 
The budget constraint equalises income earned to consumptions plus savings, which consists of 
accumulation of financial assets – K, with return r. The budget constraint, expressed as 
savings = income – consumptions, is 
),()()(),()(),( tac-amtwtaKtrtaK m+=& , where : m = H if aa >  and m = L if aa £ . (8) 
From the problem of optimal control, the solution for the consumption path, which is 
independent of the individual, is the standard Euler equation: 
 
q
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=
)()(ˆ tr tc ,  where )(ˆ  tc  is the growth rate of c. (9) 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1. Equilibrium for given factor levels 
The endogenous threshold final good n  follows from equilibrium in the inputs markets and 
relies on the determinants of economic viability of the two technologies – i.e., H-technology is 
used in final goods n > n  and L-technology in final goods n £ n . 
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It can be related to prices since on the threshold both an L- and H-technology firm should 
break even. This yields the ratio of index prices of final goods produced with L- and H-
technologies, 
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The equilibrium aggregate resources devoted to intermediate-goods production, X, and 
the equilibrium aggregate output, Y, are expressible as a function of the currently given 
aggregate quality indexes, 
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The price paid for a unit of m-type labour, wm, is equal to its marginal product. From 
(12b), the equilibrium growth rate of wm and the equilibrium H-premium, W (a measure of intra-
country wage inequality), are, at each time t, respectively: 
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3.2. Equilibrium R&D 
The expected current value of the flow of profits to the producer of j, V(k, j, t), relies on the 
profits at each time, P (k, j, t), on the interest rate and on the expected duration of the flow, 
which is the expected duration of the successful research’s technological-knowledge leadership. 
Such duration, in turn, depends on pb(k,j,t). The expression for V(k, j, t) is 
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Under free-entry R&D equilibrium the expected returns are equal to resources spent, 
 ),,(),1,(),,( tjkrstjkVtjkpb =+ . (15) 
The equilibrium can be translated into the path of technological knowledge. The following 
expression for the equilibrium m-specific growth rate (where the equilibrium m-specific 
probability of successful R&D, pbm, given r and pm is plugged in) is obtained: 
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The equilibrium aggregate resources devoted to R&D, R, at each time t, are  
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3.3. Steady state 
The stable and unique steady-state endogenous growth rate, which through the Euler equation 
(9) also implies a stable steady-state interest rate, )( *** HL rrr == , designed by )( *** HL ggg ==  
is: 
 
q
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* ******* ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ  Þ 0ˆˆˆ ** === npp LH . (18) 
Thus, *r  is obtained by setting (9) equal to (16), and *g  results from plugging *r  into (9). *mp  
and *n  can be found by equalling the steady-state growth rates of QH and QL.  
 
3.4. Subtitles Transitional dynamics and sensitivity analysis 
Since our aim is to analyse the direction of technological-knowledge progress and its 
repercussion on H-premium, we can use (16) to obtain the differential equation: 
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We can thus verify first the stability of the relative productivity of the technological knowledge 
used together with H, D º QH/QL (a technological-knowledge bias measure). Then, we can 
characterise the behaviour of other variables, namely the H-premium in (13).  
Using the 4th-order Runge-Kutta numerical method, we present technological knowledge’s 
precise time path for a set of baseline parameter and labour level values:  
 
Baseline parameter values and baseline labour endowments 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
A 1.50  a  0.70  z  4.00  H  0.90 
h 1.20  q  3.33  q   1.50  L  1.00 
l  1.00  b  1.60  r  0.02  s  1.90 
 
Figures 1a and 1b below summarises the main results.  
 
Figure 1. Transitional dynamics of 
1a. The technological-knowledge bias 1b. The H-premium 
  
They compare the baseline steady-state paths of, respectively, the technological-knowledge 
bias, D, and the H-premium, W, with the ones resulting from an exogenous increase (at time 
t = 0) in skilled labour (from 0.9 to 1.1, 1.3 and 1.5). Table1 compares initial and steady-state 
values of D and W under different scenarios.  
 
Table 1 - Comparing initial and steady state values of the variables 
 Three different scenarios 
Variable 
Scenario 1, H = 1.1 Scenario 2, H = 1.3 Scenario 3, H = 1.5 
Initial Steady state Initial Steady state Initial Steady state 
D 12.784 15.967 12.784 20.499 12.784 26.810 
W 3.734 4.174 3.435 4.350 3.198 4.632 
 
Due to the increase in skilled labour, f ( j) in (6) jumps immediately. This biases the 
technological-knowledge in favour of H-intermediate goods (see Figure 1a). Such bias 
increases the supply of H-intermediate goods, thereby increasing the number of final goods 
produced with H-technology – see (10) – and lowering their relative price – see (11). Thus, 
relative prices of final goods produced with H-technology drop continuously towards the 
12
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234
constant steady-state levels. This path of relative prices implies that the technological-
knowledge bias is increasing, from 784.12)0(* === tDDBaseline , but at a decreasing rate until it 
reaches its new higher steady state, D* = 26.810 (see Figure 1a).  
Figure 1b shows that an increase of skilled labour causes an immediate drop in the H-premium, 
at time t = 0, from 129.4* =BaselineW  to W = 3.198. This is because an increase in H raises its 
relative supply and lowers its relative wage – see (13); i.e., the H-premium falls instantly due to 
the rise in the supply of skilled labour without new endogenous technological knowledge and so 
without change in technological-knowledge bias.  
By reason of complementarity between inputs in (1), changes in the H-premium are closely 
related to the technological-knowledge bias, as (13) clearly shows. As the increase in the supply 
of skilled labour induces technological-knowledge bias, the immediate effect on the level of the 
H-premium ends up being reverted in the transition. That is, the stimulus to the demand for H, 
arising from the technological-knowledge bias, increases the H-premium. Once in steady state, 
with a constant technological-knowledge bias, the H-premium remains constant. Moreover, we 
must highlight that the steady-state H-premium can be greater than that which has prevailed 
under the baseline case.  
In summary, instead of the market-size channel emphasised by the skill-biased technological 
change literature, we propose another mechanism to explain the increase in the H-premium 
even when the relative supply of high-skilled labour has also increased. In particular, the 
market-size is neutralised by introducing risk assessment.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Instead of the market-size channel emphasised by the SBTC, we propose another explanation 
for skill-biased technological knowledge. By removing the scale effects, we propose a new 
mechanism by which the pool of labour increases the rate of technological-knowledge progress 
and thus determines the technological-knowledge bias. Indeed, through the price channel, the 
technological-knowledge bias increases but at a decreasing rate until it reaches its new higher 
steady state. 
Concerning wage inequality, we find that an increase in skilled labour causes an immediate 
steep drop in the skilled premium since its relative supply decreases its relative wage. This 
immediate effect is reverted in the transitional dynamics towards the constant steady-state 
skilled premium, due to the stimulus to the demand for skilled labour resulting from the 
technological-knowledge bias. Moreover, we note also that with a sufficiently strong 
technological-knowledge-absorption effect, the steady-state high-skilled premium is greater than 
the previous one. 
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Abstract 
Traditional tools for occupational risk assessment like preliminary hazard analysis, hazard 
checklists, fault trees are based on the isolation of hazard activities from the entire process and 
the development of specific measures to avoid/minimize the occupational risk. Their basic 
assumption is that the system’s structure and even its behavior are known and do not change 
with time. Such methods require the system linearization, a detailed description of the system 
and risk scenarios, and may not be adequate for systems that are dynamic, incompletely 
described, and underspecified, like most of modern socio technical systems. To deal with 
dynamic environments, where daily routine activities require flexibility rather than rigidity, 
Resilience Engineering (RE) has developed new methods and tools for system modelling. 
According to RE the main target for safety management is to increase the ability of the 
organization at all levels to adjust its operation to changes and disturbances. The Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) is based on RE principles and concepts aimed at 
describing and analyzing emergent behaviors in complex sociotechnical systems. This research 
utilizes FRAM combined with Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) – FRAM-AHP method - for 
occupational risk assessment. FRAM-AHP method is based on system functioning, not in the 
identification of specific hazards as traditional tools. According to FRAM the analyses of 
performance variability and how variability may combine and resonate are characterized as a 
quality rather than a quantity. The main steps of a FRAM analysis are: (1) setting the goal for 
modeling and describing the situation to be analyzed; (2) identifying the main functions of the 
process, and characterizing them, according to input, output, preconditions, resources, time and 
control; (3) characterizing the actual/potential variability of functions; (4) considering both normal 
and the worst-case variability; (5) defining functional resonances, based on potential/actual 
couplings among functions; (6) and providing ways to monitor the performance variability. The 
FRAM-AHP method aims to introduce a multi-criteria decision-support method to quantify FRAM 
analyses to be used for risk assessment purposes. Multi-criteria decision-support methods like 
AHP are used in situations involving multiple objectives, various decision-makers, and the 
simultaneous treatment of complex issues. In this sense, this research contributes to the 
evolution of FRAM, by proposing the application of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), to 
investigate the relative importance of the criteria and alternatives used for the identification of 
phenotypes of performance variability, as well as the aggregation of variability. The construction 
and use of the AHP model are developed in four stages; namely: structuring the hierarchy in 
order to identify the main goal, criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives; data collection of value 
judgments issued by experts; calculating the priority of each alternative, and consistency 
analysis. The case study results indicated that FRAM-AHP enables the simultaneous 
participation of multiple experts in different steps of analysis, and led to the reduction of 
subjectivity associated with the occupational risk assessment in complex socio-technical 
systems. 
 
Keywords: Risk assessment; The functional resonance analysis method, Analytic hierarchy 
process, Accident analysis, Resilience engineering. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The approaches of risk assessments are structured from the engineering tradition, represented 
by methods such as hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), and fault tree analysis (FTA) that 
were developed for technological systems and then adapted to include human actions and 
organizational functions. (Hollnagel, 2012). 
Most of the existing methods for assessing occupational safety are linear and do not cope with 
system complexity. These methods believe that the system’s structure and even its behavior do 
not change with time. Therefore, they do not provide efficient ways to assess the potential for 
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accidents in the ever-changing work environment, based on the actual execution of daily tasks, 
although they may indicate an estimated general risk and frequency of behaviors or unsafe 
conditions (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2009; Mitropoulos and Namboodiri, 2011); Harms-
Ringdahl, 2001; Ismail, Doostdar and Harun, 2012). 
Understanding the complexity of a risk, or a portfolio of risk, of an organization is crucial when 
selecting the appropriate option for the risk assessment (ISO/IEC, 2009; Mehta and Agnew, 
2010; Fung et al., 2010). 
To deal with dynamic environments, where daily routine activities require flexibility rather than 
rigidity, Resilience Engineering (RE) has developed new methods and tools for system 
modelling. According to RE the main target for safety management is to increase the ability of 
the organization at all levels to adjust its operation to changes and disturbances. The functional 
resonance model is based on RE principles and concepts aimed at describing and analyzing 
emergent behaviors in complex sociotechnical systems (Andersson et al., 2002; Levenson, 
2004; Hollnagel, 2007; Steen and Aven, 2011). 
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) has been developed to provide a method 
to deal with such systems, focusing on the nature of everyday activities rather than on systems’ 
previously defined structure, or the nature of failures.   
FRAM is able to accommodate past occurrences normally addressed by accident analysis, 
therefore being used as an accident analysis method, and to understand future occurrences 
normally addressed through risk assessment, or system modeling methods (Hollnagel, 2004; 
Hollnagel, 2012). 
At the current stage of FRAM development, the analyses related to the identification of 
performance variability phenotypes, and to the variability aggregation to find potential 
resonances, are performed by experts’ judgments, characterized by the subjectivity of 
evaluations. This makes it entirely possible to introduce a multi-criteria decision-support method. 
Among the more widely used of multiple-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) approaches, 
methods and techniques in various fields of research is the method of Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) that provides a good compromise between targets, understanding, and 
objectivity. AHP is based on the use of pairwise comparisons that lead to the elaboration of a 
ratio scale. Moreover, AHP permits the refinement of the decision-making process, while 
respecting the global coherence of the user’s preferences, by calculating an overall consistency 
ratio (Saaty, 1980; Costa, 2006; Vidal et al., 2010).  
The construction and use of the AHP model are supported by three basic principles (Saaty, 
1990; Saaty, 1999; Figueira and Ehrogott, 2005; Costa, 2006):   
• Structuring the hierarchy. This principle involves identifying the overall objective, the criteria 
that must be satisfied to fulfill the focus, sub criteria under each criterion and the alternatives 
• Establishing priorities. This principle involves three steps. The first step is to make pairwise 
comparisons to specify the decision-makers’ preferences, that is, to compare pairs of like 
elements in each level of a hierarchy against a criterion in the next higher level. The second 
step is to synthesize the judgments made in the pairwise comparisons to get the relative 
priorities of each element. Finally, average is calculated over the rows by adding the values in 
each row of the normalized matrix and then dividing the rows by the number of entries in each. 
• Measuring the logical consistency. The AHP measures the overall consistency of judgments 
by means of a consistency ratio (C.R.). The value of C.R. should be 10 percent or less to be 
acceptable. 
In this sense, this research contributes to the evolution of FRAM, by proposing the application of 
the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The FRAM-AHP method aims to introduce a multi-criteria 
decision-support method to quantify FRAM analyses to be used for accident analysis and risk 
assessment purposes. 
 
2. FRAM-AHP 
The main steps of a FRAM-AHP analysis are:  
• Setting the goal for modeling and describing the situation to be analyzed.  
• Identifying the main functions of the process, and characterizing them, according to input, 
output, preconditions, resources, time, and control. According to FRAM, the basis for risk 
assessment and the analysis of accidents is the design of functional entities relevant to the 
scenarios or tasks. Functional entities are characteristic functions, and not system structures or 
physical units. Inputs (I) provide links to previous functions. Inputs may transform or be used by 
the function to produce outputs. Outputs (O) provide links to subsequent functions. Resources 
(R) are necessary for the function to process the input (hardware, procedures, software, energy, 
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and labor) to create the output. Controls (C) are the restrictions or controlling elements that 
serve to supervise or limit function (monitoring and tuning). Preconditions (P) are system 
conditions that must be satisfied before performance of a function (another process or step, and 
specific condition) can occur. Time (T) or time window (duration) is a special type of resource or 
constraint based on an allowed amount of time. 
• Identification of phenotypes of performance variability. According to FRAM manifestations of 
variability are identified from outputs of functions, according to the ‘‘elaborate solution.’’ The 
‘‘elaborate solution’’ uses phenotypes, or failure modes, normally used in safety studies. The 
necessary analyses involve four basic groups (time/duration; force/distance/direction; object; 
and sequence), which are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Dimensions of failure modes. 
 
This step is supported by AHP, given the participation of multiple decision-makers (experts), 
and the concurrent treatment of complex issues. The AHP hierarchical structure characterizing 
actual or potential variability is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Direction
Timing
Reversal, repetition, commission, intrusion
Too fast, too slow
Too far, too short
Wrong action, wrong object
Too much, too little
Too long, too short
Wrong direction
Too early, too late, omission
Speed
Distance
Sequence
Object
Force
Duration
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Figure 2: AHP Hierarchical structure for characterizing actual or potential variability 
 
The questionnaire based on AHP hierarchical structure, shown in Figure 3, is used to obtain 
value judgments. 
 
Too early Too late Omission
Force    
Distance 
Direction
Wrong   
Object   
Omission Jumping Repetition
Proximity Similar Unrelated
Weighting of output 
variability
Wrong part Reversal
Timing    
Duration
Sequence
Too weak 
or 
insufficient
Too strong 
or 
excessive
Too short 
or Wrong 
direction
Too long 
or goes 
Too far
240
 
Figure 3. Judging output variability. 
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Sequence of Objects, Movements, or (state) Changes, rate the following:
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1. Knowing the objective of determining the relative importance of phenotypes in relation to output variability, rate the
following:
Similar object has compared to unrelated object
Repetition has  compared to reversal   
5. Knowing the objective of determining the relative importance of failure modes related to variability in terms of
Wrong Objects or Points to the Wrong Object, rate the following:
compared to similar object
Proximity  (neighbouring) object has
Sequence has   
compared to sequence   
compared to sequence   
compared to wrong object   
Judging output variability
compared to time/duration  
Force/distance/direction has compared to wrong object   
minor importance larger importance
Too weak or insufficient has compared to too strong or excessive  
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2. Knowing the objective of determining the relative importance of failure modes related to variability in terms of Force,
Direction and Distance, rate the following:
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• Aggregation of variability. According to FRAM the variability of a function can result from 
coupling to upstream functions, where outputs from upstream functions (used as input, 
precondition, resource, control, or time) may vary and therefore can affect the variability of 
downstream functions. Characterizing the actual or potential variability of each function involves 
analysis of five criteria, namely: input, preconditions, resources, time, and control under two 
alternatives (timing and precision). The analyses were also supported by AHP using the 
hierarchical structure shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4: AHP Hierarchical Structure for characterizing variability aggregation 
 
The questionnaire derived from the hierarchical structure, illustrated in Figure 5, is used to 
obtain value judgments. 
 
Timing Precision
Input Time Preconditions ControlResources
Weightings of Upstream-Downstream coupling
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Figure 5. Judging functional upstream-downstream coupling 
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• Defining functional resonances, based on potential/ actual couplings among functions and 
providing ways to monitor and minimize the variability of performance. According to FRAM the 
determination of possible functional resonances is based on potential or actual couplings 
among functions. Analysis to determine functional resonance provides the necessary basis for 
identifying potential problem areas in the system’s functioning, in addition to the more traditional 
analyses of failure modes or malfunctions. The high-priority coupling emerges as the 
simultaneous presence of a certain basic group of phenotypes, or failure modes in the output of 
a function, and in one of the downstream function entrances. These priority groups are used to 
characterize potential functional resonances in the system.  
• The last step is to propose ways to damper functional resonance. According to FRAM this 
model can be used to identify the conditions where developments may potentially get out of 
control. This model can, therefore, be used as a basis for proposing indicators, hence as a basis 
for monitoring. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Traditional methods of risk assessment applied in the construction industry are not providing the 
expected responses to reduce the level of occurrence of occupational diseases and accidents 
involving material and human losses. Moreover, the employee no longer dominates the process 
resulting from the loss of control over his job.  
The major limitations of traditional methods of risk assessment when used in the construction 
industry are: 
• Lack of adequate description for use in the operation. 
• The complexity of the methods requiring specific training. 
• Doubt about applicability in the industry. 
• Specificity of the project not warranting application of the technique. 
• Availability of reliable data and skilled analysts. 
• Difficulty in the identification of benefit due to the high level of uncertainty. 
• The low demand for risk assessment by customers. 
• The great distance between the scientific model and the actual work (Gambatese et al., 2007; 
Pinto et al., 2011; Mitropoulos and Namboodiri, 2011). 
The pilot of the method was done in the construction industry in the modernization of Maracanã 
for the soccer world cup in the City of Rio de Janeiro (Rosa et al, 2015). We apply the method in 
the process where demolished concrete was reused in the construction. This activity posed 
risks of accidents involving factors like noise, vibration, dust, thermal overload, postures, and 
other work accidents. This process has the following functions:  
• Material selection (screening);  
• Delivery of sorted waste for processing the crusher using loaders;  
• Crushing the material using the mobile jaw crusher;  
• Delivery of the crushed material. 
According to FRAM first step, the identification of key functions is shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Main features of the process. 
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The analysis were performed by a team consisting of three experts in health, safety, and the 
environment, and three worker representatives. Figure 7 shows the relative importance of the 
output variability x functional couplings (FRAM-AHP) over the map of the main features of the 
process.  
 
Figure 7. FRAM: instantiations of the model. 
 
The analysis indicated that the efficacious performance of the system requires perfect levelling 
of the equipment. Perfect levelling leads to low consumption of energy, low noise level, low 
dispersion of pollutants, high productivity and a good level of safety for workers. If levelling 
becomes too variable, then charging and unloading will occur in adverse conditions and without 
adequate control. This can lead to a situation that is out of control. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
Finding ways to improve occupation safety performance is a huge challenge to the scientific 
community, employees, and employers. Traditional methods for risk assessment and accident 
analysis do not provide the expected outcome, as indicated worldwide by stagnation in the level 
of occurrence of occupational illnesses and accidents, involving material and human losses 
(Geetha et al. 2007; ILO 2009). 
The fact that normally used approaches to risk assessment and accident analysis require the 
linearization system and a detailed description of the system and the scenarios argues for the 
need to develop approaches that can be used in complex sociotechnical systems that are 
dynamic, incompletely described, and therefore underspecified. 
This paper presents the motivation that led to the use of FRAM, to assess risk in sociotechnical 
systems, and highlights the proposal to adopt the AHP when performing the functional 
characterization of variability.  
FRAM-AHP enables the simultaneous participation of multiple experts in different steps of 
analysis, and led to the reduction of subjectivity associated with the occupational risk 
assessment in complex socio-technical systems. 
As methodological challenges for future research are the adoption of AHP in accident analysis 
with FRAM and developing of a FRAM-AHP app. 
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Abstract 
There is a growing concern related to the effects of nanomaterials in safety and health. 
Nanotechnologies are already present in many consumer products, including textiles. In fact, 
the textile industry is already an important user of nanotechnologies. 
Functionalities such as antibacterial (odour prevention), ultraviolet radiation protection, water 
and dirt repellency, self-cleaning or flame retardancy can be obtained more effectively than with 
traditional finishing processes. Although it is possible to incorporate the nanoparticles directly in 
the production of the fibres, the most frequent application is made in the final phase of the 
textile manufacturing process, which corresponds to fabric finishing. In this case, there is a 
higher rate of release of nanoparticles from the textile material, which can occur due to different 
effects (abrasion and other mechanical stresses, sweat, irradiation, washing, temperature 
changes, etc.). It is then expectable that “nanotextiles” may release individual nanoparticles, 
agglomerates of nanoparticles or small particles of textile with or without nanoparticles. These 
nanoparticles can then interfere with workers, consumers and natural ecosystems. In terms of 
occupational safety, it is important to consider the workers that are involved in the fabric 
finishing plants, which have to handle chemical preparations and fabrics containing 
nanomaterials. It is also essential to take into consideration all downstream workers, with 
special emphasis on the clothing manufacturing, In fact, the workers involved in cutting, sewing 
and garment finish have to manipulate all the time large quantities of fabrics, potentially 
releasing nanoparticles. It is important to understand the type of integration of the nanoparticles 
in textiles and the mechanism of release. 
There are different exposure routes of the human body to nanoparticles. In case of textiles, skin 
contact in particularly relevant, although, inhalation and ingestion can also be relevant, in this 
case especially with babies who often suck textiles. Following a mandate, from the European 
Commission, several standards are being developed under the auspices of the European 
Committee for Standardization. In this paper, it is presented the development and application of 
a test method to evaluate the skin exposure to nanoparticles, to evaluate the transfer of the 
nanoparticles from the textile to the skin by the effect of abrasion and sweat. The method can 
be easily applied for instance in the case of nano-silver and nano-titanium dioxide, which are 
most frequently used in textiles. 
Nanotechnology is very promising to obtain novel effects and to contribute to industrial 
competitiveness. However, it is also essential to identify the risks in terms of safety and health 
of the workers and of the consumers, as well as effects on the environment during all the life 
cycle of the nanotextiles. Further research is needed to better understand this subject. 
 
Keywords: Nanotechnology, Safety and Health, Nanotextiles, Consumer Products, Skin 
Contact. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently there has been a rapid emergence of nanotechnology into several consumer products, 
which has led to concerns as regards the potential risk for human health following consumer 
exposure. But there is also a concern in terms of occupational safety and health, related to the 
exposure of workers involved in manufacturing, processing and handling of consumer goods 
containing nanomaterials. 
Textiles are one of the most heavily traded commodities in the world. The industry is very 
diverse and its products are used by virtually everybody from private households to large 
businesses. The textile industry is already an important user of nanotechnologies and there are 
a significant number of “nanotextiles” in the market, including many consumer goods, with the 
incorporation of nanoparticles. These include many textiles used in direct contact with the skin, 
such as underwear, shirts and socks but also interior textiles like cushions, blankets or mattress 
covers. 
There is a knowledge gap between the technological progress in nanotechnology and 
nanosafety research which is estimated to be 20 years, and it is likely to expand. The European 
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Agency for Safety and Health at Work has established as priority for research related to the 
safety and health in Europe during the period 2013-2020 the increase of knowledge on 
nanomaterials in occupational settings, including new generation nanomaterials and understand 
their characteristics in relation to toxicity in biological systems. 
The risk for the workers and for the consumer is linked to the characteristic properties of certain 
nanomaterials that make them different from their macroscale counterparts and will be 
determined by the chemical composition of the nanomaterial, its physicochemical properties, the 
interactions with the textile materials and the potential exposure levels. Ingestion exposure via 
the gut, airborne exposure via the lungs and dermal exposure are the most important exposure 
routes to be considered in a risk analysis. In addition, the increasing use of nanomaterials, 
including for industrial purposes, raises specific concerns regarding their disposal at the end of 
their life cycle with the unavoidable release to the environment that may lead to indirect human 
exposure. 
The European Commission, in its action plan for Europe 2005-2009, defined a series of 
articulated and interconnected actions for the immediate implementation of a safe, integrated 
and responsible approach for nanosciences and nanotechnologies. In line with this 
commitments, it is important to determine the applicability of the existing regulations to the 
potential risks of nanomaterials. It was then concluded that the term “nanomaterials” was not 
mentioned specifically in European Union (EU) legislation but that existing legislation in principle 
covers the potential health, safety and environmental risks in relation to nanomaterials. It was 
then decided to publish an official definition of nanomaterial, which is a basis for the adoption 
and implementation of legislation, policy and research programmes concerning products of 
nanotechnologies. According to this definition, “Nanomaterial” means a natural, incidental or 
manufactured material containing particles, in an unbound state or as an aggregate or as an 
agglomerate and where, for 50 % or more of the particles in the number size distribution, one or 
more external dimensions is in the size range 1 nm-100 nm. But in specific cases and where 
warranted by concerns for the environment, health, safety or competitiveness, the number size 
distribution threshold of 50 % may be replaced by a threshold between 1 and 50 % (European 
Commission, 2011). 
This definition, although based on available scientific knowledge, is wider that the present 
definition included in ISO / EN standards. The definition was supposed to be reviewed by the 
end of 2014 (especially in what concerns the increase or decrease of the number size 
distribution threshold of 50 %), but this revision has been postponed to 2016, based on the 
three reports published by the Joint European Research Centre (the last one was published in 
June 2015) and taking into account the consultation with stakeholders. 
At present, some EU Regulations already include a specific mention to nanomaterials. This is 
the case of food (including additives and packaging), biocides and cosmetic products. But this is 
still not the case of textiles. 
The General Products Safety Directive (GPSD) is intended to ensure a high level of product 
safety throughout the EU for consumer products that are not covered by specific sector 
legislation, which is the case of textiles. It is foreseen to modify GPSD into a Regulation, 
including then a specific mention to nanomaterials. 
The growing concern about the possible negative effects of nanomaterials on humans and on 
the environment can lead to restrictions to “nanotextiles”. In fact, for instance, the 2014 version 
of the ecological label GOTS (Global Organic Textile Standard) fully bans the presence of 
nanofinishes in textiles. Also in the recent discussion of the new version of the EU ecolabel for 
textiles, there were several voices to exclude nanomaterials. 
In the present paper, after making an overview of the use of nanotechnology in textiles, with 
special emphasis on textiles for major consumer applications, the safety and health concerns 
related to nanotextiles are presented. The paper includes then a case study concerning the 
development of a test method to evaluate the skin exposure to nanoparticles, mainly directed to 
the transfer of the nanoparticles from the textile to the skin. 
This paper does not deal with the penetration of the nanoparticles into the skin. There are many 
studies about this topic, related for instance to sunscreens and cosmetics, which are often 
based on nanomaterials. In fact, only the smaller nanoparticles (diameter lower than 10 nm) 
seem to be able to penetrate in the undamaged skin, although in the skin is injured, larger 
nanoparticles can penetrate (see for instance Labouta et al, 2011). 
This paper also does not concern the toxicological aspects related to nanoparticles. This topic 
has been and is being extensively studied in many research works. The safety and health 
concerns related to nanoparticles is very important for instance for the registration of chemical 
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substances in nanoform in the REACH system. Nanotoxicology is a very important science that 
will serve as a basis for future regulations, including possibly textile products. 
 
2. USE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY IN TEXTILES 
Often the first application of nanotechnology to textiles that comes to the minds is related to 
nanofibers. 
Nanofibers are normally produced by the electrospinning process. The polymer must previously 
be dissolved in a solvent. The process makes use of electrostatic and mechanical forces to spin 
fibers from the tip of a fine orifice or spinneret, with evaporation of the solvent. This process 
produces in fact a nonwoven web and nanofibers normally cannot be used in common textile 
processing. 
Nanofibers have applications in medicine, including artificial organ components, tissue 
engineering, implant material, wound dressing and drug delivery. In fact, all these products are 
not normally considered as textile products, as they do not fully enter in the definition of the EU 
Regulation no. 1007/2011 (they cannot be processed like traditional fibres) and they are not 
normally present in general consumer products. This paper will not further consider nanofibers. 
In this paper we will also not include the use of carbon nanotubes. In fact, carbon nanotubes 
pose serious health problems but, due to the present high cost, are for the moment only used in 
high-tech products and not in “normal” textile products. 
When we speak about “nanotextiles” we refer normally to traditional textile products in which 
engineered nanomaterials (normally nanoparticles) are incorporated or on which a 
nanostructured surface has been applied. In fact, nanotechnology is already very often used in 
textile products and involves the incorporation of nanoparticles in textile materials or the 
nanostructuration of the surface, in order to obtain specific functionalities (Wong et al., 2006; 
Gowri et al., 2010). The most common effects are: 
· water and dirt repellency (including self-cleaning properties, also called “lotus leaf” effect); 
· antibacterial properties: 
· protection against ultraviolet radiation; 
· flame retardancy. 
Table 1 presents the nanomaterials that are more commonly used in the functionalization of 
textiles. 
 
Table 1 – Nanomaterials used in the functionalization of textiles (adapted from Som et al., 2010) 
Nanomaterial Function 
Silver (Ag) antibacterial (odour), electrically conductive 
Titanium dioxide(TiO2) 
UV protection 
self-cleaning 
water and dirt repellent 
Zinc oxide 
UV protection 
antibacterial 
self-cleaning 
abrasion resistance, stiffness 
Silicon dioxide (SiO2) 
water and dirt repellent 
abrasion-resistant, reinforcement 
improved dyeability 
Aluminium oxide (Al2O3)  
abrasion resistance 
flame retardant 
Nanoclays (e.g. 
montmorillonite) 
abrasion resistance 
flame retardant 
support of active ingredients 
 
Nanomaterials can be incorporated in textiles in two different ways: during fiber production or 
during textile finishing. 
In fiber manufacturing, the nanoparticles are introduced by mixing in the polymer, before fiber 
spinning. The incorporation is made either in the melted polymer, in the case of melt spinning, 
or in the polymer solution, in the case of wet or dry fiber spinning processes. In both cases, the 
nanoparticles are evenly distributed inside the fiber volume. We can speak in this case of a 
“nanocomposite” material. The content of nanoparticles in the fiber can be as low as 0.1% to 
obtain a sufficient functionalization (Som et al., 2009). When the incorporation is done by this 
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process, the nanoparticles are firmly incorporated in the textile fiber and the effect is highly 
durable. The nanoparticles are inside the fiber and normally can only be released by means of 
abrasion. This fact poses low risk in terms of safety and health both for the workers involved in 
the subsequent textile processing and for the consumers. 
Although the use of fibers functionalized by means of the incorporation of nanoparticles before 
fiber spinning has the advantage of having a very durable effect, it has as two major 
inconvenients: the process cannot be applied to natural fibers and there is a dependence on the 
fiber manufacturer. In fact, the textile manufacturing chain is very long, from yarn spinning to the 
final product, and it is normally much easier and cheaper to work with traditional textiles and 
apply the functionalization at the end of the textile process, during fabric finishing. 
The incorporation of nanoparticles during fabric finishing can be obtained by traditional 
processes like dipping (exhaustion process), padding, printing or coating. To assure a good 
adhesion of the nanoparticles to the textile surface, organic polymers are normally used. 
In this case, there are further concerns for the safety and health of the workers involved in the 
fabric finishing processing, due to the manipulation of the chemicals containing nanoparticles 
and of the textile itself. There must also be a concern for the workers in the garment 
manufacturing processes, which will be manipulating the textiles containing nanoparticles in all 
the cutting, sewing, pressing and packaging operations. 
Most of the nanotextiles present in the consumer products are based on the application of 
nanoparticles by means of the fabric finishing process. The release of nanoparticles during the 
daily use is a safety and health concern, which will be dealt in the next section. 
 
3. SAFETY AND HEALTH CONCERNS RELATED TO NANOTEXTILES 
As there are different manufacturing processes by which nanoparticles can be integrated in 
fibres or textiles, there can be variation in how tightly bound the nanoparticles are into the textile 
material (fibre or coating). It is these factors and the use to which the textile is subjected that 
determine whether and to what extent nanoparticles can be released from it. 
Depending on the location of the integration of nanoparticles in the textile, they can be more or 
less heavily exposed to external influences. In addition, there can be different degrees of 
binding of the nanoparticles to the textile material (covalent bonding, ionic bonding, hydrogen 
bonding, Van der Waals bonding). The strength level of bonding depends primarily on the 
following factors (Som et al., 2009): 
· Type of nanoparticle (chemical composition, shape, etc.) 
· Type of fabric 
· Ageing of the nanoparticle functionalization (e.g. photo-oxidative reactions on the 
nanoparticle surface can cause the destruction of  functional groups and the covalent bond 
to the fabric) 
· Process engineering parameters during production 
· Previous and subsequent finishing treatments of the textile fabric. 
· The stability (durability) of the nanoparticles present in the textile is not only dependent on 
their binding to the fabric, but also on the impacts on the fabric during its life cycle 
(production, use, recycling / disposal), which can damage the textile material or the bond 
between the nanoparticle and the fibers: 
· Abrasion 
· Mechanical stress (such as strains, pressure) 
· Ultraviolet radiation 
· Body fluids (sweat, saliva, urine) 
· Water (rain, washing) 
· Solvents (during textile processing or dry cleaning) 
· Detergents (either in textile processing or during laundry) 
· Temperature changes; high temperatures (up to 225° C in textile finishing). 
It is known that textiles can lose between 5% (in the case of continuous filaments) and up to 
20% (in the case of staple fiber loose materials) of their mass during use as a result of abrasion, 
mechanical influence, irradiation, water, sweat, washing detergents or temperature variations. 
Even if the nanoparticles remain attached to the fibers, they will be released from the textile 
material to the environment (either to the human body, air, water, soil) together with the fibers. 
In fact, nanotextiles may release individual nanoparticles, agglomerates of nanoparticles or 
small particles of textile with or without nanoparticles. 
For instance, in the case of textiles containing nano-silver, there are several studies concerning 
the release of silver nanoparticles during washing (e.g. Benn & Westerhoff, 2008, Geranio et al., 
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2009, Mitrano et al., 2014). Some investigations that have been made show that some products 
can lose up to 35% of the silver in the washing water after only one wash; nevertheless, some 
suppliers of silver-based antibacterial finishes claim that there is practical no release during 
washing and that the finish remains effective after more than 50 washes. 
Safety and health concerns related to nanotextiles should consider all the life cycle of the 
materials: safety for the workers during all the manufacturing stages, especially in the case of 
the application of nanostructured materials in the fabrics, as mentioned in the previous section, 
safety for all the people involved in the trade phases (distribution and retail), safety for the 
consumers. Nanoparticles released from textiles to the air, to the water and to landfill must also 
be taken into consideration, as they can directly or indirectly affect humans. 
The nanoparticles can interact with the human body via three different ways of contact or 
penetration: inhalation, ingestion and skin contact. Although all the three pathways can be 
related to textiles, skin contact is of course the most relevant. This topic will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
4. CASE STUDY: DEVELOPMENT OF A TEST METHOD FOR SKIN EXPOSURE TO 
NANOPARTICLES  
The European Commission has recently issued a mandate to the three European 
Standardization bodies (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) specifically asking to develop standards for 
testing methods and tools for the characterization, behaviour and exposure assessment of 
nanomaterials. The exposure takes into account aspects of health and safety of workers as well 
as of consumers and the environment itself. This mandate identifies four areas for standards 
development: 
· Methodologies for nanomaterial characterization in the manufactured form and before 
toxicity and eco-toxicity testing; 
· Sampling and measurement of workplace, consumer and environment exposure 
· Methods to simulate exposures to nanomaterials 
· Health, safety and the environment. 
This mandate is being handled by the Technical Committee CEN/TC352 – Nanotechnologies. A 
roadmap identified 45 standardization projects in the field of "characterization of and exposure 
to nanomaterials" and "health, safety and environment". Among these, ten are directly within 
CEN/TC 352 scope, clustered in three areas: 
Area 1: Sampling and measurement at workplace, consumer and environment exposure 
Area 2: Methods to simulate exposures to nanomaterials 
Area 3: Health, safety and the environment 
Within this mandate, an extensive standardization programme has been prepared and is being 
developed, with conclusion foreseen for 2018. 
In area 2, one of the possible exposures of humans to nanomaterials is skin exposure. As this 
topic can be very relevant for textiles, the Technical Committee CEN/TC248 (Textile and Textile 
Products) is at present developing a test method named: “Guidance on measurement 
techniques relevant to different exposure routes to nanoparticles – Skin exposure”. Although 
this method is specifically being developed for textiles, it can in principle be applied also to other 
products containing nanomaterials that can enter into direct contact with the skin. 
In order to evaluate the migration of nanoparticles from textiles to the skin, a possible test can 
be based on the use of an artificial perspiration solution under physical stress. Artificial 
perspiration solutions (acid and alkaline) are described in standard EN ISO 105-E04 (Textiles – 
Tests for colour fastness – Part E04: Colour fastness to perspiration). The artificial perspiration 
acid solution is already used in the following document: prEN 16711-2 (Textiles – Determination 
of metal content – Part 2: Determination of metals extracted by acidic artificial perspiration 
solution), with expected publication during 2015. 
In the standard EN ISO 105-E04, there is a simulation of contact with the skin of the textile to be 
tested, together with white standard adjacent fabrics, during 4h at 37ºC, but there is no 
mechanical stress. A possible alternative is to use a test similar to the test EN ISO 105-C06 
(Textiles - Tests for colour fastness - Part C06: Colour fastness to domestic and commercial 
laundering), by immersing the textile to be tested in the artificial sweat solutions, under 
mechanical agitation in a thermostatic bad at 40ºC. Test is made both with the acid (pH 5.5) and 
with the alkaline (pH 8.0) artificial sweat solutions, with separate test specimens. The treatment 
is carried out during 30 minutes and involves the use of acrylic plastic balls to simulate physical 
stress. Nanoparticles, as well as their aggregates and agglomerates that can release 
nanoparticles, are then analysed in the extract solution. 
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This method has been developed by von Goetz et al (2013). These authors have tested 
commercially available textile products intended for sports or outdoor activities (shirts, pants 
trousers and socks, for adults and also for children) which included finishes based on nano-
silver (antimicrobial effect) and nano-titanium dioxide (UV protection). The content of 
nanomaterials in the tested textiles was up to 183 mg Ag / kg of textile or 8543 mg Ti / Kg of 
textile. The tests show a significant release of nano-silver, which reached up to 14%. These 
results are much higher than other reported in the literature and contradict the producers that 
the claim that there is practically no release of nano-silver during the use of textiles and that the 
finish is permanent. In the case of titanium dioxide, no relevant release has been detected. It 
must be emphasized that sun protective lotions, which are put on the skin, are often based on 
nanoparticles of titanium dioxide or zinc dioxide. 
Another possibility, which is also foreseen for possible inclusion in the standard test method to 
be developed, is the release from the textile by mechanical action, through a “linting” 
mechanism. This test could possibly be based in the method mentioned in the standard EN ISO 
9073-10:2004 (Textiles - Test methods for nonwovens - Part 10: Lint and other particles 
generation in the dry state). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Nanomaterials have the potential to improve the quality of life and to contribute to industrial 
competitiveness in Europe. However, the new materials may also pose risks to the environment 
and raise health and safety concerns. The Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly 
Identified Health Risks has concluded that, even though nanomaterials are not per se 
dangerous, there is still scientific uncertainty about the safety of nanomaterials in many aspects 
and therefore the safety assessment of the substances must be done on a case-by-case basis. 
In the case of textiles, there are still very few studies on the possible health risks involved with 
“nanotextiles”. 
The release of nanoparticles from textiles is particularly relevant when the incorporation is made 
by fabric finishing. It can occur by different mechanisms. In this paper, the release resulting from 
skin contact, involving abrasion and sweat, has been analysed more in detail, involving a 
possible standard text method. The studies made up to now involve silver and titanium dioxide 
nanoparticles, which are present in the most common nanotextiles in the consumer market. 
Nevertheless, there are still a lot of discussions on if these nanoparticles can really penetrate 
into the different skin layers and on the negative effects on human health. 
In the case of titanium dioxide, it is very commonly used in sunscreens, the nanoparticles being 
deliberately spread over a large surface of the skin. Comparatively, the dermal exposure coming 
from textiles is much lower, so the relative relevance of skin exposure coming from textiles can 
be questioned. 
Also in the case of nanosilver, it is used in deodorants, deliberately put on the skin, food 
packaging or even in toothpastes. Again the relevance of the silver nanoparticles from the 
textiles to the human body can also be questioned. 
Further research work involving experts in the area of textiles, of safety and health and of 
toxicology is needed before the emergence of any regulation concerning nanotextiles. 
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Abstract  
Work accidents still represent social problem in Europe and the world. For long, research has 
acknowledged the relevance of accident information for prevention and learning and the need 
for companies to develop a reporting and learning culture. A learning culture means that the 
information is available, disseminated, discussed, and changes are implemented. Recently the 
Institute of Medicine emphasized the role of continuously learning for improving health care in 
America and simultaneously decrease costs. Few studies approached this issue comparing 
different learning strategies used by companies. Our study aims to explore how companies use 
accident information and develop strategies for learning with accidents, covering all the learning 
cycle phases through, a)  identifying the learning patterns across companies and across activity 
sectors, b) checking for differences among certified and non-certified companies. Seventeen 
case studies were conducted with organizations operating in Portugal in different activity sectors 
(e.g., chemical industry; construction; transports; energy production, health care) that were 
identified as having good practices. Data was collected using long semi-structured interviews 
with key stakeholders. The interview protocol covered information such as: type of accident 
records; the formal procedure for accident investigation, the use of relevant information towards 
learning and improvement. Additionally, relevant documentation was also analyzed. All data 
was subjected to descriptive analysis, followed by a statistical treatment with Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA), which allows an analysis of multiple and interrelated 
categorical variables and it is used to detect underlying structures in a data set by representing 
the categories of the multiple variables as points in low-dimensional Euclidean spaces. Results 
from the preliminary descriptive analysis suggested that organizations have some 
standardization of the practices used for dealing with accident information. These practices 
cover the procedures, responsibilities and ways to collect, code, analyze and spread the 
information about accidents at all hierarchical levels. Simultaneously, it was observed that some 
(apparently) standardized procedures are characterized by non-standardization. For instance, 
some organizations accept that accident data might be collected by several persons, with 
different job responsibilities and training. The main MCA results showed two dimensions 
corresponding to the technical and social learning strategies and practices and four patterns 
were found. These patterns reveal different levels of learning practices from a level 1 
corresponding to minimal practices used for learning to level 4 that reveal a high degree of 
learning, combining practices of a technical and social nature. Additionally, the results revealed 
that companies in the same activity sector can have very different practices, independently of 
the existence of OHSAS certification. The results allowed to conclude that organizations with 
good safety practices follow the learning cycle. Overall, these organizations have established 
procedures to report accidents and to collect information on them. Nevertheless, results also 
show that there are organizations that still do not maximize the means of learning with work 
accidents. Namely some critical practices require improvement: lack of internal discussion of 
accidents’ causes, accidents learning process entirely centralized in persons with higher 
responsibilities; not all the hierarchical levels are involved in accidents analyses, discussion 
activities and on the resulting information diffusion.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Europe has been facing very difficult times due to the economic crisis and austerity that is 
installed in several countries to assure its sustainability. In this paper, it is our claim, that 
improving prevention through accident learning is the answer for improving safety outcomes 
and decrease organizational costs due to accidents or safety problems. This assertion is 
sustained in two main types of evidence: accident statistics and the role of learning in its 
prevention; reports on costs in Health Care and the role of learning from adverse events/errors 
for increasing quality and efficiency. 
The European statistics on accidents at work reveal that the number of accidents have been 
decreasing but are still high, around 2.4 million leading to around 4500 fatalities (Eurostat, 
2013). Considering all the efforts made in developing an European policy and legislation that 
enforce Safety and investments in changing attitudes and behaviour, those numbers suggest 
that all the efforts are still not enough. This can be the reason behind the fact that in the last 5 
years, several papers were published focusing the need for improving learning from accidents 
and its prevention (e.g. a special number in Safety Science in 2011, see the editorial by Carrol 
& Fahlbruch; Hovden et al., 2011; Størseth et al., 2012; Jorgensen, 2015; Gotcheva et al., 
2015). 
Stock et al. (2007) emphasized that medical errors are linked to more than 98,000 deaths 
annually, and that 58% of these error-related deaths are preventable. In this study the authors 
stress the role of organizational culture and critical success factors, like reporting errors without 
blame, open discussion about errors, statistical analysis of error data that may lead to a 
reduction of medical errors. Recently the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (2013) 
presented a report sustaining that the answer for having “best care at lower cost” requires 
continuous learning in the health care systems. Specifically it is stressed that it is possible to 
reduce the costs (excessive costs in Health Care) and at the same time improve the quality of 
the service. For instance in this report it is shown that “Missed Prevention Opportunities” 
represent a cost of 55 billion dollars, inefficiency in the delivered services (including due to 
mistakes and errors) are estimated to have 130 billion dollars of excess costs. The development 
of the continuous learning requires continuous knowledge development, improvement and 
application and enforcing a continuous learning culture.  
 
1.1. Organizational Learning with accidents 
Major accidents with catastrophic consequences have been analyzed by experts or teams of 
highly trained investigators and, typically, significant lessons can be learned from any single 
event. In contrast, with the “small” but very frequent accidents at work, meaningful conclusions 
leading to prevention are normally drawn up on statistical analysis of aggregated data. 
Preventing accidents at work, as any other type of accidents, involves learning and decision-
making processes that require objective and reliable information. To be effective, it should be 
the final step of a deep-rooted learning process, rather than just the result of isolated corrective 
measures.  
Organizational learning processes may be characterized using two main approaches (Easterby-
Smith & Araujo, 1999): technical and social perspectives. The technical perspective stresses 
that learning requires information processing, interpretation and its respective consequences. 
The social perspective stresses the role of social interaction processes in learning. Together 
these two perspectives suggest three key assumptions about what groups need in order to 
learn from an event: (1) information about the event; (2) opportunity to share points of view 
about the event; (3) acquisition of new knowledge. Nevis et al. (1995) suggested learning 
facilitating factors, such as for instance: scanning imperative (seek out for information in the 
external environment); climate of openness (open communication and sharing errors); 
continuous education (providing resources for learning).  
These proposals concerned organizational learning in general, in an effort to apply these 
perspectives to the safety domain Silva & Lima (2005) suggested 4 types of strategies for 
learning from accidents: diffusion, discussion, training and change. “Diffusion” refers to the 
dissemination of accidents information. “Discussion” goes a step further and includes the 
debate of accidents information. “Training” corresponds to the use of accidents to improve 
workers safety training. “Change” implies the organizational act of modifying something after an 
accident (e.g., changing rules, technologies, supervision, etc.). Each of these four strategies 
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can be applied to the whole organization (global) or only to a sector or department (local). 
Moreover, they can be applied to accidents that happened inside the organization (direct 
experience) or that occurred in other organizations (indirect experience). 
Another approach relates learning to the organizational culture. Namely, it has been strongly 
recommended that organizations should develop a reporting culture and a learning culture 
(Reason, 1997). A reporting culture stresses the importance of getting knowledge from small 
accidents and near misses; a learning culture means that the information is available, 
disseminated, discussed, and changes are implemented. Moreover, Reason (1997) stresses 
that learning implies observing, reflecting, creating and acting. The cycle of information begins 
with the collection of accident data; in certain organizations this data is used internally for 
corrective action and, in fewer cases, for the systematic improvement of safety. In all cases, 
however, accident data is typically used for compensation purposes and for the production of 
official statistics, for which registration procedures and classification schemes are a key issue 
(Jørgensen 1998; Jacinto and Aspinwall, 2004).  Furthermore, Koornneef & Hale (2004) and 
Kingston (2001) summarise several barriers that avoid learning from accidents, as for instance: 
do not collect or preserve information; do not use appropriate methods of analysis; only 
specialists make investigations; blame culture; lack of accountability; passive communication.  
 
1.2. Learning and Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems 
Ultimately, it is also important to explore how organizational safety and learning practices may 
be shaped by the certifications that companies have and its requirements. Safety and Health 
certifications constitute a key tool to help companies to improve the quality of work conditions 
and prevent occupational fatalities and diseases. Specifically, Occupational Health and Safety 
Management Systems (OHSAS) 18001 (2007) help organizations to manage and control their 
occupational health and safety risks, and thus improve their OH&S performance. OSHAS 
specify requirements for incident investigation. Namely, they strongly recommend that 
organizations shall establish, implement and maintain procedure(s) to record, investigate and 
analyse incidents in order to: determine underlying OH&S deficiencies and other factors that 
might be causing or contributing to the occurrence of incidents; identify the need for corrective 
action; identify opportunities for preventive action; identify opportunities for continual 
improvement; communicate the results of such investigations. The investigations shall be 
performed in a timely manner and any identified need for corrective action or opportunities for 
preventive action shall be dealt with in accordance with the relevant parts and the results of 
incident investigations shall be documented and maintained (OSHAS, 2007, 12-13). 
 
1.3. Aims 
Until now research about learning from accidents has been focusing on one case study or on 
one phase of the learning cycle, but few tried to articulate the theoretical assumptions with 
companies’ practices. This study was part of a research project (CAPTAR – Learn to prevent) 
that had the goal of establishing strategies and processes to learn efficiently with accidents and 
that has covered all the cycle phases (from the collection of information to the spread of the 
lessons).  
The present study intends to contribute for the increase of the understanding about how 
companies are using work accident information and developing strategies and practices for 
learning with accidents. Specifically it aims to identify learning patterns across companies and 
across activity sectors and explore its link with OSHAS certification. 
  
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. Sample 
Seventeen case studies were carried out, involving organizations operating in 8 different activity 
sectors (e.g., manufacturing; construction; production and distribution of energy, etc.); 
participating organizations were identified considering three main criteria: size (medium/large); 
safety practices (known by having good practices and good reputation); certified management 
systems (safety management systems and/or quality management systems).  
The majority of these organizations (see table 1) are located in Lisbon and Tagus River Valley 
(i.e. 15); they are either Multinational (i.e. 5) or National (i.e. 12). Almost all (15) have certified 
management systems (e.g. Quality - 12; Environment – 11; Safety and Health – 6; and Social 
Responsibility – 2). Four organizations also have certified management systems that are 
specific to their own activity. In terms of number of workers, four have less than 500 workers, 
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nine have between 501 and 3500 workers and four have more than 3501 workers. The majority 
of the sample organizations have faced changes in the last five years, especially concerning to 
organization’s structure and management (e.g. stakeholder division, group’s fusions). All have 
an occupational health and safety system ranging from one year of antiquity to 45 years. The 
majority have particular risks of operation (N=15, e.g. biological, chemical, explosion, 
transportation), of these seven also have activity specific risks (e.g. Construction activity sector), 
and some have special legal requirements to comply with (N=8, e.g. ATEX and/or Seveso legal 
requirements). 
The response rate to this study is 61%: out of 28 organizations invited, 17 have accepted to 
participate.  
 
Table 1 – Organizations characterization 
Characterization Type Size Geographical location 
Sector 
Multi-
nation
al 
Natio
nal Med Large North 
Lisbon and 
Tagus RIVER 
Valley 
Construction 1 4 - 5 1 4 
Chemical (Manufacturing) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Services 1 1 - 2 - 2 
Energy - 1 - 1 - 1 
Transportation - 3 - 3 - 3 
Food (Manufacturing) 1 - 1 - - 1 
Health Care - 2 - 2 - 2 
Vehicles manufacturing  1 - - 1 - 1 
Total 17 17 17 
 
2.2. Data collection 
The data was collected using long semi-structured interviews with key organizational 
stakeholders. The interview protocol was developed considering the literature and previous 
work (e.g., Silva & Lima, 2005; Jacinto, 2003; Koornneeff, 2000; Reason, 1997). 
The interview protocol is structured according to different information aims and includes both 
closed and open questions. The first part was designed to collect information aiming to 
characterize organizations in general (e.g. geographical location, activity sector, organization 
type). The second part focuses on information aiming to characterize the organizations` safety 
system using 19 items (e.g. “Have any certification on management systems?”) and particular 
cases with 5 items (e.g. “Which are the particular risks in this company or activity sector?”). The 
main part of the interview protocol was designed to collect data concerning Reason’s learning 
cycle. Namely, the interview protocol has three different aims for accidents and incidents 
information collection: 1) Gathering/recording information, 2) Analyzing and coding information 
3) Information dissemination and discussion. The “gathering/recording” phase was 
operationalized using 27 items (e.g. “Which are the procedures for collecting, gathering and 
reporting an accident?”). Analyzing and coding information were operationalized by 11 items 
(e.g. “Do you run in-depth analysis of (all/any) accidents? Criteria?). The feedback learning 
cycle phase was operationalized considering the information discussion practices, with 17 items 
(e.g. “Accidents are discussed with all workers/employees?), and also considering the 
dissemination practices, with 16 items (e.g. “Are past accidents used on training sessions?”). To 
finish, there was also a section about the safety culture that included 8 items. 
In addition to the interviews, some relevant organizational documentation was also collected 
and analysed in the majority of these organizations (e.g. accident forms, accident analyses 
procedures), especially all documents associated with the gathering of information on accidents. 
In some organizations it was also collected pertinent documentation regarding their health and 
safety activity in general (e.g. annual activity reports, statistical indicators or forms); information 
and records about the organizational activity in general were also provided by some 
organizations (e.g. organization presentation, financial reports). 
For the data collection, key stakeholders from different companies identified by the criteria 
stated previously, were contacted. The contacts included informal phone calls followed by a 
formal letter explaining the research project aims, objectives and data collection procedures 
(i.e., copy of the protocol), and a confidentiality contract. Twenty-eight organizations were 
contacted and 17 accepted to participate (i.e. 61% response rate). 
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Interviews were conducted with persons from the health and safety department and most of 
them have included the head of the department. Overall, the interviews length varied between 
two and five hours and corresponded to a total around 170 pages of information. 
After the interview, all the information collected was transcript and validated by the applicable 
interviewees, for which each file was sent out to the applicable interviewee for validation of the 
contents.  
 
2.3. Data analysis 
All collected data was coded according to the learning cycle phases and the statistical analyses 
have been developed considering this variable division.  
In a first step, descriptive frequency analysis allowed to identify the most common learning 
practices used by companies (major similarities) as well as the less frequent (Silva et al, 2010). 
In the second step, Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was used in order to find learning 
strategies patterns. We managed multiple categorical indicators and explored their inter-
relationships. 
MCA allowed us to identify the associations between the multiple categorical variables and 
provided a graphical display of the multidimensionality of the space, representing all the 
categories of the variables in a sub-space with the minimum number of dimensions possible 
(two). With MCA we mapped the structure of the interrelationships between variables and we 
defined the configurations of learning practices. 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
3.1. Descriptive Results 
A preliminary descriptive analysis was conducted earlier (Silva et al, 2010) on the main 
similarities and differences within organizational formal practices considering the learning 
phases: collecting, analysing and information dissemination and discussion. These results 
suggested that organizations have some standardization on the practices they use for 
collecting, coding and analyzing accident information. These formal practices cover the 
procedures, responsibilities and ways to collect, code, analyze and spread the information 
about accidents at all hierarchical levels. Simultaneously, it was observed that some 
(apparently) standardized procedures are characterized by non-standardization. For instance, 
some organizations accept that accident data might be collected by several persons, with 
different job responsibilities and training. 
 
3.2 MCA Results 
The discrimination measures and the contributions of the active variables for both dimensions in 
analysis (inertias 0.266 and 0.218, respectively) are presented in Table 2. The two dimensions 
correspond, roughly, to the technical and social learning strategies and practices. 
From the combination of the two dimensions we can find 4 profiles of learning practices that 
correspond to different levels of learning with accidents, from a level 1 associated to minimal 
practices used for learning to level 4 that reveals a high degree of learning combining practices 
with a technical and social nature (see Figure 1). 
 
Table 2 –Discrimination Measures and contributions of the active variables 
Active variables 
Dimensions 
1 2 
Discrimination 
measures 
Contribution 
(%) 
Discrimination 
measures 
Contribution 
(%) 
Safety responsible 0.481 11.32 0.076 2.18 
Safety technician 0.196 4.61 0.055 1.57 
Supervisors 0.106 2.49 0.118 3.38 
Function (other) 0.024 0.56 0.400 11.45 
Specific Software accidents database 0.244 5.74 0.170 4.87 
Formal analyses methods tools 0.067 1.58 0.589 16.86 
Analyses level 0.497 11.69 0.302 8.65 
Predefined classification schemes 0.105 2.47 0.511 14.63 
Management system review 0.386 9.08 0.008 0.23 
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Newspaper/Newsletter 0.020 0.47 0.489 14.00 
Feedback Supervisors 0.155 3.65 0.047 1.35 
Feedback Workers 0.195 4.59 0.133 3.81 
External diffusion sharing 0.016 0.38 0.434 12.42 
Discussion Management 0.624 14.68 0.021 0.60 
Discussion Supervisors 0.524 12.33 0.127 3.64 
Discussion Workers 0.610 14.35 0.013 0.37 
Total 4.250 100.00 3.493 100.00 
Inertia 0.266  0.218  
 
 
Figure 1 - Topological configurations of formal learning practices profiles 
 
Comparing the position of companies according to these levels (Figure 2) and taking into 
account their activity sector, we observe that companies in the same sector can be very 
different from each other. For instance, the five construction companies are positioned in all the 
levels, one company (Construction 1) revealing a low level of learning, complying only to the 
legal requirements, and two companies (Construction 3 and 5) showing the highest level of 
learning practices, going far beyond legal requirements.  
 
 
258
 
Figure 2 – Formal learning practices profiles: position of companies 
 
Finally, the MCA results were also estimated for taking into account the potential relation with 
certification systems (see Figure 3). Namely, it was considered if companies had OHSAS 
certification (Health & Safety Certification) and if companies had an isolated or integrated 
system (Environment & Safety; Quality, Environment & Safety).  Results reveal that OHSAS 
certification is not related to company’s level of learning, but the type of system (isolated versus 
integrative) is related to different levels of learning practices; namely, the existence of an 
integrated system combining Quality, Environment & Safety seems to be a characteristic of 
companies that reveal higher levels of learning. 
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Figure 3 – Formal learning practices profiles: OSHAS certification and system integration 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained with the 17 cases studied allowed concluding that organizations with good 
safety practices follow the learning cycle. Overall, these organizations have well established 
procedures to report accidents and to collect information on them. Their working definition of 
“occupational accident” is broader than the strictly legal one and much broader than the 
Eurostat’s definition (+3 days lost), since they tend to record and analyze all accidents and 
incidents, even those without injury or days lost. All the organizations comply with Portuguese 
legal requirements in terms of accidents definition and reporting, information gathering, 
statistical analyses and information dissemination.  
These organizations also tend to disseminate the relevant safety information across all 
hierarchical levels and to involve their workforce actively in the responsibility of collecting and 
reporting accident’s information. The most significant results of their accident analysis, including 
causes and the lessons learned, are also disseminated thoroughly, in a way to prevent further 
and future occurrences. In synthesis data suggest three main strengths in organizational formal 
practices: 1) report accidents; 2) analyse almost all accidents and incidents, and 3) produce and 
use statistical data to support aggregate analysis and decision making. 
Nevertheless, results also show that there are organizations that still do not maximize the 
means of learning with work accidents. In particular, some critical practices require improvement 
due to: lack of internal discussion of accidents causes’ analyses; learning processes entirely 
centralized in persons with higher responsibilities; not all the hierarchical levels are involved in 
accidents analyses and discussion; lack of a good communication strategy for the information 
diffusion.  
Results also show that OHSAS certification may represent different opportunities for learning 
and prevention of accidents, depending on the company. This suggests that certification is not 
always the (magic) answer/solution for a better safety system. Furthermore, an integrated 
system of Quality, Environment & OHS seems to be associated with more complex learning 
practices. However, it remains to be answered When, Why, How?   
Considering some recent research (e.g., Cooke & Rohleder, 2007; Krstin, 2007) human 
resources practices and organizational practices play an important role in aiming to increase the 
potential learning from incidents and accidents. Therefore, it will be important to develop more 
research on this issue in order to effectively understand the role of practices and increase their 
preventive power.  
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To conclude, considering the economic costs of occupational accidents and all the benefits of 
learning with those events, having better safety at lower cost depend of our ability to develop 
and sustain a continuous learning culture. 
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Abstract 
The Zero accident vision (ZAV) is a promising new paradigm, which has been developed in 
industrial practice and offers new perspectives for accident prevention. The basic idea of ZAV is 
that all (serious) accidents are preventable, and companies should therefore have the ambition to 
prevent all (serious) accidents (Zwetsloot et al 2013). However, ZAV is a development stemming 
from industry, not from scientific development. Companies from seven European countries 
participated in a first research effort dedicated to ZAV, a project called success factors for the 
implementation of ZAV.  This paper focuses on the qualitative part of that research effort, and 
presents the preliminary findings on success factors for the implementation, good practices and 
challenges encountered from these companies.  
At the time of writing the paper data from interviews in 19 companies were available, as well as 
data from 3 national workshops wherein all companies from the respective countries participated. 
A key success factor is embedding the ZAV commitment in the company; it should be clear that 
the commitment is not hype but is there to stay even in times of change and/or difficulties. The 
companies that participated in the research use various strategies in this respect. The most 
important findings in terms of good practices that came out of our analyses so far are presented in 
this paper.  We distinguish good practices with respect to: (a) the sustainability of the commitment 
to zero accidents, (b) good strategic practices, and (c) good tactical and operational practices. 
Examples of each category are given. All in all we conclude that ZAV is the basis for inspiring and 
innovative approaches to improve safety as well as for the implementation of more traditional 
safety practices. It is part of an on-going challenge which has consequences for the processes, 
the work organisation, organisational culture and leadership. Most ZAV committed companies 
have only implemented a limited number of the more innovative good practices. There is therefore 
great potential to be gained from networking between such companies, and from identifying, 
disseminating and implementing inspiring good practices. This will generate added value for ZAV 
committed companies as well as for other companies that are seriously pursuing improvement of 
their safety performance.   
 
Keywords: good practices, safety strategies, accident prevention, commitment, injury 
prevention 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Zero accident vision (ZAV) is a promising new paradigm, which has been developed in 
industrial practice and offers new perspectives for accident prevention. The basic idea of ZAV is 
that all (serious) accidents are preventable, and companies should therefore have the ambition 
to prevent all (serious) accidents. There are several major new perspectives revealed by thy 
ZAV concept (Zwetsloot et al 2013): 
 
The first perspective is the concept of a ‘commitment strategy’ for safety; this is different from 
the dominant ‘risk control’ strategy to improve safety (Zwetsloot et al 2013). Commitment 
strategies – as opposed to control strategies - are already known in human resource 
management since the mid-eighties (e.g. Walton 1985, Beer 2009). A long term commitment to 
prevent all (serious) accidents creates conditions in organisation wherein initiatives to improve 
safety are encouraged and can flourish. It is important to note that ‘commitments to zero’ are not 
so exceptional in the business world, as many safety engineers propose. Many companies 
today have committed themselves to several ‘zeros’ e.g. lean production (zero economic 
waste), zero defects (Halpin 1966), zero climate impact, or zero tolerance of unacceptable 
behaviour (e.g. bullying, unwanted sexual attention). 
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A second innovative perspective is the importance of ‘vision zero’ for the development of a 
‘prevention culture’, which is usually defined as a culture fostering prevention in the area of 
safety and health at work (2nd Strategy Conference 2011). In this perspective the commitment to 
‘zero’ is a cornerstone for promoting a culture conducive to accident prevention. A third 
perspective is that the goal of zero accidents cannot be realised sustainably with existing good 
practices only: innovative practices are needed. While in traditional safety the focus is on 
‘control’, and innovations are associated with the introduction of new risks, innovations can also 
be an opportunity for better safety, and it makes sense to develop innovative safety practices. A 
fourth perspective is the ethical perspective: zero is the only goal that is ethically sustainable 
(Aaltonen 2007), and is compatible with modern corporate social responsibility and the growing 
attention to business ethics. Last but not least, there is the experience of the ‘Zero Accident 
Forum’ in Finland, wherein more than 300 companies currently participate. Exchanging 
inspiration and good practices in this network has supported the member companies to realize 
significant safety improvements over time, even though their safety performances were already 
much better than the national average when they joined the Forum (Virta et al., 2009). So far 
there is very little, if any, scientific research in this field, but there are good reasons to state that 
the zero accident approach as a very important innovation that deserves the full attention of 
safety researchers (Zwetsloot et al 2013). 
 
The ambition to achieve accident free workplaces should not be confused with an accountable 
zero accident target. In the present era wherein managers and sometimes workers are made 
accountable for many things, and perhaps receive a bonus for reaching their target, there is, of 
course, the risk that the statistics may show zero accidents, but only because accidents are then 
no longer reported and documented. When ‘zero accidents’ is used as a target in a safety control 
strategy, linked with accountability and management by objectives, it can easily lead to false 
safety (Zwetsloot et al 2013). 
 
In the current research project ‘Success factors for the implementation of the Zero Accident 
Vision’ the aim is to better understand the factors and activities that contribute to successful 
accident prevention in companies that have committed themselves to ZAV. The focus thereby is 
on four key areas: (1) commitment to ZAV, (2) safety communication, (3) safety culture, and (4) 
safety learning. In this paper the focus is on the analyses of the successes, good practices and 
challenges of the participating companies. As this research is, to our knowledge, the first to 
investigate the implementation of ZAV, the nature of our research is dominantly explorative in 
nature.  
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The overall research project is carried out in a joint effort of seven research institutes in seven EU 
countries. 27 companies participate in the study, and all have committed themselves to prevent all 
(serious) accident, thereby explicitly or implicitly referring to a ZAV. In the first stage a survey (72 
items, 11 dimensions) was developed that was carried out in the participating companies, in their 
national language. The focus of the survey was on the four key areas previously mentioned 
(safety commitment, communication, culture, learning). Each company received preliminary 
feedback on the results of the survey in their company. The analyses of the survey with respect to 
the four key areas are described in other papers or abstracts for the WOS conference. In this 
paper the focus is on the qualitative part of the research project only. 
 
2.1. Data gathering 
After the survey qualitative data were gathered in two ways: 
Through a limited set of semi-structured interviews (usually 3 or 4 interviews including interviews 
with line managers, safety staff managers and worker representatives) per company. A common 
interview format was developed for use in each country, with focus on identifying the key factors 
that contributed to successes in the company in each of the four areas (safety commitment, 
communication, culture, learning). The interviewees were also asked what, according to them, 
were the most important challenges with ZAV for their company for the next year, and the next five 
years. Other questions addressed their involvement (or not) in safety relevant networking and 
benchmarking activities, and broader ‘zero commitments’ (e.g. zero harm, zero defects, etc.). 
Finally the interviewees were invited to tell a ‘short story’ which illustrated a convincing, interesting 
or unique ‘good practice’ in their company.  
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The interviews were reported in a standardised format whereby the results of the various 
interviews were integrated by the interviewer into a concise ‘company report’. In case of different 
opinions or perspectives between the interviewees, each perspective was mentioned briefly. 
 
Through national workshops with the participating companies. The aims of the national workshops 
were  twofold: 
 
For the companies:  
To give feedback on the results of the project to the participating companies (per country) 
To create and use opportunities to exchange experiences and learn from other ZAV committed 
companies, again with a special focus on sharing the ZAV commitment, safety communication, 
culture and learning. 
 
For the research team: 
Acquiring a better understanding of the qualities, challenges, and needs of ZAV committed 
companies, and the roles of safety communication, culture and learning therein. 
To share and discuss ‘the  meanings’ of the outcomes of the quantitative survey with the company 
representatives 
An opportunity to validate and better understand the successes and challenges (including possible 
hidden hurdles and pitfalls) of the ZAV policies of the companies (identified in the interviews); and 
to better understand how context or/company-specific they are.  
 
Inputs for the national workshops were presentations about: 
The findings from the (European) survey and quantitative data analyses, including European 
comparison data which was provided by the national research team.  
The findings from the (national) interviews, especially the ‘success stories’ (provided by the 
national research team) 
The experiences, stories, challenges, needs and questions of the participating companies (not 
only from the safety officers, but also from managers and workers representatives) provided by 
the company representatives. 
 
From a research perspective these workshops were carried out as focus groups. All presentations 
were followed-up by reflective discussions. After all company stories were presented, the focus of 
the discussion was to go beyond apparent differences between the company activities, and to 
identify common underlying principles between the variety of approaches presented.  From each 
national workshop a concise report was made, according to a standardised format. 
 
At the time of writing this paper, some activities in the project were not beyond the stage of 
planning. Interview data were available from 19 out of the 27 companies that participated in the 
broader research effort, and data from national workshops in 3 out of the 7 countries were 
available. The overview of the sources of the available data used for this paper is given in table 1. 
 
Table 1 – the sources of the qualitative data used in this paper 
 
Country Number of 
companies 
involved in total 
study 
Data from company 
interviews  
Data from national 
workshops 
 
Belgium  3 2 - 
Denmark 3 3 - 
Finland 4 4 + 
Germany 3 - - 
Netherlands 4 3 + 
Poland 5 2 - 
UK 5 5 + 
Totals 27 19 3 
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2.2. Methods  
In each country, the members of the research team that carried out the interviews, wrote a 
concise report integrating the main outcomes of the various interviews per company, following a 
standardised format. These interview reports were verified by the central contact person of the 
company.  
 
A member of the national research team also made a report of the national workshops, wherein all 
companies involved in the broader project participated. The interview data were analysed, using 
qualitative data matrixes that were focused on respectively the ZAV commitment, safety 
communication, safety culture and safety learning, and challenges identified. For example, in the 
data matrix for ‘ZAV challenges for the next year’, the findings for each company were structured 
into columns addressing respectively: organisational synergy, procedures, safety climate, 
subcontractors, continual development, safety priority, culture of prevention, well-being at work, 
managing safety in a changing environment, and further steps towards ZAV.  
 
Moreover a research workshop was held wherein researchers from the six countries that already 
had qualitative data available participated. Inputs to the workshop came from the analyses of the 
survey data, and the findings from the interviews and national workshops that were available (see 
table 1). The meaning and interpretation of the quantitative data were discussed. Discussions 
were used to clarify and asses the various experiences and perspectives on success factors, good 
practices and challenges for the implementation of ZAV. Special attention was paid to identifying 
and understanding ‘remarkable’ findings (mostly examples of tailor made solutions and innovative 
practices) that could be regarded as ‘inspiring examples of ZAV implementation’ as opposed to 
‘good traditional safety practices’. 
 
The results of the analyses from the qualitative data matrix, the research workshop for the 
success factors, and challenges and success stories were synthesised for this paper. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1. Results 
We present here the most important findings have been derived from our analyses so far. We 
distinguish between: (a) the sustainability of the commitment to ZAV, (b), good strategic ZAV 
practices, (c) good tactical and operational ZAV practices, and (d) ZAV challenges for the next few 
years. 
 
3.1. 1. Sustainable commitment to ZAV (i.e. to continual safety improvement) 
Embedding the ZAV commitment in the company is very important; it should be clear that the 
commitment is not hype, but that it is there to stay, even in times of change and/or difficulties. The 
companies that participated in our research use various strategies in this respect.  
 
Make safety an explicit part of the company identity (mission and strategy) 
Make safety explicitly a corporate core value that guides all company decisions 
Safety and pursuing  zero accidents is recognised as an on-going challenge (not an effort limited 
in time)  
Show safety leadership and develop a proactive safety culture, wherein the importance of safety is 
always clear (especially in decisions and actions), and wherein the mind-set of managers and 
workers is focused on prevention. 
Through a multi-faceted accident prevention and safety promotion programme, with own logo and 
branding, which is key in formal company communication, but also in informal interpersonal 
communication and culture. The programme should allow for – and encourage - bottom-up 
initiatives.  
Clarify and share that in ZAV committed companies safety is truly a win-win situation, everyone 
benefits from safety - from shareholders to employees. Potential shareholders see bad safety as a 
risk – there is a visible link to CSR. 
 
Besides the commitments to zero accidents, several companies also had broader commitments. 
For example, one company had a comprehensive ‘zero’ company strategy covering four key 
areas: health (long and short term), safety, environment and security (e.g. aggressive and/or 
political incidents in global markets). There was great synergy between the four areas with some 
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acting as leading indicators for initiatives in other areas. Such an approach also ensures that 
safety is fully integrated with operational efficiency – instead of something additional or separate 
from operational performance. Some other companies had zero strategies for zero defects 
(production and quality), for environmental issues, or for psychosocial topics such as bullying and 
substance use (alcohol and drugs). The Finnish participants emphasized also the importance of 
well-being at work. Well-being at work is part of 
a comprehensive view on safety. 
 
Several factors are important in choosing the strategy: company history, the nature of the primary 
process, the company structure (centralised or decentralised), the personal conviction of top 
managers, being part of a multinational organisation, or being an independent family business, 
etc. Clearly, ZAV should serve as an aspirational goal, as it is about a process, a journey, not a 
target. There is a need to have clarity in terms of purpose and relevance of safety. Visible top 
management commitment is a prerequisite. But having defined and communicated safety as a 
company value, or having a clear aspirational safety programme and message can also be of 
help, as long as it is more than words. As many companies work decentralised, it is essential to 
allow and develop buy-in at local levels. 
 
3.1. 2. Good strategic practices  
In this section we present the main strategic safety practices provided by the companies, including 
principles, codes or values that guide company strategies for business and safety. These 
practices build on the commitment to ZAV, and help to integrate safety into the way the company 
and its production activities are managed and led. The strategic ‘good practices’ identified are: 
 
· Safety is a part of professional work - it is not seen as a separate entity 
· Bring the positive aspects of safety more to the forefront 
· Implement multifaceted programs that allow decentralised initiatives 
· Ensure that everybody understands that unsafe work should be stopped immediately, 
and can only be resumed after it is made safe. 
Strengthen participatory practices, they are the key to strengthen dialogical communication. 
Challenge people to think for themselves. Ask questions that promote reflection. Avoid pedantic 
messages. Stimulate that people solve problems themselves in their team (but with 
communication to company level) 
Be aware of the diversity in the workforce (e.g. younger - older workers) – they may have different 
values, habits and perspectives that are relevant for safety, and behave differently  
Consider strategies for rewards and sanctions in relation to safety. Rewards can be financial but 
certainly also social. Make sure they do not undermine the reporting culture and feelings of justice 
and trust. Also implementing truly just and fair accident investigation. 
World-wide standardisation of best production practices (including safety aspects), followed-up 
with training and education 
· Search and stimulate safety activities and awareness jointly with business partners 
such as clients, suppliers and contractors. 
 
3.1.3 Good tactical and operational practices  
In this section we present the most remarkable tactical and operational safety practices provided 
by the companies, including activities and procedures that are productive in generating greater 
safety in the workplace, in strengthening the safety climate on the shop floor, or in supporting the 
effectiveness of the safety management system. These practices are stimulated and encouraged 
though the visible commitment to ZAV. In the following list we start with practices that are already 
well-known from theory and the practice of frontrunner companies- these are not innovative in it-
self, but still important and not always easy to implement. These are followed by the more 
innovative practices, and practices that are very much tailored to the organisation.  
   
Focus on a limited set of key safety risks 
Routinised toolbox meetings, and/or daily start up meetings 
· Ensure feedback to those that raise a safety issue or report an near miss (incidents, 
observations); implement improvements quickly  
Ensure safety is a serious part of job/employee introduction programmes 
Stimulate people to take care of their own safety 
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Walk-arounds of management, acknowledging and social rewarding safe practices and 
challenging unsafe practices  
Develop and disseminate easy to use tools (e.g. making use of apps for reporting) 
· Make sure that lessons learned from accidents in similar departments and organisations 
are disseminated and understood 
· Use videos - as a ”safety wake ups”, appealing to emotions 
Empower first-line managers to take safety action when needed 
· Visible safety leadership on the shop floor, i.e. by regular management safety walks and 
broad corporate communication, exemplary safety behaviour by managers (safety 
leaderschip).   
Create a culture wherein people feel free to discuss safety, also with their superiors. In a positive 
safety culture employees are appreciated and encouraged to stimulate each other to improve their 
safety relevant behaviour 
Use story telling after an incident. Take care of social rewards for the story teller (who might be a 
victim or by stander) 
Implement an easy system to show which rescuers (i.e. trained in first aid, fire-fighting, etc.), are 
available in the workshop by placing green magnets on their names and pictures (all names and 
pictures on the wall) 
Organise workshops with self-assessment of risks (and ensure follow up) 
Invite workers for a few weeks to participate in the safety department – to encourage them to be 
safety champions in their workplace 
Organise one-to-one support for people confronted with safety problems or dilemmas. Consider 
creating safety coaches  
Train supervisors and foreman as moderators for theme-based safety discussions and/or make 
them ”safety believers” since they have a huge impact on workers. 
Training that creates safety experiences from another perspective (e.g. to wear an eyepatch to 
experience what it means if your eye is damaged; breathing through a straw to simulate reduced 
respiratory capacity) 
Discuss safety items in weekly progress meetings to reinforce the practices that are required for 
the site 
Discussion and reflection on events that occurred in the previous week 
Provision of training specific to the individual. Workers have their own training folder to monitor 
their in-house work-specific training 
Ensuring that workers who speak and read other languages follow the local procedures, as it is 
essential that they understand what is required of them. Due to the high numbers of workers from 
other countries, safe learning practices across the organisation have to be consistent with all 
workers knowing what is required. 
 
3.1.4 Challenges for the next few years 
Each of the companies has its ZAV challenges for the upcoming years. While some have only 
defined their challenges for the year to come, others have defined challenges for a range of years. 
Like the good practices, companies differ in the challenges encountered, depending on their 
context, history etc. Below we present a limited number of challenges mentioned that seem to 
represent the various kinds of challenges encountered: 
Being ‘smarter with our safety data’: Improved analyses and relevant communication with better 
quality data, relevant and proactive safety metrics and synergy between data sources 
To simplify processes. The organisation has detailed processes and at times, these may hinder 
the message that needs to be highlighted. If processes are simplified, the workers know what is 
required and how to accomplish it 
Attracting ‘change managers’ who can work with the company safety culture – not looking for 
quick fixes by specialists, but helping the local workforce to identify initiatives that will work for 
them in their context 
· To change from ‘we must work safe’ to ‘we want to work safe’ 
Ensuring that the contractors on site work adhere to the same standards as the rest of the 
organization, and motivating them to develop a ZAV mind-set. Contractors regularly change and 
often work using their standards as opposed to that of the main contractor 
A strong focus on changing the attitudes and behaviours of the line supervisors / foremen. More 
effort is required to change their perceptions about some work practices 
Developing safety from a business priority to a constant company value 
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3.2. Discussion 
In the introduction we proposed five new ZAV perspectives. 
When we review the findings in the 19 companies, the first two principles are easily recognised in 
most of the participating companies: 
 
The ZAV commitment strategy: is expressed in high levels of organisational as well as individual 
commitment to ZAV 
ZAV as the basis for a prevention culture: clearly the genuine ambition to create accident free 
workplaces and the leadership associated with the commitment strategy, helps to generate a 
proactive safety culture  
 
The three other perspectives are not as commonly shared by the 19 companies, and are 
recognised as important perspectives or challenges in only some of the companies. 
 
ZAV leads to innovative practices: the companies develop their safety practices, and several 
innovative practices were identified; the need for and relevance of innovative safety practices, 
depends, however, also on the level and maturity of safety already achieved. Those companies 
that recently embarked on the ‘road to zero’, can achieve a lot of progress by also implementing 
more traditional good practices 
Zero is the only ethically sustainable safety goal; the ethical dimension is visible in the (few) 
companies that regard safety as a company value   
ZAV thrives in networking and co-learning. Learning through benchmarking, networking or from 
safety lessons learned by other companies was also identified as a good practice 
 
This implies that most companies pursue only the first two innovative perspectives, and that the 
other three perspectives are currently only adopted in a limited way. Even in these ZAV committed 
companies – who often are frontrunners in safety in their sector or country – there are still new 
perspectives to further explore, thus implying relevant opportunities for improvement. This also 
explains why networking among such companies is useful.  
 
This research project was the first (to our knowledge) to explore the opportunities and challenges 
implied by the implementation of ZAV. Several good examples of company strategies and 
challenges were identified. The results therefore provide a good impression of the relevance of 
such research, though there is still a lot to do to fully understand what makes these strategies and 
practices successful, and under what conditions they are useful. Clearly, there is still a need for 
more research in this innovative area.  
  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Companies that implement the ZAV are serious in their strategies and practices to improve safety, 
and realise that it will be an on-going effort. Safety commitment, communication, culture and 
learning all play a key role in such implementation processes.  
There is, however, not a blue print for implementing ZAV. Companies differ in their business 
context, primary processes, history, structure, culture and people, which imply that a tailored 
implementation strategy is to be preferred. It is very important that it is clear for everybody that the 
zero accident commitment is not hype, but is sustainable. It needs to be embedded in the 
company’s identity, or core values, or major strategies and programmes. Examples of such 
practices were identified in the group of ZAV companies. The long-term commitments in the 
companies triggered several examples of good safety strategies. These were complemented by a 
range of good operational and tactical practices, some well-known from more traditional safety 
approaches (e.g. routinise toolbox meeting, and/or daily start up meetings), while others are more 
innovative (e.g. invite workers for a few weeks to participate in the safety department – to 
encourage them to be safety champions in their workplace) 
All in all we conclude that ZAV is the basis for inspiring and innovative approaches to improve 
safety, as well as for the implementation of more traditional safety practices. Most ZAV committed 
companies have used two perspectives:  a commitment strategy and to create a culture of 
prevention. The other three innovative ZAV perspectives are currently only used by a few of the 
participating companies. In addition to well-known good practices, we identified a range of more 
innovative practices that can form inspiring examples for other organisations. There is therefore 
still much to be gained by identifying, sharing and implementing inspiring good ZAV practices. 
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This will generate added value for ZAV committed companies, as well as for other companies that 
are seriously pursuing improvement of their safety performances.   
 
5. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
The research is made possible through funding by the German Social Accident Insurance 
(DGUV). We also like to thank the PEROSH group on Safety Culture and Zero Accidents for 
encouraging the initiative to develop the research proposal. We would like to thank the 27 
European companies and the representatives thereof that contributed to the research project by 
participating in the survey, the interviews and the national workshops. Finally, we would like to 
thank our European research partners that provided us with the data from the companies in their 
countries who are not one of the co-authors of this paper: special thanks to Karla van den Broek 
(Belgium), Ana Sklad (Poland), and Roxane Gervais (UK) who provided us with verified interview 
reports, or reports of a national workshop; they and Robert Bezemer (overall project manager) 
also actively contributed to the research workshop wherein the meaning of the quantitative and 
qualitative data were assessed and fruitful dialogues helped to formulate conclusions about 
underlying success factors.  
 
6. REFERENCES 
2nd Strategy Conference (2011): Five Pillars for a culture of prevention in business and society - Strategies on Safety and 
Health at Work, 3-4 February 2011, DGUV Academy Dresden. 
Aaltonen M., (2007). The Zero Effect Model. In: The Quality of Working Life: Challenges for the Future. Liber Amicorum for 
the 10th Anniversary of Prevent. Prevent. Brussels, pp. 166-170. 
Aaltonen M, Aräväinen A, Vainio H. (2014, editors) From Risk to Vision Zero – Proceedings of the International Symposium 
on Culture of Prevention – Future Approaches, FIOH, Helsinki. 
Beer M. (2009). High Commitment, high performance – How to build a resilient organization for sustained advantage, 
Jossey -Bass, San Francisco. 
Halpin J.F. (1966). Zero Defects - a new dimension in quality assurance, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Virta H., Liisanantti E., Aaltonen M., (2009). Nolla tapaturmaa -foorumin vaikutukset ja kokemuks Loppuraportti 
Työsuojelurahastolle. Helsinki: Työterveyslaitos. 
Walton R.E., (1985). From control to commitment in the workplace. Harvard Business Review, 63 (2), pp. 77-84. 
Zwetsloot G.,  M. Aaltonen, J.L. Wybo, J. Saari, P. Kines, and R. Op De Beeck, (2013), The case for research into the zero 
accident vision, Safety Science 58, 41-48. 
  
269
Safety Rules in the Board Room: incorporating requirements 
for senior executives in safety standards 
 
Jan Hayes, RMIT University, Australia 
jan.hayes2@rmit.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
Analyses of recent major disasters have drawn attention to poor safety decision making by 
those at the most senior level in organizations. In this paper we focus on the case for safety 
rules at a senior executive level to both control and support key aspects of their behaviour. 
Whilst rules are a commonly used means of supporting safety in operations, they are less 
commonly applied to management. The paper draws on literature about the role of rules in 
operational safety situations and analyses of senior executive failings that have contributed to 
past accidents, in order to show that some key senior management failings can be appropriately 
addressed by rules. In particular, communication of key safety information upwards from 
technical experts to senior management is amenable to formulation as a rule. The analysis 
shows that such process-based rules aimed at improved communication between technical 
specialists and senior decision makers are not overly restrictive and may provide benefit. The 
paper argues that the main objection to use of rules to promote safe behaviours at a senior 
executive level comes from underlying management attitudes to rules in general and concludes 
that a small number of new rules targeted at senior executives are likely to improve safety. 
 
Keywords: safety rules; management responsibility; standards; signatures. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Compliance with rules of various kinds is seen as a key strategy for safety performance 
assurance. Much has been written about how to categorise rules and the best types of rules to 
apply in various situations (see for example Bieder & Bourrier, 2013; Hale & Borys, 2013a, 
2013b). Rules can vary significantly in the degree of freedom that they give to the user, which 
must be commensurate with the degree of uncertainty in the activities governed by the rules in 
order to achieve the best outcome. Analysis of the role of rules has focused primarily on 
technical and operational decisions impacting safety. In summary, for routine tasks undertaken 
by lower skilled workers, a high degree of specificity is appropriate. The other end of the 
spectrum is often seen to be rules that allow significant application of judgement on the part of 
the user, in order to allow for the idiosyncrasies of each specific situation. This is the domain of 
experienced and highly skilled workers such as doctors, nuclear power station technicians, air 
traffic controllers, pilots and engineers. 
In parallel with research on the role of rules, the concept of the organizational accident has 
remained popular and continues to inform both safety research and practice. This view of safety 
and of accident causation in particular, emphasises the importance of senior executives in 
preventing accidents. In addition, studies of safety culture and leadership, and also analyses of 
numerous major disasters (Hayes, 2012; Hayes & Hopkins, 2014; Hopkins, 2008, 2012; Snook, 
2000) have highlighted the key role of senior management in setting strategic organizational 
priorities both formally and informally and as a result ultimately impacting on and influencing the 
day to day actions of professional staff and those working in the field.  
Looking at these two views of what makes for excellent safety performance raises the question 
as to why senior management actions are so rarely specified in the form of rules. One 
explanation appears to lie in what managers understand to be the primary purpose of rules. If 
formal written rules are seen as a mechanism of command and control management, then it 
makes sense that those in the most powerful positions in organizations rarely create such rules 
to apply to themselves. After all, why would those who wish to use rules as a way of enacting 
and exercising their authority over others, create rules that are designed to control their own 
actions? Such rules would need to be externally generated i.e. to be in the form of either 
standards or legislation. This paper explores the idea of including basic requirements for senior 
executives in externally imposed rules such as standards and legislation. 
We begin by examining the role of rules in achieving safe outcomes and how this varies from 
the way in which senior managers view rules. We then review the literature on organizational 
accidents to determine what is known about senior executive actions supporting safety. The 
paper then explores the extent to which such actions can be usefully put into the form of rules 
using the concept of due diligence. 
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How these issues might be put into practice is then explored using the case study of the 
Australian Standard for high pressure hydrocarbon pipelines. 
 
2. RULES AS A SAFETY STRATEGY 
Rules come in a wide range of forms depending on the particular situation they are designed to 
address. Before we can consider if and how safety rules might apply to senior managers it is 
useful to focus on the breadth of options available. Research also provides insights into 
common attitudes of managers towards rules in general. This is relevant since it will directly 
impact the views of managers themselves as to whether rules should be applied to their own 
activities. 
Rules are a key mechanism by which actions and decisions are informed by the skills and 
knowledge of others. In following a well-written procedure when making a decision, an individual 
indirectly draws on the experience of peers and of professionals of various disciplines past and 
present, in the same organization or across an industry sector. Whilst the experience and 
judgement of the decision maker is also critical, in design and operation of complex and 
hazardous systems the best decisions are rarely made without reference to some kind of rules. 
Various authors (Bluff & Gunningham, 2004; Hale & Swuste, 1998) have proposed that safety 
rules are of several distinctly different kinds such as: 
· rules that specify goals to be achieved, 
· rules that define the process to be followed in order to decide on a course of action, 
and, 
· rules that define a specific concrete action or system state. 
Goal-based rules give the highest degree of freedom to the decision maker. This type of rule 
specifies only the general outcome required and leaves unspecified the details of how the goal 
is to be achieved.  
Process-based rules describe the sequence of steps that the decision maker is required to 
complete before coming to a decision about the course of action required. The steps often 
involve consultation with people with diverse views of the task at hand. In this case, the detailed 
outcome is not specified (although a general goal is usually inherent in the context of the 
prescribed process).  
Action rules specify tightly the behaviour required of an individual. They involve much less 
interpretation than the other two types of rules. Examples are hard and fast requirements to 
wear specific protective clothing to undertake certain activities or requirements for staff to be 
licensed in order to carry out certain tasks. Similar tightly specified rules may cover system state 
such as a rule that specifies that three independent well control devices must be in place at all 
times during drilling operations.  
Any real rule may include some features of each of these kinds of rules but many procedures 
aimed at technical and professional staff are primarily process-based rules. Process rules have 
a significant degree of freedom for those following the rules. Many of them focus on a 
communication process that the user must adhere to before reaching a conclusion. Examples 
include permit to work systems and procedures for conducting risk assessments. The basic 
assumption behind such rules is that, by involving and informing representatives of different 
functions, and prompting them to consider a range of specific questions in relation to the 
planned activity, the interests and perspectives of all functions will be brought to bear on the 
task at hand and work will be carried out in a safe and timely manner. To put it another way, 
those following the process as laid down must have sufficient knowledge and experience to 
bring to the task at hand. Since details are not specified but rather left to the user to determine, 
this requires thought and judgement.  
We have found in previous research that senior managers tend to overestimate the degree to 
which the actions of their employees are controlled and constrained by company procedures 
(Hayes, 2013). Managers tend to think of all rules as being in the form of action rules as 
described above. In the context of operational decision making, overestimating the role of rules 
masks the extent to which organizations rely on the experience, expertise and judgement of 
professional staff in ensuring safe outcomes. When it comes to application of rules to managers’ 
own work, overestimating the extent to which rules in general impose control is likely to increase 
resistance to the idea that rules could be useful in this context. The overall view of the role of 
rules implicit in such considerations is that, in the ideal world, there is one best way for any 
particular task to be conducted and that this can be known in advance and completely specified. 
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This is what Dekker calls Model 1 thinking about rules (2005). This view is essentially top-down, 
with managers having the role of ‘enforcers’ of rules which apply to the operational workforce.  
Consistent with this understanding of the role of rules, many managers see rules primarily as a 
method of normalising worker behaviour. Owing much to foundations in Taylor’s scientific 
management, workers who fail to comply are viewed by management as lazy, complacent 
and/or stupid (Hayes & Hopkins, 2014). This way of thinking about rules places the authority to 
dictate what it means to be safe squarely with management, rather than workers. As Schulman  
puts it, a key assumption in preparation of procedures is very often that ‘those who write 
procedures will have a more reliable and comprehensive concern for safety than those who are 
constrained to follow them’(2013, pg 245). Whilst senior managers may not personally write 
such procedures, they are certainly issued, and compliance is required, under their authority. If 
rules are something that competent managers impose on incompetent workers, then it is hardly 
surprising that some managers see no need for rules to constrain their own behaviour and are 
offended by the very idea. 
The literature on rule violations at a working level gives us further insights into why senior 
managers may not respond well to the idea of rules that apply to them. Self-efficacy, or a belief 
in one’s own abilities to work safely has been consistently found to be a key factor in the 
motivation of workers not to follow safety rules (Iszatt-White, 2007; Mascini, 2005). 
Extrapolating this finding to higher levels of the organization, managers believe themselves to 
be competent and consistent with this, some may be unlikely to see any benefit in a compliance 
framework in order to make good safety decisions. 
The strong move in recent decades to implement management systems based on the well-
known Deming Cycle (plan, do, check, act) has reinforced this view of managers as the origin of 
legitimacy regarding safety requirements (Defoe & Juran, 2010). For the first time, such 
frameworks begin to specify processes in which senior managers have a direct role and a direct 
responsibility, but this primarily takes the form of setting policies. Policies are the foundation of 
all management system requirements and the source of legitimacy for the ever more specific 
requirements that are promulgated through organizations and with which those lower in the 
organizational hierarchy are required to comply. 
Paradoxically, whilst attitudes to rules demonstrate senior management beliefs about their 
relatively higher competence on safety matters, procedures also form a powerful framework for 
moving responsibility for safety from management to workers. As La Porte says, many 
procedures are written ‘… to assure that responsibility/blame is placed on the workforce, not 
placed on senior institutional actors ...’ (2013, pg 259). Some studies have even shown 
complicity in violations, indicating that the main purpose of rules is no longer achieving a safe 
outcome but rather ensuring that management has no liability should something go wrong, 
whilst at the same time allowing production to continue. This has been found to be a particular 
issue for middle management or supervisory staff who have been exhorted to report non 
compliances by staff lower in the organizational hierarchy, and yet are themselves violators in 
the interests of getting the job done. The classic example of how organizations can be 
constrained in this way by poor quality rules is ‘work to rule’ by British Rail staff that slowed the 
British railways to a snail’s pace as part of collective action on industrial issues. Normal 
functioning of the system required ongoing routine violations by workers. When they instead 
obeyed all rules as written, the system quickly descended into chaos (Morgan, 1997, pg 177).  
In this way, rules can take on a political dimension whereby organizational actors at various 
levels use rules from their own purposes. Iszatt-White calls this ‘…“gambits of compliance” 
whereby individuals superficially appear to be obeying the rules but are actually finding ways of 
making the rules suit their own way of working.’ Workers behave in this way ‘thus enabling them 
to finish allocated jobs which would otherwise have to be left incomplete’ (2007, pg 457). The 
middle management response is to ‘turn a blind eye’. Again, it is hardly surprising that some 
managers would see any suggestion that safety rules could apply to their activities as 
anathema. 
In summary, rules come in a wide range of forms. Process-based rules in particular are 
commonly used for technical and professional staff as they represent a balance between 
constraint to prevent repetition of past mistakes and freedom to exercise judgement to take into 
account specific circumstances. This type of rule would appear to have potential for application 
to senior managers. On the other hand, research suggests that managers sometimes 
misunderstand the role of rules in ways that are likely to make them hostile to imposition of rules 
on their own activities. At worst, managers in a range of industries have been found to use rules 
in two ways that are not directly related to achieving good safety outcomes. This is to control 
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workers and to shift liability. Neither of these motivations for imposing safety rules on workers 
gives senior management any reason to understand that they too could usefully be guided by 
appropriately formulated safety rules. 
 
3. SENIOR MANAGERS AND SAFETY 
The evidence that senior managers’ decisions would be improved by compliance with some 
basic rules is found in the literature on culture and leadership, and in analysis of the causes of 
past disasters. It is also consistent with the organizational view of accidents widely adopted by 
social science. 
The literature on safety culture places a strong emphasis on the role of senior executives in 
ultimately driving positive safety outcomes, usually by reference to the need for leadership. 
Leadership is often taken to mean a focus on safety. Hale’s analysis of what makes for a good 
‘culture of safety’ includes ‘the importance which is given by … top managers to safety as a 
goal, alongside and in unavoidable conflict with other organizational goals’ (2000, pg 12)  as 
one of eight necessary elements. Similarly, Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000, pg 18) postulate that 
‘senior management commitment to safety’ is a factor that both fosters and sustains a good 
safety culture. Schein’s famous definition of culture as ‘the way we do things around here’ stems 
from priorities and behaviours set from the top. In his words, “[l]eaders create and change 
cultures, while managers and administrators live within them” (1992, pg 5).  
Moving from theories of accident prevention to accident causation, the organizational view of 
accidents epitomised by Reason’s Swiss cheese model (1997) also emphasises the influence of 
top management by seeing them as ultimately responsible for the latent failures that allow small 
errors to result in major disasters.  
Similarly, analyses of the causes of major disasters have also highlighted the role of 
management. Such research necessarily takes a bottom up approach and so gives insights into 
management practice, as well as values. Senior management failings such as cost cutting 
and/or a focus on production without understanding the safety implications and a lack of 
understanding of the difference between personal and process safety have been consistently 
highlighted (Hayes, 2012; Hayes & Hopkins, 2014; Hopkins, 2008, 2012; Snook, 2000). These 
studies and many others emphasise the importance of senior management practices – how they 
behave and the decisions that they make. It is values ‘in practice’ that directly impact budgets 
for maintenance and other similar decisions that require the best balance between safety and 
other organizational goals to be determined. It is important to note that this is not simply a 
matter of emphasising to staff that safety is important. Leadership on safety matters in isolation 
of other organizational priorities is not sufficient. Delegation of decision making on all technical 
safety issues is also not sufficient. Safety needs to be integrated into senior management 
decision making at the highest level so that decisions are made in a way that is mindful of the 
long term safety implications.  
Of course it is not possible to mandate values for senior managers (or any other group) in the 
form of rules, but it is possible to mandate aspects of management practice by rules requiring 
specific actions to be taken. The evidence suggests that effective management practices are 
needed and we cannot expect to achieve this with so few procedures controlling management 
actions in place. As described earlier, procedures can be conceptualised as ‘experience 
carriers’. This idea can apply equally to senior executives as to other professional and skilled 
groups. Without such rules in place, senior executives are reliant on their personal experience 
or tacit learning from colleagues. Senior managers often do not have the necessary expertise 
personally and so rules to support communication upwards could be a major improvement. 
So where does that leave us in the quest for safety improvements? Senior managers think that 
rules do not, by definition, apply to them and yet evidence shows that their performance 
collectively could be improved by compliance with some basic rules. The answer lies in a 
redefinition of the role of rules. 
An alternative view of rules (Dekker’s Model 2) considers them to be dynamic, generated from 
collective experience (of both rule writers and rule users), always incomplete, only as specific as 
they need to be to ensure safe outcomes and necessarily incorporating some scope for 
variation in action in the face of complexity and uncertainty. A third view comes from Grote and 
Weichbrodt who maintain that effective rules support effective behavioural routines by 
coordinating work processes (2013). Further they maintain that ideally this should be the 
primary role of rules, rather than providing a framework for legal accountability. For professional 
and managerial personnel, the Grote and Weichbridt definition has much in common with the 
concept of process-based rules. 
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Decisions made by senior managers are critical to safety. There is a great deal of evidence to 
support this. The safety culture literature in particular highlights the need for senior management 
leadership on safety matters in order to set a good example, but accident analysis demonstrates 
that senior management decisions have a direct impact on safety, too, when it comes to cutting 
maintenance budgets and similar. On the other hand, managers are likely to be justifiably wary 
of rules that they see as imposing an unnecessary and unreasonable constraint. An alternative 
view of rules as capturing collective senior management experience and co-ordinating their 
actions with those of technical experts who advise them may make it easier for those at senior 
levels of organizations to see well designed safety rules as a support, rather than a hindrance.  
 
4. SENIOR MANAGERS AND REGULATION 
Given the attitudes of many managers, rules for senior managers are unlikely to gain wide 
acceptance inside organizations without an external driving force and this is indeed what is 
happening. In jurisdictions that favour performance-based safety legislation, the most senior 
levels of management are already effectively subject to some externally imposed safety rules. In 
Australia, as in the UK, safety legislation imposes general duties on organizations in control of 
potentially hazardous activities to ensure that risk is reduced so far as is reasonably practicable. 
Although the details can vary, such duties typically extend to senior management who may face 
penalties in the event of an accident. These are goal-based rules with only the desired outcome 
specified and so provide room for discretion. Recent regulatory changes in Australia are 
extending regulatory reach when it comes to the duties of top managers.  
Australia has recently gone through a process of ‘harmonisation’ of general workplace health 
and safety legislation across all states. A key step in this process has been to agree on a new 
model Workplace Health and Safety (WHS) Act. Arguably the biggest change in the model WHS 
Act from previous legislation was the introduction of proactive duties for company officers (see 
s27 of the model WHS Act (Safework Australia, 2011)). Before the states introduced new WHS 
legislation that was harmonised with the model Act1, company officers did not have legislative 
duties imposed on them directly as individuals, rather they could have liabilities attributed to 
them in some circumstances (which varied from state to state) regarding the conduct of their 
company in the event of an accident (Foster, 2012; Johnstone & Tooma, 2012).  
Since at least the time of the UK Robens review (1972), the benefit of assigning a duty to senior 
managers has been recognised by policy makers, but it is only with the recent model Act that 
this has been adopted into legislation wholeheartedly. To be clear, it has long been common for 
organizations to have a general duty to reduce risk so far as is reasonably practicable. This is 
also a requirement of the model WHS Act, but critically the Act also includes duties that are 
targeted directly at company officers as individuals and sets specific requirements for them that 
apply prior to any accident. They must exercise due diligence to ensure that the organization 
complies with its obligations and duties under the Act. This approach is new for safety, but 
common in the context of corporations law where company directors (for example) are required 
to exercise care and diligence in financial affairs including such matters as understanding a 
company’s financial position well enough to form an opinion as to the company’s solvency.  
To paraphrase and summarise the legislation, senior managers of all organizations that have 
duties under workplace health and safety legislation are required to exercise due diligence on 
relevant matters. Summarising the model Act, requirements for company officers’ due diligence 
are: 
· having knowledge of work health and safety matters, 
· understanding the nature of operations and the associated hazards and risks, 
· ensuring that appropriate processes and resources are in place to manage those 
hazards and risks, 
· ensuring that the organization has effective learning and feedback processes in place, 
· ensuring that the organization complies with other parts of the Act, and 
· verifying that all of the above is in place and working. 
Importantly, these requirements take the form of goal-based rules. They specify an outcome 
(that company officers must have knowledge of work health and safety matters etc.) but leave 
                                                          
1 All States of Australia have introduced legislation in line with the model WHS Act except Western Australia and 
Victoria. In WA, public comment on the new Work Health and Safety Bill 2014 closed on 30 January 2015. This Bill 
includes section 27 of the model WHS Act verbatim. In Victoria, the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 does 
not specifically include duties for company officers linked to due diligence. In Queensland, general workplace health 
and safety is legislated by the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 which includes due diligence requirements. 
274
the process by which that outcome is to be achieved up to each company to determine. Equally 
importantly, these requirements are proactive duties that must be in place (and hence may be 
audited by regulators) before any accident occurs. This clearly places the onus on organizations 
operating under this legislation to have process-based rules in place in order to demonstrate 
that company officers are meeting these requirements because if they are not then they may be 
personally open to prosecution.  
 
5. CASE STUDY – THE AUSTRALIAN PIPELINE INDUSTRY 
We have been presented with an opportunity to put our work on this subject into practice via our 
involvement with the Australian pipeline industry. As with many industrial sectors, the pipeline 
industry has suffered several recent failures that have gained iconic status. For the natural gas 
transmission pipeline sector, such an accident occurred at San Bruno in California in September 
2010 when a pipeline ruptured due to a construction flaw dating from 1956 that had remained 
hidden for more than five decades. The US National Transportation Safety Board report into the 
incident identified many failings in the operating company’s integrity management system 
(NTSB, 2011). As with all similar accidents, those professionals who had been involved over 
many years no doubt did not intend to do such a poor job. Looking more deeply at the 
organizational circumstances has identified cost cutting on maintenance and inspection initiated 
from the most senior management levels and also highlighted the lack of understanding of key 
risks and the potential consequences (Hayes & Hopkins, 2014). The incident has provided this 
sector with a specific incentive to think about how information on key safety issues can be better 
communicated to top managers and how they can be made more aware of the potential 
consequences of their decisions. 
The full project lifecycle for high pressure gas pipelines in Australia is covered by a suite of 
standards, AS/NZ 2885. The standard is called up in legislation in every state of Australia giving 
it significant power over safety practices in this sector. As part of the current consideration of 
revisions to the standard, serious consideration has been given to what the standard should 
require of senior executives in order to effectively take responsibility for safety of the general 
public and workers (in addition to protection of the environment and security of supply as is also 
required by the standard). This has led to consideration of four specific issues as described 
below. 
 
5.1 Addressing Requirements of a Standard to Management 
The proposal is that some rules for senior managers be included in AS2885. Until now, the 
primary intended audience for the standard has been technical professionals – those with direct 
responsibility for designing, operating and maintaining pipelines. The plan to broaden this 
audience calls into consideration the background to and history of standards generally to 
consider whether this broader role is appropriate.  
Standards are a special type of rule that has broad application to a given field. According to the 
Standards Australia website, ‘[s]tandards are published documents setting out specifications 
and procedures designed to ensure products, services and systems are safe, reliable and 
consistently perform the way they were intended to. They establish a common language which 
defines quality and safety criteria.’ (Standards Australia, ND)  Standards have a dual role – 
setting minimum standards related to quality of life issues such as safety and environmental 
performance, and maximising competitiveness by standardisation of output. They have been 
strongly promoted by the Productivity Commission as a factor in ensuring Australian industry’s 
global competitiveness (Productivity Commission, 2006). Many engineering standards used in 
Australia are published by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). According to their 
website ANSI also works to balance these two functions of standards: The mission of the 
organization is ‘To enhance both the global competitiveness of U.S. business and the U.S. 
quality of life by promoting and facilitating voluntary consensus standards and conformity 
assessment systems, and safeguarding their integrity.’ (ANSI, ND) 
Standards are typically developed by a committee process with relevant experts conferring on 
requirements. Consistent with this, Hale et al (2007) call engineering standards ‘experience 
carriers’. Codes and standards are therefore a key repository of professional experience in safe 
and efficient design. Standards are often updated following an accident or serious incident in 
order to prevent recurrence (for example following the incident at La Spezia in Italy in 1971, 
LNG storage tank standards were updated to address the issue of rollover due to density 
stratification). Professional societies such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) have played a key role in standards development. Varrasi (2009) describes ASME 
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standards committees as ‘a tradition of public service and professional responsibility that dates 
to the late nineteenth century industrial age’. His article documents the two drivers for standards 
– safety and cost. An early focus area for ASME was standards for fittings, screw threads and 
flanges – initially seen as an issue of production efficiency, but brought into safety focus when 
fire fighters brought in from neighbouring areas to assist in fighting a major fire in Baltimore in 
1904 could only watch helplessly as their hose fittings did not fit local hydrants. At this early 
stage, standards were primarily action rules, designed to completely specify aspects of 
component design. 
In recent years, there has been a move away from prescriptive, action-based rules to more 
process-based standards, often called management system standards, based on the Deming 
cycle mentioned earlier. AS2885 includes some prescriptive requirements but these are 
generally within the overall process-based framework. It is this framework that moves the style 
of the standard away from simply a list of detailed technical requirements regarding how work 
must be done, to a document that in some places specifies overall processes that experts are 
expected to use in order to ensure that complex decisions receive input from all relevant parts of 
the organization. In safety matters, the backbone of the standard is the Safety Management 
Study process (Tuft, 2008) which is an example of exactly this type of rulemaking. This shift to 
process-based requirements means that the requirements of standards can readily be imposed 
on any experts for whom process-based rules are relevant, including top management. 
In summary, standards reflect the accumulated knowledge of a particular industry. They can 
require a high level of performance or they can be pitched at the level of minimum requirements. 
They can focus on prescription, or on setting processes and providing guidance. Whilst the 
historical focus of standards has been on technical matters, the move to process-based 
standards makes them more amenable to inclusion of managerial matters.  
 
5.2 Individual or Company? 
The Standard uses formal, documented approvals of various key engineering documents as the 
mechanism for communication of key issues both up and down the organization. In this way, 
key engineering information is acknowledged by those who approve any given document and 
the implication is that the approver is also authorising allocation of any necessary resources. In 
other words, decisions are made by those with the appropriate competence and authority. A key 
question that has been considered by the standard writers is whether duties such as these 
should be imposed on individuals or organizations. 
According to the Standard, the ultimately responsible entity is the Licensee. The Licensee is 
defined as ‘[t]he organization responsible for the design, construction, testing, inspection, 
operation and maintenance’ (Standards Australia, 2012, Section 1.6.27). Note the reference to 
an organization, rather than a specific role. Prior to revision, AS2885.0 included a list of nine 
specific documents that require approval (for new versions and revisions) from the Licensee 
(Standards Australia, 2008, Section 3.4). The list includes a range of key engineering plans and 
records. The Standard also requires that organizations develop and document an ‘approvals 
matrix’ which defines what position holds authority to approve which document (Section 3.2). 
Delegation from the arrangements defined in the approvals matrix is prohibited. The intention of 
those who wrote this requirement had been to ensure that senior technical professionals are 
aware of and formally approve key design and operating features of each pipeline. In practice, 
since the Licensee is defined as an organization, the authority for approval of many documents 
has been fixed by the approvals matrix as a middle level technical professional. The most senior 
levels of management have no role in this system given the technical, voluminous nature of the 
various documents requiring formal approval. This has been compounded by the fact that some 
pipeline companies hold licences for many pipelines resulting in literally scores of documents 
that require approval by the Licensee.  
The regular program of Standard revisions has given the pipeline sector an opportunity to 
reconsider this issue in the light of recent research. The proposed revised definition is ‘the entity 
that the regulatory authority holds accountable for the pipeline.’ (AS2885.0-2008 markups for 
revision – section 1.5.2). This immediately raises the option of the responsible entity being an 
individual company officer, rather than an organization, and places responsibility for this 
definition with the regulators, rather than in an industry based standard. As explained above, the 
trend in Australia has been to define responsibilities for specific roles in general workplace 
safety legislation and these changes to the pipeline Standard ensure that no conflict arises with 
this aspect of legislation should it apply to pipelines.  
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5.3 The Value of Signing Documents 
The list of documents that require approval by the Licensee has also been critically reviewed. 
The intention has been to differentiate between those documents requiring the formal approval 
of senior technical professionals and the key information of which senior executives must be 
aware in order to effectively fulfil their governance role on process safety issues. To achieve 
this, technical and managerial approvals have been separated so that the number of documents 
requiring formal approval of the Licensee has been reduced substantially. In such cases, this 
responsibility is enacted in practice by requiring that specific documents are signed by senior 
executives. It is therefore appropriate to consider the meaning that is attached to a signature 
and the associated act of signing. 
Research on the effectiveness of this type of process-based rule as a safety strategy is scant. 
Limited research has been conducted in the accounting sector linked to the introduction of 
international requirements for accounting firm partners to personally sign audit reports. As 
Carcello and Li (2013) report, the CFO of a large multinational corporation said publicly of the 
new arrangements, ‘I used to sign off in the name of a ﬁrm. Now I’m certifying ﬁnancial 
statements … in my personal name. I would like to believe ... that it wouldn’t have made a 
difference, but it does. It is psychologically different.’ (pg 1512). Further Carcello and Li found 
that the quality of audits increased in the UK following introduction of such a requirement. 
Similarly Yen, Chang, and Hui-Ling (2013) conducted a perception survey among the 
accounting profession in Taiwan following the introduction of the same requirements and found 
that the profession overall believed that introduction of these international requirements for 
additional signatures had improved audit quality. Further the main reason for this improved 
quality was seem to be increased personal accountability linked to signing. 
This limited research appears to confirm what we would intuitively understand to be the case. 
Requiring personal ‘sign off’ increases attention. A signature is much more than simply ink on 
paper (or some electronic variation). As the Oxford English Dictionary says, a signature is ‘a 
person’s name written in a distinctive way as a form of identification’. An alternative meaning is 
‘a distinctive pattern, product, or characteristic by which someone or something can be 
identified’ such as a chef’s signature dish. In this way, a signature becomes a symbol of the 
person who signs, an embodied presence of that individual, even when they are not physically 
present. 
It is perhaps also worth commenting on the question of multiple signatories. In his work with 
health professionals and families, Hopwood (2014) found that requiring key medical documents 
to be signed by both health professionals and family members engendered a sense of shared 
responsibility. In this case, it is reported that the division of responsibilities was also clearly 
understood.  
This is not always the case. Group decision making as epitomised by multiple signatories can 
fall down due to two well-known psychological processes. The first is groupthink (Janis, 1982) 
where no one challenges the status quo. In this case, later signatories will just go along with 
those who have already signed as a way of keeping harmony within the group. The second is 
social loafing (Karau & Williams, 1993) where some group members put no intellectual effort 
into the pros and cons of their decision but rather follow the lead of the rest of the group instead 
of making an independent decision. 
Anecdotally, an industry organization with which we work has recently critically reviewed the 
signatories of a key document detailing integrity management plans and arrangements for 
formal acceptance. The documents initially required nine signatories. We were told that most 
people did not look critically at the document before signing it but rather at who else had already 
signed it. As a result the work was receiving very little review. From an initial nine signatories, 
the number has been reduced significantly. The four signatories who remain hold overall 
accountability for the implementation of the plan. The work program has been adjusted to 
include a formal presentation of the plan by technical experts to those four people prior to 
seeking their sign off. As a result the quality of the plans has improved and the awareness of the 
signatories regarding their own responsibilities has increased.  
In summary, the effectiveness of signing documents as a form of approval has been little 
researched but there is some evidence suggesting that a requirement to sign can focus 
attention. On the other hand, more is not necessarily better. Multiple signatories can distribute 
responsibility to the point where signatures become tokenistic and so effectively meaningless. 
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5.4 Senior Management Understanding of Key Risk Data 
The overall integrity of pipelines is managed through the design process described in AS2885 
by a detailed safety management study (Tuft, 2008). The requirements for the study are detailed 
in the standard and whilst there are some unique details, the overall framework would be 
familiar to anyone used to risk assessment as a key design verification tool. Consideration has 
been given to the best way to ensure that key risk information is known to and understood by 
senior management. 
There are two problems with simply requiring that safety management study reports are signed 
off by senior management. The first is the issue of the volume of reports and information that 
would be put in front of senior people if this were to be the requirement as described earlier. The 
second issue is that reports are written by technical specialists whose overall desire is to 
communicate both that they have done their work well and also that risks are appropriately 
controlled. This is perhaps especially the case for documents that will be sent to regulatory 
bodies for approval.  
At worst, risk assessment reports can take on the qualities of ‘fantasy planning’ (Clarke, 1999) 
in the sense that the purpose of the documents becomes asserting to outsiders that the 
uncontrollable can actually be controlled. Having said that, even risk assessments that remain 
firmly grounded in reality are bound to conclude that, if all the necessary controls are in place 
and functioning as designed, then the risk will be controlled sufficiently. This might be relevant 
information for top management in a governance sense, but as discussed earlier top 
management decisions can impact the ongoing validity of such a conclusion e.g. if controls are 
compromised by budget decisions. Risk assessment reports are rarely written with 
communication to senior management of their responsibilities in mind. 
Another important factor is the treatment of low frequency but high consequence events in 
particular. In such cases, there is usually a high degree of uncertainty about the frequency 
calculation and yet ultimately risk is deemed to be acceptable because of frequency-based 
arguments. This is fundamentally problematic (Aven, 2009; Hopkins, 2015) and, worse, hides 
from top management the magnitude of the potential consequences of their decisions. 
To return to AS2885, in order to provide a better basis for top management decision making, 
consideration is being given to use of a summary statement that focuses on the consequences 
and key risk controls of the most serious failures that could occur on a pipeline. It is this 
information that needs to be considered by senior management when signing off on risk 
assessment conclusions that no significant danger remains or will be introduced by their own 
budgetary choices. 
 
These relatively small changes to the standard are an important repositioning of the document 
to promote processes that make key safety information more visible to those at the top of 
pipeline companies who ultimately have a high degree of control over long term safety 
outcomes.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Investigations into numerous accidents have shown that senior management (like all other 
workers) are sometimes fallible when it comes to safety decision making. The saving grace is 
that management actions rarely have an immediate impact on outcomes, but rather take weeks, 
months or even years to impact activities on the ground (as a result of budget decisions for 
example). This means that there is time to uncover mistakes and respond. 
Nevertheless, history shows that actions of senior managers cannot be unconstrained if the best 
safety performance is to be achieved. They need help to know what is right. In some 
circumstances it is appropriate for behaviour of senior managers to be guided by process-based 
rules. 
Our work with the pipeline industry and in particular AS2885 gives several examples. Firstly, 
ensuring that management individuals have duties not just organisations. Secondly considering 
carefully who needs to sign what to maximise the sense of personal responsibility that goes with 
the act of putting one’s name to something. Finally ensuring that the most important aspects of 
risk documents are highlighted in communication to senior management rather than lost – either 
in the detail, or in the overall argument that risk is controlled sufficiently. 
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Abstract  
Nowadays for many industries working on a safety culture has become a common practice. To 
do so, several culture programs are available consisting of a variety of methods and 
implementation strategies, depending on needs, size and companies’ budgets. Consultants and 
researchers of AdviSafe Risk Management B.V. are supporting a diversity of companies to set 
up activities for strengthen their safety culture. We are able to conduct and tailor made a variety 
of research and interventions. However we daily witness the progress companies are making in 
further developing and strengthening their safety culture, we became interested in drives and 
arguments companies make before starting a safety culture program and with what 
expectations. Our question therefore is why and with what perspective in mind companies 
starting safety culture programs? To answer this question we used data of three companies 
where we recently have conducted safety culture analysis and interventions, and we compared 
these outcomes with change management theories and literature of successful safety culture 
interventions. Our main conclusion is that cultural change in organizations, including safety 
culture, may benefit from motives and perspectives to be explicit and shared within the 
company. With these outcomes we aim to feed the discussion if current available 
methodologies are actually helping companies moving forward in strengthen their safety culture.   
Keywords: qualitative research; safety; organizational culture; hearts & minds; change 
management 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of organizational culture is often used to describe shared corporate values that 
affect and influence members’ attitude and behaviours. Guldenmund (2000) gave an overview 
in his research of a variety of 18 definitions on safety culture and safety climate. This overview 
showed that to give a distinct definition on safety culture remains to be difficult. In this paper we 
define a safety culture as the attitude, values (implicit) assumptions, perceptions and customs of 
the members of an organisation handling safety risks. As a result, the safety culture of an 
organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, 
and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to organisation's health and safety 
management. Safety culture is always connected to the broader organisation culture and 
therefore relevant at all levels in the organisation, in policy making, in perceptions and handling 
of higher management, in employees’ attitudes and perceptions of daily risks at the work floor. 
In practice, we notice that safety culture is often used in a positive way to emphasize that 
organisations feel responsible for safety and act accordingly.  
In reflection to all these definitions of safety culture Cooper (2000) stated that safety culture is 
rather than something the organisation has. An interesting notion which raises the question if all 
stakeholders in organisations are aware of the current safety culture is-situation and aligned to 
become a desirable safety culture has-situation. One of the ways to capture safety culture 
forward in a has-situation for companies is to build a roadmap. This roadmap is based on the 
goal setting paradigm, placing safety culture as a super-ordinate goal which can be achieved by 
dividing the tasks into a series of sub goals. These sub goals are intended to direct people’s 
attention towards improvement of safety culture. When using this goal setting theory for 
analysing, interactive relations between psychological, behavioural and situational factors 
should be taken into account.  
However, changing a safety culture emphasizes more than goal setting. According to Schein 
(2004) organizational culture can be changed intentionally given the right circumstances and 
initiatives. Culture is seen as a stabilizing force that serves an anxiety reducing function, as it 
gives people a frame of reference for how to act, think, and feel in new situations. In that sense 
culture is a learned defence mechanism against uncertainty and change. Therefore, cultural 
change is an anxiety provoking process that is only undertaken if there is a large enough 
motivation to change. This might be the case if the organization senses a large enough threat, 
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crisis, or dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs to warrant a change in its basic 
assumptions. Or, if the ambition is big and urgent enough, for example to build up a new 
company brand (De Witte, 2014). 
Our research question why and with what perspective in mind companies starting safety culture 
programs will gain more insight in arguments and drives of organisations to change safety 
culture: is it goal setting, crisis or dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs or neither of 
those. Our study also aims to contribute to the lack of culture change intervention studies in the 
safety literature (Hale, Guldenmund et al 2010). 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
To answer our research question what arguments and drives organisations have to change their 
safety culture we used the following materials: 
– Key references of change literature (Schein, 2002; Kotter, 2002; Cozijnsen, 2014) 
– A limited literature survey on interventions for improving safety culture and arguments for 
starting interventions (Zwetsloot & Dijkman, 2010; Hale, Guldenmund et al, 2006, 
Guldenmund 2010, Zwetsloot et al 2013) 
– Qualitative survey data and workshop reports of three companies, that is: oil and gas 
industry (company A); energy provider (company B) and a ship yard (company C). The 
survey data consists of semi-structured interviews based on intervention ‘understanding 
your culture’ of the Hearts & Minds program of the Energy institute (Fleming, 2001). 
Surveys and workshops were held in the period 2013- spring 2015. 
Based on these literature and qualitative data we subsequently developed two topic lists, one 
for motives and one for perspectives and preconditions (see also 2.5.).  We first scored all 
companies to the topic list of motives to get an overview on the essential why the company 
intends to start with safety culture. Then, in a second step we organised all data into the topic 
list of perspectives to unravel perspectives in terms of goal settings, how problems and 
ambitions should be met.  
2.1 Reasons to start with safety culture  
An overview with examples of reasons why organisations start activities for safety culture 
changes is compiled by Zwetsloot & Dijkman (2010). This overview is in general ‘problem-
driven’ and based on expert opinions and reports on practical experiences in a variety of 
industries. These main reasons are:  
1. Our safety performance lags behind of our concurrent 
2. Too much loss of productivity due to incidents and disturbances 
3. A serious accident 
4. General bad project preparation (do first, instead of think first) 
5. Insufficient report of incidents, near misses and deviations  
6. Overruling of procedures and rules  
7. Labour inspection enforces to better performance on safety  
Behind those arguments for starting activities to improve a safety culture lies the assumption 
that change of organizational culture will contribute to solve those problems. However safety 
problems can be a drive to improve the safety culture, at the same time, we notice that safety 
culture is often used in a positive way to emphasize that organisations feel responsible for 
safety and act accordingly. Therefore, arguments for changing organisation’s safety culture can 
also be ambition driven. Examples of these ambition driven activities are found in the zero 
vision strategy (Zwetsloot et al 2013), meaning prevent all kinds of accidents as business 
principle (see: www.ttl.fi/zeroaccidentforum) or strengthen the resilience of the organisation.  
Resilience is explained as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, 
during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under 
both expected and unexpected conditions” (see: http://www.resilience-
innovationlab.org/resilience) 
In addition to either problem driven, or ambition driven arguments to invest in safety culture, in 
our view, it is important how companies understand their current safety culture, and what issues 
with what perspectives are referred to as important to take up for change. To be able to include 
both elements in our research we used three theoretical and pragmatic frameworks consisting: 
– hearts & minds intervention understanding your culture– score on 11 theme’s 
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– Theories of change (Kotter, 2002;Schein 2004; Cozijnsen, 2014)  
– Success factors in safety culture projects (Hale, Guldenmund et al, 2006) 
All three frameworks will be described here in short: 
2.2. Hearts & Minds understanding your culture 
The program Hearts and Minds of the Energy Institute (Fleming, 2001) is intended to help the 
organisation to improve HSE performance to develop themselves according the safety culture ladder 
(see figure 1).  The program also provides processes and tools to facilitate behavioural change.  
 
Figure 1: Safety culture ladder 
Basic assumptions of the program are that for developing a safety culture the organisation has 
to run through five stages of development. This gradual development of the safety culture offers 
companies a systematic framework to work with. We have used the self-assessment tool of 
Hearts & Minds “Understanding your culture” as a basis for our qualitative survey at three 
companies, resulting in 11 questions (see table 1).  
Table 1: 11 questions to better understand current safety culture (based on Understanding your culture, Energy 
Institute, 2008) 
1.Leadership 
Do you think that management is always committed to safety? How does management demonstrate this 
on a daily basis? 
2.Quality and quantity of procedures, 
What do you think about the quantity and quality of existing HSEQ procedures? 
3.Daily HSE Behaviour 
Do you always work safe? Is it always possible to work safe? 
4.Competences and safety Awareness 
What can you tell us about the hazards and risks of your work? 
5.Contractor safety 
How do you cooperate with contractors regarding to HSE? 
What can be improved? 
6.Reporting incidents 
Do you think employees feel free to report all incidents, even unsafe behaviour? 
Are all incidents analysed in a proper way? 
Do employees always get feedback from their incident report? 
7.Continuous improvement 
Do you think the organisation is focused on continuous improvement? Why do you think that? 
8.Involvement of employees 
In what way are employees involved in safety initiatives? 
9.Communication  
Is the safety vision consistently communicated within the company? 
10.Maintenance management  and  Management of Change 
What do you think of the quality of maintenance within the company? 
Are HSE issues always considered in case of change? 
11.Risk management (H,S & E) 
Are all risks sufficiently known and tackled? 
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2.3. Theories of organizational change  
Change management literature stresses some important elements to take into account for 
making successful organizational changes. For example Schein (2004), Kotter (2002) and 
Cozijnsen (2014) emphasize that for successful change, organizations should have large 
enough motivation, explained as an ambition or a crisis. Furthermore, all authors state the 
importance to get a grip on the flow to manage and organise organisational change. Moreover, 
to be aware in this process of the effect when trying to change people’s behaviour. Cozijnsen 
(2014) developed a model of change to help organizations to find out whether they are fit to 
take up organisational changes. The model has integrated knowledge of a variety of change 
management disciplines and literature, and includes four building blocks: 1. organisation 
context; 2. Concepts for improvement; 3.behaviour; 4. Strategies, methods and interventions, 
and seven pillars for successful change. Each pillar helps to frame the risk into a factor of 
success. For example the risk profile of the organisation context might be an inhibitor, which 
includes risk factors as lack of trust, urgency or chance capacity. Nonetheless each process for 
changing safety culture starts with a question, an ambition, a situation (actuality) or a crisis. 
2.4. Success factors safety culture projects 
From effect studies from safety culture projects we can possibly learn what were drives and 
arguments to start these projects. Unfortunately little of those studies are available. Based on 
an evaluation study of the results of 20 companies in The Netherlands who started in the period 
2003-2008 activities to improve their safety culture, Hale and Guldenmund et al(2010) 
concluded that for effective change four success factors are of importance. That is: 
1. Active and supportive role of higher management  
2. Strengthen dialogue between shop floor and (operational) management 
3. Training and motivation management and board members 
4. Systematic approach 
Especially factors 1-3 for successful changes seems to pinpoint underlying drives and 
arguments which make changes apparently to a success. These factors are all also an 
important part of the Hearts and Minds program. 
2.5. Topic lists 
Based on literature as described above, we derived two topic lists on motives and perspectives 
how companies intend to invest in safety culture. For all three companies, we collected survey 
and workshop data. We used this data to complete our topic list for motives (see table 2) and 
perspectives (see table 3).  
Table 2: Topic list of motives  
Motives 
 
What is the 
essential 
why? 
Crisis, 
ambition? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem driven (Zwetsloot & Dijkman, 2010) 
 Our safety performance lags behind of our concurrent 
 Too much loss of productivity due to incidents and disturbances 
 A serious accident 
 General bad project preparation (do first, instead of think first) 
 Insufficient report of incidents, near misses and deviations  
 Overruling of procedures and rules  
 Labour inspection enforces to better performance on safety 
 
Ambition driven (zero accidents, resilience)  
 Zero vision: prevent all kinds of accidents as business principle 
 Strengthen the resilience of the organisation 
. Image improvement 
. Improvement of organisational culture and collaboration in the 
network economy 
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Table 3: Topic list of perspectives and preconditions (derives from Hearts & Minds UYC and literature) 
Wat are 
perspectives 
to meet 
problems and 
ambitions, 
and how?  
 
Goal setting, 
give a push to 
organizational 
movement, 
strengthen 
dialogue 
Leadership 
Commitment to safety 
1.Demonstration of safety leadership 
In all daily decisions at all levels and 
communicate those decisions in a 
consequent way 
HSEQ procedures 
Quantity and quality 
2.increase compliance of rules and 
procedures 
3.develop a congruent set of rules and 
procedures 
Daily HSE behaviour 
Always work safe? 
4.safety should be the first priority, rules 
over production 
5.more compliance behaviour at all levels 
Competence and 
safety awareness 
Hazards and risks? 
6.trust employees to make the right risk 
assessments 
7.improving visible leading by example 
 
Contractor safety 
Cooperation with 
contractors in HSE 
8.better align purchasers and planners 
with safety 
9.more attention to multi languages at the 
shop floor  
Reporting incidents 
Employees feel free 
and motivated to 
report? 
10.increase reporting 
11. consequent follow up and feedback 
on reports 
12. ensure blame free investigations 
Continuous 
improvement 
Focus on 
improvement? 
13.follow up and learn from incidents 
14.reframe focus towards lagging 
indicators instead of leading indicators 
Involvement of 
employees 
In what way 
employees are 
involved in safety 
initiatives? 
15. increase of involvement of employees 
at shop floor 
16. use practical knowledge of employees 
 Communication 
Is safety vision 
consequently 
communicated?  
17. develop a consistent safety vision 
18.training of communication skills, 
improve dialogue and interaction 
 Maintenance 
management 
What is quality of 
maintenance? 
19.Increase supervision and interaction 
20.Overdue of maintenance is a serious 
safety issue 
21.Implementation of new technics and 
materials can be improved 
 Risk Management 
Are all risks sufficient 
known and tackled? 
22.do not let systems overtake safety; 
personal contact should be the driver for 
attitude and behaviour for safety 
Preconditions  Motivation and 
capacities (Theories 
of chance: Kotter, 
Cozijnsen and 
success factors from 
success factors safety 
culture projects ( Hale, 
Guldenmund): 
23.Large enough motivation ( ambition or 
crises) 
24.Change capacities 
25.Aware of effect of behavioural 
changes 
26.Active and supportive role of (higher) 
management 
27.Strengthen dialogue between shop 
floor and (operational) management 
28.Training and motivation management 
and board members 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Results ‘what drives the wish to change’?  
First, we scored data of three companies (company A: oil and gas industry; company B: energy 
company C: ship yard) to the topic list of motives to get an overview on the essential why the 
company intends to start with safety.  
Table 4 shows the motives (essential why) of the three companies.  Although our first 
impression was that all companies tend to have more problem driven motives than ambition 
driven motives towards safety culture, it turned out that company A. expressed to have a clear 
ambition towards zero accidents. Ambition driven motives seem to be less common for 
company B and C. All three companies scored on the problem of overruling procedures and 
rules. Remarkable is that all companies shared the ambition driven motive of image 
improvement.  
Table 4: Scores of three companies to topic list of motives 
   Company 
   A 
 
B C 
Motives 
 
What is 
the 
essential 
why? 
Crisis, 
ambition? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem driven (Zwetsloot & Dijkman, 
2010) 
 Our safety performance lags behind of 
our concurrent 
 Too much loss of productivity due to 
incidents and disturbances 
 A serious accident 
 General bad project preparation (do 
first, instead of think first) 
 Insufficient report of incidents, near 
misses and deviations  
 Overruling of procedures and rules  
 Labour inspection enforces to better 
performance on safety 
 
Ambition driven (zero accidents, 
resilience)  
 Zero vision: prevent all kinds of 
accidents as business principle 
 Strengthen the resilience of the 
organisation 
. Image improvement 
. Improvement of organisational culture 
and collaboration in the network 
economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
x 
 
 
x 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
Table 5 shows the perspectives of the three companies. These scores show that perspectives 
to change within all companies are specifically found in leadership, increase of HSEQ 
compliance and procedures, issues with contractor safety and involvement of employees.  This 
latter perspective of involvement of employees shows that there is apparently a need and an 
interest to better align employees to safety activities. Although, based upon these cores, 
perspectives for such an alignment might differ, is this for better reporting, increase compliance 
behaviour, to set up communication and dialogue, or perhaps other perspectives? Looking at 
preconditions, company C is driven from an ambition or a crisis to start with safety culture. 
Clearly this is an important situation, shown by the supportive and active role of company’s 
(higher) management.  
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Table 5: Scores of three companies to topic list of perspectives and preconditions 
   Company 
   A. B. C. 
Wat are 
perspectives 
to meet 
problems 
and 
ambitions, 
and how?  
 
Goal setting, 
give a push 
to 
organizationa
l movement, 
strengthen 
dialogue 
Leadership 
Commitment to safety 
1.Demonstration of safety 
leadership 
In all daily decisions at all levels and 
communicate those decisions in a 
consequent way 
x x x 
HSEQ procedures 
Quantity and quality 
2.increase compliance of rules and 
procedures 
3.develop a congruent set of rules 
and procedures 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Daily HSE behaviour 
Always work safe? 
4.safety should be the first priority, 
and therefore rules over production 
5.more compliance behaviour at all 
levels 
x 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
Competence and 
safety awareness 
Hazards and risks? 
6.trust employees to make the right 
risk assessments 
7.improving visible leading by 
example 
 
 
 
x 
x 
 
x 
 
 
 
Contractor safety 
Cooperation with 
contractors in HSE 
8.better align purchasers and 
planners with safety 
9.more attention to multi languages 
at the shop floor  
x x x 
 
x 
Reporting incidents 
Employees feel free and 
motivated to report? 
10.increase reporting 
11. consequent follow up and 
feedback on reports 
12. ensure blame free investigations 
 x 
 
x 
x 
 
 
Continuous 
improvement 
Focus on improvement? 
13.follow up and learn from 
incidents 
14.reframe focus towards lagging 
indicators instead of leading 
indicators 
 
 
x 
x x 
Involvement of 
employees 
In what way employees 
are involved in safety 
initiatives? 
15. increase of involvement of 
employees at shop floor 
16. use practical knowledge of 
employees 
x x 
 
 
x 
 
x 
 Communication 
Is safety vision 
consequently 
communicated?  
17. develop a consistent safety 
vision 
18.training of communication skills, 
improve dialogue and interaction 
 
x 
 x 
x 
 Maintenance 
management 
What is quality of 
maintenance? 
19.Increase supervision and 
interaction 
20.Overdue of maintenance is a 
serious safety issue 
21.Implementation of new technics 
and materials can be improved 
 
x 
 
 
x 
x 
x 
 Risk Management 
Are all risks sufficient 
known and tackled? 
22.do not let systems overtake 
safety; personal contact should be 
the driver for attitude and behaviour 
for safety 
x x  
Precondition
s  
Motivation and 
capacities (Theories of 
chance: Kotter, 
Cozijnsen and success 
factors from success 
factors safety culture 
projects ( Hale, 
Guldenmund): 
23.Large enough motivation ( 
ambition or crises) 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
x  
24.Change capacities 
25.Aware of effect of behavioural 
changes 
26.Active and supportive role of 
(higher) management 
27.Strengthen dialogue between 
shop floor and (operational) 
management 
28.Training and motivation 
management and board members 
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3.2. Discussion 
To ensure sustainable safety at work, companies increasingly intent to create a safety culture. 
Doing so, improving safety culture requires (behavioural) change within the company. For this, 
companies should not only have insights into what has to be changed, but also how this change 
can be induced. In practice, inducing change often appears to be difficult (see Schein 2004). 
Sustainable change requires an active involvement of a variety of stakeholders. These 
stakeholders should understand why the change is worthwhile for the company. Moreover, they 
should give meaning to the change themselves (Scharmer, 2007, Van der Zouwen, 2011, Van 
Scheppingen, 2014). In other words: stakeholders should understand the ‘essential why’ of 
improving safety culture and understand what the perspectives are to induce the change. Effect 
studies often state the relevance of drives, motives and perspectives to start a safety culture 
program. Unfortunately, these motives and perspectives are rarely specified. This paper aims to 
contribute to this lacking knowledge by making explicit what are the motives and perspectives of 
companies to improve their safety culture. 
Based on the findings – and in line with Guldenmund (2010), who stated that ‘safety culture had 
become a term used by people all around the globe to explain everything relating to safety 
failure that cannot be explained in another way’-, the motives to improve safety culture are 
mostly related to problem solving and reducing safety risks. Risk reduction, of course, is – and 
will be- a main focus of safety professionals. Creating a sense of urgency to prevent hazards is, 
therefore, often remarked as step 1 in a safety culture program. With this we come up to the 
issue of different risk perceptions. Different stakeholders - needed to induce the full change and 
embed a safety culture- may (will!) have different risk perspectives. It is not likely that all 
stakeholders will give the same meaning to safety and/or risks and feel the same sense of 
urgency when safety hazards are made clear. This raises the question whether safety 
professionals should invest (all) their effort in convincing other stakeholders of the urgency to 
strengthen a safety culture. Another possibly relevant strategy is searching for shared motives 
and creating common ground. Working on shared motives is expected to mobilize energy within 
the organization to make a next step in change (Van der Zouwen, 2011; Van Scheppingen, 
2014). It is interesting to address the question what motives serve (parallel) interests of all 
relevant stakeholders. We presume that the ambition/developmental motives of organizations 
are specifically relevant for this. Especially to align with strategic management can be fruitful, 
after all their ambition to ensure the existence of the company might include also safety 
ambitions. Further research however is needed to examine our presumption. 
Strengthening safety culture is not a rational and linear process that can be implemented. 
Organizational and safety culture is something that a company is, rather than something a 
company has (Cooper, 2000). Making a next step in cultural development is therefore seen as a 
collective and continuously learning process (Schein, 2004). This research provides some 
insights in supporting such a collective learning process and strengthening a safety culture. 
Making motives explicit within the company is seen as an important step to cultural change. 
With this, stakeholders are enabled to develop their own meaning to the change. In health 
science, a participatory value case methodology was found to be a useful method to 
collaboratively making shared motives explicit (Van Scheppingen et al 2013). It seems relevant 
to investigate if such a method will be useful regarding safety culture. 
To promote safety culture, it is meaningful to reflect from time to time to the current situation and 
the way ahead (Zwetsloot & Dijkman, 2010). The recognized motives and perspectives in this 
paper can be used to support this reflective, developmental process. First, the motives and 
perspectives can be used as (shared) aim for which companies strive. Second, the motives and 
perspective can be used as indicators for periodically monitoring within the company. Third, 
they can be used to investigate and discuss the similarities and differences among the 
stakeholders when regarding safety culture.  
Maybe the main contribution of the recognized motives and perspectives, however, is that they 
can be used to facilitate a substantive dialogue about the ‘essential why’ and perspective of 
strengthening a safety culture. To be used in training, workshops, strategic dialogue or regular 
work meetings or tool box meeting, this seem useful and complementary to other approaches to 
enhance safety culture. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Our main conclusion is that cultural change in organizations, including safety culture, may 
benefit from motives and perspectives to be explicit and shared within the company. Sharing 
such motives and perspectives among stakeholders and searching for parallel interests are 
expected to mobilize energy and motivation to make a next step in safety culture.  
More specific, our research showed that most motives for starting up activities on safety culture 
are problem driven, and not so much ambition driven. Those ambitions of organisations, 
perhaps hidden in several divisions, are of value to dig up. Safety culture could then be more a 
shared concern, embedded in company’s strategy and not so much the only concern of safety 
professionals.  
Making motives and perspectives explicit contributes not only to better understand why there is 
a need to change organisations’ safety culture, but also unravels several perceptions on risks 
and safety within the organisation. Although we are aware that we have based our research on 
data of three companies, we are convinced that this research opens new possibilities to look 
into organisations’ safety culture. The findings of this research are presumed to be useful in 
developing sustainable safety culture programs and interventions. 
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Abstract 
Existing approaches to stimulate safe behaviour mostly fail to devote explicit attention to the 
diversity of employers on the workfloor. Especially the group of workers that performs risky and 
low skilled work appears to be more diverse in terms of age, language, culture, religion, gender, 
and also health status. In this study we focus on the improvement of safety performance in 
multilingual i.e. multicultural organisations. Due to globalisation trends the need for approaches 
that pay attention to language issues and aspects of cultural background for the prevention of 
accidents has grown. One of such tools could be the managing role of the leader in such 
diverse teams as is already shown by the positive effects of a Safety Specific Transformational 
Leader (SSTL) on Safety Performance on operational workfloors. The open and safety specific 
style of communication of this type of leaders has been shown to foster safety on the workfloor. 
However, none of these studies made a comparison between multilingual and monolingual work 
teams regarding the effectiveness of this SSTL communication style. One could suggest that in 
multilingual teams a “walking and talking around” manager is not that profitable as in 
monolingual teams; in what way he manager has to communicate with his colleagues speaking 
different languages in order to be convincing about safety performance?  To explore the safety 
performance in multicultural teams and the role of leadership, we defined the following research 
questions: (a) do multilingual organisations differ in safety performance from monolingual 
organisations? (b) what is the impact of leadership to safety performance, and does this differ 
between monolingual and multilingual organisations? (c) What do our findings mean for 
potential approaches in managing safety of multilingual organisations? 
Based on a questionnaire study in 17 companies in the warehouse sector in the Netherlands 
(total number of participants was 260, from which 154 from multilingual organisations), we have 
analysed the following variables: company safety awareness, personal safety awareness, 
general safety risks, safety-specific transformational leadership. Pearson correlations, a t-test, 
linear regression analyses and an interaction term were conducted to test the relations and 
differences between the relationships. At last the results will be discussed with a selection of the 
companies in an interactive panel.  
Our first analyses indicate that employees in multicultural/lingual organisations show a lower 
safety awareness on company level, more safety risks and a lower score on transformational 
leadership. Also, it shows that transformational leadership is positively related to safety 
awareness and negatively to safety risks. 
The results of explorative multivariate regression analyses indicate that there is a positive 
relation between leadership and safety awareness on a company level and a stronger 
relationship between leadership and safety awareness in monocultural/lingual organisations 
compared to multicultural/lingual organizations. 
The results of this study show that the safety performance within multicultural/lingual 
organisations is lower than the safety performance of monocultural/lingual organisations. Also 
we found that there is more transformational leadership in mono cultural/lingual teams, and also 
that the relationship between leadership and safety is stronger in the monolingual teams.  
 
Keywords: safety culture; multiculturalism, communication, leadership, warehousing. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to globalisation trends there is a growing need for ways to improve safety and health in 
multicultural/multilingual work settings.  Over the past few years, the workforce has changed, 
with a growing number of migrants in the labor force (EU-OSHA, 2013). Migrant workers are 
often employed in low-skilled, low-paid jobs with dangerous working conditions that local 
workers would not accept. Moreover, several studies have revealed that migrant workers are 
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more often involved in occupational accidents than national workers (EU-OSHA, 2013). The 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound, 2007) 
has published several national reports concerning migrant workers, which highlight that migrant 
workers are more exposed to risky situations than local workers, for example in Spain, Italy and 
Austria. Based on the results of the Netherlands Working Conditions Survey, conducted among 
approximately 25 000 workers, Van den Bossche et al. (2006) showed that non-Western 
migrants are significantly more often involved in accidents resulting in physical or mental injury.  
Possible reasons for this range from more practical ‘communicational problems in 
understanding the instructions’ to the ‘confrontation with unfamiliar local working procedures’ 
(EU-OSHA, 2013). Lindhout (2009) for example found that language issues were related to 
safety issues but also indicated that other factors, such as cultural diversity may play an 
underlying role in safety (Lindhout, 2009). Evidently, organizational communication, be it in the 
form of language or cross-cultural communication styles or the complexity of intercultural 
communication, plays an important role in occupational safety.  Guldenmund and colleagues 
(2010) refer to the serious consequences of diversity in relation to safety knowledge, values 
about work and communication. In their study, it is shown that migrants are more vulnerable to 
safety incidents owing to aspects such as obedience (e.g. they are more reluctant to raise 
safety issues), language barriers, and eagerness to earn money quickly. For example, in the 
Netherlands it is expected that half of the migrants from Mid-and East European countries will 
enter via an employment agency (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in the Netherlands, 
2011). Their more flexible (insecure) and so more vulnerable labour position will probably make 
the workers more reluctant to come up with safety issues.  
Communication issues and risk perception have been mentioned as causes of accidents by the 
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Guldenmund et al., 2010). De Vries and 
colleagues (2007) argue that language problems and cultural differences often cause problems 
with respect to understanding safety regulations. Employees often do not understand the safety 
regulations and/or its importance, and will probably as a result, act less committed to them. In 
addition, unfamiliarity with local standards can account for accidents (Van Hooff et al., 2009). 
This study shows that the higher risk may be partly explained by the characteristics of the low-
skilled jobs. Van Hooff and colleagues (2009) conclude that both the characteristics of migrants 
(e.g. language comprehension, knowledge and understanding of local habits and risk 
perception) and those of their working environment (temporary work, unskilled and risky work) 
mean that occupational safety is at risk.  
In a study for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Guldenmund and colleagues 
(2012) investigated possible factors affecting occupational accidents among migrant workers in 
three European countries (Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Guldenmund 
and colleagues (2012, p. 7) conclude that the vulnerability of migrant workers might best be 
explained on situational (instead of cultural) grounds. Migrants might, for example, encounter 
difficulties in receiving and/or fully understanding safety instructions owing to language and/or 
literacy problems. Moreover, they often settle for poor and unsafe working conditions as their 
primary concern is to make money to avoid going home empty handed.  
So, next to language issues and cultural issues, also characteristics of the migrants  (knowledge 
of the local habits, illiteracy),  characteristics of the job (unskilled or risky work) and situations 
circumstances will possibly affect safety in multicultural/multilingual teams. Whether cultural 
aspects, like background differences and differences in  risk perception are undoubtedly 
influential in the potential occurrence of occupational accidents, on the workfloor it is still 
believed that multilingualism on the work floor accounts for the largest part of situations in which 
accidents occur. Although companies are aware of the difficulties that a workforce with different 
cultural backgrounds and languages can bring, when examining occupational safety policies 
these cultural background characteristics are hardly considered (Bukman et al., 2010; cf. 
Vickers et al., 2003). In existing safety programs the attention to the diversity of cultural 
backgrounds of employees on the work floor is lacking. Safety managers do renew existing 
safety guides and create interventions and/or programs to improve the adaptability to the variety 
of workers, in terms of safety, but merely translating procedures, to avoid language barriers, is 
insufficient. For example using pictograms is seen as an effective and practical way of 
decreasing language related uncertainties, but in most times they are unable to give an ‘action 
perspective’; let alone the perception of pictograms by workers with different cultural 
backgrounds. Taking into account the multiple type of factors that may cause unsafety in 
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multicultural  teams, it is argued by  Starren et al. (2013)  that “there is a need for the 
improvement of personal competencies, and especially leadership competencies, to deal with 
constantly changing language and culture situations at work.”  
In this present study we will look at the managing role of the leader in such diverse teams. 
Regarding to leadership style, it is already shown form literature that there are positive effects 
from specific leadership on Safety Performance on operational workfloors. Prior research has 
found that transformational leadership is a management method/style with specific 
communication styles (Barling, Weber & Kelloway, 1996) that could improve the procedures in 
multicultural (multilingual) teams related to safety (EU-OSHA, 2013). The open and safety 
specific style of communication of this type of leaders has been shown to foster safety on the 
workfloor. Moreover this style of leadership competencies can be trained and developed.  
In the studies of Barling et al. (2002),  De Koster et al. (2011) and Kelloway et al. (2006), the 
crucial aspects for Safety-Specific Transformational Leadership (SSTL) have been defined. This 
type of leadership is characterized by the following aspects: 
- “Idealized influence”: refers to acting as a role model for safety behaviour; 
- “Inspirational motivation”: means communicating a safety vision that encourages employees 
to behave accordingly; 
- “Intellectual stimulation”: makes employees think of “new ways of doing work” to improve 
safety, and; 
- a transformational leader with “Individualized consideration”: shows active interest and care 
for the personal safety of employees and individually supports them to. 
The above SSTL characteristics show the aspects of an effective  communicative style in order 
to behave and convince as a safety specific leader. 
However, none of these earlier studies made a comparison between multicultural and 
monocultural work teams regarding the effectiveness of this transformational communication 
style. One could suggest that it will work in multicultural/multilingual setting too. But one could 
also suggest  that in these kind of teams the typical “walking and talking around” -characteristic 
of the transformational style manager is not that profitable, because of the language barriers. 
The question is in what way he manager has to communicate with his colleagues speaking 
different languages and coming from different backgrounds,  in order to be convincing about 
safety performance? 
In this present  study we conduct a quantitative study on leadership style in monolingual and 
multilingual warehouses in  the Netherlands, and its effect on the risk of occupational accidents.  
We choose for the warehousing because of the relatively high risk activities, the prevalence of 
multicultural teams, and because De Koster has used the warehouse setting for his earlier 
findings.  To explore the safety performance in multicultural teams and the role of leadership, 
we defined the following research questions:  
(a) do multilingual organisations differ in safety performance from monolingual organisations?  
(b) what is the impact of leadership to safety performance, and does this differ between 
monolingual and multilingual organisations? 
(c) What do our findings mean for potential approaches and tools in managing safety of 
multilingual organisations? 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1 Sample 
Based on a questionnaire study in 17 companies in the warehouse sector in the Netherlands 
(total number of participants was 260, from which 154 were multilingual organisations). The 
companies were randomly selected and categorised as being MULT (9)/MONO (8) based on 
our criteria of how many languages were spoken on the workfloor . The sectors ranged from the 
logistics sector to food supply warehouses. Most warehouses used in this study were located 
around the city of Nijmegen, and/or the eastern part of the Netherlands (for example, JUMBO, 
KRUIVAT, DHL).  
 
2.2 Procedure 
The self-reported questionnaire data were collected in 2013 by means of random company 
visits to warehouses. Dutch warehouses were contacted via email or telephone and provided 
with a written or oral introduction that the research was about different leadership styles in 
multicultural teams and asked whether the workforce had a certain degree of internationality or 
multilingualism or not. After confirmation of the amount of different languages spoken on the 
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workfloor, we labeled the company as monolingual if there was only one general worklanguage, 
if there were more then two languages spoken om the workfloor  we labeled the company by 
definition as multilingual. In companies where only two languages were spoken we analysed the 
percentage of multilingualism (if more then 50 % of the employees indicated in the 
questionnaire that he/she spoke two language at the workfloor then the company w was 
considered as being multilingual). Respondents were asked to fill in a paper questionnaire 
provided by the researcher in person. Respondents could select between Dutch, English, 
German and Polish questionnaires. The questionnaire included 50 questions and a short 
instruction that the research is on different leadership styles, that all data will be treated 
anonymously, only serving the purpose of the research, and information on how to answer the 
questions. It took respondents about 5 minutes to fill in the survey. As the researchers were 
present during the answering procedure, respondents were allowed to ask if they had difficulties 
understanding the questionnaire. The respondents were informed of the purpose and 
procedures of the study, the participation was voluntary, and strict confidentiality was 
guaranteed regarding individual responses outside the research team. All respondents were 
men between 19 and 51.   
 
2.3 Measures 
Multi/monolingualism The first four questions were combined to multilingualism/monolingualism 
and focused respectively on the native language, language knowledge, language(s) spoken on 
the work floor by oneself, and language(s) spoken on the work floor by others. These 
introductory questions all had six answer possibilities, namely: 1 = Dutch, 2 = English, 3 = 
German, 4 = Polish, 5 = Romanian and 6 = ‘Other(s), namely __’.  
Safety Awareness (SA) SA was measured with a scale developed by Barling et al. (2002). The 
scale measures an individual’s own awareness of safety issues and consists of seven items on 
a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). We modified three 
items slightly to be applicable to a warehouse situation. An example item is: “I know how to 
inform management about any potential hazards I notice on the job”.  
The reliability of (individual) safety awareness consisting out of 5 items was adequate: α = .70. 
However, in order to ensure the reliability of the questions, item 7, regarding dangerous 
situations on the work floor (e.g. fire) has been withheld from the study. Apparently, the question 
was not formulated clearly. The reliability of company safety awareness consisting of 6 items 
was good: α = .89. Example “I work in a company where the possibility of accidents causing a 
threat to the environment is low”. 
Safety performance The reliability of safety performance consisting of 7 items was good: α = 
.91. Example “In the past 12 months I came in contact with fluids, gasses or high voltage that 
were unintentionally released”. 
Safety-specific transformational leadership (SSTL): The remaining questions, 23 to 33 focused 
on safety-specific transformational leadership (SSTL). We measured SSTL using Barling et al.’s 
(2002) 10-item scale; see also de Koster et al. (2006), Kelloway et al. (2011). Barling and 
colleagues based this scale on the MLQ, an instrument used to measure general 
transformational leadership (Bass and Avolio, 1990). Like Barling et al. (2002), we used a 
seven-point scale response format per item ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree 
strongly). An example of an item includes, 'My direct manager talks about his/her values and 
beliefs of the importance of safety'. The reliability of safety-specific transformational leadership 
consisting out of 11 items was good: α = .92.  
First Pearson correlations were calculated between the variables. T-test and lineair regression 
analyses were applied to investigate research question 1 and 2a. An interaction term was 
calculated and added to the regression analyses to test whether the impact of SSTL differs 
between mono and multilingual companies.  
 
3. RESULTS 
First step in our analyses was to find out whether multilingual organisations do differ in safety 
performance and awareness and in their (perceived) Safety Leadership from monolingual 
organisations? Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among the study variables for the 
sample as a whole are presented in Table 1. The correlations analyses show that company 
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safety awareness correlates significantly with personal safety awareness and safety 
performance in general. Personal safety awareness does not correlate with safety performance. 
Transformational leadership correlates significantly with all the safety performance indicators for 
mono- and multicultural teams taken together. Due to a high intercorrelation between company 
safety awareness and personal safety awareness, personal safety awareness is excluded from 
further analyses (!). 
 
Table 1: Intercorrelations among language of the company (MULTI/MONO) company safety awareness, personal safety 
awareness, safety performance and safety-specific transformational leadership (N=254). 
Variable name 1. 2. 3. 4. M (SD) α 
1. Company safety awareness - .67** .24** .55** 5.14 (1.28) .70 
2. Personal safety awareness   - .01 .52** 5.83 (1.32) .89 
3. Safety performance (high score 
is  
low risk-) 
  - .17* 5.42 (1.93) .91 
4. Safety-specific transformational 
leadership 
   - 5.29 (1.37) .91 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Question A: Do multilingual organisations differ in safety awareness, safety performance and  
SSTL from monolingual organisations? Table 2 shows the results of the T-test in which 
monolingual and multilingual companies are compared. Monolingual companies show a 
significantly higher score on company safety awareness, safety performance and 
transformational leadership.  
 
Table 2: T-test , comparison of monolingual and multilingual companies on included measures 
Variable name Mono
l/ 
Multi 
N M SD T  Df Sig. 
Company safety 
awareness 
Monl 104 5.51 1.20 3.79 254 .00 
 Multi 152 4.91 1.27    
Personal safety 
awareness  
Mono 104 5.91 1.24 .88 254 .38 
 Multi 152 5.76 1.37    
Safety performance Mono 106 6.01 1.61 4.16 256 .00 
 Multi 152 5.03 2.01    
Safety-specific 
Transformational 
leadership 
Mono 104 5.53 1.26 2.48 256 .01 
 Multi 154 5.11 1.41    
 
Monolingual companies do significantly differ from multilingual companies on company safety 
awareness and safety performance even when controlled for SSTL (see table 3).: Monolingual 
companies show a higher company safety awareness and safety performance. However, 
monolingual companies do not differ significantly from multilingual companies on SSTL when 
controlled for company safety awareness and safety performance (see table 4).  
 
(B) 1. What is the impact of safety specific leadership on safety awareness and performance? 
Table 3 shows the regression analyses with safety performance and company safety 
awareness as dependent variables. The analyses show that transformational leadership is 
significanty related to company safety awareness but is not significantly related to safety 
performance when controlled for company safety awareness. This is an indication that safety 
awareness partly mediates the relationship between SSTL and safety performance. Since we 
also found a significant relationship between between company safety awareness and safety 
performance not controlled for SSTL (not depicted) and no difference between MULTI/MONO) 
in relationship between performance and awareness. 
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Table 3: Regression analysis for safety performance and company safety awareness, standardized Beta coefficients 
(N=254). 
 Compa
ny 
safety 
awaren
ess 
   Safety 
perfor- 
mance 
  
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3  Step 1 Step 
2 
Step 
3 
MONO=0,  
MULTI=1) 
-.14* -.11* -.10 MONO=0 
MULTI=1 
-.22** -.20* -.20* 
Safety-
specific 
transformatio
nal 
leadership 
.53** .51** .53** Safety-
specific 
transformatio
nal leadership 
.14** .05 .05 
Safety 
performance 
- .12* .11* Company 
safety 
awareness 
 .16* .16* 
MONO/MUL
TI*Leadershi
p 
 - -.14** MONO/MULT
I*Leadership 
  -.01 
R2 adjusted .32 .33 .34 R2 adjusted .07 .09 .08 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Table 4: Regression analysis for transformational leadership, standardized Beta coefficients (N=254) 
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
MONO=0 
MULTI-1 
-.16** -.04 -.03 
Company safety awareness  .54** .53** 
Safety performance   .04 
R2 adjusted .02 .30 .30 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
(B) 2. The next question was whether the relationship between leadership and company safety 
awareness and performance differs between monolingual and multilingual companies. For this 
question an interaction term was calculated of SSTL and company language (MULTI/MONO) 
and added in the third step of the analysis. The interaction term is significant for the outcome 
measure company safety awareness but not for safety performance (see table 3). In order to 
get a better insight in the direction of the relationship two separate analyses are performed for 
monolingual and multilingual companies (see table 5). The relationship between 
transformational leadership and company safety awareness is stronger for monolingual 
companies in comparison to multilingual companies. 
 
Table 5: Regression analysis for company safety awareness separately for monolingual, (N=102) and multilingual 
(N=152 )companies standardized Beta coefficients 
 Monolingual Multilingual 
Safety performance 0.02 0.16** 
Safety-specific 
transformational 
leadership 
0.71** 0.42** 
R2 adjusted .49 .21 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
(C) Third Research Question is on the meaning of our findings for potential approaches and 
tools in managing safety of multilingual organisations?  
This research question will be based on discussions of the outcomes with a selection of the 
involved companies to make recommendations on how to improve safety performance in 
multicultural organisations. The involvement of the companies self is important since culture is a 
very complex phenomenon which makes it very important to look at the contextvariables as well 
before drawing conclusions. 
295
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In sum, the multivariate analyses show that multilingual companies do differ in the degree of 
company safety awareness and safety performance from monolingual companies (monolingual 
companies have a higher degree of safety awareness and safety performance), but do not differ 
in the degree of transformational leadership style when controlled for company safety 
awareness and safety performance.  
Transformational leadership has a positive relationship with company safety awareness and 
there is an indication that company safety awareness mediates the relationship between SSTL 
and safety performance. The relationship between SSTL and company safety awareness is 
stronger in monolingual companies. These results add to prior research on the influence of  
safety-specific transformational leadership an important leadership styles on occupational safety 
(Barling  de Koster et al, xx) . As no other emprirical research is carried out before  on this 
reltaionshp beween SSTL and Safety on the operational workfloor within multicultural 
workfloors, is has always been suggested that “SSTL is likely to become even more important 
as work teams with high levels of cultural difference become more common.” (OSH 2013, p xx). 
Our results clearly show that safety specific transformational leadership is not enough because 
SSTL is a much weaker predictor for maintaining safety in multincultural companies then it is for 
monocultural companies. One of the reasons of why a SSTL is less effective in a multlingual 
company could be that the diversity in culture and language among he workers in a 
multinational team makes it very complex to create a shared safety climate. Starren and 
colleagues (2012) did present a framework and a research agenda that may guide the current 
understanding of national culture and occupational safety and identify promising areas for 
research that advance the field. In their paper they looked at the safety climate as one of the 
predictors of knowledge and motivation regarding safety and thus safe behaviour. It is to be 
expected that individual perceptions of the safety climate will vary in a culturally diverse work 
team. Enhancing a constructive safety climate in a diverse workforce requires special attention. 
Therefore, multicultural and multilingual work teams should pay special attention to developing 
a shared vision on the safety climate. This requires an inclusive organisation, and it is the role of 
good leadership to develop such a shared vision. As the combinations of cultural differences, 
individual differences and regulations are endless, it is important to train in competences that 
increase leaders’, as well as team members’, in intercultural effectiveness. Recognizing 
intercultural differences and their predictive role on the degree of safety awareness and safety 
climate as well as the crucial role leadership plays in predicting occupational safety climate, 
performance and awareness, may provide the basis for a multi-level organizational 
communication training and development of safety programmes in multicultural and multilingual 
workplaces. 
One of the problems n developing multi-level organizational communication training, is the 
underestimationthe “power of language” of the managers but also of the colleague-employees 
in the process of creating a safe and healthy work environment. Non-English speaking 
employees, more so than the managers and English speaking co-workers, strongly think that 
(lack of) language is influencing the way they are treated within the company (Paul, 2012). 
Safety specific transformational managers need not only to be able to demonstrate genuine, 
public and continuing commitment to safety. They must also ensure openness and trust in the 
workplace, and the absence of a blame culture. Managers must be ready to make use of safety 
expertise, as well as to listen to the views of their own workers and recognise their knowledge 
and understanding of the practicalities of OSH in the workplace . The first challenge in future 
research for finding more effective ways in providing safety in multicultural and multilingual 
companies is to investigate  how these managers can create a shared vision of safety climate 
without speaking the language of their employees?  
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Abstract 
This research aimed to evaluate the physical structure of a dental clinic in a public school in the 
city of Curitiba and its impact on biosecurity. As a methodology, a descriptive research in 
October 2014 was carried out by means of direct observation of architecture and furniture 
according to which advocates the RDC 50/02, rule of Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) and 
system Investment Support Project Development in Health (SOMASUS). Was conducted 
photographic record for risk analysis, documenting possible sources and existing control 
measures. As for the physical structure of the building architecture standards were followed in 
relation to the design, pipes, countertops, sinks and sterilization materials. However, 
inadequacies were found: waiting room with wooden floors, irregular footers, an office without 
protection against the incidence of sunlight; taps that had no device to dispense contact with 
hands, brushing room with tiles and inadequate painting. The existing furniture was well 
distributed and in accordance with the regulatory standard. The study enabled us to identify the 
potential risks of contamination of this sector, especially in relation to the built environment 
(architecture). There is no effective security to control cross-contamination because of 
inadequate infrastructure present, requiring reforms in physical spaces and adaptations in the 
dental clinic. 
 
Keywords: contamination; biosecurity; occupational hazards 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Biosafety can be understood as a set of educational and regulatory actions aimed at accident 
prevention in healthcare (Santos, Santos & Arnaud, 2011; Vasconcelos et al, 2009). It is 
necessary that the spaces and practices meet the indispensable requirements to minimize 
occupational hazards. 
The architectural programming of healthcare environments is topic of growing concern as its 
construction, dimensioning, organization of furniture and equipment, so that professionals can 
attend more adequately and satisfactorily their patients (Assoni & Almeida, 2013). 
The physical infrastructure is based on building techniques and architectural solutions of 
Engineering in relation to the functional conduits and flow of services, in order to minimize the 
risks or prevent them, contributing to the quality of care provided (Brasil, 2002). 
In this sense, the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA), follows medical advances, 
making available to health care services a series of equipment and architectural solutions, 
making it efficient to curative and preventive action of diseases in Healthcare Care Facilities 
environments – EAS (Rodrigues, 2008). 
Thus, it is understood that the physical infrastructure relies on technical basis, assuming the 
combination of functional behaviors and architectural and engineering solutions, in order to 
contribute effectively to the quality of health assistance in the workplace (Camargo, Medrado & 
Pereira, 2014).  
Therefore, the present study aims to evaluate the physical and organizational structure of a 
dental clinic of a public school in the city of Curitiba and its impacts on biosecurity. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
This was descriptive research, through direct structured observation of architecture and 
photographic record of a dental clinic of a public school in the city of Curitiba, held in October 
2014.  
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For the observation, were evaluated criteria regarding physical structure and furniture. And this 
was structured from two Brazilian legislation: the Collegiate Board Resolution (RDC) of the 
National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) number 50/2002 (Brazil, 2002), Regulatory 
Standard 32 and the Support System Regulation to Investment Projects Development in Health 
(SOMASUS) (Brazil, 2011).  
As support for analysis and documentation of the risks, the photographic record was performed 
(SAMSUNG Digimax i6 camera, with 8.1 megapixel resolution and 4x optical zoom). 
The research followed the ethical aspects, not being identified the name of the school 
investigated. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Following the rules of the RDC/ANVISA No. 50/2002, the individual dental offices must have, 
obligatorily: 
a) Sizing: minimum area of 9 m2. May dispense the Material Sterilization Central (CME) and 
have, in the same environment, a countertop with sink and sterilization equipment. The two 
investigated offices present 22 m2, countertop, sink and autoclave for sterilization of materials 
and instruments. The sterilization regulation control is performed by a ribbon that accompanies 
all the instruments to be sterilized where it reads the sterilization and its effectiveness; being the 
date of the last preventive maintenance of biosafety equipment the day 08/22/2014. Sterilization 
occurs at 132 degrees, for 4 to 6 minutes. 
b) Finishing materials: materials for cladding of walls, floors and ceilings of critical areas and 
semi-critical environments must be resistant to washing and the use of disinfectants, monolithic 
surfaces and absorption rate not exceeding 4%, without slots and apparent structural shapes. 
The walls and ceilings of the clinic investigated (figure 1), presented smooth surfaces, light-
colored, without structural shapes with resistant painting to cleaning and disinfection processes. 
c) Partitions: the use of removable partitions in the critical areas is not allowed. The offices 
analyzed are separated by masonry wall, showing no partitions. 
 
 
Figure 1 – dental office 
 
d) Tubing: the critical and semi-critical areas, should be no apparent tubing in the walls and 
ceilings. The studied clinic does not have apparent tubing. 
e) Baseboards and floors: the execution of the joint between the baseboard and the floor should 
be such that allows complete cleaning of the formed corner. Baseboards were observed not 
aligned with the wall and the floor which made difficult the local cleaning process. Furthermore, 
the floor of the waiting area is old and with wood floor in clubs (many loose, damaged and 
having protrusions), which prevents it from being classified as washable, impermeable and light 
color as is required (figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 – waiting room footers 
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f) Ceilings: The ceilings in critical areas should be continuous, being forbidden the use of 
removable false linings, the kind that interferes with the cleaning of the environments. The 
construction of offices presents slab ceiling having no wood or plaster linings. 
g) Blinds and curtains: for protection from the sun and reduction of dust accumulation, the use 
of protective films in glasses or soluble facade louvers is the most recommended. The clinic 
uses washable blinds, however one of the offices did not present this protection (figure 3). 
h) Lighting: is performed by natural and artificial means. However, in one of the rooms there is 
no protection against the sun in the afternoon, causing complaints..   
 
 
i) Brushing room: we found damaged baseboards; taps without commands that dispense 
contact with hands; tiled walls to the middle height and with inadequate painting presenting 
infiltration (figures 4, 5 and 6).   
 
 
Figure 4 – wall with tile up to middle height 
 
Figure 5 – wall with infiltration and damaged baseboards 
 
Figure 6 – taps that do not dispense contact with hands 
 
j) Furniture: the dental offices have dental set, dental x-ray machine, cupboard, cylindrical 
bucket for debris with pedal, rotating chair/owl, chairs, office type table with drawers, swivel 
Figure 3 – Windows with no protection against sunlight 
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chair with arm, all well distributed in an area of 22 square meters. The cleaning of the 
equipment is made with soap and water and disinfection with alcohol 70 (figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7 – dental room furniture 
 
The procedures regarding the working routine of dentists and their offices occur satisfactorily, 
due to the organization and planning of the flow of services. The irregularities of the physical 
structure found had already been plotted by the department of works of the institution according 
to request for improvements in the environment made by the head of the health section of the 
school and with reform timetable scheduled for January 2015. 
Because it could not be traced separately from medical sciences and due to the specific 
particularities of services, Odontology seeks the prevention of cross-contamination in 
ambulatory care and the reduction or elimination of these risks (Lima et al, 2012; Vasconcelos 
et al, 2009). In the face of contamination of the a dental environment, the Biosafety presents 
itself as a functional and operational process. Thus, needs to be evaluated for its efficiency and 
quality for the prevention and cross- contamination reduction, very important for reduction of 
occupational hazards in dental practice (Lima et al, 2012). 
The conducted study enabled the identification of the potential risks of contamination of this 
sector, especially in relation to the built environment, due to the impossibility of adequate 
sanitation.  
The dental clinic investigated has offices whose area size exceeds the recommended minimum. 
However, it does not fully meet the standards established by the Brazilian legislation as the 
physical infrastructure.  
The dental chairs are positioned facing the natural light (windows) which on the one hand 
optimizes the use of this type of lighting as well as the use of appropriate artificial lighting. 
Because natural lighting makes it possible to reduce shadows and obfuscation on the work field, 
thus minimizing eye fatigue (Pernambuco, 2001; Dias, Orenha & Sundefeld, 2007). On the 
other hand, creates a need as the placement of blinds of washable material in one of the dental 
offices, thereby avoiding the main complaint related to obscuring by the incidence of sunrays 
during the morning hours.  
The wash basins of dental rooms do not present adequate infrastructure for hand hygiene to 
occur properly, being proposed following the regulatory standard of safety and health at work in 
health facilities NR-32 (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011), according to which all 
washbasins and sinks must have taps and liquid soap dispenser with commands that dispense 
hands contact (Aranha, 2014).  
The Sanitation of the equipments and surfaces is made with alcohol 70, following the regulatory 
standard, because cleaning and disinfection of such surfaces is fundamental factor for the 
reduction and incidence of infections, where can be used Povidini Iodine spray or alcohol 70 in 
spray (ANVISA) (Brazil, 2002). 
On the issue of ventilation this was considered appropriate, because it has good exchange of 
fresh air, external escapes and acclimatized, by the presence of air conditioner with regular and 
periodic exchange of filters) (Brazil, 2002). According to the study by Santos et al (2011), the 
air-conditioning equipment installation must be accompanied by ventilation system and/or 
complementary exhaustion, thereby ensuring the renewal of outside air necessary in these 
environments.  
The sterilization of instruments in the autoclave is by self-vacuum sterilization was also 
considered adequate, since its use is the preconized to bring many advantages to the used 
time, promoting sterilization at a temperature of 132 degrees Celsius in two atmospheres of 
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pressure, in four minutes (Noro & Ribeiro, 2012). The autoclave is an effective mean for 
sterilization and not enough to have a good equipment, periodic maintenance is necessary and 
control with biological tests (Assoni & Almeida, 2013), as well as follow the technical 
specifications regarding the use to avoid shocks and burns (Silva et al, 2015). 
The arrangement of the furniture is in accordance with the guideline of SOMASUS (Brazil, 
2011) and NR 32 (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2011), containing all the equipment and 
furniture needed by individual offices. Failure to meet the rules can lead to physical wear and 
consequently damage to the worker health. According to Mallone and Dellinger (2011), the 
furniture organization in the dental office should forebode the comfort and support to the patient 
and professionals. Dias et al (2007) also agree with this description, stating that the correct 
planning of the workspace prevents the development of occupational diseases. Besides, 
Barreto et al (2011), regarding safety and health at work, reports that the proper placement of 
equipment and furniture provides reduction of cross-contamination risks. With regard to this 
issue, Draganov et al (2011) state that for the safety and comfort of the patient, the sizing, flows 
and measures of environments must be observed. 
Regarding the floor of the waiting room that is wood, it should be replaced with ceramic floors, 
washable, light-colored, resistant to cleaning. On the issue tiles of brushing room, they should 
be replaced by clear tiles to the ceiling, with minimal indentations, as well as the elimination of 
infiltration of the wall and proper painting. Is also necessary the exchange for new taps, which 
dispense the contact of the hands when the closing of water. The baseboards should be 
reformed so that they are aligned with the wall, thereby facilitating efficient cleaning and 
sanitizing. These adequacies are necessary to make the place into compliance with which 
forebode the RDC no.50 / 02 (Brazil, 2002) and the NR 32 (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 
2011). 
Also in relation to the existence of taps that require manual activation, Queluz (2005) writes in 
his paper that the absence of this mechanism makes the work inadequate to the biosafety 
standards, exposing the entire team of professionals to health risks. 
Although the results of the present study have revealed a good professional conduct in relation 
to biosecurity protocols, there is much to be conquered, particularly with reforms in physical 
spaces and adaptations in the dental clinic architecture for effective control of biosafety. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The clinics analyzed, in infrastructure criteria, are in disagreement with Brazilian standards. The 
fact of being in accordance to the flow of aseptic procedures, follow safety standards, health at 
work and have the appropriate furniture, does not guarantee the effective security of cross-
contamination control. This occurs because the infrastructure presents itself inadequate, 
necessitating reforms that facilitate the elimination of contamination risks, preserve the health of 
workers and, especially, of patients to be assisted.  
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Abstract 
Police work has many hazards, and in order to minimize many of them, particularly those 
relating to personal accidents that endanger the integrity of this worker, it is necessary to 
maintain a good cardio-respiratory condition. Many factors may affect this condition, and among 
them we highlight sedentary lifestyle and smoking. About the smoking, focus of this study, 
epidemiological studies in Brazil have shown that respiratory diseases have been occupying an 
important place in the main causes of hospitalization in the Unified Health System. It is 
estimated that 50% of smokers will develop chronic bronchitis and even those who do not yet 
have clinical symptoms already have functional and morphological changes in the lungs. So it is 
relevant to adopt worker’s healthcare policies that focus on reducing the prevalence of smoking. 
However, despite the various techniques described in literature, there is no consensus on the 
best strategy to achieve this goal. So, this article aims to investigate effectiveness of non-
pharmacological treatment strategy, known as Neural Stimulation (NS) in a Brazilian military 
corporation in southern Brazil. For this purpose has been performed an exploratory and 
descriptive research with 27 workers who were smokers and were willing to quit smoking. The 
technique of NS was first presented to all police through speeches conducted by a group of 
volunteers from a non-governmental organization (NGO). After raising awareness through 
lectures, the group that agreed stop smoking went through a course that taught the technique 
that should be applied on a daily basis. For monitoring the effect of treatment researchers 
adopted a monoximeter to evaluate treatment six steps. The equipment measures the CO 
concentration in parts per million (ppm) on a scale ranging from 1ppm (non-smoker) to 20ppm 
(heavy smoker). When arriving to the course on the first day the worker has been evaluated 
(average of 9,3ppm), ranking the group on the penultimate level of light smokers; during the 
course after smoking his "last cigarette" (average of 11.1ppm); after the first week of self-
treatment (average of 3,3ppm); after the second week of self-treatment (average of 3.0ppm); 
after three months from the starting of self-treatment (average of 6,6ppm) and after six months 
of starting self-treatment (average of 6,5ppm - first level of light smokers). At the end of the 
study, none of the military stopped smoking, although there was a reduction of two levels in the 
monitoring range. This result showed a tendency to decrease or cessation of smoking during 
the two weeks in which volunteers of NGO and researchers were in the corporation. Direct 
stimulating and supporting during the beginning of self-treatment appears to have presented a 
positive result. However, with the gaps between meetings, there has been hard to maintain the 
motivation to quit smoking, as demonstrated by reports where only one of the military have 
performed the technique of NS every day as recommended. Therefore, so for that strategies like 
this one can be adopted in other companies, it is suggested to keep a support group until the 
end of the recommended time for smoking cessation.   
 
Keywords: non-pharmacological treatment; monoximeter; neural stimulation; NGO. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Smoking is associated with mortality of about six million people a year and continues to 
represent the leading cause of preventable deaths in the world, being considered a worldwide 
epidemic (Organización Mundial de la Salud, 2011). 
The World Health Organization (OMS) recognizes that a basic requirement for the reduction of 
tobacco use is that each person is made aware of the damage of this use for health: its 
addictive nature and the potential to cause numerous and varied diseases, including premature 
deaths, for both direct consumers and for those exposed to its smoke (World Health 
Organization, 2011). 
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Additionally, the population, in general, has the fundamental right of assistance to quit smoking, 
being a humanitarian commitment and a legal obligation of member countries. OMS also 
stimulates that countries develop and conduct data collection on the use and tobacco control 
policy implementation, which can be used in general health surveys or as part of researches in 
the area. Brazil was one of the countries that have signed the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (CQCT) (Organización Mundial de la Salud, 2011).  
This convention provides, among other actions, controlling the use of tobacco by the population 
and, therefore, has as commitment to establish effective measures that promote cessation of 
use of this substance and the appropriate treatment for its dependence, leaving to the country, 
prepare and implement effective programs with these objectives (Organización Mundial de la 
Salud, 2011).  
Brazil has developed strong and comprehensive actions in relation to tobacco control, giving the 
country international recognition of leadership in this area, even being the second largest 
exporter and producer of tobacco in the world (American Cancer Society, 2003). 
Therefore, evaluate possible methods to combat smoking in the country seems to be a 
fundamental task and the research group Quality of Life, Health and Labour, of the Federal 
Technological University of Paraná (QVSAT-UTFPR), chose to monitor and evaluate the 
initiative not - pharmacological to combat smoking proposed by a non-governmental 
organization (NOG), that got, from one of the public security systems of a Brazilian state, the 
permission to operate with their servers. 
  
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
The cited NOG offers a comprehensive program of possible improvement of the quality of life of 
the servers involved in the project. This program was initially constituted of a series of courses, 
repeated every week, for six months, aimed at creating the opportunity for all employees to 
have access to it. A part of the course focused on the "treatment for tobacco dependence" as 
recommended by the non-pharmacological methodology of neural stimulation (NS), and the 
servers who smoked were invited to participate in treatment. The NS is a treatment technique 
made with hands, resting the fingertips on specific points of the human body as the top of the 
head and regions of the spine, for a few minutes (Mãos sem Fronteiras, s/d). To participate in 
this survey, the participants were presented to their goals, advantages, disadvantages, the form 
of participation and informed that they could abandon the research at any time without any 
personal injury. In case of acceptance, the participants signed the Clarified and Free Consent 
Term (TCLE) before the start of data collection. 
In this regard, a group of investigated was monitored and tested. The application of these tests 
included: the filling of an instrument on the participant's profile; an individual field diary and 
measurement of the amount of carbon monoxide (CO) expired by the investigated, device 
through BabyCO Meter carbon monoxide measuring equipment, CareFusion brand, Cat No. 
BC01, STK-36 -. battery hand gear, often used, among other applications, in varying programs 
and anti-smoking treatment clinics aiming to verify and quantify the progress of clients. The 
equipment measures the CO concentration in parts per million (ppm) on a scale ranging from 1 
ppm (non-smoker) to 20ppm (heavy smoker) (CareFusion, 2010). 
As to monitoring and evaluation of treatment, the study participants were approached by the 
research team six times: initial evaluation; during treatment proposed by the NGO (two weeks), 
which have been evaluated three times; after this period of treatment and considering the 
Smoker’s Minimum Approach Protocol (Prefeitura Municipal de Curitiba, 2007), the participants 
were evaluated at the end of the third month, counting from the day of start of the treatment 
performed. This period is considered as relevant, because it represents the most likely months 
to relapse and also to be estimated as a period of improvement in lung function (Boletim 
Brasileiro de Avaliação de Tecnologias em Saúde, 2005). The accompaniment and evaluation 
were terminated at the end of the sixth month, after the beginning treatment, verifying the final 
situation in which it was at the time. This minimum time of five to six months for verification of 
effectiveness of the treatment was determined by comparative studies of anti-smoking 
treatments of the Brazilian Bulletin of Technology Assessment in Health (2005) and by the 
wording of the Cochrane Library, which, according Presman et al. (2005), adopts as a success 
criterion the abstinence for the minimum period of six months.   
Among the possible results were considered four options to be investigated: the fully quit 
smoking; reduce consumption; not quit smoking; or increase the consumption; and the 
proposed approach helped in the understanding of the main difficulties for obtaining the first 
result.  
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Data collection using the carbon monoxide measuring equipment (a three seconds puff on the 
device) was as follows: 
1st At the beginning of the second day of QV course , taught by the NGO, after the signing of 
the TCLE; 
2nd On the same day, at the end of the course, when the smoker, supposedly, smoked his last 
cigarette after NS treatment conducted by volunteers of the NGO in smokers; 
3rd After the first week of NS treatment performed by study participants themselves; 
4th After the second week of NS treatment conducted by study participants themselves; 
5th After at least three months of starting treatment; 
6th After at least six months of starting treatment. 
In each one of these six moments of gathering the research team used an individual field diary 
of the participants where were noted all their grievances, perceived changes, explanations 
provided by the participants about what happened during the week or the months that followed, 
seeking elucidate, from the qualitative point of view, the numerical results obtained through the 
use of carbon monoxide measuring equipment. 
Additionally, there was a specific space in this diary to write down day by day, during the first 
two weeks of treatment, if the study participant performed or not self NS treatment proposed 
and taught by the NGO during the course previously taught. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Between the months of July and October 2012, were administered 10 QV courses, with the 
participation of 500 servers. Of this total of servers, 27 declared themselves willing to quit 
smoking and decided to perform the non-pharmacological treatment proposed by the NGO. 
There were 25 men and two women (sample).  
As the research universe is composed of servers of a police corporation was considered 
absolutely normal that the sample had presented 93.6% of men (25) and 7.4% of women (two). 
This situation only reflected the reality found on site, an environment that actually work more 
men than women. 
The average age presented was 39 years, having 31 years the youngest and 50 years the 
oldest, and started smoking, on average, at age 16 (median 16 and trend 17). 
The group showed variations in the level of education: 13 subjects were graduated, 11 had 
completed high school, two had only primary education and one of them was postgraduate. 
The main reason that led them to smoke was follow friends (16), followed by curiosity (eight) 
and for fun (seven). 
On average, they smoke 16 cigarettes a day, with the first being consumed before the first time 
after waking up (56 minutes on average). Only five of them (18.5%) had never tried to quit 
smoking. 
The main symptoms they feel when they stop are restlessness (23) and nervousness (18) and 
return to smoking mainly due to stress (13) or by seeing someone else smoking (11). 
Eight report having problems due to smoking as shortness of breath, cough, weight loss, pain or 
inflammation in the throat and laryngitis and 24 of them (89% of the sample), believe that 
smoking is definitely harmful to health.  
On average, the first day the worker has been evaluated (average of 9,3ppm), ranking the 
group on the penultimate level of light smokers; during the course after smoking his "last 
cigarette" (average of 11.1ppm); after the first week of self-treatment (average of 3,3ppm); after 
the second week of self-treatment (average of 3.0ppm); after three months from the starting of 
self-treatment (average of 6,6ppm) and after six months of starting self-treatment (average of 
6,5ppm) - first level of light smokers. 
This result showed a tendency to decrease or cessation of the smoking habit during the two 
weeks in which participants were sought by the researchers who collected the data and, at the 
same time, were accompanied by volunteers from the NGO, who accompanied the last day of 
the first week and the last day of the second week of proposed treatment, talking to the 
participants and performing on them the NS technique. 
Until the holding of the fifth data collection - after three months, were 17 dropouts (16 men and 
one woman), being that 12 of them have already given up on the first day because have not 
returned any time. Figure 1 presents the numerical result obtained by blowing three seconds on 
the carbon monoxide measuring equipment in each one of the seven participants who 
presented himself from the first to the penultimate stage of collection of the study, the fifth 
collection. 
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Figure1 - Results obtained with the five first measures of data collections by using the carbon monoxide measuring 
equipment. 
Source: Stadnik et al. (2013, p. 1138 
 
Study participants until the sixth data gathering - after six months of treatment, four individuals. 
That is, of the 27 smokers who started the non-pharmacological treatment proposed by the 
NGO, only four participated in all data gathering performed, the other 23 did not attend to one or 
more of the different stages of the research process. Figure 2 shows the numerical result 
obtained by blowing three seconds on the carbon monoxide measuring equipment in each one 
of the four participants who presented himself for this step of the study: the sixth collection.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Results obtained with the measures of the six data gathering by using the carbon monoxide measuring 
equipment. 
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Each line in grayscale of the graphics exposed (Fig 1 and Fig 2) represents one of the 
participants who presented themselves to the stages of data collection. The Figure 1 graphic 
shows the seven participants who presented themselves for the fifth data collection and the 
Figure 2 graphic shows the four participants who presented themselves for the sixth and final 
data collection. These participants are identified by numbers that correspond to their entry into 
the study. It also appears in these two figures (graphics) a horizontal line, that represents the 
data collections, which were five in Figure 1 and six in Fig 2, and a vertical line, with numbers 
ranging from 0 to 14, indicating the amount found by making use of the carbon monoxide 
measuring equipment in evaluation of CO expired by study participants at the time of collection. 
In Figure 1, additionally, it can be observed two dotted black lines, one to identify the mean and 
the other the median, resulting from the comparison of the numerical data of the first five data 
gathering using the carbon monoxide measuring equipment. 
We choose not to perform the same analysis with the graph that showed the four participants, 
when the inclusion of the sixth collection (Fig 2), as we consider unnecessary, since it was 
possible to show only with the first figure what we got with this analysis of mean and median: a 
trend of reduced values in steps 3 and 4. The mean was slightly higher than the median 
because of one of the participants (number 15 in Fig 1 and 2) that presented higher results 
exactly during the two weeks (steps 3 and 4) in which the participants received attention of the 
two treatment control groups: the investigation team, which conducted the measurements via 
carbon monoxide measuring equipment and notes in individual field diary and; the group of 
volunteers of the NGO who performed the treatment by the NS technique. 
We infer that this decrease precisely in the weeks that the participants were strongly 
accompanied by both groups may have aided the participants in a reduction of cigarette 
consumption, by social support. On the other hand, one of the participants, inversely to the 
behavior of others, increased his consumption precisely during these two weeks. We observed 
that this subject was one of the women. According to Perkins11, who performed a specific study 
on the incidence of smoking on women, the main symptoms of abstinence syndrome are more 
frequent in this social group. However, this study presented here revealed no major data. This 
done, we believe that we can not confirm this information, just present it as a possibility. 
In a note in the field diary, we see that this participant, particularly, was going through a change 
in her work sector and considered her new role very stressful. Moreover, referring to other notes 
of the field diary of other participants, we found that this was a very common complaint in the 
studied group. Workers really perform a normally very stressful function, public safety. 
In this regard, Shiffman et al (1993) described that most of the relapses related to a period of 
abstinence from smoking are related, especially, to situations of psychological stress and the 
presence of smokers in the the environment. 
In the case of the study presented here, were observed reports of smokers who wanted to leave 
the addiction, but who has, for example, a spouse who is a smoker or friends who are smokers 
as well. According to the participants, this situation hinders the success of treatment.    
In Figure 2 it can be observed the four individuals (Ind.) who participated the six phases of data 
collection. Will be detailed some of the events that have passed with each of them in Table 1, 
from the notes of the field diary.  
 
Table 1 - Details of the four participants who presented themselves for all stages of data collection.  
Ind. Age Genre NS 
practiced? 
Final summary notes in the field diary: 
  
Final 
situation: 
8 35 Male No. Even quit smoking until early January (treatment 
began in October), but in the holidays changed 
the routine and returned to sporadically smoking. 
Decreased 
consumption. 
14 30 Male No. Stayed 40 days without smoking at the beginning 
and then returned with the same intensity. 
Does not quit 
smoking. 
15 31 Male Partially. Managed to stay a few days without smoking but 
spouse smokes and does not intend to leave the 
addiction. Considered that this situation hindered 
his success in the program. 
Does not quit 
smoking. 
21 48 Fem. Yes. NS technique practiced, but did not find co-
workers to follow her development in the 
technique learned. 
Felt fine with the treatments and liked to 
participate. 
Considers her professional work very stressful. 
 
Does not quit 
smoking. 
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The non-pharmacological tobacco control technique used by the NGO here cited is the NS and 
it was considered that this type of treatment offered approaches other activities recognized by 
the Brazilian public health system (National Health System - SUS) as Integrative and 
Complementary Health Practice and comprises, according to the Decree # 971 the universe of 
approaches denominated by the WHO as Traditional and Complementary/Alternative Medicine - 
TCM/AM, such as acupuncture, homeopathy, herbal medicine, hydrotherapy and cryotherapy. 
These therapies involve approaches that seek to stimulate the natural mechanisms of 
prevention and health recovery, with emphasis on welcoming listening, developing the 
therapeutic relationship and the integration of the human being with the environment and 
society. Other points shared by various approaches covered in this field are the broader view of 
the health / disease process and the global promotion of human care, especially self-care 
(Brasil, 2006). 
According to studies found in the database of the Cochrane Library (White, Rampes & 
Campbell, 2006; Bise, Burnand, Mueller, et al., 2005), methods such as acupuncture, 
hypnotherapy, laser therapy, electro-stimulation and evaluation of biomedical risk (expired CO 
measurement and spirometry) are methods for which there is still no scientific evidence showing 
that these methods increase the smoking cessation rate, preventing their recommendation 
based on current knowledge. 
Epidemiological studies in Brazil have shown that respiratory diseases have been occupying an 
important place in the main causes of hospitalization in the Unified Health System (SUS) and 
that the prevalence of chronic bronchitis, wheezing and breathlessness are more common in 
smokers, with a prevalence rate in direct proportion to the number of cigarettes smoked. It is 
estimated that 50% of smokers will develop chronic bronchitis and even those who do not yet 
have clinical symptoms already have functional and morphological changes in the lungs. From 
the point of view of workers' health, studies have also pointed out that smoking cessation 
improves respiratory symptoms as much as the decline in lung function and bronchial hyper 
responsiveness. So it is relevant to adopt worker’s healthcare policies that focus on reducing 
the prevalence of smoking. (Reichert et al, 2008). However, despite the various techniques 
described in literature, there is no consensus on the best strategy to achieve this goal. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We chose to investigate a non-pharmacological technique that began to be used in Brazil in the 
past ten years, Neural Stimulation. We conclude that we have not studied sufficiently to perform 
validation of such treatment. None of the participants truly stopped smoking after to the first 
three months of treatment. Of the seven participants who were present at all stages of data 
collection, only one showed a considerable decrease and the participant claimed to have 
stopped smoking (participant no. 8 in the Fig. 1). However, only one of the participants 
performed the self-treatment regularly as indicated by the technique. Additionally, the participant 
(a woman) who was more disciplined in relation to treatment was one that had the highest 
measurements by monoximeter during the two weeks of following-up (measurements 3 and 4). 
On the other hand, experience reports coming from the NGO group of volunteers present 
successful cases regarding smoking cessation, hence our interest in researching the technique. 
Although it seems promising still requires further studies for their understanding and validation. 
We consider an important aspect to be pointed out the issue of psychosocial support; we 
observed that during the time in which participants were followed directly by the volunteers of 
the NGO the results were better. 
Also, it is important to clarify that the use of monoximeter may have caused some positive or 
negative influence. There were no clinical studies proving its effectiveness in the treatment of 
smokers. (Boletim Brasileiro de Avaliação de Tecnologias em Saúde, 2005) 
In this research the monoximeter was only used as a tool of measurement to monitor and 
evaluate the treatment carried out by the volunteers of the NGO, however, we believe that this 
tool can also influence the participants, some participants were motivated to check your 
measurements, others were intimidated or annoyed by the results or with the number of times 
they were searched for this action. 
Based on the importance of worker healthcare to guarantee their safety in the workplace, it is 
suggested to keep a support group until the end of the recommended time for smoking 
cessation and, besides the utilization of monoximeter, cardiorespiratory fitness tests would be 
applied so that participants can clearly quantify the benefits of to kick the habit. 
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Abstract 
In recent years there has been an important increase in the number of interventions in 
Madrid, involving medical emergency workers, associated with chemical and biological risk. 
In those interventions, the safety of the workers depends, among other things, on the 
integrity of the protective suit. Several accidents within workers attending ebola- infected 
patients stood out the significance of a correct selection of the protection equipment. During 
learning courses, practices and real interventions, we have observed some tears in the 
perineal zone seams, which led us to study the factors influencing on those dangerous fails. 
The main findings of this study were obtained by performing a cross- sectional study: the 
sample underwent a stress test regarding their physical features (flex cracking resistance, 
tensile strength and puncture resistance). The convenience sample consisted of 45 members of 
a civil protection  and emergency medical service agency, who had basic training in wearing 
CBRN suits for hazardous risks. All of them completed a four tests circuit: bending over to pick 
up an object from the floor, getting on a 60cm. high object, walking 100m. and crossing twice a 
narrow pass. One third of the coveralls got broken at the seams. Within them, 75% had tears 
situated at the perineal zone, while one third of the tears happened in overalls whose 
size was bigger than that recommended by the manufacturer. The average waist 
measurement of the people, who tore the coverall at the perineal seams, is 113.6 cm, would 
use XL-size according to manufacturer specification and was using XXL while performing the 
test. The study has revealed a lack of toughness of the fabric at the seams, mainly at the 
perineal zone. The tears were produced even when using bigger than recommended sized 
coveralls. Bearing in mind the deficiencies found we studied how to improve workers safety 
and concluded that he pattern design should start adapting to the new anthropometric 
measures of the current population and with variation between men and women. As sizes 
are getting increased, waist and hips circumferences of the protective suit should be 
increased at a higher rate than the other measures or include elastic elements. The perineal 
zone of the protective suites must be reinforced, especially at the seams.The measures to 
choose the correct size, in the manufacturer specifications, must include the waist 
circumference. Damages in lower limbs appear with a higher prevalence in women as they have 
a lower average height, thus causing bags which are at greater risk of being punctured. To get a 
better adjustment to the various anthropometric measures it would be advisable to 
implement tightening elements to better fit the suit to the worker phenotype, particularly in 
the back and under the buttocks. All these measures are aimed at obtaining a further 
adaptation of the suits to the actual worker constitution, thus minimizing the risk of accidents. 
 
Keywords: CBRN coverall, Fabric toughness, Tears in seams, Puncture resistance, Chemical 
risk, Emergency response teams. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The cases in which protective equipment against CBRN (Chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear) risks are used in SAMUR Civil Protection (Emergency Medical Service and Civil 
Protection of the City of Madrid), are steadily increasing. In those cases the integrity of the 
suit is the primary measure of worker protection, meaning that suit integrity is a key 
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element in the prevention of occupational risks for those workers. Additionally, several Ebola 
cases were treated in Spain in 2014, where a nurse suffered an accident, having contact with 
the patient and contracting the disease. This fact has produced a great concern among health 
workers both in Spain and in other infected countries. 
Our study aims to assess the relation between the suits anthropometric measures and the 
breaks produced in those suits when the subjects pass a stress test regarding the suits physical 
characteristics. 
The costumes used in this analysis are used by SAMUR Civil Protection at CBRN risks, usually 
in the following cases: 
• First aid in cases with suspected serious infectious diseases (ex. Ebola); always asking for 
teams with a higher level of protection and avoiding, while working with this suit, contact with 
the fluids of the patient, due of its limited resistance to liquids. 
• Pepper-spray attacks, protecting those involved in the decontamination of the patient. 
• In massive chemical contamination (leakage, explosion, ...) or biohazard (anthrax) (see 
Figure 1), it is used in areas where the risk of contact with agents is low or very low during 
patients decontamination or, after complete decontamination, for people checking proper 
decontamination and/or delivering clothes (see Figure 2). They can also be used when 
decontamination area is far from the incident area, to indicate and help people access to 
decontamination (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 1 –Intervention in embassy for possible anthrax attack. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Worker waiting at the end of the decontamination line for evaluation and clothing. 
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 Figure 3 – Indication of the decontamination for personnel that came into contact with a possible Ebola-infected patient. 
 
 
• In accidents or attacks with acid or base (eg gender-based violence in which an individual 
throw acid to the partner’s face or body, or accidents in which a person comes into contact with 
the acid). It is used for administering Diphoterine® (neutralizing) to the patient (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 – Helping a woman attacked with acid. 
 
• Death certification of several days corpses or entering in people with Diogenes syndrome 
houses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Entering in the home of a patient with Diogenes syndrome 
and large amount of accumulated garbage. 
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Apart from hazardous risks that make essential the use of protective suits (Giménez-
Mediavilla 2012), the working environment for emergency services teams might have hook 
and sharp elements (collapsing buildings, needles, street furniture, vegetation,...) threatening 
the suit integrity. 
Additionally during learning courses, practices and real interventions, we have observed some 
tears in the perineal zone seams, which led us to study the factors influencing on those 
dangerous fails. 
According to Schwope, 1989, we tested protective suits with hood, made with a microporous 
membrane and classified as Category III protective equipment with limited protection against 
particles (type 5) and limited liquid splashes or sprays (type 6) (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6 – Analyzed suits. 
 
1.1. Applicable regulations 
Based on the general principles of prevention (art. 6 Directive 89/391/EEC - OSH "Framework 
Directive" of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health of workers at work), the first and most important objective is to avoid risks, 
but if these risks cannot be avoided, other measures such as the use of personal protective 
equipment (PPS) shall be adopted. 
In general, the use of PPE as a preventive measure is the last election as collective 
protection measures should take precedence over PPE use, but this is not the case in 
situations of emergency, where the lack of time makes the use of PPE prioritized, or in those 
situations in where the installation of collective protection is impossible. This situation is often 
produced within emergency medical services work e.g. going to help one or more patients 
presenting biological or chemical hazard. 
PPE must be provided by the employer (art. 9 89/391 EC), employers are required to provide 
workers and their clothes with appropriate protective equipment (Art. 16.3 of ILO Convention 
155, 7/22/81). 
According to the European directives, PPE should provide effective protection, should not cause 
unnecessary discomfort, should take into account the anatomical and physiological conditions of 
the worker and must fit the wearer (article 1.3.1 European Directive 89/686 approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to Personal Protection Equipment). Besides, article 4 of the 
European Directive 89/656 / EEC (use of Personal Protective Equipment by workers at work) 
indicates that PPE must fit the wearer correctly after any necessary adjustment. Moreover these  
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rules it indicates that protective clothing against chemical hazard should be also considered as 
PPE. 
According to the above listed regulations, we conclude that the suits analyzed in this study, as 
being used as Personal Protective Equipment should mandatorily be adapted to the 
anthropometric conditions of workers using them. 
In emergency situations as well as in other jobs where they collective action cannot be 
established, PPS act as the main barrier to avoid contact with contaminants. That is why 
ensuring the integrity of the suits is very important to prevent accidents. 
 
2. STUDY OVERVIEW 
The main findings of this study were obtained by performing a cross-sectional study: the sample 
underwent a stress test regarding their physical features (flex cracking resistance, tensile 
strength and puncture resistance) (Schwope, 1989). The convenience sample consisted of 
45 members of SAMUR-PC-Madrid (civil protection and emergency medical service agency), 
who had basic training in wearing CBRN suits for hazardous risks, being 62.2% of them 
members of HazMat teams. They wore a XXL-coverall (the biggest size). The suit was sealed in 
wrists with the gloves and in calves with the boots. All of them completed a four tests circuit: 
bending over to pick up an object from the floor, getting on a 60cm. high object, walking 100m. 
and crossing twice a narrow pass (about 10cm. bigger than the intervenient) with sharp 
elements (in one side of the pass there were 15 mm. sharp elements linearly aligned between 
0.30 and 1.50 meters from the ground and, in the other side, 6 mm. sharp elements randomly 
distributed and connected by a wire) (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7 – crossing a narrow pass. 
 
The average morphology of the participants was: a male, 31 years old, measuring: height 
171.73cm. (SD=9.42, 95%CI=169-174.5), chest circumference 98.8cm. (P25=88, P50=98, 
P75=108.5) and waist circumference 90.16 cm. (P25=76, P50=84, P75=103) and L-size 
according to manufacturer specifications (DuPont 2010, Indutex 2011). 
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2.1. Study results 
33.33% (16) of the coveralls got broken at the seams (see Table 1). Within them, 75% (12) of 
the tears were situated at the perinneal zone, while 66.66% (16) of the tears happened in 
overalls whose size was bigger than that recommended by the manufacturer. 
 
Table 1 – Tears at seams. 
 Axilla Groing Perineum Total 
Men 2 1 9 26 
Women 1 0 3 19 
 
The average waist measurement of the people, who tore the coverall at the perineal seams, is 
113.6 (SD=14.8, 95%CI=104.87-122.37) and the average person would use XL-size according 
to manufacturer specification and was using XXL while performing the test. 
The study has revealed a lack of toughness of the fabric at the seams (which are the most 
critical areas), mainly at the perineal zone (with higher prevalence in men). The tears were 
produced even when using bigger than recommended sized coveralls (the recommendations 
are based on height and chest circumference). 
According to recent studies, the average waist circumference of Spanish people is increasing. 
This fact augments the multidirectional tension in the perineal zone, thus subjecting the fabric 
and seams to an increased effort compared to which they were subjected several years ago, 
when these suits were designed. 
55.56% (25) of the suits presents orifices (see table 2), within them 52% (13, 7 men and 6 
women) were situated in   the 
back, 48% (12, 9 women and 3 men) in the lower limbs, 32% (8, 5 men and 3 women) in the 
abdomen and 36% (9, 5 men and 4 women) in the thorax. The average height for the 12 people 
whose suit presented orifices in the lower limbs was 167.25cm. (P25=160, P50=165, 
P75=169.5) and their average manufacturer recommended size was M. 
 
Table 2 – Snags. 
 Upper limbs Lower limbs Thorax Back Abdomen Total 
Men 0 3 5 7 5 26 
Women 1 9 4 6 3 19 
 
The study shows two noticeable differences between the damaged zones: one depending 
on the difference between recommended by the manufacturer and used size and the other 
depending on the participant gender (lower limbs in women and abdomen in men). 
An additional problem is that, due to their location, some of the tears were not detected when 
they occurred. 
 
3. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PROTECTIVE SUITS DESIGN 
Bearing in mind the deficiencies described in section 2 we propose the inclusion of elastic 
elements in the seam of the perineal area. The union between the elastic elements and the suit 
can be made in two ways, by sewing the elastic strips to the suit or attaching elastic strips by 
using adhesive strips (avoiding any loss of strength caused by the new seams). The elastic 
tape used gives the protective suit amplitude of 2 cm (5-7 cm) in the middle of the piece of the 
perineal area. Being conscious that this test has been done with a very limited sample, we 
believe that the change is significant enough to recommend to manufacturers the addition of 
elastic elements at the maximum stress seams thus improving safety for occasional workers in 
CBRN hazard environments, and preserving in those areas the impermeability and 
tightness required to the whole suit. 
Seeking for solutions to prevent breakage by snags, we suggest adapting the costume to the 
worker as recommended by the standards of Occupational Hazards. All the following 
proposed elements increase the tight fit of the suit to the worker morphology. 
The first option is to expand the elastic band at the waist (see Figure 8), currently located in 
the back area of the waist, to the whole waist circumference (see Figures 8 and 9). This 
option improves the fit of the suit to the worker in the waist area, but due to over sizing there 
are some remaining areas susceptible to snag with sharp objects at the top and bottom areas 
of the elastic area. Another potential problem of this option lies in its manufacturing cost. 
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 Figure 8 – Waist elastic enlarged area.                                                    Figure 9 – Suit with elastic all around. 
 
Other tested option consists in incorporating a tape of the same material as the rest of the suit 
to be used as a belt, (see Figure 10). Initially the suggestion of the same material is due to 
its low cost and the easiness to be removed when undressing. We consider that the cost of 
this solution would be the middle of the proposed, since it would be enough to include a strip of 
fabric, similar to the suit, in the bagging process. 
 
  
Figure 10 – Suit with belt. 
 
Finally adhesive tapes can be placed in waist and hip zone. Those tapes could be placed by 
the manufacturer together with the suit or could be just placed over it while dressing, adjusting 
the suit to the worker. They never should be placed so tight that the suit might be broken 
because of them. By placing adhesive tapes at strategic points, a better adjustment to the 
worker morphology is achieved (see Figure 11). If the tapes are not supplied an indication could 
be incorporated to the user manual, thus being the cheapest solution for manufacturers and is 
also the solution in which a better fit is achieved. Moreover, if the adhesive strips are placed in 
front backwards it will be difficult to have hooks problems. 
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Figure 21 – Tapes placed in waist and hip zone. 
 
 
We consider that with this contribution to the of protective clothing manufacturing, workers will 
be safer as it will be less likely to have accidental exposure to chemical and biological risks. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The pattern design should start adapting to the new anthropometric measures of the 
current population and with variation between men and women. As sizes are getting 
increased, waist and hips circumferences of the protective suit should be increased at a higher 
rate than the other measures or elastic elements should be included. 
The perineal zone of the protective suites must be reinforced, especially at the seams. 
The measures to choose the correct size, witthin the manufacturer specifications, must include 
the waist circumference. Damages in lower limbs appear with a higher prevalence in women 
as they have a lower average height, thus causing bags which are at greater risk of being 
punctured. To get a better adjustment to the various anthropometric measures it would be 
advisable to implement tightening elements to better fit the suit to the worker phenotype, 
particularly in the back and under the buttocks. 
All these measures are aimed at obtaining a further adaptation of the suits to the actual 
worker constitution, thus minimizing the risk of accidents. 
Several inexpensive improvements have been tested and a remarkable advance in suit 
performance has been found. The most advisable improvement consists in placing adhesive 
straps in waist and hip zones adapting the suit to the worker and avoiding loose and 
decreasing the risk of snagging. There have also been placed elastic bands that have 
prevented the break in the perineal area in 100% of the tested individuals. We recommend the 
implementation of these measures among PPE users. 
 
5. REFERENCES 
Authors. (2015). ------ In Actas del 27 Congreso Nacional en Urgencias y Emergencias SEMES (pp. ---). 
DuPont. (2010). Classic and classic colour model CHF5: Instructions for use. DuPont Personal Protective Equipment, 
Retrieved March 5, 2015, from http://www.dpp-europe.com/IMG/pdf/IFU_Tyvek_Classic-5.pdf 
Giménez-Mediavilla, J.J., M.C. Castillo-Ruiz de Apodaca, D. González-Rodríguez (2012). Actuación sanitaria en 
incidentes NRBQ, Madrid: Acindes. 
Indutex (2011). Propguard: Instructions for use. 
Schwope, A.D., T.R. Carroll, J.O. Stull, M.D. Royer (1989). The selection and measurement of physical properties for 
characterization of chemical protective clothing materials. In Perkins, Stull (Ed.) Chemical protective clothing 
performance in chemical emergency response, ASTM-STP 1037, Philadelphia: American Society for Testing and 
Materials. 
318
Developments in the safety science sector and in the field of 
safety management between the 1970s and 1979, the year of 
the near disaster on three mile island, a literature review 
 
Paul Swuste1, Coen van Gulijk2, Walter Zwaard3, Saul Lemkowitz4 
Yvette Oostendorp5, Jop Groeneweg6  
July 2nd 2015 number of words: 13.236, ex summary and refs 10.047 
 Safety Science Manuscript 
 
1Safety Science group, Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands p.h.j.j.swuste@tudelft.nl 
2Reader in Railway Safety, University of Huddersfield, the United Kingdom 
3Trainer and advisor, Delft, the Netherlands 
4Product and process engineering, Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands 
5Council for the Environment and Infrastructure, The Hague, the Netherlands 
6Institute of Cognitive Psychology University of Leyden, TNO Leyden, the Netherlands 
 
Content 
1. Summary 
2. Introduction 
3. Materials and methods 
4. General management approaches 
4.1 Classical management and behavioural management 
4.2 Quantitative and modern management 
5 Occupational safety 
5.1 Safety theories, models, and ‘accident prone conditions’. 
6. Process safety 
6.1 System approach and increasing complexity 
6.2 Industrial disasters and process safety 
6.3 Developments in the Netherlands 
7. Safety management 
7.1  Managing safety, the safety ladder, and control of damage 
7.2  Safety management, -systems and audits 
8  Development in the Netherlands 
9 Discussion and conclusions 
10 References 
 
1. SUMMARY 
Objective: What influence has research conducted by general management schools and safety 
research had upon the causes of accidents and disasters in relation to the managing of safety 
between 1970 and 1979? 
Method: The study was confined to original articles and documents, written in English or Dutch 
from the period under consideration. For the Netherlands, the professional journal De Veiligheid 
(Safety) was consulted. 
Results and conclusions: Dominant management approaches started with 1) classical 
management starting from the 19th century incorporating as a main component scientific 
management from the early 20th century. The interwar period saw the rise of 2) behavioural 
management which was based on behaviourism, this was followed by 3) quantitative 
management from the Second World War onwards. After the war it was 4) modern management 
that became important. A company was seen as an open system, interacting with an external 
environment with external stakeholders. These management schools of thought were not 
exclusive, but existed side by side in the period under consideration. 
Early in the 20th century, it was the U.S. 'Safety First' movement that marked the starting point of 
this knowledge development in the sphere of safety managing, with cost reduction and 
production efficiency as the key drivers. Psychological models and metaphors were used to 
explain accidents resulting from ‘unsafe acts’. Safety was managed by training and targeting 
reckless workers, all in line with scientific management. Supported by behavioural 
management, this approach remained dominant for many years until long after World War II. 
Influenced by quantitative management, potential and actual disasters occurring after the war 
led to two approaches; loss prevention (up-scaling in the process industry) and reliability 
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 engineering (inherently dangerous processes in the aerospace and nuclear sectors). The 
distinction between process safety and occupational safety became clear after the war when the 
two evolved as relatively independent domains. 
In occupational safety in the 1970s human error was thought to be symptomatic of 
mismanagement. The term ‘safety management’ was introduced to scientific safety literature 
alongside concepts such as loosely and tightly coupled processes, organizational culture, 
disaster incubation and the notion of mechanisms blinding organizations to portents of disaster 
scenarios. Loss prevention remained technically oriented. Until 1979 there was no clear link 
with safety management. Reliability engineering that was based on systems theory did have 
such a connection with the MORT technique that served as a management audit. The 
Netherlands mainly followed Anglo-Saxon developments. In the late 1970s, following 
international safety symposia in The Hague and Delft, independent research finally began in the 
Netherlands.  
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This article is one in a series on knowledge development of the safety domain. Previous 
publications in Safety Science examined periods extending from the late 19th century until the 
1970s (Swuste et al., 2010, 2014). According to the authors, these reviews should provide 
historical insight into the development of the scientific safety domain. They demonstrate how 
era-linked knowledge on the causes of accidents is and why ideas can emerge, disappear or lay 
dormant for some time. In this contribution the rate of knowledge development for managing 
safety at company level is mapped out. The terms safety management and safety management 
system were only introduced in the 1970s. 
The authors base their assumptions on the idea that the managing of safety development, as 
reflected in the literature, is fed both by knowledge about the causes of severe accidents 
(severe or otherwise), and by more general ideas on the managing of companies and their 
production. However, the authors do not suggest that these relations will clearly emerge during 
the period under discussion.  
All the articles published before the early 1970s are briefly summarized but the post-1970s 
discussion will be more extensive. In conjunction with these publications the questions below 
were crucial: 
 
1. What are the general management schools, theories and models for accident causation 
that have been developed over the years? 
2. What has been the influence of such developments on safety management knowledge? 
3. What was the context within which this development took place? 
4. What are the consequences of this for the field of professional safety in the 
Netherlands? 
 
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The questions posed and answers given in this study are based on extensive literature research 
involving documents and scientific articles, both in English and Dutch. The research was mainly 
limited to developments seen in the safety domain in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands. Original references and sources were accessed via the Delft University of 
Technology library and through internet. The national professional journal for safety specialists 
De Veiligheid (Safety Journal) was studied to discover more about the various consequences 
for the Dutch professional field of safety. 
The period under study has been divided into five subsections including: general management 
schools, safety theories and occupational safety models, process safety theories and models, 
knowledge development related to managing safety and finally, the development in the 
Netherlands. General management schools are based on the common format of management 
literature that distinguishes between the classic, the behavioural, quantitative and modern 
management (Pindur et al., 1995). 
The relationship between general management trends, safety theories and models, and safety 
management is not completely obvious. General management developments are based on 
market developments and production efficiency, while the other two aspects originate from 
developments in occupational and process safety. The discussion and conclusion section will 
provide a suitable synthesis between these topics. 
In this article the developments seen in safety legislation are only cursorily discussed. Although 
legislation remains the primary consideration in many companies, including in the introduction of 
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 safety management and such systems, and even though legislation can have a pivotal role in 
knowledge development, it is still predominantly based upon previously acquired knowledge. 
Tables 2 and 3 at the end of this article will present an overview of the knowledge development 
observed in safety theories, models, metaphors, safety management and general management 
approaches from the 19th century onwards. The tables will also integrate information from two 
previous articles (Swuste et al., 2010, 2014). 
 
4. GENERAL MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
This chapter will start with a short description of different management schools, already starting 
in the 19th century onwards, because these schools still had their influence in the period under 
consideration. 
 
4.1 Classical management and behavioural management 
The classical management school began in the late 19th century and placed top company 
managers in the centre of decision-making, which at that time was a revolutionary concept. The 
classical management trend has two fundamental movements – scientific management and 
general administrative management. Scientific management centres on ways of improving 
industrial and labour productivity by redesigning tasks and working methods. By contrast 
administrative management theory examines organizations as total entities and focuses on 
ways of making them more effective and efficient (Pindur et al., 1995). The Americans Fredrick 
Taylor and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth were well-known pioneers of scientific management. The 
Franco-Turkish Henri Fayol and the German Max Weber were pioneers of administrative 
management. With the exception of Weber, these authors had engineering backgrounds and it 
was these technological backgrounds that were to determine the characteristics of the related 
management schools. An organization was seen as a mechanical entity and every person in the 
organization was expected to judge and act rationally. This view was reflected in the publication 
‘The Principles of Scientific Management’ by Taylor (1911). In the early 20th century business 
flourished in America, there was plenty of money, but labour remained the limiting factor. In the 
late 19th century Taylor experimented with different working methods at the Midvale Steel 
Company where he worked in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In particular, he found that it was the 
participation of employees in production decisions that led to production increase, as long as 
there was evidence of a standardized workflow. Complex processes were divided into simple 
sub-processes. The ideal scenario was to cultivate an atmosphere in which employees would 
not have to think about work. Taylor maintained that employers and employees had similar 
goals. After all, higher production increased profits for employers and led to higher wages for 
employees. The approach constituted a first attempt at influencing the behaviour of employees 
through reward systems. However, in most organizations the management was barely aware of 
what the work actually entailed and could not therefore guide the system. According to Taylor 
this was the biggest obstacle to efficient production. His approach was based on: 
 
o observations, measurements, registration; 
o selection and training of workers; 
o the development of standards and regulations; 
o close cooperation between management and employees. 
 
Later on this was to culminate in the renowned' time and motion studies’, initiated by Frank and 
Lillian Gilbreth (1917). Classic management was characterized by the use of 'scientific methods’ 
in management. In this respect scientific involved introducing empiricism, together with 
measuring, monitoring and recording, all of which marked the start of the planning, organizing, 
influencing and controlling of production. What limited this approach was the assumption that 
employees and employers are economically-driven beings. Workers were mainly seen as a 
means to achieving management ends. 
Prior to World War II it was the rise of industrial psychology that was to introduce a new 
movement to management approaches, that of behavioural management, in which human 
behaviour, motivation and leadership were the key features. This management movement was 
inspired by the then modern behaviourism, an empirical approach within psychology, which 
based human behavioural explanations on the incentives offered, conditioning and the context 
in which behaviour occurred. The ‘human relations movement’ was simply a part of this 
movement. Well-known pioneers were the Americans Elton Mayo and Fritz Roethlisberger who, 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, investigated the behaviour of workers at the Western Electric 
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 Company Hawthorne, situated just outside Chicago, Illinois. Productivity was thought to be 
determined much more by psychological factors, group dynamics at work and by the attention 
received from supervisors and management, and much less by the economic benefits or 
physical working conditions. Another pioneer was the American psychologist Abraham Maslow. 
He published his hierarchy of needs in 1943, a theory of psychological health founded more 
profoundly on the fulfilling of innate human needs and culminating in self-actualization forming 
the basis for most motivation of human behaviour. The main problem with the behavioural 
management school of thought was the complexity of human behaviour. Behaviour and 
changes in behaviour are simply too difficult to predict. Human motivation thus seemed to play 
no significant role. The psychoanalytical movement led by Freud (1911), although arguably one 
of the first attempts to understand the background to human error, did not create any response 
in the safety domain. All that remains of his approach is the 'slip', an act that occurs without any 
planning. In the ‘behaviourist climate' of that time no value was attached to the drivers of 
behaviour. 
 
4.2 Qualitative management and modern management 
During and just after World War II seven manuals on safety, damage prevention and the 
managing of security were published in the United States (Heinrich, 1941, 1950; Armstrong et 
al., 1945, 1953 Heinrich and Crannis, 1959, Blake, 1963 Bird and Germain, 1966). In that period 
in the United Kingdom only one publication appeared (Association of British Chemical 
Manufacturers, 1964). All these publications were produced against the background of two 
management schools: quantitative management and modern management. 
Quantitative management started before World War II and was based upon the mathematical 
and statistical approaches adopted for military problems. After the war, these techniques started 
being applied in the private sector. The approach, which was originally known as ‘operational 
research’, supported management decisions during the planning phase and in the monitoring of 
projects (Moore, 1968). Quantified and mathematical models, amounted to both its strength and 
its weakness because when making decisions not all the relevant input is quantifiable. 
After World War II modern management emerged. This trend focused on management 
processes. There management was seen as a decision-making and information-processing 
activity in which managers had to plan, organize, manage and supervise. The view of an 
organisation as an open system was also important. Companies were no longer seen as a 
closed system, as in previous times, but were perceived to interact within a commercial 
environment and with external stakeholders. The Americans Deming (1982) and Juran (Juran, 
1951; Juran and Barish, 1955) were its pioneers. Immediately after the Second World War they 
played an important role in rebuilding the Japanese industry. Their focus was on quality control; 
it was a focus that had shifted from finished products to production. Employees and customers 
played a major role in quality control. 
Later on it was stressed that the production and market environment, as well as stakeholders, 
are sector specific or even company specific. Universal management techniques did not seem 
to be obvious thereby leading to the design of management systems for individual organizations 
(Schein, 1972). Another trend came from Mintzberg (1979), who did not emphasize the 
uniqueness of companies, but postulated rather that there is a consistent pattern in the 
response of companies to external influences. This pattern was determined by the structure of 
the organization and by subsequent decision-making processes. 
 
5. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
 
5.1 Safety theories and models, and ‘accident prone conditions’ 
The main centre for safety science research in the 1970s was the United Kingdom and there 
were a number of breakthroughs. The multi-causality concept was introduced in relation to 
accidents. ‘People, not things are causing accidents’. In fact it still resembled the ‘accident 
proneness theory’ (for an overview see Swuste et al., 2010), but unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions were, by then, more clearly being explained as symptoms of faulty management and 
not as causes of accidents (Petersen, 1971). The term ‘accident prone conditions’ emerged in 
the United States, in sharp contrast to 'accident prone workers' (Pfeifer et al., 1974). Therefore 
unsafe acts were placed in a context. 
In the United Kingdom, the research done on occupational accidents was predominantly 
conducted by psychologists and ergonomists, working at Aston University, Birmingham. Unlike 
previous accident models and theories, which were based upon hazards, or reflex reaction 
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 during process disturbances, the focus was on the information that was available to workers just 
before an accident took place (Hale and Hale, 1970; Dunn, 1972). During accidents, information 
flows could be disturbed; there could be information overload physical limitations preventing 
adequate responses, or evidence of a worker having chosen the wrong action strategy. 
Ergonomists developed the ergonomics of information as well as the type, design and quality of 
information offered to employees at their workplace and the classification of errors that could 
result from this (Singleton, 1971, 1972). 
In general, ergonomics was increasingly influential in the safety domain. According to the task 
dynamics theory developed by the Dutchman Winsemius (see for more information Swuste et al., 
2014), the ergonomic design and redesign of machines and workplaces was a direction in which 
solutions could be sought. The theory of task dynamics or task momentum was also reflected in a 
large prospective study on accidents in the metal, assembly and distribution sectors. What made 
this study remarkable was the fact that safety research had hitherto only relied on retrospective 
study design or had been based on case studies. The study also showed the general disinterest of 
safety management in the companies being studied. A director could find safety important, but 
generally it remained something on paper with no further consequences for business operations 
(Powell et al., 1971). Similar conclusions were also drawn during an extensive literature review of 
80 years of publications on accidents. In addition to the extensive analysis of the accident 
proneness literature, the survey pointed to conflicts at company level between safety and 
production, to process disturbances being risk factors for accidents and to the relatively low 
effectiveness of safety training for employees (Hale and Hale, 1972). 
In the United States attention was being given to a topic which later on in the Netherlands was 
to become known as the ‘humanization of labour’. Short-cycle work on conveyor belts was 
described as monotonous and demotivating. In the literature, a comparison was drawn with 
Modern Times, Charlie Chaplin's 1936 movie (Swain, 1973) (Figure 1). Higher wages, strict 
employee selection, training and motivational programs, punishment none of these measures 
had any demonstrable effects or, if they did, they were only short-lived. 
 
 
Figure 1, ‘Modern Times’, movie by Charley Chaplin 
 
The suggested solutions were: to seek job enrichment, to match tasks to humans and to give 
workers greater autonomy over the organization of their work (Pfeifer et al, 1974; Cohen et al., 
1975). The need for active involvement on the part of top management of companies was also 
emphasized. That would not only save time and money but would display demonstrable care for 
the welfare of employees. The concept of 'workers’ welfare' which originated in the United 
Kingdom was introduced to the United States (Ellis, 1975; Cohen, 1977; Cleveland et al., 1979; 
Nye, 2013). Finally, the defective scientific evaluation of safety initiatives was criticized as were 
the generally accepted determinants of safety. Cohen complained about the extensive literature 
on safety training, which lacked evaluative research (Cohen et al., 1979). For similar reasons 
Ellis (1975) was hesitant about the effects that safety legislation, inspections, statistics and 
government standards had on safety in companies.  
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 6. PROCESS SAFETY 
 
6.1 The system approach and increased complexity 
It was after World War II that large-scale industrial processes first began. It was a development 
that was to result in the process safety movement of the early 60s, an important movement within 
the safety domain which became known as ‘Loss Prevention’. Due to the upscaling of production 
processes in the chemical industry, the control of these processes became more complex thus 
resulting in fires, explosions and the emission of toxic substances. All of this was to have far-
reaching effects beyond the premises of plants. There was growing public anxiety concerning the 
possibility of large-scale accidents and various forms of pollution (Carson, 1962). 
Publications on loss prevention appeared in both the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, 1964; Fawcett, 1965a, 1965b). As with safety 
techniques, the engineering approach was dominant. The focus was no longer on unsafe 
actions but rather on ‘loss of containment’ control; on keeping chemicals inside the pipes. In 
both countries methods and techniques were developed to improve equipment and process 
reliability. In part these techniques originated from the process industry (Hazard and Operability 
Study - HAZOP) but they also came from the military sector (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
- FMEA and Fault Tree Analysis - FTA error or tree). An extensive discussion of these methods 
is to be found in a previous publication (Swuste et al., 2014). 
 
6.2 Major industrial accidents and process safety 
In the 1970s certain sociological studies were published that dealt with the complexity of 
production processes (Reeves and Turner, 1972), their organisation but also their internal 
codes, rituals and socialization processes (Turner, 1971). In three medium-sized to large 
companies a relationship was established between the organization of the work, the technology 
of the production process and the control that management had over production. In the early 
70s of the last century, the automation of production in the manufacturing sector was relatively 
limited and production was mainly organised as batch-wise processes. These processes 
possessed a high degree of complexity due to the numerous sub-products and thus also the 
many process steps, which made any production planning virtually impossible. Foremen and 
middle managers had to resolve production and planning problems in an ad hoc fashion. This 
was no different in the case of safety-related issues. 
The describing of socialization processes in companies came as a direct result of extensive 
sociological study. Through informal interviews and observations researchers had been able to 
put themselves in the shoes of companies, while pinpointing their organizational characteristics 
by means of what was termed the ‘grounded theory’ approach. These studies were relevant to 
occupational safety but especially to process safety. A sociological approach does not focus on 
the individual behaviour of employees. Instead it investigates and describes how production 
companies are functioning and how decision-making works. Such an approach was also 
followed in the United States but different conclusions were drawn. In the British study, batch-
wise production was seen as an obstacle, due to its increased complexity. Batch-wise 
production was, by definition, loosely coupled. Loosely coupling is a technical term and refers to 
the presence of a buffer, or of space between production steps, as well as a degree of variability 
between these steps. In the US study it was precisely the benefits of a loosely coupled 
production system that were investigated, its flexibility, the capacity to respond to local needs, to 
restore faults in production, and the reduced vulnerability compared to tightly coupled 
production systems (Weick, 1976). 
In the 1970s a number of major accidents and disasters occurred in the process and nuclear 
industries that received much media attention and created fear amongst the general public. In 
the Nypro, Flixborough, North Lincolnshire disaster of July 1st 1974 in the United Kingdom at the 
caprolactam plant, 28 workers were killed and 89 people were wounded, including 53 civilians. 
DSM owned 55% of Nypro. A year later, on November 7th, 1975 the naphtha cracker II exploded 
at the DSM Beek plant in Limburg. Fourteen workers were killed and 109 were wounded. Again 
a year later, on July 9th, 1976 a reactor exploded at the Icmesa Chemical Company in Meda, 
near Seveso, Italy. A gas cloud escaped with the highly toxic TCDD (2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzodioxin). This disaster culminated in the mass slaughter of animals in the 
region. No direct fatalities or injuries were reported but there was a high rate of spontaneous 
abortions in pregnant women exposed to the toxin. On March 28th, 1979 a malfunctioning of the 
secondary cooling system at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, near Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, in the United States triggered the increased risk of 'meltdown'. During this near-
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 disaster radioactive gases were discharged into the atmosphere. This incident, which the media 
classified as a ‘disaster’, led to no immediate injuries or deaths or later, to any demonstrable 
adverse effects on public health in the Harrisburg area. These four events are just a few 
examples of the number of disasters occurring during this period which led to serious doubts 
about safety. The reference book by Lees (1980) provides an extensive overview of the 
situation. 
Public resistance to industrial disasters, took off in the 1960s. This led to extensive media 
coverage. The chemical and nuclear industries had an image problem and action groups 
published articles in Nature, one of the most important scientific platforms (Anonymous, 1977). 
Such bad control of industrial activities on the part of companies was no longer acceptable. In 
the case of Three Mile Island, this was reinforced by the ‘China Syndrome’ movie, which was 
released twelve days before the near-disaster occurred. Starring Jack Lemmon and Jane 
Fonda, it told the story of safety problems at a nuclear power plant. The title was a metaphor for 
a meltdown at a plant. If such a thing were to happen it was predicted that the repercussions 
would reach China. 
Disasters and accidents drew people’s attention to process safety and two trends emerged: 
reliability engineering and loss prevention. Reliability engineering originated from military, 
nuclear and aerospace domains (Barlow and Proschan, 1975; WASH-1400, Rasmussen, 1975) 
and loss prevention came from the processing industry (Lees, 1980). These two movements, 
together with Rowe’s 1977 reference book ‘An anatomy of risk’, introduced the concept of risk in 
the safety domain. More information on this is provided in the article by Oostendorp et al., 2013. 
The disasters at Flixborough and DSM Beek, but also the 1978 BLEVE (boiling liquid vapour 
explosion) involving an LPG tanker at the Los Alfaques campsite in Spain Tarragona, were 
decisive in the field of loss prevention. These events generated a stream of publications both in 
professional and scientific journals. The devastating effects of vapour cloud explosions were 
poorly understood, as became clear from official reports of these disasters and in the relevant 
literature (Parker, 1975 Ficq, 1976; Sadee et al., 1976). Much research was initiated to 
understand the dangers and spreading of these gas clouds (see e.g. Nettleton, 1976 and 
1976/1977). On industrial sites, offices and control rooms were either situated in the vicinity of 
process installations or were dotted around the plants thus leading to devastating effects for 
workers if disasters occurred at such locations. The official Flixborough report published by the 
Department of Employment (1975) was surprisingly mild about the company’s quality of the 
management. According to the report the management had been safety conscious, there were 
no indications that production had taken precedence over safety. However, the understaffing of 
the technical support facilities was mentioned. Other reports and articles drew very different 
conclusions. Attention was drawn to the very low standard of safety management, to the way in 
which production prevailed over safety and to the inadequacy of the local authorities’ licensing 
thus allowing large volumes of flammable substances to be stored on site. (See also Lees, 
1980; Carsen and Mumford, 1979; Harvey, 1979). Trevor Kletz (1976) from Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI) was the greatest critic. He denounced the way in which, in the process 
industries, management had a fascination for accident rates as a gauge of safety. To his mind 
‘loss of containment’ incidence and analyses of near accidents were more important. According 
to the author, such data reflected, in line with the loss prevention approach, the reliability of 
plant components and therefore presented a more realistic picture of the safety of any process. 
‘First time safe’ was the reliability engineering motto. It challenged the customary 'fly-fix-fly' 
routine. The Apollo I fire of 1967, which killed three astronauts, made people realize that the 
consequences of the old motto were unacceptable for complex systems. System safety that 
adhered to the life cycle approach, hazard analysis and fault tree analysis techniques formed 
the basis to this philosophy, along with the calculating or estimating of the chances and 
probabilities of system errors occurring. The assumption was that 'what could happen, would 
happen when the time was ripe’. Reliability engineering was promoted through series of 
seminars, organized by the United States and held in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Denmark. A schematic overview of this is given in Figure 2 which shows a 
model that was developed for the Danish Atomic Energy Commission to systematically 
investigate the chances of failure in the nuclear reactor industry sector (Nielsen, 1971; Nielsen 
et al., 1975). 
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Figure 2, the cause and consequences diagram (Nielsen, 1971) 
 
The model consists of two fault trees surrounding an unwanted event and thus constituting an 
early presentation of the later bowtie. The adverse event was defined in the same way as in a 
fault tree or in the functional failure of a system or component. The system approach, previously 
advocated by ergonomists in the safety domain, recognizably returned and is apparent in the 
graphical presentation given in Figure 2. Technical solutions to safety problems were preferred, 
because they were relatively easy to define. 
In 1976, the results of another descriptive sociological study into companies and organizations 
were published. This time the study involved companies and organizations from outside the 
process industry sector and described: the slag of a colliery tip on a mountainside in Aberfan, 
Wales which slid down into the village in 1996; the collision of an express train carrying 
exceptional freight in Hixon, Staffordshire (1968); and the fire at a resort in Douglas, Isle of Man 
(1974). These accidents caused dozens of deaths (Turner, 1976). The main question that was 
asked was this: ‘what had gone wrong in these organizations’. It was assumed that no single 
human error could be accountable for such accidents so the causes had to be sought in the 
complex and diverging chains of events and decisions made within those organizations. Despite 
the wide differences in the types of accidents, it was only with great difficulty that the 
organizations seemed to recognise and appreciate the deviant signals. Big accidents proved 
virtually impossible to predict. Like much safety research, this study, had the benefit of 
'hindsight'. In retrospect, the disturbances confronting workers seemed fairly clear and well 
defined. At the time of the respective accidents though that was sometimes quite different. 
Problems, for example during production, could be quite diverse, not understood or ignored, so 
making the early signs of major accidents very vague for workers. Stage II of the model in 
Figure 3, known as the ‘incubation period’ addresses this very point.  
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Figure 3, the stages of major accidents (Turner, 1976) 
 
In a later publication, the term ‘man-made disasters' was used for the first time (Turner, 1978), 
and the study was extended to include 84 reports of major accidents in civil aviation, water 
heaters, trains, ships and mines. 
 
7 SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
 
7.1The managing of safety, the safety ladder and the control of damage 
After World War II the first publications on the managing of occupational safety began to 
appear. In fact it was only 20 years later that the term ‘safety management’ was introduced. In 
the 1950 edition of his reference book Heinrich discussed certain fundamentals of accident 
prevention which he graphically represented as a ladder; a metaphor for a management 
system. A comprehensive article on Heinrich’s publications was published by Gulijk and several 
co-authors in 2015. The Heinrich approach ascribed an exemplary role to the manager in 
realizing safe and efficient production. It was a message that had been underscored in the first 
edition of a publication by Armstrong and his co-authors some five years before (Armstrong et 
al., 1945). 
'Damage Control', in the work of Bird and later also Germain, adhered to Heinrich's tradition of 
the domino metaphor in which unsafe acts were seen as the primary cause of accidents. It was 
just extent of the consequences that had widened, from injury to accidents, near-accidents and 
the incurring of damage (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4, damage control (Bird and Germain, 1966) 
 
Both authors worked at the Lukens Steel Co. in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, where they 
investigated 90,000 accidents involving injury between 1959 and 1965. Until then damage to 
objects had not been covered by any US safety literature. Working on the 1: 29: 300 
distribution of the accident mechanism (see Table 2 at the end of this article), it was pointed 
out that a large proportion of the accidents without injury and the near misses could actually 
have caused considerable damage. This led to the 'damage iceberg' with its different ratios, 
as illustrated in Figure 5. According to the authors, the costs connected with these accidents 
were considerably higher than the costs of the accidents themselves. Furthermore, this 
investigation revealed to the management a range of unsafe acts, which also contributed to 
non-damage accidents. The damage control program required an accurate strategy of 
accident and damage reporting, work preparation, auditing and cost calculations. The books 
by Bird and by Bird and Germain gave extensive examples of the kinds of forms used for 
these reports (Bird and Germain, 1966; Bird, 1974). 
 
 
Figure 5, the damage iceberg (Bird and Germain, 1966) 
 
7.2 Occupational and process safety management systems and auditing 
In the United Kingdom it was the government that took the initiative concerning the 
consequences of safety and management within companies. The well-known Robens report 
started off by reflecting on the role of the government (Robens, 1972). This led, in 1972, to the 
establishment of the Health and Safety Commission (HSC). One year later the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) was made responsible for safety- related research and for the 
monitoring of safety in companies. In the United States, several safety reference books on 
safety management were published in the 1970s (Petersen, 1971, 1975, 1978; Bird, 1974; Bird 
and Loftus, 1976). Petersen coined the term 'safety management' in the title of his books. 
Finally a significant contribution was made to accident sequences and management by 
328
 Johnson, (1973a). That led to an accident management model in the nuclear industry in the 
form of the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) technique (Johnson, 1973b). 
The Robens Committee (1972) started with the fairly broad remit of evaluating the quality of 
legal provisions for occupational and process safety. The results were shocking. Occupational 
mortality and morbidity were alarmingly high in the United Kingdom and alongside accidents the 
incidence of new occupational diseases, like bladder cancer and asbestos-related cancers also 
emerged. The impact of safety legislation started being seriously questioned when, for instance, 
in the United States a few years later (Ellis, 1975) the question 'What is wrong with the system?’ 
was asked. That became the title of the first chapter of the related report and the answer was 
clear. There were nine groups of laws with as many controlling bodies, spread over five different 
ministries. It took an average of 15 years to amend any law. The laws were impossible to 
implement, too many, too detailed and too poorly structured. There were far too many technical 
and descriptive regulations, while human and organizational factors remained desperately 
underexplored. The remedy was relatively simple. The committee suggested delegating the 
technical control of hazards to those who created them, in other words to industry. Businesses 
would have to take the initiative, leaving the issue of safety mainly to private parties. The 
Committee also proposed establishing a single organization with responsibility for research and 
monitoring. That organization became the HSC and the HSE. The HSC produced two reports 
on ‘major hazards’ (HSC, 1976 and 1979), in the immediate aftermath of the Flixborough 
disaster. These reports provided an inventory of all the British companies using toxic and very 
toxic gases as well as flammable liquids, and any unstable, highly reactive materials that were 
subject to legislation once the quantities exceeded certain limits. The reports gave overviews of 
explosions in almost every continent and stressed, as also mentioned in the Robens report, the 
importance of the role of top company management in matters of safety. Companies had to 
demonstrate that their management systems had an impact on safety, and hazard and risk 
analyses became mandatory. This focus on management was also present at the HSE, which 
conducted research into the conditions for occupational safety improvements. 
A humanitarian approach to working conditions was also promoted in the UK, whilst noting that 
surprisingly few managers had had any form of safety training (HSE, 1976). Curiously, none of the 
reports adopted the term safety management, in contrast to the American textbooks of the day. 
Models of accidents and their prevention in manuals both by Bird and Petersen looked very 
similar. Both authors were indebted to Heinrich’s domino model. Bird used a modified version of 
the dominoes and drew a distinction between the root and direct causes (see Figures 6 and 7).  
 
 
Figure 6 dominoes (Bird, 1974) 
 
Root causes were personal and work-related causes. Personal factors were skills, motivation 
and mental or physical problems. Work factors were the different standards for tasks, design, 
maintenance, inadequate purchases, or simply wear and tear. The direct causes resembled the 
factors published by Heinrich in 1941 (Figure 7).Instead of ‘social environment’ and ‘fault of 
person’: the first two dominoes of Heinrich’s, Bird’s first domino pointed to a lack of 
management control in the company in question. This resulted in a safety program consisting of 
regular inspections, task analyses, safety procedures and training, as well as personal contacts 
with employees that functioned badly. 
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Figure 7, immediate causes of accidents (Bird, 1974) 
 
The manual by Bird and later by Bird and Loftus took the reader by the hand and was written in 
a very practical and hands-on way, including extensive chapters on psychological insight into 
behaviour and the motivation of employees. This latter subject was also covered by Petersen’s 
reference books. These authors rejected the early 20th century 'Safety First' movement (US 
Steel, 1913). To their minds safety had to be integral to the business and part of work 
procedure. This was articulated in the 3rd point of Figure 8. Again, both Bird and Petersen 
provided many examples of the kinds of forms that could be used for accident investigation 
reports in relation to safety inspections and other initiatives. Combinations of these topics turned 
into a first draft for a safety audit. Petersen introduced SCRAPE, a systematic model for 
measuring the safety efforts of foremen, such as safety inspection rounds, safety training and 
meetings, and accident investigation (Petersen, 1971). These activities were point scores and 
the management could award a weekly score to each leader on the basis of a record of the 
activity forms. A second system was the Technic of Operations Review (TOR), which enabled 
people to detect deficiencies in the organization after an accident, a near-accident or damage. 
An example of this is given in Figure 9. The reference book by Petersen of 1975 provided an 
extensive report of the psychological and management models that existed on motivation, 
behaviour and different ways of managing a safety program. 
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Figure 8 Safety management (Petersen, 1971) 
 
This was called the safety climate program and it distinguished between: 
 
o The overzealous style; personal protective equipment should be worn, machines must 
be shielded so that they are difficult to reach but operable, there are severe penalties 
for the violation of procedures and there is an endless stream of safety films, talks and 
meetings. There is evidence of an overexposure to safety; 
o The rewarding style; the company initiates safety competitions and rewards individual 
employees for their safety performance. The rewards are small. Employees can see 
that the company takes safety seriously; 
o The lively style; the company organizes safety competitions between factories or 
departments. Big billboards at the entrance to the company record the number of 
accident-free days. These companies teach employees that safety is an integral part of 
the job; 
o The negligent style; safety in such companies only becomes important after a serious 
accident has occurred. Employees see that the company is not interested 
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Figure 9, management audit (Petersen, 1971) 
 
In this approach the role of management was not essentially different from that of the 1950s. 
Cost control and production efficiency remained central. It was just the welfare of workers that 
received extra emphasis. A combination of a safety analysis of each task, task-specific training 
and ongoing safety observations, otherwise known as the JSA JIT SO system (job safety 
analysis, job instruction training, safety observations) gave companies a high degree of labour 
autonomy. From then on, the safety of a company or plant was seen as a measure of the quality 
of the supervision and safety observations. Just as stated by Heinrich, the foreman was central. 
If a foreman could not organize safety, his control of costs and the general product quality and 
production level would also be doubted. The responsibility for safety was placed fairly and 
squarely on the shoulders of middle and lower management. At the same time, the system 
approach was directly related to training and design. If an industrial system failed that meant 
that those operating the system had been insufficiently well trained to deal with the design of the 
system (Johnson, 1970; Cleveland et al., 1979). This was reflected in the accident definition, in 
which the ‘energy transfer' and 'barrier' concepts referred directly to the models of Gibson 
(1961), and Haddon and his co-authors (1964): 
 
An accident is the result of a complex series of events, related to energy transfer, failing 
barriers, and control systems, causing faults, errors, unsafe acts, and unsafe conditions 
and changes in process and organisational conditions (Johnson, 1970). 
 
Johnson (1973a) presented an integrated management model for occupational and process-
related accidents. Accidents were multi-causal and resulted from a relatively long sequence of 
changes and errors; the accident scenario. Any components of the industrial process could be 
part of this sequence; management, design, the environment, machinery, equipment, 
supervision and employees. Before accidents occurred, scenarios were often already partly in 
place because of certain interaction and changes in both process and organizational conditions. 
Examples of such non-routine conditions are shown in Figure 9, Paragraph 5 and they simply 
added to the complexity of the accident which, only in retrospect, could be seen as having led to 
the disaster scenario (Figure 10).  
This concept of accident causation led to the MORT technique. It was developed by the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission, the aim being to establish a perfect safety 
management system, by combining accident models with quality systems. MORT was also 
useful as an in-depth analysis technique for system failure. MORT comprised a number of fault 
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trees, starting from the functional failure of a system. The use of these kinds of error trees had 
been previously represented by Nielsen who had made a logical connection between causes 
and consequences (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 10, the errors and changes leading to accident scenarios (Johnson, 1973a) 
 
The top event in MORT is an accident or damage. Directly below the top event there are four 
different fault trees that are used to analyse the event: 1) assumed risks, 2) the Haddon (1963) 
energy model, 3) a feedback and control system, and 4) the system life cycle (Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 11, the bowtie precursor (Nielsen, 1971; Johnson, 1973b) 
 
If Petersen was the first to use the term 'safety management' then the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission report represented the first time when the descriptor 'safety management 
system’ was used. Like a fault tree, MORT was not based on systematic research but rather on 
a logical description of the functions required for an organization to manage its risks effectively. 
The report concluded that the overall safety programs seen in companies were far from optimal, 
as was the literature on safety tools for major accidents. The programs were poorly defined and 
the information collected was flawed, thus saddling middle managers and workers with blame in 
the event of damage or accidents. In this respect, the situation did not seem to be very different 
from that of the beginning of the century. Management had, according to the report, the legal 
and moral obligation to guarantee production safety. First an answer needed to be given to 
questions regarding the predominant probable accident and disaster scenarios, and the likely 
consequences of these scenarios. The next question was whether the risks were controlled, 
what residual risks were present and what arguments were used to reject the measures taken 
to reduce risk. Finally, there was the question of the quality of the company’s safety program, 
was it as effective as it was designed to be? 
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Figure 12, MORT (Johnson, 1973b) 
 
The report also gave a characterization of five safety program quality levels and linked that to 
the risk of a major accident or disaster (see Table 1). The origin of the probabilities presented 
was not given. The only thing mentioned was that companies had sufficient data to justify an 
order of magnitude difference between the successive levels. Nuclear energy sector reactors 
fell into the fifth level. 
 
safety program level disaster probability 
sub-minimal, less than minimal compliance with regulations,  1 x 10-3 
minimal, minimal compliance with enforced regulations,  5 x 10-4 
manuals, applications of manuals and standards,  1 x 10-4 
advanced, advanced programming, exemplified by leading industries,  1 x 10-5 
systems, system safety,  1 x 10-6 
Table 1, the quality of safety programs and disaster probability (Johnson, 1973b) 
 
8 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
By the 1970s, the focus in the Dutch professional journal De Veiligheid on accident proneness 
theory, and Heinrich’s notions of lack of safety, which had become dominant from the 1930s 
onwards, had somewhat diminished. Other developments originating from the safety science 
domain and mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom were discussed. Two 
international symposia on safety were also organized in the Netherlands. The first was the Loss 
Prevention Symposium in The Hague and Delft, organized by the Royal Institute of Engineers 
(KIVI) and the Royal Dutch Chemical Society (KNCV), which ended just a day before the 
Flixborough disaster (Buschmann, 1974). This Symposia was the very first of a successful 
series of Loss Prevention Symposia, organised every three year throughout Europe. The 
second symposium was organized by what was then the Technical High school of Delft, the 
Foundation for Road Safety Research (SWOV), the Safety Institute (VI) and the Directorate 
General of Labour (DGA). This Delft symposium discussed academic education and the 
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research continuing into safety (THD, 1978). In the same year, the organization psychologist 
Hofstede (1978) published an article in which he denounced systems thinking. Also in 1979, a 
new journal Riskobulletin (Risk Bulletin) appeared, edited by the Adviesgroep Veiligheid en 
Gezondheid in de Industrie (the Advisory Group for Safety and Health in Industry). This Group 
included members of the Union of Scientific Workers, which had been created in reaction to the 
Vietnam War, and the Association of Scientific Researchers, which had been created after the 
World War II atomic attack on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Science shops, present at almost all 
Dutch universities and supporting the knowledge-related questions posed by workers, 
environmental and community groups, were also connected to this Advisory Group. 
The major disasters that had received considerable media attention were discussed in the 
professional journal De Veiligheid (Groothuizen, 1976; Versteeg, 1979). There was extensive 
coverage of the theories and models expounded by Winsemius (1951), task dynamics 
(Anonymous, 1974; Andriessen, 1974 Wijk, 1977), prevention strategies and Haddon’s hazard-
barrier-target model (Cooper, 1973; Bergsma, 1974), loss control management proposed by 
Bird and the reference books of Petersen (Pope, 1976 Bird, 1978; Fletcher, 1978; Wright, 1978; 
Leij, 1978, 1979). The Netherlands also received its first book on safety management (Zwam, 
1978). The reviewing of Petersen’s safety manual marked the introduction of the term safety 
management to the Netherlands and at certain fixed intervals the control of process deviations 
and organizational change were viewed as sources of prevention (Dop, 1977 Radandt, 1979). It 
is interesting to note that neither MORT nor developments within the nuclear sector were 
addressed in the journal. This was different when it came to the topic of the ‘humanization of 
labour’ which addressed the negative effects of extensive division of labour and the separation 
of management and operations, ‘head and hand’, that had come into being in conjunction with 
scientific management, (Strien, 1978). Conflicts on responsibility were also evident in the 
working group 13 of the Dutch Society for Safety Science (NVVK). There the dilemma of 
company interests versus the interests of employees was addressed. The role of safety 
inspector was difficult to combine with the promoting of the welfare of workers, at least that was 
the argument (Meertens and Zwam, 1976; Kraan and Schenke, 1976; Oostrom, 1979). The 
debate about the ethics of the safety profession, was not unique to the NVVK. At universities, 
the role within society of scientists and engineers was being discussed and chemistry and 
science shops were the result (Zwaard, 2007). 
The other topics discussed in De Veiligheid were systems theory together with system and 
process safety. These were complicated issues that met with considerable resistance from 
NVVK members. ‘There is relatively little overlap between safety experts and system thinkers’, 
claimed Koornneef (1979). Incidentally, this system approach had resulted in the accident 
model developed by Wijk (1977) which, like the one produced by Johnson and Nielsen, could 
be seen as a precursor to the bowtie (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13 accident model (Wijk, 1977) 
 
The model started with a block of 'activities'. From there, a network of lines through amending 
factors and disturbances ran towards the goal (accident). The tangle of lines indicates the multi-
causal nature of the accident process and the interdependencies of the various factors. In its 
layout this model is more complex than those of Figures 2 and 11. It is highly likely that the 
models were developed independently of each other. The author probably knew nothing of the 
Danish or the United States Atomic Energy Commission models (Koornneef, 2013). 
Publications on system safety, such as those of Pope, Wijk and Wansing (1976), could 
therefore count on criticism. The main argument was that safety science should focus on a 
human approach. Man was not, after all, a component of a system and did not fit into 
mathematical formulas and this was consistent with criticism on the failure probabilities of 
human behaviour alive in the United States and the United Kingdom (Rigby and Swain, 1971; 
Kirwan, 1994; Pasmooij, 1979). The system approach first led to the quantification, assessment 
and evaluation of risk, followed by all kinds of decisions made on acceptability, risk acceptance 
and the resultant measures and interventions or risk control. Extended argument concerning 
risk quantification and acceptance was published in De Veiligheid en Risikobulletin. Probability 
calculations were often, it was thought, based on guesswork and the uncertainty surrounding 
probabilities was seriously underestimated (Wetenschap en Samenleving, 1978; Reijnders, 
1979) (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14 special issue of Science and Society, risk acceptance (W&S, 1978) 
 
Furthermore, a comparison of the risk figures, in which non-equivalent activities were compared, 
made little sense. Not all risks were voluntarily taken and risk acceptance was ultimately a 
political issue presented as a scientific problem (Boskma, 1977 Leij and Mutgeert, 1977 
Boesten 1978, 1979). 
Moreover, these issues were not raised during the Delft/The Hague Loss Prevention 
Symposium. The problems addressed were presented as guidelines for safe design in the 
process industry and as studies on the hazards and risks attached to static electricity, gas and 
dust explosions, the transportation of hazardous materials and the reliability of system 
components. Oddly enough, the matter of safety management was not explicitly addressed. The 
University Teaching and Research Symposium in Delft was much broader. At the symposium 
the safety domain was not merely restricted to occupational or process safety. It was extended 
to include private safety, safety at home, in sport, and road safety. The presentation topics were 
also broader. The The Hague-Delft symposium was restricted to experts from universities, 
industry and government. At the Delft symposium there was also space for presentations from 
unions, chemistry and science shops and action groups which, alongside the technical aspects, 
also highlighted the social aspects of safety. The Delft symposium marked the start of the 
Safety Science Group, which was established at the Technical University in 1979 (Goossens, 
1981). Safety Science thus became an academic discipline in the Netherlands, following earlier 
initiatives undertaken by the University of Wuppertal (1974), the Catholic University of Leuven 
(1975) and the University of Aston, Birmingham (1976). 
Apart from participating in the symposium, Hofstede (1978) ventilated fierce criticism on 
systems thinking. The system approach with its clear goals, its input-process-output scheme, its 
comparison with standards and the feedback and feedforward loops was also prevalent in 
management literature as a model for decision structure. However, the managing of companies 
is primarily a social process in a socio-technical environment. Any systems approach remains 
flawed because there are no clear defining goals, only certain general remarks, derived from 
business visions. The claims, or the quality of management activities are only partially 
measurable or not measurable at all, which renders feedback information either usable, or not 
desirable. 
 
9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The development of knowledge on the accident process and the management of safety 
presented in this review is based upon articles and documents. This does not necessarily mean 
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to say that the knowledge and ideas in the academic and the professional domain were 
common in the period in which they were presented. Sometimes knowledge fades, sometimes it 
takes years or decades for ideas to be accepted. One example of this is the theory of 
Winsemius on task dynamics that was developed in the early 1950s but not referred to in 
publications until the 1970s. Much the same applied to the ‘man-made disasters' of Turner 
dating from 1978. The preface to the second edition (Turner and Pigeon, 1997) shows that – 
apart from among a select group of academics – the publication went unnoticed at the time of 
its appearance. A summary of the knowledge developments within the safety domain and the 
general management trends is given in Tables 2 and 3. 
The relationship between general management trends and knowledge development in the field 
of safety management within enterprises is not completely obvious. Here, too, the above-
mentioned delaying factors could play a role. In addition, safety and general management could 
be perceived as two separate domains, each with their own dynamics. The first focused more 
on accidents and was guided by dominant explanations or models of accident processes. 
General management is primarily driven by market machinations and production efficiency in 
industrial sectors and therefore by the consequent management control in companies. 
The dominant schools of management are limited. In the period under consideration four major 
schools emerged: classical and scientific management, behavioural management, quantitative 
management and modern management. These schools were not confined to a certain period of 
time and they could co-exist (Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15 the leading management schools in relation to safety in Europe and the US 
 
The focus on the managing of safety starts halfway through the 19th century in the United 
Kingdom, and was later to be followed by the American Safety First movement. Companies with 
an obvious interest in safety, like US Steel, were pioneers. Safety First prioritized safety for a 
company and there was no relationship with classical and scientific management. In the early 
days safety was a safety technique and it was the domain of the technician. 
Knowledge on the managing of company safety did not become customary until the second 
decade of the 20th century, starting in the United States, and at first it was the preserve of large 
corporations and insurance companies. That knowledge was fuelled by psychological concepts. 
Management had to control unsafe acts by means of selection and through training; these were 
the standard methods of scientific management. Since the early 19th century, comprehensive 
labour legislation had existed in the United Kingdom which had also extended to include 
occupational safety and health. Safety was the domain of government committees such as the 
Industrial Fatigue Board and the later Industrial Health Research Board (1918-1959), which 
commissioned investigation on the causes of accidents. The management of safety was not a 
big topic in the publications of these boards or in any British literature of that period. 
Before World War II the psychological models of the accident process were directly linked to the 
school of behavioural management. Safety techniques could quite effectively solve the 'unsafe 
conditions' signalled by Heinrich’s dominoes. Behaviour, though, was more complex and would 
therefore play a greater part in the causes of accidents. It was undoubtedly the behavioural 
management approach which ensured that the domino metaphor remained popular until long 
after World War II. Dutch and American doctors and British and American ergonomists and 
psychologists developed theories and models of accident causation in the second half of the 20e 
century. Their attention was focussed on process disturbances, the barrier concept and on the 
errors and discrepancies in the information passed on to employees. These models and 
theories had no detectable influence on the development of knowledge in relation to safety 
management, a term which had not yet been used in documents and articles. The management 
process linked to safety first gained clear contours in the form of the Heinrich’s safety ladder 
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Heinrich. There seemed to be no direct line linking this to general management schools or 
quantitative and modern management, which emerged during and after the war. The dominoes 
and the safety ladder were more related to the behavioural and scientific management school. 
In the 1960s an independent line of development in the area of process safety emerged in the 
form of loss prevention. The stress was on the operability of complex technical systems. This 
generated no knowledge on safety management. It merely produced the notion that safety 
must, by definition, be an integral part of the design and performance of processes and that 
empirical knowledge should support the reliability of parts of process installations.  
 
 
Table 2, theories, models, metaphors and management approaches in occupational safety up till 1979 
 
 
 
Table 3, major accidents, theories, models, metaphors and management approaches in process safety up until 1979 
 
Loss prevention emerged against a background of strong upscaling in the process industry, 
increased complexity in the managing of these processes and increased public criticism.  
The 1970s was a stormy period. Public opinion turned against the major industries, including 
the process industry, and was fuelled by a series of major accidents that received significant 
media attention. The rift in the departure from occupational safety, which had already been 
present in the previous period, only widened and the two domains gained their own dynamics. 
Both in the United States and in the United Kingdom the human factor was reassessed, first in 
occupational safety and later in process safety. This was not seen as the cause of accidents but 
rather as a symptom of mismanagement. The effect of safety training in both countries was also 
seriously questioned. British researchers went even further. The numerous publications on 
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safety had been unable to prevent companies from limiting their safety focus to written 
statements with no further consequences for the workplaces. With the exception of reports on 
individual companies, serious research into the implementation and quality of safety 
management (systems) in various sectors had not yet been implemented. 
In the 1970s British sociologists investigated the emergence of major accidents in large 
organizations. Concepts such as loosely and tightly coupled organizations arose, as did the 
concept of organizational culture, the incubation time of a disaster and the various 
organisational processes that blinded companies to weak signals and the omens of developing 
disaster scenarios. These contributions placed a very strong emphasis on safety management 
but only bore little or no relationship to the technical aspects of the relevant disaster scenarios. 
This was different in the process industry, in aerospace and in the nuclear industries. There, 
safety approaches developed that relied on systems theory, on the technical aspects of 
production processes and which had a relationship with quantitative management, the loss 
prevention movement and reliability engineering. Loss prevention had no clear affinity with 
safety management. Following the devastating effects of Flixborough, Beek and Los Alfaques, 
models and theories were developed to understand and control gas, vapour or dust explosions. 
The present survey reveals the multidisciplinary nature of the safety domain. Technicians, 
engineers, doctors, psychologists, sociologists, ergonomists and safety experts have all 
interfered with the discipline, each presenting their own questions. In the early days there was 
little sign of any kind of integration of knowledge. All of that changed in the 1970's when the 
knowledge on safety management began to take shape, and models and concepts from 
different knowledge domains emerged. 
With the exception of a few excursions around the start of the 20st century and the 1950's, since 
World War II the Netherlands always adhered rigidly to Anglo-Saxon developments. It was not 
until the end of the 1970s that independent research was actually conducted in our country. The 
Netherlands got its own Safety Science Group at the Delft University of Technology and 
Hofstede voiced sharp criticism of the system approach taken both to the management of 
companies and safety. However, in the post-1979 period this system approach only became 
more influential. 
Many topics which dominate the discussions on safety of today are also addressed in the period 
covered, like for instance the integration of safety and production, management commitment, 
the position of middle management, the dominance of accident rates, the quality of 
management and the lack of attention paid to the evaluation safety of interventions. 
Unfortunately, one has to conclude that all those decennia of safety research did not provide 
any insight to control major accidents. 
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Abstract  
Unfortunately, despite the technological developments, the number of occupational accidents 
and occupational diseases has been increasing day by day according to the raise of the number 
of employees across the world. The rehabilitation of the occupational health and safety 
conditions at workplaces is the key point to decrease the number of occupational accidents and 
diseases. Of course, there are lots of factors affecting the conditions of workplace and one of 
them is inspection system of these conditions. The labour inspection is an important mechanism 
to improve the occupational health and safety conditions at workplaces. So the education and 
the edification of assistant labour inspectors should be effective and adequate.  
With technological developments late 20th century a concept of virtual reality has emerged in 
the world. Firstly in game sector and then in some other sectors, “Virtual Reality” has entered 
into every point in our lives very fastly. As an inevitable result, it will be also used for 
occupational health and safety systems very soon. For this reason, Labour Inspection Board of 
Turkey has been started to use a new simulation system. Firstly, a mine and a construction 
have been modeled with a 3D program. According to the law and related legislations, all of the 
faults and shortcomings related with these sectors are shown in the simulation. 
In this study, the modeled construction will be introduced. This education system is called 
AROSH (Augmented Reality for Occupational Health and Safety).  In this program, an 
excavation part of a construction has been modeled. Some of construction equipments had 
been imported and then the scenario was created.  The entire scene rendered and a video 
composition created. These processes which need a huge team and lot of time, was achieved 
with a team of three people in a very short time with outstanding work. According to the 
scenario, all of the law articles about the excavation shown respectively. Thus making it easier 
to keep law articles in mind and gives opportunity to debate on event cases. Also a situation can 
be seen with lots of perspectives and can be analyzed easier.  
Firstly, AROSH (Augmented Reality for Occupational Health and Safety) will be used to educate 
the assistant labour inspectors about inspections and legislations. In the second part of project, 
simulations will be use to raise the awareness of employers and employees. Also the program 
will be moved on a different platform and it will be interactive presentation with users. So a user 
can travel around the excavations and examine the equipments and analyze the situation as 
he/she lives in there. In case of an emergency or in case of a bad state he/she will confront 
what needs to be done. 
As a result, a 3D program has been used to form an education program of assistant labour 
inspectors. Of course this program is an open program to develop. In the future, the workplace 
inspections will be possible when we are sitting in our office with augmented reality and so this 
is the first step of this dream. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Unfortunately, despite the technological developments, the number of occupational accidents 
and occupational diseases has been increasing day by day according to the raise of the number 
of employees across the world. Especially occupational accidents in Turkey in recent years, 
made it necessary to include new methods for the promotion of occupational health and safety 
culture throughout the country. Labour Inspection Board has an important position for the 
implementation of these new methods. Although not having a direct impact on the prevention of 
occupational accidents, Labour Inspection Board has a key role for the improvement of 
workplace health and safety conditions. For these reasons, the board has been started to use a 
new animation and simulation system since the beginning of 2015. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
2.1. ANIMATION FOR EDUCATION 
Animation is the process of creating the video of motion and shape change by means of the 
rapid display of a sequence of images that differ from previous image. Animations are excellent 
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 tools that can be used for understanding the issues easier and more effective and to educate 
the people.  For this reason, Labour Inspection Board prepared a work schedule for the 
education and the edification of assistant labour inspectors. AROSH (Augmented Reality for 
Occupational Health and Safety) will be used to educate the assistant labour inspectors about 
inspections and legislations. First of all, to increase the effectiveness and adequateness of 
educations, 3D animations prepared for the construction and mining sectors. By this way, 
assistant labour inspectors were able to see all of what is written in the legislations before they 
go to the inspections of workplaces. Not only the assistant labour inspectors, also the inspectors 
in other occupational groups also could see visually what they will be encountered in the 
construction and mining workplace conditions. Then prepared animations, were shown to 
inspectors. Of course inspectors have adequate knowledge in terms of legislation, but visuals 
can change inspectors’ practical vision regarding the applicability of the legislations in the best 
sense. Animations, provides the opportunity to see the possible lack of safety precautions at 
workplaces without inspecting a workplace. Also it is allowing discussions to be made on issues 
about occupational health and safety. 
3D animations composed about excavation and scaffolding subjects in construction. Excavation 
animation shows thirteen deficiency about occupational health and safety and the precautions 
for the deficiencies. To compose the animation, first of all, according to the inspections and 
occupational accidents statistics the most common deficiencies are identified in the excavation 
work and the scenario was created. After that in terms of being realistic, the equipment and the 
environment to be used is determined and they began to be created with vector lines as shown 
in the Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 – The environment and the construction equipments created with vector lines 
 
Afterwards, the materials of the drawn equipments and environmental factors have been 
identified. During the determination of the properties of materials, it had been paid attention the 
materials to be more realistic. Assigned material properties and equipments as shown in the 
Figure 2 were analyzed detailly in the program. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Assigned materails and equipments 
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 And finally the computer rendered the scenario according to the camera movements and the 
animation composed. While rendering the computer calculates the colour of every pixel 
according the light and material properties (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure – 3 Rendered screen 
 
In the program some equipments modeled  by the team of the Board but beside them some of 
ready equipments had been imported from some free libraries. 
The animation shows the deficiencies of the excavation workplaces and the measurements that 
should be taken for these deficiencies according to the legislations. 
 
2.2. VIRTUAL REALITY  
Virtual Reality is a continuously evolving new computer technology, which allows users to 
interact with computers in a new way. Virtual Reality is also asimulator, but instead of looking 
at a flat screen and operating a joystick, the user who experiences with some special glasses, 
virtual reality is surrounded by a three-dimensional environment generated representation, and 
is able to move around in the virtual world and sees it from different angles, to reach into it, grab 
it and reshape it. After the creation of animations, in the scope of education of assistant labour 
inspector, the media built in the 3-D program exported to a simulation engine program. Then the 
environment built by the engine afterwards an environment created that can be used in an 
interactive way by user. For instance, in the program, when a user comes next to an excavation 
border without railing system, the program gives alert and wants user to find the deficiency 
(Figure – 4) 
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Figure – 4 Excavation border without precaution / with precaution 
 
Another deficiency shown in the Figure  - 5 is about where the entrance and exit to excavation 
areas should be located. 
 
 
 
Figure – 5 the entrance and exit to excavation areas 
 
The first part of AROSH is used to train assistant labour inspector. In 2016, the second part of 
AROSH, the simulation, is intended to be used in trainings of  inspectors. For now three 
simulation trainings completed for construction site education. One of the subjects is about 
excavation, the other is related scaffoldings and the last is about general deficiencies of a 
building construction. The supply of special glasses is planned by the end of this year. So it will 
be used with the simulated environment next year. 
Virtual reality is not just to see how the legislation is applied to workplaces, at the same time it is 
an excellent tool to predict how the accidents might be in workplaces. Investigating an accident 
by reconstructing it using advanced computer graphics techniques is an essential step towards 
improving the safety performance of the construction sites With this way poeple can 
understand: 
· How the accident happened, 
· Why it happened, 
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 · How it could have been prevented, 
· How injuries or fatalities could have been avoided. 
With virtual reality it is possible to see 3D virtual environment of workplaces and to test the 
physical results of equipments. 
 
2.3. AUGMENTED REALITY 
Augmented reality is a live direct or indirect view of a physical, real-world environment whose 
elements are augmented (or supplemented) by computer-generated sensory input such as 
sound, video, graphics or GPSdata (Figure - 6). Augmented reality is a very important factor for 
the future as can be understood from the definition of it. In the long-term plan of Labour 
Inspection Board,  the use of augmented reality is included in for occupational health and safety 
inspections. By special glasses which can be used in accordance with the virtual reality 
programs, an inspector will realize where is a deficiency at work places. For example, first of all 
the special glasses will perceive a worker and then it will control the helmet of him or the mask. 
And also when a personel protective equipment will be showed to the glasses it will check if it is 
suitable for the risk of workplaces.  
 
 
Figure – 5 Augmented reality for an environment 
 
3.RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
All the animation, virtual and augmented reality are the parts of the future technologies. The 
animation education given to the assistant labour inspectors showed us that  visual perception 
is very important to clucth the legislations. The subjects have been clutched by assistant labour 
inspection very clearly as can be understood from their exams. But of course it takes a lot of 
time to compose a 3D construction environment but if it once created it can be used by all the 
programs. Also Virtual Reality offers limitless possibilities in training, simulation and education. It  
has a great potential to increase productivity, better utilise time and most importantly improve 
safety awareness and therefore reduce incidents. 
 
4.CONCLUSIONS 
Workplace safety is paramount for all production sectors throughout the world.The aim of the 
preliminary and formative usability evaluation study was to investigate the design of the virtual 
reality system to trigger virtual reality design improvements and to prepare for more 
comprehensive usability evaluation studies in order to facilitate generalisation of research into 
virtual reality applications for real world scenarios to the greatest possible extent. So to increase 
awareness of occupational health and safety of all parts, and to improve the occupational health 
and safety conditions in workplaces virtual reality is a very good technological solution. Labour 
inspection Board of Turkey has been started to work on virtual reality and augmented reality fort 
his. As a result, a 3D program has been used to form an education program of assistant labour 
inspectors. Of course this program is an open program to develop. In the future, the workplace 
inspections will be possible when we are sitting in our office with augmented reality and so this 
is the first step of this dream. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Developing labour inspection activity is a challenging task. Interventions aimed at developing 
such activities should not be limited to the development of methods and tools (BRUHN and 
FRICK, 2011).  
The Worker Health Services emerged in Brazil, in the 80’s, as a result of social struggle for the 
paradigm change in the health-work relations in the country.  
Embedded in the Institutional framework of Public Health and augmented in the Unified Health 
System (SUS, Portuguese acronym, from now on) after the enactment of the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988, it acquired normative legitimacy and capillarization in several States of the 
federation (VASCONCELLOS and RIBEIRO, 2011). 
In this perspective, the area of Worker Health in Brazil, influenced by the Italian sanitation 
reform, consolidated itself as a field of knowledge and practices, acting on the determinants of 
the health-illness process, originated from the production and service processes, shaped by the 
theoretical assumptions of Latin-American Social Medicine (VASCONCELLOS and RIBEIRO, 
2011). It has as main objects of intervention, work accidents and work related illnesses. 
After it inclusion in SUS, municipal services were set up, called Centres of Reference in Worker 
Health (CEREST- Portuguese acronym, from now on), representing the government policy 
strategy in the decade of 2000 to nucleate the actions in Worker Health, which would enable, 
depending on the success of the experiences with activities of surveillance and prevention, 
have a positive impact on the worker conditions in the formal and informal sectors of the 
economy. However, these services, with rare exceptions, still lack consistent articulation with 
other SUS organic structures, greater investment and consolidation with priority public policy in 
addressing the relevant epidemiological problems such as deaths, mutilations and incapacities, 
plus work related traumatic occurrences.  
The directives of the Ministry of Health for monitoring initiatives related to Worker Health 
include: the principles of integrality, pluri-institutionality, social control, among others, apart from 
research-intervention which has as prerogative the characteristic of transforming the 
conditioners and determiners of occupational health hazards (BRASIL, 1998). 
In order to address these questions some few services developed initiatives of prevention and 
promotion of worker health, with activities, dialectically articulated, but which contemplate two 
differentiated subject contents: the first being focussed on collective preventative practices in 
the workplace, processes and forms of work organization, health hazard generators, and the 
second, of an individualized therapeutic nature, interpreted as clinical assistance activities and 
rehabilitation. Both receive the broader denomination of Worker Health Surveillance and are 
developed by multi-disciplinary teams, whose composition varies according to the availability of 
human resources, but which can cover the technical professional categories of work security, 
engineers, doctors, psychologists, occupational therapists, physiotherapists, phonoaudiologists, 
social assistants, sociologists, nurses, and nurses in training, amongst others. With these types 
of intervention actions, it is possible to interrupt the cycle of illness and work related deaths, 
avoiding new cases, as well as minimizing the devastating consequences of these traumatic 
occurrences for the workers and their families.  
  
1.1 Justification 
Given the complexity of the surveillance actions, the professional of the multi-disciplinary team 
of a CEREST in the interior of São Paulo/Brazil, with twelve years of existence, complained 
about the conceptual and technical difficulties in the development of their activities, such as the 
planning of priority actions in the light of the numerical significance of demands induced by the 
notification system for severe and grave work accidents, and through the channelling of patients 
from the public and private medical care services and by means of the system of general public 
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complaint schemes. Other contradictions were also identified in relation to the low reach of the 
instruments in the light of heterogeneity of the object, since the traditional technical tools, such 
as inspections and supervisory monitoring on the basis of Regulatory Norms (RN) of the 
Ministry of Labour (MTE – Portuguese acronym) did not capture the hidden organizational 
questions, such as work rhythm, adequate workforce numbers, and abusive production targets, 
work density, work intensity, authoritative and harassing management style and contradictions 
between programmed work and real work.  
By means of a University partnership integrating thematic project with a duration of five years, 
the proposal of a Change Laboratory (CL) was found to be appropriate with the needs to 
indentify and equate the crisis lived by the professional in service with the objective of 
identifying and discussing the contradictions in the system of activity with a view to their future 
remodelling. At the same time, their application would result in incorporation of the methodology 
by the team, in this way becoming a wider-ranging technical tool for the intervention in 
historically degraded security systems, contributing to the increase in preventative actions 
developed by the group. 
 
1.2 General Objective 
The main objective of this intervention research was to improve the preventative and promotion 
of worker health actions undertaken by CEREST. 
 
1.2.1 Specific Objectives 
· To bring to the surface the contradictions existing in the system of activity of CEREST 
which impeded reaching more satisfactory results; 
· To contribute to the remodelling of this system in such way so as to overcome these 
contradictions; 
· To favour the learning process of the participants regarding Change Laboratory (CL) 
methodology. 
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used was Change Laboratory, developed in Finland in the 90’s, and based on 
the referential, the Theory of Activity, originated by Vygotsky (1978), and developed by Leontiev 
(1978) and Engeström (1978). Using as guidelines a series of concepts and methods, it enables 
the possibility of contributing to the development and learning of subjects which come together 
to define and improve the activity system of which they are a part. Starting from planned 
sessions and with the participation of interventionist researchers, who would have the role of 
facilitators in the application of the methodology, the individuals themselves would develop new 
understanding concerning the purpose of their activity and its modifications over the length of 
the historical process to which they were being subjected (PEREIRA-QUEROL et al., 2011; 
VIRKKUNEN and NEWNHAM, 2015).  
The intervention was based on the undertaking of meetings, in the workplace itself, to which 
analytical tools of the work process in focus were made available, prepared by the 
interventionists with assistance from the professionals of CEREST. Ethnographic research to 
collect historical data concerning the services and its functioning, the alterations in the quantity 
and quality of demand and the present practices, that is, the forms by which the activities are 
conducted in the present and in the past. 
Regarding the information gathering of the main problems faced by the team, semi-structured 
interviews were applied on the professionals who took part in both the inspections as well as in 
therapeutic activities, including, the representatives of trade unions who are institutional 
partners of this service. Two management bodies were interviewed – the Coordination of 
CEREST and the Coordination of the Area of the Municipal Health Surveillance. Documental 
research was also undertaken in the records of the service itself. 
The findings were used as database mirror of the activity, with the purpose of offering key 
information to the participants for the debate of the content of the activity over the length of time 
– past, present and future. The 13 sessions carried out followed the model proposed by 
Engeström (1996): (1) analysis and historic formation of the elements of the activity; (2) 
identification of the contradictions in the system of activities and between related systems; (3) 
modelling of a new system and new instruments with the purpose of resolving the contradictions 
identified; (4) testing of the application of the new model; (5) evaluation and consolidation of the 
new model. 
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For definition of the activity system, the following conceptual instrument was used, shown in 
Figure 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Engeström et al., 1996 p.11 
 
The elements presented can be defined as follows: A) subject – which can as much  apply to an 
individual as well as to a group of people, whose visions will be valued regarding the 
perspective of analysis; B) object – understood as being the purpose of an activity system; C) 
instruments – all the action mediator tools of the subjects, of a physical or symbolic nature, such 
as devices, furnishings, support texts, legislation, concepts, action plans etc…; D) community 
represents the group of individuals, the organized groups who have interface with the activity 
system; E) division of work being the division of tasks among the subjects, the hierarchy 
between them, and the relations of conflict and resistance; F) rules are the regulations, norms, 
conventions and agreements, formal or informal, related to the context of activity 
(ENGESTRÖM, 1987; ENGESTRÖM et al., 1996). 
The material was recorded, which facilitated its analysis and guidance in the undertaking of 
formation intervention sessions. The number of participants varied from 9 to 14 people, in that 
one group showed resistance related to mapping out the problematic situation and returning 
some sessions later. In sessions of creation of a new model the group reached a formation of 
19 participants. The subjects participated voluntarily of the group, the ethical precepts of 
research being respected. 
At this moment, this model redesigned by the participants is in test. The immediate coordination 
approved the model. After the test it will be presented with data of successes and failures to the 
senior management and other members of the community for validation and, if necessary, new 
adjustments will be made until the consolidation of the final model. The interventionist 
researchers of CL will accompany this process of testing undertaking sessions every so often. 
 
3 RESULTS 
The first sessions of CL were focussed on understanding how the activity system of CEREST 
was and what were the difficulties and present necessities. The participants discussed that 
although this was an already quite an advanced service when compared with others in 
CERESTs of the country; there still persisted some difficulties not overcome. 
The first discussions showed consensus of the group as to the evolution in service activities and 
in the recognition of CEREST by the community (trade unions, companies, Ministry of Labour, 
Regional Superintendence of Labour, civil society). 
 “(...) we evolved, but it’s necessary to study more, but since the demand is big and the service 
has to give responses to the people that knock on our door, there is little or no time to study. 
And CEREST has become much more visible, and for this reason more sought after than three 
years ago, with much greater volume of activity and much more demand” (Subject A). 
“´Previously there was more team work, everyone learnt more and the successful results were 
greater” (Subject B). 
 
Instruments 
Division of work 
Object 
Rules 
Subject 
Community 
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The increase in demand created a need for a redesign of the service activity system, leading to 
a new division of work – what previously had been undertaken as a team, was now undertaken 
done individually, with productivity targets of ten inspections per month. The conversations 
demonstrated the discontent as a consequence of this induced demand and the perception that 
the lack of success was linked to the hypertrophy of the demand and the impossibility of going 
more deeply into the study of cases, understood as instrument of group work. 
These conversations exemplify the discontent and the perception of lack of success in the 
actions. 
In subsequent sessions the object of the work of CEREST was discussed. The participant made 
the point that the present object of the service was oriented just to work conditions with 
pathogenic potential for accidents or illnesses and that one-off inspections related to the 
approximate reasons were predominating in the functioning of the group, which was perceived 
as being incomplete, unsatisfactory and demotivating. The debate on the conceptual and 
technical difference between supervision and surveillance extended over a number of 
encounters until the understanding prevailed that the object needed to be broadened, and that 
new instruments and new rules needed to be added to the work. It was concluded that to 
operate in surveillance demands knowledge and planning not just about conditioning factors or 
causes closer to the events, but rather about the macro social determinants of work accidents 
and illnesses. These broader comprehensions of the object motivated the group to question and 
identify problems and contradictions that existed in the activity system. 
The Table below represents a synthesis of the main changes suggested in the model of activity 
system after the CL interventions. 
 
Table 1: CEREST Activity System before and after CL intervention 
Elements of the 
Activity System 
Before the Intervention After the Intervention 
Object Inspection in companies on an 
individual basis regarding 
specific cases 
Sectoral Projects 
Worker Health Surveillance  
Division of Work Differentiated teams for: 
Surveillance 
Rehabilitation Assistance 
Database typing 
The same teams undertake the same 
tasks. The tasks were differentiated for: 
 
Emergency Actions 
Planned Actions 
Information Room 
Instruments Regulatory Norms 
Work divided by sectoral actions 
induced by demand 
Negotiation (meetings, round 
table, forums and public 
hearings) 
Conduct Adjustment Term 
Sanitary Authority  
MAPA 
Fire Brigade 
Sanitary Code 
Technical Notes from MTE 
Regulatory Norms 
Work by planned actions 
Negotiation (meetings, round table, 
forums and public hearings) 
Conduct Adjustment Term 
Sanitary Authority  
MAPA 
Fire Brigade 
Sanitary Code 
Change Laboratory 
Information Room 
Ergonomic Analysis  
of Work  
Subjects  Supervisor flavour of the month Multidisciplinary Team 
Rules  Compliance with Targets 
Inspect all the severe and fatal 
accidents 
Inspect all the denunciations 
through 156, trade unions and 
Ministry of Labour 
Autonomous Consensus  
Planning 
To be present at meetings 
Community Universities , Workers, SUS, 
INSS, MPT, MTE, Trade Unions,  
Companies and Others  
Universities, Workers, SUS, INSS, 
MPT, MTE, Trade Unions, 
Companies and Others 
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In continuity the contradictions in each element will be detailed and the redesign proposed will 
be explained regarding overcoming difficulties.  
 
3.1 The Object 
The main question brought up by the group was the broadening of the object of CEREST of 
consolidating what conceptually and legally1 is understood by surveillance of worker health: 
 “... a continuous and systematic functioning, over time, in the sense of detecting, 
knowing, researching and analysing the conditioning factors and determinants of 
health hazard related to the processes and workplace ambiences, in its 
technological, social, organizational and epidemiological aspects, with the 
purpose of planning, executing and evaluating interventions in these aspects, in 
such a way as to eliminate and control them.” (BRASIL, 1998). 
In the light of the legal and conceptual complexity of the object, the group indicated as 
contradictory the lack of efficacy of one-off inspections, individualized and traditional in the field 
of Surveillance.  
The professionals, in general, expressed concern with the efficacy of their interventions, 
evaluating when they could have a pedagogical character, in the sense of guiding change. Their 
efficacy seems to be reached when they coincide with moments of replanning of the 
organization itself due to self-recognition of the existence of problems in the area of health and 
safety. However, in some situations, such as for example, in companies in which there is little 
protection from machinery, considered obstacles to activities and to productivity, the inspectors 
perceived that the infraction notice or the interdiction of the dangerous machine can be an 
inefficient measure of prevention of new occurrences, since the company does not assume 
recognition of the seriousness of the situation, not paying any attention to the infractions. 
The theme of accompaniment of the company actions to resolve the problem, object of the 
infraction notice was also amply discussed. One of the complaints of the coordination and team 
itself was that the processes remain open for long periods of time due to difficulties in 
undertaking visits of accompaniment. Once again the question of high demand and production 
targets seem to conflict with the activity of surveillance. 
Thus, remodelling the activity of CEREST signified to the group the broadening of the work 
object, reaching greater efficacy in the prevention acts, by means of planned multidisciplinary 
functioning, prioritised by epidemiological criteria and using technical instruments of greater 
reach. 
 
3.2   The Division of Work 
The division of work was an altered item which demanded change throughout the system. 
Initially CEREST had three work fronts based on professional rankings: inspection, 
assistance/rehabilitation and data processing. This division established an important 
contradiction, since at the moment of expanding the object to health surveillance, the 
knowledge required was also broadened, no longer being possible to be equated by specific 
disciplines. To address these demands it was decided to prepare a new division of work, not 
based on individual competencies, but rather on multi-professional and interdisciplinary teams. 
The tasks were thus divided in: 1) emergency actions to respond to immediate demands coming 
from denunciations or Work Accident Attendance Reports (RAATs2); 2) an information room 
                                                          
1 Decree MS n.3.120/1998. 
2 In 2002 the SIVAT (Information System and Surveillance of Work Accidents) was implemented and 
developed by means of a research project, financed by FAPESP in a development programme of Public 
Policies (FAPESP 06/51684-3).  The SIVAT operated by means of a base of ambulatory obligatory 
notification through the filling in of the Work Accident Attendance Report – RAAT (Municipal Decree nº 
9951/2002). This Report is filled at the location of attendance and emergency services to workers 
sustaining accidents (Hospitals and company Ambulatories). The RAAT contains information concerning 
the patient, the place of the accident, a summary description of the accident and the medical bulletin 
concerning the diagnostic.  In continuity this information is sent to CEREST and feeds the database which 
supplies subsidy for the implementation of Public Policies with the objective of preventing the occurrence 
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responsible for the feeding in of data and qualitative analysis, according to the complexity of the 
case, and statistics according to the criteria considered most important to work out the action 
strategy (index of seriousness, incidence and frequency of the accident or illness); 3) planned 
actions prioritized by the team, after analysis of the information room, according to the 
complexity and size of the case. It is worth pointing out, however, that not only was the division 
of work altered (who does what) but advance was made in the direction of decentralization of 
the power to the team to decide collectively the priorities taking into consideration the 
knowledge of the group concerning the companies and role-players in the territory.  
 
3.3 The instruments  
The CEREST developed with the researchers of two Brazilian universities  (UNESP and USP) a 
tool called MAPA (Model for Analysis and Accident Prevention) (ALMEIDA et al., 2014), whose 
purpose is to enable analysis of wider-ranging work accidents improving the quality of the 
surveillances actions, permitting taking initiatives related to organizational factors of the 
companies with accidentogenic potential. In spite of having participated in the preparation of 
MAPA, the professionals reported difficulties in the application of the method. 
 “I apply MAPA, but I think it is difficult, and it takes time to do. As it takes time and the work 
demand is high, with new accidents arriving all the time, it not possible to apply it as one might 
like.” (Subject C).  
This conversation reveals, however, that the difficulty with the tools is much more related with 
the rules and quantative targets and less with the complexity or inapplicability of the instrument.  
To solution this contradiction, the remodelling process was to organize the work in project of 
sectoral actions, prioritizing according to the analyses of the information room, including, apart 
from the MAPA, other tools such as the ergonomic analysis of the activity and the change 
laboratory, used as instruments of greater reach in the identification of the conditioning and 
determining factors of illnesses or work accidents and actions of improvement of these 
situations. 
 
3.4 The Subject 
In the previous model the subject was the “inspector flavour of the month”, decided by exclusive 
criteria of the management. This inspector was designated, primarily to verify the situation by 
telecommunication, and to analyse individually if it was the case or not to undertake inspection 
in loco, by means of an existing evaluation of serious and imminent risk and of behaviours of 
the organization in relation to aspects of health and safety.   
One of the inspector conversations indicated this dissatisfaction, because despite considering, 
the individual experience of each inspector related to the productive and service sectors, in the 
management distribution of tasks, the reality consisted in single minded and highly subjective 
action: 
 “I have fear of doing some of jobs alone, especially in isolated companies in the suburbs. I 
would like to undertake these cases together with another colleague, but the collaboration is 
difficult, understandably, because by collaborating with a colleague one runs the risk of being 
unable to achieve one’s own targets” (Subject D). 
Two aspects of different natures can be drawn from the remark: the first one being the 
individualization of the action in the light of the complexity of the confrontation involved, by 
means of criteria, which for the greater number of instances, the inspector did not have 
objective evaluation resources available. The other question is to make inspections 
unaccompanied by a colleague or another public organ signifies putting oneself in a situation of 
risk, since the inspectors sustain threats, bribery attempts and intimidation. There are situations 
when the inspectors have been received by the owner of the company carrying a gun in his belt. 
In the remodelling, the operational functioning of the inspection was increased to a multi-
professional team. The division of the teams was undertaken by the workers themselves during 
the CL sessions. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of work accidents. The serious cases are considered sentinel events, that is, generate a surveillance action 
whose objective is to analyse and understand the determinants of that occurrence. 
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3.5 The Rules 
The rules of compliance with targets of 10 inspections per month and to inspect all the 
denunciations and RAAT (s) of serious and fatal accidents were altered. The weekly meeting 
with the whole of the CEREST team was established as a rule, with an interdisciplinary space 
for discussion of problems, dilemmas and difficulties faced during the week, as well as, 
prioritizing and planning the actions, according to technical data from the information room and 
autonomy of the team consensus regarding the strategic approach adopted. 
 
3.6 The Community 
The community remained the same, since the participants of CL consider its  participation 
essential: a) the university with research projects which end up giving support to the 
surveillance actions; b) the workers who are sources of important essential and important data; 
c) the network of attention of SUS – Unified Health System at all levels (municipal, state and 
federal); d) in joint actions with professionals from Social Services (INSS-Portuguese acronym); 
e) of the labour prosecutors from the MPT (Ministry of Labour) in sectoral projects, processes 
that require Conduct Adjustment Agreement (TAC-Portuguese acronym), among others; f) the 
auditor work inspectors of the MTE (Ministry of Labour and Work); g) the trade unions who are 
sources of data and should also be present at the negotiating table to exert social control; 
As for the organizations, since they represent the pathogenic organization locus, in the first 
instance, become targets of intervention, however, depending on their willingness to recognise 
their problems of internal deterioration of the area of health and safety and implement 
improvement initiatives of their processes, may also come to integrate in partnership with the 
service in question, especially in the application of the CL method. 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
CEREST studied in this research, has already been indicated by researchers as a service which 
stands out in Brazil for its innovatory and successful experiences in relation to worker health 
(JACKSON FILHO and BARREIRA, 2013). Even recognising that there have been advances 
and conquests, the team demanded the intervention by perceiving that the contradiction 
between analysis in depth and the productivity demanded by the management generated low 
efficacy of actions. 
One very important mirror data used in the sessions was the incidence rate of the accidents and 
their seriousness. The graphs analysed in the sessions demonstrated that the seriousness of 
the accidents had diminished considerably, however the incidence had reduced little. The 
question of this first contradiction showed the team that although the interventions undertaken 
had had impacts, they had not led to a social construction of change, because there had not 
been effective participation of the organization in the process. 
Numerous are the factors that make difficult the efficacy of the interventions in worker health, 
among them are the low adherence level of the workers, authoritarianism of the management, 
insufficient resources and prioritization of production in detriment of health and safety 
(WHYSALL et al., 2006). Approaches centralized on quantative evaluations and normatizations 
do not reach these factors.  
The efficacy of work security norms have been much discussed  (FARIA, 2008, LIMA, 2005; 
DWYER, 2006) and approaches which understand work as an element within a complex and 
imperfect system are ever more frequently indicated as a route to prevention (ALMEIDA, 
2006a,b; MENDES, 2014; OWEN, et al., 2009). 
The construction of change is problematic, although a good prognosis can be made. When one 
detects a situation of risk, the intervention should always be planned whenever possible based 
on theoretical and practical scientific knowledge about the sector in which the problem is 
occurring; subsequently one chooses a more adequate method of intervention for the case and 
makes the intervention always evaluating the results (GOLDENHAR et al., 2001; ROBSON et 
al., 2007). Approaches of interventions based on qualitative analyses can contribute more 
favourably with prevention (BARIL-GINGRAS et al., 2006). And the participative approaches in 
the risk management have been shown to be a key part in the efficacy of interventions in a 
number of sectors (KAZUTAKA, 2012). 
Intervention using the method of Change Laboratory in this research offered the team a broader 
form of understanding the problem. They parted from an abstract idea of what was their object 
(surveillance) to a solid remodelling of the activity system. The manner that they perceived 
matters previously, generated the perception that the tools that they possessed were 
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incompatible with the object which they intended to reach. During the length of the encounters, 
it was perceived that the problem was systemic, that is, it had its origin in a number of elements 
of the activity system. It was principally necessary to alter the subject, rules and division of work. 
The other noteworthy contribution of the method was the agencying of the participants. They 
had expectations regarding the change in the activity itself, but initially did not know from where 
to begin. The possibility of expressing themselves, analysing in depth and collectively the 
problems faced and to actively seek the solutions, is what guarantees the necessary conditions 
for these role-players to become protagonists of their own activity (BRITO, 2011).  
This valorisation of the role-players in the analysis and search for solutions showed itself to be 
fundamental, since this team also demanded intervention as a form of learning method in order 
to use it in surveillance actions. The workers need to be heard, but also they themselves need 
to be the protagonists of the analyses of accidents and search of prevention solutions 
(OSORIO, 2008).   
The method is configured in six distinct phases, as follows: 1) mapping of the situation (when 
one recognises that something should be done regarding the problematic situation); 2) analysis 
of the situation (how they worked before, what are the present difficulties); 3) creation of a new 
model (how one wants to work); 4) consolidation and model testing (what changes one wants 
for the next months); 5) application of the new model (putting into practise the proposals); 6) 
disseminating and consolidating (teaching others what was learnt). 
At this moment, the intervention in CEREST is in phase 5 of application of the new model. The 
intervention has only given a start to the process of expansive learning. This is an extremely 
fragile process and needs constant support, since the model is never ready and completed, but 
rather in construction. The implementation will probably show that some elements are not 
compatible, needing a new round of redesign, a new analysis. It is hoped that even if the 
intervention is successful, probably the new activity system will enter into contradiction with 
other neighbouring activities, which will generate the necessity for a new intervention involving 
these activities. 
 
5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
At the moment, the redesigned model is being applied in the form of a pilot project. Its 
experimentation in the four months planned for development of the new CEREST system 
activity needs to give response whether the idealised model managed to supersede in practise 
the contradictions between the subjects and their object, between these and the traditional 
instruments used and the existing rules in the service. In order to establish itself in the future, 
the model needs to be validated by the remaining hierarchies of the organization and by the 
community, and the institutions that have interface with Worker Health: the network of Social 
Security3, the Ministry of Work and Labour, the Ministry of Labour and the Municipal Health 
Council which represents society in general. 
In the same way, the resumption of the prominence of the multidisciplinary team began the 
process of more decentralized and democratic decision-making, recognised by the group as 
essential attributes to redesign and implement the desired changes. 
The group and the interventionist researchers believe that revival of significance and expansion 
of the object had a transforming role. On the other hand, it helped in the diagnosis of a reduced 
operational functioning model, diverted from its main purposes to attend exclusively centralized 
rules in quantative demand, to be serviced superficially without qualitative criteria of public 
health, which resulted in low efficacy of the prevention actions. On the other hand, it 
represented a new germinal cell, visualized as being capable of equating the existing 
contradictions and of regaining the sense of work for the professionals of the service. Conscious 
of this real possibility they seek to consolidate (by passing the abstract to concrete) recreating, 
testing and reinventing new elements of the system. A new cycle begins. New tensions can 
arise in the future with the neighbouring systems and at higher levels. The RENAST (National 
Network of Attention to Worker Health) could be put to the test by those who make things 
happen at a local level, with possible future gains. 
                                                          
3 INSS (National Institute of Social Security) 
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Abstract 
In the context of high-risk industries, risk assessment takes place not only through standardized 
methods for risk analysis, but is frequently negotiated and discussed as an integral part of 
operational decision making. This is not least the case in the context of operational planning. 
Frequent changes in operations require ongoing assessment of risk as tasks are rescheduled 
and resources reallocated. The current study explores how professionals account for the 
presence or absence of risk in a setting in which risk analysis is not the primary objective. With 
data from the offshore petroleum industry, the rhetorical aspects of risk assessments in 
operational planning are examined. A series of interprofessional planning meetings were video 
recorded, transcribed and analyzed using a rhetorical discourse analytic framework. The data is 
analyzed at a micro-interactional level in order to study how accounts of risk are presented and 
negotiated in this particular setting. The meaning and consequences of operational plan 
changes, and their implications for safety, are issues that need to be established and negotiated 
discursively through interprofessional meeting talk. The analysis shows that accounts of risk are 
characterized by shifting rhetorical strategies that can be seen to echo established risk 
discourses often referred to as ‘technico-scientific’ and ‘contextualized’ conceptions of risk. 
Rhetorical devices are used interchangeably and strategically by the participants as they 
account for risk from their respective institutional positions and their specific areas of expertise 
and responsibility. The accounts are found to be increasingly persuasive and rhetorical in style 
as disagreements over risk and prioritizations surface. Established risk discourses can in this 
way be seen as rhetorical resources for the participants in their negotiations over the meaning 
of risk and in support of their specific communicative projects. The accounts of risk are, in other 
words, not seen as simply objective presentations of probability and consequence, but rather as 
powerful tools for achieving specific professional outcomes. The study contributes to the 
understanding of risk assessment at its most concrete and practical level, as it takes place 
through professional interaction in an operational setting and through the presentation of 
persuasive accounts. Acknowledging the discursive and rhetorical elements of risk assessment 
might encourage awareness among professionals and managers of the interactional dynamics 
that are at play when professionals negotiate the meaning of risk across departments and fields 
of expertise.  
 
Keywords: Risk assessment, rhetoric, discourse analysis, interprofessional interaction, 
operational planning  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of high-risk industries, structured methods for risk analysis are key tools in risk 
management. These methods are closely linked to ideals of rational decision making, 
systematically approaching apparently tangible and objective factors, indexing risk through 
probability-based methods of expected values or risk matrices. But risk analysis is not only 
performed in these structured meeting formats. Risk is also continuously dealt with in other 
organizational settings, in which the continuous management of operational change takes 
place. This paper considers risk assessment in the domain of operational planning in offshore 
oil and gas production and studies the risk talk that occurs in an interprofessional meeting in 
which plan changes are addressed, with subsequent re-scheduling of activities and reallocation 
of resources. Decisions made at this level are crucial for the day to day operations and 
ultimately for the safety and the bottom-line of production. However, these arenas for 
operational decision making have rarely been studied as sites for interprofessional interaction in 
which assessments of risk take place. 
 
The last few decades have seen what has been called a ‘discursive turn’ in organization 
studies, in which the role of language and discourse, text and talk, is seen as central in the 
shaping and changing of organizations (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & 
Putnam, 2004; Mumby & Clair, 1997). Organizations are increasingly seen as complex 
formations where discursive practices are both "in" organizations and productive of them 
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(Cooren, Taylor, & van Every, 2006; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009). Weick (1995) has contributed 
significantly in turning our attention to the social nature of sensemaking. A similar discursive 
turn can also be observed in the safety practices of the petroleum industry itself, evidenced by 
extensive procedures for ensuring that operators talk about risk and safety – preceding, during, 
and following work operations (e.g. “Before the job talk”, “Open safety conversation”, “Check 
your colleague”, and “Safe job analysis”). Risk talk is seen to affect risk behavior and to serve a 
function in preventing misunderstandings to occur. The communicative events in which 
professionals discuss and negotiate risk have received limited attention in safety science. The 
research field of risk communication is still growing, but has largely oriented to mass 
communication of societal risk, to perception studies or the rhetorical shaping of mass media 
messages (Fischoff, 1995; Roeser, Hillerbrand, Sandin, & Peterson, 2012). Few studies have 
examined the role of discourse in defining and negotiating risk at a micro-interactional level 
(Rasmussen & Kroon Lundell, 2012). 
 
This article brings attention to the formulation and negotiation of risk at the level of 
interprofessional interaction where professionals meet, talk and negotiate the meanings and 
consequences of risk in a particular setting. The data is taken from a weekly planning meeting 
that attends to the optimization of the maintenance plan for offshore oil and gas wells. The 
research questions can be formulated as follows: How do the meeting participants account for 
the presence or absence of risk in the planning meeting and what interactional negotiations can 
be found to take place? The data is analyzed within the framework of rhetorical discourse 
analysis, which involves attention to micro-interactional features and the recurrent patterns of 
argumentation (rhetorical strategies) that are employed in accounts of risk. Accounts are, in this 
context, descriptions of risk given by the participants, and these descriptions are seen as 
interactionally designed with reference to how they will be recognized and understood by 
others, and as constructing preferred meanings for problematic events (Antaki, 1994). The term 
risk will be used broadly to refer to the perceived possibility of any unwanted event or effect, not 
only those related to the safety of personnel or the integrity of technical equipment. In this 
setting, risk is also related to the threat of losing production and the threat of producing an 
unfeasible plan. If problems arise due to poor planning, decisions will have to be made on the 
spot and with limited information, imposing increased risk for both safety and production. 
 
1.1 The study of risk  
The technico-scientific approaches to risk are and have been dominant in attempt to understand 
and control risk (Lupton, 1999). Based on the principles of probability theory and scientific 
methods, risk is defined as the product of the probability of an unwanted event and the severity 
of its effects (Haimes, 2009; Lowrance, 1976). The hazard that gives rise to the possibility of an 
event is considered to exist independently of our perception of it and to be controllable through 
appropriate measures. However, the probabilistic and objectivistic approaches to risk have been 
challenged by more contextualized perspectives on risk and what has been called a 
constructivist turn in safety science (Le Coze, 2013). This brings in new paradigms of thinking 
from human and social sciences. 
 
The field of cognitive psychology has, for example, described the heuristics and biases that 
people employ when making decisions, and how they generally do not follow the principles of 
probability theory when appraising probability and consequence (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982). The role of emotion and styles of information processing, for example, are directing 
reason and affect. Importantly, the non-probabilistic thinking, often seen as ‘human flaws’, are 
now increasingly seen as a resource in risk assessment (Jackson, Allum, & Gaskell, 2006). 
From an anthropological perspective, Douglas (1992) has provided a cultural approach to risk, 
in which risk is seen as shared cultural understandings and practices. Social relations and 
organization brings meaning and value to risk, and culture therefore place a role in determining 
what risks people perceive as significant. In these contextualized approaches to risk, probability 
is one among many attributes of risk, not the singular condition for classification, and risk does 
not exist independently of human interpretation and meaning-making. 
 
The current study takes a discourse analytic approach to risk, emphasizing the role of language 
and interaction in the interpretation and assessment of risk. This approach investigates 
language as social action, which implies studying language use, text and talk, as it is 
manifested in actual, real-life situations (Candlin & Sarangi, 2011). Frequently, the assessment 
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of risk is a fundamentally communicative activity: planning for safe behavior, breaking down 
work processes into steps, formulating possible future scenarios, assessing probability and 
consequences of different circumstances. These are all activities in which language and 
interaction are key tools for reaching shared decisions in a high-risk setting. The information 
processing that organizational members do is rarely done in the solitary mind and it is rarely 
based on knowledge and information that is completely certain or uncontested.  Rather it is 
created in dialogue and with the influence and expertise of others  (Linell, 1998; Sarangi & 
Coulthard, 2000). Expert assessments of risk, in turn, are not only based on facts and input but 
also on institutional constraints and social hierarchies (Cicourel, 1990). Sarangi & Roberts 
(1999) distinguish between professional and institutional constraints, the latter regulating who 
has access to information, who has the position to legitimately assess information, and who 
holds the authority to decide based on this information. Sarangi & Clarke (2002) show how 
professionals, in the face of uncertainty, demarcate their own expertise with the help of specific 
discursive resources. Even the production and assessment of evidence has been shown to be a 
result of interactional work. What counts as evidence for one profession might be circumstantial 
for another. Evidence in an interprofessional setting must be established as relevant and 
applicable for other professions (Cicourel, 1986; Måseide, 2006) and the evidential status of 
information can change in the course of an interactional episode (Sarangi, 1998). This is highly 
relevant in risk assessment scenarios in which information and evidence play a crucial role in 
decision making.  
 
1.2 Empirical site 
The plan optimization meeting, which is the empirical site for this study, is a key meeting for 
prioritizing service activities on oil and gas wells and for optimizing the well service plan across 
a field of oil and gas installations. Well service tasks involve maintenance or treatment that will 
restore, prolong, or enhance the productivity of the wells. These are in other words crucial 
activities for the total production of the plant and consequently for the revenue of the company. 
Well services are in this particular case performed by 5-6 roving crews that travel from 
installation to installation performing tasks according to the plan produced onshore.  
 
The objective of the planning meeting is to ensure an optimal and feasible plan for well service 
tasks that continuously responds to the changes that occur offshore and that is coordinated with 
the plans in related domains on the installation (drilling, operations, modifications, 
maintenance). Around ten people meet once and twice a week for this plan optimization 
meeting, and representatives of up to six different departments participate. The meeting lasts 
about one hour and is conducted in English. Two to three of the participants are native speakers 
of English, while the rest have English as a second language. All participants are on shore, in 
the same room, gathered around a small table. Two large screens are used for displaying the 
current well service plans.  
 
Risk analysis is not formally a part of the agenda for this meeting, but a change in the 
operational plan might also involve a change in risk picture, and this will have to be dealt with by 
the professionals involved in planning and rescheduling. Expertise across departments is 
needed to assess the meaning and consequences of operational changes and their implications 
for safety. Inability to produce a feasible plan, or the occurrence of unplanned events or plan 
conflicts, might create unanticipated effects and threats to both safety and production. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
The data for the paper is part of a larger study on decision making in operational planning. The 
author conducted ethnographic field work with an international oil and gas operator during 2010, 
attending and recording key meetings in operational planning. The plan optimization meeting 
was one such meeting, observed throughout the period and video recorded on five occasions, 
with later supplements of another four audio recordings. Following usual ethics clearance 
surrounding informed consent, the recorded data have been anonymized and transcribed, 
allowing the researcher to “slow down” the interaction and explore in detail the patterns of 
activity and the rhetorical choices made by the participants. 
 
2.1 Rhetorical discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis is the study of language in use, how we accomplish actions, goals and 
purposes with language (Gee & Handford, 2012). In light of the research question, the meeting 
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data is approached with a qualitative rhetorical discourse analysis (Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi, & 
Clarke, 2011), focusing on the process of risk assessment through analyzing the accounts of 
risk given by the participants, i.e. how they use language and discourse in negotiating 
understandings of risk as part of a decision making trajectory. The analytic focus is on micro-
level discourse, which includes not only spoken and written language but also nonverbal and 
multimodal representations, while the analysis remains attentive to the broader social context. 
Importantly, rhetoric is here not seen as counter-factual or superficial ways of using language in 
order to persuade or deceive. Rather, rhetorical devices are seen as participants’ strategic and 
competent ways of using language to achieve communicative goals (whether these are 
collaborative and shared or not).  
 
Rhetorical discourse analysis approaches discourse as accounts and focuses on the discourse 
strategies employed in the meeting as participants describe or present accounts in which risk as 
a focal theme. How is risk or safety “accounted for”, formulated, conceptualized, presented, 
supported, or challenged? What elements of risk are made relevant through the meeting talk, 
and what risks are perceived to be salient or contested? Accounts are descriptions in which 
speakers attend to content by establishing facts, identifying causes, backing up claims, 
providing explanations, or justifying actions. But they also attend to relational aspects by 
implicating motives and intentions, assigning responsibility, managing credibility, etc. This 
indicates that accounts are interactionally designed with reference to how they will be 
recognized and understood by others and as constructing preferred meanings for problematic 
events (Antaki 1994). Accounts provide, in other words, a rich intake into rationalities and 
relations that pervade in settings such as the planning meeting of this study.  
 
The approach attends to the discursive choices that participants make in response to previous 
utterances, in anticipation of projected next turns, and for the purposes of contributing to the 
communicative project of the meeting (Linell, 1998). Underlying this approach is a perspective 
of language that does not consider it as mirroring an objective world outside of perception or 
interpretation. Language is seen as a social practice and as playing a constitutive role in our 
perception and production of social reality. Accounts reflect, in other words, culturally embedded 
and normative explanations, they are not seen as expressions of inner feelings, perceptions or 
intentions as such.  
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The first two examples below illustrate some of the rhetorical strategies employed in risk 
assessment in the planning meetings and how the accounts of risk can be seen to lean on 
different conceptualizations of risk. In the first example (Excerpt 1), a Well service engineer 
accounts for the risk, or rather absence of risk, related to the timing of a specific well service 
task. The current plan has it scheduled before the drilling rig arrives, but the chair expresses 
some uncertainty as to the feasibility of this plan. The account given by the Well service 
engineer is marked with arrows. Transcription conventions can be found in section 6 Appendix. 
 
Excerpt 1 (20/8) 
36 Production  we’ll try to do it before the rig is- 
37 Chair  yeah we try to do but if not- I mean- 
38 Well service  I think we’ll probably have a pretty good shot at it= the rig’s not 
supposed to be there- (.) so after task 7   right? 
39 Chair  yeah? 
40 Well service  so we’ll have time either in between task 7 phase one and 
phase two or before the rig is XscheduledX   to [xxx-] 
((turns omitted, digression))  
45 Chair  it would be good to have an idea whether it is- I mean if for some 
reason we sh- e:h we need to     reprioritize both usage and xx 
of- 
46 Well service  I’ve - I would say there’s a ninety nine percent chance we’re 
going to do it before the rig gets there. 
47 Chair  okay 
 
Through turns 38-46 the Well service engineer is increasingly persuasive in his attempt to 
reassure the Chair that the current plan is feasible and does not entail great risk of plan 
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conflicts. In turn 38, he presents a mitigated account through several modifying devices, or 
hedges (Fraser, 2010), such as ’I think’, ‘probably’, ‘pretty good’, and ‘supposed to’. This 
creates an attenuated claim that represents only partial commitment to its content. The account 
continues in turn 40 adding more technical and practical detail of when the task will take place, 
which lends more credibility to the account. After a short digression, the Chair still expresses 
some concern and calls for further reassurance about this plan (turn 45), and this triggers a 
boosted account form the Well service engineer in turn 46, in which he chooses to describe his 
assessment of risk in terms of numerical value of probability (‘a ninety nine percent chance’). He 
frames his claim as an expert judgment (‘I would say’) and his account is now of a more 
persuasive character, with the rhetorical help of a form of scientific risk talk. He presents the 
likelihood of a plan change as minimal, and the risk of a plan conflict, with subsequent risk to 
safety and production, is presented as nearly inexistent. This establishes his sense of certainty 
as well as his expertise in support of the current plan as it stands. The account is accepted by 
the chair and the meeting moves on. The rhetorical strategy of presenting risk in terms of 
numerical value, combined with an expert framing of the claim, is persuasive, and countering 
such a claim is difficult as it would involve questioning the speaker’s expertise. 
 
In the next example (Excerpt 2), we will see a range of other rhetorical devices that, in the face 
of disagreement, allows the speaker to present a highly persuasive account of risk. The Well 
integrity manager, in charge of the technical state (safety) of the wells, updates the participants 
about a discussion outside the meeting about prioritizing a specific task (‘coiled tubing’) on 
platform T. This information is met with skepticism and expressions of discontent, mainly 
because the discussion should have been brought to this particular meeting and not been taken 
without involving the participants here present. The negative response triggers a persuasive 
account of risk from the Well integrity manager: 
 
Excerpt 2 (27/4) 
510 Well integrity   [we’ve initiated] a discussion with operations with (name 
manager) about the prioritization of this    coiled tubing job 
511 Production1  yeah but he hasn’t talked to us 
512 Well integrity   WELL 
513 Production2  this is the forum- 
514 Production1  =this is the forum for those things  
515 Well service  yeah and therefore I meant  [because we xx] 
516 Chair      [you talked about] P&A jobs- no one said coil  
516 Well integrity  basically this coiled tubing job on that platform T well could 
potentially save about two  months of the   (vessel) time. (. .)  
517 NN   mm 
518 Production1  what well is it? 
519 Well integrity   it’s E5 (. .) technically the well is in such a poor condition that it 
would be very hazardous for us to rig    up BOP ((blow-out preventer)) x 
xx. It really is a job that needs to be done with coiled tubing. I know   it’s a 
strain (.) E5- it’s a strain on the organization already to resource that coiled tubing job but if 
we    don’t get it rigged up during the shutdown (.) we’re not going to have 
time to do it. 
((turns omitted, series of clarifications)) 
531   I mean fundamentally we- the well is in that poor a condition our only 
other option is to rig up coiled    tubing through the (vessel). And I think if we 
look at the cost consequences of having to do coiled    tubing work 
through the (vessel) on time that ain’t an attractive option. 
 
The discontent from the other participants leads the Well integrity manager to first present an 
argument for the upside of this decision (turn 516), namely that it will save vessel time. She 
receives minimal response to this from the other participants, and in turn 519 she moves on to 
present a more persuasive account for why this decision is sound and necessary. She employs 
several modifying devices here that function to boost the strength of her account. Intensifiers 
such as ‘such a poor condition’, ‘very hazardous’, ‘really’, and ‘needs to’ all creates a sense of 
urgency and necessity to her claim, and they divert the attention away from the procedural 
error, namely that she has not involved the other participants in the discussion. Following this 
strong chain of argument, she employs an elegant persuasive structure in which she first gives 
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a concession (Kotthoff, 1993), an acknowledgment of a counter-argument (‘I know it’s a strain’), 
and then follows with a contrast marker (‘but’) and a reprise of her initial claim in a more 
extreme form. She repeats her position in the form a conditional statement of causality (‘if not –
then’), indicating that if they do not do it this way, it will not get done at all. This structure is an 
example of a ‘show concession’ (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999), in which the speaker makes a show 
out of appreciating opposing views but by doing so, strengthens her own position at the 
expense of the counter-argument, thereby dismissing any rival claims.  
 
After some clarifications (omitted turns), the well integrity manager chooses to further intensify 
her account in turn 531 with a series of extreme-case formulations (expressions using extreme 
terms, here ‘fundamentally’, ‘our only option’). This strategy of maximizing one’s case is often 
used when a speaker finds herself in an adversarial situation and expect other interactants to 
undermine her claims (Pomerantz, 1986, p. 222). She closes her account with a move from 
Standard English to vernacular English dialect (‘aint’), a shift of tone and style which allows her 
to lighten up her account and assume a less formal-managerial position. Disclaiming the 
contrastive status (‘ain’t attractive’) in this manner, allows her to end her account on a more 
attenuated and less adversarial note. This closing statement receives no comment, instead, the 
other participants move directly to discussing the necessary reprioritization of resources for 
accommodating the coiled tubing job, in other words a quiet acceptance of the decision to 
prioritize this job. The Well integrity manager has presented a highly persuasive account, with a 
range of rhetorical devices that legitimize her judgment and that blocks counter arguments. Her 
account is based on knowledge of specifics with the current situation and can rhetorically be 
described as a case of ‘particularization’ (Billig, 1996). She strengthens her claim by 
constructing a narrative of urgent circumstances, and this can be heard to echo a 
contextualized conception of risk. 
 
The third and final example is chosen to illustrate how participants can be found to strategically 
shift between technical-scientific and contextual rhetorical strategies when facing disagreement. 
The episode also shows the tensions that exist between the different domains of expertise that 
are present. In excerpt 3 below, problems with boat availability to platform B forces them to 
reschedule some of the tasks in the plan. Task B18 is currently in the plan, a so-called P&A job, 
which prepares for closing down the well permanently (‘plug and abandon’). The Subsurface 
manager is contesting this priority and calls for another job, B1, to be selected instead. This is a 
so-called perforation job, which prepares for stimulating the well to restore or increase 
production. The increasing intensity of the discussion is visible in the transcript by the short 
speaking turns, few pauses, and frequent overlaps and interruptions (marked by brackets). 
 
Excerpt 3 
294 Chair  [then you] should take B18 first and [then eh- do B10] 
295 Subsurface      [E:::H bah] bah bah- ((indicating ‘stop 
right there’)) there is    debate on- still debate on B18 or B1. I brought it 
last week and then I brought it to (Well integrity     manager) and 
she was going to bring  it to the (production optimization) people cause we are eh in  
  favor of B1 at first and restim (.) 
((Turns omitted, on events preceding the meeting)) 
301 Subsurface  [I have-] I have talked to (name) to clarify this but we are asking for B1. 
302 Well Service1  has- has- but what about- what about the boat for stimulation on 
B1? 
303 Subsurface  it’s xx perforation so- ((implies there is no need for a boat)) 
304 Well service2  it’s perforation so yeah- have we- have we seen a (plan) for B1 
yet? 
305 Subsurface  yes. yeah yesterday 
((turns omitted)) 
310 Subsurface  B18 as you know is going to be XrebuiltX   [next year] 
311 Chair       [so next eh] we need [to:-]  
312 Subsurface              [it’s ] not a 
red well 
313 Chair  huh? 
314 Subsurface  this is not [a red one] 
315 Well integrity     [wo wo wo]  
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316 NN   yes 
317 Well integrity  it doesn’t- it doesn’t need to be a red well to be- to get 
prio[ritization] 
318 Subsurface              [okay, all right] 
319 Well integrity  it has to do with risk 
320 Subsurface  okay 
321 Well integrity  so we have wells that are not red and that are [xxx-] 
322 Subsurface       [quoting-] quoting (Well integrity 
manager) it is  still    in much better condition now than it was eh 
 [xxx-] 
323 Well integrity       [but we] will- we’ll take 
it outside and- and weight    it up 
324 Well service  could we have an uh- we- come with eh- we need a decision 
today. because now I will go down and say    hold again to (subcontractor) 
and everyone that is involved in B18 because we have  to rig that up   
 today e:h so we need to put a hold on everything 
 
The Chair suggests taking well B18 first when the Subsurface production manager stops her 
emphatically to point out a conflict of interest (‘bah bah bah’, turn 295). The debate whether B18 
should be prioritized is evidenced by his account of his personal actions, and when stating his 
claim he shifts pronominal form from ‘I’ to ‘we’, establishing the conflict of interest (‘we are in 
favor of B1’). This underlines the formality of his request while keeping the request mild and 
mitigated (‘in favor of’). After further accounts of interactions prior to the meeting, he restates 
this position more explicitly and unmodified in turn 301 (‘we are asking for B1’). The 
disagreement concerning the plan is now evident and this triggers two questions from the Well 
service representatives, both concerning the feasibility of doing B1 instead of B18 (boat 
availability and plan readiness, turns 302 and 304). As practical objections to his request are 
cleared, the Subsurface manager continues the argument for his stance in turn 310, and he 
proceeds to bring in a piece of contextual information about the future of B18 (to be rebuilt next 
year). He frames this information as known to the other participants (‘as you know’), aligning 
with them and appealing to shared knowledge. Just as the well integrity manager in the 
previous example, the Subsurface manager here employs a strategy of particularization to 
strengthen his claim, drawing on specifics surrounding the issue. 
 
Interestingly, immediately following this statement, he turns to the contrasting rhetorical device 
of ‘categorization’ (Billig, 1996) to further strengthen his claim, placing the issue in a category 
with similar characteristics rather than seeing it in its particularity. He now turns to the color 
coding of wells (‘it’s not a red well’, turn 312), and places B18 in the category of non-red wells, 
which implies it has not reached a critical safety level and therefore need not be prioritized for 
maintenance. Categorization represents a resource for making authoritative, de-contextualized 
claims. Such statements provide a basis for making decisions that may be portrayed as 
objective (Horlick-Jones, 1998). The Subsurface manager can, in other words, be seen to lean 
on a technical-scientific conception of risk as he turns to established categories that are 
independent of context. With this statement, however, he has moved into the territory of Well 
integrity and he is stopped fervently by the Well integrity engineer in turn 315 (‘wo wo wo’). Well 
integrity rejects the use of the color coding as an argument and claims that the well does not 
have to be red to be prioritized. He indicates that the color category is not the only criterion for 
prioritization, but he does not specify what this might be (turn 319).  
 
What becomes evident here is that also seemingly objective categories such as color coding of 
wells do not evade interpretation. Risk related to safety is clearly a matter of degree; it is not an 
either-or issue. Once a category has been assigned, an interpretation still needs to be made as 
to whether it indeed qualifies for priority. The Subsurface manager gives what could be seen as 
a token agreement with the Well integrity engineer (turns 318 and 319), and he moves on to 
focus precisely on the interpretation of the color coding. Having failed the categorization 
strategy, he now shifts back to particularization, but designing his claim as reported speech, 
referring to the Well integrity manager and her alleged assessment of the condition of the well 
(turn 322). Reported speech is a device that functions as an interactional evidential, using the 
voice of another for supporting your argument. This lends an air of objectivity to the claim and 
defers responsibility to an outside authority (Clift, 2006), in this case the Well integrity manager. 
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The Well integrity engineer refrains from commenting this reported claim, instead he suggests 
that the issue is taken out of the meeting and re-assessed (‘weight it up’, turn 323). He does not 
have the authority to decide and possibly not sufficient information to discuss the issue further. 
He uses the metaphor of weighing, which alludes to a rational method of decision making that 
will conclude which well should be prioritized. A well-known, scientific approach is here used as 
a rhetorical device for postponing the issue and for distancing himself from the argument. The 
last turn in the excerpt finds the Well service representative again expressing concern for the 
feasibility of the plan and calls for a quick decision so he can make the necessary arrangements 
with the subcontractor (turn 324). 
 
What this excerpt has shown is how both the Subsurface manager and the Well integrity 
engineer draw on both scientific and contextualized conceptions of risk, as they choose 
rhetorical devices that serve their purposes at the given moment of interaction and in response 
to the preceding talk. Both scientific and contextual elements are used as evidence for their 
respective cases, as exemplified in the Subsurface manager’s shifts between particularization 
and categorization strategies. This allows us to see that different conceptions of risk are not 
necessarily related to different epistemological or ontological perspectives, but to interactional 
negotiations, communicative goals, and role-responsibilities that come to expression at the level 
of everyday interprofessional interaction. 
 
Also, the professionals’ responsibilities and entitlements mediate their accounts of risk (cf. also 
Linell, Adelswärd, Sachs, Bredmar, & Lindstedt, 2002). In the last example we have seen that 
Subsurface is concerned with risks to production (B18 does not contribute to increasing 
production but ties up resources that could be used for production-enhancing activities, such as 
B1); Well integrity is concerned with the technical state of the well and B18 has been assessed 
as a prioritized well despite not being categorized as red; Well service, on their end, are 
repeatedly concerned with feasibility and the practical arrangements for the crew (including 
subcontractors). The tensions present are, in other words, not simply based in differing risk 
perceptions, but seem to surface from diverging agendas, interests, and their specific role-
responsibilities in the organization. This calls into question the achievement of balanced 
interprofessional risk assessment if disagreements over the meaning of risk grow out of a battle 
over resources or performance targets, for example.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
Much of the decisions related to risk and risk assessment in high-risk operations are made 
during and as a result of talk. Interaction is at the heart of risk assessment, as groups of 
professionals use language and interaction as tools for achieving legitimacy for operational 
decisions and a sense of collective control of the perceived risks associated with operations. 
The current study has explored how risk is accounted for at the level of interprofessional 
interaction and in a meeting setting in which risk analysis is not the primary objective, namely 
operational planning meetings. Risk assessment frequently occur as an integral part of the 
decision making processes in these meetings, however, not in the form associated with formal 
methods of risk analysis. The paper has aimed to contribute with a micro-interactional analysis 
of risk talk in this context, illustrating the rhetorical aspects of accounts of risk. 
 
Interprofessional risk assessment, as it occurs in both formal and informal meeting settings, is a 
dynamic process involving persuasive elements and rhetorical strategies that go beyond 
traditional conceptions of risk or established methods for risk analysis. The analysis showed 
examples of shifting rhetorical strategies, invoking different paradigms or conceptions of risk in 
a strategic manner and for persuasive purposes. Rhetorical devices such as categorization and 
particularization were found to be strategic resources for participants in their efforts to achieve 
communicative goals and fulfill organizational role-responsibilities. What is frequently seen as 
competing paradigms of risk – the technico-scientific and the contextualized conceptions of risk 
– might in actual interaction function as rhetorical resources for participants. The accounts of 
risk in the present data were also found to be highly mediated by the organizational role-
responsibilities of the participants, revealing tensions between the different domains of expertise 
and responsibility that were present in the meeting.  
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The findings support an argument for nuancing the predominant cognitive approach to risk, and 
calls for considering a practice-oriented approach that emphasize the role of language and 
interaction in risk assessment. Discourse analysis has the potential for complementing and 
advancing existing risk and safety research by studying in detail how notions of risk are 
manifested in actual talk and interaction.  The analysis shows that risk assessment in 
interprofessional settings is an activity that requires interactional competence as well as 
technical expertise. As the analysis has shown, the speakers are not just presenting information 
to other participants. Organizational members are pragmatic and pursue communicative 
projects specific to the situation and constructs accounts that relate to the preceding talk and 
the possible ways in which other participants might respond to their claims. In Myers’ (2007) 
words: “Risk talk is not just about risk, it is about me and you and them, and any statement 
might have more to do with the immediate context of interaction than with the underlying attitude 
or with calculations of probabilities and dangers.” (p. 287). Understanding the interactional and 
rhetorical dimensions of interprofessional risk assessment can help us understand the dynamics 
that are at play in decisions pertaining to risk.  
 
This implies that as students of risk and safety, we should interest ourselves in the 
communicative activities in which risk assessments takes place, whether these are formal or 
informal, structured or unstructured. Efforts to improve safety and organizational robustness can 
also benefit from addressing the topic of interprofessional interaction and the functionality of the 
meeting sites in which risk assessments take place. This is relevant for facilitators of formal risk 
analysis, in which the interactional dynamics to a greater extent can be controlled or guided, as 
well as for meeting chairs of operational meetings who might show awareness of the impact that 
rhetorical accounts of risk might have on decision making trajectories.  
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6. APPENDIX: LIST OF TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS 
Word-  : truncated word or phrase   
Word  : increased emphasis  
(.)  : micro pause  
(3s)  : pause in seconds 
xx  : inaudible word 
XwordX : uncertain transcription 
[word]  : overlapping talk  
=word : latching utterance  
WORD  : louder voice  
((word)) : comment to transcription  
(word)  : anonymized information  
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Abstract 
The onset of the economic recession in 2008 has put severe pressure on enterprises that in 
turn have downsized and reorganized. Research has shown that economic recessions have an 
effect on psychological and behavioural health that is attributed to working environment 
problems. The objective of the study is to unravel whether the onset of a general economic 
recession has had an impact on companies and public institutions’ preventive occupational 
health and safety activities. Hypotheses of the role of pro-cyclical and countercyclical effects 
are presented. The study is based on a quantitative questionnaire based survey of enterprises 
preventive occupational health and safety activities. The baseline for the survey was 
established in 2006 before the onset of the recession with a follow up in 2011. We discuss 
findings that support both the pro-cyclical and the countercyclical hypotheses. The results 
suggest a mixed picture. It is concluded that there is a need for more focus on the management 
of preventive workplace health and safety activities in enterprises during a period of economic 
recession. 
 
Keywords: occupational health and safety; preventive actions, survey, pro-cyclical, 
countercyclical, economic recession. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most economies in the world have suffered from the worst financial crisis since World War II. 
The onset of the crisis has been much debated in the literature, but the International Monetary 
Fund in their World Economic Outlook (IMF 2009) state that the outbreak of the U.S. subprime 
crisis in August 2007 led to mild economic recessions in mid-2008. However, the Fund state 
that the fall of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers, the deep financial problems of and 
the intervention into the leading U.S. insurance company American International Group and a 
range of other major financial institutions in US and Europe lead to the histrionic onset of a full-
blown financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008. As such the developed countries witnessed 
deep recessions with an unmatched 7½ percent drop in the economies. Apart from the financial 
problems in the western part of Europe the trade also suffered severely and in some of the 
countries housing correction was a factor. In Denmark the Committee on financial crisis in 2013 
in their analysis of the causes conclude that the financial crisis began in summer 2008 with a 
collapse of one the major banks. Denmark in the next years suffered from a general financial 
crisis in the banking sector that was heavy influenced by the international financial crisis. 
Moreover the crisis intensified with severe real estate market problems due to a housing price 
bubble caused by a preceding generally good economy, low interest rates and innovative 
lending forms (Rangvid 2013). 
The recession has put substantial pressure on companies that in turn have downsized and 
reorganized of business functions. The effect of downscaling has been documented by the 
International Labour Office (ILO 2009). Here ILO ascertained that descaling has led to more 
part-time and temporary work, outsourcing and subcontracting including business functions 
as the management of occupational health and safety activities. In the same vein, ILO have 
later stressed that there are some evidence that the recession has a negative impact on a 
series of occupational mental health and risk factors, but that there is a need for a more 
profound understanding on the impact of recession on the management of the occupational 
health and safety activities (ILO 2013). 
Accordingly, with respect to the impact on the economic recession on the working environment 
the result of a Europe- wide survey carried out by the European Agency for Safety and Health 
shows that nearly two-thirds of the respondents claim that the recession could adversely have 
a great (21%) or some (40%) effect on occupational health and safety. The Danish 
respondents however showed a less negative attitude with approximately 45% answering that 
occupational health and safety would greatly (7%) or to some extent (38%) be affected by the 
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 economic recession. Other studies have shown that in general employees are exposed to 
higher mental and physical workload and fatigue due to a lack of financial resources. 
In this vein Westgaard and Winkel (2011) has carried out a systematic review of production 
system rationalization in terms of general restructuring (n=67 studies) and downsizing (n=34 
studies) measures and their association to health and risk factors in the area of 
musculoskeletal and mental health. The review showed that 76% of the studies point at 
negative downsizing health effects. Only 6% of the studies included showed a positive effect of 
downsizing, while 11% showed mixed results. Moreover, the review revealed that in terms of 
general organizational restructuring measures with downsizing excluded, 16 % showed a 
positive effect and 16% showed mixed results while an overwhelming 67% of the studies 
pointed at negative health outcomes. 
In a 2008 survey approximately half of the human resources and people development 
professionals included in the survey reported from their companies that individual staff 
workload had increased as result of the economic recession. In addition, a similar proportion of 
the respondents said that employee stress levels have increased (Wisdom et al 2008). On the 
other hand there are also more positive statistics indicating that in the US and the UK there has 
been a decline of fatal work induced accidents in the period just prior to 2008 compared to 
period just after (ILO 2013). In response to these findings ILO claim that the decline could be 
due to the reductions in economic activities in for example the construction sector. In a 
survey carried out by the International Social Security Association in 2009 among the 
contributing organisations in its members states also show mixed result as a consequence of 
economic recession on occupational health (ISSA 2009; 2010; 2011). One of the key findings in 
the survey was that health costs are raising  as an added effect to the financial crisis, but the 
survey also showed that the different countries different social security systems seemed to 
have played an important role to “buffer” elements of the crisis and thereby strengthen 
social cohesion, socio-economic stability and restoring public confidence. On the other hands 
ISSA also points out that the recession can lead to less spending on occupational preventive 
measures by employers. At the same time employees may be more reluctant to claim safe 
and healthy working conditions. As such the ISSA survey showed that in some countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Poland and Spain) reduced investments in occupational 
preventive occupational health and safety management systems, while in other countries 
according to the result of the survey such systems have not suffered during the crisis. However, 
the ISSA survey is up-to-the-minute of the situation in early 2009 before the full scale 
intensification of the current economic recession. 
Not much research has focused on psychosocial working environment factors and national or 
international economy. This has for example been documented by a systematic analysis of the 
content of two influential journals within the area of occupational health psychology where it was 
found that only a very limited number of the research papers published in the journal paid 
attention to the impact of economic factors on occupational factors at the work place (Kang 
et al 2008). 
None the less, in a UK work force survey initiated during times of economic recession it was 
found that a significant part of the workers share the opinion that the economic conditions 
have an influence on working environment factors like for example relationship to colleges or 
working longer and harder (Mind/Populus Workplace Health and Stress Survey 2010). 
Moreover, in the Stormont study it was found that several psychosocial factors are negatively 
correlated with the onset of an economic recession (Houdmont et al. 2012). One of the 
conclusions brought forth in the study is that there is a need for more focus on the 
management of preventive safety activities in enterprises during a period of economic 
recession. From a theoretical point of view models explain that a number of working 
environment psychosocial factors is negatively related to economic stress in two ways. First, 
workers may be affected directly, for example, dependent on their ability to cope with 
economic stress. Second, workers may be affected indirectly by for example enterprise 
organisational changes with respect to managing occupational preventive safety activities. 
Another issue brought forth by Houdmont el al. (Ibid) is that much research within occupational 
health and safety research has focused on work context. Houdmont and colleges argument is 
that this focus may due to certain hegemonic research paradigms that favour theoretical 
models of occupational stress that builds upon contextual features of work. 
The job demand–control model has for example been very influential (Karasek 1979, Karasek 
and Theorell 1990; for a critical approach se for example Kristensen 1995). The model has 
later been refined to incorporate social support (Johnson and Hall, 1988). Doef and Maes 
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 has carried out a systematic review of twenty years of studies applying the model and its 
refined version and found that the employees exposed to high job demand, low control and 
low social support has the highest risk of experiencing the most negative psychological well-
being. 
However, as pointed out by Kristensen (1995) the model may carry with it theoretical and 
methodological problems. Moreover, as mentioned above there is a growing body of research 
that recognize that occupational mental health and safety depends both on local work context 
in combination with external global factors like international economy (Kang et al, 2008). Wallis 
and Dollard (2008) has, for example, stressed that the job demand-control model needs 
further refinement to incorporate job external factors like national globalization or free 
market forces including economic factors on a national or international level. In a similar vein it 
could be argued that the same issue applies when it comes to the companies and public 
institutions’ management of occupational health and safety activities. 
Research has also shown that economic recession has an effect on psychological and 
behavioural health  that is attributed to working environment problems (Catalano 1979; Boone 
and Ours 2006; Goldman-Mellor 2010). On the one hand; the research suggests that one of the 
mechanisms involved a “countercyclical” effect which means that financial crisis can lead to an 
increase of occupational health and safety problems induced by, for example, stress caused by 
expectation of job loss. On the other hand; it is suggested that recession can have “pro-cyclical” 
effect which means that the decline in economy results in a decrease of occupational health and 
safety problems. 
Boone and Ours (2006) points out that pro-cyclicality is seen in that workplace accident rates 
decrease during recessions, which again means that occupational health and safety increases 
during financial crises. This effect has also been shown by Ruhm (2000) who found strong 
evidence that occupational health increase in case of economic decline. In addition, pro-cyclical 
research points at employees’ capability to manage occupational health safety increases when 
job demands in terms of time and quantity decrease (Catalano et al, 2011). 
All in all, an interesting research question to be pursued in this paper is, whether the onset 
of a general economic recession has had an impact on enterprises’ preventive occupational 
activities? In particular, we will discuss trends in a period spanning from non-recession in 2006 
to a full scale recession in 2011 that might reveal change in practises in the administration of 
parts of the health and safety risk assessment in Danish companies and public organisations. 
Likewise we wish to explore preventive actions related to the management of occupational 
risks within the area of psychosocial work environment and occupational accidents according to 
the hypotheses of pro-cyclicality and counter-cyclicality. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
In 2005 the Danish government launched an action programme that focus on occupational 
health and safety activities. The goal of the plan was during a five year period to put focus on 
four problem areas: psychosocial work environment, occupational accidents, noise at the 
workplace and muscle-skeletal distress. I addition, it was decided to follow the development 
of Danish enterprises’ occupational safety activities through a five year period based on a 
quantitative survey (Sønderstrup-Andersen et al 2010). A baseline for the study named 
“Surveillance of health and safety   activities in enterprises” was established in 2006, which is 
prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 as discussed above in the introduction. Follow-
up data was collected in 2011 during the recession period. The participants were randomly 
selected from the Danish national register of companies and public institutions. The samples 
are stratified according industrial sector and size of company or public institution. We have 
included all sectors listed in the Danish Industrial Classifications of All Economic Activities, 
which is the National version of EU's nomenclature (NACE). During 2006 and 2011 NACE has 
changed its classifications. The Danish Industrial Classifications has been refined according to 
the change of NACE. I 2006 data was stratified into 49 classifications and in 2011 into 36 
classifications. We have stratified data into three size groups: In 2006 1-4 employees, 5-19 
employees and 20 and above employees, while in 2011 1-9 employees, 10-19 employees and 
20 and above employees. The change of enterprise size groups follows the changes in the 
legislation with regard to the organization of occupational health and safety activities within 
enterprises. 2006 data is weighted according to the change in classifications and organizational 
size to make it comparable with the 2011 data. 
The questionnaire was distributed to an employee safety representative and an employer or an 
employer representative in each of the participating organizations. In the results presented 
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 in this paper we have used data from only one representative from each of the participating 
organization. We have used data from employer representatives as a primary source if 
available, because employers by law have the formal responsibility for managing the actual 
occupational preventive activities. For the remaining cases we used data from the employee 
representatives. In 2006 the proportion of employee representative data comprises 20% while in 
2011 the proportion amounts to 30%. 
Data was collected through mail based questionnaires, telephone interviews and internet 
based questionnaires. The survey is anonymously administered, the organizations were free 
to answer and did not receive any participation fees. The survey contain 80 items designed to 
measure the general management preventive working environment activities and to measure 
preventive activities within the following occupational health and safety areas: Work accidents, 
psychosocial working environment, physical working environment, noise, and substances and 
materials. In this paper we focus on selected items within the management of preventive 
activities in general and on the psychosocial and work accidents items. 
 
3. RESULTS 
The 2006 survey sample consists of 9720 companies and public institutions. The dropout rate 
was 1245 (defunct or non- accessible) so the questionnaire was distributed to 8475 private 
companies and public institutions. The participation rate was 76% (N=6423) when counting 
companies and institutions with at least one returned questionnaire. The 2011 survey sample 
consists of 7550 questionnaire companies and public institutions. The dropout rate was 826, 
which means that the questionnaire was sent to 6724 private companies and public institutions. 
The participation rate was 49%. 
 
Table 1 – Workplaces that as part of the general working environment activities have produced an plan for initiating 
preventive occupational health and safety actions within specific working environment areas shown as percentage of 
organizations that as part of the health and safety risk assessment has identified and recorded working 
environment problem areas. Based on Cochran-Armitage trend test. 2006 data are weighted according industrial 
sector and size of workplace. 
Occupational health and safety 
areas 
2006 2011 Development 2006-
2011 Nweigthed Percentage N Percentage P values 
Work accidents 4284,7 43,8 1913 39,4 <0,001 
Psychosocial working environment 3362,3 41,7 1833 52,2 <0,001 
 
Table 1shows the proportion of work places that has documented the state of affairs in their 
working environment and as result of that mapping has produced plan to take preventive 
action according to problems identified within the different occupational health and safety 
areas. Data from 2006 are compared to 2011. The table shows that more companies and 
public institutions in 2011 compared to 2006 have made a record of occupational health and 
safety problems, estimated the seriousness and the extent of the problems and as part of the 
analysis have produced action plans to intervene in relation to the problems in the specific 
occupational health and safety areas. 
Moreover, Table 1 shows that significantly more workplaces in 2011 have produced action 
plans compared to 2006 within the psychosocial working environment, while significantly fewer 
workplaces in 2011 have produced action plans compared to 2006 in relation to the area of 
accidents at work. 
 
Table 2 shows two examples with respect to the workplaces initiatives within the psychosocial 
working environment in terms of implementation of appraisal interviews and job satisfaction 
surveys (surveys of psychosocial well-being) and compares the development from 2006 to 
2011. The table shows an increase of the proportion of companies and public institutions that 
have implemented the forms of initiatives within the area of psychosocial occupational 
health and safety along no matter the size of companies and public institutions. 
 
Table 2 - Implementation of appraisal interviews and job satisfaction surveys according to the size of companies and 
public institutions. Based on Cochran-Armitage trend test. 2006 data is weighted according industrial sector and size of 
workplace. 
Psychosocial 
occupational 
health safety 
activities 
Number of 
employees 
2006 2011 Development 
2006-2011 
Nweigthed Percentage N Percentage P values 
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 Implementation of 
appraisal interviews 
1-9 1577,4 49,4 790 54,5 <0,001 
10-19 1917,4 60,4 978 73,6 <0,001 
20 + 2581,3 78,2 1356 85,8 <0,001 
In total 6076,2 65,1 3133 74,9 <0,001 
Job satisfaction 
surveys 
1-9 1530,4 25,5 788 34,3 0,001 
10-19 1824,6 32,4 953 46,1 <0,001 
20 + 2481,4 51,2 1313 61,1 <0,001 
In total 5636,3 38,9 3063 49,4 <0,001 
 
Table 3 shows the development from 2006-2011 with respect to the workplaces’ implementation 
of regularly occupational health and safety rounds. As seen there is a minor but significant 
decrease in the implementation of the safety rounds. 
 
Table 3 - A comparison of the proportions of workplaces that undertake safety rounds on a regular basis in 2006 and 
2011 respectively. Based on Cochran-Armitage trend test. 2006 data is weighted according industrial sector and size of 
workplace 
Have regular safety 
rounds been 
implemented at your 
workplace? 
2006 2011 Development 
2006-2011 
Nweigthed Percentage N Percentage P values 
6172,1 74,8% 3149,00 69,7% <0,001 
 
Table 4 - The companies and public institutions preventive occupational health and safety activities  with respect to 
avoid falls from heights. 2006 and 2011 data are compared. Based on Cochran-Armitage trend test. 2006 data 
is weighted according industrial sector and size of workplace. 
What have you done to avoid 
accidents as a result of falling 
from heights? 
2006 2011 Development 2006-2011 
Percentage Percentage P values 
We have kept the workplace clear 37,2% 44,7% <0,001 
Safety equipment are maintained 
regularly 51,3% 47,1% 0,027 
Ensured proper communication of 
instructions 48,5% 41,4% 0,000 
Safety equipment must be used 55,5% 51,4% 0,028 
Kept ladders and scaffolds in secure 
condition 65,8% 59,4% 0,000 
Ensured proper use of ladders and 
scaffolds 60,4% 55,1% 0,004 
Avoided time pressure 9,9% 11,2% 0,281 
Nweigthed N 1713,3 1225  
 
Table 4 compares the workplaces’ preventive activities in 2006 and 2011 with respect to prevent 
to accidents caused by falling from heights like falling from ladders and scaffolds. The table 
shows that there is a significant decrease in the following activities in 2011 compared to 2006: 
“Safety equipment are maintained regularly,” “Ensured proper communication of instructions,” 
“Safety equipment must be used,” “Kept ladders and scaffolds in secure condition,” 
“Ensured proper use of ladders and scaffolds,” and “Avoided time pressure.” In a single 
case there is a significant increase in activity namely with respect to keeping the workplace 
clear. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Several issues might limit the study. Firstly, a prospective analysis would have been possible at 
least with respect to the largest enterprises if the study had not been anonymous. Because we 
have relative few large companies and public institutions the sample will inevitably contain the 
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 same enterprises in 2006 and 2011. However, the large sample and the large number of 
responses in the two surveys allow for relatively firm conclusions. Secondly, the sample size 
and the high response rate to some extent rule out the possibility that only enterprises with a 
high occupational health and safety performance participated. Conversely, the response rate 
(49%) at the follow-up assessment in 2011 is lower than when the baseline was established in 
2006 (76%). Especially, it is difficult to get small private companies to answer questionnaires. 
Thirdly, the difference in response rate is most likely due to the general economic recession 
during the data collection period – some enterprises might not be so willing to reply on 
questionnaires if they are struggling to survive. Moreover, it might be due to differences in 
data collection techniques. That is, the conclusions might be less robust with respect to small 
private companies. 
Data from the surveys has been compiled at enterprise level. We aimed to gain data from both 
an employer representative and an employee safety representative. Nevertheless, for the 2006 
data in approximately 80% of the cases we used data from employer representatives, while for 
the 2011 data the proportion was approximately 70%. In both data samples the employer 
representatives tended to have a marginally (but statistically significant) higher score on the 
indices than the employees. The difference for the small companies is 1-2 %: For 
medium sized companies the difference is 1-5%. There is no significant difference for the 
largest companies. 
For example, in the 2011 data there is a 93% agreement between employer representative 
and the employee safety representative with respect to whether or not a health and safety risk 
assessment has been prepared. In 3% of the cases the employer representative gives a 
positive answer, while the employee safety representative in the same organization gives a 
negative answer. In 1% of the cases the opposite response pattern is found. With respect to the 
remaining 3% of the cases then at least one of the different representatives give the answer “do 
not know. We estimate that the difference in response patterns have an insignificant effect on 
the results. 
We have compared data sampled in 2006 with data gathered in 2011. I the intervening period of 
time the classification of the international industrial sectors (NACE) have changed. Accordingly 
the Danish variant of the classifications has been transformed. Moreover, legislative changes 
in the period meant that we had to stratify differently with respect to size of enterprise in 2011 
compared to 2006. Since the samples also are stratified according to the sector classifications 
we had to put weights on the 2006 data and rearrange data according to enterprise size 
groupings to make it possible directly to compare the two data samples. We do not think 
that this impact the analyses presented in this paper. Nonetheless, it means that the 2006 
results presented in this paper differ from earlier publications (e.g. Sønderstrup- Andersen et 
al 2010). 
The study shows that more enterprises 2011 compared to 2006 have made a record of 
psychosocial occupational health and safety problems and that they as part of the analysis 
have produced plans to take action in relation to problems. Conversely, this could indicate that 
enterprises being better to actually producing action plans to deal with the problems discovered. 
Nonetheless, we found that more enterprises had implemented appraisal interviews and job 
satisfaction surveys. Such actions are quite costly and resource demanding, but shows that the 
enterprises nevertheless the economic recession seem to keep a focus on learning to operate 
more effectively with respect to occupational health and safety and not focus solely on cost 
cutting strategies. All in all, these findings within the psychosocial health and safety area 
supports the countercyclical hypothesis, that economic recessions results in an increase of 
occupational health and safety problems. 
Furthermore, our study shows that fewer enterprises in 2011 have produced a register of 
occupational health and safety problems in relation to the area of accidents at work compared 
to 2006, but as part of the analysis they have produced plans to take action to deal with the 
problems. On the one hand; this could indicate that fewer problems related to accidents at 
work are detected. On the other hand; this could point toward enterprises showing a better 
performance with respect to actually producing action plans for handling the problems identified. 
However, we also found that fewer enterprises had implemented safety rounds as part the 
prevention of accidents at work and that fewer enterprises had initiated actions to prevent 
accidents caused by falling from heights like falling from ladders and scaffolds. 
In the aggregate, these findings within the work accidents area supports the pro-cyclical 
hypothesis, that economic recessions results in a decrease of occupational health and safety 
problems. All analyses presented regarding the developments with respect to occupational 
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 health and safety activities are based on the assumption that an increase in activity level is 
viewed as an enhancement. To what extent a decrease in activity level is caused by 
enterprises having reached a satisfactory level according to legal regulations and that they 
thereby judges that no further action is needed has not be taken in to account in this study. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of our study indicate that the enterprises in 2011 have had more focus on managing 
psychosocial risk factors that they did in 2006. We have only showed a few examples from our 
data, but other parts of our data seem support this pattern. For example, with respect to 
preventive activities in terms of increasing employees possibilities for personal development 
and for increasing the possibility to excert an influence over own work. We will pursue these 
issues in a later paper. In addition, we found that in 2011 more companies and public 
organisations have worked out psychosocial work environment actions plans as part of their 
health and safety risk assessment activities. With respect to the management of preventive 
activities within the area of occupational accidents the picture is a bit different. In  2011 fewer 
companies and public organisations have prepared occupational accident actions plans as part 
of their health and safety risk assessments. In addition, it is found that fewer companies than 
in 2006 have initiated safety rounds on a regular basis. Finally, there has been a decrease in 
several categories of preventive activities with respect to prevent falls. In the aggregate our 
research suggests a mixed picture and we have discussed findings that support both the pro- 
cyclical and the countercyclical hypotheses. Further research wait ahead to dig further into 
these mechanisms and the impact of economic recession on occupational health and safety 
activities. 
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Abstract 
Managers’ strong commitment to safety can result in both positive safety outcomes as well as 
increase desirable non-safety outcomes in employees’ attitudes and behaviours. Therefore, 
managers’ commitment and active participation towards safety is a key element for successful 
safety management, culture and climate. This qualitative study identifies factors that hinder or 
promote managers’ commitment to safety and reviews organisational measures that could 
support such commitment. 49 managers in five industrial organisations (energy and processing 
industries and industrial services) were interviewed. The interview data was categorised and 
examples of the factors are presented. The interviews showed that contextual factors such as 
role overload, production demands, formal safety procedures, mandated safety goals, workforce 
attitudes and managers’ attitudes hinder managers’ commitment to safety. The factors that 
promote managers’ commitment to safety are increasing safety awareness among managers, 
influencing managers’ safety attitudes, recognising managers’ safety commitment, emphasising 
managers’ safety responsibilities, developing adequate organisational safety procedures, 
superiors providing encouragement and support, benchmarking others’ safety activities, 
understanding the economic effects of safety and safety improvement itself. Finally, the 
researchers and safety professionals of the participating companies held a workshop where 
they reviewed the interviews and suggested organisational measures to support managers’ 
commitment to safety. The suggested measures included organisational support for safety 
activities, such as inspirational and participative management training; appropriate safety 
objectives; peer, superior and top management support; campaigns and competitions; 
employee safety training and simplified safety procedures and reporting. The results of the 
study may be utilised in a variety of organisations to promote managers’ commitment to safety. 
 
Keywords: Safety commitment, engagement, managers’ active participation, organisational 
support. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Importance of Managers’ Commitment to Safety 
Managers’ commitment to safety can be defined as the extent to which they place a high priority 
on safety and how effectively they communicate and act regarding safety issues (Neal and 
Griffin, 2004 as cited in Fruhen et al., 2014). Engagement is often synonymous with 
commitment (Conchie et al., 2013) and is defined as the extent to which a person shows 
energy, enthusiasm, a sense of inspiration, and full concentration (Schaufeli and Bakker, 2004, 
as cited in Conchie et al., 2013). Here, commitment refers to managers’ commitment to safety 
management and leadership.  
Achieving sustainable safety performance requires paying attention to both safety management 
systems and cultural change in organisations, and it is vital that the right issues are emphasised 
(Fitzgerald, 2006; Killimett, 2006). The importance of top management’s support of successful 
safety performance is almost universally claimed (e.g., Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007; Hale and 
Hovden, 1998; Michael et al., 2005; Shannon et al., 1997). Management’s level of safety 
commitment is one of the most signiﬁcant predictors of accidents and near accidents (Cohen, 
1975; Hale et al., 1997; Rundmo, 1992; Smith et al., 1978). Geldart et al. (2010) emphasise the 
attitudes and values of top management and their manifestations in the workplace. 
Management’s commitment and active participation towards safety is one major aspect of 
occupational health and safety (OHS) and safety management systems (e.g., Fernández-Muñiz 
et al., 2009; OHSAS 18001:2007; Robson et al., 2007; Redinger and Levine, 1998) and 
effective safety interventions (Chen et al., 2009; Hale et al., 2010; Mearns et al., 2003; O’Toole, 
2002; Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2011; Vredenburgh, 2002).  
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Through their actions and examples, managers can positively affect the safety culture and 
climate to encourage safe behaviours and activities for employees (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 
2007; Flin, 2003; Guldenmund, 2000, 2007; Reason, 1997; McDonald et al., 2000),). Safety 
leadership now receives great emphasis concerning the development and promotion of safety 
culture and climate (e.g., Killimett 2006; Künzle et al. 2010; O’Dea & Flin 2001; Wu et al. 2008; 
Zohar 2002). Research has increasingly supported the view that leadership style affects 
employees’ safety behaviour and levels of safety performance (Griffin and Hu, 2013; Griffin and 
Neal, 2000; Hoffmeister et al., 2014; Kapp, 2012), and managers should visibly express their 
commitment to safety (Michael et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2008). Managers can provide visible 
demonstrations of their commitment to continual improvement of safety performance by visiting 
and inspecting work environments, participating in incident investigation, being actively involved 
at OHS meetings, communicating OHS, and acknowledging good safety performance (OHSAS 
18002:2008). 
Employees’ perceptions of senior managers' safety attitudes and behaviours form the basis of 
their safety behaviour, and therefore, their safety performance (Cox et al., 1998; Clarke, 1999; 
Cooper and Phillips, 1994; Zohar, 1980). According to Clarke (1996), employees’ perceptions of 
managers’ commitment to safety is also predictive of incident reporting. Moreover, managers’ 
visible commitment is essential for employees to accept changes to the working routines 
(Clarke, 1996; Huse and Cummings, 1985). According to Clarke (1999), safety attitudes and 
collective concern for safety should be recognised at all management levels and between 
different groups. Employees typically do not have direct contact with senior management; 
therefore they base their perceptions on middle managers and supervisors.  
Organisations with a strong management’s commitment to safety may improve safety 
performance while also increasing desirable non-safety outcomes regarding employee attitudes 
and behaviours such as job satisfaction, organisational commitment and job-related 
performance (Michael et al., 2005). According to Veltri et al. (2013), the top-performing 
organisations on operational outcomes were also the top performers on safety outcomes, all 
having supportive culture for safety; for example, commitment to safety was an integral part of 
operations and safety was a core value. Several studies (Hale et al., 2010; Killimett, 2006; Veltri 
et al., 2013; Yorio and Wachter, 2013) suggest, that an organisation’s industry or operating 
environment are not predictive of safety performance, but commitment to safety is important. 
These findings highlight the value of managers exhibiting a strong commitment to safety. 
Nevertheless, these studies cannot model the likely eﬀect of a particular type of factor or 
intervention in a particular type of organisation (Michael et al., 2005; Robson et al., 2007). 
Petersen (2000) suggests criteria for safety excellence at different organisational levels 
reflecting management’s commitment to safety: 
• Safety system enforcing supervisory performance  
• Middle managers’ involvement in their threefold role of: 
- Ensuring supervisory performance 
- Ensuring the quality of that supervisory performance 
- Doing something that shows commitment 
• Top executives visibly demonstrating that safety is a value 
Despite managers’ essential role, some show low levels of commitment to safety and prioritise 
production criteria over safety. Thus, the level of implementation of safety management 
procedures may be quite low, resource allocation for preventive actions could be limited, and 
managers may only seek avoidance of legal responsibilities when adhering to formal 
compliance with regulations. (Fernández-Muñiz et al. 2009) Managers who successfully 
demonstrate honest and consistent prioritisation of worker safety may promote the development 
of workers’ trust in the importance of safety and this may motivate workers to behave safely 
(Törner, 2011). A combination of transformational and active transactional leadership styles 
(Bass 1985, 1990) is suggested to be most effective towards managing workplace safety 
(Clarke, 2013; Tappura and Nenonen, 2014). There is a need to support managers’ safety 
participation and commitment in order to achieve real improvements in safety (Simola 2005). 
Moreover, safety leadership behaviour expressing commitment to safety should be emphasised 
in organisations. 
Previous research related to managers’ safety commitment has focused on different managerial 
actions that demonstrate commitment from employees’ viewpoint (e.g. Michael et al., 2005). 
Conchie et al. (2013) studied supervisors’ commitment towards safety leadership from 
managers’ perspective. Huang et al. (2012) studied the interconnection between employees’ 
and supervisors’ perceptions of management safety commitment. Nevertheless, research 
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approaching managers’ commitment from managers’ own viewpoint is scarce (Fruhen et al. 
2014). Moreover, while relatively little research in the safety field has focused on factors that 
influence managers’ commitment to safety, non-safety domain factors that promote commitment 
have gained increasing attention (Conchie et al. 2013). Thus, information is needed about the 
factors that promote and hinder managers’ commitment to safety and implementation of 
organisational measures that support managers in safety activities.  
This paper discusses the factors that influence managers’ commitment to safety (e.g. 
organizational safety policies and procedures), as well as organisational measures that could 
support their commitment. The objective of this paper is to identify factors that hinder or promote 
managers’ commitment to safety and review organisational measures to support managers’ 
commitment to safety. 
 
1.2. Factors that Hinder or Promote Managers’ Commitment to Safety 
Research in the non-safety domain has shown that, in addition to individual factors, contextual 
factors existing in the work environment significantly affect leadership engagement (Arvey et al., 
2006), although they are less frequently studied (Bommer et al., 2004; Porter and McLaughlin, 
2006). Physical, social and organisational demands (e.g., hazardous work environment) and 
resources (e.g., peer support) may affect engagement positively or negatively depending on 
context and whether each is perceived as a hindrance or a challenge (Conchie et al., 2013; 
Crawford et al., 2010; Demorouti et al., 2001). Factors affecting managers’ commitment to 
safety in the safety literature are presented in Table 1 and discussed in the following section. 
 
Table 1 – Factors that may hinder or promote managers’ commitment to safety in the literature. 
Study Industry Hindering factors Promoting factors 
Conchie et al. 
2013 
Construction Role overload 
Production demands 
Formal procedures 
Workforce characteristics 
Management’s lack of 
training and experience 
Social support 
Perceived autonomy 
Organisational support 
Training addressing safety 
knowledge and confidence 
to lead 
Michael et al. 
2005 
Wood products 
manufacturing 
 Developing management’s 
knowledge about the 
manufacturing process 
Emphasising managers’ role 
of showing personal concern 
for employee safety 
Developing consistent safety 
attitudes and actions among 
production managers  
Simola 2005 Metal 
manufacturing 
 Management training 
Safety improvement 
programmes 
Tappura & 
Hämäläinen 
2011 
  Management training and 
workshops with joint 
discussions and company-
specific examples 
Fruhen et al. 
2014 
Air navigation 
services 
 Senior management training 
and guidance in problem-
solving abilities and 
perceptions of others 
Tappura et al. 
2013 
 Underestimation of 
occupational accident 
costs 
Knowledge of overall 
occupational accident costs 
 
Managers’ commitment to safety arises from increased safety awareness, which may be 
induced by an accident or other crisis, or by a training or safety improvement programme 
(Simola 2005). According to Tappura and Hämäläinen (2011), commitment can be promoted by 
workshops and training, which consists of joint discussions that build a shared understanding of 
safety issues. Fruhen et al. (2014) propose that training and guidance designed for senior 
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managers should focus on their problem-solving abilities and perception of others in order to 
support them demonstrating a commitment to safety. 
After studying supervisors’ commitment to safety leadership, Conchie et al. (2013) identify 
several contextual factors. Multiple, often conflicting, role responsibilities and production 
pressures reduced supervisors’ time dedicated to safety activities and hindered their 
commitment to safety. Formal procedures related to administration and discipline, as well as 
conflict between formal discipline procedures and their preferred style of leadership, were also 
regarded as hindrances. Workforce characteristics which include subcontractor safety attitudes, 
inadequately skilled employees and language barriers, emerged as a hindering factor. For some 
supervisors, a lack of management training or experience was regarded as a hindrance. 
Consequently, supervisors exhibited coping mechanisms such as adopting a directive approach 
of telling rather than consulting and adapting their leadership approach to the situation or 
employee, thus helping them with the role’s demands. Social support and autonomy were 
perceived to be main resources promoting engagement. Providing organisational support, 
conveying a message that safety is the top priority and expected from supervisors, equipping 
supervisors with adequate safety knowledge and providing supervisors with necessary tools 
supported supervisors’ safety commitment. The importance of peer support and both 
professional and personal relationships with co-workers was emphasised. Moreover, support 
and ‘back-up’ from managers was perceived to be crucial. However, most supervisors agreed 
that managers could provide more support, such as verbal recognition. Moreover, Tappura et al. 
(2014) find that organizational support, particularly support from immediate superiors and peers 
is crucial towards challenging safety management situations when such support is especially 
needed, but this support is often insufficient. 
According to Michael et al. (2005), developing managers’ knowledge and understanding of the 
manufacturing process helps them to identify unsafe working conditions, equipment or 
behaviours and take corrective actions reflecting their commitment to safety. Emphasising 
managers’ and supervisors’ responsibility of showing personal concern for employee safety and 
health, implementing job-training programmes, participating in safety committees and 
considering safety in job design may help their commitment to safety. Moreover, developing 
consistent attitudes and actions (e.g., not allowing safety to be compromised) among production 
managers and supervisors helps them in demonstrating such a commitment. 
According to a study by Tappura et al. (2013), estimating overall occupational accident costs 
could increase managers’ safety awareness and help them to focus on optimal safety 
investments and the introduction of preventive actions (that is, help managers to internalise the 
importance of safety measures from the economic perspective). However, these costs are often 
underestimated, which may decrease managers’ commitment to safety.  
Previous studies (Conchie et al., 2013; Frick, 2013; Hardison et al., 2014; Tappura et al., 2014) 
identify the importance of safety resources, competence development and organisational 
support for managers to succeed in their safety work. However, upper management often 
ignores the importance of its own role, instead delegating safety issues to front-line managers 
without providing adequate resources or support (Frick 2013). 
The objective of this study is to chart the factors that hinder or promote managers’ commitment 
to safety from the managerial perspective and to complement the literature with empirical 
findings. In addition, organizational measures that could support managers’ commitment to 
safety are suggested. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The study was carried out as part of a research project which focuses on safety leadership, 
competence and commitment according to managers’ perspectives from five industrial 
organisations (energy and processing industries and industrial services) (Table 2). The 
motivation for the study of the participating organisations arises from the need to support and 
advance managers in their safety role. Thus, the focus is on the managerial viewpoint, as well 
as organisational factors and measures. The study is based on managers’ thematic interviews 
(n=49) about the five participating companies. It exploits a qualitative research strategy due to 
its exploratory nature and focus on managers’ own perceptions of the topic, for which a 
qualitative approach is suitable (Creswell, 2013; Palys, 2003). It also charts factors affecting 
managers’ commitment to safety from managers’ perspectives and complements the literature 
with empirical findings.  
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Table 2 – Background information about participating organisations (in 2014). 
Company Industry Turnover Number of 
employees 
Number of 
interviewees 
A Energy 819 million € 1 500 15 
B Industrial services 640 million € 7 800 14 
C Chemical 
processing 
 550 7 
D Industrial services 100+ million € 700 7 
E Industrial services  22 6 
 
Purposive sampling was applied to recruit interviewees from different organisational levels and 
different business units within the participating organisations. The organisations’ safety 
professionals named and invited the interviewees to participate in the study. The interviewees 
were selected based on the needs of organisational development projects. Researchers 
conducted the interviews. Each researcher scheduled and conducted the interviews individually. 
Thematic interviews were used to explore the contextual factors that managers perceive in 
relation to their commitment to safety. The interviewees were middle- and line-managers 
including production managers, maintenance managers, project managers and supervisors. 
Managers were asked about both the hindering and supporting factors affecting their 
commitment to safety. The interviews were conducted either individually or in focus groups of 2-
3 participants. Three interviews were conducted by phone due to scheduling difficulties. The 
anonymity and confidentiality of the responses was emphasised during the interviews to 
facilitate interviewees’ free and open responses, which improves the validity of qualitative 
research (Stenbacka, 2001). Interviews were conducted between May 2014 and January 2015 
and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. 
The interview data was recorded and transcribed. The researchers analysed the data by 
comparing and categorising it according to the findings from the literature. The interview data 
was reviewed during a workshop in March 2015 and complemented by organisational measures 
that could support managers’ commitment to safety. The participants of the workshop were the 
safety professionals of the participating companies. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Based on the results in Table 3, the most important factors hindering managers’ commitment to 
safety are contextual in nature. The results are well in line with the previous study of Conchie et 
al. (2013) and they confirm that the major factors hindering managers’ commitment to safety are 
related to managers’ role overload, production demands and formal safety procedures. In 
addition to Conchie et al. (2013), the interviews showed that managers perceived (negative) 
employee and management attitudes to safety, as well as external safety objectives to be 
hindrances. 
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Table 3 – Categorisation of factors hindering managers’ commitment to safety. 
Category Examples 
Role overload A lot of managerial activities 
Lack of resources (e.g., time) for safety activities 
Time consuming safety administration and paper work 
Production demands Daily production activities and revenue are prioritised 
Office work impedes being present and supervising at work 
sites 
Formal safety 
procedures 
Slow procurement process for safety equipment 
Complicated registration procedures and systems 
Too many meetings 
Safety goals External safety goals 
Unable to influence goal-setting 
Tightening of safety goals despite previous goals not being 
achieved 
Employee attitudes Negative attitudes during safety meetings 
Negative attitudes about safety among senior employees 
Making unnecessary safety notifications 
Management attitudes Disinterest in safety 
Not perceiving safety as a necessity 
Overlooking safety negligence 
Shooting down safety proposals 
Conflicting safety alignments between different managerial 
levels 
Fairness and equal treatment of managers 
Neglecting formal safety procedures (e.g. issuing a 
warning) 
 Resistance to changes and new safety procedures 
 
According to managers’ perceptions (Table 4), the factors that promote managers’ commitment 
to safety are increasing safety awareness among managers, influencing managers’ safety 
attitudes, recognition of managers’ safety commitment, emphasising managers’ safety 
responsibilities, developing adequate organisational safety procedures, encouragement and 
support from superiors, benchmarking others’ safety activities, understanding the economic 
impacts of safety and safety improvement itself. 
 
Table 4 – Categorisation of the factors promoting managers’ commitment to safety. 
Category Examples 
Safety awareness Increasing managers’ safety awareness 
Understanding manager’s safety role 
Personal growth in relation to safety 
Adequate tools for accessing safety information 
Emphasising the effects of a positive/negative safety 
culture  
Safety communication via various channels 
Managers’ safety 
attitudes 
Influencing managers’ safety attitudes by inspiring training 
Improving safety knowledge 
Peer discussion and support 
Recognition of safety 
commitment 
Clear safety goals (e.g., zero accidents) 
Rewarding good safety results 
Possibility to influence goal-setting 
Resources (time) for achieving the goals provided 
Competitions, campaigns and bonus 
Verbal recognition 
Management safety 
responsibilities 
Emphasising managers’ regulatory and moral 
responsibility to take care of employees 
Organisational safety 
procedures 
Top management resourcing, appreciation and emphasis 
on safety 
Uniform, mandatory and scheduled safety procedures 
Instructions for safety procedures 
Support and help in safety activities 
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Support from superior Own superior encouraging and expressing interest in 
safety 
Pressure and discussions, when the safety goals are not 
achieved 
Safety benchmarking Visiting other units and learning from them 
Competitions between units 
Wide participation for safety rounds 
Participating in forums outside of the company 
Economic effects of 
safety 
Understanding the economic effects of good/poor safety 
and accident costs 
Safety improvement Seeing the progress and the benefits of good safety 
Ability to influence safety improvement 
 
The major factors promoting managers’ commitment to safety were related to managers’ safety 
awareness, attitudes, recognition, responsibilities and organisational safety procedures. 
Moreover, managers’ perceived support from superiors, safety benchmarking, economic effects 
and safety improvements itself acted as promoting factors for their commitment to safety. 
According to Conchie et al. (2013), major factors helping supervisors’ commitment to safety 
leadership were social support and perceived autonomy. Tappura et al. (2014) and Frick (2013) 
find that to succeed in safety management, organisational safety procedures, as well as upper 
management support, resourcing and guidance, should be in place to support managers. 
Inadequate support from managers’ own superiors was a key challenge for some managers, as 
the principal support was expected to come from one’s superior (Tappura et al., 2014). 
The results of the interviews were reviewed in a related workshop carried out with the 
participating companies. Based on the results, effective measures to support managers’ 
commitment to safety were suggested. Measures that support managers in their safety activities 
include organisational support in safety activities, such as inspirational and participative 
management training; appropriate safety objectives; support from peers and superiors; 
campaigns and competitions; employee safety training and simplified safety procedures and 
reporting. Including safety responsibilities and activities in the recruitment process (e.g., 
interviews) and job description supports managers’ commitment to safety from the very 
beginning of their career. Management training, workshops and safety meetings enabling 
discussions on regulatory safety requirements, topical safety issues and related problem-solving 
give managers both concrete and emotional support. In order to support managers’ personal 
growth (e.g., attitudes) and to express superiors’s interest in safety, safety issues can be 
included in yearly development discussions and informal discussions. Defining clear, uniform 
and achievable safety goals and developing a safety bonus system as a part of the general 
reward system may support managers’ commitment to safety. Support from safety, occupational 
health, human resource and law professionals may assist managers when their own 
competence or resources are inadequate. Top management’s expressed commitment (e.g., 
safety walks, safety communication), allocation of resourcing for safety activities at all 
managerial levels and investment in an adequate safety management system are crucial 
towards supporting lower-level managers’ commitment to safety. Creating unified safety 
instructions and ensuring their enforcement at all organisational levels gives managers back-up 
when conflicts arise. Other organisational supports for managers include learning from 
customers’ safety procedures, internal and external safety audits, information on absence and 
accident costs, increasing use of mobile devices for safety reporting and meetings, and active 
communication of safety improvements and success stories. 
Managers’ commitment to safety can be promoted through workshops and training consisting of 
joint discussions with peers, which build a shared understanding of safety issues and enable 
peer support (Conchie et al., 2013; Tappura and Hämäläinen, 2011). Senior management’s 
training programmes should focus on their problem-solving abilities and perception of others in 
order to support them towards demonstrating a commitment to safety (Fruhen et al., 2014), 
which is crucial for maintaining the commitment of lower-level managers. Diverse organisational 
measures are beneficial for improving managers’ consistent commitment to safety. This is 
important towards improving safety performance and other positive outcomes such as fostering 
favourable employee attitudes and behaviours (Michael et al., 2005). These organisational 
measures include top management activities expressing their commitment to safety, defining 
managers’ safety responsibilities, providing inspirational and participative management training 
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and providing superior and peer support, as well as support from safety, health, human 
resource and law professionals.  
The scientific contribution of this study relies on the identification and categorisation of the 
factors affecting managers’ commitment to safety. The results support and extend previous 
research on these factors and provide new information about organisational measures that 
support managers’ commitment to safety. Moreover, the information and examples of factors 
and organisational supports for managers provide a practical contribution. Organisations may 
utilise this new information on the hindering and promoting factors of managers’ commitment to 
safety when they design organisational-specific safety management interventions (e.g., 
training). In addition, various organisations may utilise the measures suggested by the 
participating companies to support managers’ commitment to safety and to promote safety. In 
the future, the researchers will study the effects of particular factors or organisational supports 
towards managers’ commitment. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores the contextual factors hindering and promoting managers’ commitment to 
safety. Based on the results, organisational measures are suggested that can be used to 
increase managers’ commitment to safety in various organisations. Increasing managers’ 
resources for safety activities or simplifying safety activities helps them when conducting their 
daily responsibilities. Participation towards defining safety goals improves managers’ 
commitment to these goals. Developing managers’ safety awareness from the very beginning of 
their career also supports their commitment. Managers’ commitment to safety should be 
recognised at least verbally or by rewarding good safety results. Increasing organisational 
support by providing uniform safety procedures and inspirational training, developing consistent 
safety attitudes and behaviours among all managers and offering social support and top 
management’s support are important for promoting managers’ commitment to safety. A formal 
peer support system such as managers’ forums could be beneficial especially for less 
experienced managers. Managers’ commitment to safety is important at all organisational 
levels. Upper-management’s support, resourcing and guidance are essential for lower-level 
managers, especially when they encounter conflicting role responsibilities. Moreover, 
developing consistent safety attitudes among managers requires top management’s support.  
This study contributes to safety research as it extends the literature on managers’ commitment 
to safety into an area that has seen few past works. Presenting examples of the factors that 
may hinder or promote managers’ commitment to safety provides guidance for organisations, 
managers and researchers towards defining the organisational development activities that 
promote managers’ commitment to safety. 
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Abstract 
Many of the accidents in the construction industry could have been prevented by improved 
systematic safety management and safety awareness in the project development phase and in 
the transition between the development and construction phase. The purpose of this paper is to 
study safety challenges in the interaction between the project development phase where plans 
and drawings are made and the project construction phase where the construction work is done. 
The paper is based on 24 interviews with representatives from clients, consulting engineers, 
main contractors and sub-contractors at two different construction projects. Both projects are 
large projects where transportation infrastructure was constructed. The interviews demonstrate 
the importance of safety management in the transition between project development and project 
construction. Furthermore the interviews indicate three types of challenges for safety 
management in the interface between project development and project construction: 1) the 
transition from project development to project construction; 2) inadequate safety focus in early 
project phases; and 3) resulting challenges for safe work in project construction. A common 
issue for the interface challenges identified in the case projects is transition of both tacit and 
explicit knowledge between the two project phases. Feedback mechanisms to ensure that 
knowledge about practical work is applied to modify and improve the formal structures 
facilitating safe work are missing. Additionally, the formal structures (plans, procedures) are not 
suited the real situation at the site. Establishing a collaboration phase between planning and 
operation to create a common understanding between involved actors; give feedback on the 
formal structures; and modify the formal structures if necessary, will improve the mechanisms 
for knowledge transition between the phases. 
 
Keywords: construction industry; project management; interface; knowledge management; 
feedback. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety management in early phases of a construction project (business development and 
project development) can have a huge impact on reducing the risk of occupational accidents 
when the construction work is performed (Szymberski, 1997; Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000; 
Gibb, 2004; Behm, 2005; Frijters and Swuste, 2008; Jørgensen, 2013). The construction 
industry is one of the industries with the highest accident risk. Annually, the industry experience 
several fatal accidents in addition to numerous severe accidents and minor accidents. The 
affected workers are injured in the operative construction phase. Studies from Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the US show that 40-60 % of these accidents could have been prevented by 
better decisions and actions in early project phases (Behm, 2005). 
Generally, a construction project includes four main phases (Kjellén, 2000). First, the business 
development phase that includes investigations of business opportunities and pre-feasibility 
studies. Second, the project development phase where plans and drawings are made. Third, 
project construction where the operative construction work is performed, which also is the phase 
were workers are exposed to risk. The fourth phase is operations and maintenance, i.e. usage 
of the constructed building or infrastructure. Safety-related decisions, plans and commitment in 
the two first phases are correlated to the safety performance at the sharp-end (Behm, 2005). 
This paper pays attention to the interface between early project phases and the operative phase 
in construction projects. 
The purpose of this paper is to study safety challenges in the interface between the project 
development phase and the project construction phase. To approach this purpose the following 
research questions are answered: 1) What safety problems may occur in the interface between 
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project development and project construction? 2) Why do these safety problems occur? 3) How 
should the safety problems be dealt with? The three questions are answered by an analysis of 
24 interviews with representatives from both clients and construction companies at two different 
case projects. Both cases were large projects where transportation infrastructures were being 
constructed. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Both nationally and internationally, the construction industry is one of the most risky businesses 
to work in compared to other industries (Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority, 2010; Frijters 
et al., 2010; Weeks, 2011; Jørgensen, 2013). In Norway, the construction industry is one of the 
sectors with most occupational accidents per working hour. A report from the Norwegian Labour 
Inspection Authority (2010) states that about 25 % of the fatalities due to occupational accidents 
in Norway happens in this industry. 
The reasons for the hazardous conditions in the construction industry are complicated. Hale et 
al. (2012) made a root cause analysis of fatal accidents for the industry in the UK. Their study 
shows that the most frequent root causes to fatal accidents in this industry are: inadequate risk 
management; inadequate competency and training; lack of compliance; inadequate employee 
participation; poor man-machine interaction and poor acquisition and maintenance of 
machinery; inadequate monitoring of the management system; poor contracting strategies; and 
lack of top management involvement. The situation is likely to be similar in Norway. An in-depth 
study of fatal accidents by the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (2010) is pointing at two 
particular issues in the industry: use of foreign employees and the complexity of organizing work 
that requires collaboration between different actors.  
Construction projects are complex socio-technical systems that can take many different 
organisational forms. The industry is project-based and operates in an ever-changing 
environment (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005). One dimension of the complexity is related to the 
many actors involved in a construction project, that all impact on safety, e.g. authorities, clients, 
designers, specialist consultants, subcontractors, suppliers. Another dimension of the 
complexity is related to the labile characteristics of the portfolio of projects in the industry. Each 
project is unique related to type of project (a building, a railway, a road or a bridge), ways of 
doing work, partners and techniques for construction. This requires adaptive safety 
management systems. Construction workers tend to be given a high degree of self-control over 
their own work. When this situation is combined with the pressure to be productive and to 
reduce construction project times, they tend to select non-standard solutions and cut corners 
(Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005).   
The safety situation for construction workers in the project construction phase, as well as for 
operation and maintenance of the end product, depends on prior planning and on 
considerations for safety and health in the project development and design phases (i.e. 
architects, constructers, engineers and others that plan and design a construction project). 
Construction designers have a legal obligation to take working conditions and safety during 
construction, maintenance and demolition work into account in their designs. This obligation is 
contained in “Directive 92/57/EEC”, a Directive that has been incorporated in Norway as well. 
However, Frijters and Swuste (2008) and Jørgensen (2013) claim that the actors in the 
development and design phases have not seen their responsibility to provide safety during the 
execution of construction projects, and have passed the responsibility in the hands on the 
contractors. A root cause analysis of three fatal accidents by Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) 
show three main root causes that also demonstrate safety challenges in the interface between 
planning and operation: failing to identify an unsafe condition that existed before an activity was 
started or that developed after an activity was started; deciding to proceed with a work activity 
after the worker identifies an existing unsafe condition; and deciding to act unsafe regardless of 
initial conditions of the work environment. 
Behm (2005) demonstrates that decisions made upstream from the construction phase have a 
strong influence on safety in the construction phase. His study shows that the design of a 
project relates to 42 % of the fatalities. The safety of an operation is determined long before 
people, procedures, and equipment come together at the worksite (Stephenson, 1991). 
Designers’ (architects and engineers) lack of safety knowledge (Gibb, 2004) and their 
unawareness of regulations (Cosman, 2004) are obstacles for safety improvements in this 
industry. The early project phases’ ability to influence safety at the operational phase is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Szymberski’s (1997) time/safety influence curve (upper part of Figure 1) 
illustrates how early phases of a project are able to influence safety. The lower part of Figure 1 
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shows a conceptual framework for the phases of project work based on Kjellén (2000). 
Decisions and actions made by clients and designers in early phases will influence the safe 
performance of the construction phase. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – A phase model for project work (based on Kjellén, 2000) and the ability to influence safety in the phases 
(based on Szymberski, 1997). 
 
The presented literature review demonstrates that many of the safety problems for sharp-end 
work are initiated and created in early project phases (Szymberski, 1997; Behm, 2004; Frijters 
and Swuste, 2008; Jørgensen, 2013).  Walter and James (2009) presented an extensive 
literature review on supply chain relationships and their role in influencing health and safety 
management. These sources of evidence provided considerable support for the view that the 
dynamics of supply chains frequently lead to adverse health and safety effects. Following this 
line of argument, the safety challenges at the operative phase are not only due to the decisions 
made in early project phases. Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) show that safety challenges in the 
interface between planning and operation also occur when workers decide to proceed with a 
work activity after unsafe conditions, which may be due to design choices, are identified. An 
interview study by Albrechtsen and Hovden (2014) shows that lack of communication and 
inadequate flow of information between phases and actors, in particular related to the interface 
between planning and operation, create both safety and efficiency challenges for sharp-end 
work. Their study points out the need to establish feedback loops between actors and phases, 
in particular from lower levels (sharp-end) to higher levels (management levels) to avoid 
misunderstandings and disturbances.  
As a result, interface management, i.e. communication, coordination and allocation of 
responsibility across a common boundary between two or more organizations, organizational 
units or project phases, matters. The dynamic nature of construction projects and the high 
number of involved actors (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005) strengthen the importance of 
systematic management of interfaces in the construction industry. Pavitt and Gibb (2003) 
proposed three main interface types in the construction industry. First, physical interfaces which 
are the actual, physical connection between two or more building elements or components. 
Second, contractual interfaces between different activities and sub-activities that are agreed on 
at an early stage and managed throughout the project. Third, organizational interactions 
between various actors involved in projects from it initial start-up to final handover. 
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3. METHOD 
Interviews were conducted in two case projects to study challenges in the interaction between 
project phases. In total 24 interviews were conducted, 13 in the Case 1 and 11 in Case 2. 
These interviews were analysed to answer the research questions. 
 
3.1. Case studies 
The study is based on data collection from two case projects concerning construction of 
transportation infrastructure in southern part of Norway. The data collection was performed at 
two major construction sites in September and November 2014. Both projects were large in 
scale and the construction periods were lasting three to four years. The clients as well as the 
main contractors were large and professional companies. Both case projects were divided into 
several sub-projects, with a main contractor on each. One sub-project in each case project was 
visited. 
As the case projects are both large in scale and encompass professional builders and 
contractors, they might therefore not be representative for the Norwegian construction industry, 
as many construction projects involve small clients, small contractors and often many small sub-
contractors. Further, the clients and contractors had worked together before and knew each 
other well in these two case projects.  
 
3.2. Sample 
The interviewees were representatives from the client, consulting engineer, main contractor and 
sub-contractors. In Table 1 the distribution of the informants and their roles are presented. Most 
of the informants had higher positions, but also opinions from workers in the sharp-end were 
obtained. At both cases there were safety representatives among the informants. 
 
Table 1 - Sample distribution according to enterprise (actor) and role. 
Case 1 Case 2 
# Actor Role # Actor Role 
1 Client Main construction 
manger 
1 Client Main construction 
manager 
2 Client HSE advisor 2 Client Project manager 
3 Client HSE advisor 3 Client HSE coordinator 
4 Consulting 
engineer 
Projecting engineer 4 Client HSE coordinator 
5 Main 
contractor 
Project manager 5 Consulting 
engineer 
Projecting leader 
6 Main 
contractor 
Project leader 6 Main 
contractor 
Project manager 
7 Main 
contractor 
Production 
supervisor 
7 Main 
contractor 
Production 
supervisor 
8 Main 
contractor 
Production 
supervisor 
8 Main 
contractor 
Supervisor 
9 Main 
contractor 
Supervisor 9 Main 
contractor 
HSE advisor 
10 Main 
contractor 
Safety 
representative 
10 Main 
contractor 
Safety 
representative 
11 Main 
contractor 
Purchasing manager 11 Sub-contractor Traffic coordinator 
12 Main 
contractor 
HSE advisor    
13 Sub-contractor Site manager    
 
3.3. Interviews 
The aim of the interviews was to get insight into challenges related to safety management in 
construction projects in the interaction between clients, designers, planners, contractors, 
subcontractors and suppliers. An interview guide was used in semi-structures interviews. The 
guide consisted of the following five main topics: safety management in construction projects; 
cooperation and coordination; information flow; safety analysis; and work practices (execution 
phase). All the topics had three to eight main questions. The guide was not successively 
followed, but served as a support with the intention to cover all topics in the guide.  
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The interviewees answered to the questions by applying their experience from previous projects 
in addition to their knowledge on the current project they were working on. All the interviews 
were conducted at the construction sites with two to three interviewers. Each interview lasted 
around 1½ hour and was written down during the interview. 
 
3.4. Analytical approach 
The 24 documented interviews were analysed following basic guidelines for qualitative data 
analysis described by e.g. Miles and Huberman (1994). The main topics from the interview 
guide were used for the analysis and each interview was examined to collect all relevant 
information on each topic. New topics recurring in the interviews, such as the transition phase, 
were included as main subjects for analysis. Thereafter the collected data from both cases was 
analysed for each topic. The analysis consisted of understanding safety activities and safety 
performance of each phase and processing the opinions of the informants about the phase. 
Further the results were discussed in two meetings with representatives from the construction 
industry, including one meeting with sharp-end workers/safety representatives, to hear their 
opinions and validate the findings. 
 
4. RESULTS OF INTERVIEW STUDY 
The interviews indicate that the interface and transition between project development and 
project construction is a critical contribution to the safety performance of a project. Both 
representatives from clients and contractors agree about the criticality of this interface to 
facilitate safe sharp-end work. A shared understanding among the interviewees is that a 
common continuous safety approach and attention is required from the start of a project to 
operation and maintenance of the final product, i.e. a joint and coherent safety focus throughout 
the project life cycle. However, based on experience from various projects, the interviewees 
have seen different challenges regarding this common and continuous safety approach in the 
move from early project phases and the construction work. The challenges identified in the 
interviews can be categorized into three types of interface challenges, ref. to Figure 2. First, the 
interviewees have experienced poor communication and collaboration between early project 
phases and the construction phase, i.e. challenges in the transition from project development to 
project construction. Second, which also is an important reason for the first challenge, there are 
challenges related to lack of safety focus in business development and project development. 
Many of the interviewees claim that there is only a minimal attention to safety in the early project 
phases. Third, the two first challenges generate challenges for safe performance in the 
construction phase. Inadequate plans and drawings and inadequate risk assessments and 
safety management in the early project phase can create time pressure; deviations; ad hoc 
solutions; practical trouble regarding physical solutions; and unexpected situations for sharp-
end work which all can produce hazardous situations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Three types of interface challenges between early project phases and project construction. Inadequate safety 
focus contributes to challenges in the transition between project development and project construction, which 
furthermore lead to sharp-end safety problems. 
 
4.1. Challenges in the transition from project development to project construction 
Based on experience from previous and current construction projects, both representatives from 
clients and contractors talk about collaboration and communication problems between project 
development and project construction. This is related to lack of continuity of personnel involved 
in planning and operation; obstacles for flow of critical information; no chance for contractors 
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and sub-contractors to give feedback on plans and drawing before starting work. 
Representatives from contractors are seldom involved in the project development phase, and 
only few of the involved persons in the project development phase are involved in project 
construction. Furthermore, new persons and companies enter the construction phase after start-
up, which implies that some of those who perform work at the construction site are not 
necessarily represented at construction start-up. 
 
"There should be added some more time after contract signing, so the contractor could 
be a part of some of the engineering. This would ensure better execution of the project, 
better quality and better predictability for both the client and the contractor" [project 
manager, main contractor]. 
 
For large projects, the two clients involved in the current case study have implemented a 
"collaboration phase" between project development and project construction. The objective of 
the collaboration phase is to develop common guidelines and shared ambitions and standards 
for the project between the stakeholders. Many of the interviewees feel that this phase is useful 
for safety performance as well as other parts of the project execution. Such a collaboration 
phase will include representatives from the contractor at the final parts of the project 
development. Some interviewees claim that such a collaboration phase will lead to better 
performance in terms of efficiency as well as safety; improved quality and better predictability for 
both clients and contractors. Improved collaboration is generated by: short and efficient 
meetings with a clear agenda; reviews of plans when required; good flow of information from 
shift to shift; all necessary documents provided on time; awareness of dependencies between 
disciplines and activities; detailed and robust plans; coordination meeting when there are 
parallel activities; knowledge sharing; quick response for all requests; mutual respect for each 
other; and frequent, honest and open dialogue. 
The collaboration between client, consulting engineers/designers and contractors a period 
before construction start-up is perceived as useful since there is a dialogue about important 
information for efficiency, quality and safety of the project construction. Depending how far the 
project planning has come, changes can be agreed upon and made. Additionally, mutual trust 
between actors is created. Several of the interviewees point out that getting to know the people 
you will work with and agreeing on common communication rules will make the cooperation in 
the project easier. 
 
"We get to know people and get information about the project. That is good. If 
something happens later and you already know people, it is easier to solve problems 
and avoid misunderstandings" [HSE-coordinator, client]. 
 
Most interviewees find this phase useful as it serves as a common starting point for the 
construction works, but there are some critical issues mentioned by some of the interviewees. 
The critical voices regarding the "collaboration phase" claim that it should last longer; that sub-
contractors are not included; and that more specific discipline meetings should be arranged. It 
was pointed out that persons from the project development phase should be a part of the 
collaboration phase and carry on to the first stage of construction phase to assure continuity. In 
many cases new personnel come into the construction phase without knowledge about the 
basis for decisions that are made in earlier phases. Therefore it was said that as much 
personnel as possible should be kept throughout the phases. 
 
4.2. Inadequate safety focus in early project phases 
Many of the interviewees ascribe the reasons for some of the safety problems at the sharp-end 
to inadequate safety focus in the early project phases.  Lack of knowledge about practical work 
at the sharp-end is mentioned by several of the interviewees as a main reason for the 
weaknesses in plans and drawings. The situation would improve if specific expert knowledge in 
addition to practical knowledge in early project phases was integrated in the project 
development process. In addition, lack of time in early project phases is described as a reason 
for poor quality of plans and drawings. Some interviewees explain this by a desire from clients 
to start the construction work as quickly as possible. It is also claimed that actors in project 
development tend to focus on the end product of the construction without paying significant 
attention to safety of execution of work.   
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“98% of the planning work is on a good technical result. They don’t consider safe work 
in the project phase to a large extent” [project manager, main contractor]. 
 
Several of the interviewees tell about poor plans for safety and health made in the early project 
phases, mainly because the plans are too general and are not sufficiently adapted to the 
specific project. As part of the project development, clients are obliged to make plans for safety 
and health that govern the safety work in the construction phase. In that sense this plan is a 
highly relevant framework condition for the safety work in the construction phase. The plan 
should be based on a coarse risk analysis. The risk analyses are criticised by some of the 
interviewees as vague and without concrete risk reducing measures. Inadequate risk 
information and safety plans from clients make a poor basis for contractors’ safety plans. 
Further, the risk analyses made in the different phases of a project are often not related to each 
other, i.e. the risk analysis for the health and safety plan might not build upon the risk analysis 
enclosed with the tender. 
According to many of the interviewees, safety performance and safety management systems 
count for a very small part of tender evaluations. It is mentioned that the tenders’ safety system 
only counts for 1-2 % of the total evaluation. Other factors such as price and feasibility are much 
more important than safety. It is also mentioned that the same problem occurs when appointing 
contractors (e.g. designers, architects, consulting engineers) for the project development phase. 
This type of contracting shares the same problem regarding weight of safety. Some of the 
interviewees indicate that increased emphasis on safety when selecting contractors would be a 
significant contribution to better safety in the industry. However, this is a measure that the whole 
industry must collaborate on to have any meaningful effect. 
 
4.3. Challenges for safe work in the construction phase 
The problems in the interface between project development and construction lead to new 
challenges for the operative work in construction phase. The interviews indicate that the 
interface problems create a reactive mind-set and approach in the construction phase, which 
results in ad-hoc solutions and even time rush. The interviewees have experienced that 
contractors and subcontractors get behind the time-schedule because of poor plans from project 
construction. Poor planning is typically when plans and reality are not matched. One of the 
interviewees provided this example of poor safety planning: 
 
“Area for rigging is not thought about before construction start-up. There are 
constructions and equipment that require large amounts of space; mobile cranes, tower 
crane, reinforcement and shuttering. Such a narrow space leads to hazardous 
situations. Visibility is reduced and material and equipment are stored on each other. It 
should have been considered during project development, but was not” [supervisor, 
main contractor]. 
 
The time dimension is mentioned as another crucial aspect that creates problems at the sharp-
end. According to the interviewees from the operative level, there is no extra space of time 
allocated in the plans, which could have worked as a buffer in situations where one gets behind 
the time schedule. Another explanation for this is that the start-up of project construction work is 
too early, before plans and drawings are adequate. Another related challenge mentioned in the 
interviews is the delays in project development taking time away from the operative work, as the 
end-dates of most projects are a fixed date.   
  
"The consulting engineers are planning with the lowest possible times for sharp-end 
activities" [HSE advisor, client]. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Interface challenges 
The interface challenges identified in the interview study can be recognized as a combination of 
the three main types of interfaces in the construction industry: physical, contractual and 
organizational interfaces (Pavitt and Gibb, 2003).  The physical interface challenges in the 
interview study are a result of poor planning and drawings that are not suited to the reality of 
sharp-end work, e.g. narrow spaces for lifting operations. Contractual interface challenges are 
expressed in the tender evaluation phase where contractors’ and sub-contractors’ safety 
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performance and safety management systems only represent a small part of decision criteria. 
Organizational interfaces, i.e. communication, coordination and responsibility across boundaries 
between different organizations, phases, or organizational entities, are mentioned as an 
experienced challenge by most of the interviewees. Examples of this challenge are: inadequate 
HSE plans from clients; no continuity in involved personnel along the project life cycle, 
inadequate dialogue between client, consulting engineers/designer, contractor and sub-
contractors before start-up of construction. Other studies demonstrate the same challenges. An 
empirical study performed by Albrechtsen and Hovden (2014) also show that communication 
between phases and organizations in projects often are weak. Their study also demonstrates 
that the client’s safety control in the construction phase often is rather vague. A root cause 
analysis of severe accidents by Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) also shows the same patterns.  
A common issue for the interface challenges identified in the case projects is flow of information 
between phases and actors. The flow of information is related to transition of explicit knowledge 
but also about sharing tacit knowledge. Sharp-end action is partly based on espoused theory 
(rules, norms, expressed values) and theory-in-use (how work actually is done) (Argyris and 
Schön, 1992). The first is mainly related to tacit knowledge of sharp-end workers, while the 
latter is related to explicit knowledge (e.g. procedures, guidelines, databases). Knowledge 
creation in organizations is created in a combination of transformations of two types of 
knowledge: explicit and tacit (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
For the case projects, the feedback process is a combination of transfers of tacit and explicit 
knowledge. First, applying explicit knowledge in terms of plans, procedures and verbal stories 
for sharp-end work, i.e. internalization (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), creates operational tacit 
knowledge through learning by doing supported by explicit knowledge. Second, utilizing tacit 
knowledge about sharp-end work in planning processes, i.e. externalization (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995), makes tacit knowledge explicit through articulation of tacit knowledge using 
language. This knowledge creation is according to many of the interviewees missing in many 
construction projects. The interview study shows obstacles for the feedback mechanisms from 
the execution level to the planning level. For the industry in general there is often lack of arenas 
for dialogue between these two layers. One is related to obstacles for giving feedback on 
practical limitations in plans, either before work has been started, during work or after work has 
started. Another obstacle is related to the tacit knowledge of sharp-end workers. Planners and 
designers are criticised for lack of practical and local knowledge, which the sharp-end personnel 
hold.  
For the case projects, the externalization and internalization problems are related to formal and 
informal feedback mechanisms, respectively, in combination with inadequate formal structures 
(e.g. plans, drawings) from planning to execution. Feedback is here understood as the process 
by which information on the actual or expected results of an activity is fed back to decision 
makers as new input to modify and improve the actual or subsequent activities (based on 
Kjellén, 2008). For simplicity the related feedforward process is included in this characterization 
of feedback i.e. providing information to decision makers before an activity as support to 
modifying the frames and plans for an activity. The interviews indicate that operative experience 
and practical knowledge often is lacking in the planning phase. In addition the interviews 
indicate that the formal structures (e.g. HSE plans, project plans, drawings) often are not suited 
the actual work practice and work conditions. The externalization and internalization problems 
are interwoven, as improved feedback ideally will be applied to modify and improve the formal 
structures. 
 
5.2. Problem solving at three levels 
Management of safety can be understood as problem solving at three levels (Hale et al., 1997; 
Hale, 2003), where the central problem is the potential occurrence of damage and uncontrolled 
hazard at the execution level; the plan and procedures level; and the structure (and policy) 
level, ref. to Figure 3. For a construction project, the execution level is where contractors and 
sub-contractors perform sharp-end work.  This is also the level where the primary control of 
hazards, through the actions taken by those in contact with the hazards, is taking place. HSE 
plans, safety procedures and guidelines make these control actions explicit, which are a result 
of the plan and procedure level. Drawings and construction plans are other relevant documents 
for a construction project. The client’s project management and consulting engineers/designers 
represent this level. A third level is the structure and policy level. At this level, clients, have 
company standards representing the philosophy of risk control in the organizations. Figure 3 
illustrates the three levels and transition of knowledge in the interface between levels. The figure 
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is inspired by Hale’s (2003) model for three levels of safety management and modified based on 
Rasmussen’s (1997) framework for risk management in a dynamic society. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Knowledge transition in interfaces between three levels of safety management in construction projects 
(inspired by Hale, 2003 and Rasmussen, 1997). 
 
Despite the challenges for feedback between execution and planning, there are mechanisms 
that work well between the structure and planning level in the case projects. The collaboration 
phase introduced by the clients of the case projects is a good attempt to create arenas for 
feedback by changing the company HSE standards. This collaboration phase is based on 
experience feedback from previous projects and is thus a combination of different sources of 
explicit knowledge. 
In addition to externalization and internalization, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe a third 
and fourth knowledge transfer: socialization (transfer of tacit knowledge to shared mental 
models and practices among several members of the organization) and combination (generating 
new explicit knowledge through systemizing and combining different sources of explicit 
knowledge). Together, the four types of transitions make a spiral of knowledge creation with the 
following continuous order: socialization-externalization-combination-internalization (starting at 
the beginning). The identified challenges in the case projects are thus linked; it implies that 
improved externalization will improve the formal structures. An extensive review of rules and 
rule compliance by Hale and Borys (2013a) reasons about the merits and limitations of safety 
rules and rule compliance. Similar to the case study, they point at the problem that rules are not 
fitted the reality of actual work. Reality cannot be modified according to the rules, but the rules 
can be developed and modified to reality. The study of Hale and Borys (2013b) emphasises the 
importance of feedback on experience with practical work and use of rules as key input to 
development of appropriate rules. 
Another aspect of the knowledge sharing and creation in the interface between actors and 
phases can be compartmentalization of information; simplification and misrepresentation of 
information; accumulation of incidents are either not noticed or misunderstood; ignored warning 
signals; and normalization of deviations. The complex nature of the interface issue between 
planners and doers in construction projects can lead to such problems. These characteristics 
are central in the theory of man-made disasters (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). They found that 
limitations or lack of information sharing is the cause of most major accidents. In the build-up to 
accidents, someone has known something that could have prevented the accident, but this 
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information is not shared to those who could have made a significant change based on this 
decision-making support.  
 
5.3. Conflicting objectives 
Conflicting objectives between safety and efficiency is mentioned as a root cause to the 
interface challenges by several of the interviewees. Rasmussen (1997) explained this conflict by 
two forces that may contribute to an unacceptable risk picture if not dealt with. First, there is an 
economical pressure aiming at cost reduction and income increase, which is a pressure towards 
efficiency. Second, there is a pressure towards least effort, i.e. avoiding unacceptable work 
load. Many of the interviewees pointed out that poor planning can lead to time pressure and 
quick solutions, which are not always as safe as they could be. The end date of the project is 
usually fixed and not moved even when project planning is not on time. This may lead to less 
efficient projects, several simultaneous operations and higher accident risk. Some interviewees 
were of the opinion that project plans have too small time margins, and that some additional 
time should be added, as unexpected changes are not accounted for by planners and 
designers. 
Both the client and contractor want to spend as little money and time as possible and get a 
highest possible profit, while safety should be dealt with. Safety is seen as important and 
necessary to invest in, however often there is a conflict about who should pay for the safety 
measures. In some cases the client finds the safety measure as part of the job and the 
contractor's responsibility, in other cases as their own responsibility. As both parties want the 
profit to be as high as possible, additional costs for safety measures can become a threat for 
safety if neither is keen on paying the extra costs, which might result in fewer safety measures 
being implemented. The cost effect of saving on safety can be seen in the short run on a 
project; however an accident can be more costly for a project or the whole company. In the long 
run investing in safety might rather be seen as saving costs, as shown by this citation form a 
production manager: 
 
"Actually there is a correlation between safety and production and a good economy, but 
in the short term economic gains can be achieved by saving on safety" [production 
manager, contractor]. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The interviews at the two construction projects indicate that safety management in the interface 
and transition between project development and project construction is a critical contribution to 
the safety performance of a project. A shared understanding among the interviewees is that a 
common continuous safety approach and attention is required from the start of a project to 
operation and maintenance of the final product. The interface challenges can be categorized 
into three types: 1) the transition from project development to project construction; 2) 
inadequate safety focus in early project phases; and 3) resulting challenges for safe work in 
project construction.  
In general there are two interrelated main improvements for the interface challenges. First, 
improving the formal and informal feedback on practical experience with plans and sharp-end 
work (from the execution phase to the planning phase). Second, improving the formal structures 
(from the planning phase to execution, e.g. plans and procedures). Improvement of feedback 
mechanisms can both be related to explicit knowledge (formal feedback mechanisms such as 
safety management elements as reporting and monitoring system) and tacit knowledge. 
Transfer of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge is in particular related to mechanisms for 
utilization of operative personnel’s knowledge on practical experiences from the on-going as 
well as previous projects.  
The clients of the case studies have implemented a collaboration phase between project 
development and project construction. According to several of the interviewees this 
collaboration between representatives from the client, consulting engineers/designers and the 
main contractor is an important mean to create a common understanding; give feedback on the 
formal structures and modify the formal structures if necessary. A collaboration phase as a 
transition from project development to project construction is thus a mean to improve the 
feedback of tacit knowledge among operators to planners and designers.  
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Abstract 
Bridge and engine room resource management (BRM/ERM) courses are mandatory to gain 
necessary certification according to STCW 2010 (The Convention of Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping - International Maritime Organization IMO).  The 
BRM/ERM courses are designed to enable all maritime personnel on/off shore to develop their 
existing knowledge and understanding of human and technical resources in an operational 
maritime environment. During the course the crew gain experience in handling ships under 
various conditions, improve communication quality, improve quality of decisions and contribute 
to the bridge team during ship maneuvering in normal and emergency conditions more 
effectively. Recent advances in technology have positioned simulators as powerful tools for 
creating more realistic, experiential learning environments and thereby helping organizations 
meet the BRM training challenges. A training simulator is a tool for creating a more realistic 
learning environment, providing the trainer with a virtual medium through which various types of 
knowledge, skills and attitudes can be acquired. Antai (2002) defines training as “the systematic 
development of employees’ knowledge, skills and attitudes that are required for an organization 
to meet its goals.” Knowledge refers to factual information and skills refer to the learned 
capacity to perform some type of task. Unlike knowledge, skills typically include a physical 
component that must be developed through practice and feedback.  
Maritime Operations AS offers four different training options leading to BRM certification, 
depending on the seafarer’s previous education. All four courses teach theory and link it to 
practice through simulator training. A questionnaire with 46 items was distributed to 317 
seafarers who attended the courses between April 2013 and March 2014 resulting in a total of 
112 completed questionnaires. Results indicate that 77 % of the variation of “Change in 
behavior as a result of the BRM course” was explained by the combination of increased skills, 
change in attitudes, and increased knowledge and understanding. One can conclude that using 
simulations in BRM courses have great potential as a medium to create highly-relevant training 
contexts where the bridge teams are active participants in a learning process that creates 
specialized and adaptive knowledge and skills.   
 
Keywords: Crew- training, maritime safety, maritime training 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the major causes for marine casualties is human error (Hanzu-Pazara , Barsan & 
Arsenie, 2008; Petkov, Todorov, Takov,  Petrov,  Stoychev, Vladimirov  & Chukov.  2004; 
O'Connor & Flin 2003; O’Connor, 2011).  Perrow (1999) and Hetherington et al. (2006) suggest 
that ship-owners and regulating bodies should place more emphasis on team training with focus 
on training in non-technical skills. Bridge and engine room resource management (BRM/ERM) 
courses are now becoming mandatory to gain certificatation according to STCW 2010 (The 
Convention of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping  - International Maritime 
Organization IMO).  The BRM/ERM courses are designed to enable all maritime personnel 
on/off shore to develop their existing knowledge and understanding of human and technical 
resources in an operational maritime environment.  This paper assesses BRM training courses 
offered by Maritime Operations AS in Ålesund, Norway. The courses leading to BRM 
certification teach theory and link this theory to practice through simulator training. Antani (2002) 
define training as “the systematic development of employees’ knowledge, skills and attitudes 
that are required for an organization to meet its goals” and  Cannon-Bowers, Salas, 
Tannenbaum  & Mathieu (1995) define team training as:  “Team-training is defined as a 
constellation of content (i.e., the specific knowledge, skills and attitudes that underlie targeted 
teamwork competencies), tools (i.e., team task analysis, performance measures) and delivery 
methods (i.e., information, demonstration and practice-based learning methods) that together 
form an instructional strategy.” Bridge Resource Management (BRM) intends to reduce the risk 
of marine casualties by training a ship’s bridge crew to anticipate and respond to their ship in 
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changing situations.  BRM addresses bridge officers’ knowledge, skills and attitudes and brings 
teambuilding, communication, leadership, and decision-making, into the larger picture of 
organizational and regulatory management since 1970. Commercial and military aviation have 
used Crew Resource Management (CRM), the aviation version of BRM.  BRM courses are a 
more recent initiative, adapted directly from the aviation model. Simulator-based training 
courses comparable with the CRM courses used in the aviation industry were introduced in 
shipping primarily to train the skills of passage planning, and the importance of the Master/Pilot 
relationship (Gyles & Salmon 1978). Even earlier, as a result of a number of radar-assisted 
collisions in the 1950s, simulators were used in shipping for training in the interpretation of radar 
information. These passage planning and radar information training courses have been 
developed into the BRM courses that are conducted today on many simulators world-wide. If the 
definition of CRM as used in the aviation industry (Salas, Prince, Bowers, Stout, Oser, Cannon-
Bowers, 1999) is employed changing cockpit with bridge, the following definition of BRM is 
created:  
“a set of instructional strategies designed to improve 
teamwork on the bridge by applying well tested training tools 
(i.e., performance measures, exercises, feedback 
mechanisms) and appropriate training tools (e.g., simulators, 
lectures, videos) target at specific content (i.e. teamwork, 
knowledge, skills and attitudes).” (Salas et al. 1999, p163). 
A maritime training simulator is mainly a tool for creating a more realistic learning environment 
in the implementation of BRM, providing the trainer with a virtual medium through which various 
types of knowledge, skills and attitudes can be acquired. Knowledge refers to factual 
information and skills refer to the learned capacity to perform certain types of task. Unlike 
knowledge, skills typically include a physical component that must be developed through 
practice and feedback. According to Carson-Jackson (2010) simulation for optimal use of crew 
resources on the bridge has become a very useful tool in education, and is an effective teaching 
method for transferring theoretical knowledge into practical applications.  
According to some research, the use of BRM is not completely positive and may include 
problems of coordination and communication between crewmembers. Therefore, failures related 
to poor shared mental models and shared situation awareness in the bridge team might occur. 
Chauvin et al. (2013) reports that “failures in BRM are involved in more than 1 out of every 3 
collisions investigated. BRM is a contributory factor of accidents when it does not play its role as 
a “barrier” to prevent accidents” (p35). In a review paper on CRM which looks at 34 articles 
Salas, Wilson, Burke & Wightman (2006) present evidence that CRM training is effective at 
some levels (e.g., attitudes). CRM training seems to be only one of a number of factors 
influencing practice and effectiveness of behavior. CRM can enhance learning, and change 
behavior in a simulated environment; however, one cannot answer with certainty as to whether 
CRM training has an effect on safety (Salas et al. 2006). O’Connor (2011) evaluated the 
effectiveness of the US Navy’s BRM training assessing the attitudes and knowledge of human 
factors that contributed to accidents in a high risk organization. He compared Surface Warfare 
Officers who have had no BRM training with officers that have had BRM training and found that 
BRM training had no significant effect on the attitudes and knowledge of the officers. He 
concluded that for this sample of navy officers BRM training was not having the impact on 
knowledge and attitudes that were typical for the Crew Resource Management training reported 
in aviation. He proposed that the main reason might be that the content of the training was not 
based upon a needs assessment among the officers (the content of the course). Haerkens, Kox, 
Lemson, Houterman,van der Hoeven & Pickkers (2015) indicate that when CRM is implemented 
in hospitals there is an improved perceived safety climate and improved clinical outcome such 
as a reduction in complication rate and mortality in critically ill patients. In view of these results 
and absence of deleterious side effects for the patients, they argue that similar to aviation, 
widespread implementation of CRM in the intensive care units is justified, even without higher 
levels of evidence obtained from randomized clinical trials.  
Figure 1 shows the conceptual model of the study and illustrates five hypotheses which are to 
be empirically tested. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual evaluation model for simulator training 
 
The five hypotheses below have to be seen in connection to each other. The Theory of 
Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) and Theory of  Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) 
provide us with a conceptual framework including knowledge, skills and the influence of 
attitudes on behaviors. According to the theories (Ajzen, 1991 and Fishbein, 2000) intention is 
the immediate antecedent of actual behavior and intention is in turn determined, amongst other 
factors, by the attitude towards the behavior.  Wilson, Kraft & Dunn (1989) and Neal, Griffin, & 
Hart (2000) found that knowledge predicted behavior, compliance and participation. Bentler & 
Speckart (1981) found that attitudes influenced behavior both directly and through behavioral 
intentions.  Salas, DiazGranados,Weaver & King (2008) conclude that “Team training works”, 
however, one should pay attention to the elements of the training design and delivery, ensuring 
that the trainees gain the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes (KSAs) to become good 
team members and make use of their knowledge and skills. Krug &  Frush (2007) identified poor 
teamwork as a factor that threatened the safety in emergency situations. Trainers and educators 
often refer to these three categories as KSA (Knowledge [cognitive], Skills [psychomotor], and 
Attitudes [affective]). This taxonomy of learning behaviors may be thought of as “the goals of the 
learning process.” That is, after a learning episode, the learner should have acquired a new skill, 
knowledge, and/or attitude. The cognitive domain involves knowledge and the development of 
intellectual skills (Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill & Krathwohl 1956). This includes the recall 
or recognition of specific facts, procedural patterns, and concepts that serve in the development 
of intellectual abilities and skills. The affective domain (Krathwohl, Bloom & Masia, 1973) 
includes the manner in which we deal with things emotionally, such as feelings, values, 
appreciation, enthusiasms, motivations, and attitudes. The psychomotor domain includes 
physical movement, coordination, and use of the motor-skill areas. Development of these skills 
requires practice. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Improved operational skills among crew lead to a more positive perception of behavioral 
change 
H2: Improved operational skills among crew lead to a more positive perception of intended 
change in attitude 
H3: Improved knowledge and understanding lead to a more positive perception of behavioral 
change 
H4: Improved knowledge and understanding lead to a more positive perception of intended 
change in attitude 
H5: Change in attitude among crew leads to a more positive perception of behavioral change 
 
According to Schein process, intervention activities are designed to assist individuals and 
groups to examine, diagnose, and act upon their behavior and interpersonal relationships. The 
ideal end-result of these activities is improved team skills and effectiveness, knowledge and 
competence and attitudes which in turn lead to change in behavior/behavioral intentions 
(Schein, 1969; 1999). 
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2 . MATERIALS AND METHOD 
A questionnaire with 46 items was distributed to 317 seafarers who attended the courses 
between April 2013 and March 2014 resulting in a total of 112 completed questionnaires. The 
conceptual model consisted of six latent variables each of which was measured with multiple 
items on a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The question items and 
constructs/factors are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Constructs/factors, indicators, mean, standard deviation, loadings and t-values 
Indicators/variables Mean SD Loadings T-value# 
Relevance of course content     
Communication was a very useful topic 
Situational awareness was a very useful topic 
Cultural differences was a useful topic 
Decision making was a useful topic 
The "human element" was a useful topic 
The theoretical teaching worked well 
6.28 
6.11 
5.61 
6.01 
6.00 
5.97 
0.85 
0.85 
1.01 
0.97 
1.10 
0.98 
0.842 
0.844 
0.722 
0.797 
0.824 
0.761 
13.355*** 
12.172*** 
  8.477*** 
  8.242*** 
18.684*** 
  9.509*** 
Pedagogical approach     
Instructions during simulator training worked well 
The preparation before the simulator exercise was very useful 
The discussions after the simulator exercise were very useful 
It is very important to use a simulator when practising co-
operation 
A combination of theory and practice on the simulator was very 
useful 
5.79 
5.51 
6.03 
6.01 
6.03 
1.09 
1.20 
1.09 
1.20 
1.03 
0.832 
0.826 
0.818 
0.855 
0.865 
14.786*** 
18.898*** 
16.896*** 
23.051*** 
19.317*** 
Improved operational skills     
After the course  
  my skills in how to cooperate has improved 
  my skills in how to communicate has improved 
  the bridge/engine crew work better as a team 
  my decision making skills in critical situations have improved 
  my decision making skills under pressure have become better 
 
4.92 
5.18 
4.46 
4.83 
4.72 
 
1.17 
1.19 
1.14 
1.21 
1.30 
 
0.921 
0.897 
0.876 
0.919 
0.913 
 
47.868*** 
35.596*** 
31.447*** 
51.264*** 
51.192*** 
Improved knowledge and understanding     
I gained a better understanding of  
  the thinking process of the people that I work with 
  the importance of joint situational awareness in the bridge team 
  the importance of precise communication aboard 
  the importance of good planning 
 
5.40 
6.04 
6.20 
5.89 
 
1.10 
1.05 
1.04 
1.13 
 
0.840 
0.910 
0.882 
0.865 
 
24.932*** 
33.990*** 
21.143*** 
19.382*** 
Change in attitude     
After the course I took into consideration conditions I had not 
thought about before 
After the course I gained a more positive attitude towards 
cooperation 
My colleagues claimed they had had an "aha" experience 
concerning how we behaved towards each other 
5.26 
5.16 
4.59 
1.09 
1.20 
1.27 
0.894 
0.891 
0.825 
41.759*** 
40.549*** 
25.689*** 
Behavioural change     
I feel that the course has 
  had a positive effect on safety aboard 
  led to new attitudes aboard 
  led to me doing things differently  
  led to safer operations aboard  
 
5.06 
4.68 
4.76 
4.79 
 
1.14 
1.14 
1.11 
1.16 
 
0.847 
0.882 
0.914 
0.888 
 
22.531*** 
26.521*** 
52.210*** 
39.183*** 
# Based on 1000 bootstrapping samples ***Significant at p < 0.001 (two-tailed test) 
 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a methodological tool that helps in running multiple 
regressions between variables and latent variables of which LISREL, AMOS and Mplus are the 
most popular of SEM software packages. Partial Least Square (PLS) (Wold, 1975) is a SEM 
technique that can simultaneously test the measurement model (relationship between indicators 
or manifest variables and their corresponding constructs or latent variables) and the structural 
model (relationships between constructs). Recently, the use of PLS has increased (Hair, Hult, 
Ringle & Sarstedt, 2014). This study used PLS to evaluate the proposed theoretical model. PLS 
has the capacity to deal with complex models with a high number of constructs, indicators and 
relationships (Barclay, Thompson & Higgins, 1995; Hair, Hult, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2014) which 
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makes its application in our study an ideal analytical technique. The method is not covariance 
based but variance-based. Compared to covariance-based SEM (BSEM), PLS offers many 
benefits with respect to distribution requirements, type of variables, sample size and the 
complexity of the model to be tested (Chin & Newsted, 1999). Psychometric properties of the 
measures were assessed by first performing an exploratory factor analysis with Varimax 
rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.883 and 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was significant at the 0.0001 level, indicating that the data matrix 
sufficiently correlated to the factor analysis. Further analysis was performed by the use of PLS 
software application SmartPLS (Ringle, Wende & Becker, 2014). All constructs in this study 
were operationalized as reflective measures. We assessed the measurement model in terms of 
item reliability, internal consistency and discriminant validity. Using the rule of thumb of 
accepting items with loadings of 0.707 or more, though loadings of at least 0.5 are acceptable 
(Barclays et al. 1995), all the indicators were above 0.707 as shown in Table1. Internal 
consistency was examined using Fornell & Larcker’s (1981) composite reliability index. In our 
model the composite reliability index for all constructs exceeded the acceptable value of 0.7 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998) with all constructs above 0.900. Discriminant validity 
indicates the extent to which a given construct is different from other latent constructs. Fornell & 
Larcker (1981) suggest the use of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) such that a score of 0.5 
for the AVE indicates an acceptable level. Table 2 shows that the average variance extracted by 
our measures range from 0.639 to 0.820, all above the acceptable value of 0.5. A comparison of 
the square root of the AVE (diagonal values) with the correlations among the constructs meets 
Fornell & Larcker’s (1981) criterion in support of discriminant validity. The correlation between 
behavioral change and improved operational change is the highest (0.864). However, further 
assessment of collinearity statistics shows there was no problem with multicollinearity. 
Convergent and discriminant validity was also achieved by examining the construct/factor 
loadings and cross loadings, which shows that all constructs were more strongly correlated with 
their own measures than with any other constructs suggesting good convergent and 
discriminant validity.  
 
Table 2. Discriminant validity coefficients 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Change in attitude 0.870      
Behavioral change 0.740 0.883     
Improved knowledge and understanding 0.706 0.668 0.875    
Improved operational skills 0.744 0.864 0.710 0.905   
Pedagogical approach 0.574 0.610 0.728 0.651 0.839  
Relevance of course content 0.638 0.668 0.738 0.663 0.807 0.800 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Composite reliability 
AVE 
5.000 
1.031 
0.903 
0.757 
4.821 
1.004 
0.934 
0.780 
5.884 
0.943 
0.929 
0.766 
4.823 
1.087 
0.958 
0.820 
5.871 
0.943 
0.923 
0.705 
5.995 
0.767 
0.914 
0.639 
Bold numbers on the diagonals shows the square root of the AVE, numbers below the diagonal represent construct 
correlations 
 
3 . RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
In the sample the median age is 40 (from 21 to 66 years); almost 70 % worked on offshore 
vessels, 85 % were officers, 62. 5 % attended the course together with other members from the 
same crew.  Almost 53 % of the respondents reported that they had experienced highly stressful 
situations which the BRM course helped them tackle. Between 88% and 97% of the 
respondents evaluated the theory part of the course including themes such as communication, 
decision-making, situational awareness, cultural differences and the human elements as useful 
and important. Most of the respondents (77.7 %) reported that they had improved their 
communications skills as a result of the course while 64.3 % reported that their decision-making 
skills had improved.  Debriefing was evaluated as an especially important part of the course 
since around 96 % of the respondents reported that debriefing after each training session was 
useful or very useful.  
The structural model represents the relationships between constructs or latent variables that 
were hypothesized in the conceptual model. Since the primary goal of PLS is prediction (Duarte 
& Rapaso, 2010; Hair et al, 2014), the effectiveness of a theoretical model is established by the 
strength of each structural path and the combined predictability (R2) of its exogenous constructs 
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(Chin, 1998). The results of the structural model are shown in Figure 2 with variance explained 
for each dependent construct. 
 
Figure 2. Results of structural model 
 
The estimation and assessment of structural model path coefficients was performed using 
SmartPLS3. Assessment of the path coefficients was done by bootstrap analysis in SmartPLS3 
to assess the significance of the path coefficients.  Table 3 shows the results of the path 
analysis.   
 
Table 3. Path coefficients (Sample size=112) 
Path   Coeff. T-value# 
Change in attitude → Behavioral change 0.202 2.767** 
Improved knowledge and 
understanding 
     → Change in attitude 0.319 2.666** 
Improved knowledge and 
understanding 
→ Behavioral change 0.037 0.473 
Improved operational skills → Change in attitude 0.470 5.195*** 
Improved operational skills → Behavioral change 0.688 9.918*** 
Pedagogical approach → Change in attitude -0.107 0.851 
Pedagogical approach → Improved knowledge and 
understanding 
0.379 3.252** 
Pedagogical approach → Improved operational skills 0.334 2.570** 
Relevance of course content → Change in attitude 0.176 1.365 
Relevance of course content → Improved knowledge and 
understanding 
0.433 3.570*** 
Relevance of course content → Improved operational skills 0.394 3.101** 
# Based on 1000 bootstrapping samples, *** p<0.001,   ** p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
The effect of improved operational skills on behavioral change (H1) is significant at 0.001(two-
tailed).  The hypothesized relation between improved operational skills among and change in 
attitude (H2) is significant (β=0.470, p< 0.001). However, the effect of improved knowledge and 
understanding on perception of behavioral change (H3) is insignificant (β=0.037, p>0.05). 
Improved knowledge and understanding has a positive significant effect on change in attitude 
(H4; β=0.319, p<0.01). The hypothesized relation between change in attitude and behavioral 
change (H5) is significant (β=0.202, p< 0.01). Thus, improved operational skills’ effect on 
behavioral change has the highest effect size (f2=0.77), followed by improved operational skills’ 
effect on change in attitude (f2 =0.26) and the lowest effect size for the effect change in attitude 
on behavioural change (f2=0.07). In assessing the path coefficients, effect sizes are used to 
gauge whether a predictor latent variable has a weak, medium or large effect at the structural 
level.  Values of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 are considered as weak, medium and large respectively 
(Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2011; Hair, Hult, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2014).      
In the current context, with expensive specialized vessels and platforms with high workloads, 
the acquisition of knowledge, attitudes and skills can be difficult in terms of available time, cost 
effectiveness and safety (Håvold, Nistad, Skiri & Ødegård, 2015). The Bridge Resource 
Management (BRM) course which involves the use of simulators appears to be a valuable  
course  which provides the needed skills, change in attitudes and behavior  which is required by 
crew to perform efficiently and safely especially in very ‘demanding conditions’ at sea. The 
relevance of course content (highest mean value of 5.995, Table 2) and the pedagogical 
Relevance of 
course content
Pedagogical 
approach
Improved 
operational skills
R2 = 0.48
Change in 
attitude
R2 = 0.63
Improved 
knowledge and 
understanding
R2 = 0.60
Behavioral 
change
R2 = 0.77
0.688***
0.470***
0.0370.319**
0.202**
0.334**
0.334**
0.176(ns)
-0.107(ns)
0.394**
0.379**
Legend
ns Not significant
*** p<0.001  (two-tailed)    
** p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
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approach (mean value of 5.871, Table 2) brought about improved operational skills and 
increased knowledge and understanding to crewmembers who participated in the course.   
Relevance of course content in terms of   how to communicate effectively, how to be aware of 
situations on board, how to relate with other crew members and make decisions were 
considered to be very useful topics on this course (see mean values of items, Table 1). The 
pedagogical approach which involves discussions after the simulator training, a combination of 
theory and practice on the simulator, and the use of the simulator in practical training were 
considered as very important pedagogical approaches in disseminating knowledge and 
providing the   skills that are required for effective operations on board. The use of simulators 
provides better and more realistic situations. For example, the use of simulation is required by 
law for airline pilots in many countries. Offshore seafaring yet lacks such a requirement. 
However, the need to improve offshore safety has made the use of simulators in training 
seafaring crew a necessity in order to provide realistic situations for participants on such training 
programs. Simulations have a great potential as a ‘‘low cost’’ medium to create relevant training 
contexts where trainees, students, employees are participants in a learning process (Håvold et 
al, 2015, p.143). The outcomes of the BRM training course include improvement and acquisition 
of skills in communication, cooperation, decision-making and working as a team.  
Outcomes in terms of an increase in knowledge and understanding   with specific reference to 
improvements in  gaining better understanding of the thinking process of other crewmembers, 
planning and more effective communication between crewmembers cannot be 
underemphasized.  In terms of change in attitude and behavior, the BRM course is indisputably 
an important and effective way to bring about those desirable attitudinal and behavioral 
changes. The BRM course is an effective way of changing attitude (mean value of 5.000, Table 
2). The structural model (Figure 2) shows that most of the 63% variation in change in attitude is 
explained by improved operational skills and improved knowledge and understanding. 
Relevance of course content and the pedagogical approach explains 48% variation in improved 
operational skills and 60% in improved knowledge and understanding respectively. Behavioral 
change has 77% of its variation explained by improved operational skills, change in attitude and 
improved knowledge and understanding.   The significant effect of change in attitude on 
behavior is consistent with the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) and Theory 
of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Attitudes are indicators of behavior and effectiveness, as 
they reflect the cognitive aspects of the concepts espoused in training (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). 
Attitudes may not be perfect indicators of behavior, but the findings suggest that in order to 
bring the desired change in attitudes, the acquisition of knowledge and understanding and 
increased skills (in other words, improvement in skills) has a profound influence on changing 
attitudes. When people have the necessary skills, they are more able to act on their intentions. 
Hence, without the necessary skills, intention will not predict behavior. Thus, the acquisition of 
skills is very important.  The evaluation of training programs such as those discussed in this 
study can contribute to improvements in course program design.  It can help to know which 
factors to consider in order to provide effective training for participants.   Course content and the 
pedagogical approach are important predictors of improved operational skills and improved 
knowledge and understanding while improved operational skills are significant predictors of 
behavioral change.   
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Team training works!  “Careful attention to all elements of the training design and delivery will 
ensure that trainees gain the necessary KSAs to be a good team member and can maximize 
their use of these skills on the job, thereby enhancing both their own working conditions and 
patient safety.” The use of evaluation and the assessment of BRM simulator training programs 
can help pinpoint the key success factors that should be given prioritized attention in the design 
of such training programs.   Training programs are very important strategic tools that can be 
employed to provide the needed skills to participants, to help bring about the necessary 
changes in attitudes and behavior especially in the demanding situations which occur in 
seafaring. The use of cross-sectional correlational design used in this study means that the 
various hypotheses used in evaluating the training program was done at a point in time and this 
may not be useful in demonstrating causality.  Secondly, attitudes are dynamic and change over 
time; hence a longitudinal design may be useful in providing further insights in the evaluation of 
such training programs over some considerable period of time. Thirdly, interesting possibilities 
for further research could involve a cross cultural crew (e.g. Norway and Brazil) since more 
vessels are now operating in the Brazilian shelf. Multicultural teams can provide interesting 
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moderating factors to help provide alternative explanations for some of the issues that have 
been discussed in this study. 
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Abstract 
Management and safe storage of chemicals in micro-firms (<10 employees) is a critical issue 
due to their lack of resources and the limited – in certain cases – knowledge on the subject. It is 
also an under-researched area in the international safety literature. While there is limited, yet 
comprehensive, literature and survey results focusing on Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs), there is very little evidence on micro firms.  This paper is based on a nationwide survey 
with the cooperation of the relevant health and safety authority among micro-firms in several 
economic sectors. Micro-firms comprise a major percentage of business firms in a small 
economy like Cyprus. The survey involved the workers and the owners/managers of the firms, 
but also obtained information for compliance and safety performance of the particular firms from 
safety inspectors. The proposed approach overcomes potential problems of common method 
bias when all data are obtained from the same group of respondents. Safe storage and 
management of chemicals is a sensitive issue with potentially catastrophic consequences at 
human, company, as well as, societal level.  Micro firms employing a small number of 
employees tend to portray certain types of safety behavior that reflect the degree of close 
relationships between the workers and management.  Employees and employers – due to the 
small size of the firm – tend to develop a “sense of belonging” with the firm and sometimes 
undermine safety rules. In addition to that, it is reported, in literature that the role of the manager 
in a micro firm is decisive.  The financial crisis has added to that by adding extra costs, fewer 
employees, more stress in the workplace and an increased possibility of accident or 
mismanagement of chemicals. The paper – a part of a wider nationwide survey to collect 
information on the management and storage of chemicals in micro-firms – deals in a holistic 
way with information related to employees, employers and their role, strategies and attitudes 
towards safe storage and management of chemicals in the workplace. It is work-in-progress and 
at a later stage, further to appropriate analysis, will yield information regarding employees as 
well as employers in micro firms. The paper presents only the results related to the perceptions 
of employees and safety inspectors. Information was collected on demographic characteristics 
of firms and major influencing factors of safety performance such as employee participation in 
safety decisions, worker willingness to use personal protection measures, and safety training. 
The analysis of data has produced some interesting results showing the relationship between 
good practices on the one hand and safety performance on the other, even in micro-firms. The 
safety compliance measure, an index comprising safety and chemicals regulations compliance 
aspects assessed by the health and safety inspectors, has a positive and statistically significant 
correlation with views of employees on access and use of safety information on chemicals. The 
employer interest and consultation measure was not found a statistically significant predictor of 
safety compliance in the regression model. The results also present the current situation with 
regards to the safe management of chemicals. 
 
Keywords: compliance, consultation, employees, employers, safety  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Firms in various economic sectors produce, store, and/or use chemicals. Some examples 
include the paint, printing, and pesticides industries. Management of safety from exposure of 
workers to hazardous chemicals is a serious issue (Niskanen et al, 2014). The consequences of 
an accident could have a significant, sometimes even devastating impact on the firm and the 
individual. Adverse consequences of an accident for the firm include compensation costs, loss 
of production time, and negative reputation. The impact of accident for employees includes fall 
in their morale, personal and social costs, and risk for continuation of employment for the 
accident victim (Vinodkumar and Bashie, 2009). While most attention is frequently directed to 
the short term adverse effects of chemicals, the chronic effects should not be overlooked 
(Sadhra et al, 2002). 
 
The present study focuses on a particular category of firms with special problems in the 
management of safety regarding the production and/or use of chemicals, that is the micro-firms 
defined here as those with fewer than 10 employees (Cunningham et al, 2014). While accidents 
in such firms are perceived as being of lower scale and therefore importance they are 
significant, since there is usually a large number of micro-firms in the economy and form a 
relatively neglected category from an inspection point of view (Cowley et al, 2004).  
 Accident prevention in micro-firms is of particular importance since relative lack of knowledge 
and familiarity with chemicals leads to deficiencies in the use and safe storage of chemicals in 
such firms. Risk assessment systems, hazard management systems, and worker exposure 
monitoring and reporting systems are either non-existing or in a primitive form in comparison 
with larger firms (Balsat et al, 2003). The approach to accident prevention is largely reactive and 
ad hoc rather than proactive and planned (Hasle and Limborg, 2006). There are, however, 
increasing pressures, even on micro-firms to comply with laws and regulations in order to avoid 
fines, protect their reputation, and show social responsibility to their employees and the wider 
community.   
The sources of information of micro-firms for safe storage and handling are mainly external, 
especially suppliers, but also safety inspectors and to a smaller extent consultants (Walker and 
Tait, 2004). The dependence on suppliers for information, including provision of material safety 
data sheets (MSDS), makes the links in the supply chain of particular importance in the study of 
management of chemicals in micro-firms (Laird et al, 2011). The compliance to safety rules and 
legislation, and especially the preparation and maintenance of MSDS in the local language, are 
viewed as a difficult to bear bureaucratic burden by small firms and even more so by the micro-
firms (Balsat et al, 2003).  
Some of the characteristics of micro-firms can be summarized as follows: 
· Small size, informal task division, and lack of clear role responsibility 
· Sense of belonging of employees due to the family nature of micro-firm 
· Informality and close social relationships affecting views of safety issues 
· Financial instability and survival concerns 
· Limited resources capability and resource slack, especially money and managerial time 
· Ability of the owner/manager to directly influence business decisions.  
 
The above characteristics are important because they lead to special challenges and needs of 
micro-firms (Laird et al, 2011). Such needs include the cost-effective and practical advice, which 
is easy to convert to meaningful and especially effective action (Oldershaw, 2003). 
 
The management of chemicals in firms has been widely studied, especially the technical 
aspects of handling chemicals and systems for prevention of accidents (Bragatto et al, 2015). 
Social and behavioural factors and informal aspects of the management of chemicals are 
equally, if not more, important and interact with the technical safety features (Harms-Ringdahl et 
al, 2000). Even the limited studies on such factors are mainly focused on large firms, especially 
in industrially advanced countries and to a much lower extent on small firms. The lower end of 
small firms that is micro-firms are severely under-represented in the literature. The present 
study attempts to close this gap. There are differences in safety patterns between micro-firms 
and other categories of small firms and therefore business size matters (Micheli and Cagno, 
2010, Legg et al, 2015). 
The specific characteristics of micro-firms as mentioned above, especially the close inter-
personal relationships of management and employees, and the expectation that employee 
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attitudes are more homogeneous and therefore easier to be captured is an additional reason for 
this study (Luria and Yagil, 2010). 
The main research objectives of the paper include: 
· Understand perceptions and beliefs of employees about chemical risks 
· Current management of hazardous chemicals in micro-firms and collaboration of 
workers and managers 
· Compliance practice to safety rules and procedures in relation to hazardous chemicals 
· Differences in perceptions, knowledge, and practice of owners/managers, employees, 
and safety inspectors 
· The effect of various organizational variables on safety  outcomes (like compliance and 
proactive safety activities) 
 
The current paper focuses mainly on the views of employees and their involvement in safety 
practices, but also their perceptions about management commitment and priority given to safety 
versus production targets. It also investigates their safety behaviour in the workplace including 
the extent of involvement in information gathering on chemical risks, comprehension of such 
information, and application for the proper handling of chemicals. Compliance of the firm to 
safety and chemicals regulations, as a major barrier to accidents in the workplace, is an 
essential aspect of safety performance and a major output variable for this study (Dahl and 
Olsen, 2013). 
The research is expected to lead to identification of potential types of suitable preventive 
intervention practices like training, information provision, safety audits, monitoring and reporting 
systems and their relative importance, and increased learning from near misses and accidents. 
The context of research is Cyprus a small European island country. The social and economic 
context, especially the legal and regulatory framework of the country, have an important impact 
on the management of chemicals in micro-firms (Walters, 2006). The legal structure about 
protecting the health of workers from chemicals in Cyprus is briefly summarized here as a 
useful background for the current study.  
In Cyprus there is a major regulation for chemical substances and the safety of the workers, 
namely Chemical Substances Law 78/2010. This legal framework encompasses the main EU 
directives, REACH (2007) and CLP (2008). REACH is “the Regulation on Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals” and has been put into play on the 1st of 
June 2007. It aims to ensure a high level protection of the human health and the environment 
from the risks arising from the use of chemicals, the promotion of alternative testing methods, 
the free circulation of substances on the internal market and the enhancement of 
competitiveness and innovation (EC, 2006). CLP – Regulation 1272/2008 has been put into 
force on January the 20th 2009 and focuses on classification, labeling and packaging aiming at 
ensuring that the same hazards are described and labelled the same around the world, as 
directed by the Globally Harmonized System (GHS). The EU suggested a transition period until 
CLP – Regulation completely took over the older EU regulations; that was the 1st of December 
2010 for substance classification and labelling to be consistent with the new rules and the 1st of 
June 2015 for mixtures to abide by the new CLP directive (2008).   
 In addition to the above directives, the Chemical Substances Law 78/2010 of the Cyprus 
government is acting as an umbrella ensuring that a) hazardous chemical substances and 
mixtures are always in the appropriate packages, b) they are labeled correctly in terms of 
safety, exposure limits and protective measures to be taken by workers for their personal safety 
and health and the safety of the environment, c) the professionals using hazardous substances 
are obligated by this law to keep a Safety Data Sheet in Greek, d) the restrictions for production, 
importing, exporting and distributing specific hazardous substances and mixtures are not being 
compromised, e) all chemical substances available on the market are registered by the CLP 
standards, and f) relevant information regarding the hazardous chemicals that are on the 
Cypriot market has been notified to the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA).  
Section 2 below describes the materials and methods, while section 3 the analysis of results 
and their discussion, and finally section 4 the conclusions and some recommendations based 
on the findings. 
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2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
2.1 Sample 
The paper is based on the results of a study on safety management in micro-firms in Cyprus. 
The survey tool (questionnaire) was divided in 3 sections: the employer, the employee, and the 
labour inspector.  In this way, the labour inspector as an independent observer would confirm 
(or not) the statements of the employer and employee.  For every organization, a questionnaire 
was filled by the employer, one employee, and the labour inspector that administered the 
questionnaire and observed the workplace. A survey was conducted among 60 micro-firms 
(employing less than 10 employees) from several economic sectors with the help of the 
Department of Labour Inspection, Cyprus.  48 questionnaires were returned. The sample is 
representative of the main economic sectors of Cyprus (Manufacturing (other than chemical) 
33.3%, Chemical industry 26.8%, Services 29.4%, Others 10.5%).  The sample is small 
therefore the study has only an exploratory character. Micro-firms are notorious for their 
reluctance to participate in surveys (Lamm 2014). 
 
A pilot study was conducted among ten micro-firms to test whether the questions of the 
questionnaire were easily comprehended by the respondents. Based on this pilot study re-
wording of some questions was made in order to increase clarity and comprehension. For 
example in the question of accidents at the workplace the qualification of reporting only those 
that kept the employee three days away from work had to be added.  
 
The Department of Labour Inspection had an active participation in questionnaire design and 
data collection. Confidentiality and the fact that this data collection was completely independent 
from the inspection duties of the inspectors were emphasized. Although the method of delivery 
of questionnaires by labour inspectors has admittedly introduced some potential bias in the 
interviewee responses, it was the only feasible approach for access to micro-firms in Cyprus, 
which are notoriously reluctant in providing information to researchers. The inspectors then filled 
in their answers to questions regarding to indicators of safety performance and chemicals 
management of the firm after the visit.  
 
Questions were asked to employees about the provision of training on health and safety issues, 
the provision of individual safety protection measures and their participation in safety and 
chemicals management related decisions. There were also questions on the perceived safety 
conditions and occurrence of accidents (which kept employees for more than 3 days away from 
work) in the last 12 months. Finally questions were asked about the employee role in proper 
handling of chemicals and the availability of safety information. The research complied with the 
guidelines of our university for human research ethics.  
 
2.2. Variable measures 
A safety performance measure for the firm was constructed in order to be used as the 
dependent variable. It is a simple summative index (safety compliance) comprising two safety 
performance aspects, assessed by the health and safety inspectors. The two items of the index 
were based on the following questions answered by the safety inspectors:  
1. Does the firm comply with the law and regulations about chemicals?  
2. Does the firm comply with health and safety law and regulations?  
In both cases they were asked to “Grade compliance on a scale of 1 minimum to 10 maximum” 
The Cronbach’s alpha reliability of the summative scale at 0.83 is quite good. The fact that this 
measure is based on judgement of safety inspectors, while the independent variables are based 
on responses of employees is an advantage of the research design since it avoids the common 
method bias. 
 
Safety compliance cannot be tested for association with the occurrence of serious accidents in 
the firm because there were no accidents in the last 12 months in the sample firms. Serious 
accidents – according to Cypriot Law - are those requiring an absence of the employee for more 
than three days from work.  
 
Some of the independent variables as use of chemicals in the production process of the firm, 
everyday use of chemicals by the employee, study of the material safety data sheets, and 
willingness to follow instructions for proper use of chemicals were measured as dichotomous 
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(binary) variables (Yes = 1, No = 0). Access to chemicals safety data, perceived safety 
conditions in the workplace, perceived employer interest in health and safety issues and 
“Breach of safety regulations in order to meet production targets” are each measured by a 
single five step scale from not at all to very much. Extent of safety training was measured by 
taking into account the number of hours of training regarding proper use of chemicals (5-10, 10-
20, and over 20 hours). 
 
A scale was constructed for the “perceived consultation and interest in safety of the employer” 
by employees. It is based on the following four items and has a high Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
of 0.91. 
· Employer/employee consultation on chemicals 
· Employer interested in employee protection from chemicals 
· Awareness of employer views on protection from chemicals 
· Appreciation of my views on chemicals management 
 
A second scale was constructed for “access and use of safety information on chemicals” by 
employees. It is based on the following three items and has an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability of 0.69. 
· Access to chemicals safety data 
· Label information adequacy 
· Study of chemicals labels 
 
Descriptive statistics was initially used for some of the results and then zero order correlation 
was used in order to explore the relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables by calculating the Pearson r coefficient. Multiple regression was used to determine the 
relative influence of the independent variables on safety compliance.  
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Due to limited space the article reports only some of the descriptive results. The employee 
respondents are mainly males (76%) against 24% females. Their answers on length of training 
for proper use of chemicals show that the majority of companies (56.7%) provide minimal 
training 5-10 hours, but a significant percentage over 20 hours with only 8.1% providing 10-20 
hours of training. 
 
There is no significant correlation between safety compliance and OHS policy existence, and 
surprisingly no significant correlation also between safety compliance and training, employee 
willingness to follow safety guidelines and employee willingness to use personal protection 
measures. There is, however a significant relation (r= 0.35 p<0.05) between safety compliance 
and “employee consultation about chemical management” as reported by owners/managers. 
Some similarities between the views of employers and employees are noteworthy. For example 
there is a moderate and statistically significant correlation (r= 0.51 p<0.01) between 
“consultation on chemicals management” as perceived by employees and “consultation” as 
reported by employers. The latter variables are not however statistically correlated with the 
“compliance of employees to information provided by material safety data sheets” as reported 
by the inspectors. Finally there is a statistically significant correlation between information 
provided on proper use of chemicals as reported by employers and as reported by employees 
(r= 0.30 p<0.05). 
Subsequently multiple regression analysis was conducted in order to determine the relative 
contribution of each predictor to the outcome variable safety compliance (sumcomplianceins). 
Two demographic variables company age, and employee years of experience (as a proxy for 
work experience), and the two scales on “perceived consultation and interest in safety of the 
employer” (employerconsult) and “access and use of safety information on chemicals” 
(labelchem). Table 1 presents the abbreviations used in the analyses. Table 2 the descriptive 
statistics and Table 3 zero-order correlations, while Tables 4, 5, 6 illustrate the results of 
regression analysis. The assumptions of linear regression for normality, linearity, 
homoskedasticity, and lack of collinearity were checked with the appropriate diagnostic tests 
(mainly inspection of appropriate histograms, residual scatter plots, and normal probability plots) 
and it was confirmed that they are met. 
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In the regression model the R square is 0.48, (adjusted R square 0.32). Only the variable 
“access and use of safety information on chemicals” (labelchem) was statistically significant in 
the regression model: beta = 3.28, p<0.01. 
 
Table 1 – Abbreviations of variables used during the analyses 
Variable  
description 
Variable 
Abbreviation 
perceived consultation and interest in safety of the 
employer employerconsult 
safety information on chemicals  and use by 
employees  labelchem 
years of employment at the firm  Years Employment 
Compliance of the firm with the law and regulations 
(about chemicals and health and safety)  sumcomplianceins 
Years the company has operated for Company Age 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
employerconsult 170.667 342.053 
labelchem 107.209 336.880 
Years Employment 3.02 .901 
sumcomplianceins 129.362 345.407 
Company Age 4.62 .834 
N   45 
 
Table 3 – Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 
employerconsult [1]  
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .481** .315* .274 .086 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.001 .035 .076 .593 
 
N 45 41 45 43 41 
labelchem [2] 
Pearson 
Correlation .481** 1 .343* .583** .115 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
 
.024 .000 .485 
 
N 41 43 43 41 39 
Years Employment 
[3] 
Pearson 
Correlation .315* .343* 1 .380** .440** 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .024 
 
.009 .003 
 
N 45 43 49 47 45 
sumcomplianceins 
[4] 
Pearson 
Correlation .274 .583** .380** 1 .316* 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .076 .000 .009 
 
.039 
 
N 43 41 47 47 43 
Company Age [5] 
Pearson 
Correlation .086 .115 .440** .316* 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .593 .485 .003 .039 
   N 41 39 45 43 45 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
   *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4 – Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .696a .484 .415 260.442 2.068 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Years Employment, employerconsult, Company Age, 
labelchem 
b. Dependent Variable: sumcomplianceins 
 
Table 5 – ANOVA 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 190.795 4 47.699 7.032 .000b 
 
Residual 203.490 30 6.783 
    Total 394.286 34       
a. Dependent Variable: sumcomplianceins 
  
b. Predictors: (Constant), Years Employment, employerconsult, Company Age, labelchem 
 
Table 6 – Regression Model Coefficients 
 
 
There is substantial agreement between the views of managers and employees on the issue of 
“perceived consultation of employers and employees” as shown above by the statistically 
significant correlation between the relevant variables and also on provision of information on 
proper use of chemicals. In contrast many literature sources refer to differences in views on 
safety issues between employees and owners/managers in small firms (Hasle and Limborg, 
2006). Frequently owners/managers blame employees for accidents considering them 
responsible for their own safety in the workplace (Laird et al, 2011).The demographic variables 
years of employment or tenure of the employee (a proxy for work experience) and company age 
(a potential proxy for experience at company level for safe handling of chemicals) although 
individually positively correlated with compliance of the firm to safety regulations are not 
statistically significant in the regression model. 
 
The results of regression analysis show that the variable “Perceived employer interest in safety 
and consultation” is not a statistically significant predictor of safety compliance. This variable 
reflects the views of employees regarding consultation of management with employees on 
protection from chemicals, the perceived interest of employer in protection of workers from 
chemicals, management commitment to safety, and importance attached to employee views by 
management. It is an indirect measure of safety leadership as perceived by employees (Dahl 
and Olsen, 2013). More positive views were expected to be associated with higher safety 
compliance of the firm, but this was not the case. Similarly Hambach et al (2011) report distrust 
of workers in chemical firms towards management from their focus group based study. In 
contrast Walters and Nichols, 2006 refer to the importance of consultation of management with 
employees on health and safety issues in small chemical firms. Niskanen et al, 2014 report 
positive views of workers’ organizational safety and health (OSH) representatives in chemical 
industry in general (mainly small and medium size firms) regarding engagement, willingness to 
collaborate with, and trust to management. 
 
Positive views on “access and use of safety information on chemicals” by employees as 
summarized by the relevant variable are positively associated with higher safety compliance. 
Model
Unstandardize
d Coefficients
Standardize
d 
Coefficients t S ig.
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B
Correlatio
ns
Collineari
ty 
Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 3.425 3.106 1.103 .279 -2.919 9.769
employerconsult -.001 .143 -.001 -.004 .997 -.292 .291 .320 -.001 .000 .776 1.288
labelchem .527 .161 .534 3.278 .003 .199 .855 .656 .514 .430 .649 1.540
Company Age .316 .584 .081 .541 .592 -.877 1.510 .293 .098 .071 .778 1.286
Years Employment .818 .643 .214 1.273 .213 -.494 2.131 .515 .226 .167 .609 1.643
a. Dependent Variable: sumcomplianceins
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Safety communication is considered as an important factor for safety performance. Brown et al, 
2006 have found that workers in the printing industry criticize management for lack of interest 
for employees, provision of little health and safety information, and inadequate training provided 
to them. Sadhra et al, 2002 from a study among small electroplaters have found that workers 
learn more from one another than from material safety sheets or other available written material. 
The sources of information (formal and informal) and the role of exchange of information with 
peers in the family atmosphere of the micro-firm is an issue worthy of further investigation in the 
context of micro-firms. 
 
Limitations of the current study include the small sample size, its cross–sectional survey nature 
and the selection of firms from different economic sectors instead of concentration on chemical 
industry. It is also possible that some of the replies reflect the desirable and socially acceptable 
behaviour rather than the actual one. Agreement between additional questions on similar issues 
do not show however a large extent of this effect.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The most interesting finding of the study is that the variable representing the perceptions of 
employees regarding access and active use of safety information on chemicals has a positive 
association with safety compliance. The cross-sectional nature of the study does not allow to 
conclude whether positive views of employees on availability and use of information on 
chemicals leads to higher compliance of the firm to regulations or whether high compliance 
leads to positive employee views on safety information issues. Views of employees on 
employer’s interest in protecting workers from chemical risks, consultation and commitment to 
safety were not found significantly related to safety compliance as independently judged by 
safety inspectors in the regression model.  
The findings suggest that good practices like provision of information on chemicals and 
motivation of employees to read the relevant information and especially act accordingly taking 
the necessary precaution measures and using the appropriate personal protection equipment 
seem to be a proper intervention strategy in micro-firms using chemicals. The key issue is how 
to design realistic intervention strategies to match the informal atmosphere and the resources 
and safety capabilities of micro-firms in order to increase their effectiveness.  
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Abstract 
The paper addresses challenges that occur when elements of a regulatory regime developed 
under certain historical contexts in one region are transferred to other national contexts. On 
February 11, 2015, there was a serious explosion on the Floating, Production, Storage and 
Offloading unit (FSPO) Ciade de Sau Mateus on the Brazilian continental shelf.  Nine workers 
died in the accident. The explosion was, however, not powerful enough to affect the large 
amount of oil that was stored on the vessel, which could have resulted in further fatalities and 
potential large oil spill. The FSPO was owned and operated by the Norwegian company BW 
Offshore that produced oil for the state owned Brazilian company - Petrobras. Accordingly, the 
accident put attention on the relationships between the Norwegian and Brazilian petroleum 
industry and how Norwegian experiences have been used in developing an offshore sector in 
Brazil.   
Through a comparative analysis, the paper discusses similarities and differences in relation to 
regulatory challenges overseeing the Norwegian and the Brazilian offshore sector. In order to 
accomplish such an analysis, the paper also relates cases of the Brazilian regulatory system to 
relevant cases of the U.S and British regulatory system.  
 
Keywords: Petroleum industry, Social Context, Governmental role, Local content, Safety  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When Brazil established an independent regulatory institution related to petroleum activities in 
1997, the regulatory approach in the Norwegian offshore oil sector was one of the main models. 
Together with the regulatory regime in Britain, the Norwegian regulatory regime has developed 
a status as “industrial best praxis” when it comes to regulation of petroleum activities offshore. 
The main reason for this is the fact that more than 30 years have passed since Norway has had 
a large accident. The statistics show that work-related fatalities in the sector are rare. There was 
not a single fatality between 2009 and 2015. Other statistical figures that compare lost time due 
to incidents and other safety related indicators between countries show a more complex picture. 
This does not undermine the general positive picture as it can be interpreted as simply a 
consequence of effective report systems. However, during the last decade there have been 
near misses that under more unfortunate circumstances might have turned into catastrophes 
(IRIS 2011). It is difficult to determine just what it is about the Norwegian safety system that 
makes it work. Since the efficiencies of a safety system can be related to specific context, 
important pillars in a system can erode unnoticed. Accordingly, the challenge is even higher if 
one transforms a part of a system that work in one country to other countries where contexts are 
very different. 
Context is also important when it comes to safety. The relevant contexts can be very concrete 
such as laws, regulations, and formal institutions, such as the Norwegian Petroleum Agency 
(PSA), and therefore easy to define. Context can also consist of more vague factors such as 
power structure, tacit knowledge, and even more general, culture.  The international petroleum 
industry is experienced in transferring huge packages of technological solutions that are 
organized in certain structures. However, the industries will also, to a large degree, be shaped 
by the social, cultural and political relations in the country where they operate. Since regulatory 
regimes are tied to the local state, regulation must be related to other regulatory traditions that 
dominate the host country. These dimensions all have their own history. The paper, therefore, 
addresses challenges that occur when elements of a regulatory regime developed under certain 
historical contexts in one region are transferred to other national contexts. The paper is based 
on findings from the ongoing projects “Robust Regulatory Regimes” and “Defences against 
Major Accidents” (Funded by Norwegian Research Council). 
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Even though Latin America has a long petroleum history, with Mexico and Venezuela being 
among the largest producers in the world for long periods of time, the Brazilian oil industry has a 
distinct historical background in the sense that it first became a large producer after oil was 
found on the Brazilian continental shelf in the 1960s (Randall 1993). The most important 
reference point in the development of the Brazilian oil sector has therefore not been other Latin 
American countries, but the development in the other two largest offshore oil producing regions, 
i.e. the North Sea and the U.S. part of the Gulf of Mexico. Even though the Brazilian state oil 
company has had an almost monopolistic position as owner and formal operator since it was 
established in 1953, it has to a large degree relied on the international offshore supply and 
service industry for difficult technological tasks. Given the size and advanced nature of the 
operation, the dependency of the international supply and service industry enhanced after 
exploration and production of petroleum started offshore. This meant that it was the same 
international industry that operated in both Brazil and Norway when drilling started offshore in 
the mid-1960s. The parallel development was such that companies sometimes could even 
move key equipment and personnel back and forth, crossing the Atlantic and the Equator.  
However, since oil was first found offshore in the Garoupa-field in Brazil in 1968 and at the 
Ekofisk-field in the Norwegian part of the North Sea in late 1969, there have been important 
differences between Brazil and Norway that have had significant effects on safety issues. First 
there are some very basic weather conditions that have influenced technological decisions from 
the pioneer period in the 1960s up to today:  All installations operating in the North Sea have to 
be robust enough to handle a cold, stormy winter season.  Platforms have to be designed for a 
so called “100-year’s wave” up to 30 meters. The Brazilian continental shelf does not have the 
same climate and waves seldom reach more than 7 meters. That is a bit higher than in the U.S. 
outer continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. However, unlike U.S., Brazil did not have to take 
into account hurricanes.  
Another major difference between Norway and Britain on one side, and Brazil on the other was 
that the oil companies operating in the North Sea during the 1970s and 1980s found a series of 
large reservoirs of oil and gas, while the finding rate in Brazil was much lower (BP 2015). 
Several of the largest findings in the North Sea, like Brent Spar, Statfjord, Murchison, were on 
water depths from 150 meters and below. The size of the findings and the fact they were found 
in politically safe areas far from more politically turbulent oil-producing countries in the Middle 
East, led to an intense investment boom.  In Norway and Britain, a new industry was built from 
scratch during a very short period. This, combined with the fact that the industry was operating 
on the very edge of what was technologically possible, had also profound consequences for 
safety. Both the Norwegian and the British continental shelf experienced a series of accidents. 
In Norway, between the 1960s and 1978 there were 82 fatalities related to offshore activities. 
The worst accident occurred in 1980 when the Alexander Kielland platform capsized, causing 
123 deaths. Britain had a similar accident rate and experienced its worst accident in 1988 when 
a blow-out led to an explosion and fire at the Piper Alpha platform, causing 167 deaths 
(Woolfson, Foster, Beck 1997, Paterson 2014).   
Investments in offshore installations in Brazil did not really take off until there were significant oil 
findings in the Campos basin in the mid-1970s. The findings were not as big as the largest 
findings in the North Sea.  When several of them were producing in the mid-1980s, Brazil 
produced 1/3 of what Norway and 1/5 of what Britain produced at the same time. What is 
important in relation to safety is that the Brazilian fields were generally found in shallow waters.  
With a lag of time of about five years, less wave heights, more shallow water, and a less intense 
investment boom, the Brazilian offshore sector had the advantage of being able to use 
technologies that had been proven effective under more challenging circumstances in the North 
Sea. This did not mean that exploration and production of oil from offshore installations in Brazil 
was an easy task. In Brazil, as in Norway, there was strong desire to make sure that 
construction of installations was made locally. In the Campos basin many of the basic metal 
structures that were in use, such as jackets and platform-decks, were constructed at local yards.   
 
2.1 First Accidents 
Parallel to Norway, the first serious incident in relation to offshore petroleum activities in Brazil 
occurred when the first drilling rig was towed over the Atlantic. Another serious accident 
happened when a jacket for first production installations on the Gouropa-field was to be 
installed in 1980 (C.T. da Costa Fraga (et. Al.) OTC 15219. 2003. p.2). The jacket was 
constructed based on experience from the North Sea. However, when the installation was 
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placed on the seabed outside Brazil, part of it sank and made the entire installation tilt.  In the 
same year, the process plant on the same installation collapsed.  After these incidents the 
engineers concluded that different seabed conditions, wave, and stream conditions had to be 
taken more seriously when designing and constructing installations.  
The most serious accident in the first phase of the Brazilian offshore oil history occurred when a 
production installation on the Enchova field in August 1984 experienced a blowout.  The 
Platform caught fire after an explosion. Forty-two workers were killed in the event, most of them 
because a life boat collapsed when it reached water after having been released from the 
platform.  In April 1988 the same platform experienced a new blowout (Maduro & Reunolds, 
1989). This time the evacuation went well but the platform collapsed however from a heavy fire.   
In the 1990s, Brazil caught up with the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico in the sense that oil 
was found on deeper waters. The breakthrough for Brazil as a deep-sea producer happened 
when oil was found in the Barracuda field (300 meter and down) and the Marlim field (800 meter 
and below) in the late 1980s. The real technological challenge was not the exploration drilling, 
but the installation of production wells and the related installation adjusted to such conditions. 
However, due to Brazil’s debt problems, heavy inflations, and long periods of economy crises 
and stagnation it was difficult for Brazil to promote any kind of protective industrial policy from 
the mid-1980s into the 1990s. Brazil had given up most of its ambitions to develop a local 
supply and service industry. This meant that even though the Brazilian continental shelf was 
about to become an important technological laboratory for offshore oil technology, it was mainly 
firms with historical roots in the offshore activities in the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico that 
dominated. Initially, U.S. firms received most of the contracts. When Petrobras in the early 
1990s during the development phase on the Barracuda and the Marlim fields established 
technical standards for sub-sea structures, they chose to use the U.S. API standard (Oil & Gas 
Journal 1994). The main rationale for introducing technical standards was to reduce cost and 
make sure that operations ran as smoothly as possible. However, making equipment and 
installations fit together and become more robust also had safety implications. 
In the late 1990s and into the 2000s, Norwegian firms played an increasingly important role in 
the deep sea segment of the Brazilian industry. The hazards in relations to petroleum 
production offshore increase for every extra meter drilled into the ground. These dangers are 
further related to extreme temperatures (i.e. extra cold in deep waters, potential extra warm the 
deeper in to the ground), as well as extreme pressure. This was clearly demonstrated by the 
Deepwater Horizon accident.  The main technological breakthrough, though, was the ability to 
operate the equipment from above. As long deep sea activities were regulated by the 
technological standards set by the dominating operator Petrobras, Norwegian firms also had to 
rely on U.S.-developed API standards. However, the very competitive edge of many Norwegian 
firms was, to a large degree, influenced by a stricter Norwegian regulation regime. Most new 
fields on the Norwegian shelf in the 1990s were on depths between 150 and 350 meters. These 
depths made it possible but dangerous for divers to operate. In the early 1990s, Norway 
introduced new regulations that in praxis restricted diving beneath 180 meters. Major operators 
and supply and service firms were therefore forced to quit operate installations for BOPs, 
wellheads, manifolds, etc., on the seabed either from automated steering systems on platforms 
or from remote operated vessels (ROVs).  Norwegian firms operating in Brazil had to adapt to 
the API standards that were in use in Brazil. However, many firms used installations and 
equipment that were developed to adapt to stricter safety requirements that also were adjusted 
to the Norwegian technological standard, NORSOK. This was particular the case for drilling rigs 
and supply ships active in Brazil. It was also the case for some of the standardised equipment 
on board FSPOs, even if these were usually registered in flag states. 
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, offshore activities in Brazil competed with the U.S outer 
continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico to have the world record both in drilling and operative 
production installations on deeper water. The Roncador field, which was found in 1996, covered 
an area with water depths between 1500 and 1900 meters.  It was here that Brazil experienced 
one of its most serious offshore accidents when, in March 2001, an explosion and a following 
fire led to a total collapse of the platform. (Petrobras 2001) Eleven people lost their lives. The 
platform was originally constructed as a drilling rig. When the construction was finished at an 
Italian yard it was the largest semi-submersible drilling rig ever built. When production on 
Norwegian oil fields started up in the 1990s and 2000s, the typical strategy would be to 
construct entirely new installations for the purpose of production only. Due to constant financial 
constraints, the typical strategy for Petrobras would be to start production early, often with 
installations that were originally constructed for drilling only, and adapt them to production 
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purposes. This strategy was a way to create cash flow that circumvented the governmental 
formal budget procedures.  When the P 36 was converted to a production platform, it was the 
largest semi-submersible production platform in the world.  
The production from the Roncador field was taken up again when a Floating, Production, 
Storage and Offloading unit (FSPO) began production in 2002.  In the same manner as large 
gravity production platforms, it became a symbol of the technological style on the Norwegian 
continental shelf from the late 1970s and into the 1990s, the use of FPSOs on the Brazilian 
have some of the same symbolic meanings. No other offshore oil region in the world can boast 
the same concentration of large FPSO’s (FSPO.com), which has a total of 30 vessels. In the 
U.S. part of the Gulf of Mexico, where the water depths and environmental conditions are 
similar, FSPOs are seldom used.  The reason is a general scepticism among many actors in the 
U.S oil industry regarding the storage of a large amount of oil in the same place since the Exxon 
Valdez Accident in 1989. Typical, it was Petrobras who operated a large oil field from an FSPO 
in the U.S Gulf of Mexico (Caskade & Chinook fields). The actual PSPO, BW Pioneer, was 
owned and operated by the same Norwegian company BW Offshore that operated the FSPO 
Cidade de São Mateus that experienced a serious accident in 2015.  
The use of FPSO, with equipment able to withstand extreme pressure, has been the main 
solution after oil from 2007 was found in pre-salt layers. Located in areas with water depths 
down to 2000 meters and more, and in geological zones placed more than 7000 meter below 
the sea, oil petroleum activities in pre-layers have taken the oil industry to new challenging 
ground, where safety implications have not yet been fully explored. When an explosion occurred 
on the Cidade de São Mateus in February 2015, it was the worst incident ever on an FSPO. 
Nine of the vessel’s 76 crew members died. However, with a depth of 760 on the Camarupim 
field where the vessels were operating, the potential challenges were not as great as in the 
much deeper pre-salt field. Luckily, and partly due to safety systems on board, the fire did not 
spread. A total collapse of the installation such as the Allexander Kielland/Piper Alpha/P-
36/Deepwater Horizon type was therefore not experienced 
 
3. REGULATION IN NORWAY 
When offshore oil activities began in Brazilian waters in the 1960s, responsibility for safety was 
left to an internal department in Petrobras. This department conducted enquiries of accidents as 
well as qualified and monitored procedures and technical standards regulating both the oil 
companies and the suppliers. This kind of self-regulation from an operative state institution is 
not unique to Brazil. It used to be the norm in most countries where state oil companies 
operated. In Norway a similar regulation system was used in the state railway system until 1997. 
However, in 1972, when it was clear that the petroleum sector offshore where to become an 
important part of Norwegian industry and economy, an independent regulatory institution was 
established. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was established the same year as 
was the state oil company Statoil. The NPD was, from the start, responsible for regulating both 
resource allocation and safety. Since the maximum amount of resource rent on one side and 
safety on the other to some extent may involve contradictory interests, the two departments 
from 1978 had to report to different ministries. It was not before 2004 that the two departments 
became two different independent institutions: the NPD and Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). 
The regulatory philosophy in NPD was unique compared to other regulatory traditions in 
Norway. The fact that offshore petroleum activities in Norway were a totally new and quickly 
expanding industry contributed to such an uniqueness. Instead of building on other established 
institutions, NPD was developed from scratch and was located in Norways’ new oil capital 
Stavanger, not near established state institutions in the capitol, Oslo. It took some time and 
several serious accidents before the NPD acquired sufficient knowledge and authority to 
confront the industry in a way that actually influenced behaviour and technology. In the early 
1980s, the internal control system was developed. The internal control system was a 
combination of self-regulation and prescriptive regulations, the Working Environmental Act from 
1977, and an adaption of modern principles in safety science such as the system approach and 
risk analyses. When the NPD opted for a system based on performance based instead of 
prescriptive regulation, it was a response to the continuous development of new technologies 
and new kinds of installations in the sector. The NPD found that it was impossible to follow up 
the development of new technologies with the existing system of prescriptive rules and detailed 
auditing procedures.   
However, the system that was developed was different from pure self-regulation in the sense 
that it was made very clear that it was always the operator’s responsibility to operate safe. That 
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meant that operators had established their own procedures and technical standards when 
necessary. The self-regulation element did not mean that the NPD was a weak regulatory 
authority. Companies have always had to prove their focus on safety in extensive 
documentation.  When the regulatory system was fully developed, the ideal role of the NPD was 
said to be to audit the companies’ safety system, not conduct detailed inspections of technical 
equipment. Typically, when civil servants from the NPDs and later PSA, visited offshore sites it 
was described as part of audits, not inspection. A typical audit would involve several civil 
servants in the NPD, last for several months, and involve document analyses, interviews, and 
inspection, resulting in a report published openly on PSAs webpage (Ryggvik 2014, PSA.com). 
When all operators had to perform risk analyses it was considered to be an important part of the 
companies’ safety systems. This was at the same time a requirement in the NPD/PSAs 
regulations. The internal control principle was enforced in several resolutions from 1995 when 
the regulator made specific demand towards the orientation of the companies’ management 
systems [SAM-forskriften 1995, Kgl res. 27. Juni 1997 and Styringsforskriften (the steering 
regulation) of 3. September 2002]  
The offshore safety system reflects the underlying philosophy of the Working Environmental Act 
in two ways.  First, companies operating on the Norwegian shelf have to accept trade unions as 
legitimate counterparts. Concerning safety companies have to establish Health and Safety 
Committees. Several committees and institutions of a more corporative type where workers 
representatives (unions), companies and relevant government representatives cooperates on 
everything from safety issues to the forming of technological standards were also established. 
Second, the Act from 1977 was important in the sense that it clarified the importance of 
improving technology instead of focusing on workers behaviour in enhancing safety. Hence, the 
underlying philosophy was that technology had to adapt to humans, not that humans had to 
adapt to existing technology. This was made particularly clear in the so-called steering 
regulation. 
The last revision of the Norwegian regulation system offshore happened in the early 2000s. This 
was a time with low oil prices and a focus on cost cutting, which created a tense atmosphere 
between unions and companies. The conflict ended after the creation of a series of new 
corporative institutions.  Facilitated by the Norwegian Petroleum Authority, the Regulatory 
Forum and Safety Forum were established.  These new institutions formalized the tripartite 
partnership between public agencies, industrial actors, and labour unions. 
 
3. REGULATION IN BRAZIL 
When Brazil, based on Law 9,478 from 1997, established the Acencia Nacional do Petrolero, 
Gas natural e Biocumbustiveis (ANP), it was part of a larger reform process. The main goal of 
the reform was to create a counter power towards Petrobras inside the Brazilian state apparatus 
while opening up the Brazilian oil sector for foreign oil companies.  Safety was a secondary 
issue. By creating separate regulatory authority, Brazil copied the basic structure of offshore 
regulations in Norway, UK, and U.S.  However, like in Norway with NPD in the 1970s, it took 
some time for the safety department in ANP to develop the necessary knowledge and authority 
to influence an industry where activities took great leaps into the unknown. Also similar to 
Norway in the early years, there were many uncertainties regarding the division of labour 
concerning responsibilities between ANP and other Brazilian regulatory institutions. ANP had to 
coordinate its activities with the Ministry of Labor, standards from Marine Authority, Regulation 
and licensing from IBAMA - Brazilian Institute of Environment (offshore), and Health 
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA). To reduce and control the overlap of responsibilities the group 
"Operação Ouro Negro" (Black Gold Operation) was established so the related authorities 
changed information and resources (email:  Luciano da Silva Pinto Teixeira, ANP). 
It was not before the P 36 accident in 2001 that work to develop a regulatory safety framework 
gained momentum. This finally resulted in a regulatory framework introduced in 2007 
(Resolution No 43, 6th December 2007). The Brazilian system copied all of the three major 
offshore oil regulatory systems confirming that operators had an overall responsibility of safety 
and a responsibility when contractors conducted activities.  At least in theory, the Brazilian 
system copied the Norwegian and partly UK orientation towards performance-based 
regulations. Like in Norway and Britain, there was a strong focus on the regulations for 
operators performing risk analyses. Like in Norway, and unlike offshore regulation in the U.S., 
Brazil’s regulations cover issues like the content of management systems, culture, and 
involvement of workers. However, unlike Norway, there were no strong requirements for oil 
companies to document all relevant safety data such concrete technical information, as well as 
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more general information like workers involvement and the kinds of safety management system 
that were in use. This means that when safety personnel in ANP visit installations, they tend to 
perform inspections focusing on the actual technical equipment rather than the more general 
form of audits that is typical for the Norwegian system. Likewise, the Brazilian regulation did not 
have an equivalent to the underlying philosophy in the Norwegian Work Environment Act and 
the mentioned Norwegian steering regulations where it is made clear that companies in their 
safety system should focus on robust technological solutions (installations as well as necessary 
barriers if something goes wrong). 
In Brazil trade unions have played a much more important role in the development of the oil 
sector than in the U.S where unions have been almost non-existent on offshore installations. In 
Brazil unions have had particularly strong position inside Petrobras (Braathen 2014). But, like in 
the U.S, unions have been weaker when it comes to offshore activities. This is partly because 
much of the actual work offshore is performed by contracted firms, like BW Offshore, which 
operated a field in production for Petrobras. In such companies, unions tend to be weaker. 
Since the first years under President Vargas in the 1930s, Brazil has had laws that 
institutionalized trade unions. In the late 1970s trade union mobilization from below also 
became an important political force in Brazil. But the focus for unions was mainly basic 
demands like wages, work hours, pensions, etc. When conflicts became political in the oil sector 
it was issues such as the privatisation of Petrobras and opening for foreign participation that 
were at the forefront. Brazil did not have any kind of tripartite arenas where workers and 
employers cooperated on safety issues and other issues relevant to the development of the 
industry. This was also reflected in ANPs regulations. The paragraphs in the regulations that 
address work relations are vague. They might as well accept the kind of involvement from 
workers in behaviour-based safety systems that, up until the Deep Water Horizon accident, had 
a central place in the U. S. system, as opposed to the more collective cooperation between 
unions and companies that characterizes the Norwegian system.   
An event that typically initiated activities in the abovementioned forums (Regulatory Forum and 
Safety Forum) in Norway was the Deepwater Horizon accident in 2010. The different forums 
came forward with proposals for adjustments in safety regulations and technical standards that 
the system quickly took into account. Many criticised the Brazilian system for not doing the 
same. This criticism got momentum in the Brazilian public sphere during the blowout on a field 
operated by Chevron just a few months after the accident in the Gulf of Mexico. Chevron was 
using a rig owned and operated by Transocean, the very same company that was involved in 
the accident on the Macondo where BP was the formal operator. As in Norway, technical 
standards were important when it came to slowing detailed safety issues. However, due to the 
dominance of foreign companies, it was in praxis the U.S. API-standard that, where in use on 
the Brazilian continental shelf, did Brazil do any work to develop its own technological standard. 
 
4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REGULATORY REGIMES  
A regulatory regime consists of rules and enforcement mechanisms, and includes everything 
from overall policy to concrete implementation, stakeholders, and agencies at various levels, as 
well as all formal and informal mechanisms that keep the regime together. A certain amount of 
stability and durability over time will thus characterize a regime, although dynamic, changing 
processes and interactions between elements are important topics in regime studies. The 
persistence of a regime will be continuously tested because stakeholders will try to conquer or 
gain control over the regime.  
A way of describing the legal part of the leeway within a function based regulatory framework is 
presented in figure 1. The two left columns show the two main categories of rules; legally and 
non-legal binding norms with examples of sub-categories. The right column shows examples 
from the Norwegian offshore regime. The Petroleum Act and the Working Environment Act are 
the laws and the main regulations that form the legal binding rules. Guidelines, etc. from the 
regulator and recognised industrial standards as well as company- and project specific 
requirements are the non-legal rules. As a “linking-pin” between the legal and non-legal rules is 
pasted the legend “Legal standards”. The term is aimed at words or phrases in a law referring to 
norms or standards that are not defined in the law itself.  Such norms are developed within a 
particular professional community and are following prevalent norms and “best practice” and 
attitudes in society. 
Function-based regulation needs some form of discretionary criteria that are considered as legal 
standards and provide some special interpretation challenges. The term "legal standard” refers 
to words or phrases in a law claim that stipulates a scale or norm beyond the law, i.e., a 
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particular practice, widespread attitudes in the community, professional standards, etc. Since 
these conditions and phenomena change over time, the content of the legal requirement 
embedded in the law will similarly change over time. The underlying measure of the legal 
standards is based on the issues, terminology, and solutions that are understood in the 
professional and scientific community. Through stakeholder involvement in the process of 
developing these norms, the use of legal standards may enjoy greater legitimacy than rules 
based on legal terminology and legal text. The use of legal standards aims to achieve an 
appropriate regulation of complex fields in constant development. It can also be seen as an 
expression of respect for the importance of expert knowledge to ensure the safety and quality in 
key areas of society. Legal standards probably safeguard the goal of combining flexibility, 
innovation, and technological development with safety and quality better than prescriptive rules 
fully formulated in laws and regulations. 
 
Table 1. Hierarchy of norms with legal standard as “linking-pin” 
Hierarchy of 
norms 
Main group Examples from Norwegian 
offshore regime  
Examples from 
Brazilian offshore  
regime 
 
Legally binding 
norms 
Laws Petroleum Act, Working 
Environment Act 
Law 9,478 from 1997 
 
By-laws 
(regulation) 
The Framework Regulation 
(Royal Decree) Regulations 
regarding (1) Management, 
Activity, (2) Information and 
(3) Installation passed by 
the Petroleum Safety 
Authority (PSA) 
Resolution No 43, 6th 
December 2007. 
 
 
Non-legal 
binding norms  
Regulatory 
guidelines 
Guidelines to the regulation, 
Letters of interpretation 
 
Industrial 
standards 
“Best Practice” 
Specific standards 
developed on the NCS 
(NORSOK), Recognized 
global or regional industry 
standards  (ISO), company 
specific requirements and 
guidelines, project specific 
requirements and 
specifications, etc. 
Specific standards, 
developed by Petrobras in 
cooperation with mainly 
foreign supplier (often copy 
of U.S. API-standard) 
Petrobras specific 
contracts requirements. 
 
 
 
As shown in table 1, there is an important distinction between legally binding norms, i.e., laws, 
regulations, and decisions, and norms that are not legally binding. Non-legally binding 
standards are guides to laws and regulations, measures that are not statutory, and industry 
norms and standards of various kinds. Maintaining authority through governmental actors such 
as PSA implies it is exercising its legitimate power through legally binding rules and following up 
with sanctions. Strong governmental agents can exercise power by binding up companies and 
suppliers and thereby reducing the scope that occurs in the space of legal standards. In the 
Norwegian safety regime, there has traditionally been an established balance of power and 
trust. The way this is done has great significance for how risk is managed, safety is maintained, 
and how development and change occur.  
A consistent application of a function-based regulation requires a comprehensive and 
systematic review as to how the various provisions are to be understood and how the 
appropriate standards should be used to meet the requirements. Procedures must provide 
relationships between laws and regulations and technical/professional standards to comply with 
the laws and predictability in relation to supervisors' evaluations. For the regulatory authorities 
and inspectors this can be a demanding and comprehensive system to keep up to date, and it 
requires that the standards keep pace with developments and new knowledge. Comprehensive 
guidelines may also be an excuse for companies to not take responsibility in monitoring and 
implementing newly recognized expertise and scientific knowledge. 
 
Legal  
standards 
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5. DISCUSSION 
In a long historical perspective, given the extreme expansion under extreme circumstances, the 
Brazilian oil sector has gone through since the early 2000s, one might have expected even 
more serious accidents on the Brazilian continental shelf. In 2014 the ANP was responsible for 
regulating around 70 drilling rigs, 140 production units, and 300 different types of vessels, from 
simple to very advanced supply and service vessels. The Brazilian offshore oil activities 
surpassed the Norwegian continental shelf both yearly production and activities measured in 
number of workers.  Both the number of fatalities and serious incidents show that there were 
elements in the safety system that worked less efficiently than the safety system in Norway. 
Hence, even if the Brazilian oil sector was living through a challenging phase, there was a 
problem that needed to be fixed.  
 
5.1 Norway and Brazil: nationals and foreigners 
When the Norwegian regulators gradually built up their competence and authority vis a vis the 
oil industry, the general understanding was that foreign oil companies, which at the time 
dominated as operators, did not take safety issues serious enough. Hence, when the authorities 
introduced strict regulations, there was an element of nationalism. The regulator could always 
count on significant support from both politicians and civil society in general when the “foreign” 
industry was to be confronted. Under such circumstances, Norwegian oil companies that were 
struggling to take over as the dominant operators made an effort to present themselves as 
particularly concerned about safety. Foreign companies that wanted to keep their position had 
to do the same.  
In Brazil the foreign–national dichotomy has been a central theme in relations to oil policies.  
However, for the regulatory institution ANP the dominant counterpart when struggling to 
establish real authority was the local, national oil company Petrobras. Even in the 2000, after 
the Brazilian oil sector opened up for foreign oil companies, Petrobras continued to be operator 
for around 90 per cent of the country’s production. In such a context, ANP had a more difficult 
task in opposing the dominating operator’s informal political power than NPD had in Norway 
towards Statoil.  
 
5.2. Norway and Brazil: companies, workers and public awareness 
Different from industrial plants onshore, the actual exploration and production of oil and gas 
takes place out of the public’s sight. This remoteness opens up a possibility for the oil 
companies to operate partly outside the social structures and formal democratic procedures. 
Serious events, when covered by media, however, visualise potential risk of the industry. 
Norway does not seem to be particularly different from Brazil in the sense that that major events 
in the form of large accident that have become headlines in media have also turned public 
attention to what is going on offshore, and put pressure on the industry to perform better when it 
comes to safety.  
Both Brazil and Norway confirm the general truth in the history of safety that large accidents 
tend to mobilise the public, actors in the industry and authorities, and initiate changes and 
improvements. In this sense, the offshore oil sector’s major challenge is, paradoxically, that 
large accident happens too seldom. Offshore oil technology has in the last 40 years been 
constantly evolving. Safety systems based on the experience of one serious accident might not 
be of much help when the technology ten years later has changed or is being used in finding 
and producing petroleum reserves in very different geological formations. A focus on risk 
analyses that have become important for both the Norwegian and the Brazilian offshore industry 
have partly compensated for that. However, there might be other circumstances (falling oil 
prices, less interesting geological prospect, political turmoil etc.) where the element of self-
regulation in a performance-based safety system is not working for regulatory authorities who 
often want to be ahead of developments. The Deepwater Horizon accident proved that a safety 
indicator like lost time accident is not of much help in indicating where the potential for major 
accident related to process operation is large (Hopkins 2013, US CSB 2015). In the U.S, after 
the accident, the new U.S. authority BOMERE, will be maintained with a system relying on 
government authorities inspecting offshore installations regularly. The Norwegian and the 
Brazilian systems have to compensate for the fact that many operations will be left to 
themselves, without government oversight, with the responsibility to uncover where problems 
might occur. In Norway, unions, safety representatives, and the different parts of the tripartite 
system have played a very important part.  With enforced power from regulations workers’ 
safety representatives are an extended arm of the regulatory authority. In offshore installations 
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in Brazil there are no similar combinations of enforced counter power and corporative 
cooperation.  
 
5.3 Norway and Brazil: Institutional dependence or independence 
It is general accepted that institutional independence is important for both regulatory authorities’ 
credibility and their efficiency. For Brazil, with the government’s recent large deficit as a 
consequence of overinvestment and cost overruns in offshore oil sector, the contradictory role 
of regulation production and safety in the same institution can seem particularly unfortunate. It 
is, however, important not to put too much emphasis on formal institutional set ups. The 
Norwegian experience shows again how the historical context in the form of underlying power 
relations, subjective factors such as attitude of key personnel in the relevant institutions, and 
general expectation in the society at any time in history play have great significance.  It took 
some time to educate regulators on the necessary skills to effectively audit and survey the oil 
industry. In the late 1970s, these regulators confronted the same kind of challenges that Brazil 
has experienced recently, with large deficits on the state budget and a strong pressure from 
both companies and interest groups within the state to get production on stream as soon as 
possible. The major improvements in safety came in the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when state 
finances was in a much better state. There is no strong indication that the final breakup of the 
NPD in two separate institutions in 2004 in itself has improved safety. Separation of institutions 
is no guarantee against the possibility for regulators to relax on strict, costly safety measures in 
difficult economic periods. Once again the historical context is important: When the NPDs 
headquarter was placed in the new oil city Stavanger instead of the country’s capitol Oslo, it 
was an important factor in defining the new institution’s independence and willingness to 
confront an industry that essentially was foreign. However, in a situation where activities are 
reduced, such nearness can create an affiliation to the industry and its workers that can make 
regulators more cautious in introducing necessary measures that, in worst case scenario, might 
lead to activities being closed down.  
 
5.4 Norway & Brazil: Governmental legitimacy 
A regulatory regime rests on the assumption that the involved parties have a common interest in 
that the system is maintained and that conflicts of interest that may arise naturally will be solved 
without exercising power that would threaten the foundation of trust between the involved 
parties. Hale (2014) emphasizes how relatively few players or agents and a transparent 
institutional structure makes it easier to establish relationships of trust between the different 
parties. Institutional transparency refers to one of the basic prerequisites for the regime to work - 
namely the existence of legitimate arenas for co-operation and negotiations. The basic 
foundations of the robustness of both the Brazilian and the Norwegian regimes are the abilities 
to take institutional action, facilitate information exchange and encourage dialogue and 
negotiation between a limited numbers of participants. In some cases this can lead to 
constructive cooperation for the development of regulations and meet the requirements of 
professional anchoring and democracy.  
Maintaining authority, e.g., through governmental actors such as PSA, may reduce their 
vulnerability through an exercise of legitimate power through legally binding rules and following 
up with sanctions. Strong governmental agents can exercise power by binding up companies 
and suppliers and thereby reduce the scope that occurs in the space of legal standards. In 
Norway, the regulatory practices and strategies involve comprehensive, frequent, and 
multifaceted patterns of interaction between the authorities and the industry (Kringen, 2014a), 
and the equilibrium of the tripartite process leads to a balance of power within those 
interactions. However, there have been threats to the equilibrium and disturbance of the 
balance of power. Different views among employers and unions of the risk level have previously 
led to union activism and to conciliation by the regulator who restored the balance partly by 
threatening the employers with a return to prescriptive regulation.  
 
5.5 Norway and Brazil: Technical standards 
A final issue, which makes it difficult to assess the Brazilian safety system offshore, is the 
industry’s use of technical standards. Since Brazil, to such large degree, has been relying on 
the international offshore supply industry, one might expect that actual operations to a large 
degree have been influenced by the kind of technological solutions and work praxis’s the 
companies have been bringing with them. Hence, safety on the Brazilian continental shelf will 
be indirectly influenced by safety systems and technical standards developed elsewhere. The 
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U.S. API standard, which to some degree has been used in Brazil, is considered to be less strict 
than the Norwegian NORSOK-standard. However, there are also vessels and installation in use 
in Brazil where Norwegian owners have ordered special equipment constructed in accordance 
with the NORSOK- standard. One hypothesis is that since these companies are international 
they will tend to adapt their safety standards to the one of the large offshore markets that have 
the strictest regulations. In that way, the company will be able to use the same technologies and 
the same key personnel. This will mean that safety in Brazil can be heavily influenced by 
standards in Norway, among others. Another hypothesis might be that companies, because of 
intense competition, will always tend to choose the shortest and the less costly way. To 
conclude how such concrete, but important issues are influencing the Brazilian safety system, 
more research is needed. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
When Brazil established an independent regulatory institution to oversee oil related activities in 
1997, the regulatory approach in the Norwegian offshore oil sector was one of the main models. 
As opposed to the prescriptive regulatory system in the U.S. and Gulf of Mexico, Brazil chose to 
rely on the Norwegian/British performance based system. However, important formal, informal, 
and contexto-related elements of the Norwegian and British system were not implemented into 
the Brazilian petroleum sector. 
The international petroleum industry is experienced in transferring huge packages of 
technological solutions that are organized into certain type of organisational structures, etc. 
However, when a national regulation system tries to influence such a dominant technological 
system, it is not only formal institutional set ups concrete regulations in the form of laws that 
matter. The actual outcome will, to a large degree, be shaped by the social, cultural, and 
political relations in the country where the systems meet.  
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Abstract 
This paper applies a sociotechnical perspective on tripartite collaboration in the Norwegian 
petroleum industry by highlighting developments and challenges related to the regulation of risk 
and issues of power and trust. The paper is based on findings from the ongoing projects 
“SAF€RA STARS - Socio Technical Safety Assessment within Risk Regulation Regimes”, and 
“Robust Regulatory Regimes. Defences against Major Accidents” (Funded by SAF€RA and 
NRC-Norwegian Research Council). During nearly 45 years of oil and gas production, the 
Norwegian petroleum industry has established a risk regulation regime following the Nordic 
welfare model of a tripartite system of collaboration, egalitarian values, and mutual trust among 
the main actors. Through close interactions between the Norwegian government, the oil 
companies, the supplier industry, and the labour unions, the shaping of the regulatory 
framework has been characterised by shifting alliances, power relations, trust, and distrust. 
Focusing events (such as accidents and near misses) have created arenas for policy change, 
but have also influenced the relationships between the involved actors and created institutional 
settings for risk and safety regulation. From a sociotechnical perspective, risk regulation of the 
petroleum industry consists not only of rules and enforcement mechanisms, but also of the 
institutional environment from overall policy to concrete implementation. This provides a wider 
picture of how to develop and enforce safety for high-risk technological systems, which includes 
relations between stakeholders and agencies at various levels, as well as the institutional and 
organisational structures and processes that keep the regime together. 
 
Keywords: power; trust; safety; institutional structures; focusing events 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
European and U.S. risk-regulating regimes are commonly characterised by a command-and-
control structure, where a top-down approach foresees that high-risk industries (the regulated) 
comply with the rules set down by the regulator. Rules are reinforced by legal sanctions in case 
of non-compliance. Norway, on the other hand, has developed a different regulatory structure 
for its petroleum industry that mirrors the Nordic welfare state model. The Norwegian risk-
regulating regime promotes a symmetrical partnership between public agencies and industrial 
actors, which involves labour unions (the so-called tripartite regulatory system), in parallel with 
the asymmetric role of sanctioning the industry for law violations. Principles of enforced self-
regulation (functional regulations) are followed, thereby relying on the capability of the industry 
to manage its own risks according to accepted norms and standards. Thanks to this tripartite 
regulatory system’s long-lasting cooperation in monitoring risk and improving safety and 
reliability, the Norwegian petroleum industry has been characterised by a certain amount of 
stability and durability. However, such processes are vulnerable due to the comprehensive, 
frequent, and multifaceted patterns of interaction among government, operators/suppliers, and 
labour unions. Functional risk regulation requires a balance of power and mutual trust among 
the intervening actors, which sometimes becomes challenging during periods of technological 
innovation and organisational changes that impact safety. 
Applying a sociotechnical approach to risk regulation within the Norwegian petroleum industry, 
we analyse the extent of different views on risk among the Norwegian government, petroleum 
operators/suppliers, and labour unions, whether this differentiation may jeopardize the 
foundations of the tripartite regulatory system, and implications for safety. 
The aim of the paper is threefold:  
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1. What characterises the development and challenges of the risk regulatory regime and 
tripartite system within the sociotechnical framework of the Norwegian petroleum 
industry? 
2. How are focusing events influencing and challenging the sociotechnical character of the 
Norwegian petroleum risk regulation regime? 
3. How are issues of power and trust affecting the sociotechnical character of the 
Norwegian petroleum industry? 
The remainder of the paper will elaborate on these issues. First, we will outline the 
sociotechnical-systems approach, including important concepts, and the sociotechnical 
framework of “the Nordic Model”. We will then discuss the development and challenges of the 
Norwegian tripartite regulatory system, focusing events that have influenced and challenged the 
sociotechnical character of the Norwegian petroleum risk regime, and the important issues of 
power and trust. Finally, we outline how the use of a sociotechnical approach can provide a 
wider picture of how to develop and enforce safety in high-risk industries. The paper is based on 
findings from the ongoing projects “SAF€RA STARS - Socio Technical Safety Assessment 
within Risk Regulation Regimes”, and “Robust Regulatory Regimes. Defences against Major 
Accidents” (Funded by SAF€RA and NRC-Norwegian Research Council). 
 
2. SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS APPROACH 
In this section, we will briefly describe the evolution of the concept “sociotechnical system”. 
According to Davis et al. (2014), sociotechnical-systems thinking grew out of work conducted at 
the U.K. Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Emery and Trist, 
1960; Trist et al., 1963; Trist, 1981). Researchers at the Institute reflected on the importance of 
adding to the technical framework of production, the so-called human factor inside a work 
system (industry or organisation). The idea of sociotechnical system was designed to cope with 
the theoretical and practical problems of working conditions in industry, in particular the 
introduction of new machines into coalmines. The researchers argued that technology could not 
be an independent and autonomous variable since it is strictly related to and influenced by 
social aspects, such as human working conditions, and political and economic structures. Thus, 
the sociotechnical term was coined to describe the reciprocal interrelations between technology 
and humans. The term “system” was taken from general systems theory, which describes a 
system as a set of elements related to each other, with functions that transform the system over 
time. These studies were the foundation for the sociotechnical systems theory (van Eijnatten, 
1997), and sought to overcome the challenge of analysing elements of a system separately by 
embracing its complexity and interdependencies between the technical (hard or structural) and 
the social (behavioural) aspects. Furthermore, they sought to explain the changes of the 
workplace in terms of ways of organising work, technology and practices (Davis et al., 2014; 
Klein, 2014). 
Several disciplines (sociology, psychology, engineering, cognitive engineering, ergonomics, 
management, and political sciences) have enriched sociotechnical systems research, and over 
the years researchers have formulated different models in order to develop a unifying concept 
of a “sociotechnical system”, e.g., Smith and Carayon-Sainfort’s work system model (1989), 
Rasmussen’s vertical model (1997), and Wilson’s model of interactions (2000). In the 1970s, 
the notion of “high-risk” (or “safety critical”) systems were grouped into an independent category 
that included industries such as nuclear, aviation, marine, and petroleum (Le Coze, 2013). The 
notion of a sociotechnical system has been successfully applied in order to understand risks, 
disasters, and the prevention of accidents in complex technological systems (Nævestad, 2009). 
Furthermore, disaster research has shown how risks and disasters derive from interactions in 
interrelated technical and social elements of technological systems (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). 
This is an argument for understanding safety in relation to social relations, processes, and 
structures (or networks) where the system plays a role in generating trust and discouraging 
misconduct (Granovetter, 1985; Vaughan, 1999), but also where political, regulatory, and power 
issues can contribute to system failures (Sagan, 1993, 1994; Perrow, 1999). According to 
Vaughan (1999), it is important to link an organisation’s environment (political, economic, legal, 
demographic, and cultural dimensions), to the organisational characteristics (structure, e.g. 
centralisation/decentralisation; processes, e.g. power plays, feedback loops; tasks, e.g. routines 
and interface with technology) and individuals (cognitive practices, influence of social context on 
choice). Based on this perspective, safety is the result of implementation of functions to be 
understood through technological designs and tasks, as well as structural features of 
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organisations and cognitive, cultural, and power issues at several nested layers of analysis 
(micro-meso-macro) (Le Coze, 2013). 
Power is an important concept in a sociotechnical view on risk and safety. A definition of power 
is “a persons’ ability to achieve his/her will, despite resistance from others”. Moreover, power 
and trust are interrelated concepts. Trust can be considered as a contrast to power, meaning 
that those who receive trust can act in a way that is not in accordance with the trust-giver’s will 
and interests (Grimen, 2009). One who has trust is empowered, and giving trust implies a 
transfer of power from the trust-giver to the trusted. Consequently, an analysis of trust in a 
system where actors relate to each other automatically implies that the power relations must be 
an integrated part of the discussion. 
 
3. THE SOCIOTECHNICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE NORDIC MODEL – GOVERNANCE, 
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES 
“The Nordic model” refers to institutional frameworks that organise and regulate negotiations, 
wealth distribution, and conflict resolution in the Nordic countries. In terms of regulation, the 
Nordic model involves a high degree of formalized industrial relations. This implies a centralised 
organisational structure, and, at the same time, a trinity of cooperation among employers, 
employees, and the government concerning economic policy, exchange of information, and 
consultations at different levels of the industries. This institutional integration has supported a 
national system, organising the collective negotiations between employers and employees. 
Moreover, it has contributed to the institutionalisation of petroleum companies according to the 
formal and informal rules of the Norwegian institutional setting. 
In terms of safety, the Nordic model is embodied in the tripartite collaboration. A common 
feature within the tripartite system is the in-house use of an “Occupational Health and Safety 
Organisation” that offers three different collaborating structures. First, Safety Committees 
provide opportunities for employers and employees to meet and discuss important issues. 
Second, there are independent and autonomous “institutions”, as Safety Representatives, and 
third, there are a number of experts on occupational health and safety who may be called upon 
in disputes, either as an in-house service or external consulting expertise. Hence, safety and 
optimal working environment is one of the cornerstones of the model.  
No-blaming regulatory cultures appear to correspond well with these contextual factors. Key 
features of the Nordic welfare model are also reflected in the health and safety regulations. The 
Norwegian petroleum industry covers a complex group of actors, technologies, and natural 
resources. Risks range from minor injuries, to long-term health impairments, to major accidents. 
Responsibilities are distributed at all levels in the industrial value chain (Kringen, 2014). 
According to Engen (2014), in the context of the sociotechnical system of the Norwegian 
petroleum industry, institutional aspects of technology and the Nordic model can be expressed 
through the following figure (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The sociotechnical system of the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
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This figure conveys a broad institutional perspective on industrial policy, regulation, working life, 
and technological pathways. The integrated organisational unit – department, installation, plant, 
and the like – follows traditional sociotechnical models of risk regulation wherein organisational 
units combine the technical production system with a safety management system (Olsen and 
Lindøe, 2009). The diamond-like figure in the middle illustrates feedbacks where information 
and effects from industrial policy and risk regulation are handled through a complex set of 
institutional mechanisms. These institutional mechanisms consist of actors, i.e. companies, 
labour unions, employers’ associations, and governmental organisations, and are constituted by 
their mutual relationships (Engen, 2014). 
 
4. THE REGULATORY REGIME AND TRIPARTITE SYSTEM OF THE NORWEGIAN 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY – DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES 
The first aim of this paper is to describe and discuss the development and challenges of the risk 
regulatory regime and tripartite system within the sociotechnical framework of the Norwegian 
petroleum industry. 
The sociotechnical systems approach provides a framework for analysing the linkages and 
relationships between different social and technical aspects. The potential value of applying 
such an approach is that it provides a structured and systematic way of analysing a variety of 
complex systems, problems, and events (Davis et al., 2014). As mentioned in the previous 
section, the working regulation in the Nordic countries is characterised by a trinity of cooperation 
among employers, employees, and the government concerning economic policy, exchange of 
information, and consultations at different levels of industries, i.e. a tripartite system. The 
institutional strength of the tripartite system for the Norwegian offshore petroleum industry was 
fortified in 1977 when the working conditions offshore were subjected to the same legal 
framework as the working conditions onshore. The Working Environment Act of 1977 gave 
employees in Norway extended privileges in general, and became a powerful instrument for 
offshore workers in terms of influencing safety and security regulations. A safety deputy, for 
instance, had the same power as the platform manager to stop the production stream if there 
was any suspicion of technical or organisational irregularities that could increase the risk of 
undesirable incidents. 
Lindøe (1992) states that the introduction of the “internal control-system” in the 1980s, which 
was based on the philosophy of enforced self-regulation and goal-setting (function-based) 
legislation, strengthened the robustness of the Norwegian regulatory system. When self-
regulation is used to assure safety, enterprises are obliged to identify and assess risks and 
hazards embedded in their operations (Lindøe et al., 2006). Internal control gives companies a 
personal responsibility to monitor and implement an updated safety management system. 
Organisations have an incentive to comply with principles of internal control because the 
regulatory process can focus on desired outcomes, rather than regulating detailed processes, 
with regulatory intervention as a last resort. In cases of breach or dissatisfaction, the regulatory 
body can escalate its enforcement process with more serious consequences for the regulated 
organisation. Some regulatory systems are linked to licensing privileges (including the 
regulatory system for the Norwegian Petroleum activities) where a license to trade or conduct 
an activity is conditional on compliance with formal or procedural norms such as having 
“effective” internal control. The sanction of withdrawing a license is usually a last resort and an 
outcome of extensive prior negotiation (Power, 2007). 
The introduction of the internal control regulations has partly been a response to the complex 
and dynamic nature of the petroleum industry. The traditional model of regulation from above, 
through specified command and control rules, has been challenged in several ways. 
Prescriptive rules proved difficult in terms of keeping up with the dynamic technological 
developments and the complexity of hazards and their causes. The traditional regulations did 
not sufficient address risks related to long-term exposures, combined effects of several hazards, 
psychosocial strain, etc. In the Norwegian petroleum industry, the tripartite system is clearly 
expressed in the formal institutions facilitated by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA), i.e. the Regulatory Forum and the Safety Forum, which are forums for discussing overall 
priorities and critical issues, and developing regulations, as well as more specific and practical 
questions (Kringen, 2014b). These institutions formalise the partnership between public 
agencies and industrial actors (Lindøe et al., 2011, Lindøe et al., 2014), and thus constitute an 
important formal part of the sociotechnical structure of the petroleum system. 
The experience gained through the last few decades indicates that the adoption of internal 
control as the principle for risk regulation of the Norwegian petroleum industry is regarded as a 
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success because it permits more flexible and efficient regulatory supervision. However, this 
regulatory approach also creates challenges. The function-based regulatory regime creates a 
hierarchy of overlapping norms, which has developed into a complex system of rules and 
regulations, legal standards, industrial standards, internal company standards, as well as 
codified “best practices”. This array of documentation (for companies) is further challenging 
aspects of the robustness of the Norwegian regime. To master such complexity requires 
knowledge and skills, and therefore gives power to those who possess this knowledge and skill, 
i.e. those handling and navigating in the system. For those firms who do not handle complexity, 
this can easily develop into distrust towards those who possess knowledge. Complexity thus 
creates an imbalance between power and confidence, as those with competence get increased 
power, while those who lack knowledge may respond with distrust. Such a disparity can further 
develop where there is a significant scope in which to apply industry standards or other "best 
practices". Labour unions in Norway are experiencing an increasing lack of knowledge while, at 
the same time, a reduction in their confidence in the function-based system (Engen et al., 
2013). 
Regulatory requirements for internal control represent an indirect form of government where 
results ultimately may be produced by the companies instead of the government itself, and 
where the companies are held accountable. These outcomes create challenges for the 
regulator. The regulator may choose between different roles or strategies, and thereby be 
exposed to different expectations from the companies. Such mix of roles induces an important 
challenge of the function-based legislation, which is reflected in what we might describe as the 
inspector's dilemma.  The Engen-report from 2013 (Engen et al., 2013), states that the actors of 
the Norwegian petroleum industry respond positively to a regulatory regime based on functional 
requirements. However, the regulatory regime of the Norwegian petroleum industry was 
developed under circumstances very different from the ones we have today. In the 1970s, oil 
companies were competing to get a foothold in this new, promising region. The general political 
trends pointed towards protectionism and as much national influence as possible (Ryggvik, 
2000). According to Hale and Baram (1998), the new era of free trade and globalization causes 
constant reorganising and change for companies trying to seize opportunities and to reduce 
costs and increase competitiveness. As an example, the Norwegian petroleum industry went 
through major changes of reorganising, downsizing, and merges during the late 1990s, which, 
according to some, affected the safety level of the industry (Ryggvik, 2000). 
Thus, even though the safety regime for the Norwegian petroleum industry has been in the 
forefront in developing purpose- and goal-based regulations, the change from a prescriptive 
regime to more functional regulation in the Norwegian petroleum industry has been demanding 
on everyone concerned. The regime rests on the assumption that the involved parties have a 
common interest in maintaining the system, and that the conflicts of interest that may arise will 
naturally be solved without threatening the foundation of the trust between the involved parties. 
How much power each of the involved agents actually will possess will vary depending both on 
their perception of the risk and on the character of the event. The Norwegian regulatory regime 
opens up for politicisation of the safety field and it becomes a political “battlefield”. This happens 
when different groups have different interests in the field and the groups have the formal power 
to protect their interests and use this power directly in the decision-making processes. The 
leeway of function-based regulatory regimes creates a space where the relationships between 
the actors are characterised by struggle and bargaining - conflicts and co-operations, and thus 
continuously exposed to politicisation (Rosness and Forseth, 2014).  
Such politicisation is not a problem in itself, but may affect the robustness of the regime, for 
example where such processes end up questioning the legitimacy of governmental agents, 
such as the PSA. Politicisation may, in other words disturb, trust and power relations. 
Politicisation of the Nordic model is thus problematic because decisions may be made on the 
basis of "random" policy, and may encourage intervention without clear theoretical or normative 
grounds. According to Engen et al. (2013), the strength of the tripartite regulatory system is that 
collaboration is a very potent instrument when it is necessary to change the sociotechnical 
system. At the same time, collaboration will be undermined if the balance of power is upset or 
certain actors dominate the process and gain power at the expense of other actors. 
 
5. FOCUSING EVENTS 
The second aim of this paper is to discuss how focusing events are influencing and challenging 
the sociotechnical character of the Norwegian petroleum risk regulation regime. Risk regulation 
and inspection strategies emerge from different sources. Some are global trends while others 
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are results of disasters or major industrial accidents within hazardous industries. Such events 
mobilise public opinion, environmental organisations and politicians, and initiate legislative 
processes with new regulations being implemented at different institutional levels: globally, 
nationally, and within industrial sectors (Slovic, 2000) 
The Alexander L. Kielland accident in 1980 induced an overall goal of simplifying and enhancing 
the efficiency of risk regulation on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). The accident 
underlined the importance of being able to establish and maintain a high level of safety with 
clear regulatory boundaries. Hence, the regulatory regime that was established consisted of two 
elements: A single agency, at that time the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), was 
assigned responsibility to draw up detailed regulations and to make overall safety and working 
environment assessments. Formal agreements with the pollution control authorities for the 
natural environment and with the health authorities for health-related issues were also 
negotiated and implemented. Coordination and support between many different governmental 
agencies represented a new approach to administration and differed from the common model, 
which implied that single agencies were responsible for their individual aspects of safety and 
working environment. 
This coordination of supervision gradually revealed the need for developing a joint set of 
regulations based on a number of overall considerations, including safety and the working 
environment, the natural environment, and occupational health. The industry’s response was 
not only that the reform represented a clear simplification and efficiency enhancement, but the 
more integrated health, safety, and environment (HSE) regulations also made it possible, and 
stimulated to a greater degree, participation and collaboration in influencing risk regulation in 
general. The regulator could now supervise the business on a more unified basis. However, the 
challenge became to handle collaboration issues and possible conflict of interests across 
government agencies through formal procedures and agreements in order to ensure that the 
system functioned well in practice. 
However, the regulatory regime established after Alexander Kielland was challenged from many 
directions. In 1993, a Norwegian cost-efficient program was introduced denoted NORSOK (an 
abbreviation for “NORsk SOkkels Konkurranseposisjon”, in English “The competitive situation of 
the Norwegian Shelf). NORSOK represented a break with the infant industry policy of the 1970s 
and 1980s, and a political shift from an active and interventionist oil policy to a more passive one 
that sought to link various actors rather than dictating terms to them. NORSOK introduced a 
process that allowed both the petroleum companies and main suppliers to enjoy greater freedom 
when choosing technological concepts, sub-suppliers, location of bases, headquarters, etc. 
The incidents and number of accidents, however, increased during the 1990s. In the 1990s 
several trends in the risk picture could be identified: First, an increase in major hazards related to 
problems with gas leakage, and second, increased risk and uncertainty regarding the safety level 
for floating installations. This was mainly related to new technology. The Norne accident in 1998, a 
helicopter accident at the Norne field in the Northern part of the North Sea, clearly illustrated the 
high-risk arena of shuttle traffic by helicopters. There were also increased accidents related to the 
activities of service vessels and increased vulnerability caused by increased use of ICT systems, 
automation, and reduced manning on the installations (Engen, 2014).   
New contractual relations implied that the oil companies became less responsible for design 
and accomplishments of the development projects, and less responsible for general HSE. The 
increased economic pressure combined with lack of knowledge and experiences in risk and 
safety management created new vulnerabilities and reduced robustness in the sociotechnical 
system. This put pressure on the glue that characterised the governance structure and 
institutional mechanism of the Nordic model. During the first decade after the millennium, there 
was only one substantial incident on the NCS, namely the Snorre A incident. Snorre A is a 
floating installation in the north of the North Sea and operated by Statoil. In 2004, a gas leakage 
was discovered and the platform was evacuated. The investigation report showed afterwards 
that it was only a minute away from igniting and causing a very serious accident. The Snorre A 
incident created a lot of attention in the media, but there was no serious debate about whether 
the ground principles in the Norwegian regulation model should change. Statoil was, however, 
challenged, both from the PSA and the unions, to improve their procedures concerning 
compliance and learning. Several internal organisational programs where introduced, but these 
programs were, to a certain degree, overshadowed by the merger between the two biggest 
Norwegian oil companies, Statoil and Hydro Oil & Gas, in 2007.       
The next focusing event took place between December 2009 and May 2010, when the Gullfaks 
C field, operated by Statoil, was subjected to several critical incidents with leakages of 
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hydrocarbons from wells. The investigation showed that at least one of the incidents was only 
minutes away from becoming a full-scale disaster. An independent research institute made an 
assessment, and the strong Norwegian environmental group, Bellona, used the report as an 
indication that Norway should adapt EU regulations as soon as possible in order to avoid future 
major oil pollution. In this case, Bellona proposed a major critique towards not only Statoil, but 
also towards the PSA and thus the Norwegian regulatory regime in general. The Gullfaks C 
incident became a focusing event on the NCS that triggered the Norwegian government to start 
to evaluate the regulatory regime’s robustness. 
Gullfaks C took place in the international context of Deep Water Horizon, which fortified the 
incident as a focusing event and created further momentum, media, and NGO pressure, not 
only in Norway, but also among most European countries. After the Deep Water Horizon 
disaster, members of the EU Parliament asked how robust the existing risk regulatory 
approaches for offshore HSE regulation were among the member states. The authorities and 
industry in Norway and U.K. formed groups to review and assess lessons learned and make 
necessary recommendations with regard to well control and safe offshore operations. In the 
U.K., some instances rapidly declared that offshore regulatory standards, as exemplified by the 
“Safety Case Regime”, were superior to those that were found in the Gulf of Mexico at the time 
of the Deep Water Horizon disaster. Both in the U.K. and in Norway, the reaction towards those 
who wanted to use the focusing event as an engine for regulatory change was unambiguous; 
the functionality and robustness of the North Sea regulatory regimes was the best way of 
organising safety, which implied that redesign towards more standard prescriptive directions 
was not applicable.        
 
6. THE IMPORTANCE OF POWER AND TRUST IN THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP 
The third aim of the paper is to discuss how issues of power and trust are affecting the 
sociotechnical character of the Norwegian petroleum industry. As mentioned in section 4, while 
the tripartite relationship is based on trust between the parties, of equal importance to the 
tripartite relationship is the balance of power (Engen, 2014). The Nordic model implies strong 
unions, strong and competent oil companies, and strong competent governmental institutions 
(Ryggvik, 2014; Lindøe et al., 2012). In order to use the leeway of the function-based risk 
regulations in a best possible way, the key players have to trust each other. Companies have to 
trust that employees and contractors will perform work according to agreements. Inspectors 
must trust that the oil companies have the right quality systems and procedures in place for safe 
work both in themselves and towards their suppliers. Unions have to trust that the government 
has established the right kind of supervision and control chains for the companies and 
suppliers. 
As previously mentioned, trust and power are interrelated concepts, and the relevance of a 
power approach is further enhanced by two empirical characteristics of the petroleum industry. 
Petroleum is an international industry with large investments, potential gains, and substantial 
risks, as well as operational and technological challenges. In such settings, conflicts of interest 
and politicization between those involved can obviously be substantial. At the same time, the 
institutionalised system of collaboration between employers, unions, and government are vital to 
the Norwegian regime. Governmental authorities regard these traits as vital in the petroleum 
industry and they serve as a cornerstone in efforts to establish and develop a high level of 
safety in the petroleum industry. The challenge within this leeway is, therefore, to strike a 
balance between giving trust and executing power. The question is whether the leeway is 
defined too widely, and whether the Norwegian regulatory regime requires more clearly defined 
and restricted rules and procedures. 
Trust means that the people and organisations that interact with each other act in expected 
ways. Furthermore, to rely on another means that one expects that the person or organisation 
will, for example, use the functions-based system and framework of norms in a way that is in 
accordance with the rules and overall objectives. However, displaying trust in others also makes 
oneself vulnerable in relation to the same “other”. The other might act differently than expected 
and opposite to one's own interests and desires. In this way, there is a vulnerability built into the 
function-based regime, as a potential risk and thus a threat to the robustness of the system. 
This also opens up a space where games of power and politicization unfold. The regime rests 
on the assumption that the involved parties have a common interest in maintaining the system 
and that the conflicts of interest that may arise naturally will be solved without exercising power, 
which would threaten the foundation of trust between the involved parties (Hale, 2014). 
Accordingly, the term “dialogue” is frequently used to encapsulate the relations between the 
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authority and the industry. However, the term is ambiguous as high stakes are involved for the 
primary duty holders in possibly compromising their reputation, including their attractiveness as 
(future) licence holders (or contractors) (Kringen, 2014b). 
Rosness and Forseth (2014), have denoted the relationships within the sociotechnical system of 
the Norwegian petroleum regime as a shifting between boxing and dancing. The boxing and 
dancing metaphor refers to both the vulnerability and to the strength of the Norwegian regime - 
namely due to the actual existence of legitimate arenas for cooperation and negotiations. The 
foundation of the robustness of the Norwegian regime is the ability to take institutional action, 
facilitate information exchange, and encourage dialogue and negotiation between limited 
numbers of participants. In some cases, this can lead to constructive cooperation for the 
development of regulations and allow it to meet the requirements of professional anchoring and 
democracy.  However, the coin has two sides. In certain situations, such close and intimate 
dialogue between opponents may also produce conflicts of interest. Accordingly, we have a 
regime or institutional framework where the same constellations that make up the strength of 
the regime also make up its vulnerability. Some political issues can easily undermine the 
existing trust between the parties and immediately ruin the climate of cooperation. In such 
contexts, it is a demanding role for the governmental agency to act as a navigator and mediator 
in the leeway and space of action the function-based regulations create. The ability to handle 
the role of facilitator is also to determine the degree of the robustness of the regime in general. 
Over the last 10 to 15 years, we have seen several examples where the parties have used their 
power base in a way that has reduced their trust in each other, and in some cases turned into 
distrust and blocking of the cooperation. As an example, different views among employers and 
unions of the risk level have previously led to union activism and to conciliation by the regulator 
who restored the balance partly by threatening the employers with a return to prescriptive 
regulation. This particular conflict was resolved by initiating the RNNP project (Trends in Risk 
Level in the Petroleum Activity) in 2001, which brought in independent researchers to study the 
risks and trends and establish sufficient consensus. Another example is the introduction of the 
NORSOK programme by the Norwegian government in the 1990s to improve the competitive 
abilities of the Norwegian petroleum industry. There was a need to encourage implementation of 
new technology and organisational designs, new contractual arrangements, and improved 
procedures for accomplishing and launching development projects. However, the NORSOK 
programme changed the sociotechnical character of the Norwegian petroleum industry by 
challenging the practices of the Nordic model. The merger of Statoil and Hydro in 2007 also upset 
the power balance in the tripartite collaboration. The merger increased the domination Statoil 
possessed over the technological pathways and towards the regulatory authorities concerning risk 
regulation and safety. These practices survived, however, despite new technological directions 
and alterations in governance structures and institutional mechanisms. Even though different 
types of safety regulation systems, new technologies, and economic pressure are continuously 
challenging the principles of the Nordic model, it seems that the basic principles remain intact. The 
discussion about the NORSOK programme shows how the explanation lies in the 
interdependency and balance of power between the parties (Engen, 2014). 
Hence, the means to reduce vulnerabilities of fragile trust relationships and/or build robustness 
is through power relations and the exercise of power. In the Norwegian safety regime, balancing 
between power and trust is also balancing between functional and prescriptive regulation. The 
way this is done in the future will have great significance for how risk is managed and 
robustness is maintained, and for how development and change may occur in the Norwegian 
petroleum regime. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have applied a sociotechnical perspective on the risk regulation regime and 
tripartite collaboration of the Norwegian petroleum industry. Sociotechnical theory makes 
explicit that technology cannot be considered an independent and autonomous variable since it 
is strictly related to and influenced by social aspects, such as human working conditions and 
political and economic structures. From a sociotechnical perspective, risk regulation of high-risk 
technological systems such as the Norwegian petroleum industry, consists not only of rules and 
enforcement mechanisms, but also of the institutional environment from overall policy to 
concrete implementation. We have highlighted developments and challenges related to 
regulation of risk in the sociotechnical system and issues of power and trust. We have also 
shown that different focusing events (accidents and near misses) have influenced and 
challenged the sociotechnical character of the Norwegian petroleum risk regulation regime. 
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Furthermore, we have discussed the extent of different views concerning risk among the 
Norwegian government, petroleum operators/suppliers, and labour unions, and whether this 
differentiation may jeopardize the foundations of the tripartite regulatory system, and its 
implications for safety. 
The function-based character of the risk regulatory regime and tripartite system of the 
Norwegian petroleum industry guarantees a large degree of autonomy for employers and 
companies, which they can use to design their safety practices in directions they feel 
appropriate. Such autonomy can be advantageous for employers in several ways, not least 
financially. Similarly, the employee side has vested interests in the regime since it gives them 
relatively large possibilities of influence. Such influence is provided through the formal forums 
for collaboration that have been established through the Nordic Model. Thus, the Norwegian 
regime has given employees more power than other regulatory regimes. However, the various 
groups' use of force to protect their interests in the safety field represents a type of politics that 
can be challenging for the regime because it can weaken its academic integrity, among other 
reasons.  
At any time the challenge within the leeway of the function-based regulatory system is to 
balance between giving trust and executing power. Conflicts between parties in the Norwegian 
tripartite system are solved through extensive laws and systems of agreements. Historically 
speaking, the Nordic model implied that employers supported unions and their professional 
activities to a certain degree. Moreover, employers have often been forced to de-emphasise 
short-term profit goals to advance longer-term managerial objectives. The success of this policy 
may be explained by the strength of the unions in national and local political processes. From 
this perspective, we may say that the Nordic model has functioned as a stabilising factor in 
Norwegian politics and society. In relation to the Norwegian petroleum sector, the Nordic model 
has formed and shaped the political strategies concerning the balancing of a growing resource 
economy with other economic sectors, the balancing of a public and private sector, and finally, 
how to consider challenges created by the fact that petroleum is a non-renewable and 
exhaustible resource (Engen et al., 2015). 
A sociotechnical perspective conveys a broad institutional perspective on industrial policy, 
regulation, working life, and technological pathways (Olsen and Lindøe, 2009). Information and 
effects from industrial policy and risk regulation are handled through a complex set of 
institutional mechanisms. These institutional mechanisms consist of actors, i.e. companies, 
labour unions, employers’ associations, and governmental organisations, and are constituted by 
their mutual relationships (Engen, 2014). Thus, the use of a sociotechnical approach to risk 
regulation can provide a greater picture of how to develop and enforce safety in high-risk 
industries. 
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Abstract 
Background and Aims: A range of risk management initiatives are increasingly being introduced 
in many motorised countries to improve occupational fleet safety, including: driver training, 
driver monitoring via intelligent transport systems, education and awareness, purchasing safer 
vehicles, etc.  Such interventions often incorporate frameworks aligned with safety culture and 
climate, in an attempt to maximise safety outcomes. However, considerable variation has been 
documented with interventions’ ability to create lasting behavioural change, and the frequency 
of application is not always based on scientific evidence regarding effectiveness. While research 
has shown that community perception of road safety countermeasures do not always align with 
evidence, employees’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of fleet interventions has been 
almost entirely overlooked.  This is a critical oversight as employees’ beliefs and acceptance 
levels (as well as the perceived organisational commitment to safety) can ultimately influence 
levels of effectiveness, and this study aimed to examine such perceptions in Australian fleet 
settings.  Method: 679 employees sourced from four Australian organisations completed a 
safety climate questionnaire as well as provided perspectives about the effectiveness of 35 
different safety initiatives.  These initiatives were based on best practice in industry reports as 
well as countermeasures that had previously been empirically evaluated in the literature.  These 
included: monitoring driver behaviour, signing commitment cards and encouraging self-
monitoring of driving behaviours. Results: Countermeasures that were perceived as most 
effective were a mix of human and engineering-based approaches: (a) purchasing safer 
vehicles, (b) investigating serious vehicle incidents and (c) practical driver skills training. In 
contrast, least effective countermeasures were considered to be: (a) signing a promise card, (b) 
advertising a company’s phone number on the back of cars for complaints and compliments and 
(c) communicating cost benefits of road safety to employees.  It is noteworthy that some of 
these initiatives are regularly implemented.  No significant differences in employee perceptions 
were identified based on age, gender, employees’ self-reported crash involvement or 
employees’ self-reported traffic infringement history.  Perceptions of safety climate were 
identified to be “moderate” but were not linked to self-reported crash or traffic infringement 
history.  However, higher levels of safety climate were positively correlated with perceived 
effectiveness of some interventions.  Conclusion: Taken together, employees believed 
occupational road safety risks could best be managed by the employer by implementing a 
combination of engineering and human resource initiatives to enhance road safety.  This paper 
will further outline the key findings in regards to practice as well as provide direction for future 
research.    
 
Keywords: Safety culture, climate, occupational road safety, interventions. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Compared to general motorists, a relatively small body of research has focused on fleet drivers, 
particularly individuals who drive company sponsored vehicles  (Davey et al 2007; Freeman et al., 
2009; Newnam et al., 2002, 2004; Sullman et al., 2002; Xie & Parker, 2002). This may be 
considered surprising given that professional drivers not only have different driving demands, but 
they also have higher exposure to risk (Öz, Özkan, & Lajunen, 2010) and are disproportionately 
represented in crash statistics.  In fact, occupational driving crashes are the most common form of 
injury or death in Australian workplaces (Haworth et al., 2000), with 40% of all worker fatalities 
over the past 11 years (2003-2013) resulting from vehicle collisions (Safe Work Australia, 2014).  
This effect is not confined to Australia, but rather, similar findings have been reported in the United 
Kingdom (Maycock et al., 1996) and in the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). The 
largest proportion of the research has been directed towards examining fleet drivers’ self-reported 
driving behaviours, which is usually measured via the Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (Reason, et 
al., 1990).  This research has demonstrated that company drivers have a greater risk of accident 
involvement  (Newnam et al., 2002; Sullman et al., 2002), due not only to higher levels of 
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exposure to the road environment, but also as a result of time and scheduling pressures and other 
distractions (Stradling et al., 2000). This has resulted in a growing view expressed both in industry 
and the corresponding road safety literature that there is a need to create a proactive “fleet safety 
culture” that has a strong foundation based on corporate policies, processes and procedures 
(Darby, Murray & Raeside, 2009).   
 
Interventions 
Within Australia, organisational intervention strategies have historically been applied in a “post 
hoc” manner due to an increase in numbers or severity of work-related vehicle crashes or 
incidents (Wishart & Davey, 2004).  That is, most organisational intervention strategies have 
historically been implemented in reaction to an increase in numbers or severity of work-related 
vehicle crashes or incidents (Wishart & Davey, 2004) and fail to proactively address problems or 
incidents before they occur. Additionally, organisations have traditionally adopted a “one size fits 
all” approach to intervention strategies that often involves an overreliance on driver training, 
generally based on enhancing driver skills and not targeting specific driver behaviours or 
organisational influences (Davey, Freeman, Wishart & Rowland, 2008). However, some research 
has been conducted into the effectiveness of fleet interventions, briefly reviewed below.   
 
Driver Training: The effectiveness of driver training in fleet settings remains relatively 
unknown, despite it being the most widely implemented fleet intervention (Darby et al., 
2009; Haworth et al., 2000).  Preliminary research provided limited evidence of 
effectiveness (Brown et al., 1987) as it has been suggested that the approach focuses 
too much on skill improvement at the expense of judgement and decision-making 
(Christie, 2001).  Rowland, Wishart and Davey (2005) argued that an emphasis on 
strategies to improve the driving skills of drivers reinforces the perceptions of 
organisational management that the driver, more specifically a lack of driver skills and 
ability, is primarily to “blame” for work-related incidents/crashes.  This may in fact not be 
the case in many incidents. Nevertheless, research on general motorists has 
demonstrated the approach can improve driving skill if it involves formal instruction and 
extensive practice (Groeger & Clegg, 2000; Groeger & Brady, 2004). 
 
Various Organisational Interventions: Advancements in Occupational Health and Safety 
legislative frameworks have also resulted in an increasing presence of employer 
obligations in the workplace (Haworth et al., 2000).  This has subsequently enhanced 
the focus on driver safety management approaches (Haworth et al., 2000).  Newnam 
and Watson (2011) categorised these risk management approaches into: (a) crash 
reporting databases and (b) driver recruitment and training.  While the utilisation of 
crash databases is useful in regards to benchmarking, the approach is often reactive 
and is of little use to develop proactive interventions (Davey et al., 2008). Driver 
recruitment processes often involve confirming that the applicant has a valid licence and 
collecting information about driving history (Newnam & Watson, 2011), which arguably 
should also be undertaken at on-going intervals throughout an employee’s contract.   
 
Behaviour Modification: The use of incentives has also proven popular within fleet 
settings, with many of the approaches being modelled off operant conditioning e.g., 
providing incentives.  Some preliminary research has indicated there is merit in the 
approach for reducing crashes (Gregersen et al., 1996) as well as seat belt usage 
(Mortimer et al., 1990).  Safety awareness programs have also been trialed, and have 
proven effective but outcome measures are dependent upon self-reported data 
(Newnam & Watson, 2009).  
 
Organisational fleet safety interventions are not limited to the above approaches. Rather, a 
range of risk management initiatives have been introduced in many motorised countries 
(including Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America, Ireland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom) that include: management education and awareness; policies relating to the 
management of journeys, drivers and vehicles; safe vehicle selection and maintenance; driver 
training; driver monitoring; awareness campaigns; risk assessments; post-incident 
investigations; assessments of health and fitness to operate vehicles; conferences, seminars 
and workshops; incident data recording; safe driving awards; group discussions; competency 
based licence testing; and programs focussing on vehicle maintenance, fatigue management, 
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driving hours, and driver health (Haworth, Greig, & Wishart, 2008; Murray, 2007). Banks, Davey, 
Biggs and King (2010) conducted a document review of empirical studies pertaining to 
occupational road safety initiatives. From the 19 initiatives reviewed, only six initiatives were 
found to be positively associated with occupational road safety both during and after the 
intervention period (Banks et al., 2012). These were: a pay rise; driver training; group 
discussions; enlisting employees as community road safety change agents; safety reminders; 
and group and individual rewards.  However, it should be noted that quantifying the level of 
effectiveness has yet to be undertaken.  While others have argued that a holistic approach is 
necessary. More specifically, this could include the systematic identification and management of 
the risks associated with fleet drivers, development of appropriate intervention/improvement 
strategies, and maintaining continuous monitoring and review of the risks (Rowland et al., 
2005). Furthermore, it has also been suggested that theoretical development in the work-related 
driving arena has been limited (and similar to the application of interventions), has been 
anecdotal and data driven (Newman & Watson, 2011).   
 
Importantly, there is some preliminary evidence that indicates community perception of road 
safety countermeasures do not align with evidence, but rather, appear to suffer from a 
misunderstanding of behaviour change principles and crash causation (Watson, 1997). 
Therefore, there may be a disconnect between perceptions of the effectiveness of fleet 
interventions (as well as the subsequent implementation of initiatives) and actual empirical 
evidence regarding the efficacy of countermeasures to improve road safety.  Furthermore, while 
previous research has focused heavily on drivers’ perceptions of safety (Wills et al., 2006) as 
well as self-reported attitudes and behaviours (Wishart et al., 2011), it has generally neglected 
drivers’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of different fleet interventions.  This may prove 
to be a significant oversight, as research has suggested that employees’ beliefs may facilitate or 
act as a barrier when implementing organisational initiatives (Weiner, Amick, & Lee, 2008).   It 
may yet be proven that individuals are more likely to accept initiatives that they believe will 
assist them in achieving a goal and to resist initiatives that they believe have limited 
effectiveness and/or are not appropriate in their organisation (Banks et al., 2010).  More 
broadly, the impact of attitudes on behaviour is well documented within the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Riebl et al., 2015) and the powerful influence of attitudes as well as expectations is 
no more clearly evidenced than in the placebo effect (Maybeck et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
positive attitudes towards an initiative have been proven to increase usage (Celebi, 2015) and it 
may yet be proven that the limited effectiveness of in-vehicle monitoring systems for teenager 
drivers (Farmer et al., 2010; Lotan & Toledo, 2005) is related to low levels of acceptance.   
 
Safety Culture and Climate 
There is some evidence that creating a strong “safety culture” can have a positive effect on 
improving road safety by reducing fleet collisions (Gregersen et al., 1996; Newman et al., 2004; 
Wills et al., 2006), although it is also noted that traffic safety culture is a relatively new concept 
and there is no consensus regarding the nature of the concept nor how it should be defined 
(Edwards et al., 2014).  The concept of safety culture first emerged in the International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group’s (INSAG) report on the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, 
which indicated that a lack of safety culture contributed to the incident. A complete review into 
the evolution and development of safety culture is beyond the scope of the current paper (see 
Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 2010), but in its simplest terms, the concept may be defined as “the 
assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of an 
organisation, which interact with an organisation’s structures and systems and the broader 
contextual setting to result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety” 
(Edwards et al., 2013; p.77).  The concept has a lengthy history of application in organisational 
safety over the past 25 years, but it has only recently emerged in the traffic safety literature 
(Edwards et al., 2014).  Nevertheless, preliminary research has provided positive results 
regarding the influence of safety culture.  For example, Öz et al. (2010) explored the self-
reported driving behaviours of 230 male professional drivers and reported those with low work 
orientation scores (e.g., culture) reported significantly more DBQ related-violations than those 
with high scores for work orientation.   
 
A further extension of the safety culture concept is that of safety climate, which refers to 
employees’ shared perceptions of management’s commitment and operations with regards to 
fleet safety practices, policies and procedures (Banks, Davey & Brownlow 2006; Wills, Watson 
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& Biggs, 2004). As such, fleet safety climate forms part of the broader concept of safety culture, 
but focuses primarily on workers’ perceptions and thus represents a psychological construct 
(Wills et al., 2006). Preliminary research has identified a number of general dimensions that 
may impact fleet safety climate including: management commitment; work demands and 
pressure; trusting relationships including communication and support; appropriateness of safety 
rules as well as safety training (Banks, et al., 2006; Wills, et al., 2004; Wills, Watson & Biggs, 
2006).  In regards to impacts on safety performance, there is some evidence for a relationship 
between safety climate and safety outcomes in regards to: self-reported current driver behaviour 
and future driving intentions at work (Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2009); incident rates (Mearns, 
Whitaker & Flin, 2003); and self-reported safety behaviours and injury outcomes (Huang, Zohar, 
Robertson, Garabet, Lee & Murphy, 2013).  For example, Wills et al. (2009) found that both 
individual factors (e.g., safety attitudes) and organisational factors (e.g., safety climate 
perceptions) influenced current driving behaviours as well as future driving intentions.  Newnam 
et al. (2008) also reported that among a sample of fleet drivers, both individual factors and 
organisational safety values can influence safety outcomes.  Despite this research, it has been 
suggested that few theoretical or conceptual advances have been made within the fleet safety 
domain (Newnam & Watson, 2011), and research rarely uses such frameworks to explore work-
related driving issues.  Nevertheless, given the possible links between safety climate and safety 
outcomes, it is suggested that fleet safety climate may be related to occupational road safety 
outcomes, and thus worthy of further exploration (Banks, Freeman & Davey, 2014). 
 
Taken together, empirical evidence is lacking into the effectiveness of a range of fleet 
interventions as well as how theoretical constructs such as safety culture and climate can be 
combined with organisational initiatives to enhance safety outcomes.  Arguably, one of the first 
steps is to examine employees’ perceptions regarding various occupational road safety 
initiatives and explore what factors influence such perceptions.    
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
A total of 679 employees sourced from four Australian organisations completed an on-line 
questionnaire. Participation was confidential and anonymous.  The organisations included 
private and public, profit and not-for-profit organisations, and contained either medium or large 
vehicle fleets. These organisations were responsible for a combined workforce of approximately 
42,000 and a combined fleet of approximately 19,000, which operated in both rural and urban 
environments. A convenience sampling approach was utilised with a minimum of 100 
participants being sampled from each of the four organisations. Participants ranged in age from 
18 years to 65 years (M = 42, SD = 11). A relatively even distribution of male (58 percent) and 
female (42 percent) participants was achieved. All participants reported regularly driving a 
vehicle for occupational purposes. Crash involvement and demerit point history (e.g., fines) 
were examined via participants reported frequency of such events over the past 12 months.  
The largest proportion of the sample had not been involved in a crash (84.5%, n = 574), with 
9.6% (n = 65) being involved in one crash and 1.9% (n = 13) being involved in more than one 
crash.  In regards to fines, 87.5% (n = 594) had not received a fine in the last year, while 7.1% 
(n = 48) received one fine and 1.5% (n = 10) received more than one fine.   
 
A questionnaire was developed that required participants to rate 35 fleet safety-based initiatives 
in regards to how effective they perceived they would be in improving road safety in their 
organisation. Initiatives were selected based upon: (a) a review of interventions proposed to be 
best practice in industry reports (Anderson, Plowman, Leven, & Fraine, 1998; Haworth et al., 
2008; Haworth, Tingvall, & Kowadlo, 2000; Health and Safety Executive, 2000; Murray, 2007; 
Murray, Newnam, Watson, Davey, & Schonfeld, 2003); and (b) initiatives that had been 
previously empirically evaluated (Banks, Davey, Biggs & King, 2010).  Identified initiatives that 
have been previously researched included: group discussions to identify safety problems and 
brainstorm solutions (Gregersen et al., 1996), safe driving goal setting, (Ludwig, 2000) signing a 
promise card commitment to drive safely (Ludwig & Geller, 1991), monitoring driver behaviour 
with in-car data recorders (Wouters & Bos, 1999), and encouraging self-monitoring of driving 
behaviour (Olson & Austin, 2000). The questionnaire was piloted with both managers and 
employees.  Participants were required to rate initiatives on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from very ineffective to very effective. The descriptions of the initiatives used in the 
questionnaire can be viewed in the results section in Table 1.  
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A 36 item fleet safety climate scale developed in previous research (Banks et al., 2006) was 
also utilised.  The items were consistent with existing fleet safety climate measures such as the 
Safety Climate Questionnaire – Modified for Drivers [SCQ-MD] which has previously been 
validated with industry samples (Wills et al., 2009). Participants’ responses to the items required 
them to indicate how much they thought the practices applied to their organisation. Items were 
measured using a five-point scale ranging from one representing never to five representing 
always. All factors were calculated such that higher scores indicated safer perceptions.  
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1 Perceived Effectiveness 
Descriptive analysis revealed that the initiatives perceived by employees to be most effective in 
managing occupational road risks were multifaceted.  The top five initiatives were considered to 
be: (a) making vehicle safety features standard, (b) practical driver training skills, (c) 
investigation of serious driver vehicle incidents, (d) making cruise control a standard vehicle 
feature and (e) targeting safety assistance to high risk drivers.  As a result, the 
countermeasures perceived to be most effective were a combination of technology and human 
factors.  However, it is noteworthy that only “making vehicle safety features standard” reached a 
mean score above 4 indicating consensus that the approach was “effective.”  Additionally, there 
has yet to be a cumulative body of evidence that indicates the initiatives (particularly practical 
driver training skills) actually improves fleet safety. Between groups analysis revealed no 
significant differences between the three highest ranked items, although a top ranked items 
(e.g., making vehicles safer) was ranked significantly higher than the fifth ranked item (e.g., 
targeting safety assistance) t(679) = 8.19, p <.01. In contrast, the least effective initiatives were 
considered to be: (a) signing a promise card, (b) advertising company phone numbers on 
vehicles, (c) consideration of driving competence in staff recruitment, (d) communicating cost 
benefits of road safety e.g., fuel efficiency, and (e) presenting comparisons of vehicle incident 
statistics between depots.  No significant differences in employee perceptions were identified 
based on age, affiliated organisation, gender, employees’ self-reported crash involvement or 
employees’ self-reported traffic infringement history. The means and standard deviations for all 
35 initiatives are presented below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Employee perceptions of initiative effectiveness 
Occupational Road Safety Initiative Mean  SD 
Making vehicle safety features standard e.g. passenger airbags 4.02 1.11 
Practical driver skills training 3.94 1.25 
Investigation of serious vehicle incidents 3.89 1.09 
Making cruise control a standard vehicle feature 3.69 1.23 
Targeting safety assistance to high risk drivers 3.66 1.14 
Marking low visibility walls and objects with hazard colours 3.60 1.21 
Recording vehicle incidents and identifying high risk employees and 
vehicles 
3.59 1.16 
Assessing competency before being cleared to operate vehicles in 
difficult areas 
3.57 1.22 
Medical screening for problems that will affect driving e.g. vision 3.53 1.25 
Journey planning to avoid high risk situations e.g. animals at dusk 3.49 1.19 
Vehicle inductions for all drivers 3.48 1.22 
Awareness communication on work related road risks e.g. emails, 
posters 
3.46 1.01 
Employee input in selection of vehicles 3.44 1.27 
Individual incentives for safe driving 3.44 1.27 
Presenting genuine personal stories about serious crashes in your 
organisation 
3.43 1.19 
Making ‘lights on’ during driving a standard vehicle feature 3.39 1.30 
Documenting vehicle maintenance 3.39 1.10 
Provision of driver safety information 3.38 1.02 
Checking driver’s licences are current every 12 months 3.30 1.35 
Group incentives for safe driving 3.27 1.21 
Individual feedback on driving behaviour 3.27 1.13 
Development and promotion of work related road safety policy 3.25 1.01 
Including driving behaviour in performance assessments 3.21 1.21 
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Safe driving goal setting 3.15 1.10 
Encouraging self-monitoring of driving behaviour 3.09 1.06 
Individual consequences for unsafe driving 3.07 1.03 
Making speed-limiters a standard vehicle feature 3.06 1.36 
Group discussions to identify safety problems and brainstorm solutions 3.00 1.12 
Group feedback on driving behaviour 3.00 1.17 
Monitor driver behaviour with in-car data recorders 2.93 1.32 
Presenting comparisons of vehicle incident statistics between depots 2.92 1.20 
Communicating cost benefits of road safety e.g. fuel efficiency 2.87 1.13 
Consideration of driving competency in staff selection process 2.87 1.18 
Advertising organisations phone number on vehicles for complaints & 
compliments 
2.81 1.36 
Signing a promise card commitment to drive safely 2.37 1.17 
 
3.2 Safety Climate 
A factor analysis of the Fleet safety climate scale extracted five factors that were: (a) 
management commitment; (b) work demands; (c) trust; (d) appropriateness of rules; and (e) 
communication. The observed reliability coefficients for each of the factors were above the 
acceptable cut-off level of .70 (De Vaus, 2002). Examples of items loading on each of the 
factors are provided below. 
 
· Management commitment: “Management are committed to motor vehicle safety” and 
“Management are committed to driver safety”; 
· Work demands: “Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are followed even when a 
job is rushed” and “Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic”; 
· Appropriateness of Rules: “Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are always 
practical” and “Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles can be followed without 
conflicting with work practices”;  
· Trust: “Employees trust management” and “Management trust employees”; 
· Communication: “An effective documentation management system ensures the availability 
of safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles” and “safety policies relating to the 
use of motor vehicles are effectively communicated to workers” 
 
Mean and standard deviation scores were calculated for the overall fleet safety climate 
questionnaire as well as for each of the five extracted factors. The mean overall fleet safety 
climate score was 3.33 (SD = 0.67), which on a five point likert scale, suggests a perceived 
“moderate” level of organisational support for safety. Mean scores remained relatively 
consistent across the five factors. More specifically, the scores were as follows: Factor One - 
management commitment (M = 3.47, SD = 0.88); Factor Two - work demands (M = 3.13, SD = 
0.89); Factor Three – trusting relationships (M = 3.15, SD = 0.89); Factor Four - appropriateness 
of rules (M = 3.55, SD = 0.72); and Factor Five - communication (M = 3.27, SD = 0.80).  
 
3.3 Safety Performance  
A series of analyses were undertaken to determine the impact of safety climate and perceived 
initiative effectiveness on driving performance e.g., crashes and fines. In regards to aberrant 
driving behaviours, no significant differences were identified between crash involvement or 
incurring fines and self-reported safety climate.  This may be considered unsurprising given the 
small number of employees who reported being involved in a crash or receiving a fine, which 
may in part be dependent upon the 12 month time period.  Pearson’s correlations revealed that 
higher perceptions of management commitment were positively associated with awareness 
communication regarding risks (r = .20**), setting a goal of safe driving (r = .21**) and promotion 
of road safety policy (r = .21**).  Higher reports of work demands was positively associated with 
including driver behaviour in performance assessments (r = .24**) and enforcing individual 
consequences for unsafe driving (r = .22**).  For trusting relationships, communicating the 
benefits of cost benefits was positively associated with this factor (r = .21**) and signing promise 
cards (r = .19**).  Having appropriate rules was positively correlated with performance 
assessments (r = .17**) while communication was related to promoting awareness (r = .20**), 
goal setting (r = 2.23**) and having safety policies (r = .21**).  Not surprisingly, higher inter-
correlations were identified between the five safety climate factors e.g., communication and 
management commitment (r = .78**). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study aimed to examine employees’ perceptions regarding various occupational road 
safety initiatives and determine whether a higher presence of safety climate influenced such 
perceptions.  In regards to perceptions, a range of engineering/technology as well as human 
factors initiatives were considered moderately effective, such as purchasing safer vehicles, 
investigating serious vehicle incidents and practical driver skills training. It is noteworthy that 
research has yet to conclusively determine whether such approaches are in fact effective at 
improving road safety. More specifically, while utilising safer vehicles and investigating incidents 
makes intuitive sense, research has yet to demonstrate that increasing driver training skills and 
targeting safety assistance for high risk drivers actually improves safety outcomes. Of interest is 
that some of the initiatives that were considered least effective, were countermeasures currently 
widely undertaken in Australia, such as “advertising company phone numbers on vehicles”. 
Additionally, monitoring driver behaviour with in-car data recorders was considered the sixth 
least effective initiative, which is surprising given that in-vehicle monitoring systems are: (a) 
being increasingly embraced within the fleet industry and (b) beginning to produce positive 
results (Horrey et al., 2012).  In regards to the latter, a number of preliminary trials have 
reported improvements in fleet safety (Toledo & Lotan, 2006) including a reduction in crashes 
(Lehmann & Cheale, 1998; Musicant et al., 2007; Toledo et al., 2008; Wouters & Bos, 2000).  
This finding may be explained by the human propensity to display negative attitudes towards 
interventions they have little exposure to (Aletraris, Shelton, & Roman, 2015).  Further research 
is required into fleet drivers’ acceptance of installing technology in vehicles, as research is 
identifying that user acceptance is a multifaceted concept that can influence program success 
e.g., Technology Acceptance Model (Regan et al., 2014).  The lack of research into user 
acceptance of in-vehicle systems is a critical oversight given the increasing implementation of 
the technology in Australia. 
 
In regards to the influence of safety climate on perceptions of initiative effectiveness as well as 
self-reported aberrant driving behaviours, the findings were mixed.  On the one hand, expected 
correlations were found between factor loadings of safety climate and the perceived 
effectiveness of initiatives e.g., trusting relationships and communicating cost benefits of safety 
to employees. On the other hand, a clear link was not identified between safety climate and self-
reported crash involvement or incurring fines.  This could be due to the small percentage of the 
sample who were actually involved in such incidents in the 12 months, or the finding could also 
reflect on-going difficulties conceptualising and operationalising safety culture and climate. 
While the difficulties associated with measuring the nature and impact of safety culture are well 
documented in the literature (Edwards et al., 2013; Guldenmund, 2000), the concept is 
increasingly being utilised to direct the implementation of safety initiatives (Edwards et al., 
2013).  Finally, further research is needed to determine the organisational processes that both 
facilitate and maximise a collective motivation to improve safety.  Preliminary research has 
demonstrated that institutional forces can positively influence employees’ general perceptions of 
initiatives in the workplace (Susskind et al., 2014) and employee’s perceived effectiveness of 
interventions actually impacts upon safety outcomes (Matlow et al., 2012).  Taken together, 
continued research to both identify and enhance the processes that increase intervention 
acceptance and the corresponding effectiveness of actual fleet interventions can only assist in 
reducing the burden of road crashes. This research has demonstrated that while the relationship 
between perceived effectiveness of interventions and safety climate is not always clear, workers 
may be willing to participate in a range of engineering and human-factor initiatives.   
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Abstract 
Safety leadership is asserted to positively influence safety compliance amongst employees. We 
examine this assertion by conducting a systematic literature review of the available academic 
literature on safety leadership practices and observed safety outcomes. We identified 22 
empirical studies, the majority of which measured leadership through generic scales (MLQ and 
LMX). Closer scrutiny of the outcome measures suggested that these were mainly aligned to 
the implementation and operations phases of the safety management systems framework 
proposed by the British Standards Institution in response to legislation and incorporating HSE 
guidance. We conclude that safety compliance has been narrowly defined in academic study, 
and in practice embraces a much wider range of activities. While safety leadership may 
contribute to successfully achieving these other actions, there is no empirical evidence for this. 
Moreover, there is considerable critique of transformational and transactional leadership, so that 
the specification of desired leadership practices is problematic. We propose that a broader 
conceptualization of safety compliance requires safety leadership to embrace organizational 
context, which is currently ignored, and suggest that a relational model of leadership adopting 
the notion of distributed leadership may ensure safety compliance.  
 
Keywords: Leadership; Compliance; Regulated Environments; Self-Regulation 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Leadership is always exercised within a particular context, and yet it is frequently ignored 
despite calls for greater attention to be given to the environment within which leadership is 
enacted (Osborn et al., 2002; Porter and McLaughlin, 2006). Studies of safety leadership also 
follow to this pattern. For example a recent meta-analysis of safety leadership styles as 
antecedents of safety behaviours (Clarke, 2013) took no account of context and how this might 
influence choice of styles or required behaviours. Conchie et al. (2013) noted this lack of 
research on the impact of context on leadership, using it to justify their study of supervisors’ 
engagement with safety leadership. 
In the UK an organization’s safety environment is replete with legal requirements, stemming 
from the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), safety standards (e.g. BSI, 2004), guidance on 
safety practices from the Health and Safety Executive (e.g. HSE, 2013) and specific codes of 
practice. Such safety regulations are an integral component of the external environment and a 
key aspect of the safety leader’s role is to ensure compliance with them. Members of the top 
management team have a legal responsibility to ensure their organization’s safety management 
systems (broadly defined) are compliant with these regulations. However, the requirements of 
these systems are extensive ranging from risk assessment and hazard identification to 
evaluating compliance against organizational policies and practices, and also including training, 
operational control and emergency preparedness (e.g. BSI, 2007; HSE, 1997). Achieving 
compliance with all of these different requirements is a challenging task for the safety leader(s). 
Compliance encompasses much more than the narrow definition of safety compliance provided 
by Neal et al. (2000, pg. 101), namely “adhering to safety procedures and carrying out work in a 
safe manner”, and regularly rehearsed in subsequent studies of safety leadership. Safety 
compliance, broadly understood, would require differential leadership responses depending on 
a combination of the nature and object of the regulation; the role or position of the leader; and 
the role and position of the employees required to comply; as well as their perception of risk.   
The aim of this paper is therefore to explore from within existing academic literature the extent 
to which safety leadership has ensured compliance with this wider range of safety requirements 
demanded of organizations. The paper is structured as follows. A literature review considering 
particular safety leadership styles, the subjective nature of risk and motivations for compliance 
is followed by a description of the systematic literature review methodology deployed to elicit 
empirical studies of safety leadership roles and practices. The findings for safety compliance 
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are represented against good practice guidelines for a comprehensive safety management 
system. These findings together with leadership styles are discussed and an alternative model 
of safety leadership to ensure compliance based on distributed leadership is proposed.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Safety Leadership 
According to the HSE sponsored literature review of effective leadership behaviours for safety 
(Lekka and Healey, 2012) existing safety leadership research has focused on either 
transformational-transactional leadership or leader-member exchange (LMX).  
Transformational leadership may be defined as “leader behaviours that transform and inspire 
followers to perform beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the good of the 
organization” (Avolio et al., 2009; pg 423). Transformational leadership comprises four leader 
behaviours (Bass, 1985) namely; idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual 
stimulation and individual consideration and is characterized by value-based and individualized 
interaction, which results in better exchange quality and greater concern for welfare (Clarke, 
2013). Idealized influence is based on trust and occurs when leaders demonstrate high 
standards of moral conduct in their own behaviour, becoming role models for their subordinates. 
Inspirational motivation occurs when leaders provide clarity, communicate a positive value-
based vision for the future state of the organization and its employees and challenge employees 
to go beyond their personal interests and focus their attention on the goals of the collective. 
Leaders exhibit intellectual stimulation when they encourage employees to share their 
perspectives on issues, to challenge organizational norms, question assumptions and to think 
creatively. Leaders draw on a variety of opinions in order to make decisions. Leaders displaying 
individual consideration recognize the unique needs and abilities of the followers and by 
adapting their approach seek to coach or mentor them in order that they might reach their full 
potential. Each of these four dimensions of transformational leadership has implications for 
safety leadership (see Kapp, 2012 or Hoffmeister et al., 2014). 
In contrast, transactional leadership is based on non-individualized hierarchical relationships 
and comprises three dimensions (constructive leadership, corrective leadership and laissez-
faire leadership) (Zohar, 2002a). Constructive leadership offers material rewards (e.g. 
increased salary, promotion, job security) contingent upon satisfactory performance. This 
requires clear communication between leader and follower. Some understanding of the 
individual needs and abilities is needed in order to offer motivationally relevant rewards. 
Corrective leadership (or active management by exception) monitors individual performance 
against standards, detecting errors and correcting them. Laissez-faire leadership (passive 
management by exceptions) disowns all leadership responsibility and only engages with 
subordinates in an emergency. 
In adopting a transactional leadership style for safety, leaders typically establish appropriate 
safety goals, monitor performance towards these goals and reward behaviours that sustain or 
improve safety practices (Kapp, 2012; Zohar 2002a, 2002b). By contrast, leaders adopting a 
transformational leadership style for safety demonstrate 10 different actions, as outlined in 
Kelloway et al. (2006). These include: expressing satisfaction when jobs are performed safely; 
rewarding achievement of safety targets; continuous encouragement for safe working; 
maintaining a safe working environment; suggesting new ways of working more safely; 
encouraging employees to openly discuss safety at work; talking about personal value and 
beliefs in the importance of safety; behaving in a way that demonstrates commitment to safety; 
spending time to demonstrate how to work safely; and, listening to safety concerns. 
LMX focuses on the dyadic social exchange processes between leader and follower, 
acknowledging that leaders develop different exchange relationships with their followers thereby 
differentially impacting important leader and member outcomes (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). In 
dyadic relationships, the early social exchanges (essentially between strangers or 
acquaintances) which are more ‘transactional’ in nature, change to become more 
‘transformational’ as the relationship develops into a partnership (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). 
Thus low LMX relationships align more closely with descriptions of transactional leadership 
while high LMX relationships align more closely with the descriptions of transformational 
leadership (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). Leadership occurs when leaders and followers develop 
effective relationships based on trust, respect and mutual obligations, resulting in mutual and 
incremental influence to meet shared interests (Uhl-Bien, 2006). Safety studies adopting this 
perspective (e.g. Hofmann and Morgeson, 1999; Yagil and Luria, 2010) investigated 
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relationship quality using the 7-point LMX scale (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995) relying on practices 
implicit within the scales that constitute trust, respect and obligation. These are giving feedback, 
problem solving, providing personal support, decision making, providing direction and clarity, 
which strongly resemble aspects of both transactional and transformational leadership.  
While many of these studies explicitly focused on particular relationships and consideration of 
the specific compliance context, what was required and from whom was often reported in the 
methods section, how together these influenced the choice of leadership style to ensure safety 
compliance was not discussed. 
 
2.2 Variation in understanding risk 
Krimsky and Golding (1992) drew attention to ontologically different perspectives on risk. The 
dominant one, adopted typically by safety engineers, is agent-centred and based on “a model of 
rationality that is fixed and invariant” (Tansley, 2004; pg 18), this renders safety and safety 
compliance amenable to traditional scientific methods and standards. An alternative draws on 
structural-cultural approaches that emphasize the contextual, situated and socially-constructed 
nature of risk, risk perceptions and therefore safety (Tansley, 2004). Hutter (2011, pg 305) 
acknowledged the “situated and negotiated character of regulatory compliance”, so that 
compliance with what, by whom and for what purpose is not clear cut. Regulation and safety 
compliance is therefore fraught with dilemmas and conflicts as different groups have different 
perspectives on what the particular risks are and what is required to mitigate them. Hutter (2011) 
draws on her earlier investigation of British Rail to note the differences in perspective on risk 
between senior managers who had learned about risks through reports and safety data, and 
employees who had little knowledge of risk but understood very well through experience and 
anecdote the nature of accidents and their causes in their workplace. As a consequence these 
two groups would have different capabilities and motivations to comply. While board members or 
senior managers may have engaged with a regulator, middle managers, supervisors and front-line 
workers are unlikely to have had that experience. Indeed even board members and senior 
managers may not have met a regulator because most organizations are never inspected (Gray 
and Silbey, 2011). Knowledge and understanding of safety compliance requirements will therefore 
vary across the organizational hierarchy, so that who is trying to comply with what and how this is 
to be achieved cannot be assumed and needs to be made explicit. 
 
2.3 Achieving compliance 
Achieving compliance depends not only on knowledge, understanding and skill (Gray and 
Silbey, 2011) but also on individual motivation (Tyler, 2011), which may be either extrinsic or 
intrinsic (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Extrinsic motivation to achieve compliance draws on an 
individual’s instrumental concerns and their utility maximization goals, and is often achieved 
through either fear of punishment or anticipation of reward (Tyler, 2006), which may be tangible, 
for example financial, or intangible, for example praise. Leadership practices associated with a 
transactional style typically adopt this ‘command-or-control’ form of regulation to ensure 
compliance in general, and safety compliance, defined narrowly as ‘adhering to safety 
procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner, pg. 101’ (Neal et al., 2000), in particular. In 
contrast, self-regulation depends on the internalization of social norms and values which drives 
individual behaviours (Tyler, 2006). Intrinsic motivation appeals to these norms and values so 
that the individual desires to conform, or comply, through a sense of obligation or feelings of 
morality (Tyler, 2006). These can be encouraged and developed by establishing the legitimacy 
of the rules or the authority figure, where ‘legitimacy refers to the judgement that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definition’ (Suchman, 1995; pg. 574). A transformational leadership style 
characterized by value-based and individual interaction, seeks to establish the legitimacy of the 
leader by appealing to the values of the individual.  
This brief review of the literature suggest that safety leadership may be either transformational 
or transactional drawing respectively on intrinsic motivation which encourages voluntary rule 
following out of obligation to the leader, and the organization they represent, or extrinsic 
motivations, which establishes control through fear of punishment or anticipation of reward. 
These are presented as discrete alternatives to achieve safety compliance. Nevertheless it is 
unclear to which circumstances either applies, even though we know that motivations and ability 
to comply and understanding and knowledge of compliance requirements vary amongst 
individuals employed in different roles. Furthermore this assumes that both transformational and 
transactional leadership are single constructs, when clearly they are multi-dimensional. 
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Consequently it is unclear whether particular aspects of leadership practice encourage specific 
sorts of compliance, and if so which. For example how do corrective and constructive leadership 
differ in the ways they deliver compliance with standard procedures? And, what difference 
would an employee experience it their leader adopted individual consideration rather than 
inspirational motivation to ensure more individuals were involved in safety planning? Although 
Griffin and Hu (2013; pg. 197) argued that “more empirical studies are required to understand 
how safety leaders can promote safety compliance”, we believe that a closer inspection of 
existing safety leadership studies taking account of their contextual differences, allied with either 
a “command-or-control” or a self-regulation perspective (Tyler, 2011), will reveal more about 
how safety leaders achieve compliance with the variety of safety requirements noted above.  
Specifically, this paper has three objectives. First, we will review existing empirical studies of 
safety leadership noting aspects of the context and identifying the different reported leadership 
practices. Based on the alignment between transformational leadership and intrinsic motivation 
and between transactional leadership and extrinsic motivation, we can infer the ways the 
leadership practices support various motivations for the range of observed employee groups to 
comply with the particular safety regulations evident in any particular study. Second, drawing on 
a self-regulation framework (Lord et al., 2010) we will suggest how these might explain the 
achievement of compliance with safety requirements by different safety leadership styles 
apparent in the existing literature. Third, drawing on selected reviews of the wider leadership 
literature we will suggest how a newer conceptualization of leadership, namely distributed 
leadership, may engender a different form of compliance by employees. Rather than relying on 
the traditional psychological approaches to understanding individual behaviours and motivations 
and personal characteristics of individual leaders in relation to safety, we draw on more 
relational perspectives (Emirbayer, 1997) from sociology to present an alternative approach to 
safety leadership to support safety compliance.   
 
METHOD 
A literature review based on the systematic literature review methodology developed for 
management and business studies (Tranfield et al., 2003) was deployed. A series of key words 
were developed in relation to the three primary terms of interest, namely, safety, leadership and 
role (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Keywords used to create search strings 
Main Term Additional Terms 
Safety safety OR security OR sure* OR safeguard OR protect* OR reliab* OR 
resilien* 
Leadership leader* OR manage* OR advisor OR director OR supervisor OR facilitator 
OR officer OR superintendent OR chief OR commander OR expert OR 
coach OR specialist 
Role activity OR action OR role OR function OR skill OR enact OR do OR 
conduct OR routine OR practi?e 
 
These keywords were combined to make strings using the Boolean character ‘OR’ and different 
strings were combined using the Boolean character ‘AND’ (Table 2). These were applied to five 
different electronic databases (ABI-Proquest, EBSCO Host – Business Source Complete, 
SCOPUS, Science Direct and PsychInfo). Table 2 shows the numbers of items appearing in 
scholarly peer reviewed academic journals in the different databases in relation to the different 
search string combinations. An initial screen of titles permitted a substantial reduction in 
apparently relevant articles (Table 2). Exclusion criteria included book reviews and non-English 
language articles, as well as those that focused on different forms of security (including cyber, 
food, financial, energy and national) and various forms of safety (including health and patient, 
environmental, technical, transport, chemical and product). Papers that dealt with modelling, 
families, education and business performance were also excluded. After removal of the 
duplicates occurring in each of the databases the articles from the string for ‘safety + leadership 
+ role’ was reduced from 112 to 54. The three authors then reviewed the abstracts of these 
articles together, and by discussion eliminated a further 47 articles that were deemed not 
relevant to safety leader practices.  
Table 2. Number of items discovered by applying a search string to an electronic database. 
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Number of relevant titles are in parenthesis. 
Database 
Search 
String 
ABI EBSCO SCOPUS Science 
Direct 
PsychInfo 
Safety + 
Leadership 
1192 1169 6486 1949 577 
Safety + Role 1263 1533 20425 6124 2250 
Safety + 
Leadership + 
Role 
90 
(12) 
100 
(21) 
480 
(37) 
134 
(18) 
66 
(24) 
 
Scanning the reference list of the remaining seven articles and tracking their citations surfaced 
15 additional papers relevant to safety leader practices. These 22 articles were then read and 
analysed and the following information was extracted from each paper (where appropriate): 
· Industry / sector; 
· Focal actor(s) (e.g. manager, supervisor, front-line worker taking note of the leader); 
· Focus of measure (e.g. consciousness, communication, compliance and participation) 
used to describe compliance (defined broadly);  
· Scale (where appropriate) used to indicate leadership. Many studies used the MLQ 
scale to indicate transformational-transactional leadership (Bass and Avolio, 2002), 
while Leader-Member exchange was indicated by the LMX scale. A few authors 
created their own leadership measures (e.g. Dahl and Olsen, 2013; Lu and Yang, 
2010); and 
· Safety practices. It was discovered that these were implicit in the different scales often 
for the dependent variable used in the study (e.g. safety consciousness (Barling et al., 
2002). 
The measures used to describe safety compliance were then aligned to the requirements of an 
occupational health and safety management system as outlined by the British Standards 
Institution (BSI, 2007) which facilitates compliance with the UK’s Health and Safety at Work 
(1974) and subsequent Regulations (The management of H&S at work regulation, 1992) (Table 
3). This allowed us to identify the breadth of safety compliance that was being considered in 
each of the papers.  
 
FINDINGS 
We identified 22 academic articles that explored the role and practices of safety leaders and 
provided details of their environmental context. Our review confirms the findings of the earlier 
review of effective leadership behaviours for safety (Lekka and Healey, 2012) that current safety 
research focuses mainly on either transactional – transformational leadership or leader-member 
exchange (LMX) (Table 4). 15 of the reviewed papers had this focus. Many of the remainder 
adopted qualitative approaches to data capture either exploring factors that influenced 
leadership enactment through focus groups (Conchie et al., 2013) or investigating the effects of 
supervisory feedback on worker safety compliance through brief interviews (Zohar, 2002b; 
Zohar and Luria, 2003).  
Table 4 reveals a number of key findings. First, leadership defined by the standard measures of 
MLQ or LMX (Table 4) was deemed to be an antecedent to several different safety behavioural 
outcomes, most commonly safety compliance and safety participation, although safety 
citizenship, including voice, and safety consciousness were also measured (Table 4). The 
measure for safety compliance developed by Neal and colleagues (Neal et al., 2000; Neal and 
Griffin, 2006) comprised four items. Dahl and Olsen (2013) supplemented these with other 
measures. Together these provide only a partial coverage of the many activities outlined in the 
framework for an OSH management systems (BSI, 2007), and against which compliance might 
be judged (Table 3). Table 3 suggests that the other measures of safety behaviours align with 
different elements of the British Standards OSH management system and therefore may 
themselves be considered to support safety compliance more broadly defined. It should also be 
noted that no scale provided a complete assessment of safety compliance, although safety 
citizenship (Hofmann et al., 2003) came closest (Table 3). The focus of most measures is on 
implementation and operation, rather than planning and checking, and with no coverage of 
reviewing. The focus in the studies on supervisor-front-line worker relationships may be a 
contributing factor, although this does ignore the responsibilities of more senior managers and 
their influence on organizational safety compliance.  
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Second, much of the research on safety leadership has been conducted in manufacturing 
industries which are commonly organized as hierarchies. Perhaps as a consequence many 
(n=14) of the studies have investigated explicitly supervisor-front-line worker relationships. 
Moreover, other studies (e.g. Hoffmeister et al., 2014 looking at journeymen-apprentice 
relationships, and Yagil and Luria (2010) looking at manager-employee) examined similar 
relationships between a low ranked worker and a higher ranked worker, leaving different and 
more senior relationships in the organizational hierarchy under-explored.  
In contrast to the majority of studies which used generic scales, the work of Zohar and 
colleagues in Israel, focused on particular aspects of compliance, namely the use of PPE, 
specifically ear-plugs by workers, and safety communication, specifically the giving of feedback 
to workers by their supervisors (e.g. Zohar and Luria, 2003; Luria et al., 2008). In addition 
Conchie et al. (2013) used investigated the influence of contextual factors, in particular role 
overload, production demands and formal procedures on supervisor enactment of leadership. 
 
Table 3. Compliance focus of different scales used to measure impact of leadership aligned to components of the British 
Standards management framework for Occupational Health and Safety (BSI, 2007). 
Author Safety 
Complianc
e 
(Neal and 
Griffin, 
2006a; 
Dahl and 
Olsen, 
2013b) 
Safety 
Participatio
n 
(Neal and 
Griffin, 
2006a; 
Clarke and 
Ward, 
2006b) 
Safety 
Consciousne
ss 
(Barling et al., 
2002) 
Safety 
Citizenshi
p 
(Hofmann 
et al., 
2003) 
Safety 
Communicati
on 
(Hofmann and 
Morgeson, 
1999) 
1. Develop, 
Deploy & Monitor 
OSH Policy 
     
2. Plan      
2.1Risk 
assessment/haza
rd identification 
Xb Xb  X  
3. Implement & 
Operate 
     
3.1 Resources & 
role clarity 
     
3.2 Competence / 
Training 
/Awareness 
Xa Xa X X  
3.3 
Communication / 
Participation 
 Xa,b X X X 
3.4 
Documentation 
(provision and 
control) 
Xb     
3.5 Operational 
Control 
Xa,b  X X  
3.6 Emergency 
preparedness 
and response 
  X   
4. Checking      
4.1 Monitor OSH 
objectives 
     
4.2 Evaluate 
compliance 
 Xb  X  
4.3 Investigate 
accidents / non-
conformity 
   X  
4.4 Audit  Xb    
5. Review      
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DISCUSSION 
Complying with safety regulations requires attention to more than just operational practices 
which is the primary focus of many of the measures of safety compliance in the academic 
literature (e.g. Neal and Griffin, 2006) and indicated in Table 3. In the UK, the Health and Safety 
at Work etc Act (1974) covers: the provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work; the 
safe deployment of processes and practices; the provision of information, instruction and 
training; maintenance of a safe work place which implies attentiveness; the provision of 
necessary safety equipment to ensure the work environment is safe. These imply a range of 
activities as developed in various standards documents (e.g. BSI, 2007), including but not 
limited to planning and design, controlling, monitoring and evaluating, developing policy, 
process and procedure, and training. Although this larger compliance framework is UK-centric 
and directly applicable only to the studies by Conchie and her colleagues and by Clarke and her 
colleagues, nevertheless it is probable that safety legislation in other countries will have a 
similarly wide remit, so that safety compliance should be understood broadly. As a 
consequence, and in marked contrast to existing research studies, not only is the scope of 
safety compliance enlarged, but also a greater diversity of factors may contribute to its 
successful enactment. 
One factor in particular, leadership, is often perceived to influence safety compliance. Hitherto 
most studies of safety leadership (Table 4) have adopted a transactional-transformational 
perspective, either explicitly or implicitly, because the LMX perspective adopted by some “is 
both transactional and transformational: it begins as transactional social exchange and evolved 
into transformational social exchange” (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995, pg 238). This perspective 
draws on both the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of individuals to achieve its effects, so that 
safety compliance in a ‘command and control’ form is achieved by transactional leadership 
which appeals to an individual’s extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivations encourage self-
regulation, and are supported by transformational leadership. One might conclude simplistically 
that different forms of safety leadership motivate individuals in different ways and these 
differentially impact safety compliance, or that individuals naturally differ in their inherent 
motivations and the role of the safety leader is to modify his/her style to match these 
requirements of the individual to ensure safety compliance. What is much less clear, and yet 
altogether more practical, is how safety compliance may be achieved in specific circumstances 
and how this varies as context changes. The use of generic scales in safety questionnaires may 
contribute partially to this absence of clarity and lack of utility. In contrast the studies by Zohar 
and Luria (2003) and Luria et al. (2008) which measured particular leader practices (supervisory 
feedback on safety) in relation to the use of PPE by workers have greater conceptual clarity and 
more obvious practical application. 
 
Table 4. Data extracted from empirical studies of safety leadership identified by a systematic literature review. 
Author Country / 
Industry 
Focal Actor(s) 
(Leader indicated 
first) 
Focus of study Measure of 
Leadership 
type used 
Barling et al. 
(2002) 
Canada. Food & 
beverage 
industry 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Consciousness 
MLQ 
Clarke and 
Ward (2006) 
UK. 
Manufacturing 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Participation 
Bespoke 
measure of 
leader influence 
Conchie and 
Donald (2009) 
UK. Construction Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Citizenship 
MLQ 
Conchie et al. 
(2012) 
UK. Oil 
Company 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Citizenship 
MLQ 
Conchie et al. 
(2013) 
UK. Construction Supervisor + 
Operatives 
Safety 
Leadership 
Behaviours 
Job Demands-
Resources 
Framework 
Credo et al. 
(2010) 
USA. Drilling 
Company 
Managers + 
Supervisors/Front-
line worker 
Safety 
Consciousness 
LMX 
Dahl and Olsen 
(2013) 
Norway. Oil 
Company 
Leaders  + 
workers 
Safety 
Compliance 
Bespoke scale 
Hoffmeister et 
al. (2014) 
USA. 
Construction 
Journeymen + 
apprentices 
Safety 
Compliance and 
MLQ 
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Company Participation 
Hofmann and 
Morgeson 
(1999) 
USA. 
Manufacturing 
Group leader + 
supervisor / front-
line worker 
Safety 
Communication 
LMX 
Hofmann et al. 
(2003) 
USA. Army 
transport team 
Leaders + team 
members 
Safety 
Citizenship 
LMX 
Innes et al. 
(2010) 
USA. Range of 
industries 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Compliance and 
Participation 
MLQ 
Kapp (2012) USA. 
Construction and 
Manufacturing 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Compliance and 
Participation 
MLQ 
Kath et al. 
(2010) 
USA. Railway 
maintenance 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Communication 
LMX 
Kelloway et al. 
(2006) 
Canada. Service 
sector 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Consciousness 
MLQ 
Lu and Yang 
(2010) 
China. Container 
terminal 
Senior Manager + 
worker 
Safety 
Compliance and 
Safety 
Participation 
Bespoke scale 
Luria et al. 
(2008) 
Israel. 
Manufacturing 
Supervisor + front-
line worker 
Supervisory 
feedback + 
Worker use of 
PPE 
Supervisory 
feedback on 
safety 
Michael et al. 
(2006) 
USA. Wood 
product 
manufacturing 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Safety 
Communication 
LMX 
Mullen and 
Kelloway 
(2009) 
Canada. 
Hospitals 
Manager  + 
employees 
Safety 
Compliance and 
Participation 
MLQ 
Yagil and Luria 
(2010) 
Israel. 
Manufacturing 
Manager + 
employees 
Safety 
Compliance and 
Participation 
LMX 
Zohar (2002a) Israel. Metal 
processing 
Supervisor + 
employees 
Safety Climate MLQ 
Zohar (2002b) Israel. 
Maintenance of 
heavy equipment 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Worker use of 
PPE 
Supervisory 
feedback on 
safety 
Zohar and Luria 
(2003) 
Israel. Oil 
Refinery  + 
Processing 
industries 
Supervisor + 
Front-line worker 
Supervisory 
feedback + 
worker use of 
PPE 
Supervisory 
feedback on 
safety 
 
Many of the studies of transformational-transactional safety leadership have used the MLQ 
scale (Bass and Avolio, 2002), often selecting particular items, most notably the four items 
relating to transformational leadership plus contingent reward, a component of transactional 
leadership (e.g. Barling et al., 2002; Kapp, 2012). However the general concept of 
transformational leadership, and because it is a continuum transactional leadership also, has 
been the focus of severe critique both conceptually and methodologically (van Knippenberg and 
Sitkin, 2013). According to Yukl (1999) these critiques “include ambiguous constructs, 
insufficient description of explanatory processes, a narrow focus on dyadic processes, 
omissions of some relevant behaviours, insufficient specification of limiting conditions 
(situational variables) and a bias towards heroic conceptions of leadership, pg. 286”. These 
flaws are inevitably present in safety leadership studies because they use the same scales. 
Future studies of safety leadership should seek to ensure greater conceptual clarity in the 
dimensions of the leadership construct under investigation and in their relationship to each 
other. Moreover, it is important that the explanatory processes linking leadership characteristics 
to follower outcomes are made explicit and are unambiguous. For example in the studies of 
safety leadership that use LMX (e.g. Credo et al., 2010; Kath et al., 2010) perceived 
organizational support (POS) (Eisenberger, et al., 1986) is additionally used to explain the 
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safety outcomes, yet it is unclear how the leader does or does not also contribute to providing 
organizational support and whether the two constructs (leadership and POS) are conflated and 
to what extent. As a consequence it is unclear what specifically individual safety leaders do 
when they are leading for safety. Moreover the mechanisms are poorly understood by which 
their actions stimulate safety compliance either with the narrow range of activities embraced in 
academic studies of safety compliance or with the broader range of activities specified in 
regulations, standards and guidelines which also demand compliance. Some of the latter may 
be covered in other academic studies of safety participation, safety consciousness and safety 
citizenship (Table 3). 
We contend that safety compliance has been narrowly focused in the academic literature and 
that this needs to be broadened to reflect practice. In addition existing studies of safety 
compliance (including safety participation, safety citizenship and safety consciousness) suggest 
implicitly that compliance is a binary state: either it has been achieved or it has not. The role of 
the safety leader is to ensure compliance. In practice of course safety is not static but rather a 
dynamic on-going process, needing continual intervention. Gray and Silbey (2011) note that 
“compliance as a process evolves among countless transactions across a heterogeneous set of 
compliance agents, with varying degrees of agency, knowledge, hierarchy, autonomy and 
experience, pg 134”. Their observation also indicates that compliance is not the sole 
responsibility of one individual – the safety leader, but rather a collaborative endeavour which, 
because of variation in context and diversity in actor abilities and engagement with risk and so 
safety, requires collective leadership. Safety compliance is therefore a dynamic process that 
requires collective rather than individual responsibility. 
All of the studies in this review of safety leadership and leadership practices to achieve safety 
compliance adopted a unitary view of the leader as an individual. More recent reviews of the 
general leadership literature (e.g. Thorpe et al., 2011) consider that leadership skills and 
responsibilities can be dispersed throughout an organization. Such perspectives are described 
as ‘plural leadership’ (Denis et al., 2012). One particular form of ‘plural leadership’ embraces the 
work on distributed leadership (Fitzsimmons et al., 2011), where leadership roles are dispersed 
across organizational levels over time, so that multiple actors take on leadership roles at 
appropriate moments exerting influence jointly. Adopting such a distributed perspective on 
safety leadership would accommodate the need for collective responsibility and accountability 
for safety compliance by drawing on the diverse skills, knowledge, expertise and experience 
within an organization to develop policies, practices and procedures that ensure safety 
compliance while remaining relevant and viable. This enhances the possibility of greater 
employee buy-in and increases the chance of success in achieving safety compliance. This 
moves away from the traditional psychological approach to safety leadership and points towards 
a more relational approach to safety leadership that also gives consideration to context, which 
has been absent in studies hitherto.  
A particular formulation of this possibility is the concept of ‘relational regulation’ (Huising and 
Silbey, 2011).They observe that because of circumstances in the organizational environment 
there is frequently a gap between the expectations of regulatory systems and the actual 
practices enacted in organizations and designed to meet those expectations. In other words 
there is a failure to achieve safety compliance. They suggest that relational regulation allows 
managers to keep “organizational activities within an acceptable range of variation close to 
regulatory specifications” (Huising and Silbey, 2011; pg .14). Managers do this: by building a 
support network through which they exchange information and learn from others; by pursuing 
expertise wherever it may be found (i.e. both formally and informally) within the organization 
and beyond; by developing a comprehensive multi-faceted view of the relations, practices and 
resources available across the organization, and how these may enable safety; and finally by 
being pragmatic about what is possible and what is required in any presenting circumstance. 
While ‘relational regulation’ focuses on a particular individual acting as a safety leader (rather 
than on a collective) it is nevertheless a collaborative endeavour that suggests how these 
individuals may more effectively engage with many others to develop practices, procedures and 
policies that are locally relevant, pragmatic and more effective because others have been 
involved in their development. Safety leadership that involves others encourages more 
widespread adoption and deployment of safe practices in the organization. This enhances 
safety compliance. ‘Relational regulation’ provides such a contextually-sensitive alternative 
model of safety leadership for safety compliance.  
Where previous studies of safety leadership have focused on an individual, future research 
could explore the connectivity between individuals perhaps using social network analysis 
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techniques, aligning their connections to their individual beliefs about safety and their particular 
safety skills and knowledge. This would permit the investigation of distributed safety leadership 
and the occurrence of ‘relational regulation’ 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper demonstrates that academic studies have not investigated the full range of practices 
that are deployed in practice by organizations to ensure safety compliance. The selection of 
sample population, typically of supervisors and front-line workers, ensures that safety 
compliance focused mainly on implementation and operations. Moreover, the adoption of 
existing leadership scales narrows the focus of safety leadership to individuals, and it must be 
inferred that they use either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations congruent with their leadership 
style. From these observations we suggest first that safety compliance should be 
conceptualized more broadly to conform closely to the requirements of OSH management 
systems, and second that a ‘relational regulation’ perspective on safety compliance drawing on 
distributed leadership could be more fully developed to ensure safety compliance is more 
effectively achieved in organizations and that studies of safety leadership embrace 
organizational context more fully. 
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Abstract 
The goal of this contribution is presentation of the risk assessment and management of risk 
sources in industrial enterprises. The main part of the paper will deal with so called unclassified 
risk sources, i.e. LPG storages, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). The 
evaluated SME are characterized as risk sources with an amount of dangerous materials under 
the limits of the SEVESO III Directive that could represent, as a result of the area location or 
specific process activities, significant major-accident risks. The major-accident prevention of 
these risk sources is not specified in any law at present, and that is why any adequate pressure 
is put neither on the assessment, nor the reduction of risks. Therefore, one of the goals of the 
article is to increase awareness on these unclassified risk sources, because risk perception is 
one of the main influencing factors within accident prevention. 
 
Keywords: Major Accident Prevention, Risk Assessment Methods, ARAMIS, Hazardous 
Materials, LPG. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In view of the growing prices of petrol and oil, the interest of drivers in liquefied propane-butane 
(LPG) as a fuel for cars rises. The number of storage tanks for car filling, both stand-alone tanks 
and tanks as part of petrol filling stations, increases. Prevention of accidents associated with LPG 
storage facilities is a priority in the protection of people in the vicinity of the facilities and equipment 
and forms an integral part of the management of system safety. The aim is to contribute to the 
prevention of accidents and incidents of process equipment with LPG based on the analysis of 
possible scenarios of accidents of LPG storage tanks and on the assessment of risks. Equipment 
with propane-butane (pressure vessels, tanks for heating) together with its transport by road and 
rail represents a significant number of risk sources. New LPG filling stations are built, but the issue 
of distances between them and petrol filling stations has not been sufficiently solved yet. During 
normal operation, fuel filling stations are not regarded as significant sources of risk in spite of the 
fact that from statistical data a certain level of major accident risk follows. In case of accident, a 
so-called domino effect, when an accident of one piece of equipment may cause a major accident 
of another piece of equipment, has to be considered. 
From the point of view of present amounts of stored LPG, the following facts can be stated. The 
amount of LPG in filling stations moves in a range from 2.1 t to 4.2 t in storage tanks of various 
sizes (e.g. a 5 m3 storage tank contains 2.1 t of LPG). Similar tanks are used for house heating 
(1.1 or 2.1 t of LPG for family houses) and for establishments in isolated places (e.g. hotel – 8.4 
t of LPG). These tanks can be of underground or aboveground type (see example in Figure 1). 
Further, propane-butane is sold in pressure vessels of various sizes (2, 5, 10 and 33 kg of 
LPG). The sources of risk can be above all rather large storage facilities for vessels, when the 
total amount of propane-butane can be to 4 t. 
 
 
Figure 1 – LPG filling station in a plant. 
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When storing the LPG in tanks, the following types of accidents may occur - Jet Fire, Flash Fire 
and VCE-type and BLEVE-type explosions. In the case of handling of LPG pressure vessels, 
the start of fire and explosion can be expected as well. Table 1 presents the possible types of 
phenomena of accidents in the case of damaged equipment containing selected fuels and their 
subsequent leaks. 
 
Table 1 – Overview of phenomena of accidents involving specific fuels. 
 Pool fire Jet fire Flash fire VCE BLEVE 
Petrol +   +  
Oil +     
LPG  + + + + 
CNG   + +  
LNG   + +  
 
2. METHODS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessment can be carried out by quite a number of methods developed by modifying 
several most widely used methods. The publication “Review of 62 risk analysis methodologies 
of industrial plants” (Tixier, et al, 2002) summarises the best known methods of risk 
assessment. To the most significant publications in the area of quantitative risk assessment 
belong Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Hazard identification, assessment and 
control, 2005 (Mannam, 2005), Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis - 
CPQRA, 1989 (CCPS, 1989) and Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment –“Purple Book”, 
1999 (Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1999). It is just the Dutch methodology 
CPR 18E Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment known as “Purple Book” that represents 
a recognized approach to the overall risk assessment. 
For making the risk analysis, various methods exist that are used for individual steps of the 
analysis, namely risk source identification and determination of consequences and probabilities 
of scenarios. The first group of the methods can be characterized by taking pre-defined data 
from well-known literature based on experience from the past (they use so-called reference 
scenarios). The second group of methods uses a demanding procedure of the very generation 
of development of a scenario that is necessary, e.g. in the case of assessment of new 
technologies and new risks, when the first procedure of reference scenarios cannot be used 
owing to the lack of information and experience. The ARAMIS methodology, belonging to the 
second group, uses logical graphs - fault trees and event trees – for the preparation of accident 
scenarios.  
 
3. ARAMIS METHODOLOGY 
The methodology ARAMIS (“Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries in the 
framework of the SEVESO II directive”) was developed in the framework of an EU 5FP project. 
A harmonized methodology for risk assessment, aimed especially at reducing uncertainties and 
variability in results and at including the evaluation of risk management efficiency into the 
analysis, was proposed. It is necessary to regard ARAMIS as a comprehensive tool for efficient 
implementation of risk identification and analysis with many pre-prepared and recommended 
steps (ARAMIS, 2004). 
The procedure of the ARAMIS methodology can be divided into three basic steps, the outputs of 
which are relevant indexes, see Figure 2:  
1. assessment of consequence severity (S - severity index), 
2. evaluation of risk management efficiency (M - management index),  
3. assessment of surrounding environment vulnerability (V- vulnerability index). 
All the indexes can be evaluated separately, but above all the indexes S and M are 
considerably interconnected in the selection of reference accident scenarios and consequence 
severity determination, when efficient measures to reduce the risks can affect the frequency of 
accidents or to limit the consequences of them. 
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 Figure 2 – Summary diagram of the ARAMIS methodology (Hourtolou, 2004). 
 
To determine the S index, or reference scenarios of accidents it is necessary to do two partial 
assessments according to the methods for the identification of risk sources designed by the 
ARAMIS project – MIMAH and MIRAS methods.  
The goal of MIMAH is to identify potential scenarios of accidents that may occur in the industrial 
process. MIMAH defines the maximum dangerous potential in the piece of equipment. The bow-
tie diagram is built by the association of the critical event with the corresponding fault tree on the 
left and the corresponding event tree on the right (see Figure 3). These bow-tie diagrams must 
be understood as scenarios for major accident without considering any installed safety 
measures. The evaluation of safety systems forms a basis of MIRAS methodology application. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – A common ’bow-tie‘ diagram for one critical event (Nevrly, 2004). 
Notes: UE – Undesirable Event, DDC – Detailed Direct Cause, DC – Direct Cause, NSC – Necessary and Sufficient 
Condition, CE – Critical Event, SCE – Secondary Critical Event, TCE – Tertiary Critical Event, DP – Dangerous 
Phenomena 
 
The objective of MIRAS is to select reference scenarios from the scenarios identified in the 
MIMAH part. The method rests on studying the influence of elements of safety and risk 
management on the scenarios selected in MIMAH. The reference accident scenarios (RASs) 
represent a real hazardous potential of the piece of equipment after considering safety systems, 
including management (see Figure 4). In the MIRAS methodology, safety systems installed on 
the piece of equipment, the safety management system, the frequency of accident occurrence 
and the possible consequences of the accident are considered. 
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Figure 4 – Identification of reference accident scenarios -MIRAS (Nevrly, 2004). 
Notes: UnE – Undesirable Event, EI – Initiating Event, DC – Direct Cause, CE – Critical Event, SCE – Secondary 
Critical Event, DP – Dangerous Phenomena, ME – Major Event  
 
The goal of the next part of the ARAMIS methodology (S- index) is the determination of severity 
of reference accident scenarios by means of proposed parameters. Map of the risk severity 
index (see example in Figure 5) is based on these data can be made to: 
• individual dangerous phenomena (DPi), 
• individual critical events (CEj), 
• for the whole installation,  
• for each type of hazardous effects (toxic, overpressure, thermal radiation, pollution). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Datasheet for a critical event and an example of Severity Index Map for a particular critical event (Nevrly, 
2004). 
 
The ARAMIS methodology was justly selected for the analysis and assessment of risks 
associated with the LPG filling station.   
 
3. CASE STUDY 
Risk analysis and assessment by the ARAMIS methodology were carried out in an industrial 
plant using the LPG for powering forklifts and having a built-up LPG filling station on its 
premises. The filling station consists of two cylindrical horizontal tanks; the total maximum 
amount of LPG is 4.9 t (see Figure 1 and 8). In the vicinity of the filling station, which is located 
on the boundary of the industrial plant, there are a housing estate and a public road. In case of 
major accident, a threat to both the employees of the plant and the population can be expected. 
For the purpose of simplification, other risk sources in the plant are not assessed.  
Furthermore, the procedure for determining the index S-assessment of consequence severity 
will be presented. In the first phase, a list of sources of risks of major chemical handling 
accidents is made up. 
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• - LPG filling station, 4 900 kg of propane-butane, extremely flammable liquefied 
gas.  
 
For the purpose of risk source identification, 16 types of equipment (selected EQ equipment) 
are defined in the methodology. In our case, it is EQ4–Pressure storage type of equipment. 
To each selected risk source, a critical event has to be assigned (CE - Critical Event). The 
critical event is defined as a release of liquid content (LOC - Loss of Containment) from 
equipment. The method assumes 12 critical events. For our purposes, a critical event CE10 –
Catastrophic ruptures was selected.  
Further, fault trees and event trees that are connected to a so-called bow-tie (diagram) are built. 
Bow-ties are to be understood as major accident scenarios without considering installed safety 
systems. The result of this part is the construction of a bow-tie. 
The aim of the next phase of ARAMIS methodology is to select a reference scenario of 
accidents from scenarios identified in the first part. It is based on the study of influence of safety 
elements and risk management on selected scenarios. The reference accident scenarios (RAS) 
represent a real hazardous potential of equipment after considering safety systems (including 
management). In the methodology, the following items are taken into account: 
• safety systems installed on equipment, 
• safety management system, 
• frequency of accidents, 
• possible consequences of accidents.  
 
For the determination of frequencies of initiating events, the methodology offers selected data in 
appendices; above all the summary of frequencies of initiating events from specialist literature, 
list of possible safety barriers, method of evaluation of effects of individual barriers are stated. 
For the needs of placement of barriers into the fault tress, the safety barriers are divided by 
actions to be achieved, namely to avoid, to prevent, to control, to detect and to limit. For the 
needs of evaluation of effects of the barriers, 4 main categories of safety barriers are defined: 
passive, activated, human actions and symbolic barriers. The very evaluation of barrier effects 
is carried out by means of three parameters, especially according to the level of confidence 
(Level of Confidence -LC), effectiveness and response time. The output is a fault tree with 
determined frequencies of critical events (will be discussed during paper presentation as well). 
The result of this part of the methodology is the frequencies of critical event after considering 
safety barriers in the fault trees. 
 
• For CE10 –catastrophic rupture of LPG storage tank – 2.1x10-6 /year. 
 
In the case of frequency of critical event of less than 10-7 /year, there is no need to apply 
subsequent steps. 
The aim of this step is to determine the frequencies of all dangerous phenomena of selected 
critical events. The procedure is based on considerations concerning the safety barriers in the 
event trees that can decrease the frequency or consequences of the dangerous phenomena. 
Results for the selected critical event are illustrated in Figure 6. The methodology again offers 
rough values of probability of immediate ignition, probability of delayed ignition and probability of 
VCE from specialist literature. 
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Figure 6 – Event tree with the frequencies of dangerous phenomena – rupture of LPG storage tank. 
 
In the next step, it is necessary to carry out the rough evaluation of consequences of dangerous 
phenomena. This qualitative evaluation of consequences is based on classifying the dangerous 
phenomena into 4 classes of consequences (C1- 4), when the class C4 means the most serious 
consequences on human health and/or the environment. For individual dangerous phenomena 
the methodology offers pre-defined classes of consequences that can be modified according to 
the efficiency of barriers limiting the released amount of the substance or the impact of the 
dangerous phenomenon. The final classes of consequences are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Frequencies and classes of consequences of dangerous phenomena. 
No. Dangerous phenomenon Frequency Class of 
consequences 
1. 1a) Poolfire 2.1x10-7 / year C2 
1b) VCE 1.4x10-6 / year C3 
1c) Flashfire 1.4x10-6 / year C3 
1d) Fireball 1x10-6 / year C4 
 
Definition of classes of consequences: 
C1  - no injury or slight injury with no stoppage of work 
 - only observable effects on the environment, no action  
C2 - injury leading to a hospitalization more than 24 hours  
 - serious effects on the environment, requiring local means of intervention 
C3 - irreversible injuries or death inside the site, reversible injuries outside the site 
 - effects on the environment outside the site, requiring national means  
C4 - irreversible injuries or death outside the site 
 - irreversible effects on the environment outside the site, requiring national means.  
 
Reference scenarios are selected by means of a tool – risk matrix (see Figure 7). In the matrix, 
the following 3 zones are defined: 
• “Negligible effects” zone corresponds to dangerous phenomena with sufficiently low 
frequencies and consequences that probably will not be significant. There is no 
need to evaluate these scenarios any more. 
• “Medium effects” zone corresponds to the reference accident scenarios that will 
probably have significant impacts. These scenarios are selected for further detailed 
assessment of severity.   
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• “High effects” zone corresponds to reference accident scenarios that will certainly 
have significant impacts. These scenarios are selected for further detailed 
assessment of severity and additional safety barriers should be proposed. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Risk matrix with results. 
 
It is necessary to state that the risk matrix in this phase of the methodology does not decide 
about the acceptability of risks but that it merely selects the reference accident scenarios that 
are further modeled for the purposes of severity determination.  
 
For the determination of individual distances, any mathematical model can be used. With regard 
to the fact that the use of computing module is entirely independent of the methodology for the 
determination of index S, the user can employ any mathematical model for the evaluation of 
accident effects. Distances for particular levels of effects were calculated using the recognized 
Dutch model EFFECTS. One of advantages of this model is a possibility of calculation of 
consequences of fires, explosions and dispersion of toxic substances. Table 3 states the results 
in the form of distances (in meters) for particular levels of consequences d1 – d4 (d1 – small 
effects, d2 – reversible effects, d3 - irreversible effects, d4 – lethal effects) and for each 
dangerous phenomenon that was selected as a reference accident scenario. The type of 
consequences expresses one of four possible serious effects of accidents (thermal radiation, 
overpressure, missiles, toxic effects). 
 
Table 3 –Results of range distances of dangerous phenomena for CE10 
Dangerous 
phenomena 
 
d1 
 
d2 
 
d3 
 
d4 
 
Freguency 
(/year) 
 
Type 
1b) VCE 260 165 75 45 1.4E-06 overpressure 
1c) Flashfire 72 72 68 35 1.4E-06 thermal 
1d) Fireball 430 330 255 195 1.0E-06 thermal 
 
Another case study of methodology ARAMIS applications can be found in e.g. (Nevrly, 2004), 
(Delvosalle, 2004) or (Bernatik, 2005). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The application of the ARAMIS methodology in an industrial plant using the LPG as a fuel for 
powering forklifts is described. The aim was to test the applicability of the methodology to such 
types of risk sources. The following conclusions can be stated: 
Þ ARAMIS enables the assessment of risk sources containing the LPG. 
Þ In a number of steps, pre-defined data facilitate the procedure of detailed risk 
assessment. 
Þ However, making the analysis is difficult from the specialist as well as time point of 
view. 
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In spite of rather high professional and time demands, the ARAMIS methodology can be 
recommended as a suitable approach to the carrying out of quantitative risk analysis.  
From the results it follows that it is the explosion of LPG storage tank (deadly consequences 
within a distance of about 195 m) that represents the greatest threat to the population and 
employees of the industrial plant. It is necessary to state that in the plant, high-level safety is 
ensured; many technical and organizational measures are implemented. For example, spraying 
equipment above storage tanks as a safety measure to protect against BLEVE type explosions 
was additionally installed (see Figure 8). In the plant, the equipment was installed as a result of 
an accident of a similar filling station abroad and recommendations of the multinational owner. 
 
 
Figure 8 – LPG filling station after installed spraying equipment. 
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Abstract 
Health and safety issues are very important aspects of the operation in high-risk plants, like 
the refineries. One of the relevant elements of safety management is learning from incidents. 
Research on learning in organizations is often focused on the ability of the new knowledge to 
lead to changes in the relevant settings. We assume that learning also covers confirmation of 
existing knowledge and gaining deeper comprehension of existing practices at the refinery. 
Learning processes implemented in refineries could be complex due to the multiplicity of 
actors involved (interacting employees) and the performance of learning activities could be 
highly individualized. The motivation for our research has been to understand learning 
processes implemented in a European refinery and to provide measures and recommendations 
to improve learning from incidents. 
The visualization of the organizational processes is an established method facilitating the 
understanding by explicitly presenting the interdependencies between the actors (units) as 
well as the nature of those links, e.g. the flow of information or communication patterns. 
Links represent the flow of information, its type and form. However, visualization of studies of 
organizational learning is not common. The novelty of the presented approach consists in the 
use of the graphic representation for improving the learning process in the refinery. 
In order to present the learning processes in the refinery we apply the approach called Business 
Processes Modeling Notation (BPMN). BPMN visualizes interdependencies of the processes 
and records all accident and near miss information in an easy and transparent way. We used 
BPMN to understand, optimize and re-engineer the learning processes in the refinery. 
In this paper we sketch the graphic representation of the learning processes in the refinery. It 
helps understand how the process is accomplished, who the stakeholders are and their 
related roles, how they communicate and what type of information they pass. Graphic 
representation of the processes enables fast identification of the loops, for example in 
incidents management. 
Negative impact of the loops on the performance of the processes is related to the fact that any 
loop requires a repetition of one or more of the activities. Repetition slows down the whole 
process and increases the use of the human and material resources. The identification of 
loops and their elimination or modification is a method that improves the efficiency of 
processes. It is worth to note that the loops identified in visualization are a different concept 
than “the learning loops”. Organizational loop corresponds to the repetition of identical 
activities and involvement of the same actors while “learning loops” assume the change of 
information contents by the application of sets of additional rules or reflection on the learning 
process itself. BPMN enables the identification of organizational loops in the process of 
learning, which provides the basis for improvement and simplification of the whole process. 
Rationalization of information flow inside an organization should contribute to facilitation of the 
process of learning from incidents. 
In this paper we propose a set of performance measures adapted to the BPMN. The 
assessment of the performance of learning in an organization could, for example, be done by 
analysing the ability of various loops to accumulate knowledge, the time needed for this 
accumulation, the number of employees having access to knowledge and so on. The aspect of 
access to knowledge is particularly addressed in this paper in order to provide a deeper 
comprehension of one of the performance measures based on empirical data from the refinery. 
 
Keywords: learning process in organization, modeling of organizational processes, business 
processes modeling notation, 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Learning is a crucial topic to organizations that want to be powerful competitors in the modern 
economic world. Research on learning in organizations is often centred on the ability of new 
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knowledge to lead to changes in the relevant settings. We assume that learning also covers 
confirmation of existing knowledge and gaining deeper comprehension of existing practices in 
the organization. 
Organizational learning (OL) is a multilevel process and can be considered in a wider 
perspective. Wang and Pervaiz (2002) in their work present the five focuses of the concept 
to clarify the understanding of organizational learning. According to them, OL may depend on 
the following assumptions: process or system, collective aspects of individual learning, culture 
or metaphor, knowledge management and continuous improvement. In our work it  is important  
to focus on the OL as process and knowledge management, and this we can observe in 
Crossan’s work about 4I process and in Nonaka’s dynamic theory of organizational knowledge 
creation (Barker Scott, 2011; Crossan, Lane, and White, 1999; Nonaka, 1994; Wang and 
Pervaiz, 2002).The health and safety issues are very important operational aspects in high-
risk plants such as refineries. The intensification of research in the field of safety was 
caused by the series of disasters in the 1980s, i.e. Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), 
Challenger (1986) and Piper Alpha (1988)  (Le Coze, 2013). At present, to prevent the 
incidents many organizations put a lot of effort in safety management, and learning from 
incidents (LFI) is one of its relevant elements. LFI can be defined as: learning from incidents 
by individuals and groups in organizations with the aim of improving safety (Russell Vastveit, 
2015). Learning from incidents is a complex process, that is defined by the Swedish Centre for 
Lessons Learned from Incidents and Accidents (NCO) as: “learning from accidents is to extract, 
put together and analyse and also to communicate and bring back knowledge on accidents and 
near-misses, from discovery to course of event, damage and cause to all who need this 
information. The purpose is to prevent the occurrence of similar events, to limit damage, and 
thereby improve safety work” (Lindberg, Hansson and Rollenhagen, 2010). Incidents can refer 
to unwanted and unexpected events in the form of accidents and near misses (which include 
potentially harmful conditions that are discovered) (Russell Vastveit, 2015). We assume that 
incidents include occupational accidents, process safety incidents and near misses that lead or 
can lead to losses in human lives, property or the environment. 
Organizations expect, that through learning from incidents they will increase the level of safety 
and they will prevent the occurrence the same or the similar events. However, organizations 
have a lot of problems with the reduction of the number of incidents. According to Drupsteen 
and Guldenmund (2014), it can be associated with inappropriate management of LFI. In the 
literature we observe interest in activities aimed at the identification of factors that hinder and 
facilitate the LFI process, and proposals to improve the process (Drupsteen and Guldenmund, 
2014; Lindberg et al., 2010; Lukic, Littlejohn and Margaryan, 2012). In order to improve the 
process it is very important to understand complex processes such as learning from incidents. 
For this purpose Lukic et al., (2012) highlight four main factors: type of knowledge, type of 
incidents, learning process and participants, who influence the process. 
Due to the constantly increasing interest and demand for improving the process of learning from 
incidents, in this article we propose an innovative method to improve the LFI process at the 
organizational level using the BPMN. BPMN is a specific language, which consist of a set of 
graphic elements and rules for their application that enables graphic representation of business 
processes, such as learning from incidents, accomplished in an organization. 
For this purpose we explain how organisations learn to use knowledge obtained from 
investigation of incidents, then we describe learning from incidents and the role of the process in 
organizations. Next, we refer to the role of graphic representation of procedures used in 
organizations and we clarify what BPMN is and why we used this type of notation. 
 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
To remain competitive in the modern economic world organizations must fulfil new requirements 
imposed by consumers and other organizations; the key factor to fulfil these requirements is 
learning in the organization (Gilaninia, Abdolhasan Askari Rankouh, and Abbas Poor Gildeh, 
2013). In the literature relating to learning in an organization, depending on the discipline and 
the trends of research scholars, there are many definitions and concepts of learning in 
organizations. Moreover, concepts of organizational learning discussed in the literature can be 
classified according to five focal points such as: focus on collective nature of individual learning, 
focus on the process or system, focus on culture or metaphor, focus on knowledge management 
and focus on continuous improvement  (Wang and Pervaiz, 2002). 
Learning in organizations can be defined as multilevel processes, through which members 
individually and collectively acquire knowledge by acting together and reflecting together. 
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Knowledge is acquired, created and applied by individuals. Then individual knowledge is 
shared, combined, expanded, tested, and applied amongst individuals to become group or 
community knowledge. As that knowledge is captured, disseminated and embedded in 
organizational strategies and protocols, it becomes part of an organizational context. 
Knowledge internalized in procedures influences individual and group learning (Barker Scott, 
2011). We assume that learning also covers confirmation of existing knowledge and gaining 
deeper comprehension of existing practices within the organization (Braut and Njå, 2012). 
In our work we present OL in the context of learning from incidents, therefore we consider OL 
in terms of learning of the stakeholders of LFI, dissemination and utilization of knowledge 
obtained from LFI process, and we  take  into account the tension between the acquisition of 
new knowledge and utilization of existing learning stock. 
It is therefore important in terms of the above conditions proposed by the Crossan model 4I., in 
which it is assumed that the OL is multilevel and takes place at 3 levels: individual, group and 
organizational level (Crossan et al., 1999). In this model, learning starts from individual level, 
and all three levels are related with each other by social and psychological processes of: 
intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing. An important issue addressed in this 
model is the tension between assimilating new learning (exploration) and using what has 
been learned (exploitation). Exploration refers to the feed forward process and occurs in 
individual learning further continued by the group and organizational learning and exploitation 
called also the feedback process starts from the organization and moves to the group and 
individual levels (Crossan et al., 1999). 
Another assumption, which takes into account the fact that organizational learning has got the 
starting point at the individual level is the concept of March (1991). He developed a cycle of 
mutual learning, through which organization learns from its members at the individual level and 
over time acquired knowledge is embedded in the strategy, procedures, standards, practices, 
protocols and forms. That influences the beliefs, behaviours and openness to new science 
of individual members of the organization. March (1991) in his work also showed the tension 
between consideration of new learning by the members and the use of existing learning, 
which he described as Functional Constructs of Exploration and Exploitation (March, 1991). 
 
Management of knowledge derived from the process is important from the point of view of 
learning from incidents in organizations. Nonaka developed the Dynamic Theory of 
Organizational Knowledge Creation (Fig. 1), which describes the acquisition of knowledge and 
its transformation at the level of individuals as a process of internalizing and externalizing 
knowledge. Central theme of this theory assumes that organizational knowledge is created 
through continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge, that is knowledge which is 
difficult to articulate using plain language and knowledge which can easily be expressed with 
words. The Dynamic Theory  of  Organizational Knowledge Creation, similarly to previously 
presented OL models, also takes into account learning between individual, group, organizational 
and inter-organizational levels. Transformation of tacit and explicit knowledge takes  place 
through the following steps: socialization, externalization, combination and internalization. The 
Figure below depicts the transformation of two types of knowledge: tacit and explicit at every 
stage of the process and shows how stakeholders influence each other at every stage. 
 
Figure 1 - The Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation 
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Another interesting assumption in organizational learning is presented in the work of 
Gilaninia et al. (2013) where organizational learning is presented as a set of organizational 
activities such as knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, 
and memory that consciously or unconsciously affects positive development of organizations 
(Gilaninia et al., 2013). These stages are very important aspects when considering learning  
from incidents. 
 
3. LEARNING FROM INCIDENTS 
Learning from incidents leads to improved safety and prevents unwanted events in 
organizations, if the LFI process is appropriately understood and managed. Therefore, literature 
shows great interest in the topic expressed by practitioners and scientists. LFI is often 
described as a process consisting of consecutive steps. Depending on the model, processes 
differ from each other in the number of stages and activities included in stages, but the crucial 
purpose of the all LFI models is the same and it is to obtain knowledge from incidents and then 
improve the safety at work through preventing the re-occurrence of the same or similar events 
(Drupsteen and Guldenmund, 2014; Lindberg et al., 2010; Lukic et al. 2012) 
One interesting LFI model described in literature is the Chain model proposed by Lukic et al. 
(2012). This model consists of five steps: reporting of accidents (possible incidents), selection, 
investigation, and dissemination of the obtained results and actual prevention of such accidents 
(Lukic et al. 2012). A more complex LFI model is the one developed by Drupsteen and 
Guldenmund (2014) that consists of eleven steps divided into four stages: investigating and 
analysing incidents, planning interventions, intervening and evaluating. Each of the stages leads 
to results considered to be vital inputs into the next stage of the learning process (Drupsteen 
and Guldenmund, 2014). According to both presented models, learning process is as strong 
as its the weakest link and if some of the stages are less effective, the whole process does 
not bring the potential learning lessons and changes. In the chain model attention is paid to 
the dissemination of knowledge and information obtained from analysis and investigation of 
incidents. Such dissemination of lessons can be considered another learning process. Similar 
assumption is presented in Ramanujam and Goodman’s (2011) work, where during the 
learning from event analysis there is a sub-process called Learning Process that includes 
cyclic steps such as: storage, retrieval and sharing. According to their assumption, the 
model implies that learning is also a set of processes at the group level and the results are newly 
established repertoires (Ramanujam and Goodman, 2011). This assumption can be linked to 
some aspects of organizational learning. 
Literature seems to focus on studying the learning process and identifying factors that hinder 
and facilitate the process at every stage. There are also actions proposed to increase the 
effectiveness of the whole LFI process, however, researchers highlight the investigation and 
analysis of the incident stage and they put less efforts in studying the rest of the stages or 
simply overlook them (Drupsteen and Guldenmund, 2014; Lindberg et al., 2010). To achieve the 
best results that will lead to the prevention of occurrence of incidents and to improve the safety 
in an organization we need to understand the entire process of learning from incidents. 
Therefore, according to Lukic et al. (2012) in  order  to clarify the nature and to understand the 
LFI process it is necessary to explore four main aspects that influence it, namely: 
participants, type of knowledge, type of incidents and learning process. 
Learning processes implemented in refineries could be complex due to many actors involved 
(interacting employees) and the performance of learning activities could be highly 
individualized. However, learning that takes place can be done at individual, group or 
organizational level, and such assumption is associated with organizational learning 
(Ramanujam and Goodman, 2011). 
In order to obtain appropriate learning from incidents, it is important to consider the type of 
aspects of  knowledge. Lukic et al. (2012) presented three forms of knowledge: conceptual 
("knowing why" and "knowing what"), procedural ("know-how") and dispositional. 
For organizations the learning from severe incidents it is very important issues that could help in 
their prevention. However, the near misses are the crucial source of learning from incidents 
as they are much more frequent than the severe accidents. 
In LFI the key issue is to receive appropriate results. To this end, investigation committees 
should perform investigation deep enough to find out the immediate but also the underlying 
causes of incidents (Lukic et al., 2012). With reference to the aspect of learning process 
presented by Lukic et al., (2012), the causes of incidents are related with the single and 
double-loop learning. While single-loop learning is based on the solutions to errors that can 
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correct superficial elements of the problem, i.e., address the immediate causes, double-loop 
learning includes an open inquiry into deep-root causes, system failures and values. 
 
4. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF ORGANISATIONAL PROCEDURES 
In order to increase the effectiveness in achieving goals set out in in-house policies, 
organizations implement the Integrated Management System (IMS), which consists of 
processes, procedures and practice. IMS  is  designed to support quality management, 
environmental management and management of health and safety. The procedures included in 
the IMS describe how incidents should be dealt with. In those procedures we can find, inter alia, 
the following information: how incidents are defined; what are the ways to manage incidents 
depending on their type; who participates in the process and what roles particular 
stakeholders play in the LFI process; how information about incidents, knowledge and 
results obtained from LFI process is disseminated; how the systems are used to manage 
incidents. However, although the procedures describe activities and provide information on 
how to manage incidents, organizations have problems with achieving the best effectiveness 
and efficiency of the process. This is due to many factors and, e.g., when we consider 
reporting it is very important how incidents are defined and what reporting procedure is 
followed. Because employees working in different departments and at various positions are 
engaged, it is vital to provide a procedure understandable to everyone. Reporting should be 
easy and as fast as possible and contain meaningful information about the incident. Besides, 
we need to select incidents for follow-up activities, such as an investigation or analysis 
conducted by an appropriate person, who receives information about incidents. The selection 
should be based on a method that enables choosing incidents offering the maximum learning 
potential. When it comes to investigation, the important aspect is to quickly initiate the work of 
the committee. To obtain good results from the investigation of an incident, the committee 
should consist of people having appropriate knowledge on the specific type of incident in order 
to identify various causes that have led to a particular incident. 
To prevent incidents it is crucial to implement preventive measures developed as a result of 
the investigation. In order to achieve this objective, it is important is disseminate the results 
among persons who implement preventive measures. For this purpose, results should be 
transmitted to appropriate persons to follow-up the implementation. 
The above mentioned requirements regarding the content and understandable description of 
procedures raise problems concerning the management of incidents. To facilitate the 
understanding of implemented processes in organizations, those processes could be presented 
in graphic ways. Visualization of organizational processes is an established method that 
facilitates the understanding by explicitly presenting interdependencies between the actors 
(units) as well as the nature of those links, e.g. flow of information or communication patterns 
(Piotrowski, 2007). The links represent the flow of information, its type and form. However, the 
application of visualization into the studies of organizational learning is not common. The 
novelty aspect of the presented approach is the use of graphic  representation  for improving the 
learning from incidents in the refinery, through graphic presentation of procedures related with 
the learning process and finding the places to improve. 
Graphic representation of the procedures that influence the management of incidents and 
learning from them facilitates the understanding of how the process is accomplished, who 
the stakeholders are and their related roles, how they communicate and what type of 
information they pass (Piotrowski, 2007). Graphic representation of  the processes enables fast 
identification of the places for improvement, for example in incident management processes. 
Every process can be shaped depending on the assumptions and the choice of the best solution 
is dictated by our requirements. Piotrowski (2013) in his work presents main optimization issues 
in view of the minimization of the process time and the workload. 
To ensure good management of processes, it is important to implement efficient procedures , 
therefore they should not include any loops. The negative impact of the loops is related to the 
fact that any loop requires the repetition of one or more of the activities. Repetition slows 
down the whole process and increases the use of the human and material resources. The 
identification of loops and their elimination or modification is a method for the improvement 
of the efficiency of processes. It is worth to note that the loops identified in the process of 
visualization are a different concept than “the learning loops”. The organizational loop 
corresponds to the process of repetition of identical activities and the involvement of the same 
actors while “learning loops” assume the change of the information contents by application of 
the sets  of additional rules or  reflection  on  the learning process  itself (Lukic et al.,  2012).  
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Graphic representation  of organizational procedures enables to identify organizational loops 
in the process of learning, which is the basis for improvement and simplification of the whole 
process. The rationalization of information flow inside an organization will improve the process 
of learning from incidents. 
 
5. BUSINESS PROCESS MODELING NOTATION (BPMN) 
In organizations a lot of complex business processes occur, which involve stakeholders who 
work in various organizations or departments and perform different tasks, which are supported 
by distinct systems. In order to facilitate the work of the participants to the process a system of 
notation was developed by the organization called Business Process Modeling Initiative, which 
enables graphic representation of business process (Piotrowski, 2007). 
In the literature we can see interesting methods of business process modeling, such as, inter 
alia, ebXM (Electronic Business Extensible Markup Language), BPMN (Business Process 
Modeling Notation), XPDL (XML Process Definition Language), UML (Unified Modeling 
Language), EPC (Event-Driven Process Chain). In this paper we have applied the BPMN 
because of its relevance to standardization, simplicity, power of expression and a large 
selection of software. BPMN is a specific language, which consist of a set of graphic elements 
and rules for application in domain tasks that enable the users to graphically represent 
business processes accomplished in the organization. 
As mentioned above, BPMN is standardized and easy to use, which allows the notation to be 
used by all users within the process independently of the level of involvement in BPMN issues. 
In addition, the simplicity of recording enables quick start of work with the notation. According to 
the survey prepared by Recker (2008), 70% users of BPMN learned notation by self-education 
or using it at work and only 13.6% users received formal training in process modeling with 
BPMN. An advantage of BPMN is the possibility to adjust the level of detail of the processes 
depending on the requirements of users, which makes it possible for the graphic representation 
of processes to be used by business and IT communities. 
Because of the level of detail of the presented processes using BPMN, we can use visualization 
to document the processes in order to understand them, to design and analyse them and to 
improve them. A more complex  presentation of processes can be used in automation, re-
engineering and optimization. 
 
6. APPLICATION OF BPMN 
Below we present a procedure utilizing BPMN followed when investigating incidents. The 
procedure is a part of the Integrated Management System and is assumed to influence the 
learning from incidents within a  refinery.  The procedure which is the subject of our 
considerations is called “Post-breakdowns investigations”. It consist of three the following 
parts: 
 
- appointment of the committee for breakdowns, 
- documentation of the work of the committee, 
- monitoring the delivery of tasks specified in the breakdown report. 
 
The purpose of graphic representation of the organizational procedure is to optimize the 
process in order to improve learning from incidents. To this end, we visualized the above 
mentioned organizational procedure, and then we identified places where it needs 
improvement. We consider changes in the procedure regarding two objectives: improving the 
flow of process and improving internal communications. 
In our work we delimit the optimization and improvement to the first part of the procedure: 
appointment of the committee for breakdowns. Breakdowns should be understood as 
unexpected, deviating from the normal state, sudden events, involving, or not, a hazardous 
substance that may result in risks to the health or life of people or / and the threat of 
environmental pollution and / or the threat to property. 
 
Figure 2 below shows elements of the procedure which have been optimized. 
A part of the process takes place in the Environmental Protection Office (EPO), but the process 
has got its stakeholders: the Person Who Appoints the Committee (a director) and the 
Chairman of the Committee. The employees of EPO deal with different tasks related with 
environmental protection. They, inter alia, participate in investigating breakdowns that lead or 
can lead to environmental consequences. 
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The event that initiates the process at this level is the receiving of information about the 
appointment of the committee from the Person Who Appoints the Committee. After preliminary 
assessment of the breakdown, the process is divided in two parallel paths. One of them is 
designed to tell us whether the breakdown should be registered in the “Register of 
Environmental Accidents”. While the other path checks whether an employee from the office has 
been appointed to the committee; if not and if he/she should have been appointed, an 
application is sent to the Chairman of the Committee. In order to improve the process, we 
propose to change its flow. Changes to the procedure are presented in Figure 3. The 
requirement that has to be met under the task “Breakdown registration in - Register of 
Environmental Accidents” is related with the requirements connected with “Applying for an 
extension of the committee with an EPO worker”. Therefore the two inquiries (gates) can be 
replaced with one. This change allows to simplify the process maintaining its objectives. Before 
the improvement, the process could lead to a situation where a breakdown relevant from the 
point of view of the Environmental Protection Office is entered only into the “Register of 
Environmental Accidents”, while nothing is happening with respect to the membership of the 
committee, even if an EPO employee,  who should  have been  involved  in  the investigation is 
not a part of it  or  vice versa: a  breakdown  has been  studied by an     appropriate employee 
but has not been entered into the register. The improvement allows participants to better 
manage their work and visualization can lead to better understanding of the process, which 
following the improvement is easier to grasp. In the context of learning from incidents, the 
process improvement means relevant breakdowns will be accordingly dealt with, i.e., they will 
be investigated by EPO staff and will be entered into the Register, meaning the persons who 
have access to the register can look up the information about breakdowns included in it, the 
lessons have partially been learned. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Visualization of the fragment of the first part of the procedure before improvement. 
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 Figure 3 - Visualization of the fragment of the first part of the procedure after improvement – changes in the flow 
process. 
 
The second assumption aimed to improve internal communications is presented in the next 
element of the procedure in question; Figure 4 describes the process according to implementing 
procedures in the organization. Improvement of the process is presented in Figure 5. 
This element of the procedure involves three main stakeholders: the Person Who Appoints the 
Committee (a director), the Chairman of the Committee and of the Team for Reliability and one 
minor stakeholder from the Environmental Protection Office. 
One of responsibilities of the Team for Reliability is to manage the reports of breakdowns and 
“the register of the breakdown committee”. The whole process begins with receiving 
information about a breakdown by the Person Who Appoints the Committee and next transfers 
this information to the others above mentioned stakeholders. 
In Fig. 4 and 5, the fragment of the process realized by Environmental Protection Office is 
represented as pool “collapsed” as it was already given in Fig 2. At the level of the Chairman 
of Committee, the process is initiated by the message. Its first task is a preliminary assessment 
of event as well as composition of the committee. Next, if needed, the chairman can change the 
composition by appointment of the additional members. The pool of the Chairman of the 
Committee contains the process activated by the information sent from EPO office. It is 
proposal related to the incorporation of the member of EPO into the commission. This sub-
process does not interrupt the flow of the main process, but it shows that the additional flows 
should be considered. The process taking place in the pool, realized by Team for Reliability, is 
also initialized by information on the appointment of the commission. This information is stored 
in ”the Register of the Breakdown Committee”. Next the Team for Reliability sends information 
on duties of the Chairman of Committee, template of the report and its number. The monitoring 
of the process of the event analysis is the last step realized in this pool. 
In Fig 4 we can see that the information flow is directed from the person who appoints the 
committee to the rest of stakeholders and next from the team for reliability to the Committee 
chairman. In our opinion, the fragment of the procedure does not allow to take sufficient care 
of the dissemination of information, namely there is lack of information flow from the chairman of 
the committee to the rest of stakeholders. It which can lead to the mistakes when disseminating 
the results obtained from the investigation of incidents. 
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 Figure 4 - Visualization of an element of the first part of the procedure before improvement. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Visualization of an element of the first part of the procedure after the improvement of internal 
communications. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
In high-risk facilities such as a refinery, learning from incidents is one of the key elements 
that allow maintaining competitiveness in the economic world. Therefore, such organizations 
aim to improve processes and procedures related to learning from incidents. Visualization of 
organizational processes is an established method facilitating the understanding by explicitly 
presenting interdependencies between the actors (units) as well as the nature of those  links, 
e.g. flow of information or communication patterns. The motivation behind our research has 
been to reveal the innovatory aspect of presented approach and to use graphic 
representation for improving the learning process in organization. Visualization of 
organizational processes is an established method of their improvement, however it is not a 
common approach to reflect on improving the learning process. 
For our considerations we take the procedure called “Post-breakdowns investigations” that 
consists of three parts: appointment of the committee for breakdowns, documentation of the 
work of the committee, monitoring the delivery of tasks specified in the breakdown report. We 
propose changes in one of the parts of the procedure and those changes are related to two 
objectives: improving the flow of the process as well as internal communication. 
The implementation of changes in some part of the procedure should lead to the improved 
learning from incidents. It should be expected as information about incidents is disseminated 
among a bigger group of persons, which is crucial in the learning process. The next issue 
resulting from the changes at the EPO level that should lead to an improved learning 
process is the simplification of the flow process. Visualization can lead to better understanding 
of the process and participants should better manage their work. In the context of improving the 
learning process the simplification of the process should lead to better management of 
incidents, which is also important aspects of safety management. 
The above proposals to improve are merely preliminary considerations on the subject as is the 
improving of the learning process and that is why we do not take into account issues such as 
improvement by minimizing the duration of the process, minimizing the correspondence or 
workload. 
Despite that, obtained results show that the topic of BPMN application to improve learning 
from accidents should be further considered and focus on the above mentioned aspects of 
optimizing the processes sets new paths for researchers who are dealing with improving the 
process of learning from accidents. 
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Abstract 
A major part of the traffic and accidents on Norwegian roads are related to transport connected 
to work. The ISO 39001:2012 “Road traffic safety (RTS) management systems. Requirements 
with guidance and use”, has been issued for increasing safety. The study presented in this 
paper was organized in three major phases. First, we analyzed the ISO 39001 with the aim to 
address what matters and how enterprises that adopt the standard would be able to influence 
traffic safety on the public roads. The standard’s assumption of possible users, objectives, 
underlying accident models and recommendations of risk reducing measures were also part of 
the analysis. Next, we made four case-studies in relevant enterprises from various sectors, with 
the aim to discuss how their representatives responded to the idea of implementing a standard 
like ISO 39001 as part of the HES management. The interviews from the case-studies and the 
background information were further developed into a Delphi-survey in which 36 traffic safety 
and HES experts responded. The issues were; 1) Prerequisites for a successful implementation 
of ISO 39001; 2) tools at hand to implement the standard, 3) possible effects of an implemented 
standard, and 4) Norwegian Public Roads Administration’s (NPRA’s) role and options related to 
implementation of the standard in enterprises using the Norwegian public roads.   
We conclude that ISO 39001 represents an interesting opportunity in the Norwegian context of 
traffic safety work. Internal control principles have been in place in Norwegian enterprises for 
more than 20 years, and road traffic safety is getting societal foothold as an important value. 
However, the driving forces for implementing a traffic safety standard in enterprises must 
become much more visible for enterprises being the dominating stakeholders in the road traffic 
system. In real competitive life, it is difficult for managers and employees to internalize the 
philosophy “traffic safety is part of everything we do”. Thus, the premises for easy 
implementation and related benefits needs careful consideration. Here, the NPRA plays an 
important role being the traffic safety coordinator. Through a well-communicated implementation 
of the traffic safety standard in NPRA’s own organization, the experts anticipated amplifications 
in other enterprises. This will lead to increased knowledge in the road-user population about 
traffic accident causes and traffic safety, possibly implying increased acceptance of traffic 
regulations (speed limits, signs and traffic marking). 
 
Keywords: ISO 39001; risk management, traffic accidents, road authorities, implementation of 
codes. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A major part of the traffic and accidents on Norwegian roads are related to transport connected 
to work. The ISO 39001:2012 “Road traffic safety (RTS) management systems. Requirements 
with guidance and use”, has been issued for increasing safety. The Norwegian Government has 
adopted the Zero Vision strategy since 1999, which is operationalized by the Norwegian Public 
Roads Administration (NPRA). This strategy fits very well with the ideas in the ISO 39001, thus 
the NPRA as a major stakeholder for transport safety has taken an initiative to assess the traffic 
safety potential in ISO 39001 as a traffic safety measure in Norway. The general Norwegian 
regulation on health, environment and safety (HES) could become an attractive option for also 
implementing traffic safety.  
 
In order to understand the contents of ISO 39001 and who the standard approaches as end-
users we did a content analysis of the standard. The standard sees traffic safety in a systems 
perspective, where it is assumed that traffic safety is a system property created by road users, 
vehicles, road design, surroundings and the regulation regime. The major goal with the standard 
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is to better control road traffic safety and reduce the number of serious injuries and deaths from 
road accidents. By developing requirements to the components of the road system, ISO 39001 
expect to develop a more resilient system, of which the interaction between the components 
also imply significant safety effects.   
 
Accident preventive effects can be achieved through reduced road traffic loads due to 
enterprises collaborating to optimise logistics, the ISO 39001 might promote improved condition 
for public transport, pedestrians and cyclists becomes prioritised in planning processes, and the 
ISO 39001 promotes traffic safety behaviour in general. The use of the standard enhance the 
following goals: 
· Use of the standard influences traffic accidents in which organisational factors are 
significant contributors. 
· Use of the standard enables enterprises to focus on own goals as well as societal goals 
through social corporate responsibilities.  
· Use of the standard enables enterprises to adopt a mind-set of continuous 
improvement, through leadership’s involvement in traffic safety management activities. 
· Use of the standard enables enterprises to tailor-make its traffic safety work to its own 
activities and risk levels. 
· Use of the standard enables enterprises to acknowledge that the responsibility for traffic 
safety is a shared responsibility, not an issue for the public roads authorities alone. 
 
The users of the standard seem to be: 
· Traffic generators. Organizations that have activities that generate traffic such as; 
department stores, schools, sport arenas, etc. 
· General enterprises. All enterprises with employees that use the road system back and 
forth to jobs or official journeys, either by car, by (motor)cycle or walking. 
· Professional transport enterprises. Enterprises that provide commercial goods or 
person transport services, or enterprises that administer contracts on transport services. 
Examples on this is bus transport, taxi, commercial goods transport (heavy goods 
vehicles or other vehicles), etc. 
· Road designers. Organisations that perform services directly at the road system, for 
example engineering, construction, maintenance on roads and vehicles, emergency 
services etc. 
· Certifying organisations, employed to carry out revisions in enterprises to control 
conformity. 
· Individual employees influenced by their organisations. 
 
ISO 39001 is a product of the mind-set of high reliability organisation (HRO) theory, which is 
seen in its weight upon organisational measures to influence traffic safety (La Porte & Consolini, 
1991; Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1987). This mind-set of the possibilities to design reliable systems 
from unreliable components is adopted by societal systems. James Reason’s book on safety 
management (Reason, 1997) has been very influential in the Nordic countries’ development of 
traffic safety approaches based on the Zero Vision philosophy. The ISO 39001 promotes 
collective mindfulness (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999), traffic safety barriers (Vinnem, 2009) 
and safety culture/climate (Guldenmund, 2000). The standard addresses processes within the 
enterprises to include traffic safety concerns. By doing such activities the standard infer that 
implementing more technical vehicle measures, driver behaviour measures and emergency 
preparedness measures will naturally be part of the safety management processes. 
 
ISO 39001 provides some ideas for user incentives, which could enhance the end-users’ views 
of the standard being useful and meaningful to them. These are: 
· Accreditation in accordance with the standard (status). 
· Obtain better traffic safety records (societal responsibility). 
· Increase the available time for production by reducing unavailability due to accidents, 
injuries and damages (economic factors). 
· Increase the enterprises’ trust and affirmative effect in their clients and stakeholders 
(credibility). 
 
However, in order to succeed, implementation of a standard on traffic safety, as part of 
enterprises HES systems, need to overcome obstacles as well. Organisations’ use of time 
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connected to strategies, planning, analyses, documentation, communication etc., could be 
regarded counterproductive, especially if road transport is not part of the core activities. There 
might be competence barriers, because ISO 39001 assume high competency related to 
analysis and design of traffic safety measures. Normal enterprises do not possess that kind of 
competency and must either hire or purchase the services. The incentives related to corporate 
social responsibilities could be challenging, and it is difficult to predict effects such as reduced 
number of accidents, reduced costs related to operation and management of the vehicle fleet, 
reduced number of sick leave, improved reputation etc. A major challenge is to identify the 
potential of the benefits from implementing a traffic safety standard. These concerns led us to 
the major issue of the work presented in this paper: 
 
What potential does the ISO 39001 has as a traffic safety measure in the Norwegian 
society? 
This paper reports on a study carried out for the NPRA in 2014/2015 (Njå, Bjelland & Braut, 
2015). We have a futuristic perspective (looking into the future), and the idea was to reveal 
important assumptions and conditions that the NPRA and other enterprises responsible for 
traffic safety standards can supervise, and thereby influence the implementation process of the 
ISO 39001 in the Norwegian enterprises. 
 
This paper is organised with first a presentation of a Delphi study involving professional 
transport enterprises, road designers, traffic generators and certification organisations. Then we 
present findings from four example cases; municipal home care services, public transport, 
grocery trade and the taxi sector. The findings are assembled and discussed to the end of the 
paper. 
 
2. SOME RESULTS FROM THE DELPHI-STUDY 
The aims of the study were to identify different views on what potential, in terms of increased 
traffic safety, a standard on traffic safety adopted by Norwegian enterprises could have. The 
investigation was inspired by the Delphi-technique developed in the early 1950-ies (Linstone & 
Turoff, 1975). The methodology assumes that if we lack data on a subject or a phenomenon, 
eliciting expert opinions is the only feasible approach to data collection. Based on our 
knowledge of the transport sector and participation on two relevant conferences, we defined our 
“experts” from important enterprises. No one is really experts on the implementation of 
standards and at the same time an expert within the traffic safety domain. We chose persons 
based on their knowledge and experiences from management of relevant enterprises, 
knowledge of their own enterprise, interest in traffic safety, investigation of and experience from 
hazardous and accident events in road traffic, and education of drivers. We asked 51 persons, 
of which 36 agreed to participate (just after Christmas and with short notice, a 70 % response 
rate was considered very good). The study had one iteration. The first survey was sent to the 
respondents, they answered and the results were then sent to the experts once more in order 
for them to change their views after reconsideration. 50 % of the respondents replied the 
second time, which we reported separately.  
 
The questionnaire was constructed with 23 statements, to which we asked the respondents to 
assess with a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). We asked the experts to 
comment upon his or her assessment with free text related to each statement. This gave us 
valuable perspectives on the subject matters. The statements were sectioned into four groups: 
1) statements related to prerequisites for Norwegian organizations ability to adopt and benefit 
from international traffic safety standards; 2) statements related to how the standard could be 
effectively  implemented in Norwegian organizations; 3) statements related to what effects an 
implemented standard could have, and; 4) statements related to the NPRA’s role and 
possibilities to implement and increase the likelihood of gaining the potential benefits of 
managing traffic safety according to the ISO standard. 
 
The most prominent prerequisites for implementing the ISO 39001 are first of all that the 
enterprises must recognize their own need for managing traffic safety within their HES-work. 
The experts think that many enterprises have not realized this and even the professional 
commercial transport enterprises acknowledge the fact that traffic safety is not part of their 
enterprise management. Another important issue is the need to realise other positive effects 
than safety, such as improved economy, well-being, reputation, being a preferred collaboration 
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partner, reduced fuel consumption etc. This factor was enhanced after the second iteration. The 
third prominent factor is leadership involvement. An expert described it like this: “To introduce a 
standard requires nothing, implementation require a deeply involved management”.  
 
Many experts were convinced that specific and measurable requirements to traffic safety as part 
of the tenderers’ HES systems would positively influence the implementation of the standard. 
However, there was objections related to the structure in the transport sector. A lot of the 
transport is carried out by very small companies (one or two persons), which will not be capable 
to adopt the standard. 
 
The largest part of the survey was the experts’ anticipation of effects from an implemented 
standard. We mixed organisational effects with more direct effects on the road in order to see 
how the experts responded. We did not ask the experts whether they meant that an 
implemented standard showed direct effects on number of accidents, because it is very difficult 
to address any link between occurrences of accidents and organisational factors. However, the 
experts do believe that an implementation of ISO 39001 would be very positive, cf figure 1.  
 
Figure 1, average scores of the experts’ assessments of potentials of implemented standard 
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The experts are generally positive to the potential of the standard, especially with regard to 
organizational effects. This includes the organizations’ ability to think out of the box (innovation), 
the conduction and outcomes of risk management processes, a better working environment and 
the organizations’ willingness to accept traffic safety responsibility. The experts were more 
reluctant to agree with our statements related to intermediate effects on the roads, such as drug 
or alcohol abuse and speeding. However, the experts were positive to our statement that the 
standard would enhance usage of personal safety equipment, such as seat belts. 
 
These results coincides very well with other similar studies (Coglianese, 2012). For example, 
studies of health supervision often present statements on correlation between supervision 
activities and health effects, but they lack scientific evidence (Packard, 2013; Riksrevisjonen, 
2014). In the health sector the focus is shifted to intermediate factors which might influence the 
effects from the supervision activities (Coglianese, 2012). An important finding is that the 
enterprises that are exposed to supervision activities must possess intention, ability and 
capability to carry out change processes (Kotter, 1996). Thus, engaged leadership is very 
important to prepare the organization for changes, within the frames of the enterprises’ 
responsibilities, sizes and frame conditions. The number of experts that responded to each 
statement in our study varied (35-30). This could be interpreted as a measure of self-assessed 
competencies and their uncertainties. Instead of speculating into the most uncertain factors we 
conclude that these should be further studied.  
 
The experts also considered the NPRA’s role in the implementation processes of the standard. 
The most prominent factors here was that the NPRA could use its power in contract 
negotiations and their collaboration with the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority and thus be 
very effective. However, the experts were not so harmonized about the sole positive effects, 
and objections such as the Norwegian Labour Administration do not have a constructive attitude 
to working activities, foreign companies will make good intentions problematic because they do 
not conform to the standard, the NPRA is not assessed as a consistent contract administrator – 
price is the only criteria. 
 
3. FOUR CASES OF SECTORS WHERE ISO 39001 IS RELEVANT 
From rather context free assessments from experts, we also looked at four cases, in which we 
interviewed key informants. We wanted to challenge the key informants on the essence of the 
standard and see how they responded. Only some of the respondents were familiar with ISO 
39001, but the relevance of the standard was high for all the enterprises interviewed. They 
were: 
· Municipal home care services in a medium sized Norwegian municipality (approximately 
20 000 inhabitants), 
· Public transport based on a large area in the Norwegian context (approximately 
400 000 inhabitants).  
· Grocery trade company, one of the largest companies in the sector. 
· The taxi sector in Norway, two major enterprises. 
 
Below we list the major findings from the cases. 
 
3.1 Municipal home care service 
Geographically it is a rather small municipality, approximately 115 km2. The interview data 
reveals that the employees in the home care service might travel as much as 100 km on their 
duty. Even though there exist driving plans, these are often departed due to emerging events. 
The employees on duty are often contacted via cell phones during transport, which demand 
some sort of flexibility. All the cars have Bluetooth and hands-free. The respondents 
emphasized that the small cars were minimum equipped and the cars were perceived as 
ordinary. The organisational working pressure is high, but there have not been many serious 
accidents. Minor events causing scratches and other damages occur often, and many 
employees have been fined for speeding. Traffic safety is not on the agenda and neither not a 
part of the HES-system. When the respondents were asked for things that they wanted different 
they replied; 1) Heat traced steering wheel (to avoid cold hands when they meet and treat the 
clients) and stronger motors (for better ability to navigate to distant places). 
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3.2 Public transport 
This case involves interviews with representatives from a transport administrator and a transport 
contractor.  
 
The transport administrator is an enterprise owned by the regional government, and it is 
responsible for administering three major contracts on public person transport in the county, 
which comprised regular public transport, transporting pupils and ferry transports. The transport 
administrator promotes employees to use the public transport and financially support long-term 
tickets. Within their sector the respondents claimed that a standard like ISO 39001 (they were 
not familiar with the standard) would only be effective if it was implemented in the key 
enterprises, and that these enterprises collaborated on achieving results in the traffic safety 
area. They suggested a “traffic safety council”, which could regularly meet, but they were clear 
on that it must not become a bureaucracy provider. The respondents was particularly concerned 
with the public roads authority’s role and involvement. The respondents had manager roles and 
they claimed that the management in collaboration with the board could be very influential in the 
implementation process of such a standard. Traffic safety was regarded important and they 
listed school transport, mixed transport activities in the terminals, road widths, design of stops 
and tunnels partly closed as critical areas. Their major concern was the information flow, which 
in their opinion could be significantly improved. 
 
The transport contractor is a large national contractor working on two of the contracts within the 
county. The company provides services at sea, rail and road. The contractor is certified in 
accordance with ISO 9001 and ISO 14001. Traffic safety is managed in two ways; they have a 
traffic safety committee, which investigates events; and they carry out their own traffic safety 
education program with their drivers. The company put weight on latent conditions and 
underlying causes of accidents in their traffic safety work. They use their traffic safety 
information system actively. They had been involved in a fatal accident some years ago, and in 
the summer 2013 the company was involved in a collision with person injury in this particular 
region. The respondent claimed that key enterprises and their leaders, such as the director of 
the public roads administration might be very influential regarding implementation of ISO 39001 
in the sector. Barriers against successful implementation of the traffic safety standard was not a 
bigger challenge than implementing changes in general, there is always resistance in 
organisations he said. The respondent meant that road transport could learn much from the sea 
transport with respect to traffic safety. 
 
3.3 Grocery trade 
The company studied is a large national grocery transport business. We studied the Oslo 
section. Their transport services are characterised by: Short travel distances in heavy traffic, 
and thus relatively low speed; generally acceptable road infrastructure, but often quite complex 
routes and narrow access points at delivery stations; a high technical standard on vehicles, and; 
nearly a monopoly situation with regards to contracts (the organization deliver goods to its own 
grocery chain). The organization is already working systematically with traffic safety issues. This 
includes performing risk analyses of new processes and transport routes, accident investigation, 
safety courses for the employees, registration of the drivers’ safety behaviour in traffic, 
acknowledgment of good safety behaviour. Their incentives were: The standard need to be 
demanded by clients, the management in the organizations need to believe in the standard and 
the processes it entails, the management need to be good role models for the employees, the 
employees need to feel heard, and the employees could receive bonuses for good road traffic 
behaviour. The respondents complained about the commercial goods transport sector, which 
has a deserved bad reputation, and the respondent emphasized foreign companies providing 
services in Norway completely unfamiliar with Norwegian conditions. 
 
3.4 Taxi-sector 
In this case we interviewed respondents from the taxi trade organisations and two 
representatives from two of the largest taxi centres in Norway. There are two different 
organisational structures of taxi centres. One type of centres is owned by the taxi owners (minor 
companies of few drivers). In this case the taxi owners are both employers and subordinate of 
the managing director of the centre, which might provide challenges for the directors’ ability to 
manage for example traffic safety. The other structure is a regular limited company working as a 
taxi centre. Taxi owners are related to the centre through distinct contracts, but in this case they 
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are free to leave for other centres if the taxi owners are dissatisfied in one way or another. The 
respondents meant that organisational structures was a big challenge for managing traffic 
safety in the taxi sector. However, the sector experiences few accidents, and when they occur 
the consequences are usually minor. An accident is very critical for the single taxi owner 
because his or her economic margins does not put up with many damages. Incentives for 
implementing ISO 39001 were perceived to be: reduced fuel cost, service cost and operational 
costs, and potential demands from the government, clients and the insurance sector.  
 
Challenges was raised: It is difficult to influence the taxi owners. The respondents had difficult to 
see the connection between traffic accidents and the law on working environment. Recording 
working hours is difficult. Tender assessment is entirely about price, nothing else. There are 
many foreign taxi drivers, which struggle with cultural conditions and language. The tacit 
knowledge and oral communication complicates traffic safety information. 
 
In one of the taxi centres they had employed a supervisor working in the field looking up taxi 
drivers to influence them in the real and active working situations. Various foreign cultures have 
been influenced by addressing informal leaders. Government campaign directed towards the 
taxi sector, for example through audits have been successful. The taxi centres have developed 
their own training programs that drivers must follow. 
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARDS – IMPORTANT FACTORS 
Phillips & Meyer (2012) claim that road transport is the largest accident risk in many enterprises. 
Traffic safety as a HES-measure in organisations is becoming an important issue at the 
European agenda, inter alia through the European Transport Safety Council and European 
Safety and Health Agency. The Norwegian national transport plan (2010-2019) suggests that 
traffic safety should be implemented in the HES-work in the governing of the working life.  
 
The transport sector is diverse, and so is the end users deploying the road infrastructure in their 
businesses. Two important dimension to characterize the involvement in work related road 
transport is the level of functions and the enterprises’ connections with road elements, see 
figure 2. The elements are to be understood in a systems perspective, that is the road, the road 
users, the vehicles and the emergency response systems, and they are parts of an overall 
system property (Leveson, 2011), also encompassing surroundings (weather, climate, road 
conditions) and frame conditions (regulation regimes, economics, culture etc.). Functions in 
road transport is shown to the left side of figure 2, and the more and comprehensive 
involvement in the functions connected with elements it decides what level of involvement exists 
from minor focus up to key enterprise, cf. figure 3. 
 
Our study is based on interviews and expert opinions. What are the qualities of this material and 
can we say that the reliability and validity is satisfying? Critics would say that the data is 
persons expressing strong opinions in an area one knows little about. Such critics are often 
seen in studies with a futuristic perspective, such as risk analyses, prognoses, scenario-
descriptions and Delphi studies. Our underlying assumption is not positivism rather socially 
constructed assessments of what the future might look like if the ISO 39001 was implemented 
in a huge number of enterprises. It is not estimates of true values, but the experts beliefs. This 
is the best knowledge we can obtain and it is not arbitrary statements from random people. We 
have included a variety of backgrounds and experiences in our study, and we have found good 
correlations between the cases and the survey data, in which we think strengthen our findings. 
However, there are uncertainties, which should be followed up. The precisions in the responses 
varies, and we have therefor been very concerned with experts and interviewees to reveal their 
reasons for the assessments. But what are the heuristics and biases? The respondents do have 
a common interest in the field of traffic safety, which could provide too optimistic responses 
(Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982 - representativeness heuristics). Since we do not use the 
absolute numbers of the scale, we think we have reduced the effect of representativeness 
heuristics. 
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Figure 2 – Functions and links to elements in a road traffic system perspective 
 
The major findings in our study are as follows: 
· There is a traffic safety potential in the enterprises’ self-realization and knowledge of 
their need to manage traffic safety. 
· Traffic safety management must be perceived as meaningful, thus measures that 
increase the knowledge, measures that increase leadership engagements, success 
stories and customer requirements and incentives, are needed. 
· Customers are important stakeholders. If the customers demand traffic safety through 
ISO 39001, this will be a powerful prerequisite. 
· Important stakeholders, such as the NPRA, the Police and the Norwegian Labour 
Inspection Authority, must be good role models. 
· The effect of implementing ISO 39001 could be measured through intermediate factors, 
such as increased work satisfaction, reduced fuel consumption, reduced maintenance 
and operational costs, improved quality of vehicles and equipment, better speed 
adaption amongst road users, increased use of safety equipment in vehicles, and 
generally improved traffic safety knowledge amongst road users.   
· The NPRA has many options to influence the implementation of ISO 39001, e.g. 
through their development of regulations, contracts with entrepreneurs, consultancies, 
and vendors, internal HES work, collaborations and networking activities in sectors, and 
aiding tailor-made traffic safety management packages for various businesses. 
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Wallington et al. (2014) have studied British Telecom’s (BT) implementation of a risk-based 
management system for work-related transport. BT has 95 000 employees and a high transport 
workload. It is interesting to note that the number of traffic accidents in BT fell by 50 % in the 
ten-year period from 2002 to 2012. There is a strong correlation between the number of 
insurance claims per 1000 vehicles and the number of conducted risk assessments. The study 
has also identified many weaknesses in the coupling between scientifically based knowledge 
and practical working skills and experience. This is a bi-effect the assessors had not beien able 
to identify without the implementation of a risk-based regime, such as the ISO 39001.  
 
We are of the opinion that it would be very difficult (impossible) to measure the effect of ISO 
39001 in terms of accidents (severely injured and killed) directly. Still, it is natural to believe that, 
over time, we would see a reduction in the number of accidents if we measure improvements on 
intermediate effects. Enterprises, such as BT, claim that a commitment to traffic safety 
management has given a severe positive effect (Wallington et al., 2014), but they have not 
collated their results with the general improvement in traffic safety in Great Britain during the 
same period. To isolate effects from organizational initiatives, such as implementing a system 
for traffic safety management, is very difficult. Our own studies of the commercial goods 
transport identifies positive attitudes towards the effect of HSE-related work in enterprises. Of 
the enterprises that responded to our investigation, 26.5 % had experienced severe accidents 
(killed or severely injured) the past ten years (Njå & Fjelltun, 2010). HSE-related work in the 
enterprises was not only associated with positive attitudes. A factor we identified was that HSE-
related work reduces work motivation. In our opinion, a successful implementation of ISO 39001 
in Norway entails a great deal of efforts from key enterprises. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A reinforced risk-informed system for traffic safety management, in the form of ISO 39001, is 
considered an effective initiative towards better traffic safety by most of our respondents. Our 
results show that the key enterprises with regard to traffic safety; the NPRA, the Police, the 
Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority, the county councils and municipalities need to strive to 
be good role models. This means showing that they can manage traffic safety in accordance 
with the main principles in the standard. If the NPRA are to succeed with a requirement, which 
requires that cooperating enterprises and vendors certify in accordance with ISO 39001, they 
will need trust from the surroundings. A first step towards building trust is that the NPRA begins 
with itself, and implement the principles of the standard. A subject that occupied our 
respondents was contracts. If clients demand the standard, implementation is likely to succeed. 
 
Another important aspect is to clarify the contents of the concept “work-related driving”, identify 
the extent of such driving and collate this against accident production. We recommend the 
NPRA to conduct a study of a sample of randomly selected reports from accidents involving 
severely injured and killed persons (zero-vision accidents), to identify how work-related driving 
is treated: Are accidents seen as the driver’s own responsibility? Or is there consistency in the 
accident insurance provided by the employer and the mode of treatment conducted? What roles 
do employers and employees take?  
 
Our respondents clearly express that there is a potential for enterprises to acknowledge their 
own needs for traffic safety management. The NPRA could for instance use the ongoing work 
associated with developing a HSE-charter in the building and construction industry as a 
gateway to introducing traffic safety as a natural part of the enterprises’ management systems. 
The NPRA is already one of the parties that have signed the HSE-charter. Other parties who 
have signed the charter is, e.g.: the Norwegian National Rail Administration, the Norwegian 
government’s key advisor in construction and property affairs (Statsbygg), the Norwegian 
Association for Consulting Engineers (RIF), the Federation of Norwegian Construction 
Industries (BKL) and the Norwegian Association of Heavy Equipment Contractors (MEF). 
 
When an enterprise fails to acknowledge its needs for systematic traffic safety management, it 
may originate from lack of knowledge of its challenges with and possibilities to influence traffic 
safety. The above-mentioned initiatives, associated with clarifying the contents of work-related 
driving, is important to increase this knowledge in the enterprises. Our major conclusion is that 
the Norwegian Public Roads Administration should be active in the implementation processes of 
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traffic safety management standards for businesses that use the Norwegian public road 
systems. 
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Abstract 
Occupational health and wellbeing may be understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. It 
comprises the interaction of physical, psychological and social dimensions, which manifests in 
the workers cognitions, motivations, behaviors, and self-reported physical and psychological 
health. The Health and Work Survey  (INSAT - Inquérito Saúde e Trabalho) was conceived with 
the contribution of different European questionnaires, and aims to analyze the relations of work 
conditions and their consequences in worker health and wellbeing. INSAT is a self-applied 
survey instrument which focuses on several questions related with work situations and their 
impact on health and wellbeing. The main goals of this work are to analyze statistically 706 
questionnaires applied between 2010 and 2014 and to validate the discomfort scale of the 
instrument. In the validation process was used the Rasch Partial Credit Model, an extension of 
Rasch’s simple logistic model that is suitable for use when items are scored polytomously. As 
result from the application of Rasch Partial Credit Model, Person Separation Reliability was 
obtained (0.8761) and the value can be considered very good (>0.8). From the statistical 
analysis we can see that Overall Model fit information, given by Outfit Mean square /Infit Mean 
square, are between 0.5 and 1.5, that means “Productive for measurement” and “acceptable fit 
overall”. As result, these items can generate predictable response patterns. Some of the items 
do not fulfill these criteria and must be analyzed more carefully to ensure the instrument 
improvement. 
 
Keywords: health and work relations, survey validation, Rasch Partial Credit Model 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Occupational health and wellbeing may be understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. It 
comprises the interaction of physical, psychological and social dimensions, which manifests in 
the workers cognitions, motivations, behaviors, and self-reported physical and psychological 
health (Ilmarien, 2009; Molinié & Leroyer; Taris, Van Horn, Schaufeli, & Schreurs, 2004).  
The Health and Work Survey  (INSAT - Inquérito Saúde e Trabalho) (Barros-Duarte & Cunha, 
2014) was conceived with the contribution of different European questionnaires, and aims to 
analyze the relations of work conditions and their consequences in worker health and wellbeing 
(Barros-Duarte & Cunha, 2010). INSAT is a self-applied survey instrument which focuses on 
several questions related with work situations and their impact on health and wellbeing. 
The INSAT is a good evaluation tool as it focuses on the diverse and variable questions related 
to the different work situations. In fact, the inclusion of a diverse number of questions related to 
the work context, even those that focus on a more subjective dimension of work, is one of the 
main concerns of this questionnaire and a constant point of reference in the suggested 
methodology (Barros, Carnide, Cunha, Santos, & & Silva, 2015).  
To validate the survey instrument it was used the Rasch Partial Credit Model, an extension of 
Rasch’s simple logistic model that is suitable for use when items are scored polytomously. 
Although the classical statistical methods more used to examine construct validity are 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and Cronbach’s alpha, these methods have been criticized by 
several authors as being insufficient for determining construct validity in psychological survey 
instruments (Cortina, 1993; S. Green, Lissitz, & Mulaik, 1977; Kline, 2000; Schmitt, 1996; 
Sijtsma, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Waugh & Chapman, 2005).  
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2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1. INSAT  
The Health and Work Questionnaire (INSAT: Inquérito Saúde e Trabalho) (Barros-Duarte & 
Cunha, 2010) was developed in 2007 and suffered some changes in 2010 and 2013. It 
originated from the contribution of European questionnaires (Barros-Duarte, Cunha, & 
Lacomblez, 2007) and it aims to understand the notion that workers have of their own working 
conditions and the impact on their health.  
The actual survey, the INSAT 2013 version, is composed by 154 items (questions). Responses 
to these items are generally dichotomous (e.g., \yes" or \no", \agree" or\disagree") and/or 
ordinal (e.g., from 1 to 5, where 1 represents the maximum discomfort and 5 represents the 
absence of discomfort). The survey is self-reported because, as mentioned above, the main 
goal is to ascertain what the workers’ perception is of the effects of their work conditions on their 
health and wellbeing. 
INSAT begins with a set of questions designed to collect general and personal information 
(gender, age, sector of activity, profession) and followed by queries grouped into seven 
categories: i) work: a set of questions focused on the job description in terms of the nature of 
work, type of contract, working hours and shifts; ii) conditions and characteristics of work: 
another group of questions concentrates on work constraints and their effects on workers, 
namely, environmental and physical constraints, organizational (pace and autonomy) 
constraints, relationship (colleagues and customers) constraints, and work characteristics; iii) 
conditions of life outside work; iv) training and work; v) work and health; vi) my health and my 
work: another set of questions broaches the effects of work on health, it includes health 
problems such as: back pain, headache, respiratory, heart and vision problems, and 
musculoskeletal disorders, among others vii) my health and my well-being: corresponds to the 
Portuguese version of the Nottingham Health Profile (NHP) (Ferreira & E., 1999). 
The INSAT survey was validated by the ethical commission of the University of Porto and 
University Fernando Pessoa.  
 
2.2. Sample 
For the validation process of the INSAT survey instrument it was used a sample with 706 
Portuguese workers. The sample included six economic sectors: (a) Health and Social Support 
(hospital front offices and pharmacists); (b) Education (high school and university teachers); (c) 
Wholesale and Retail (salespeople, store managers and market cashiers; (d) Manufacturing 
Industry (highly-qualified and technical staff, middle managers, back office workers, warehouse 
and logistics workers, and assembly line workers); (e) Public administration and defense 
(directors, middle managers, case-workers, human resources technicians, front and back office 
workers), and (f) Other service activities (hairdressers, psychologists). The exclusion criterion of 
the sample was not having answered a third or more of the questions. 
The survey follows the researchers’ guidance, and was conducted between 2010 and 2014. We 
ensured the confidentiality on the data collected by maintaining the anonymity of the 
participants. All the participants provided signed informed consent to participate. 
 
2.3. Statistical procedures 
The statistical analysis applied to this survey was divided into two parts.  The first part is based 
on a descriptive analysis for the groups I – general and personal information items and some 
work information, III – Conditions of life outside work, IV - training and work; V – Work and 
health, VI – My health and my work, and VII – My health and wellbeing). The second part is 
associated with the validation process using the Rasch Parcial Credit model (PCM) applied only 
to the group II – Conditions and characteristics of work with de sub-dimensions: 1 – 
Environmental and physical constraints; 2 – Organizational constraints; 3 – Work 
characteristics. The main goal of this Rasch model application was to validate the group of 
items with a polytomuos discomfort scale. For that it was used the Rasch Partial Credit Model, 
an extension to Rasch’s simple logistic model, suitable for use when items are scored 
polytomously and when response categories in each item are ordered but not necessarily 
equidistant from each other in terms of the latent trait being described. This model specifies that 
each item has its own rating scale structure. It derives from multiple-choice tests where 
responses that are incorrect, but indicate some knowledge, are given partial credit towards a 
correct response. The amount of partial correctness varies across items. This is considered for 
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some authors as one of the most simplest and useful Item Response Theory (IRT) model (C. 
Green & Frantom, 2002; Mair, Hatzinger, & Maier, 2009). 
The PCM was applied to 76 items from the group Conditions and characteristics of work (with 
sub-dimensions: 1 – Environmental and physical constraints; 2 – Organizational constraints; 3 – 
Work characteristics). The scale applied to these items was “reorganized” to be possible to 
apply the PCM. Because each item of this group has two types of responses, the first part with a 
dichotomous scale (yes / no) followed by an ordinal discomfort scale (e.g., from 1 to 5, where 1 
represents the absence of discomfort and 5 represents the maximum discomfort) the two types 
of response were transformed and codified in the following scale: 0 – Not exposed and not 
discomfort; 1 – Exposed and not discomfort; 2 – Exposed and minor discomfort; 3 – Exposed 
and discomfort; 4 – Exposed and quite discomfort; 5 – Exposed and too much discomfort. 
The software used were the R version 3.2.0, with package eRm, and IBM SPSS statistics, 
version 22. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1 Sample characterization and descriptive analysis 
The descriptive analysis related to gender, age and education applied to the sample of 706 
questionnaires is in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Sample characterization and descriptive analysis. 
Gender    
   
 
Male Female 
 
  
   % 37 63 
 
  
   Age   
   Min. Mean Std Max.   
   18 37.65 9.05 63   
   Education 
 
Basic 
Educatio
n (1st 
cycle) 
Basic 
Education 
(2nd cycle) 
Basic 
Education 
(3rd cycle) 
High 
Educatio
n 
Bachelo
r Grad. 
post-
grad. 
Undefine
d 
% 1 3 22 43 2 23 5 1 
Min. – Minimum; Max. – Maximum; NA – Not applicable; Qu. – quartile; Std – Standard 
deviation; Grad. – Graduate; Post-grad. – Post-graduation. 
Other relevant INSAT results are expressed in terms of frequency of exposure to different risk 
factors – environmental risk factors, physical constraints, work intensification factors of risk – as 
it is illustrated in Tables 2, 3, and 4 (for higher frequencies: > 50% in our sample) 
 
Table 2 - Frequency of workers self-declarations to environmental risk factors 
Exposure to: Number of workers (%) 
Harmful noise 58.1 
Temperature variations (heat/cold) 67.3 
 
Table 3 - Frequency of workers self-declarations to physical constraints 
Exposure to: Number of workers (%) 
Repetitive gestures 62.0 
Standing up at same position for a long 
period of time 56.0 
Standing up with displacements 58.1 
 
Table 4 - Frequency of workers self-declarations to work intensification constraints 
Exposure to: Number of workers (%) 
Intense rhythm 52.3 
Production norms or strict deadlines 67.7 
Having constantly to adapt to method 
changes or work tools 63.5 
Working for long periods at the 57.8 
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computer 
Frequent interruptions 64.4 
Hyper-request 69.0 
Having to continue working beyond my 
assigned timetable 65.5 
 
 
As we can see, the descriptive analysis revealed the large exposition either to physical and 
organisational risks in a sample that contemplates six economic sectors and different 
professions. 
 
3.2 Rasch Partial Credit Model (PCM) 
As mentioned before the PCM was applied to 76 items from the group “Conditions and 
characteristics of work” and for that only 621 questionnaires were valid (all questionnaires with 
75 or more missing items responses were eliminated). The Person Separation Reliability was 
obtained (0.8761) and the value can be considered very good (>0.8). This measure is used to 
indicate the proportion of person variance that is not due to error. The concept is similar to 
Cronbach’s α in definition and value (Wright & Stone, 1999).  
From the statistical analysis we can see that Overall Model fit information, given by Outfit Mean 
square /Infit Mean square, are between 0.5 and 1.5, that means “Productive for measurement” 
and “acceptable fit overall” based on the criteria defined by Linacre (Linacre, 2002). As result, 
these items can generate predictable response patterns (table 5).  
 
Table 5 - Overall model fit information 
 Items 
 Outfit MSQ Infit MSQ 
N 76 
Mean 1.07 1.08 
Std 0.43 0.37 
MSQ: Mean square 
 
The statistical results of the item fit are in table 6. The item fit is an index of whether items 
function logically and provide a continuum useful for all responses. 
 
Table 6 - Item fit statisticals 
Sub-dimension     
Categories Frequencies (%) 
Item Location Outfit MSQ 
Infit 
MSQ 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Environmenta  
and physical 
constraints 
i1 -0.76483 1.081 
0.99
4 0.43 0.00 0.08 0.28 
0.1
1 0.09 
i2 -0.15328 0.809 0.93 0.91 0.01 0.00 0.05 
0.0
2 0.02 
i3 0.13325 0.66 
0.74
5 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.02 
0.0
0 0.00 
i4 -0.84329 0.992 
0.99
5 0.35 0.00 0.07 0.30 
0.1
7 0.11 
i5 -0.40886 0.939 
0.97
2 0.75 0.00 0.05 0.09 
0.0
8 0.04 
i6 -0.11035 0.801 
0.90
5 0.91 0.00 0.02 0.03 
0.0
3 0.01 
i7 -0.38451 0.96 
1.00
2 0.70 0.02 0.08 0.08 
0.0
8 0.04 
i8 -0.47059 1.006 
1.02
9 0.67 0.01 0.05 0.15 
0.0
8 0.04 
i9 -0.1367 0.854 
0.97
3 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.04 
0.0
3 0.01 
i10 -0.62869 1.109 1.09 0.41 0.02 0.15 0.25 
0.1
0 0.05 
i11 -0.37545 1.043 1.05 0.61 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.0 0.02 
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Sub-dimension     
Categories Frequencies (%) 
Item Location Outfit MSQ 
Infit 
MSQ 0 1 2 3 4 5 
7 5 
i12 -0.5767 0.897 
0.96
2 0.57 0.00 0.05 0.18 
0.1
4 0.06 
i13 -0.6196 0.907 0.97 0.59 0.01 0.06 0.15 
0.1
1 0.08 
i14 -0.74473 1.091 
1.08
8 0.45 0.02 0.06 0.22 
0.1
6 0.10 
i15 -0.70093 1.008 
1.03
3 0.41 0.04 0.12 0.23 
0.1
2 0.07 
i16 -0.3832 1.221 
1.22
2 0.59 0.03 0.13 0.18 
0.0
9 0.02 
i17 -0.03817 0.851 
0.89
7 0.81 0.03 0.07 0.09 
0.0
6 0.01 
i18 -0.325 0.929 
0.95
5 0.73 0.03 0.05 0.08 
0.0
6 0.03 
2. Organizational 
constraints 
 
i19 -0.50502 1.084 
0.98
1 0.53 0.04 0.17 0.21 
0.1
0 0.03 
i20 -0.44544 1.204 
1.07
7 0.54 0.06 0.16 0.20 
0.1
0 0.03 
i21 -0.32409 1.022 
1.04
8 0.49 0.12 0.22 0.11 
0.0
5 0.01 
i22 -0.50827 0.97 
0.97
5 0.33 0.12 0.29 0.17 
0.0
6 0.02 
i23 -0.52126 0.835 0.85 0.38 0.15 0.23 0.15 
0.0
6 0.03 
i24 -0.04838 1.396 0.85 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.01 
0.0
2 0.01 
i25 -0.40967 1.067 1.06
 
0.44 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.0
 
0.02 
i26 -0.70868 0.975 0.99 0.37 0.03 0.14 0.24 0.1
 
0.06 
i27 -0.11461 1.804 0.97 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.0
 
0.02 
i28 -0.633 0.914 0.92
 
0.31 0.09 0.23 0.25 0.0
 
0.04 
i29 -0.15064 0.929 0.96
 
0.74 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.0
 
0.01 
i30 -0.69585 1.038 1.03 0.37 0.10 0.21 0.18 0.0
 
0.06 
i31 -0.56133 0.886 0.92
 
0.70 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.0
 
0.07 
i32 -0.64166 0.82 0.87
 
0.52 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.0
 
0.07 
i33 -0.53785 0.94 0.93
 
0.63 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.0
 
0.06 
i34 -0.06135 0.856 0.93
 
0.88 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.0
 
0.01 
i35 0.06733 0.599 0.80
 
0.97 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.0
 
0.01 
i36 -0.20227 0.93 0.95
 
0.83 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.0
 
0.02 
i37 -0.15521 0.823 0.87
 
0.75 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.0
 
0.01 
i38 -0.44175 1.008 0.99
 
0.52 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.0
 
0.03 
i39 -0.56487 0.914 0.96
 
0.58 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.0
 
0.07 
i40 -0.01413 0.671 0.85
 
0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
 
0.01 
i41 -0.5262 0.913 0.93
 
0.30 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.0
 
0.02 
i42 0.22644 0.428 0.64
 
0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.0
 
0.00 
i43 0.22946 0.222 0.56
 
0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
 
0.00 
i44 -0.41632 0.771 0.88
 
0.76 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.0
 
0.04 
i45 -0.63979 0.8 0.84
 
0.65 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.1
 
0.10 
i46 -0.43462 0.801 0.90
 
0.76 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.0
 
0.05 
i47 -0.52513 0.747 0.91
 
0.81 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.0
 
0.08 
i48 -0.73167 1.058 1.01
 
0.66 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.0
 
0.15 
i49 -0.47223 1.25 1.12
 
0.85 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.0
 
0.07 
i50 -0.22249 1.849 0.97 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.0
 
0.03 
i51 -0.70659 0.884 0.98
 
0.68 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.0
 
0.14 
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Sub-dimension     
Categories Frequencies (%) 
Item Location Outfit MSQ 
Infit 
MSQ 0 1 2 3 4 5 
i52 -0.05354 1.049 0.9 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
 
0.01 
i53 -0.08229 0.855 0.83
 
0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
 
0.01 
i54 -0.01923 0.909 0.85 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.0
 
0.01 
i55 1.84018 0.429 0.52
 
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
 
0.00 
i56 0.41941 0.606 1.2 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
 
0.00 
i58 0.40285 2.137 2.19
 
0.45 0.36 0.12 0.04 0.0
 
0.01 
i59 -0.02694 1.346 1.40
 
0.53 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.0
 
0.03 
i60 -0.21181 1.298 1.35
 
0.56 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.0
 
0.03 
i61 -0.48175 1.406 1.37
 
0.63 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.1
 
0.09 
i62 -0.41238 1.714 1.42
 
0.78 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.0
 
0.08 
i63 -0.23806 1.164 1.24
 
0.64 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.0
 
0.03 
3. Work 
characteristics 
 
i64 0.09899 1.003 1.12
 
0.86 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.0
 
0.01 
i65 -0.17694 1.578 1.41
 
0.74 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.0
 
0.03 
i66 0.43851 0.98 0.98
 
0.91 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.0
 
0.00 
i67 0.29088 0.972 1.47
 
0.94 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.0
 
0.01 
i68 0.22266 3.095 3.28
 
0.54 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.0
 
0.01 
i69 0.09924 1.269 1.80
 
0.96 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.0
 
0.02 
i70 0.05046 2.486 1.90
 
0.95 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.0
 
0.03 
i71 0.01828 1.349 1.57 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.0
 
0.03 
i72 0.24739 1.618 1.30
 
0.96 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.0
 
0.01 
i73 -0.22707 0.831 1.10
 
0.91 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.0
 
0.04 
i74 -0.4736 1.036 1.06
 
0.75 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.0
 
0.09 
i75 -0.73442 1.165 1.12
 
0.50 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.1
 
0.16 
i76 -0.60369 1.276 1.15
 
0.64 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.0
 
0.11 
 
 
Based on outfit measure (since the Infit measure – information weighted fit statistics – is less 
sensitive than Outfit measure – outlier sensitive statistics) we can see that in sub-dimension 2 
some items (i27 – Take work home; i50 - sexual harassment; i58 – Direct contact with the 
public; and i62 - Physical aggression from the public), as well as some items from sub-
dimension 3 (i65 – monotonous work; i68 – Complex work; i70 – lack of career evolution; and 
i72 – lack of resources to do my work), under fit the data, meaning that contain unusual and /or 
inappropriate response patterns (C. Green & Frantom, 2002; Joan Stelmack et al., 2004). In the 
sub-dimension 2 some items (i42 – no help from colleagues; i43 - rare exchange experiences; 
and i55 – nationality discrimination) over fit the data, meaning that there are too little variation in 
the response pattern suggesting redundant items.  
From descriptive data (categories frequencies) we can see that, in all items, the 0 (not exposed 
and not discomfort) is the most observed category from the polytomous scale. 
 
The person-item maps for sub-dimension are presented in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 
show the location of item (and threshold) parameters as well as the distribution of person 
parameters along the latent dimension. Person-item maps are useful to compare the range and 
position of the item measure distribution (lower panel) to the range and position of the person 
measure distribution (upper panel).  
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Figure 1 - Person-item map for sub-dimension Environmental and physical constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Persons with 
more ability 
Persons 
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difficulty 
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Figure 2 - Person-item map for sub-dimension Organizational constraints 
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Figure 3 - Person-item map for sub-dimension Work characteristics 
 
 
As we can see the distribution of person’s ability is well shaped and with mode located on the 
“more ability” range to deal with discomfort. For item map we can see that all of them are in the 
middle of “discomfort” range, meaning they are not too high disturb / too little disturb impact 
factor.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The validation of INSAT using Rasch model revealed a very good value - as result from the 
application of Rasch Partial Credit Model, Person Separation Reliability was 0.8761. From the 
statistical analysis we can see that Overall Model fit information, given by Outfit Mean square 
/Infit Mean square, are between 0.5 and 1.5, - that means “Productive for measurement” and 
“acceptable fit overall”. As result, these items can generate predictable response patterns. 
Some of the items do not fulfill these criteria and must be analyzed more carefully to ensure the 
instrument improvement. 
Beyond this validation process, it was also presented the results obtained using INSAT in a 
sample of 706 workers. It revealed the exposition either to physical and organizational risks, 
which enhances the importance of an integrated approach of the work situation, and centered at 
a local level of analysis – knowing the enterprises involved and its concrete work activities – in 
order to conceive a contextualized, and not prescriptive, intervention. The results obtained from 
this work will be considered in the next INSAT revision. 
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Abstract 
We describe and analyse three big companies and their supplying partner networks as cases. 
We investigate demanding jobs such as industrial maintenance and land transport. We choose, 
define and utilise aspects and indicators in order to clarify the differences in enablers and 
results as far as health, safety, environment and quality (HSEQ) factors are concerned. The 
literature review aims to find concrete and activating daily issues related to safety culture. We 
think we found some important aspects of daily activities and ways to manage and behave 
versus HSEQ issues. These aspects help to describe and analyse the model and level of safety 
management and culture in an organisation in question. The most promising link we analysed in 
details was the one around near misses and hazard observations. Though, the obvious links 
between activities and ways as well as aspects of safety management and culture should be 
further studied. 
 
Keywords: accident; near miss; safety attitude; integrated management; supplier. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety management and safety culture are related but distinct. Hale et al. (2004) used many 
approaches to study the complex interactions of systematic safety management and the 
underlying safety culture at a steel mill. They found that it is important to interact with the “shop 
floor” in order to develop effective safety management improvements in the wide and rich 
context of the safety culture. The European Union’s report (Eeckelaert, Starren, van 
Scheppingen, Fox, & Brück, 2011) explained that: “the concept of safety culture has been used 
more and more in safety research, particularly in high-risk industries such as the nuclear and 
petrochemical industry, and (public) mass transportation (railway, aviation), recognising the 
importance of the human element and soft organisational aspects in accident and risk 
prevention.”  Similarly, Smith and Wadsworth (2009) have widely reviewed safety culture as 
well. The nuclear power industry, naturally, is one of most interested actors in the field of safety 
culture. The nuclear power industry‘s description is (Advisory Committee, 1993) “the safety 
culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies 
and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety programmes.” Advisory Committee (1993) has as well 
explained: “organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications 
founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence 
in the efficacy of preventive measures.” Building upon this belief, Hugnes and Ferrett (2003) 
recommend the same kind description for all workplaces.  Based on the work of researchers 
Guldenmund, Smith, Wadsworth, Cox, and Flin, Eeckelaert et al. (2011) stated: “Safety culture 
addresses the deeper, implicit convictions (at the core) which are shared amongst the members 
of a group, and which are expressed, amongst others, through the safety climate, i.e. the shared 
perceptions of workers regarding safety and their working environment. Using a metaphor, 
organisational (safety) culture could be seen as the personality of an organisation, whereas 
(safety) climate as the organisation's mood.”  Thus, safety climate originates from a 
psychological approach towards safety culture. Eeckelaert et al. (2011) continued by saying, 
“Safety climate can be regarded as a more superficial and momentary reflection - a snapshot - 
of an organisation’s safety culture.” To assess the safety climate within organisations, Nordic 
countries have adopted a joint project known as the Nordic Safety Climate Questionnaire 
(NOSACQ), which has already been utilised in many Scandinavian countries such as in the 
Swedish chemical process industry (see Bergh, 2011).  
Along on similar line, Glendon, Clarke, and McKenna (2006) suggested looking at quite specific 
topics within industrial organisations, such as the hierarchy, team structure, team performance, 
centralisation degree of the teams and networks, attitudes, and the quality of communication. 
More precisely, Glendon et al. (2006) encouraged researchers to study, e.g., the following 
aspects: adequate dissemination of top-down communications, but also bottom-up 
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communications, ease worker relations, reduced status distinctions operate through 
encouraging communication, sharing ideas, and promoting greater concern and trust among 
workers. The aim of our paper is, first, to review definitions of safety culture, and, second, to 
deal with its practical links with safety management activities and results within the case 
companies we know on the basis of our former studies. Two of the three case companies are of 
specific interest due to applying a specific Health, Safety, Environment, and Quality (HSEQ) 
management model. A model used for HSEQ assessment has been developed in collaboration 
with, and applied within many major Finnish companies and their supplying networks, especially 
the ones of process, other manufacturing, and energy industries. This paper’s case context 
covers as well the third company, representing land transport sector. We have analysed its 
occupational safety management and safety culture and experienced safety climate. As far as 
all the three cases, daily practices and actions of safety management and behaviour will be 
analysed for finding aspects that seem to promote more successful safety culture revealed by 
more positive safety performance. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
We describe quite widely and separately both the case companies and the methodology of this 
specific study. Partly we review our team’s former study reports, because they are dealing with 
the basic backgrounds and facts that are useful and essential for this study, too. Though, many 
new analyses based new and former data and variables are needed and described. 
. 
2.1. Case companies and their industrial contexts 
The process industry typically consists of the pulp, paper, other wood- and bio-based industries, 
the chemical industry, and the metal processing industry. This paper’s case context comprises 
two big Finnish process industry sites of two companies with global operations and units. 
Together, the number of employees at the two sites is many thousands. The staff is partly 
employed directly by the major process industry company but typically as well by the often 
smaller supplying companies. Supplying companies deliver a great variety of work activities at 
shared workplaces in the facilities of purchasing companies, like in our case 1 and case 2. 
People employed in the process industry are involved in either operating or maintaining the 
production system. Additionally, this paper’s case context covers a third company (case 3), 
operating within the land transport sector mainly in Finland and employing around 10000 
employees. The two big process industry sites and their supplying network belong to the Cluster 
for the HSEQ Assessment Procedure (HSEQ AP) (Koivupalo, Junno, & Väyrynen, 2015a; 
Koivupalo, Sulasalmi, Rodrigo, & Väyrynen, 2015b; Väyrynen, Hoikkala, Ketola, & Latva-Ranta, 
2008; Väyrynen, Koivupalo, & Latva-Ranta, 2012; Väyrynen, Jounila, & Latva-Ranta, 2015). 
This HSEQ management approach utilises integrated management, which is one set of 
procedures for covering multiple management objectives and means (cf., Wilkinson & Dale, 
2007; Kauppila, Härkönen, & Väyrynen, 2015). Our team acts as a research and development 
(R&D) partner within the HSEQ AP Cluster that is led by big companies (N=8). The Cluster’s 
experts have conducted, or at least started, HSEQ AP auditing in around 150 supplying 
companies. Due to our membership as a research organisation in the Cluster, we have access 
to the data describing the enablers and performance of the two process industry companies and 
their supplying network (Figure 1) as well as to the data for the case 3 company. 
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Figure 1 – Accident frequency rates, specifically lost-time injury (LTI, see 2.2) rate converted to a linear regression trend 
(supplying and principal [purchasing] companies) represent the HSEQ AP Cluster’s 8-year results. The general trend of 
accidents in the Finnish industry can be seen as well. 
 
Most typically, the suppliers are providing maintenance services to big purchasing HSEQ AP 
Cluster enterprises. In this regard, maintenance concerns all technical, administrative and 
managerial actions to keep or restore a production system to a state in which it can perform the 
required function (c.f., EN 13306, 2010). More specifically, the EURO OSHA (2015) described 
demanding and quite risky work activities related to maintenance in various industries and noted 
that: 
· Accidents increasingly tend to happen not during normal operation, but rather during 
repair, maintenance, cleaning, adjusting, etc.; 
· It is estimated that around 15% to 20% (depending on country) of all accidents and 10% 
to 15% of all fatal accidents are related to maintenance operations; 
· The activities of maintenance, repair, tuning and adjustment are fourth on the list of top 
10 working processes accounting for the highest number of fatal accidents from 2003 to 
2005; and 
· According to a survey conducted in 2005 in France, maintenance is the most 
subcontracted function in industry. An analysis of French work accidents showed that, 
in 2002, maintenance employees were the second most frequent victims of accidents 
related to subcontracting, just behind construction workers. 
Lind-Kohvakka (2015) has concluded that the maintenance-related risk assessment and 
management has to be holistic, so that factors relating to technology, human and organisational 
viewpoints are considered. The risk assessment and management procedures must also take 
into account the work system’s conditions, surrounding activities and structures, as well as fault 
manifestation in practice. The analyses may also need to pay attention to post-maintenance 
work system safety. Maintenance operations are conducted basically in all industrial 
environments, indoors and outdoors. The risks vary greatly, depending on the operating 
environment and conditions, and on the task involved. Some typical risk factors are poor system 
maintainability, defective task safety planning and shortcomings at sites of industry. Väyrynen, 
Pekkarinen, and Tornberg (1994) described the conditions in the chemical process industry 
where maintenance includes many physically heavy tasks. Risk assessment and management 
should pay attention to varying tasks and operating environments, as well as to careful task 
safety planning. Production employees working in control rooms of process industry have, 
generally speaking, much better physical work conditions.  
Case 3, with current lost-time injury (LTI) rate between 15 and 20, represents the transport 
industry where occupational safety (OS) statistics reflect a relatively high number of accidents. 
As far as the 6-decade-long trend of the numbers of accidents of the case 3 shows very strong 
reduction (Figure 2). Nowadays, according to the European Statistics on Accidents at Work 
(European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2011), the incidence rate of non-fatal 
occupational accidents decreased in the total working population between 1994 and 2006. This 
was true for all the three transport subsectors (land transport including road, train and pipelines, 
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water transport and air transport). In 2006, the average incidence rate of fatal accidents (i.e. 
cases per 100,000 workers) was 3.5 in the total working population, while in the land transport 
sector it was 14.7 and in the water transport sector it was 15.3 (European Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work, 2011). For instance lorry transport, one example of land transport, is 
characterised by combination of high physical work load and accidents (cf, Reiman, Putkonen, 
Nevala, Nyberg, Väyrynen, & Forsman, 2015). 
 
Figure 2 – The significant decrease in occupational accidents for a big land transport company (case 3) over the 
decades. Though the developments are positive, zero-accident goal thinking may be needed to progress further. 
 
Another line of research uses a narrower scope to link safety culture and daily proactive actions 
and habits. For example, Reason’s approach (1991) is more “daily-oriented” than those 
previously mentioned (e.g. Eeckelaert et al., 2011; Advisory Committee, 1993). Reason (1991) 
linked a practice-related, concrete daily phenomenon – i.e. near miss and related events – with 
the abstract concept of safety culture. Countries around the world have defined a near miss in 
various ways. For example, in the USA, a near miss is an unplanned event that did not result in 
injury, illness or damage, but had the potential to do so National Safety Council (NSC, 2013). In 
contrast, Finland’s reporting systems also include even more static and potential hazard 
conditions and situations observed and reported by employees that could become an event 
concluding with a near miss or an accident. The NSC (2013) clearly stated that reporting near 
miss incidents can significantly improve employee safety and enhance an organisation’s safety 
culture. Van der Schaaf (1991), like Reason (1991), described in many interesting ways how 
significant can be the links between the “abstract” concept of culture and “concrete” near miss 
incident reporting of everyday events and states with deviations. We identified that that key 8 
points of van der Schaaf (1991) can be concluded: 
1. An iceberg model has actual but rare accidents on the top, and an enormous number of 
errors and recoveries on the bottom; 
2. An iceberg model includes accidents, near misses and behavioural acts like errors with 
largely overlapping root causes; 
3. Near misses, which provide an optimum balance between rare visible accidents and 
frequent but invisible behavioural acts, are worth collecting and analysing; 
4. Near misses usually occur one or two orders of magnitude more frequently than actual 
accidents; 
5. The set of possible accident scenarios is enriched in all types of system failure modes; 
6. From a safety management perspective, near misses can be considered precursors to 
future accidents; 
7. An increased awareness of system defects results in an attitude of zero-defects goal-
setting; and 
8. A near miss investigation often provides a preventive perspective much more than 
accident investigation, which helps maintain the motivation that is crucial to safety 
culture. 
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2.2. Method to study  
For cases 1 and 2, we gathered and dealt further with (a) statistics related to the companies and 
the HSEQ AP Cluster and (b) materials that our team members gathered for the earlier studies 
(Koivupalo et al., 2015a, 2015b; Kurppa, 2015; Väyrynen et al., 2008, 2012, 2015). We use the 
term indicators to describe accidents, observations of near miss incidents and hazards reported 
by employees, activity with safety toolbox meetings (Levitt and Samelson, 1993) and results in 
HSEQ AP audits. We used the LTI rate as a loss-based safety performance indicator (Kjellén, 
2000). We defined the LTI rate as the number of lost-time injuries per one million hours of work. 
A lost-time injury is an injury that causes at least one whole day (or shift) absence from work. 
The amount of observations of near miss incidents and hazards is probably important, and so is 
their frequency in comparison with the accident frequency. We gathered changes in indicators, 
in which we hope to see progress based on the OS culture improvements. We wanted to check 
the possible role of the fact that over 330 organisations from all over Finland have joined the 
Zero Accident Forum, which is a national network of companies that share a common vision of 
becoming leaders in safety and are willing to share their experiences for the benefit of other 
members (Zero Accident Forum, 2015). We collected the data for case 3 from the workplaces 
with an inquiry on OS and related issues. The inquiry was directed to the whole staff of the land 
transport company, and approximately every third (n=3042) member of the staff answered it. 
We distributed the questionnaire both through the mail and over the Internet. The questionnaire 
used a 5-point Likert scale to assess 71 attitude claims divided into 12 essential theme areas. In 
addition to the inquiry, other parts of the study (i.e. interviews, focus groups, statistics related to 
the company and literature review) revealed as well a lot of various aspects, and generally the 
readiness and ideas of the company’s staff to further develop OS culture as well as their 
expectations regarding it.  
 
3. RESULTS 
The case 1 purchasing company and its tens of suppliers show a quite consistent 8-year trend 
down in accident figures (LTI, years 2007–2014). The LTI for the purchaser lowered from 17 to 
8, and the corresponding figures for case 1’s supplying network were 38 and 13, respectively 
(Kurppa, 2015). The accident frequencies for the purchaser and the suppliers at the same 
shared workplace are coming nearer and nearer to each other (Kurppa, 2015). Table 1 shows 
the combined accident situation in case 2. The improvement is quite clear, continuous, and 
consistent. 
Table 1 – Accident frequency LTI by 10 years presenting trends in a shared HSEQ AP Cluster workplace (case 2 
combining the figures of the purchaser’s own staff and suppliers’ staff at the same shared workplace) (Koivupalo et al., 
2015a). 
 
Figure 3 shows that new companies due to be audited are showing relatively straightforward 
improvement every year. Figure 4 presents the total HSEQ scores as well as the separate 
scores for HS, E and Q respectively, showing clear improvements in all supplying companies. 
These numbers reveal the positive effects of the 3-year time span between the first 
assessments and the reassessments of the same companies. 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
LTI 26.0 22.0 18.7 13.8 12.7 9.0 6.7 8.2 7.0 6.2 
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Figure 3 – A 9-year trend of total HSEQ scores in audits compared to the maximum of achievable scores (the yearly 
average in first assessments). The year 2015 includes only a half-year situation. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Total sums of HSEQ scores, and the separate scoring of HS, E, and Q respectively, of all supplying 
companies; comparison (average, max and min) with the maximum of achievable scores is presented. The data reveals 
the situation during the 3-year time span between the first assessments and the reassessments of the same companies. 
The data covers time until June 2015. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 focus on the amounts and especially the proportions of accidents (deviation 
events with loss) and near miss and hazard observations (deviation events and conditions 
without loss). As far as the case 2 (Figure 5) near misses are occurring two orders of 
magnitude, or even more, more frequently than actual accidents (n2 /n1=652). The 
corresponding ratio for the suppliers of the case 2 (Figure 5) is 14. So, near miss and hazard 
observations of the suppliers are occurring around one order of magnitude more frequently than 
actual accidents. The corresponding ratios n2 /n1 for the case 1 and 3 are 95 and 10 (Figure 6). 
Cases 1 and 2 especially, if we deal only with their own staff, are superior; apparently they 
prevent accidents because of the great amount of near miss and hazard observations reported 
by employees. The impression is that supplying companies of case companies 1 and 2, and 
case company 3 itself, could achieve better accident prevention performance by more actively 
detecting and resolving near miss and hazard observations. 
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Figure 5 – Comparison of accidents (≥ 1 day absence due to injuries) (n1) with near miss and hazard observations (n2) 
in the same case companies (purchaser case 2 on the right, its suppliers on the left). The shares (%) of the sum n1+ n2 
calculated for both types of incidents are presented as well. 
 
 
Figure 6 –Comparison of accidents (≥ 1 day absence due to injuries) (n1) with near miss and hazard observations (n2) in 
the case companies (case 2 with suppliers on the right, cases 1 and 3 on the left). The shares (%) of the sum n1+ n2 
calculated for both types of incidents are presented as well. 
 
Positive attitude, participation, conditions and equipment, own alertness and well-being are felt 
important, and, e.g., the roles of zero-accident mind-set, managers and foremen, behaviour at 
leisure, and subcontractors gain opinions expressing non-importance according to answers of 
the respondents of the case 3 (Figure 7). Table 2 shows that near miss observations and safety 
toolbox meetings were not as popular as in leading process industry workplaces, but more 
emphasis will be placed on those activities in the future. 
 
500
 
Figure 7 – OS attitude claims chosen based on the highest values of averages of staff agreement (n=around 3000), and 
on the other hand lowest values of averages in the case 3. The level assessment related to each statement was based 
on assessments according to the 5-point Likert scale. 
 
Table 2 – Yearly number of near miss incident and hazard observations in the land transport company (case 3) with 
planned goals in the parentheses. The same indicators are presented for safety toolbox meetings that were started in 
2009. 
Year Near miss incidents and 
hazard observations, n 
Safety toolbox meetings, n 
2009 1287 (-) - (-) 
2010 1032 (1500) 682 (200) 
2011 1370 (2000) 833 (700) 
2012 2061 (2000) 1606 (-) 
2013 2743 (3500) 1674 (1800) 
 
Safety toolbox meetings started between 1999 (case 1) and 2009 (case 3). All the case 
companies belong to the (Finnish) Zero Accident Forum. However, there is a significant 
difference when comparing the companies of the HSEQ AP Cluster: more than 60% of 
purchasing companies, like cases 1 and 2, belong to the Forum while only slightly more than 
20% of supplying companies are members.  
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Cases 1 and 2 belong to the HSEQ AP Cluster. In the near future, they can still utilise the 
probable route of continuous improvement of safety management and culture. We believe that 
the accident situation and other HSEQ indicators will continue to improve, though not without 
continuing successful practices and introducing new ones. Supplying companies are partly in 
need of effective follow-up and actions, though they have developed quite rapidly according to 
scorings in HSEQ AP audits during past years. The need for more effective follow-up and 
actions is based on the following aspects: the higher accident frequency, the lower active 
gathering of observations of near miss incidents and hazards, the greater frequency of 
accidents as compared to observations (this is a significant difference when comparing with 
purchasing companies themselves). Much more frequently suppliers are not members in Zero 
Accident Forum. Case 3 is in many ways more comparable with supplying companies than 
purchasing companies (cases 1 and 2). Still, it is worth mentioning that, for example, Kurppa 
(2015) has noted that the case 1 company should pay more attention to  the quality of 
observations of near miss incidents and hazards coming from its supplying companies (the 
concern likely also applies to those gathered by the case company’s own staff). The significant 
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amount is obviously important, but the company should pay more attention to keep the quality 
high as well. 
 
The Bradley Curve makes it simple for everyone to understand the shifts in mind-set and 
actions that need to occur over time to develop a mature safety culture (DuPont, 2015). In 
particular, the Bradley Curve describes the reactive stage (stage 0) as the one in which people 
do not take responsibility. They believe that safety is more a matter of luck than management 
and that “accidents will happen.” In case 3, many people’s first approach is the first one 
illustrated in Figure 8, i.e. the dependent stage (stage 1), which people see safety as a matter of 
following rules that someone else makes (DuPont, 2015). Management and staff believe that 
safety could be managed “if only all would follow the rules.” The situation visualised by number 
two (Figure 8) is similar to the independent stage (stage 2), of the Bradley Curve (DuPont, 
2015). Many individuals prioritise this stage in case 3, taking responsibility for themselves. 
People believe that safety is personal, and that they can make a difference with their own 
actions. The highest step (number three in Figure 8), Bradley’s interdependent stage (stage 3),  
(DuPont, 2015), is not the first choice of many individuals in case 3. This “highest” stage can be 
characterised in the following way (DuPont, 2015):  
· Teams of employees and supervisors feel ownership for safety and take responsibility 
for themselves and others; 
· People do not accept low standards and risk-taking; 
· They actively converse with others to understand their point of view; and 
· They believe true improvement can be achieved only as a group, and that zero 
accidents is an attainable goal.  
Specifically concerning case 3, we see all the following stages: dependent, independent and 
interdependent. So, we conclude that more trust in the zero-accident goal offers a probable 
route towards more rapid safety management and culture improvements (Figure 8). One mean 
we recommend is increasing activities related to observations of near miss incidents and 
hazards and, on the other hand, safety toolbox meetings. Integrated management (HSEQ-style) 
might also comprise one remedy opening broader views of sustainability and possibilities for 
synergy in management activities.  
 
 
Figure 8 – Simplified visualisation of the Bradley Curve’s three stages of the total four ones (dependent stage (1), 
independent stage (2), and interdependent stage (3)). Black humans show people involved. 
 
In discussing the role of safety at DuPont sites, Mottel, Long, and Morrison (1995) described 
one approach:  
“Safety is a powerful leadership tool that enables us to achieve excellence in all we do. High 
productivity, high quality, high morale, and associated low absenteeism are all products of, and 
interrelated with, a strong Safety program. During the many years of our careers with DuPont, 
we learned that Safety is our culture […] not just a priority in all industrial operations.” 
At DuPont, they began their commitment to a zero-accident goal policy 100 years ago, in 1915 
(Mottel et al., 1995). This is “a strict rule” at DuPont, but it gives many wise messages to be 
considered in all work organisations. 
Last but not least, we recommend that all individuals and organisations try to manage and 
construct a culture that involves people such as employees and supervisors as much as 
possible. Doing so brings into use powerful driving forces of potential benefits due to people’s 
involvement in processes, motivation, competence and confidence (Wilson & Haines, 2000). 
Kath, Magley, and Marmet (2010) and Levitt and Samelson (1993) have likewise emphasised 
502
the role and power of confidence. The latter study offers many practical guides on how to tackle 
the lack of confidence, and how to utilise it in construction, whether on the part of workers, 
foremen, supervisors, managers, site managers or partners and their employees (e.g. 
contractors, sub-contractors). Levitt and Samelson (1993) strongly supported a wide base of 
information, communication and interaction, such as engaging in enough discussion with people 
in safety toolbox meetings instead of utilising only management by orders and rules given 
throughout chains of command. 
Activities related to management and culture need to create an environment that fosters non-
technical skills (NTS), too. Apart from natural specialist, technical and technological knowledge, 
employees, experts and managers also need a range of NTS to carry out tasks with success 
(e.g., Discussion Paper, 2010). These skills include the ability to take in information, focus, take 
decisions and communicate with others – all of which are necessary for progress in safety 
management and culture. Work conditions and systems are not only a daily question; for 
instance, Rajala and Väyrynen (2011) emphasised that this area with safety management and 
culture is an essential strategic issue. One operative conclusion is that our case analysis 
suggests consistently, though tentatively, that promotion of certain daily safety activities, 
especially those linked with bigger amounts of near misses, is an effective tool for accident 
prevention. So, emphasis based on van der Schaaf’s (1991) report on near misses was a right 
choice.   
We think we could find some aspects of daily activities and ways for improving to manage and 
behave in OS and HSEQ issues, ones that help to describe the model and level of safety 
management and culture in an organisation in question. The obvious links between activities 
and ways, first, and features of safety management and culture, second, should be further 
studied. 
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Abstract 
Introduction: Workers, as the main risk group exposed to nanomaterials, are the aspect less 
studied by scientists and there is very limited information about which preventive measures are 
being taken by workers exposed to these materials. Objetives: The main objective of this 
research is to examine the current preventive practices of the Spanish workers exposed to 
nanomaterials on the working environments devoted to research and development: universities, 
public research organizations and research and development centers. Methodology: a specific 
methodology has been established: a quantitative technique (questionnaire via email) 
complemented with a qualitative technique (panel of experts). Results and discussion: Answers 
from 425 workers exposed to nanomaterials were obtained and descriptively analyzed 
Conclusions: According to data analyzed, respondents expressed a general ignorance about 
the fundamental issues of safety and health at work related to the use of nanomaterials. At the 
same time, most respondents take good work practices, take into account the treatment of 
nanowaste, use some kind of personal protection equipment and have collective protection 
measures when they work with nanomaterials. 
 
Keywords: Collective protective and preventive equipment; personal protective equipment; safe 
working practices; emerging risk. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The exposure to nanomaterials has become one of the most important emerging risks at work 
(Agencia Europea para la Seguridad y la Salud en el Trabajo (AESST), 2009). Currently, 
knowledge about practices regarding prevention related to nanomaterials are limited. 
Furtherthere is no specific regulatory framework for nanomaterials, so although many of the 
current regulations can be applied to nanomaterials, they must to be adapted with the 
knowledge advances (Tanarro & Gálvez, 2009).  
It is interesting to find the answer to some questions: Are workers aware of the risks related to 
nanomaterials ?, or Are they protected from exposure to nanomaterials ?, and if so, in What way 
are they? Undoubtedly, all efforts engaged from the scientific and researchin this field will allow 
us to give criteria on how to benefit us from this new technology in a responsible way. 
The main objective of this research is to examine the current preventive practices of the 
Spanish workers exposed to nanomaterials on the working environments devoted to research 
and development: universities, public research organizations and research and development 
centers. For that, it is necessary to discover nanomaterials to which workers are exposed to and 
their characteristics. As well as the information and the prevention training received by workers 
to work with nanomaterials. It is also intended to identify the preventive and protective measures 
from the exposure to nanomaterials, the good work practices and the personal protective 
measures for working with nanomaterials. Also, the consultation and the participation of workers 
in the planning, organization and implications for their health and safety are analysed. A 
scientific literature review it is done to discover the main aspects related to nanoproducts and 
the health and safety of workers.  
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
To achieve the objectives, a research methodology consisting of two phases has been followed.  
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Figure 1 – Methodology. 
 
In the second phase the questionnaire is done asa quantitative technique .The survey is 
asministered by email. because it permit to obtain information from people in other places, in a 
short time, compared with other tools and without resources investment. Moreover, it is less 
vulnerable to the effects of recency and primacy, since in many questions response options, you 
can view all the answer choices before responding. However, among other shortcomings, it is 
vulnerable to having low response rate (Cea d'Ancona, 2004). Each of the stages and steps are 
explained in Figure 1 forms. 
 
2.1. Phase 1: The expert panel as a technique of qualitative investigation.  
The first phase consisted of two stages. In the first stage, a review has been done of already 
existing studies from renowned scientific sources. A draft questionnaire was outlined after the 
analysis of the first aspects that should be consulted. The explanatory and response variables, 
as well as its different categories have been the result of scientific literature; see Table 1, and 
documentation of prestigious Institutes of Occupational Safety and Health (Gibbs, Lamba, 
Stoxkmeier, & Kojola, 2012; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 2008; 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 2010; Ricaud & Witschger, 2012; 
Rosell & Pujol, 2008; Tanarro & Gálvez, 2009). In the second stage, a qualitative validation was 
performed on the draft questionnaire obtained in the first stage. Firstly, we proceeded to the 
selection of the participants of the expert panel. For such selection, it was taken into 
consideration the intellectual baggage on the studied matter, assessing its quality in function of 
parameters such as the years of experience, publications, prestige, professional position or 
academic ranking, as well as the situation and personal resources of the participants, which 
allows them to contribute and participate positively in the research (Landeta R., 1999). After 
contacting with diverse experts, finally nine participated, a sufficient number given that the areas 
of knowledge covered were considered being represented in the present investigation, in 
addition to a broad geographical dispersion between the components. Also if we take as 
reference the requirements for the expert panel, there is no existence of significant correlation 
between the number of expert panel and its own effectiveness (Boje & Murnighan, 1982; 
Brockhoff, 1975), being eight the required minimum (Rowe & Wright, 1999). The validation to 
the questionnaire consisted of a sent invitation via email to the experts participating in the 
process. The invitation was linked to an online questionnaire, in which they could make their 
contributions with respect to each question. The aspects of the questionnaire were rated in a 
global manner through a Linkert scale of 5 levels, such as structure, extension, clarity and 
concentration of the questions, also valuing the necessary time to complete the questionnaire 
and the level of the objectives achieved. As a result of the first phase, the definite questionnaire 
was obtained.  
 
2.2 Phase 2: The survey as a technique of qualitative investigation 
The second phase consisted of two stages. In the first stage we proceeded with the selection of 
the sample, obtaining a list of names of the individuals to be surveyed. A search through the 
major networks and technological platforms had been carried out to identify the major agents 
participatimg in Spain’s current nanotechnological scenario: Génesis Red, M4Nano, Materplat, 
NanoSpain, Red Nanolito, NanoBasque, Nanomed, Nanowerk, 3Neo, Bionanomed, 
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Nanoaracat, Ibernam, NanoICT, Train2, Ciber bbn, ETSF, Nanovalor and Red Nacional 
Nanomecánica. A detailed search was also performed through the web pages of university 
research centres, university departments and centres of public research, using “nano” as a key 
word of the search. In the second stage we proceeded by sending the online invitations. Three-
spaced remainder were sent in the period of three weeks in order to obtain a higher response 
rate. The results of the questionnaire discussed though sections 3.5 to 3.9 and conclusions in 
section 4 were presented in conclusion to phase 2.  
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results and discussion obtained in the research are presented below. 
 
3.1. Draft questionnaire 
Table 1 below shows a summary of research on preventive matters and safe working practices 
in relation to investigation and development, as well as the industrial scope. 
 
Table 1 – Findings from surveys and interviews in relation to potencial health and safety implications in 
nanotechnologies. 
Title and authors Summary/Main findings 
European Survey on 
Success Factors Barriers 
an Deeds for the 
Industrial Uptake of 
Nanomaterials in SMEs 
(European Commission, 
2005). 
380 nano SMEs and startups were found.  
In conclusion we find there is a lack of awareness in the potential 
risk in aspects in the nanomaterial branch. The results indicated 
that the enterprises surveyed didn’t consider public social 
acceptance and environmental and health regulations important 
barriers for the use of nanomaterials by SMEs.  
 
(European NanoBusiness 
Association, 2005) The 
European NanoBusiness 
Survey. 
142 European enterprises were surveyed (SMEs accounted for 
about 18 % of the surveyed businesses).  
The results indicated that the vast majority of respondents 
affirmed that health and environmental impacts needed to be 
studied and that public social acceptance and environmental and 
health regulations are important barriers for launching products 
involving nanotechnologies.  
Nanotechnology Startup 
Concerns, Information 
Needs, and Opportunities 
to Proactively Address En 
vironmental, Health, and 
Social Issues (Lekas, 
Lifset, & Rejeski, 2006). 
Nine presidents and chief executive officers of nanotech startup 
firms of Connecticut and New York were interviewed via phone 
and email. In the research we found that companies confirmed 
the need of specific information on safety precautions, toxicity, 
and anticipated regulations. The firms also demonstrated a wide 
range of efforts made to proactively try to assess and address 
EHS issues, as well as varying levels of concern about 
environmental, health, and safety issues associated with their 
operations 
A review of Current 
Practices in the 
Nanotechnology Industry 
(Gerritzen, Huang, 
Killpack, Murcheva, & 
Conu, 2006). 
The survey was conducted through telephone interviews, written, 
and web-based surveys with 64 participants from North America, 
Europe, Asia (mainly Japan) and Australia. The surveyed 
belonged mainly to medium size business sectors (with less than 
50 employees), as well as research and university laboratories. 
The questionnaire was designed specially for the study and 
inquire into current practices related to research, use and 
manufacture of nanomaterials in the following areas: 
environmental health and safety training, use of engineering 
controls, personal protective equipment (PPE) and clothing 
recommendations, exposure monitoring, waste disposal, product 
stewardship practices, and risk characterization. The survey 
results generally revealed that existing differences in EHS 
practices based on organizational characteristics such as 
geographical location, size, material handled and type of 
organization.  
 
A Survey of 
Environmental, Health 
and Safety Risk 
An online survey sent to 180 company managers from 
Massachusetts and New England, at the end they are proposed 
to complete the survey in more depth with a phone interview. 
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Management Informtion 
Needs and Practices 
among Nanotechnology 
Firms in the 
Massachusetts Region 
(Lindberg & Quinn, 2007). 
Only 43 responded the survey, 12 of them completing it with an 
interview. In this survey it was found that the main barrier for 
understanding and managing EHS risks associated with 
nanotechnologies is the lack of information, especially for small 
companies, who did not even recognize the presence of such 
risk. Most companies that found themselves at an R&D level 
applied more of the measures to manage nanotechnology EHS 
risks. Finally, it should be noted that most companies indicated 
having procedures against exposure control, but the EPIs used 
weren’t nanospecific, in fact most control and risk protection 
measures established weren’t the product of an initial evaluation 
of the risk.  
 
Use of nanoparticles in 
Swiss industry: A targeted 
survey (Schmid & 
Riediker, 2008). 
 
The main objective was evaluating the use, the protection 
measures, and number of potentially exposed workers to 
manufactured nanoparticles in the Swiss industry. For this, a 
telephone survey was performed on the representatives of 197 
Swiss companies, where 43 declared using and producing 
nanoparticles, from which 11 of these imported and 
commercialized with nanoproducts. It should be highlighted that 
senior management of small and big companies have a higher 
involvement, instead of medium companies, in the subject of 
work risk prevention in relation to nanoparticles. On the other 
hand, most protection and prevention measures used seem to be 
adapted to the risk perceived in function of the type of 
application. For example for solid and liquid applications, 
airborne protection wasn’t used.  
 
Health and safety 
practices in the 
nanomaterials workplace: 
Results from an 
international survey (Conti 
et al., 2008). 
An international survey performed on nanomaterial firms and 
laboratories with 162 responses. The questionnaire consisted of 
a telephone interview containing 60 structures semistructured, 
and open-ended questions. The issues dealt with were: 
environmental health and safety (EHS) programs, engineering 
controls, personal protective equipment (PPE), exposure 
monitoring, waste disposal, product stewardship, and risk beliefs. 
Overall, this study suggests that nanomaterials firms and 
laboratories are already attentive to nanospecific EHS and 
product stewardship issues.  
 
Precaution in practice: 
Perceptions, procedures, 
and performance in the 
nanotech industry 
(Helland, Kastenholz, & 
Siegrist, 2008). 
 
Survey performed on 40 German and Swiss companies that 
worked with nanomaterials. It was found that twenty-six of these 
companies indicated that they did not perform any risk 
assessment of their nanomaterials. 
 
Nano-products in the 
European Construction 
Industry (Broekhuizen & 
Broekhuizen, 2009). 
Survey at a European scale to find out the businessmen´s and 
workers´ awareness on the nanoproducts´ applications in 
construction, obtaining a total of 28 surveys and 214 interviews. 
One of the results to highlight is that for the majority of the 
nanoproducts mentioned in the survey, the prescribed protective 
measures were described as ‘no different from before’ when non-
nano products were used and that the work practice were 
indicated as not being influenced by their use. 
 
Reported nanosafety 
practices in research 
laboratories worldwide 
(Balas, Arruebo, Urrutia, 
A survey on 240 researchers at a global scale on nanosafety 
practices in university and public research laboratories. The 
questions covered: details of the materials and processing 
methods used, safety measures, waste disposal procedures, and 
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& Santamaria, 2010). 
 
knowledge of legislation for handling nanomaterials. The results 
of the survey indicate that environmental health and safety 
practice in many research laboratories worldwide is lacking in 
several important aspects. Besides the survey shows that most 
researchers do not use suitable personal and laboratory 
protection equipment when handling nanomaterials that could 
become airborne. 
Feasibility of an 
Epidemiological 
Surveillance System for 
Workers Occupationally 
Exposed to Engineered 
Nanomaterials (Boutou-
Kempf, 2010). 
 
In France there was an attempt on performing a survey to 
explore the prevention risks in companies and research 
laboratories that used nanomaterials. The survey did not get 
good results since there was low participation, and in addition to 
companies, known for their use with nanomaterial, denied their 
use.  
 
 
Governance implications 
of nanomaterials 
companies' inconsistent 
risk perceptions and 
safety practices 
(Engeman et al., 2012).  
 
A survey involving 65 workers in the industrial scope spread over 
14 different countries. In the investigation it was manifested that 
there were high levels of ignorance towards nanomaterials´ risks. 
It was also pointed out that the lack of information was the major 
obstacle for the development of preventive practices specific to 
nanomaterials.  
 
Repérage des salariés 
potentiellement exposés 
aux nanoparticules 
(Jacquet, 2012).  
 
In France 7 prevention services, 18 occupational doctors and 2 
human resources representatives were surveyed. The objective 
was to find workers exposed to nanomaterials and the situations 
that expose them, in order to find preventive measures to these 
exposures. The main conclusion was that the collective 
protective measures weren’t enough in comparison to the risks 
as well as the information and formation received.  
 
Current safety practices in 
nano-research 
laboratories in China 
(Zhang, Zhang, & Wang, 
2014).  
A survey that specifically examined in depth safety practices in 
the Chinese nano-laboratories. This study reports the results of a 
survey involving 300 professionals who work in research 
laboratories that handle nanomaterials in China. Results show 
that almost all nano-research laboratories surveyed had general 
safety regulations, whereas less than one third of respondents 
reported having nanospecific safety rules. General safety 
measures were in place in most surveyed nano-research 
laboratories, while nanospecific protective measures were 
implemented less frequently. 
 
 
After performing a bibliographical review, a draft questionnaire was outlined divided into 11 
sections: -General data, nanomaterials, Occupational Health, Regulations and Legislation, 
Information and Training, Protective Meaures, Collective Protection, Individual Protection, Good 
practices at work, assessments and hygienic measurements, Emergencies and Waste- 22 
questions being the required mimimun to be answerd out of 63. This collection of questions 
correspond to the inclusion of filter questions.  
 
3.2. Panel de expertos 
The draft of the survey was submitted to an experts panel in order to validate it in relation to its 
structure, length, clarity and precision of the questions, assessment of the time required to 
conduct the survey and level of achievement of the objectives proposed in the questionnaire. 
 
At this phase the following recommendations were obtained: change and revise aspects 
including legislation, to address the relationship between accidents and waste management, 
including prevention and protection measures and, finally, make some changes in the 
presentation context menus. In relation to the drafts aspects, its extentions and the time taken to 
reponded it were highlited by the experts as aspects to be corrected. Nevertheless, none 
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suggested that questions should be elimated, but extending it by adding new questions. In the 
order hand, the concretion and the achivement of the objectives were the aspect best rated (see 
Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2 – Assessment on the draft questionnaire by the expert panel.  
 
As a result of phase 1 the definite questionnaire was obtained. It was divided into 6 sections: 
General information, Health and Workplace Safety, Training and Information, Consultation and 
Participation, Technical Collective Control Measures, Best Practices in the Workplace and 
Individual Protection; with a total of 19 questions, none of the formulated as a filter. Finally an 
initial question was added in function of its workplace exposition with nanomaterials in order to 
discriminate the initially selected participants. 
 
3.3. Summary and management of respondents  
The authors of this investigation identified more than 3.000 workers involved in nanotechnology 
in Spain that developed their work in university and public research centres. This fact manifests 
a great activity of investigation and development in nanotechnology in Spain. Without the 
possibility of accessing all the emails of the identified workers, only 2.618 were invited to 
respond the online questionnaire. After a week after the first email, a second invitation was sent 
to those who didn’t respond. A week after this was repeated. At last, after three weeks of the 
first invitation, another invitation was sent to those who didn’t respond. Consequently, three 
emails were sent, the initial and tree remainders. As a result 578 completed surveys were 
completed, 495 of them indicated performing their work exposed directly or indirectly to 
nanomaterials, 83 of them participant perform in a theoretical manner, without direct exposure. 
Nevertheless, out the 495 completed surveys only 425 were validated. (Mainly due to 
coherence problems in some the answers, for example marking a response and “N/A” at the 
same time.)  
 
3.4. Description of the surveyed 
The geographic location of the surveyed is shown in Figure 3. Most of the Spanish territory is 
covered, being the communities of Madrid, Aragón, País Vasco, Andalucía, and Cataluña the 
most important centres of nanotechnological activities.  
Figure 3 – Demographic characteristics of the participants. 
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On Figure 4 it is shown the surveyed industrial sectors and fields in relation to their activity in 
nanomaterials. Most surveyed belonged to the health sector, followed by Microscopy and 
Instrumentation, Electronics and Energy. 
Figure 4 – Nanotechnology-related sector activity. 
 
In Table 2, the sample is described examining the chosen descriptive variables: type of 
materials, number of workers exposed in the workplace to nanomaterials, characteristics of the 
nanomaterials, amount of nanomaterials handle at once, and number of hours exposed to 
nanomaterials. 
 
1º The most nanomaterials used are gold (Au), Iron (Fe), grapheme and silver (Ag). 
2º Most of the workers involved with nanomaterials are exposed in reduced work environments 
(10-50 workers)  
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3º Almost all nanomaterial are more frequently in the suspended state, and are practically 
always handle in small quantities (less than 1 mg) and at once.  
4º Finally, the time of exposure is very small since most of the surveyed are exposed at most 30 
hours each month.  
 
3.5 Certainty about nanorisks 
In figure 5 it graphically shown the surveyed beliefs on the risk that occur when exposed to 
nanomaterials. It can been seen that:  
1º 48% ignore the existence of the risk associated with the toxicity of nanomaterials. 
2º It can be highlighted that 13% are still not informed on nanorisks, but are aware of the 
problems related to the toxicity of nanomaterials. It can be conceived that the information 
was obtain by their means, rather than in the workplace. 
3º 88% ignore the risk resulting from the explosion and burning of nanomaterials, even though 
31% say to have received information or training on nanorisks, and 29% indicated having 
consulted the planning, organization, and implications for health and Safety for the use of 
nanomaterials. This indicated that most of the information, training or consultation by the 
workers were focused on workplace heath, ignoring safety towards fires and explosions. At 
the same, only 8% contemplated the risk of exposure to nanomaterials in the risk evaluation 
performed. Therefore, as a result of the investigation, it is concluded that it is necessary to 
reinforce the training and information programs, as well as involving the workers on issues 
that affect them in occupational risk prevention associated with nanomaterials.  
4º The lack of specific regulation means there is no obligation to monitor the health of the 
worker. Consequently, it is not contemplated in the Royal Decree 1299/2006 of professional 
disease (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2006) nanomaterials as agents that could 
develop professional diseases. Nevertheless, the information in relation to the 
Nanotoxicology could be enough to justify the use of protocol in the health monitoring of 
workers (Schulte et al., 2008). In Spain there yet to be developed protocols on the heath 
monitoring of worker exposed to nanoparticles (Secretaría de Política Sindical de UGT de 
Catalunya - Salut laboral, 2011), in is noted that the CSIC in Madrid is developing and 
applying specific medical protocols on health monitoring (Centro Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas (CSIC), 2013). However, only 17% of the sample chosen in the research admitted 
having a specific test or medical examination after being exposed to the nanomaterials. 
Although it is a positive fact, the results were expected to be higher since most of the 
surveyed belong to the CSIC in Madrid.  
5º Finally, it highlights that only 5% of the surveyed have certainty of accidents related to the 
use of nanomaterials.  
Figure 5 – Certainty about nanorisks 
3.6 Good Practices  
A 98% performed sometime of good practice specific for working with nanomaterials. The most 
highlighted practices are related with personal hygiene: showers or chaginfs clothes in the 
workplace after the workday; avoiding touch the face or other parts of the body; avoiding 
exposure of hands and touching nanomaterials; avoiding consuming food or drinks in the 
workplace; and washing your hands after leaving the workplace. In Figure 6 the percentages of 
good practices indicated are shown. 
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Figure 6 – Good Practices for working with nanomaterials. 
 
3.7 Nanowastes  
Currently there isn’t any specific regulation on the treatment of nanowaste, although it is 
recommended that they be treated as hazardous waste (NEPHH’S CONSORTIUM, 2012).  
 Figure 7 – Treatment of nanowastes versus information and training received about it. 
 
Almost half of the surveyed, a 49%, treat them with this condition. However, it is considered to 
be an autonomous initiative of the workers, since 78% of them point out having no information 
or training on the treatment of nanowaste. Its highlighted that 25% indicated treating them a 
non-hazardous, while 16% point out not generating nanowaste in the workplace (see Figure 6). 
However, it is possible to assume that the type of treatment of nanowaste responds to an 
individual and personal initiative, not being the result of a training or information carried out by 
the company. Consequently, the results of the investigation consider being urgent reinforcing 
information and training programs, as well as involving more personnel on issues of 
Occupational Risk prevention in the use nanomaterials.  
 
3.8. Personal Protective Equipment 
The use of personal protective equipment when working with nanomaterials was general among 
the surveyed, only 6% didn´t use any type of protection. (see Figure 8). 36% of the surveyed 
stated using the most as hand protection: gloves made of nitrile, latex, neoprene and polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC). Followed by 28% using face and eye protection: universal frame glasses, full 
frame grasses, and face shield. 21% stated using respiratory protection: disposable mask with 
filter FPP3, partial facemask respirator with filter, full facemask respirator with filter, and full face 
mask with external air supplier. Finally, only a 9% used body protection: protective suit against 
chemical agents (TYVEK), overshoe / shoe covers / shoe lab, and hood or cap.  
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Figure 8 – Type and use of specific personnel protection for nanomaterials 
 
3.9. Nano-specific facility design and engineering controls 
In Figure 9 the frequencies of specific facility designs and engineering controls available to 
surveyed for working with nanomaterials. Stands out considerably that 235 of the surveyed 
indicated that the used ventilation by fume hood in the workplace, followed by 146 of them 
worked in process in wet and liquid mediums and 104 in glove box/glove bags. A very 
significant number of the surveyed (59) did not apply any type of specific facility design or 
engineering controls when working with nanomaterials. Finally, only 31 pointed out using 
ventilation by dilution and rooms with positive and negative differential pressure. In conclusion, 
although there is still uncertainty in risk prevention in the use of nanomaterials, preventive and 
protective measures applied follow a precautionary principle, sometimes not being enough.  
 
Figure 9 – Nano-specific facility design and engineering controls. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Numerous studies were identified dealing with preventive issue related with nanomaterials. 425 
were surveyed in the sample, being the major investigation performed in Spain specifically on 
occupational hazards in the presence of nanomaterials. The results obtained in the survey were 
validated by an experts panel and revealed the following issues:  
1º Most workers are not aware of risk associated with nanomaterials, in particular those of 
explosion and fire. 
2º The majority has not been trained or informed on these risks. They have not consulted about 
planning, organization, and implications to health and safety for the use of nanotechnology in 
the workplace, neither the inclusion in the risk evaluations of the exposure to nanomaterials. In 
conclusion, the respondents manifest a widespread ignorance about the fundamental issues of 
safety and health at work arising from the use of nanomaterials. It is considered to be necessary 
to reinforce the training and information programs, as well as involving the workers on issues 
that affect them in occupational risk prevention associated with nanomaterials.  
3º The vast majority of the surveyed performed good workplace practices. They treated 
nanowaste in an adequate manner, used some type of protective personal equipment, and 
collective protection equipment was available to them. Consequently, risk prevention and 
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protection measures take precedence to related preventive techniques addressing occupational 
risks in the use of nanomaterials.  
4º It should be highlighted the certainty of surveyed on nanomaterial related workplace 
accidents. Therefore, it is to necessary to study the issue and check if any accidents have been 
notified or investigated.  
5º Regarding the health surveillance of workers, it has been found that is still far from being 
incorporated as a general procedure. 
6º Due to the results obtained in the survey, it has been concluded that is necessary to continue 
investigating the issue. A deep analysis of the various fields must be done and expanded at 
industrial scale in Spain, in order to know in all stages of a construction the actions in prevention 
carried out when working with nanomaterials. 
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Abstract 
Several scholars have discussed and described two different regimes for regulating risk. 
Different terminologies have been used to describe these regimes, but Hopkins (2011) refers to 
these regimes as the “risk-management regime” and the “rule-compliance regime”. Although the 
use of risk management approaches for achieving protection against intentional crimes has 
increased in multiple sectors during the last decade, little attention has been paid to the 
consequences of the application of a risk management regulation regime in the context of 
building resilience against intentional crimes such as terrorism. This paper aims to describe and 
discuss challenges and advantages with applying a risk management regulation regime within 
the area of security, which is protection from terrorism or other intentional crimes, in contrast to 
safety witch implies protection from non-intentional acts. We discuss the characteristics of the 
area of security in contrast to safety, and we identify challenges organizations face when 
governing security risks in both regimes. The application of a risk management regime is 
discussed in light of dilemmas related to the current aviation security regime, the rebuilding of 
the Government complex in Oslo after the bombing on July 22 2011, and the implementation of 
security risk management in the Norwegian petroleum sector. We conclude that several aspects 
of security risks make the application of a risk-management regime challenging from an 
organizational perspective, both concerning the characteristics of security risks and for the risk 
analytical methodology currently available to organizations. Moreover, we conclude that the new 
role of organizations in security management is a novel trajectory that places a societal security 
responsibility on organizations, which they are not necessarily designed and equipped to 
address. 
Keywords: security, terrorism, risk management, resilience, regulation regimes 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the concept of resilience has been used on a societal level in reference to how 
societies can “bounce back” in the face of a disturbance. The image of an uncertain world, in 
which new types of risks and threats can become a reality in the future, has moved the focus 
away from security from one type of threat to society`s ability to tackle all kinds of possible 
scenarios that might unfold, including terrorism. Consequently, several governments and the 
United Nations have introduced the concept of resilience as a disaster preparedness strategy to 
enable countries to improve their ability to handle crises (Comfort, Boin, & Demchak, 2010). 
While security related to intentional acts, such as terrorism, used to be an area of secrecy 
where security services played the major part in prevention, the responsibility for creating 
resilience and managing the threat of terrorism have nowadays become an area where citizens, 
companies and different official bodies have a shared responsibility. This is reflected in the 
many official strategies against terrorism published in most Western countries in recent years 
(Aly, 2013).  
In order to enhance societal resilience in regard to terrorism, governments in most Western 
countries have highlighted risk analysis as a tool in organizational security risk management, 
especially after the terrorist attack in the US on September 11 2001 (9/11) (Office U. S. G. A., 
2005). This tendency to achieve societal resilience through organizational risk management is 
also present in Norway. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the focus on terrorism as a 
risk against Norwegian society has gradually increased (Jore, 2012). The bombing of the 
Norwegian Government complex and the shooting massacre on the island of Utøya on July 22 
2011 where a total of 77 people were killed, and the terrorist attack on the Algerian oil facility in 
In Amanas in January 2013 where 5 Norwegians employees in the Norwegian oil company 
Statoil were killed, have further increased the focus on protection from the threat of terrorism in 
Norway. After these two incidents, both evaluation reports concluded that there had not been 
sufficient focus on security from intentional acts, and that the attack could either have been 
avoided or the impacts could have been reduced if the companies or official bodies responsible 
had taken the necessary precautions (Gjørv, 2012; Statoil, 2013). In the aftermath of these 
events, new object security legislation based on a risk-management approach was passed in 
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January 2011 (Ministry of Defence, 2011), and in order to lay a foundation for better risk 
analysis of intentional acts, three new standards for protection against intentional acts were 
published (Standards Norway 2012; 2014a,b).  
Several scholars over the years have discussed and described two different regimes for 
regulating risk. Different terminologies have been used for describing these two regimes (Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Hale et al., 2002; 
Hutter & O'Mahony, 2004; Hutter & Power, 2005; Hutter & Jones, 2007; Coglianese & 
Mendelson, 2010). Hopkins (2011) refers to these regimes as the “risk-management regime” 
and the “rule-compliance regime”. The distinction and the balance between these two regimes 
have been extensively discussed, and most regulatory regimes today build on a mixture of the 
two. However, these discussions have mainly been related to the area of safety. The 
consequences of the two regulatory regimes have not been discussed in relation to security. In 
line with Piètre-Cambacédès & Chaudet (2010) we call protection from terrorism or other 
intentional crimes for security in contrast to safety which implies protection from non-intentional 
acts. Security risks have had a tendency to be governed through rule-compliance regimes. for 
example in the post 9\11 aviation security regime, but the introduction of new legislation and 
new risk management standards have required that security risks now are also governed 
through a risk management regime. This paper aims to describe the consequences of these two 
regimes in a security context, and to discuss some of the challenges of applying a risk-
management regime within the area of security. The application of a risk management regime is 
discussed in light of the finding of previous studies that the author has been participating in: the 
current aviation security regime in Norway (Jore and Njå, 2012), the rebuilding of the 
Government complex in Oslo after the bombing on July 22 2011 (Berntsen et al., 2014; Meyer, 
Jore, & Johansen, 2015), and the implementation of security risk management in the Norwegian 
petroleum sector (Jore & Egeli, 2015). We conclude that several aspects with security risk make 
the application of a risk-management regime challenging from an organizational perspective, 
both concerning the characteristics of security risk and because of the status of the risk analysis 
methodologies currently available to organizations. Moreover, we conclude that the new role of 
organizations in security management is a novel trajectory that places a national security 
responsibility on organizations, which they are not necessarily designed and equipped to 
address.  
 
2. SAFETY VS. SECURITY 
Several scholars have claimed that it is meaningful to distinguish between safety and security in 
order to separate fields of handling risks and crisis (Piètre-Cambacédès, & Chaudet 2010; 
Reniers, Cremer, & Buytaer, 2011).  Protection from terrorism or other intentional crimes is 
denoted security, while safety implies protection from unintentional acts. According to these 
scholars, the difference lies in whether the incident is inflicted intentionally or not; the 
characteristics of a safety risk bear the suggestion of being accidental and security is intentional 
or deliberate. This implies that, in the case of security, an aggressor is present who is influenced 
by the physical environment and by personal factors (Reniers, Cremer, & Buytaert 2011). This 
differentiation between safety and security are meaningful to many scholars and practitioners 
and are often used, for example in aviation, to describe two different approaches for handling 
risks.  
The distinction between the role and the intent of humans in safety and security are, however, 
not necessarily as rigid as perceived at first glance The literature on organizational safety has 
for a long time acknowledged that accidents are not something that just happens (Perrow, 
2011a, 2011b; Reason, 1990; 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011; Woods, Leveson, & Hollnagel, 
2012). The role of human intent and action is discussed by Reason (1997) who claims that 
organizational accidents depend critically upon two kinds of failure: the failure of actions to go 
as intended and the failure of intended actions to achieve their desired consequences. In 
addition, he adds a category of intentional actions named violations. For violations, the error lies 
in having an intent not to follow the rules. Reason defines violations that do not involve the goal 
of system damage as exceptional, routine or reckless violations. This means that in contrast to 
what the definitions of safety and security suggest, human intent plays a role in both safety and 
security. Even though deliberate violations play a part in both safety and security, the distinction 
lays in the malicious intent of the aggressor who actually calculates and plans for a crisis to 
happen. In Figure 2, a continuum of the different human errors is visualized. Whereas safety 
events are frequently associated with the human errors on the left of the figure below, security 
events are associated with the violations characterized by ill intent on the right (Lilleby & Egeli, 
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2014). This continuum between the different types of errors places safety and security risks in a 
total risk picture. 
 
Figure 1: Continuum of human erroneous actions (Lilleby & Egeli, 2014) 
 
In both safety and security incidents, there is a significant influence of human intent. Within 
safety research, it is acknowledged that humans intentionally take shortcuts, or do not follow 
procedures, which can eventually lead to accidents. While within security research, human 
intent is the main threat in itself. In both safety and security events, there is a violator. In security 
events, the threat actor has malicious intent. 
Nowadays, both safety and security issues are considered to be risks that organizations have to 
deal with. From an organizational perspective, these risks are fundamentally different in nature. 
Safety is closely associated with the risk that the organization chooses to run while security 
involves the threat to which the organization is exposed. In regards to safety, it is the 
organization itself, with its internal management and production that is identified as the source 
of both the problem and the solution. Safety is therefore conceptualized as a relatively technical 
and controllable problem. Conversely, security problems are not necessarily directly linked to 
the actions of the company and are therefore conceptualized as less controllable (Petersen, 
2011). Consequently, when organizations deal with security risks, they have to take into account 
that human malicious intent could by rooted both from someone inside and outside the 
organization, and these factors have to be considered during security assessments. Moreover, 
most organizations do not have the means to reduce the threat, and since the area of security is 
a new area in organizational risk management, the organizations do not necessarily have the 
means to reduce either the probability or the consequences of an attack. 
For an organization that is doing a security risk analysis, probabilities are hard to determine 
because of the low frequency of such events, which means that a probability will always be of 
minor character, and there is often a lack of relevant historical data on which to build risk 
assessments. Hence, the identification of threats and the development of measures in terms of 
security is a challenging task that is often qualitative. This, however, is not necessarily the case 
for all security-related risks organizations deal with. The area of security spans from vandalism 
to terrorism or security political crises. For many security related risks, such as more “ordinary 
crimes,” historical data does exist that could be relevant to organizational security risk 
management.  
To be safe and secure essentially means that nothing goes wrong and that technical systems, 
organizational systems and humans need to function optimally. All major organizational 
accidents, within both safety and security, have elements of technical, organizational and 
operational (human acts) nature. This means that both within the area of safety and security 
humans plays an important role in detection, mitigation and emergency management. For some 
safety and security scenarios, the consequences will be the same, for example a fire, and the 
same measures, for example a fire extinguisher, will reduce the consequences of both 
incidents. It is important, however, to keep in mind that criminals deliberately might search for 
the best manner to execute their plans and that their goal could be to cause as much damage 
as possible. Preventive safety measures may decrease security risks, but not always. An 
important exception is the availability of information. It is clear that safety measures such as risk 
maps and labeling of dangerous substances have a negative impact on security (Reniers, 
Cremer, & Buytaert, 2011). These means that organizations’ security concerns often are 
classified or not open to public scrutiny. To avoid these types of conflicting situations 
organizations should strive for having a holistic approach to safety and security. 
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3 THE RULE-COMPLIANCE REGIME  
Historically, rule-compliance was the dominant approach to regulating hazardous activities. 
Governmental regulation of HSE during the first part of the 20th century was dominated by a 
top-down command and control-based regulatory model characterized by prescriptive 
regulations, involving detailed, specific and often technical requirements. During this period, the 
authorities met new risks related to technological development by applying more prescriptive 
regulations. In most industries, such as nuclear, oil and gas, risk management was traditionally 
based on this prescriptive regulating regime in which detailed requirements for design and 
operations were specified (Lindøe, Kringen, & Braut, 2012). Although this regime is often 
referred to as a historical regime, which today is challenged by the risk-management regime, 
this regime is still present in many sectors. In the area of security, this regime is applied for 
example in the post-9/11 aviation security regime.  
 
3.1. Advantages with the rule–compliance regime 
In the rule-compliance regime, the authorities set out detailed regulations in order to steer the 
direction of companies, or others, in their security work. This regime will lead to a uniform 
implementation of security measures, meaning that each organization covered by a specific 
regulation will have the same level of security independently of an organization’s perception of 
available resources, threat picture and former experience with the threat of intentional crimes. In 
a security context, this means that organizations will implement the same level of security 
measures independently of whether an organization belongs to a sector that has historical 
experience with acts of intentional crimes or terrorism. The post 9/11 aviation security regime 
illustrates this. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, harmonization of airport security was the main goal 
of the European regulations. Consequently, all commercial airports in Europe had to follow the 
same security regime regardless of national or local threat assessments or previous 
experiences with acts of terrorism (Engen & Olsvik, 2010; Jore & Njå, 2012). The outcome of 
this regime was that small airports in rural parts of Norway were bound by the same regulations 
as giant airports in Europe. 
The rule-compliance regime might lead to an easier management process within an 
organization because the government agencies or supranational official bodies have set the 
rules for when and how to implement security measures. The organization itself does not have 
to invest time and resources in evaluations of whether there should be implemented security 
measures or not. In aviation, the airports simply follow the regulations dictated on the European 
level. There is no decision-making process on each airport for deciding whether airports should 
implement measures or not.  
The rule-compliance regime might simplify the job of the official bodies responsible for 
inspections since it is easier for official bodies to clarify whether a company has the expected 
level of security or not (Stålesen, 2011). The task of those who are doing inspections is to 
decide if the rules are to be followed or not, rather than deciding whether the security measures 
are effective and in line with the threat landscape.  
 
3.2. Challenges with the rule-compliance regime 
Despite these advantages with the rule–compliance regime, there are also some challenging 
aspects with this way of managing security risks. One challenging aspect with the rule-
compliance regime is that the rules are in focus, not necessarily how to achieve the optimal 
level of security. Organizations and inspectors operating in this security regime will be 
concerned with whether the rules are followed rather than how to achieve the optimal level of 
security from intentional crimes. In aviation, the prescriptive and detailed regulation regime 
offers no opportunity to locally assess and mitigate the risk of terrorism, unless there is an 
assessment leading to a strengthening of security beyond minimum requirements. Studies of 
the post-9/11 security regime in aviation have showed that the industry informants have been 
sceptical to the actual risk-reducing effects of the new security regime. They described several 
areas where the detailed and stringent regulations were problematic or burdensome or did not 
make any logical sense (Engen & Olsvik, 2010; Jore & Njå, 2012). Moreover, if risk 
management is built on general rules rather than specific threat and vulnerability assessments 
for each organization; many organizations will implement security measures on a higher level 
than necessary and by this leading to an unnecessary level of costs and inconveniences for the 
company and its employees. 
Another challenging aspect with this approach is that since the process of changing regulation 
takes time, this security regime does not facilitate quick changes in the regulations if the threat 
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landscape changes. The rule-compliance approach has a tendency to involve a reactive 
response from the regulated organizations, meaning that rules are often made because a 
terrorist attack or a terrorist plot have revealed vulnerabilities of the current security system. In 
aviation, numerous regulations have been added to the existing regulations because 
perpetrators have tried, or carried through, attacks against the system or because of revealed 
plots; the 2001 “shoe bomber” incident led to the shoe removal and screening policy, the liquid 
and gel ban policy was instituted after the 2006 plot to blow up planes bound for the United 
States with liquid explosives, and the 2009 Christmas Day bomber incident, where the 
perpetrators were carrying explosives in their undergarments, led to the deployment of 
advanced imaging technologies and pat-downs for all passengers. In all these cases, the 
changes in the regulations were a direct response to the attempt to commit an intentional crime 
(Jacobson, 2012). In fact, the whole new security regime in aviation was a direct response to 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Birkland, 2004; Engen & Olsvik, 2010; Salter, 2008).  
 
4. THE RISK-MANAGEMENT REGIME 
As mentioned earlier, the authorities traditionally met new challenges of technological 
development related to risks and accidents by applying more prescriptive regulations. However, 
as time goes by more detailed regulations have been passed. The amount of regulations 
gradually increased to the point where it was completely unwieldy (Hale, Hopkins, & Kirwan, 
2002; Lindøe, 2012). At the end of 1990`s a review of the law and management structure in 
HSE area in Norway displayed that there were over 60 laws and 1000 regulations governing this 
area (Lindøe, 2012). In the 1970`s, a new regulatory regime emerged, and the focus changed 
from detailed governmental control towards an internal control regime (Lindøe, 2012). In most 
industries, the rule-compliance regime was replaced with more goal-oriented regimes. Goal 
orientation and risk characterizations were two major components of this new regime that has 
been endorsed by international organizations and various industries (Aven & Renn, 2009).  
The risk-management regime builds on the assumption that organizations have the necessary 
competence for knowing what type of risks the organization might face in the future, and 
knowing the appropriate means for how these threats should be met. Consequently, the 
assumption is that organizations have the ability to describe what may happen in the future, to 
assess associated risks and uncertainties, and to choose among relevant alternatives (Aven, 
2003). The assumption is that risk assessments should function as decision support in a 
decision-making process in order to make ideal decisions about how to find the optimal level of 
security.  
 
4.1.Security is an organization`s responsibility 
In the area of security, the state has traditionally been responsible for protecting citizens from 
acts of terrorism and other intentional crimes. However, the introduction of the new Norwegian 
object security regulation passed in 2011 (Ministry of Defence, 2011), was based on what 
Hopkins (2011) refers to as a risk-management regime. This regulation gave the Ministries the 
responsibility of appointing critical objects within their jurisdiction. The object security regulation 
contains a risk-based approach to how to protect critical objects, and it is the owner of a critical 
object which is responsible for conducting a risk analysis of valuation of assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities that will lay the foundation for measures the organization should implement. 
Owners of critical objects are also responsible for the implementation of risk reducing measures 
and for bearing the associated costs. The implementation of the new object security regulation 
marked a shift in who bears the responsibility for protecting citizens from acts of terrorism and 
other intentional crimes. A regulation founded on a risk–management approach entails that the 
responsibility for societal resilience no longer is dictated from the state but is delegated to the 
organizations. This implies a change in the role of the state regarding security related issues. In 
a rule-compliance regime, the state is a protector of law and the primary task is, by the use of 
legitimate authority, to force organizations to fulfil their obligation of following laws and 
regulations within legal binding norms. Anyone violating laws can be sanctioned and punished. 
In the risk-management regime, the role of the state is not to enforce companies to follow 
certain rules, but to arrange for and assist organizations in finding the optimal level of security. 
This means that the official bodies responsible for inspection working in this regulation regime 
have a different role than the inspectors working in the rule-compliance regime. The role of the 
official bodies doing inspections in the risk-management regime is to check if the organizations 
have carried through risk assessments and implemented measures in accordance with the risk 
assessments. The role of the inspector has, thus, changed from a punisher to an adviser.  
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4.2 Flexible and in line with the current threat landscape 
In the risk-management regime the knowledge that an organization has regarding its assets, 
values, vulnerabilities, and associated threats is in focus. This means that the organizations 
have more flexibility in how to arrange its security regime and can direct the security system 
against the threats that are considered to be most critical to the organization. Consequently, the 
organization can protect the assets assessed to be most valuable, and organizations can 
change and adapt security measures if the threat landscape changes. Despite these 
advantages, there are also some challenging aspects with the risk-management regime. 
 
4.2.1 The risk-management regime is no practical guide 
The role of human intent is often highlighted as problematic when conducting security risk 
analysis. For more than half a century, risk analysis has been an important tool in describing 
and managing safety risks. The use and development of risk analysis has been seen in both 
practical and academic fields. Within the area of security risks, on the contrary, the application 
of risk analysis has not traditionally been the subject of the same academic discussions.  During 
the Cold War, the management of security risks was the responsibility of the police and the 
defence, which implied that security risk analysis was not subject to public or academic scrutiny 
and consideration. The application of risk analysis to protect society and organizations from 
intentional crimes, such as terrorism, has been the subject of extensive debate both in 
academia and practice in the aftermath of this event. Scholars and practitioners have discussed 
whether security risk can be expressed by traditional risk analytical tools, or whether it is 
necessary to develop new analytical tools capable of capturing the specific characteristics of 
such threats and challenges related to protecting from malicious acts. These issues have also 
been addressed in the Norwegian petroleum sector (Jore & Egeli, 2015). The three Norwegian 
standards for protection against intentional acts (Standards Norway 2012; 2014a, 2014b) define 
security risk as a combination of valuation of assets, threats and vulnerability (Standards 
Norway 2012). Thus, probabilities are left out of the risk analysis, and this is a contested topic 
within specialists in the petroleum sector. Specialists working with risk management in general 
and specialists working exclusively in the area of security have different opinions on the use of 
probabilities in security risk management. On the one hand, those working with risk 
management in general claim that probabilities can be used as long as they are expressed as 
subjective and knowledge-based probabilities. Informants working solely in security, on the 
other hand, reject the use of probabilities in security risk management. They argue that safety 
and security are fundamentally different areas and, consequently, need different risk 
management methodologies. There seems to be a tendency that the informants lack the 
expertise for the opposite discipline. Some specialists within the security field only associate the 
term probability with mathematical calculations and statistics. They tend to believe that 
probabilities are only understood in the positivist perspective to risk and use a frequentist 
approach to probabilities. They do not seem to be aware of the more updated constructivist 
perspective to risk where probabilities are seen as subjective and knowledge-based (e.g., Aven 
2013; 2014). Since they associate probabilities with a classical positivist perspective to risk, they 
reject the use of probabilities because there will be a lack of data to base a risk assessment on. 
This means that today, the risk analysis used in safety and security are not harmonized, and 
that the new security standards are problematic for achieving a holistic approach to safety and 
security within an organization. Consequently, the organizations lack the necessary tools to 
conduct risk analysis. 
 
4.2.2 No benchmarking for when to implement security measures 
A risk-management approach is no practical guide; it does not give any clear guidance for what 
is an appropriate level of security or any benchmarking guides for when a company has 
achieved the “right” level of security. For a company standing in a concrete decision context, the 
risk level falls somewhere on a continuum from extreme to insignificant; if the threat is extreme, 
the company needs to eradicate the threat with every possible means. If the threat is 
insignificant, the organization can invest the money and resources on other things. However, for 
most organizations that conduct a security risk analysis the risk assessment will fall somewhere 
in between the risk continuum, and the organization will have to decide whether the risk is so 
severe that there is a need for implementing security measures or not. Regulations based on a 
risk-management regime do not give any clear guidance in the decision-making context. In each 
case, the risk has to be judged as falling on one or the other side of a line: on one side, a 
certain action is required; on the other, it is not. In other words, the risk continuum must be 
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converted into a dichotomy for the purposes of decision-making. Thus, the risk-management 
approach does not in general provide much guidance to those faced with these decisions. It 
does not offer a way of deciding whether the risk is acceptable or not (Hopkins, 2011). In the 
area of security, this gets even more complicated; since most assessments and decisions 
regarding security measures are classified, an organization will in a concrete decision-making 
context often lack information about how other organizations have arranged their security 
system. This could also be a challenge for the directorates responsible for inspection. According 
to the object security regulation, it is the directorate in each sector that is responsible for the 
inspections within its jurisdiction. Most of these directorates do not have security as their main 
activity, and will probably lack the experience and the competence on how to deal with security 
threats.  In the rebuilding of the government complex in Norway after the bombing on July 22 
2011, the mandate of the commissions that where appointed was to protect the complex against 
a broad range of risks. The concept study mentioned intentional acts, such as crime, 
intelligence gathering, terrorism and sabotage, and other unwanted incidents, such as fire, 
water damage, and loss of electrical power. Elements in the government complex are classified 
as critical objects in accordance with the new security law and the object security regulation. 
The commission who was appointed found it difficult to interpret the risk-management regulation 
regime, so seven absolute security requirements were formulated (Metier, OPAK, LPO 
arkitekter, 2013). This example illuminates that a risk management regime might be challenging 
for an organization to deal with because no clear answers are given about when the right level 
of security is achieved. 
 
4.2.3 Organizations can be tempted to lower the risk assessments to save money 
The purpose of risk management is to ensure that adequate measures are taken to protect 
people, the environment, and assets from harmful consequences of human activities. The 
extent to which risk reducing measures are justified depends on the balance between costs and 
benefits in terms of safety and security gains (Aven & Renn, 2009). Organizations have become 
politically important to counterterrorism efforts, but the economic logic guiding the risk thinking 
of private companies is hardly compatible with the aim of providing national security. The 
separation of politics and the market was regarded a liberal construction intended to serve the 
‘good life’ and peace, and to avoid a repressive state where security could be considered the 
main and overriding priority in all social affairs. Whereas companies previously understood 
security as a rather narrow, technical function – primarily constituting an additional cost to 
businesses – the contemporary view leans towards seeing national security as an integrated 
part of the overall business strategy (Petersen, 2008).  Private companies take many risks 
associated with safety by making investments and doing business, and therefore risks are 
positively related to making a return. Security, on the other hand, has not historically been 
associated with economic prosperity, but with prevention and necessity (Petersen, 2008). 
Hence, corporate security is not, to the same extent as safety risks, easily reconciled with profit 
maximization. The dilemma between national security and business is even bigger, as we are 
not only talking about the costs of protecting the company, but also the costs of helping to 
protect the country. Handling security risks is not most organizations main activity, and most 
organizations will probably have other risk related areas that are assessed to have higher 
probabilities of occurring, such as non-intentional accidents. According to the Norwegian object 
security regulation, organizations themselves have to pay for security measures. The 
consequence of this could be that many companies can be tempted to lower the risk level to 
save investments in a security system. Thus, trust is a fundamental character of the risk-based 
regime. Such a regime is based upon a belief about the regulated wanting and pursuing the 
best solutions available.  
 
4.2.4. In the risk management regime security becomes an ongoing process 
A risk management regime is challenging for organizations because it requires that many efforts 
are put into the risk management process. This approach moves the focus from governmental 
inspections checking compliance with existing rules, towards inspiring the industry to develop 
their own systems of internal control and management. In this regime, the organizations are 
forced to evaluate and report upon their own self-regulatory strategies in order to enable the 
regulatory authority to judge if the objectives of the regulations are met. Thus, the risk 
management process becomes central. In other words, security in this perspective is not just a 
checklist that can be completed, but an ongoing process where the organizations have to 
continue to monitor that the security system is in accordance with the threat assessments. 
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However, many companies may not fully understand the threat situation or what measures 
could be implemented. Today, many Norwegian companies operate on an international or 
global basis. This means that organizations need to be updated on the local security situation 
and the threat assessments need to be updated. Still, even for organizations operating solely on 
the national level in Norway, most organizations will not have the necessary competence and 
means to conduct meaningful threat assessments. Consequently, the organizations will have to 
rely on risk assessments done by the authorities or other companies that sell risk assessments. 
 
4.2.5. Organization lacks knowledge of the effect of counterterrorism measures 
The objective of risk-based security management is to identify risks before they materialize in 
the form of an intentional crime. Once risks have been identified, preventive measures can be 
taken to eliminate the risks or to reduce the probability of the occurrence of such events. 
Although this is an attractive idea, little is known about how well security measures actually 
work. In research, minor attention has been paid to the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
measures. Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) discovered an almost complete absence of 
research that evaluated counterterrorism measures. From the evaluations they found, it 
appeared that some interventions either did not achieve the outcomes sought or sometimes 
increased the likelihood of a terrorist attack. LePorte and Frederickson (2002) have 
demonstrated that it is almost impossible to measure the efficiency of counterterrorism 
measures because it is impossible to know if the absence of terrorist attacks means that the 
security measures are effective or whether there never existed a terrorist threat in the first place. 
This means that organizations will lack knowledge regarding the risk reducing-effect of counter 
measures, and also the means for evaluation of whether the measures are effective or not. 
 
5. THE TWO REGIMES ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE  
In this paper we have presented the risk-management regulation regime as a contrast to the 
rule-compliance regime. However, Hopkins (2011) claims that these are not mutually exclusive 
approaches; they are complimentary.  This is also the case for the area of security in Norway. 
Organizations who work under the rule-compliance regime also work under a regime that 
acknowledges that security risks can be assessed and managed. In order to determine the 
appropriate rules, a risk-assessment is most likely behind that decision. This risk-assessment is 
just removed one step from the end point decision-maker. In the case of airport security, the 
risk-assessments are done by the European Aviation authorities, and not by national or local 
assessors. Furthermore, behind the introduction of a risk-management security regime lays 
another rule, this time a legislative requirement that risk-assessments should be conducted. 
Behind the risk-management regime introduced in Norway lies the Security Act that demanded 
that owners of critical objects need to carry through the risk-management regime. Moreover, the 
security risk analysis standards that have been developed and are in progress can be seen as a 
guide for helping companies to interpret and deal with risk-management regulation –because 
organizations still need rules to guide them in their security work. From this point of view, risk-
management and rule-compliance are intertwined and complementary strategies. 
 
6. CHALLENGERS OF BUILDING SOCIETAL RESILIECE THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL 
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
This paper has described the consequences of the rule-compliance and the risk-management 
regime in a security context, and discussed some challenges of applying a risk-management 
regime within the area of security. We conclude that several aspects of security risks make the 
application of a risk-management regime challenging from an organizational perspective, both 
concerning the characteristics of security risks and the risk analysis methodologies currently 
available to organizations. Moreover, we conclude that the new role of organizations in security 
management is a novel trajectory that places a societal security responsibility on organizations, 
which they are not necessarily designed and equipped to address.  
In today’s fight against terrorism, national security concerns cannot be reduced to external 
threats and handled by diplomatic or military means alone. Counterterrorism are based on the 
active involvement of civil society, including private companies. The central role of private 
companies in contemporary security policies can be seen in the increased political focus on the 
security of airports, airlines, ports and food production in both American and European 
counterterrorism policies (Petersen, 2008). However, current counter-terrorism strategies put 
the responsibility for counter-terrorism on so many different actors in society that it is difficult to 
appoint who actually is responsible for particular actions.  
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Organizations have become politically important to counter-terrorism efforts, but the economic 
logic guiding risk prevention in private companies is hardly compatible with the aim of providing 
national security. For most organizations, security is a minor activity, and there is a knowledge-
gap concerning what effective measures are and what an ideal level of security should be. 
Additionally, current security risk analysis tools are not compatible with safety risk analysis tools, 
and this hampers a holistic approach to security in an organization. There is still lack of 
understanding on how private business conceptualizes this role on national resilience and an 
understanding of the judgements involved in the private companies’ selection and classification 
of these dangers. This is a topic future research should address. 
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Abstract 
The field of Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) has not traditionally been associated with 
technological advances.  Based on National, European and International legislation, norms, 
guidance and good practice, OSH is usually conceived as regulating workplace conditions, 
including facilities and equipment as well as human behaviour, more often than not, by setting 
minimum acceptable standards for both workplaces and employers / employed persons. 
 
The enormous advances in Information Communication Technology (ICT) are now having a 
profound effect on all aspects of OSH, effectively transforming the reach and scope of OSH, in a 
similar way as ICT is changing other sectors. 
In the broadest sense, ICT is transforming OSH by helping raise awareness and inform 
employers / employees and the public at large via the World Wide Web – websites, emails, 
bulletin boards, online databases (usually accessible by subscription). More recently, through 
Web 2.0 technologies, such as interactive apps and social media (facebook, tweeter, youtube) 
OSH has been truly brought into the mainstream, immediately accessible to millions of 
employers / employees as well as other involved parties (competent authorities, social partners, 
etc.). The application of ICT to OSH can be further subdivided into open-access and purpose 
built limited-access ICT systems. As a general rule, closed ICT OSH systems refer to competent 
OSH authority tools, subscription only OSH databases, university and research centres 
collecting and processing OSH data.  Open ICT systems on OSH comprise websites, free apps, 
open databases on OSH topics and, by their nature, online social media. 
 
As with other fields of economic activity, standardization of OSH data collection remains an 
issue, especially when attempting to draw meaningful inferences from statistical OSH data 
being collected. Within the European Union, standardization on OSH data being collected by 
the member states’ competent authorities falls under the framework directive  89/391/EEC and, 
specifically, the 2007/30/EC (20 June 2007) amendment which obliges member states to 
prepare and submit practical implementation reports on a  five year basis.  Member states OSH 
competent authorities, not only need to adopt ICT systems to implement the above directive 
requirements on OSH, but also need to collect a plethora of other OSH (and in some cases non 
OSH) data, interface with other ICT systems in the public sector, such as social insurance data 
and company registers at the same time, be transparent, so that citizens are kept informed of 
OSH legislation requirements, such as risk assessments, of occupational accidents and 
diseases and relevant statistics, while at the same time, respecting personal data protection 
measures. 
 
Some competent authorities are utilizing tablets and wireless networks to relay OSH data 
collection to their servers for safe keeping and further processing. In general, web based 
solutions are gaining ground, compared to legacy systems, in the quest of competent authorities 
for efficiency, accuracy and data sharing.   
 
An example of an ICT OSH tool, which is both open source and freely available to interested 
employers, is the Online interactive Risk Assessment tool, popularly known as OiRA.  The 
platform for this tool was developed by the European Agency for Safely and Health at Work (EU 
OSHA) and is being customized by various member states’ competent authorities for a selected 
number of sectors of economic activity.  It is an excellent example of win-win use of ICT in OSH 
benefitting both the regulator (state labour inspectorates) and the employer (implementing a 
meaningful risk assessment to safeguard OSH levels in the enterprise) in a quick and interactive 
way. 
 
Concluding the above research, the need for further development of ICT tools such as OiRA, of 
mutual benefit to all concerned parties is clearly evident. Online apps which can 
comprehensively combine the national regulators’ requirements with the real OSH needs of 
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businesses, delivered in an easy to adopt format, while utilizing the latest online social media 
capabilities, will truly transform the OSH field. 
 
Keywords: Occupational Safety and Health (OSH); Technology (ICT), web tools, OiRA, social 
media. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of ICT is by its very nature, a work in progress and in constant evolution.  
Such is the nature and pace of technological development that the traditional field of OSH, 
especially the work carried out by competent authorities such as National OSH Inspectorates, 
will inevitably go through a complete transformation when ICT is applied to it. 
This paper examines the impact of ICT on both internal structures of OSH authorities and on 
those which competent authorities strive to protect – persons at work whose safety and health 
must be safeguarded at all times. 
 
The internet revolution has enabled competent authorities to develop websites to help inform 
employers and employees on a wide range of OSH topics, additional dynamic web content has 
enabled two-way interaction and the explosion of social media has generated increased 
communication with stakeholders and awareness-raising on OSH issues. 
At the same time, competent authorities have taken steps to modernize and streamline their 
internal functioning with the gradual introduction of ICT, first with desktop publishing software, 
followed by the upgrade of legacy systems to the latest internet-enabled applications to 
seamlessly automate data collected during OSH inspections and related activities, computer 
databases build-up, subsequent data analysis and strategic decision making utilising ICT. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
Relevant research was carried into current ICT adoption, usage  and with regard to tools being 
utilised in the OSH field today – a combination of legislation, norms, procedures and good 
practice, guidance (traditional and interactive)  which employers must follow to safeguard their 
employees safety and health.  The latter included a look into OSH statistics collected by EU 
member states competent authorities, on occupational accidents and workers’ health. This data 
is published on the European Statistical Service (Eurostat). With a focus on EU member states, 
where the relevant competent authorities such as Labour Inspectorates must adhere to 
Community mandated legislation on OSH, it was found that there is very little uniformity in the 
use of ICT by the authorities.  This applies to both internal use of ICT by the Labour 
Inspectorates and to the adoption of technology to benefit external stakeholders of OSH 
authorities – employers, employees and the public at large. 
 
The information collected was categorized into two broad categories – internal ICT usage by 
Labour Inspectorates for the conduct of their OSH related work and, external ICT usage which 
directly impacted stakeholders such as employers, employees and the public at large.  A closer 
look at EU member states OSH authorities’ websites indicated the ways and means of OSH 
information dissemination to the stakeholders were assessed.  
 
2.1. Materials and Methods  
Utilization of internet resources, the European Commission’s Senior Labour Inspectors 
Committee (commonly known  as SLIC) website information, as well as EU collaboration tools 
(such as CIRCABC - Communication and Information Resource Centre for Administrations, 
Businesses and Citizens) constituted  the primary research methods and materials used for the 
present paper.  At the same time, literature and products developed by Agencies such as EU 
OSHA and US OSHA (the United States of America’s Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration) where ICT is utilised, were looked into.  Finally, the websites of Labour 
Inspectorates (mostly those of EU member states’ OSH authorities) were examined so as to 
assess the various ways ICT was promoted.  Agencies’ websites such as EU OSHA and third 
party tools / subscription only databases on OSH were also scrutinized for content delivery. 
 
2.2. Subtitles 
N/A 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The first part of the research dealing with internal ICT usage by OSH Authorities utilised 
information collected primarily from EU SLIC CIRCABC collaboration website for EU member 
states and data listed by the Authorities themselves. Whilst all EU member states must enforce 
the same OSH Directives, the way they actually do this differs from state to state according to 
national legislation, OSH priorities, degree of ICT adoption, and collaboration with other national 
bodies on ICT and OSH enforcement methodologies. So it follows, differing ICT models are 
used by each OSH Authority.  
 
Some member states utilise software which draws on the national OSH historical data collected, 
usually in legacy systems, in order to help select those work activity sectors where greater 
inspection / investigation / training efforts on OSH is necessary.  Such collected data is made up 
of workplace accidents and occupational disease statistics, risk level of the sector as well as 
complaints expressed by employees regarding OSH.  A major concern has been to make the 
legacy system data readily accessible and meaningful to the OSH authority at each level 
(inspectors, managers, strategic decision makers). Other authorities have invested in new web 
and mobile technologies to better plan their inspectors’ OSH activities and focus on providing 
the inspector with ‘real-time’ OSH data regarding the targeted enterprises / work activity sectors. 
This has succeeded in saving time and effort and leads to better follow-ups by the inspectors on 
the state of OSH compliance in each work activity sector.  A major challenge faced by most 
OSH Authorities is achieving meaningful and correct data interconnections with other state 
authorities existing technologies to avoid data duplication and receive a more complete view of 
each sector / workplace under inspection, thus achieving continuous OSH compliance of 
employers with reduced cost. Other OSH Authorities are developing internal ICT systems with a 
focus on real-time online collaboration among inspectors, managers and top decision makers 
with access to constantly updated OSH data of employers / enterprises / reports, so that each 
hierarchical level can effect measures/actions which need to be taken. The monetary cost 
involved in building new ICT systems from scratch is substantial, but when the requirements are 
clearly stated and data interconnections within and among the various authorities involved are 
meaningful, the result is well worth the time and cost invested. 
 
The external ICT usage by OSH Authorities was, in general terms, more uniform and 
streamlined than internal ICT usage.  Social media such as facebook, twitter, instagram were 
selected for official use in a minority of the EU member states OSH Authorities (only 11 
Authorities, 39%). Of those OSH authorities which did use social media, the preferred media 
were facebook and youtube, with a few using more than one of the social media.  Those 
Authorities who adopted social media expressed mostly positive views on the media’s impact 
upon employers, employees, social partners such as trade unions, journalists, politicians, 
researchers and the public at large regarding OSH attitudes.  They also stated the need for 
prompt updates and replies to keep social media users interested.  The majority of member 
states OSH authorities which did not adopt social media stated that various reasons influenced 
their decision – such as legal limitations, overall government policy, non-familiarisation with 
such technologies. 
 
However social media is only one of the ways in which ICT is used by each OSH Authorities to 
promote OSH to external stakeholders - static or dynamic information dissemination on OSH is 
part of each and every OSH Authority’s website. This may be in the form of plain electronic 
publications, legislative and explanatory texts, guidances in plain language, sample Risk 
Assessments (usually containing checklists for various types of work activities), illustrations, 
posters as well as interactive tools and even online OSH related games.  
 
One of the most publicised and promoted interactive OSH tool is the EU OSHA’s OiRA – Online 
interactive Risk Assessment tool.  This is a free open-source ICT tool to help employers and 
especially micro-enterprise employers to deal with safety and health issues in their workplaces 
and comply with relevant national legislation in an easy manner. By providing the technology 
platform, EU OSHA has enabled many member states OSH Authorities and / or sectoral Social 
Partners (employers' and employees' organisations) to tailor the tool for use by employers of 
various sectors such as cleaning, road transport, catering, office work, and others.  The platform 
is flexible enough to allow customization according to member states’ national OSH legislation 
and supports multiple languages. OiRA saves time for all stakeholders since OSH legislation 
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compliance of micro-enterprises becomes a straight forward do-it-yourself task for employers,  
OSH authorities are, thus, better positioned to focus their resources on those sectors where the 
OSH statistics are such that extra attention is needed, e.g. increased workplace accidents in 
specific sectors. EU OSHA provides the OSH authorities and social partners with ongoing 
technical support and community support. More sectoral OiRA tools are planned by the various 
member states OSH Authorities and/or the social partners in the near future. 
 
Another ICT tool increasingly adopted by OSH authorities is Applications (apps) for mobile 
phones. An excellent example of this is US OSHA’s Heat Safety Tool which enables supervisors 
and employees to find the heat index for their worksite during hot weather outdoor work and, 
based on this, determine the risk level for them, thus enabling them to take measures to protect 
their safety and health in real time.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in the Abstract, ICT has irrevocably entered the field of OSH in various forms and is 
already bringing about a transformation in the field.  Every stakeholder in the field of OSH will 
experience, to a certain extent, the impact of ICT in the work he or she carries out on a daily 
basis. A (state) OSH inspector will now have new tools at his disposal to effectively carry out 
inspection duties and bring about compliance with OSH legislation in a more timely and 
streamlined manner, thus preventing workplace accidents and ill health. An employer will have 
at his disposal many ways to easily and quickly identify risks to life and limb and take measures 
to comply with OSH legislation, all due to ICT transformation. Likewise, a worker will be better 
informed and ready to carry out his work duties, due to the OSH interactive training he has 
already received, and the prepared risk assessment steps guiding him to work as safety as 
possible – all thanks to ICT.  The benefits to social partners and the public at large will be the 
increased OSH awareness provided by various social media helping to develop an OSH culture 
in our society. 
 
On a more practical note, the way forward to encourage ICT adoption by OSH authorities and 
their stakeholders (both internally and externally) is the collaboration of all in developing online 
tools such as OiRA which can be quickly customized to suit member states attributes  / legal 
provisions / languages / work sectors / business types / other particularities and their successful 
promotion (e.g. via social media) and subsequent use by the employers they aim to target.  
 
Similarly, an EU Working Group could be established to help develop an EU wide electronic 
platform, preferably with the use of open-source software, to enable member states’ OSH 
authorities to internally collect, assess and put to good use the data necessary to carry out their 
OSH duties under law.  The EU OSH Framework Directive and its aforementioned amendment 
obliging all member states competent authorities to prepare and submit practical implementation 
reports can serve as the starting point for such a common e-platform, at the same time affording 
each OSH authority enough flexibility to customize the platform to its national needs. 
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Abstract  
Introduction: Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) in building construction remains a 
worldwide problem considering workplace injury, illness and fatality statistics. Construction 
Safety requires care and planning throughout the project life-cycle, from design to maintenance. 
Initial approaches for improving OHS consider the Safety aspects in the design phase and the 
development of manual Safety processes in the execution phase. 
The application of Building Information Modeling (BIM) is currently increasing rapidly in 
construction operations planning and management and also in Safety Management. It is 
expected to change the way that Safety is addressed thanks to the use of this new tool, as seen 
in the literature review, based on the large number of contributions in recent years.  
Objective: This study reviews the existing literature about BIM and Construction Safety to 
explore useful findings and the knowledge gaps for a future researc. 
Methodology: A systematic review has been done though the databases, ISI Web of Science 
(WOS) and Scopus. 
Results and discussion: Recent advancements of BIM technologies are providing decent 
starting points for the development of solutions for pro-active site Safety planning and 
Management. This means that the user is not just a passive observer of potential problems but 
has all necessary functions available as efficient solutions enablers for improving the working 
conditions. Compared with the earlier research it considers that the selected research approach 
having collaborative safety planning and safety awareness building as starting points can result 
in novel contributions by combining safety management functions with appropriate BIM 
solutions. 
Conclusions: BIM capabilities and versatility will allow current Safety practice in Construction 
improvement, as well as an easier Safety Management implementation on site as well as 
workers and consultants training.BIM development and it use in this area will therefore 
contribute to reduce accidents.  
 
Keywords: Building Information Model, Construction, Safety, Management, Schedule 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When comparing workplace accidents in the EU in the 2008-2015 period, it is in the 
construction sector where we find the highest number of mortal accidents (Eurostat, 2015). The 
factors that have contributed to this statistic are different  (Haslam et al., 2003; Gibb, Haslam, 
Gyi, Hide & Duff, 2006) and result in many safety hazards manifesting themselves at any given 
stage during the construction process (Gibb et al., 2006; Qi, Issa, Olbina & Hinze, 2014). 
In recent years, different technologies and execution methods are developed to provide new 
opportunities to enhance Safety Management throughout the whole project life cycle, which 
enhance Management-driven Safety, rather than replace (Teizer, Allread, Fullerton & Hinze, 
2010). For example, they serve as support to timely identify human errors and deal with them in 
order to prevent construction accidents, predicting, planning, and controlling the schedule. 
Since 1991, different studies highlight the possibility of doing so linking the CAD and planning 
process (Cherneff, Logcher & Sriram, 1991) as a mockup alternative, and looks to the 
opportunities that are available in the near term data (Tatum, Byrum & Rourke, 1994). 
The most flourishing technology in the Construction sector is Building Information Modelling 
(BIM). BIM is a new approach to design, construction, and facilities management in which a 
digital representation of the building process is used to facilitate the exchange and 
interoperability of information in a digital format (Eastman, Teicholz, Sacks & Liston, 2011). Due 
to the increasing power of BIM concept, it has also been adopted by most of the commercial 
CAD software (Autodesk Revit, ArchiCAD, Allplan, etc.). Shou et al. (2015) show the utility of 
BIM during the construction project life cycle throughout the definition of the workplace, 
visualization of quality 3D drawings, 3d model planning (that is defined as 4D) and lastly the 
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addition of the costs estimation (5D) in order to optimize and facilitate the maintenance and the 
management. 
Mattila et al. (1994) affirmed that there was a need to study the connections between good 
management, in general, and Safety. Since then lots of studies and researches about safety 
management have been developed. The overall interest around BIM and its applications have 
created wide variety of attempts some of which have also addressed occupational safety 
issues. 
The main objective of this paper is to make a literature review existing in this field of research in 
order to identify the applications and evolution of BIM for safety management in the construction 
domain. This study might have utility to new researches in aiding them to obtain a wider 
perspective of new methods of construction safety management. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
Several studies show BIM could bring important benefits in the AEC industry as a tool that add 
safety management, e.g.: scheduling, clash detection, construction progress tracking, design 
consistency and visualization, data integration, cost estimations, implementation of lean 
construction or improved stakeholder collaboration, etc.  
In a recent review in safety studies from 1978 to 2013, where 1628 documents are analyzed, it 
is shown that BIM is not the unique tool for this purpose. The study identifies 21 types of 
innovative technologies applied and only 6 documents related to the BIM uses. 
In a recent survey (Issa & Suermann, 2009), instrument collected data regarding perceptions 
about the effects of BIM on commonly accepted construction Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
that were defined by Cox et al. (2003): quality control, on time completion, cost, safety, $/unit, 
units/manhour. The authors maked a Survey was advertised in different ways. The results 
indicated that between 46% or 53% respondents also felt that BIM has “No Effect” on safety or 
lost man-hours in construction projects, making it the KPI that in their perception is the least 
impacted by BIM. Ding et al. (2014) make a study that shows the percentages of BIM 
publications from the viewpoint of project management domain, with a 7% related to Safety 
management and 17% schedule management. 
In the next paragraphs, the main highlights taken into account by different researches are 
shown. 
 
2.1. 4D = 3D + schedule 
Unsatisfactory architectural and/or organizational options or poor planning of the works at the 
project preparation stage have played a role in more than half of the occupational accidents 
occurring on construction sites in the UE (Council Directive 92/57/EEC, 1995). Effective safety 
planning contributes in the prevention of accidents and ill health of site personals. Planning well 
for safety plays an important role in reducing unnecessary cost and delays (Sulankivi, Mäkelä & 
Kiviniemi, 2009; Saurin, Formoso & Guimaraes, 2004; Bansal, 2011). If some activities are 
constructed adjacent to the overlap period, the workspace for those activities may be conflicting 
and accidents can occur (Moon, Dawood & Kang, 2014).  
Already in 1994, Euler (1994) indicated the need to consider the schedule for the control of 
accidents and their integration in graphics programs. Kartam (1997) develops a framework for a 
computerized safety and health knowledge-intensive system that has been implemented and 
integrated with current Critical Path Method (CPM) scheduling software.  
The term 4D is used by McKinney et al. (1996), defined as 3D plus time. In 1998 (McKinney & 
Fischer, 1998) insist on the construction perspective is often neglected because an important 
dimension for construction-time-is missing and the necessary efforts to develop 4D tools that 
generate 4D + x models that more realistically represent the construction process. (S. Guo, 
2001; Koo & Fischer, 2000) conclude that 4D models are a useful alternative to project 
scheduling tools like CPM. 
Since 2005, publications take the term BIM as we know it today (Tse, Wong & Wong, 2005). 
Software are commonly known as BIM, Virtual Building, Parametric Modelling, or Model-Based 
Design. Many authors have defined 4D as 3D plus schedule from the beginning of the BIM 
studies. It can be shown in studies from 2008 (Z. Hu, Zhang & Deng, 2008) until more recent 
works (Z. Hu & Zhang, 2011; S. Zhang et al., 2015; Y. Zhou et al., 2015). Moreover the concept 
4D is related to others concepts too, not only to BIM, as it is reflected in a recent work (Trebbe, 
Hartmann & Doree, 2015). So the potential of 4D CAD models to avoid costly on-site 
improvisation by providing possibilities to anticipate conflicts better in the planning phase has 
been widely acknowledged.  
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Finally, the literature review about the research on automation in construction scheduling from 
1985 to 2014, (Faghihi, Nejat, Reinschmidt & Kang, 2015), shows the dominant distribution of 
the genetic algorithm method (mainly focused on resource optimization and levelling by 
integrating the concepts of CPM and line of balance) as an optimization tool used by 
researchers to solve scheduling problems, specifically in the field of construction.  
 
2.2. Safety and use of other innovative technology application  
Construction safety and digital technologies are - Virtual Reality, 4D CAD, BIM, etc., -widely 
applied in these tools for site hazard prevention and safe project delivery (W. Zhou, Whyte & 
Sacks, 2012) 
The use of new technologies for these objectives is earlier than BIM. In 1992, Yamazaki (1992), 
and later Jung and Gibson (1999), related the use of Computer Integrated Construction to 
maximize the integrated utilization of information systems throughout the project’s entire life 
cycle to different functions, among them is safety. 
Seo et al. (2015) review the literature about studies for computer vision-based Safety and 
Health monitoring, identifying it 22 studies from 2007 to 2013. 
Otherwise, the use of simulation and virtual construction method earlier than the generalization 
of BIM for automate modification of schedules to minimize spatial conflicts (Akinci, Fischer & 
Kunz, 2002; Clayton, Warden & Parker, 2002; Dawood, Sriprasert, Mallasi & Hobbs, 2003; Waly 
& Thabet, 2003) adding the possibility of being a tool that would permit management for 
construction projects (Chau, Anson & De Saram, 2005; Chau, Anson & Zhang, 2005; Kang, 
Anderson & Clayton, 2007; Ma, Shen & Zhang, 2005; H. J. Wang, Zhang, Chau & Anson, 
2004). 
After that, many authors combine BIM with different technologies, e.g. location tracking, 
augmented reality (AR) and game technologies (Park & Kim, 2013), VP-based (H. L. Guo, Li & 
Li, 2013); RFID (or WSN in a broader scope)  (Motamedi & Hammad, 2009) Moreover, different 
researches combine schedule and BIM and simulation as a tool able to predict risks and to 
minimize conflicts at the workplace, as well as an active schedule management (K. Kim & 
Teizer, 2014; Moon et al., 2014; Moon, Kim, Kim & Kang, 2014). Lastly, it is interesting to show 
the use of other technologies for simulation of construction safety management, as a virtual 
prototyping (VP) (H. L. Guo et al., 2013) or SimSAFE (W. Wang, Liu & Chou, 2006). 
 
2.3 Collaboration, communication and life-cycle 
Shen et al. (2010) consider that these technologies can provide a consistent set of solutions to 
support the collaborative creation, management, dissemination, and use of information through 
the entire product and project life-cycle, they are believed to be the key enabling technologies 
that drive the construction industry in improving productivity and efficiency.  
New directions of research on construction safety and digital design could, for example, focus 
on technologies that enable constructors to share their knowledge with designers (W. Zhou et 
al., 2012). 
The prevention, from the first stages of the life cycle of the project, is related to the decrease of 
sinistrality (Gibb, 2004; Gibb et al., 2006; Martínez Aires, Rubio Gámez & Gibb, 2010) so the 
use of the BIM from the design and in the last stages of the project is use for the safety 
management. 
The implications of BIM adoption across the life-cycle of a project the stakeholder collaboration 
aspects related to its adoption produce the highest positive financial impact (Gu & London, 
2010; Eadie, Browne, Odeyinka, McKeown & McNiff, 2013). Otherwise BIM is a shared 
knowledge resource for information about a facility forming a reliable basis for decisions during 
its life-cycle; defined as existing from earliest conception to demolition (Ding et al., 2014), the 
use of BIM was mainly related to the construction stage (Shou et al., 2015). Moreover it can be 
shown that BIM is getting more useful, due its use in the pre-construction phase as a tool that 
improved the collaboration (Succar, 2009; Succar & Kassem, 2015; X. Wang & Chong, 2015). 
 
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Systematic review is a specific and reproducible approach for identifying, selecting and 
appraising all the literature of a certain agreed level of quality that is relevant to a research 
question (Booth, Papaioannu & Sutton, 2012).  
This study adopts the systematic review as a methodological approach to review the existing 
Construction Safety literature about BIM to explore useful findings, identify and to link in a table 
the knowledge gaps for a future research program. The databases sources used were the ISI 
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Web of Science (Wos) and Scopus. The period studied ranges from 1981 until 2015. The 
search was implemented using the ‘‘Title/Abstract/Keyword’’ field of the databases. The full 
search is ‘‘Title/Abstract/Keyword Construction and BIM and Safety” or ‘‘Title/Abstract/Keyword 
Construction and Building Information Modeling and Safety”. After removing uplicates, a total of 
145 documents has remained,from which 75 were Conference Paper and 52 Articles. After 
reviewing all the information, the structural Safety based texts have been removed. A group of 
ten more articles has also been added and studied, linked to the subject. Eventhow they do not 
match the Title/Abstract/Keyword criterion established for the research, they are still providing 
relevant information on the subject. The final number of articles reviwed is 55. The Bibliography 
research scheme is presented in Figure 1. 
The number of publications found on the databases visited dealing with BIM or Building 
Information Modeling on the area of Engineering linked to Construction-AEC, is of 673. They 
belong to the period between 2005 and 2015. Those related to safety represent an 8,2%.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Bibliography research scheme. 
 
Taking into account the results presented at point 2, five highlights have been identified, which 
define BIM use as a Safety Management tool: Construction or Safety Management, 4D 
Schedule and Planning, Visualitation/simulation, Collaboration and Communication and 
Identifying hazards.  
The 55 articles have been analysed through following protocol: (1) work title; (2) year of 
publication; (3) magazine title; (4) country; (5) Project phase identification where BIM is used: 
Desing, Constrution, Maintenance y project whole life cycle; (6) highlights identification; (7) 
innovative technology use identification and other differentiating aspects. The information 
gathered at each step has been presented in a database, which has enable to reach the results  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Based on the literature review and after applying the analysis protocol explained before, the 
results obtained have been classified in 2 sections. At the first Section 4.1, results from steps 1 
to 4 are presented, and allow to establish the publishing framework of the texts being analysed. 
At section 4.2, results from steps (5) to (7) of the analysis method have been gathered in table 
3, aiming to organise Construction Safety and BIM content proposed by authors., identifying the 
highlights addressed as well as certain diferenciating aspects, such as Lean, GIS, RFID, etc. 
 
4.1. Publishing framework 
Figure 2 presents anual distribution of magazines from articles selected for the study, which link 
BIM and Construction Safety. At a first sight it is clear that the number of articles related to this 
subjet has increased in 2014, and 2015 trend allows to see the interest in this line of research 
still growing.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Year profile of articles (*2015 until July 2015). 
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The Table 1 shows the number of publications distributed by country/region. This information is 
in line with the research carried by Porwal and Hewage (2013) - which proves that, even if BIM 
implementation is still a challenge for the North American Construction Industry, the Canadian 
Construction Industry for instance, still is well behind it. Moreover, Succar (2009) shows a non-
exhaustive list of publicly-available guides, reports and visions relating to BIM, which 
demonstrate that USA is the country where a greater number of Construction Safety and BIM 
research are published since 2009. 
 
Table 1 – The number of publications about Construction Safety and BIM distributed by country/region.  
Country/Territor
y 
Documen
ts 
 Country/Territory Documents 
United States 21  India 2 
China 14  Israel 2 
Australia 8  Pakistan 2 
South Korea 7  Taiwan 2 
Germany 5  Hungary 1 
United Kingdom 5  Netherlands 1 
Finland 2  Puerto Rico 1 
Hong Kong 2    
 
Table 2 gathers the journals where at least 2 articles on Construction Safety and BIM have 
been published, including JCR® Impact Factor and SJR Impact Factor. 
 
Table 2 – Number of documents about Construction Safety and BIM by Source and Impact Factor. 
Source Documents JCR® Impact Factor 
SJR 
Impact Factor 
Automation in Construction 18 1,812 1,572 
Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management - ASCE 5 0,842 1,199 
Advanced Engineering Informatics 3 1,627 1,218 
Electronic Journal of Information 
Technology in Construction 3 - 0,841 
Safety Science 3 1,831 0,965 
Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering 2 1,268 0,908 
 
4.2. Highlights Comparative Review 
Table 3 has seven columns. On the first one, each article is presented through autor and year of 
publication. The next five present the five highlights established for this study: Construction or 
Safety Management, 4D Schedule and Planning, Visualitation/simulation, Collaboration and 
Communication and Identifying hazards. The seventh column gathers other diferenciating 
aspects from the research published in the articles.  
Figure 3 shows the percentage of articles which addressed the five highlights defined. The 
61,82% of the Works have as main focus the Safety Management, followed by 50,91% which 
refer to BIM use for Visualitation or Simulation. The identification of hazards is a key objective, 
present in 50% of the documents. Falls are one of the main risks analysed (Melzner, Zhang, 
Teizer & Bargstädt, 2013; S. Zhang, Teizer, Lee, Eastman & Venugopal, 2013) and scaffolds 
one of the most studied systems (Clevenger, Del Puerto & Glick, 2015; Z. Hu, Zhang & Zhang, 
2010; K. Kim & Teizer, 2014). 
BIM use as a tool to promote/enable collaboration and communication, these topics are today’s 
active research topics and will still be active within next 5–10 years (Shen et al., 2010).  
Often many proposals explorea combined application of techniques due to different functions of 
same innovative technologies such as GIS (Bansal, 2011; Bansal & Pal, 2011; Min & Zhao, 
2014), RFID (Arslan, Riaz, Kiani & Azhar, 2014; H. Li, Lu, Chan & Skitmore, 2015; Xu, Wang & 
Yao, 2011; Y. Zhou et al., 2015), GPS (Akula et al., 2013) or Sensors (Riaz, Arslan, Kiani & 
Azhar, 2014; Arslan et al., 2014; Teizer, 2015).  
On the other side, the increasing concern for Safety training, results on it being the objective of 
a great number of research studies about the use of BIM to improve workers education or 
training (Becerik-Gerber, Jazizadeh, Li & Calis, 2012; Clevenger, Glick & del Puerto, 2012; 
Eadie et al., 2013; Park & Kim, 2013; Korman & Huey-King, 2014; Clevenger et al., 2015). 
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Table 3 –Highlights Comparative Review 
Source 
Safety 
manageme
nt 
4D 
Schedule/ 
Planning 
Visualitatio
n/Simulatio
n 
Collaboratio
n/ 
Communicati
on 
Identifyin
g hazards Other 
(Z. Hu et al., 2008)   Yes  Yes   
 (Sacks, Treckmann & Rozenfeld, 2009) Yes  Yes   Lean 
 (Suermann & Issa, 2009)      Research 
(Sulankivi et al., 2009) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Recording & verification of inspections  
 (Dossick & Neff, 2010)    Yes  Research 
 (Z. -. Hu et al., 2010)    Yes  Yes Scaffold 
 (Z. Hu, Zhang & Zhang, 2010)    Yes  Yes Developed algorithm  
 (Bansal & Pal, 2011) Yes Yes Yes   BIM & GIS 
(Bansal, 2011) Yes Yes Yes  Yes BIM & GIS 
 (Golparvar-Fard, Peña-Mora & Savarese, 2011)  Yes  Yes Yes 
BIM & Photographs & Point-cloud models. 
RM  
 (J. P. Zhang & Hu, 2011) Yes Yes Yes  Yes 4D space–time model 
 (Xie, Shi & Issa, 2011) Yes  Yes   RFID & Real-Time Vistual Reality 
 (Xu et al., 2011)    Yes  Integrated Project Delivery 
 (Z. Hu & Zhang, 2011) Yes Yes Yes  Yes 4D space–time model. Conflict analysis 
 (Barlish & Sullivan, 2012)       Review Article 
 (Becerik-Gerber et al., 2012) Yes     Facilities management. Trainning 
 (Chavada, Dawood & Kassem, 2012) Yes Yes Yes   CPM & BIM. 4D/5D. Real-time management 
 (Clevenger et al., 2012)   Yes   Construction education  
 (Hartmann, Van Meerveld, Vossebeld & 
Adriaanse, 2012) Yes Yes     
(Nawari, 2012) Yes   Yes  BIM standard in Off-Site Construction 
(W. Zhou et al., 2012)    Yes  Review Article 
(Akula et al., 2013) Yes  Yes  Yes Real-time. GPS 
(Eadie et al., 2013) Yes   Yes  
Facilities Management. Education and 
Training 
 (Kraatz & Hampson, 2013)      Audit and analysis R&D investment 
 (Melzner et al., 2013)  Yes   Yes PtD. Fall protection. Decision-making 
 (Park & Kim, 2013) Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
BIM & AR. Mobile screen. Education and 
Training 
 (S. Zhang et al., 2013) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PtD. Fall protection. Automated rule-based 
safety 
 (Y. Wang, Wang, Wang, Yung & Jun, 2013) Yes  Yes  Yes Facilities Management 
 (Arslan et al., 2014) Yes  Yes   BIM & RFID & Sensors. Real-time 
 (Chen & Luo, 2014) Yes Yes    BIM & Quality control process 
536
 (Choi, Lee, Park, Cho & Kim, 2014) Yes Yes    Work-space plan. Preconstruction phase 
(Ding et al., 2014) Yes Yes   Yes Review Article. Quantify and analyze quality 
(Forsythe, 2014)     Yes Real-time audio warnings 
 (K. Kim & Teizer, 2014) Yes Yes Yes   Temporary facilities. Scaffolding systems 
 (Korman & Huey-King, 2014)    Yes  Engineering education 
 (Le & Hsiung, 2014) Yes Yes  Yes Yes Mobile web servisse. GIS. Decision making 
 (Luo & Gong, 2014)     Yes Compliance checking 
 (Min & Zhao, 2014) Yes     GIS. 3D model library 
(Moon et al., 2014)  Yes Yes   Workspace conflict. Bounding box model 
(Moon et al., 2014) Yes Yes Yes   BIM & Genetic algorithm. 4D CAD 
Source 
Safety 
manageme
nt 
4D 
Schedule/ 
Planning 
Visualitatio
n/Simulatio
n 
Collaboratio
n/ 
Communicati
on 
Identifyin
g hazards Other 
(Qi et al., 2014) Yes    Yes PtD 
 (Riaz et al., 2014)     Yes BIM & Wireless sensor. Confined spaces 
 (Volk, Stengel & Schultmann, 2014)      Review Article 
 (W. -. Wang, Weng, Wang & Chen, 2014) Yes Yes Yes   BIM & MS Access & MS Excel & MS Project. 
 (Clevenger et al., 2015)   Yes   Education and training. Scaffolds 
 (Ganah & John, 2015) Yes   Yes    
 (H. Kim, Lee, Park, Chung & Hwang, 2015) Yes    Yes Accident cases. Retrieval system 
 (H. Li et al., 2015) Yes  Yes   
Training. Real-time location system. VC & 
RFID 
 (H. Li, Lu, Hsu, Gray & Huang, 2015) Yes  Yes  Yes VC System. Safety training 
(S. Zhang et al., 2015) Yes Yes Yes  Yes PtD 
 (S. Zhang, Boukamp & Teizer, 2015) Yes  Yes  Yes Automated safety planning . 
(Teizer, 2015) Yes  Yes  Yes 
Machine learning .Sensor & photo & video 
cameras 
 (X. Wang & Chong, 2015)      Review Article 
(Y. Zhou et al., 2015)  Yes Yes  Yes RFID 
 (Z. Zhou et al., 2015) Yes     Review Article 
 
ACRONYM  ACRONYM  
AR Augmented reality PtD Prevention through Design 
BIM Building Information Modeling  R&D 
Research and 
Development  
CPM Critical Path Method RM Reality Model 
GIS 
Geographic Information 
System  VC Virtual Construction 
GPS Global Positioning System VR Virtual reality  
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Figure 3 – Highlights and his Percentage of BIM publications. 
 
Figure 4 – Percentage of BIM publications from the viewpoint of project life cycle. 
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Figure 4 shows the percentage of publications about BIM from the point of view of project life-cycle. The 
majority of projects uses BIM at construction phase (Z. Zhou, Goh & Li, 2015). Nevertheless, 37% of works, 
refer to design phase as well: Life-cycle, Design phase or Desgin and Construction phase. This in fact is a 
proof of  BIM usefulness regarding Prevention through Design (Melzner et al., 2013; Qi et al., 2014; S. 
Zhang et al., 2013; S. Zhang et al., 2015). 
Last but not least, different research studies have highlighted, current existing gaps The main reason for not 
adopting BIM on current projects relates to the lack of expertise within the project team and external 
organisations (Eadie et al., 2013). Li et al. (2012). Some of the main challenges for implementing BIM 
applications are generating the 3D models, retrieving the job site environmental information and updating 
actual data from the job site, within the 3D models, as the construction process moves forward. Other of the 
remaining gaps to be bridged is a hybrid approach toward addressing multiple objectives associated with 
scheduling (Faghihi et al., 2015). An example is the need for a new hybrid tool that can automate schedules 
by ensuring the structural stability of the project while optimizing its schedule and cost.  
The study carried by Wang and Chong (2015) concludes that BIM must evolve to be fully integrated with 
other technologies, thereby contributing to project performance in various stages of project life-cycle. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
ICT (Information & Communication Tools) use has been a key factor in AEC industry for the last decades. 
BIM capabilities and versatility have allowed its use in different areas of AEC industry, and specifically in 
Safety Management. According to research results BIM can help to improve Safety in Construction in the 
followings aspects:  
1. Identify potential hazards through 4D scheduling: Using 4D model and 4D scheduling and sequencing with 
site logistics planning can easily help identify potential hazards and eliminating hazards early. The control 
program identifies the conflicts generated in the workplace activities to be implemented simultaneously. 
2. Visual representation of site conditions: BIM provides with a solid visual understanding of a site and the 
working conditions before they even begin construction. Moreover, the combined application due to different 
functions of various innovative technologies -such as GIS, Augmented Reality (AR)- allows visualization 
work site in real time. 
3. Identify each task and work area with its hazards: BIM helps to identify the risks, prepare for the work at 
hand and, therefore, complete the task more efficiently and safely.  
4. Enables Communication and Collaboration between different the stakeholders present both at the desing 
stage and construction. 
5. Can be used in worker safety training and education, design for safety, safety planning (job hazard 
analysis and pretask planning), accident investigation, and facility and maintenance phase safety.  
The research studies show that early adoption of BIM in design stage can significantly reduce accident and 
allows all stakeholders to get important information before the building is completed. This includes all agents 
involved in the life cycle project: clients, designers, engineers, builders, workers, tenants, service agents as 
well as maintenance personnel.  
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Abstract 
Psychosocial risk factors, its diagnosis and better understanding, have, in recent years, 
occupied a central place in the societal debates, setting new demanding to the ones involved in 
the field of occupational safety and health, in order to ensure these risks prevention. Apparently, 
the sub-categorization of these work-related risks as of "psychosocial" nature seems to justify a 
type of intervention, potentially "psychologizing", to which we critically position ourselves - an 
intervention in which the individual behaviour level is favoured, leaving aside the work activity 
and its conditions. In fact, it is the concrete work activity and the options on work organization 
that should assume the centrality in the analysis of these risks - which, actually, interact with 
other risks, making them, in the majority of the cases, more worrisome. Indeed, it is no 
coincidence that the visibility given to psychosocial risks arises in an historical context marked 
by the intensification of work rhythms and by a certain naturalization of physical and emotional 
exhaustion, together with a professional activity whose complexity has also increased 
significantly. The concerns of evaluation and diagnosis of psychosocial risk factors boosted the 
development of several questionnaires, their widespread dissemination, and even their 
"exportation", not always sensitive to the specificities of local realities. Beyond the issue of 
assessment and "diagnosis", the purpose of this paper is also to discuss the prevention 
practices that have been privileged in this area, particularly questioning the limits of a type of 
usage of statistics, as if the results had worth alone. The methodology used was articulated on 
the comparison of two reference instruments in this area and the theoretical and epistemological 
approaches that underlie them: (i) the Copenhagen Psychosocial Questionnaire (COPSOQ) - 
available in more than 25 languages, and used as a support to comparative studies among 
various countries in Europe and abroad - that was applied to 116 workers in the furniture 
industry; and (ii) the Health and Safety Survey (INSAT) -  developed in Portugal, but widely 
used abroad, particularly in Brazil and Angola - that was applied to 99 workers in the cork and in 
the automobile industries. The results and its discussion reinforce the importance of a 
contextualized approach in work situations, as well as in the perspective of the workers 
themselves about the risks to which they are exposed to - beyond what is and what is not 
significant from the statistical point of view, or what can be normatively defined as an 
“acceptable risk”.  
 
Keywords: Employment and working conditions, Risk assessment, Questionnaires, 
Intervention. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Psychosocial risk factors, its diagnosis and better understanding have, in recent years, occupied 
a central place in the societal debates, setting new demanding to the ones who intervene in the 
field of occupational safety and health.  
Apparently, the sub-categorization of these work-related risks as of “psychosocial” nature 
seems to justify the fact that psychologists are increasingly called upon to respond to such 
requests. These requests often reflect an expectation that the intervention will contribute to help 
workers, victims of such risks, to take ownership of other strategies, suitable of allowing them to 
react more positively to the "work demands". 
So, in this type of interventions, potentially "psychologizing", to which we critically position 
ourselves, an intervention at the individual behaviour level is favoured, leaving aside the 
collective difficulties (Loriol, 2005). 
It is the concrete work activity and the options on work organization that should assume the 
centrality in the analysis of these risks - which, actually, interact with other risks, making them, 
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in the majority of the cases, more worrisome. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the visibility given 
to psychosocial risks arises in an historical context marked by the intensification of work 
rhythms and by a certain naturalization of physical and emotional exhaustion (closely 
associated with increasingly precarious labour relations), together with a professional activity 
whose complexity has also increased significantly. 
The concerns of assessment and diagnosis of psychosocial risk factors boosted the 
development of several questionnaires, their widespread dissemination, and even their 
"exportation", not always sensitive to the specificities of local realities (and working situations). 
Beyond the issue of "diagnosis", the aim of this study is to discuss the type of assessment and 
prevention practices that have been privileged in this area, particularly questioning the limits of a 
type of usage of statistics and individual approaches.  
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The analysis here pursued is sustained on the comparison of two reference instruments in this 
area and the theoretical and epistemological approaches underlying them. The first instrument 
is the Copenhagen Psychosocial Questionnaire (COPSOQ) and, the second one, is the Health 
and Work Questionnaire (INSAT: Inquérito Saúde e Trabalho).  
The COPSOQ was developed and validated by Kristensen and cols. (Danish National Institute 
of Occupational Health), in 2005 (Kristensen et al., 2005) and, recently, was revised (COPSOQ 
II) (Petjersen et al., 2010). It is a questionnaire broadly used in the assessment of psychosocial 
risks, which integrates in its conception the influence of dominant psycho-sociological theories, 
among which: the work characteristics model, the Michigan organizational stress model, the 
demand-control-support model, the sociotechnical approach and the effort-reward theory 
(Kristensen et al., 2005; Pejtersen et al., 2010). 
The Portuguese translation and adaptation of COPSOQ (Sílvia et al., 2011), and its three 
versions are available: the long version for researchers (41 scales and 128 questions); the 
medium version for occupational health professionals (28 scales and 87 questions); and the 
short version, used in work places (23 scales and 40 questions). 
The psychosocial dimensions are analysed through questions (using Lickert scales) reported to 
the evaluation of: cognitive and emotional demands, rewards, interpersonal conflicts, stress and 
harassment in the workplace. The order of the questions follows this structure: assessment of 
health and wellbeing items; relationship with the labour market; employment conditions; work 
and private/family life; psychosocial work environment; workplace as a whole; conflicts and 
offensive behaviour. 
The INSAT (Barros-Duarte, Cunha & Lacomblez, 2007; 2010; 2013) main aim is to analyse the 
relation between working conditions and health and wellbeing. It’s a questionnaire developed in 
Portugal, and conceived from the contribution of European surveys. Its first version appeared in 
2007 (Barros-Duarte, Cunha & Lacomblez, 2007) and it was updated in 2010 (Barros-Duarte & 
Cunha, 2010), and again in 2013 (Barros-Duarte & Cunha), with the contribution of the 
experience acquired through its application in different sectors of activity, in Portugal (Barros, 
Carnide, Cunha, Santos & Silva, 2015). The usage of this instrument has, since then, been 
required not only in national context, but equally in Portuguese-speaking countries, such as 
Brazil and Angola. 
Since its conception, INSAT integrates questions from epidemiological studies (Cassou et al., 
2001) and from work psychology and ergonomics scientific tradition (Lacomblez, 2005) that 
have contributed for a better understanding of the relationships between health and work. 
From the standpoint of its structure, INSAT follows a coherent and integrative logic – from work 
to the effects of work in health and wellbeing (in a total of 145 items) – allowing the worker, in 
the auto-filling of the questionnaire (in most items using Lickert scales), a reflection and a 
progressive awareness of the consequences of work in health and wellbeing. It focuses on the 
interaction of physical, cognitive, organizational and psychosocial dimensions of work activity, 
as well as on its effects on physical health and social and psychological wellbeing. 
It is organized into seven axes: The work; work conditions and characteristics (Environment and 
physical constraints; Organizational and relational constraints; Work characteristics); Life 
conditions outside work; Training and work; Health and work; My health and my work; My health 
and my wellbeing. 
To discuss the potentialities and singularities of these two reference instruments in the 
assessment of psychosocial risk factors, we developed a comparative analysis from three case 
studies in the context of industrial sectors: furniture, cork and automobile industries. The sample 
was composed of 215 Portuguese workers from north and center regions: 116 from the furniture 
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industry, which answered to COPSOQ; and 99 workers which answered to INSAT questionnaire 
– 43 of these from the cork industry, and 56 from the automobile industry. 
  
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1 Study 1: contributions of risk factors evaluation with COPSOQ in the furniture 
industry 
The results of the COPSOQ questionnaire are frequently expressed under the shape of mean 
values, being its discussion instigated from the comparison with “averages of reference”, as 
defined by its theoretical framework. 
In tables 1 and 2, are presented the results of the application of COPSOQ in the furniture 
industry: the comparison of the means obtained in this study (second column) and the “average 
of reference” (last column) corresponds, according to that theoretical framework, to the 
privileged standpoint that can be assumed in the interpretation of the results. High values are 
considered “positive” and “healthy” (Kristensen et al., 2007; Petjersen et al., 2010), and low 
values considered as “threateners”. However, there are a considerable number of exceptions as 
portrayed by table 1. 
 
Table 1: COPSOQ results: dimensions related to individual factors 
Dimensions Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Average of 
reference 
General Health 44,82 23,19 0 100 66,0 
Sleeping 
troubles 38,45 20,99 0 100 21,3 
Stress 38,64 19,77 0 87,50 26,7 
Burnout 45,65 20,62 0 100 34,1 
Depressive 
symptoms 28,31 15,51 0 75 21,0 
Somatic stress 28,55 19,59 0 94 17,8 
Cognitive 
stress 31,63 18,93 0 75 17,8 
Self-efficacy 68,99 19,09 14 100 67,5 
  
Observing the results in table 1, it can be said, for example, that these workers evidence a 
general health state worse than the reference value, and a self-efficacy perception higher than 
the normative value. 
 
Table 2: COPSOQ results: dimensions related to work environment 
Dimensions Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Average of 
reference 
Quantitative 
Demands 
30,66 15,19 0 75 40,2 
Cognitive Demands 45,26 21,36 0 99 63,9 
Emotional Demands 42,94 16,06 0 88 40,7 
Work rhythm 56,90 15,55 25 92 59,5 
Development 
possibilities 
62,12 18,38 0 100 65,9 
Rewards 57,97 25,02 0 100 66,2 
Paper conflicts 47,41 18,78 0 99 42,0 
Colleagues social 
support 
52,58 25,59 0 100 57,3 
Superiors social 
support 
53,05 31,78 0 100 61,6 
Work insecurity 56,95 28,87 0 100 23,7 
 
None the less, if table 2 show apparently favourable results – less quantitative and cognitive 
demands, a work rhythm considered “acceptable” (Cadet & Kouabénan, 2005) – the analysis of 
the questions that compose these dimensions reveals both the presence of items related to 
work constraints and items that refer to individual assessment criteria. For example, the 
“quantitative demands” dimension integrates, namely, a question related to work constraints 
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(workload) and a question based on the assumption that the person, by itself, tends to 
accumulate work. 
 
3.2 Study 2: evaluation of risk factors with INSAT in the cork industry  
The INSAT results, opposed to the COPSOQ’s, are expressed in terms of frequency of 
exposure to different risk factors – environmental risk factors, physical constraints, psychosocial 
factors of risk – as it is illustrated in tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively.   
 
Table 3: Frequency of workers self-declarations to environmental risk factors 
Exposure to: Number of workers (%) 
Harmful noise 40 (97,6) 
Temperature variations (heat/cold) 38 (92,7) 
Dust or gases 33 (80,5) 
Chemical products 21 (51,2) 
Other dangerous situations 8 (19,5) 
 
One of the INSAT particularities is its conceptual framework that conceives the work situation as 
a whole, besides its specific risks. For example, the identification of “other dangerous situations” 
corresponds, in this case, to the work with certain type of machines (e.g., laminators). This 
information comes from other complementary methods of analysis - such as the analysis of the 
work activity in real context (Lacomblez, 2005) -, assuming that  INSAT results are not self-
explanatories, but have to be articulated with other data sources, namely from qualitative 
analysis. 
Besides this, it is also visible in the interpretation of INSAT results the concern about the options 
on work organization and not about the individuals’ performance (tables 4 and 5). 
 
Table 4: Frequency of workers self-declarations to physical constraints 
Exposure to: Number of workers (%) 
Repetitive gestures 32 (78%) 
Precise gestures 23 (56,1%) 
Harmful postures 33 (80,5%) 
Intense physical effort 30 (73,2%) 
Standing up at same position for  a long 
period of time 24 (58,5%) 
Standing up with displacements 30 (73,2%) 
 
Table 5: Frequency of workers self-declarations to work rhythm constraints 
Exposure to: Number of workers (%) 
Intense rhythm 23 (56,1) 
Production norms or strict deadlines 31 (75,6) 
Having constantly to adapt to method 
changes or work tools 25 (61) 
Manage contradictory instructions 22 (53,7) 
Hyper-request 26 (63,4) 
 
Another data that deserves to be highlighted in the usage of INSAT is related to health issues. 
On the one hand, these arise in this instrument after the exploration of work risks and, on the 
other hand, the confrontation between data of the following tables make visible how contrasting 
the results can be – when the question is more abstract (table 6) (the reference to health in a 
more global way) or when it is contextualized in the relation with work situation (table 7). 
 
Table 6: Frequency of workers self-declarations to the effects of work in health 
Work affects my health… Number of workers (%) 
Not at all 16 (39) 
Yes, mainly negatively 5 (12,2) 
Yes, mainly positively 19 (46,3) 
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Table 7: Frequency of workers self-declarations to health problems related to work 
Health problem Number of workers (%) Relationship with work (%) 
  Caused Aggravated 
Back pain 31 (75,6) 48,8 19,5 
Musculoskeletal 
diseases 28 (68,3) 46,3 19,5 
Anxiety/Irritability 17 (41,5) 14,6 19,5 
Generalized fatigue 18 (43,9) 22 19,5 
 
3.3 Study 3: evaluation of risk factors with INSAT in the automobile industry 
The third study was developed in the automobile industry, and highlights another specificity of 
INSAT further explored in this context, which enriches the debate about the instruments in the 
assessment of psychosocial risk factors. The INSAT includes a discomfort scale (Lickert scale), 
to which the worker answers every time he marks being exposed to a certain risk factor. Tables 
8, 9 and 10 are an example of this. 
 
Table 8: Frequency of discomfort degree concerning physical constraints (%) 
Degree of discomfort in 
exposure to: Precise gestures 
Painful 
postures 
Intense 
physical efforts 
Standing up at 
same position for  
a long period of 
time 
Severe discomfort 4 (13,3) 7 (19,4) 11 (26,8) 7 (19,4) 
Moderately severe 
discomfort 5 (16,6) 
15 
(41,7) 16 (39,0) 16 (44,4) 
Discomfort 10 (33,3) 11 (30,6) 9 (22,0) 8 (22,2) 
Minimal discomfort 11 (36,7) 3 (8,3) 5 (12,2) 4 (11,1) 
No discomfort 0 (0,0%) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 1 (2,7) 
 
Table 9: Frequency of discomfort degree concerning work intensification constraints (%) 
Degree of discomfort in 
exposure to: Intense rhythm 
Follow production norms 
or meet strict deadlines 
Hyper-request 
Severe discomfort 5 (12,2) 1 (2,0) 2 (9,0) 
Moderately severe discomfo  11 (27,5) 11 (22,4) 6 (27,3) 
Discomfort 16 (40,0) 15 (30,6) 5 (22,7) 
Minimal discomfort 8 (20,0%) 15 (30,6) 8 (36,4) 
No discomfort 0 (0,0%) 7 (8,1) 1 (4,5) 
 
Table 10: Frequency of discomfort degree concerning social work relationships (%) 
Degree of discomfort in 
exposure to: 
Not having my opinion 
taken into consideration 
Lack of recognition from 
managers 
Severe discomfort 4 (18,2) 10 (45,5) 
Moderately severe discomfort  4 (18,2) 7 (31,8) 
Discomfort 3 (13,6) 4 (18,2) 
Minimal discomfort 1 (4,5%) 1 (4,5) 
No discomfort 4 (18,2%) 1 (4,5) 
 
On the one hand, it is visible in INSAT’s analysis the attempt to express results in frequencies 
and not using averages, trying to highlight the weight of the exposure to different risk factors, 
more than trying to identify the “acceptability of the risk”, with reference to standard mean 
values. 
In fact, observing the results in table 9, it is possible to note the variability of workers self-
declarations concerning the degree of discomfort when exposed to intense rhythm, to 
production norms or rigid deadlines, or situations of hyper-request. 
Besides that, it is the knowledge of the work activity, in the real context, as well as the 
knowledge of the options on work organization, that allows us to understand that in the case of 
an assembly line - with strong time constraints - , a high percentage of workers declare 
discomfort due to the adoption of painful postures, the intense physical efforts and having to 
remain a long time up with displacements (table 8). Furthermore, the lack of recognition from 
managers considering the work done (table 10), and the lack of “power to act” (Clot, 2008) 
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according to their own opinions about the working methods, were pointed as harmful among 
these workers. 
It is in this perspective that INSAT tries to exceed the traditional practices of risks assessment, 
reinforcing an approach more “comprehensive” than “explanatory”, when assuming in the 
interpretation of its results, a coherent combination between the analysis of the activity and the 
use of a quantitative method of analysis. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Besides the diversity of themes framed under the notion of “psychosocial risks” – and, 
sometimes, confusing its causes with its effects (Nasse & Légeron, 2008) – the principle we 
assume in the analysis of the psychosocial risk factors is to anchor their assessment and 
prevention in the work analysis, trying to understand the risks in the scope of a contextualized 
approach and considering, at the same time, the interaction between them, that is, without treat 
them isolated. 
The approach was developed, in the pathway of a greater recognition of these risk factors and 
its prevention, corroborates the perspective of using questionnaires that allow an analysis more 
centred on the work situation - in the context of a certain work activity, of a concrete enterprise, 
of a professional group, in view of the working conditions improvement. 
The debate concerns also the passage from diagnosis to intervention (Lacomblez, 2012) and, in 
this sense, the proposal of questions that sustain the dialog with the actors of prevention in work 
safety and health domains: quantifying risks is a mean of giving them visibility, but how to use 
statistics taking into account the singularities of the work situation, as well as what escapes to a 
certain “statistical orthodoxy” (Volkoff, 2010)? 
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Abstract 
One of the tasks of the Brazilian Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE) Labour Inspectors 
(LIs) is to investigate and to analyze the causes of occupational accidents (OA) as well as the 
conditions that may produce them. This paper describes a case study regarding some accidents 
that took place in the metal-mechanic industry and which were analyzed by the LIs, of Minas 
Gerais Labour and Employment Regional Superintendence in the years 2011 to 2012. The 
study aimed at analyzing how effective the accident investigations carried out to prevent such 
events were. The main sources of information were the accident analysis reports issued by the 
inspectors, the inspection reports kept in the files of the Federal Labour Inspection System, MLE 
computerized system, and semi-structured interviews with eleven inspectors. The results were 
presented and discussed according to the "Chain Model", developed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the labour accident investigations produced by the Swedish Work Environment 
Authority (SWEA) inspectors. The model consists of five links: notification, selection, 
investigation, dissemination and prevention. This paper concentrates on the findings and their 
implications regarding the dissemination and prevention links. The lessons learned during the 
accident analysis process have not been disseminated neither among the LIs, nor outside the 
MLE.   Prevention resulting from monitoring implementation measures does not usually take 
place. Considering the "Chain Model", a contribution of the OA investigations carried out by the 
LIs is not effective enough for preventing similar events. Therefore, it is necessary that MLE 
adopts measures to strengthen the dissemination and prevention links. 
 
Keywords: metal-mechanic industry; chain model; Labour Inspector; dissemination of 
knowledge. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Labour related accidents can cause physical injuries to workers, distress to their families, as 
well as determine high costs for companies and society. In Brazil, one of the tasks of the 
Ministry of Labour and Employment (MLE) Labour Inspectors (LIs), is to investigate and analyze 
the causes of serious and fatal occupational accidents (OA) as well as the conditions that may 
produce them (Brazil, 2002). A report for each accident analyzed must be issued. It must 
include  of the accident causes and the actions employers  must take to avoid the repetition of 
the undesired event.   An OA’s analysis does not finish after the report is issued, it is necessary 
to go further (Drogaris, 1993). Lessons learned during the analysis must be propagated and, to 
avoid new occurrences, companies must comply with the preventive measurements outlined in 
the report (Human Reliability Associates [HRA], 2001; Jacobina et al., 2002; Almeida, 2006).  
This paper describes a case study concerning OA which occurred  in the metal-mechanic 
industry and which was analyzed by the LIs from the Minas Gerais Regional Labour and 
Employment Superintendence (SRTE/MG), in the cities of Belo Horizonte, Betim and 
Contagem, from 2011 to 2012, 
Workers from metal-mechanic industries are exposed to several dangers, especially those 
resulting from operating mechanical conformation machines, such as metal presses, folders, 
cutters, calenders, among others (Park, 1998; Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio 
Grande do Sul, 2006; Nobre Junior, 2009). 
The metal-mechanic industry activities range from producing food aluminum packages to 
assembling large vehicles. The typical occupational accident incidence rate in these activities is 
higher than procedures in other important economic sector in Minas Gerais (Brasil, 2012a), 
such as iron ore extraction or coffee plantations. In 2011, in Minas Gerais, 28,07% of the issued 
Occupational Accident Communication referred to typical occupational accidents which had 
happened in the cities of Belo Horizonte, Betim and Contagem (Brasil, 2012a).  
The objective of this paper is to analyze to what extent the OA investigations carried out by the 
LIs contributed to prevent new accidents. It features the procedures prescribed by the LIs 
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concerning accident analysis, and checks if the practices adopted can contribute to prevent new 
events. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Several authors have shown that new accidents can only be avoided if knowledge obtained 
during the accident analysis is disseminated among all stakeholders and if implementation of 
the measures proposed by the investigators is monitored.  
Nine basic requirements for a successful accident investigation are described in a study 
conducted by HRA (2001) for the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE), among 
them: 
[…] 
e) Carrying out of recommendations that enclose both immediate and 
underlying causes; 
f) Implementation of these recommendations and updating of relevant 
risk assessments; 
g) Monitoring to insure that actions succeed in reducing risks of new 
accidents; 
h) Feedback for stakeholders to allow them to share the obtained 
knowledge; 
i) Development of an easy-access database.  
Jacobina et al. (2002) show that after ranking by priority the control and prevention measures, 
the investigating team, with the supervision of the union and workers, must put forward to the 
company an executive plan, where deadlines and monitoring schemes must be detailed. They 
emphasize the importance of publicizing the information produced for the various stakeholders.  
For Almeida (2006), the process of accident analysis systematization can be characterized by 
the following structure: 
1. Analysis preparation, definition of the event that will be analyzed 
and its consequences; 
2. The strictly speaking analysis, including amend proposals and 
written report; 
3. Implementation of amends an its follow-up; and 
4. System feedback with updates based on lessons learned during 
analysis. 
Almeida (2006) understands that it is necessary to follow-up the impact of the implemented 
measures with regard to the occurrence of accidents that have almost the same aspects as 
those intended to be controlled by the adopted standards. Initially, Almeida assumes that the 
feedback phase aims at sharing immediate findings with the other members of the system. He 
highlights the importance of their contributions for the system improvement.  Subsequently, 
feedback becomes an updating source and a continuous improvement for the system risk 
assessment. 
Lindberg e Hansson (2006) estimated the effectiveness of the OA investigation produced by 
Haverikommissionen – HAKO, of the Swedish Work Environment Authority – SWEA. The study 
was commissioned by SWEA itself one year after HAKO’s initial activities.  
This was the reason for researchers to develop the "Chain Model", which consists of a five link 
chain as described below (Lindberg et al., 2010): 
- Link 1: Notification  
Workplace accidents and incidents must be notified to the person in charge of selecting the 
events that will be investigated in depth. This should happen as soon as possible after the 
occurrence. Notifications must have all the information needed for selecting the events that will 
be analyzed. 
- Link 2: Selection  
Notifications are used to select the accidents and incidents needing an investigation. The 
chosen events should be those owning the biggest amount of useful information to be extracted 
for preventive work.   
- Link 3: Investigation 
It is the main step in an accident analysis and has been the focus of most of the approaches on 
the topic. 
- Link 4: Dissemination 
Information obtained in OA investigations must be shared with everyone who can use it to 
prevent future accidents. 
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- Link 5: Prevention 
An accident investigation process does not come to an end before its recommendations have 
been implemented to insure the future safety of the system to be protected. 
The “Chain Model” was also used to assess the contribution of the occupational accidents 
analysis carried out by the LIs from the Minas Gerais Regional Labour and Employment 
Superintendence (SRTE/MG) to prevent further accidents.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The qualitative research was conceived as a case study related to 23 typical OAs which 
occurred at the metal-mechanic industry and which were analyzed by the LIs of the Regional 
Minas Gerais Labour and Employment Superintendence (SRTE/MG) in the cities of Belo 
Horizonte, Betim and Contagem, in 2011 and 2012. 
The sources of information for the procedures regarding the OA analysis prescribed for the LIs 
were the MLE internal regulations: Decree No. 4.552, from December 27th, 2002, establishing 
Labour Inspection rules (Brasil, 2002); Instruction No. 88 from November 30th, 2010, 
establishing the guidelines for OA analysis and the report template used by LIs (Brazil, 2010b), 
as well as the OA analysis Guide prepared by MLE in 2010 (Brasil, 2010a).  
With regard to the approaches and practices effectively adopted by the LIs, the main sources of 
information were  the OA analysis printed reports, SFIT (Labour Inspection Federal System ) 
constant inspection reports, OA analysis reports electronically entered into SIRENA’s file folder 
(Reference System in Analysis and Prevention of Occupational Accidents), information gathered 
by the LIs involved in the accident analysis, memos evidencing  that the accident analysis report 
was forwarded to people outside the MLE. 
By accessing the MLE computer network we checked whether the reports of accidents subject 
of this study were electronically inserted in the ten subfolders of SIRENA’s files.  
Initially, this study accident analysis had the participation of thirteen LIs. As one of them retired 
and another was under sick leave, information from the other 11 was gathered through the 12 
questions of the semi-structural interviews. 
The "Chain Model" was useful to evaluate how much the OA analysis reports produced by LIs 
contributed to prevent new accidents. However, in this study only information regarding the links 
“dissemination of knowledge” and “prevention of new accidents” were analyzed and discussed. 
To estimate how effective the accident analyses were to dissemination the lessons learned, the 
following are pointed out: 
a) how many accident reports were sent to SIRENA’s file folder; 
b) whether the report  was or not discussed with the employers’ representatives, the Labour 
Unions and the injured workers; 
c) LIs’ participation in technical meetings or formal trainings related to accidents analyzed by 
other LIs;  
d) whether LIs had access to SIRENA’s folder or not;  
e) whether the file was made available electronically so that it could be included in the above 
mentioned folder; 
f) whether a copy of the accident analysis report was sent to people outside MLE. 
Regarding prevention, we checked with SFIT if there were adjustments in the workplace during 
the inspection that investigated the causes of the accident, and if the companies involved were 
inspected again after the previous inspection was over. 
The LI’s words during the interviews are shown in the text in the way they were said, i.e., 
without editing. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Prescribed work 
After a serious or fatal OA has occurred, it is LIs’ responsibilities to investigate it through 
different means such as: collecting in loco information, producing a photographic record of the 
accident relevant aspects, analyzing occupational safety and health documents and, when the 
accident is not fatal, interviewing the victims and other witnesses of the accident. Finally 
inspectors must write an accident analysis report (Brasil, 2010b).   
To measure LIs’ production, data of the activities, including those related to OA analysis, are 
included in SFIT, a computerized and codified system for monitoring LI inspections.  
Besides sending data to SFIT, LIs have to produce the OA analysis report, which has to be 
typed according to a model established by the MLE. After it is printed it must be delivered to the 
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Head of Health and Safety Section. It must also be submitted electronically. The Head will be 
responsible for entering it in SIRENA’s system electronic file which is part of the MLE 
computerized network (Brasil, 2010b). 
 
4.2. Analyzed Occupational accidents  
OAs analyzed by LIs at the metal-mechanic industry are presented in this topic (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 – Occupational accidents in metal-mechanic industries, analyzed by SRTE/MG Labour Inspectors from 2011 to 
2012. 
Event M.M. factor Part of the Body hit Injury 
Observatio
n 
1 Fall of material Chest Death  
2 Contact with press Head Preparation 
3 Pressurized Cilinder  Chest  
4 Lift All body  
5 Truck Head  
6 Fire/Welding Legs  
7 Electric Ark Arms  
8 Winder Hand Amputation  
9-11 Contact with press Hand Operation 
12 Circular Saw Finger  
13 Lift 
Spine, knee 
and 
collarbone 
Fracture 
  
14 Contact with press Arm Operation 
15 Milling machine Hand  
16 Fallen material Leg  
17-18 Contact with press Hand Preparation 
19 Contact with press Hand Operation 
20 Same level fall Shoulder  
21 Fallen material Foot Contusion  
22 Fallen material Head Contusion  
23 O2/GLP explosion Foot Burn  
Source: SFIT/MLE 
Note: M.M. factor - immediate factor of morbimortality; Preparation refers to operations performed at the press before its 
operation, such as adjustments and changing tools; O2/GLP – Oxygen cylinders and liquefied oil gas. 
 
Fifteen of the 23 OAs analyzed were reported to the MLE by Labour Unions. By November 
2013, two accident reports sent to SFIT in July/2011 and February/2012 had not yet been 
received at the Head of Safety and Health Section.  
 
4.3. Dissemination (Link 4) 
After the OA analysis report is finished, the next steps are to point at the causal factors that lead 
to the accident and to indicate the necessary preventive measures to avoid the repetition of the 
event. 
By consulting the folders of the companies filed in the Head of Health and Safety Section it was 
possible to find out that a copy of the OA analysis report was sent to stakeholders (Table 2). 
Although reports of events 10 and 20 were in the companies’ folders, they were not sent to any 
stakeholder. Reports of events 22 and 23 have not been produced. Only companies of events 1 
and 6 requested MLE to send them a copy of the report. 
 
Table 2 - Stakeholders that received the analysis reports of occupational accidents which occurred in the metal-
mechanic industry, in 2011 and 2012, and which were analyzed by the SRTE/MG Labour Inspectors. 
Events Stakeholder 
1 Labour Union, the injured worker family, the company 
2 General Attorney’s Office, Labour Court 
3, 8 e 12 General Attorney’s Office  
4 General Attorney’s  Office and family of the injured worker 
5,11,16,18,19 General Attorney’s  Office and Labour Prosecutors’ Office 
6 General' Attorney’s Office, Labour Union, company, Labour Court 
7 General Attorney’s  Office, Labour Union, Labour Prosecutors’ Office  
552
9 General Attorney’s  Office, Labour Union, injured worker, Labour Prosecutors’ Office, Criminal Prosecutors’ Office 
13 General Attorney’s  Office, Labour Union, injured worker 
14, 15, 17, 21 General Attorney’s  Office, Labour Union 
Source: Company folders filed at the Safety and Health Section 
 
The eleven interviewed LIs mentioned they usually exchange information informally with other 
LIs about accidents that are similar to the ones they are analyzing. This is what LI 4 said: "We 
work in a very broad sphere of knowledge. So it's almost impossible to know everything. When 
I'm in doubt I try first to talk to someone, who has already analyzed a similar accident, or who 
has gone through training programs”. LI 6 comments: "There is no formal exchange of 
experiences. Our institution does not stimulate this exchange of experiences". 
Ten LIs recognized that the first thing to be done in order to disseminate the lessons learned 
during an accident investigation process is to improve the exchange of information among LIs 
as LI 6 stated: "Look ... first disseminate among ourselves in technical meetings".  LI 8 
expresses the same opinion: “...it would be very interesting to attend lectures where other LIs 
would present their analysis and conclusions”.  
Viewing dissemination of the learned lessons outside the MLE, seven LIs’ suggested presenting 
the analysis at conferences and seminars. LI 7 declared: "Seminars, conferences, files that 
could be consulted at the Web. Certainly, what you learn about one accident can prevent 
others". LI 2 suggests: "... organize seminars to discuss good practices regarding prevention of 
accidents. This exchange of ideas, the so called benchmarking…". 
Only three interviewed LIs declared that, after finishing their OA analysis results, they had 
communicated and/or discussed them with stakeholders such as employers, members of the 
companies’ Occupational Safety and Health Specialized Services, the Internal Accident 
Prevention Commission, Labour Unions and the injured worker himself. 
Six LIs said that during the analysis process or when the assessment notices, notice and/or 
interdiction term were sent, they tried to talk to the employer representatives about the causes 
of the accident, and how it could have been prevented.  
The main reasons LIs gave for not discussing the report with stakeholders were their work 
demands, reduced staff and the inspection targets established by the MLE. These are LI 4’ 
explanations: "No, but I even think we should do it. We don’t do it due to our job routine, to the 
MLE goals. We end up by missing everything that is not centered in the main focus. We end up 
by not having meetings due to the excessive number of tasks we are assigned”. LI 11 
completed the thought: "We don’t have enough staff, then, even if you are free to produce a 
deeper analysis, you try to be objective. So you end up by shortening steps that could even be 
more important than disseminating and discussing, however, presently we don’t do this." 
By researching SIRENA’s file folder in December 2013, we found that only five of the 23 OA 
analysis reports were inserted in it. 
Only four LIs informed they usually forward an electronic copy of OA analysis report to the Head 
of Health and Safety Section. The other seven said they usually send only the printed report, as 
it is shown in LI 5’s comment: "No, I send to the Head of the Section only the printed analysis. I 
understand that sending it to SIRENA’s file is a decision of the head of the department.” LI 6 
adds: “I have sent the reports. But our bosses don’t ask us to it, there is no rule establishing LIs 
should send it. We had no training. I had no training on how to access it. Nobody ever told me 
anything about it”.  
Ten out of 11LIs reported that they do not access SIRENA’s file folder to get information about 
an accident with similar features to the one he is analyzing.  Five of them were unaware of how 
to access the files, as reported by LI 5: "I’m not used to collect accident information through 
SIRENA as I don’t know the system". In LI 7’s opinion: “No, I have never consulted it. I am 
interested in learning about it, but honestly I’ve never consulted it. Much more due to my lack of 
computer skills than anything else”. 
All inspectors unanimously believe that if a MLE database including the OA reports produced by 
the LIs was available for the general public to consult, it would be a very important tool to 
disseminate the lessons learned during the analysis. LI 8 stated: "I think it would be interesting, 
but I see it as almost an editorial work, catch reports and do their formatting. It would be very 
interesting, an indexed thing, machine type, type of situation, type of injury". The following 
comment was made by LI 1: "I think it is important that MLE allows everybody to access this 
database. People could go there, open it, look at it etc. It shouldn’t be a bureaucratic procedure, 
you shouldn’t have to ask formally if you wanted a copy." 
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4.4. Accident prevention (Link 5)   
We found that the preventive measures that companies should adopt to prevent recurrence of 
the events either were implemented during the accident analysis, or are being followed up by LI 
through other inspections (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 –Monitoring of the metal-mechanic industries involved with occupational accidents which were analyzed by 
SRTE/MG Labour Inspectors in 2011 and 2012. 
Events Rectification during inspection 
Occurrence of other 
inspection after analysis  
1, 3-7, 9-13, 15, 17, 
18, 20, 21 No No 
8,16 e 23 No Yes, but no rectification 
2, 14, 19, 22 Yes --- 
Source: SFIT/MLE 
 
Ten of the interviewed LIs declared that the MLE does not monitor the preventive measures 
prescribed to the companies. Due to the many goals set by the MLE LIs usually don’t have time 
to think about the LA after they finish their analysis and report. LI 3stated: "No, not usually. In 
this case it´s because of my work demands". LI 5 said: "The inspection targets to be reached 
are based on criteria such as the number of audited companies. This inhibits monitoring 
companies to check if suggested preventive measures have been adopted”. 
Two LIs pointed out that the work plan does not include returning to the companies to check if 
the factors that caused the accident were corrected. LI 6 adds: "In our agency there is no 
organization or system pointing at this direction". Referring to planning LI 8 said: "... planning is 
carried out by the heads of the department. So if I choose to return to the company to check it 
out, I know this will be an additional demand I will have to comply with”. 
However, all LIs agreed that this follow up would be significant to check if companies really 
implemented the prescribed preventive measures. 
All the eleven LIs also answered the following question (Table 4): "In case monitoring is 
included in the investigation process, do you consider it is important to have other stakeholders 
taking part? Which ones and why?”. 
  
Table 4 – Social actors who could monitor the implementation of preventive measures according to the Labour 
Inspectors. 
Social Actors Labour Inspector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Labour Union X X X  X X X X X  X 
Labour Prosecutors’ Office  X  X X X X X   X 
Criminal Prosecutors’ Office    X        
Labour Court    X        
Others X X        X  
Source: Interviews with 11 Labour Inspectors carried out by the author.  
 
Most LIs were in favor of the having the Unions taking part in this phase of the investigation as 
shown by LI 6 statement: "Unions presence in the workplace is bigger than ours." LI 2 agrees: 
“...  unions could be excellent partners in checking this for us."  
 
5. DISCUSSIONS  
 
5.1. Sending of reports 
Although MLE has been informed of 15 LAs, only 9 accident analysis reports were sent to the 
Labour Unions.  
Only in two occasions a copy of the OA analysis report was sent to the companies involved in 
the accidents. This only happened because they had requested MLE for it. The relevant 
information did not reach the people who could play an important role in preventing similar 
accidents. If the Occupational Safety and Health Services, the Internal Commission on Accident 
Prevention and the employers had a copy of the OA report they could discuss it and start 
formulating their accident preventing strategies. 
As two reports were not delivered by LIs, and two other were not forwarded to any of the 
interested groups, in spite of having been received and filed at the Health and Safety Section, 
probably no action will be taken concerning four of the 23 accidents. According to Lindberg and 
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Hansson (2006), after HAKO finishes an investigation, the group begins planning how the report 
will be distributed and who should receive it. Besides SWEA inspectors, usual recipients are 
other authorities, companies, workers and labour market organizations affected by the 
conclusions and suggestions of the reports. However, HAKO’s dissemination of results and 
reports were criticized by the companies which had somehow been involved with the accidents. 
An organization that accredited a crane involved in an accident said: "The measures taken by 
us did not result from the report, since we, as a company, did not receive it" (Lindberg and 
Hansson, 2006).   
 
5.2. Dissemination among Labour Inspectors 
LIs’ interviews showed that their strategy to gather information on accidents which have the 
same characteristics as the ones they are investigating is to exchange ideas with other LIs. 
There is no MLE action to stimulate LIs to disseminate information among themselves in a 
systematic way. 
When Lindberg and Hansson study was conducted (2006), SWEA’s central agency inspectors 
who did not participate in HAKO answered a questionnaire about dissemination of the 
information included in the accident reports. In most of the inspectors’ opinion (51%) the 
committee had done very little to disseminate the results. Five percent said they did not know 
how to get hold of the reports. The interviewed district inspectors reported that more affords 
should be devoted to spread effectively HAKO’s reports within SWEA. They thought having 
them simply published in the agency intranet was not enough.  
In order to confirm LIs information concerning shortage of staff, we requested the Head of 
Safety and Health Section, Mr. Francisco Alves do Reis Junior, for the exact number of LIs 
professionally linked to SRTE/MG in the early 2011. We found out there were 41 inspectors able 
to analyze labour accidents at this time. In December 2013, only 34 of them were still engaged 
in their activities at the Safety and Health Section, besides carrying out inspection actions in 
several other places in the state of Minas Gerais. 
The problem of LIs shortage has aggravated all over the country. In December 2010 there were 
3.061 LIs at the MLE. By the end of 2013 the numbers went down to only 2.7191 . 
Barbosa et al. (2012), through the Technical Note No. 4, from IPEA, - the Applied Economic 
Research Institute presented a study showing the need to increase the number of LIs in Brazil. 
The study pointed out that from all states in Brazil, Minas Gerais owned the second worst 
average of LIs for every thousand companies in 2008/2009. 
Regarding the MLE’s target, another of the claims put forward by the LIs, the action goals 
included in the SRTE/MG project "Work Accident Analysis" were estimated. The project aimed 
at analyzing 280 serious or fatal accidents in Minas Gerais in 2010. This figure rose from 380 in 
2011, to 386 in 2012, and reached 418 in 20132. 
The figures reported by the MLE concerning the whole country confirmed the increased demand 
for Labour Inspection (Table 5). OSH inspections increased year after year, as well as the 
number of workers involved in these inspections, but the amount of analyzed accidents did not 
change. While the number of LIs decreases year after year, the goals increase, confirming LIs 
statements. 
 
Table 5 – Number of OSH inspections, of workers reached and of occupational accidents (OAs) analyzed by the MLE in 
Brazil, from 2010 to 2012. 
Year Number of OSH 
inspections 
Number of 
workers 
Number of 
OAs analyzed  
2010 135.621 17.033.658 1944 
2011 138.143 17.534.078 1957 
2012 154.361 18.810.932 1902 
Source: <http://portal.mte.gov.br/seg_sau/resultados-da-fiscalizacao-em-seguranca-e-saude-no-trabalho-brasil-1996-a-
2009.htm>. 
 
                                                          
      1  
http://portal.mte.gov.br/data/files/FF8080814373793B0143D3F566471E0B/Resultados%20da%20Fiscali
za% 
       C3%A7%C3%A3o%20-%202003%20-%202013%20atualizado%20at%C3%A9%20dezembro.pdf 
     2 https://sfitweb.mte.gov.br/sfitweb/private/pages/metas_obrigatorias_consultar_resultado.jsf 
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We observed that there is lack of knowledge of some LI about the access to SIRENA’ files 
folder, although they received SIRENA’s e-mail address in Instruction No. 88/2010 (Brasil, 
2010b). As far as SRTE/MG is concerned LIs did not receive any training on the instruction 
contents and how to access SIRENA’s files folder. 
LIs showed they were unaware on how to send their reports through the Web. They also did not 
know whether the OA reports should always be forwarded to the Head of Health and Safety 
Section or only when they were requested.  
In general, LIs are not motivated to use the information kept in the reports sent to the 
SIRENA’s file.  
 
5.3. Dissemination outside the MLE 
The LIs’ interviews proved SIRENA’s files could become a database available for the general 
public. 
Jacobina et al. (2002) suggest that, health education and communication activities aimed at 
sharing information should be planned after LIs have finish their reports and have discussed 
them with stakeholders. 
Producing an open database is the last of the nine steps of an accident analysis presented in a 
study for HSE (UK) carried out by HRA (2001). 
To disseminate the lessons learned from the accident analysis, Drogaris (1993) proposes an 
occupational accident database network. He mentions the positive aspects of the Major 
Accident Reporting System - MARS, a database developed by the European Community (EC), 
which deals with accidents and near accidents involving chemicals. Nowadays 776 accident 
reports are available in the MARS for public consultation.  
In the United States (US), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health - NIOSH, 
public agency linked to the Ministry of Health, has kept the FACE program - Fatality 
Assessment and Control Evaluation - since 1982. Currently 1010 occupational accident reports 
are available for consultation and download3. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency which is in 
charge of investigating all civil flight accidents and significant accidents in the other means of 
transport in the US. Accident reports are the major products of a NTSB investigation. They 
provide details, analyze the evidences, conclusions and most probable causes of the accidents, 
as well as the related safety recommendations. 
On its website HSE presents detailed OA reports of various production areas. 
As we learned from those occupational accident databases, making information available is of 
great help for those who administrate, operate and design security systems for the most varied 
facilities. 
  
5.4. Monitoring preventive measures 
The interviews showed that the MLE’ LIs have not monitored the preventive measures. 
According to them, this is due to the insufficient number of LIs involved in these actions, to the 
excessive goals set by the MLE and to the lack of planning regarding follow up actions. 
MLE’s annual plan does not set that after the investigation is over LIs have to go back to the 
companies in order to monitor the implementation of measures to avoid the repetition of the 
unwanted events. Investigations alone are not able to stop workers’ injuries and deaths. 
Employers must adopt preventive measures and the MLE must monitor them.  
In 2010 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration - OSHA, an agency of the US Labor 
Department, approved, the Severe Violator Enforcement Program - SVEP. This program 
channels resources to inspect employers who have disrespected the occupational safety and 
health law through intentional and repeated violations (US Department of Labor, 2010). 
From Lindberg and Hansson study (2006) we can learn that the link regarding prevention is 
faulty. HAKO inspectors pointed out at an interview that the reports needed a better monitoring, 
although they had different views concerning who should be responsible for doing it. In the 
words of one of them: "Someone has to be responsible for seeing that these costly HAKO's 
recommendations are actually put into practice". 
Most of the SWEA’s district inspectors stated that monitoring results and recommendations of 
HAKO’s reports is very important, but that this should not be the committee’s job, but a task for 
the district inspector. 
                                                          
     3 http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/desc.html 
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Kjellén insists that a follow-up meeting is an important step in a thorough investigation. In his 
opinion the purpose of the meeting is to give people involved a chance to clarify doubts and 
provide further explanations. It also generates an atmosphere of trust and willingness to learn 
from the accident (Kjellén, 2000, quoted by Lindberg and Hansson, 2006). 
 
5.5. Joint actions 
LIs were in favor of carrying out joint actions with other public organizations such as the Labour 
Prosecutors’ Office, to enable them to help with monitoring. 
The Labour Unions, the institutions the LIs mostly remembered, can also play a key role in 
monitoring as they have contact with workers not only in the production sites, but also in the 
Internal Accident Prevention Commissions. 
  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aimed at analyzing the contribution of LI’s OA investigations in preventing new 
accidents. It was focused in the last two links of the "Chain Model": dissemination and 
prevention. 
Regarding dissemination, the survey findings show that information obtained through the OA 
analyses were not disseminated outside MLE.  
Only five reports were included in SIRENA’s file folder. Some LIs declared they did not access it 
because they had no idea they were expected to do it and because they did not know they were 
supposed to provide an electronic OA report and send it to the files database. 
In general, LIs have not discussed the OA analysis results with stakeholders. Their job demands 
and the many targets set by the MLE were mentioned as the main obstacles. Their attitudes 
prevent information from being spread among people who could help preventing similar 
accidents in the future. 
Accident databases such as the HSE (UK), NIOSH and NTSB (US), MARS (EC) are examples 
of what can be made available in the computers of the global information network concerning 
labour accidents and the measures to prevent them. 
Our study conclusion is that the communication link is faulty and the MLE must repair it. 
The prevention link structure also needs improvement. Workplace was not amended after the 
OA investigation analysis and companies were not monitored to check if the problems that 
caused the accident were solved. 
In Brazil the excessive goals set to LIs plus the reduction in their numbers have lead to 
difficulties in investigating companies where serious and fatal accidents have occurred. 
However, it is MLE obligation to assume this role until the companies implement the preventive 
measures. 
Due to all these considerations, it seems that the last two links of the "Chain Model" are 
weakened. Our research results are similar to the ones of Lindberg and Hansson study (2006). 
Consequently we concluded that the contribution of the OA investigations carried out by LI to 
prevent further accidents is ineffective regarding the "Chain Model".  The federal government 
should take actions to strengthen the dissemination and prevention links. 
It is necessary to change MLE institutional position towards entrepreneurs who keep unsafe 
machines constantly turning workers into victims. 
Before finishing  we would like to say that much of what was found in this study can be 
extended to other units of the MLE, not only because accidents are investigated in the same 
way in all of them, but also because of the reduced  number of LIs in activity. As there are no 
other studies on the subject presented in this paper, especially concerning the dissemination 
and prevention steps, we consider that further research is needed in order to foster debate and 
to complement the findings of this academic study. 
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Abstract 
Background and Aims: Over the last decade, Australian industry has overwhelming embraced 
the concept of Zero Harm as a mantra for espousing their commitment to safety, a workplace 
free from injury or harm. It is suggested that the underlying principle of zero harm is based on 
the philosophy of zero tolerance, that is certain actions will not be tolerated under any 
circumstance.  Zero harm is similar in some aspects of zero tolerance in that within a workplace, 
the concept of zero harm is creating an injury and incident free work environment were injuries 
are not acceptable and everything possible is undertaken to prevent them. Zero harm can also 
have many other derivatives including goal zero, the target is zero and vision zero.  Whilst this 
is an admirable goal, what does zero harm mean for employees, is it achievable and does it 
influence workplace behaviour? What is known is that government and industry organisations 
have acknowledged that Australia’s current safety performance is not acceptable or sustainable. 
With a cost of over $60 billion representing 4.8 of Australia’s GDP, every year over 260 workers 
die and over 680,000 suffer some form of workplace injury or illness. To address this, workplace 
safety legislation continues to evolve to provide governance for improved safety, and 
organizations have invested millions into zero harm initiatives including the use of behavioural 
safety programs and measuring safety performance against lagging and leading indicators. 
Zero harm proponents postulate that there can be no other goal other than zero harm, yet 
opponents argue that zero harm ideology is detrimental to improved safety performance through 
organisations setting goals that are unachievable, unbelievable and driving a culture of under 
reporting of incidents to achieve set key performance indicators.  As a result, the aim of this 
research was to undertake a quantitative examination through surveys with a large global oil 
and gas contracting company to evaluate the employees’ perceptions of zero harm, including 
its’ effectiveness and how the concept can be manifested and measured in the work 
environment.  Method: 299 employees working in various countries (110 from Australia and 189 
Asia Pacific workers) completed a battery of questionnaires that focused on obtaining 
perceptions regarding: (a) why there is a focus on zero harm, (b) who should promote the zero 
harm concept, (c) what is the meaning of zero harm and how should it be measured, and (d) 
whether the concept is achievable and relevant. Results: Analyses revealed that the largest 
proportion of employees believed the organisations focus on zero harm was based on the 
company caring for the workers safety followed by no incidents for the environment. Factor 
analysis of the items revealed a six factor structure with the largest factor representing the 
company’s commitment to zero harm.  Participants also reported a high level of consensus 
regarding workers self-efficacy to carrying out zero harm principles. Independent t-tests 
revealed significant differences between the genders and zero harm beliefs (e.g., males higher) 
as well as been employees and supervisors.  Conclusion: Taken together, employees correctly 
articulated the meaning of zero harm and also believed the principles were achievable.  This 
paper will further outline the key findings of zero harm as well as provide direction for future 
research.    
 
Keywords: Zero Harm, Workplace Safety, Safety Culture, Incidents and Accidents 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Within Australia, industry has overwhelming embraced the concept of zero harm as a mantra for 
espousing their commitment to workplace health and safety. Organisations such as BHP 
Billiton, Shell, Rio Tinto, BP, Xstrata, Anglo American, Blue Scope, Leighton’s, Tenix, Calibre, 
Energex, Ergon and One Steel to name a few, all use the term ‘zero harm’ and or other 
derivatives including; vision zero, goal zero, target zero, zero accidents and zero incidents as 
their mantra for improved safety performance. Within these organisations zero harm is an 
organisational goal of no accidents or injuries were all incidents are viewed as preventable and 
that there is no acceptable performance level other than zero harm. Whilst this is an admirable 
goal, empirical evidence is lacking regarding what does zero harm actually mean and is it 
achievable?  
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Believers of zero harm describe the concept as a workplace environment that is embodied by a 
core safety value, that no workplace death or injury is acceptable (O’Rourke, 2010).  This 
concept is extended through a commitment that if a single day without an injury can be 
achieved, then 365 days without an injury is also achievable (Burnham, 2015). Workplace 
Health and Safety Queensland (2010) also describe zero harm as, ‘no harm to anyone, anytime 
while at work’ and postulates that zero harm is an aspirational goal not a target.  
 
Conversely there are also sceptics of the zero harm concept who consider zero harm is neither 
credible or a realistic goal (Roughton & Mercurio, 2002).  For example, one of these opponents, 
Douglas (2011), suggests that zero harm is a safety concept based purely on hope and that a 
false belief that all incidents are preventable may actually cause harm. Spigener (2009) and 
O’Rourke (2010) suggest that zero harm is a program, not a target and that zero harm focuses 
on exposure rather than injury and that it recognises the dangers of underreporting of incidents, 
as well as a focus on lost time injuries that are generally associated with target driven system. 
Byard (2009) and Douglas (2011), suggest that the concept of zero harm is noble but it is an 
unachievable goal because people don’t believe that it is actually possible to achieve. As such, 
the zero harm goal is deemed as unrealistic or attainable and is regarded as utopic nonsense 
(Zwtsloot etal, 2013).  This can negatively affect the organisation’s safety culture and expose 
the organisation to potential under-reporting or hiding of incidents from employees, supervision 
and managers who may strive to avoid poor statistics (QRMC, 2011) through fear of failure or 
personal commitment. It is also interesting to note that opponents of zero harm have also 
coined the concept of binary thinking in their justification that zero harm is a workplace 
discourse and that one must want harm if they are not an advocate of zero harm (Long, 2012).  
Zero harm supporters counter this argument by reinforcing that moral condemnation of 
organisations would exist if they ‘just accepted’ incidents, especially those that may lead to 
fatalities or have significant environmental impact.  Despite the lack of evidence-based support, 
organisations continue to readily embrace zero harm as a mantra for a new paradigm of 
workplace safety to protect their employees from occupational-related harm (O’Rourke, 2010; 
Young 2014,).  This may continue to be problematic as there is currently limited scientific 
support in the field for the concept of zero harm (Zwtsloot, Aaltonen, Wybo, Saari, Kines & 
Beeck, 2013). 
 
In regards to the evolution of the concept, it is proposed that zero harm evolved from a quality 
‘zero defects’ that arose in the 1960’s (Zwtsloot etal, 2013). This ‘zero’ approach then led to the 
concept of ‘zero tolerance’ which was first used in the 1980’s in the United States of America in 
combating crime from the philosophical origins of the article ‘Broken Windows’ (Griffith 1999). 
The focus of zero tolerance has since evolved into other areas including violence at schools, 
bullying and drugs and alcohol (NASP, 2012). The underlying principle of zero tolerance is that 
certain actions will not be tolerated under any circumstance. More recently, the occupational 
safety movement embraced the concept.  Zero harm is similar in some aspects to zero 
tolerance in that within a workplace, the concept of zero harm is creating an injury and incident 
free work environment where injuries are not acceptable and everything possible is undertaken 
to prevent them (Spigener, 2009). Zero harm can also have many other derivatives including 
goal zero, the target is zero and vision zero.  Essentially, the vision is zero acceptance of 
injuries or fatalities (O’Rourke, 2010).  
 
From an industry perspective, the evidence is also mixed.  For example, the DuPont group are 
considered a global leader in safety (Zwtsloot etal, 2013). DuPont postulates that it is an 
organisation that believes all incidents and accidents are preventable, which is a core 
constituent of zero harm. However, DuPont recently had a chemical leak at a plant near La 
Porte in the US that resulted in the death of four employees (Chemistry World 2014). BHP and 
BP are a further two global industry examples that have a mantra of zero harm but who have 
recently have had significant incidents. For example, BHP Billiton recently (22 September 2012) 
had a contractor fatality at the Pinto Valley operation in Arizona USA (BHP Billiton, 2012), prior 
to this there was another BHP Billiton fatality (7 July 2011) at its port operations, Port Hedland, 
Western Australia (ABC News, 2011). From a global perspective, in the last decade, 45 workers 
died at BHP sites (Stevens, 2015). Further, BP at its Deepwater Horizon operations in 2010 had 
11 fatalities and an estimated 4.9 million barrels of crude oil spill, which is the largest marine 
spill in history (BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation report, 2010). BP has also agreed 
to compensate the US government and five states $24 Billion for damages stemming from this 
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incident. This includes $5.5 Billion as a civil penalty under the US Clean Water Act (AFP, 2015).  
This evidence casts further doubt on the efficiency of zero harm to create lasting change in the 
real world.   
 
Despite the above, the concept of zero harm has continued to evolve, and has now become not 
only a mantra for organisations but also a fixed identity which has become an unquestioned 
concept (Long, 2012; Zwtsloot etal, 2013). Simplistically, as inferred by Long (2012), this zero 
harm concept is absolute, as there is no flexibility in its concept. In fact, those that do not agree 
with the concept of zero harm are labeled and perceived to agree that it is acceptable that 
incidents and injuries will occur. This viewpoint has a fatalistic approach and subjects those that 
are not advocates of zero harm are powerless against incidents from happening.  Taken 
together, there is considerable debate about the conceptual value and impact of zero harm on 
actual occupational safety.  As a result, it may be argued that the first step is to examine 
workers perceptions and beliefs about zero harm, in regards to whether the concept is a viable 
initiative to promote and is accepted by those most at risk of workplace harm.  Such research is 
lacking within the literature, and the current study aims to contribute to the scant endeavors that 
have investigated workers’ perceptions regarding the meaning and value of zero harm as a 
workplace initiative that needs to be embraced in order to improve safety.    
 
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
2.1 Participants 
The sample consisted of 299 workers employed in varying countries from a large global oil and 
gas contactor. Of the 299 participants, 77% (n = 229) were male.  Participants were aged 19 to 
68 (M = 38.44, SD = 10.04). The majority of participants (60%; n = 179) were classified as 
employees (e.g., Accountant, Operations Coordinator, Officer) and 36% of respondents (n = 
108) worked in supervisory or managerial positions (e.g., Operations Manager, Supervisor, 
Regional Manager). Participants’ experience in their current positions ranged from less than one 
year (.08) to 34 years.  On average, participants had approximately 5 years of experience in 
their current roles (SD = 4.96), and 5.29 (SD = 5.30).  The largest proportion of the sample 
worked in Australia (n = 110; 37%), followed by Singapore (n = 46; 15%), Indonesia (n = 26; 
9%) and Malaysia (n = 20; 7%). Several participants reported working in more than one country 
(n = 9; 3%) or across the Asia Pacific region (n = 5; 2%), outlined in Table 1 
 
Table 1 Percentage of participants by country 
Countries Participated Total surveys received (n) Percentage by country 
(%) 
Australia  
Bangladesh  
Brunei  
Singapore 
China  
Indonesia 
Malaysia  
Thailand  
Vietnam  
Papua New Guinea  
Philippines  
New Zealand  
Myanmar  
More than one country 
recorded 
No country recorded 
 
110 
11 
17 
46 
19 
26 
20 
19 
6 
1 
4 
1 
1 
14 
4 
37 
4 
6 
15 
6 
9 
7 
6 
2 
.3 
1 
.3 
.3 
5 
1 
 
 
2.2 Instrument 
A questionnaire was developed that required participants to rate each statement based on their 
own individual perception or exposure to zero harm. The development of the quantitative self-
reported questionnaire included 98 items which were informed by the theoretical outcomes from 
a literature review and supported by various adaptations of current safety culture and safety 
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climate questionnaires.  For example, safety questionnaire’s as evaluated by Diaz-Cabrera, 
Hernandez-Fernaud and Isla-Diaz (2007). All participants within the questionnaire were asked 
to express their views in regards to specific quantitative statements utilising scores on a Likert 
5-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral/unsure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly 
agree. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
The questionnaire was distributed by internal (organisational) mail, email, in person and/or at 
toolbox talks or team meetings to a cross section of the workforce that includes; management, 
supervision, general employees, tradespersons, and technical employees. Participants 
individually completed the self-reported questionnaire, which was made available either in hard 
copy paper format or via the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) on line ‘key survey’ 
electronic tool. Participation was confidential and anonymous.  The participants were required to 
respond to statements based on their perceptions and experiences at their current workplace. In 
total, there are approximately 2700 employees within the sample organisation. Approximately 
11% participated within the research project. The undertaking of the survey was conducted 
primarily at the workplace however, the option to complete the questionnaire outside of the work 
environment was also provided. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A factor analysis was conducted on 83 items in the survey (i.e., items 11 – 31 and 36 – 98).  
The Kaiser–Meyer-Olkin (KMO = .92) measure confirmed that the sample was highly suitable 
for the analysis and, similarly, Bartlett’s test of sphericity X2 (2145) = 12056, p < .001 indicated 
that there were sufficiently large correlations between items to support this analysis.  An initial 
principal axis analysis with varimax rotation showed that 18 items (i.e., items 24, 28, 48, 52, 53, 
68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 82, 89, 96, 97, 98) did not load onto a factor and were therefore 
removed from the analysis.  A second principal axis analysis with varimax rotation was carried 
out showing six factors that had an Eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 as well as a minimum 
of 4 items making up each factor.  Together, these six factors accounted for 58.42% of the 
variance (see Table 2 for the individual factor loadings).  Fourteen items loaded highly onto 
Factor 1 which represented the company’s commitment to Zero Harm and accounted for 
37.78% of the total variance; fourteen items also loaded highly onto Factor 2 which represented 
worker self-efficacy to carry out Zero Harm principles and accounted for 6.69% of the total 
variance; four items loaded highly onto Factor 3 which represented the impact of the safety 
committee and accounted for 4.52% of total variance; five items loaded highly onto Factor 4 
which represented negative work practices and accounted for 3.54% of the total variance; nine 
items loaded highly onto Factor 5 which represented prevention of incidents and accidents and 
accounted for 3.11% of the total variance; and ten items loaded highly onto Factor 6 which 
represented worker recognition and reward and accounted for 2.77% of total variance. 
 
Table 2: Factor Structure of the Zero Harm Survey 
Item F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
My company has clear safety rules that 
support the zero harm vision  
.79      
I believe that the safety standards and rules 
of this company are very high and support 
the companies zero harm policy 
.78      
The company policy and goals clearly 
support its commitment to safety and 
incident injury free workplace 
.77      
The company’s safety programs and 
actions clearly support its commitment to 
safety and an incident injury free workplace 
.68      
This company demonstrates that it is very 
serious about improving its safety 
performance 
.65      
My company has a safety management 
system that provides procedures and 
processes that will ensure the safety of its 
employees 
.61      
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My company ensures that all workers are 
instructed and trained on what their safety 
roles and responsibilities are 
.60      
My Supervisors / managers regularly 
discuss safety  
.56      
Company has safety programs to improve 
safety that focus on zero harm 
.50      
Safety is considered first in every activity .50      
The company provides me with the correct 
training to do my job safely 
.48      
I have a formal performance review 
undertaken that includes my personal safety 
performance 
.44      
Incident investigations are undertaken and 
outcomes are communicated to all 
employees 
.43      
My supervisor will regularly ask me about 
safety concerns or ideas to improve safety 
.42      
       
I always follow the highest levels of safety 
when I carry out my job 
 .78     
I always use the correct safety procedure to 
carry out my job 
 .74     
I always use the correct safety equipment to 
do my job 
 .73     
If I observe a co-worker working unsafely or 
at risk, I will intervene.   
 .69     
I always place extra effort to improve the 
safety within the workplace 
 .67     
I always follow all safety rules  .65     
I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that 
will help to improve safety within the 
workplace 
 .59     
I always report all incidents and accidents 
that I am involved in. 
 .57     
I will praise a co-worker if they are doing the 
job safely 
 .56     
I make an effort to promote zero harm 
within the organization 
 .56     
I always undertake every effort to maintain 
or improve my personal safety 
 .54     
I can stop my job if the job is unsafe  .54     
My supervisor demonstrates high safety 
behaviours 
.40 .44     
My supervisor always ensures that safety is 
prioritized over production 
 .41     
       
The safety committee is actively involved in 
promoting safety 
  .80    
I am kept informed of the safety committees 
activities 
  .79    
My department has a safety committee   .75    
My department has its own safety 
improvement plan 
  .46    
       
My supervisor sometimes encourages at 
risk behaviour or overlooks hazards to get 
the job done 
   -.66   
My supervisor will turn a blind eye if I have 
to do a job unsafely if the task is critical 
   -.60   
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Our company only measures injuries or 
incidents 
   -.58   
If an employee is injured they will be 
blamed or punished 
   -.58   
When my supervisor is not present, I tend to 
take more risks in doing my work 
   -.57   
I believe that if an accident or incident does 
happen the worker will be blamed 
   -.56   
I will take short cuts in my job due to work 
pressures 
   -.55   
I believe that you will be injured at work 
during your working career whilst working 
with this company 
   -.45   
It is inevitable that accidents and incidents 
will happen in this company 
   -.45   
       
My workmates believe that all incidents and 
accidents are preventable 
    .76  
I believe that all incidents and accidents are 
preventable 
    .74  
I believe that zero harm is achievable within 
my company 
    .66  
I believe that all operating exposures can be 
controlled and or safeguarded 
    .52  
If employees follow the company’s safety 
management system there will be no 
incidents or accidents 
    .46  
       
The company rewards it employees for 
working safely 
     .69 
Our company recognizes and celebrates 
safety milestones 
     .65 
I am praised by my manager or supervisor 
for working safely 
     .61 
My work team is praised for working safely      .55 
The company has a recognition program 
that is focused on improving safety and 
achieving zero harm 
     .42 
 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the factors.  Specifically, Factor 2 
had the highest mean (M = 4.23, SD = 0.53), showing that, on average, participants agreed with 
the items regarding worker’s self-efficacy to carry out Zero Harm principles.  Factor 4 had the 
lowest mean (M = 2.49, SD = 0.74), showing that, on average, participants disagreed with the 
items regarding the existence of negative work practices.  
 
Table 3: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for the Factors 
Factor M SD 
1. Company’s commitment to Zero Harm 4.22 0.55 
2. Worker self-efficacy to carry out Zero Harm Principles 4.23 0.53 
3. Impact of safety committee 3.63 0.88 
4. Existence of negative work practices 2.49 0.74 
5. Prevention of incidents and accidents 3.96 0.73 
6. Worker recognition and reward 3.80 0.77 
Note. Each of these items were measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = 
disagree,  
3 = neutral/unsure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
 
Of the individual survey items, Table 4 shows the four items which participants were most likely 
to agree with.  Specifically, participants were most likely to agree with the statement, ‘I feel that 
it is important to maintain safety at all times’ (M = 4.67, SD = 0.52) and were next most likely to 
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agree with ‘I believe it is important to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents within the 
workplace (M = 4.66, SD = 0.52) 
 
Table 4: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for the Highest Ranked Survey Items 
Item M SD 
1. I feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times 4.67 0.52 
2. I believe that it is important to reduce the risk of accidents and  
    Incidents within the workplace 
4.66 0.52 
3. I believe that I have the right to challenge, or refuse to work when 
    placed in an unsafe or at risk conditions without fear of reprisal 
4.58 0.57 
4. I can stop my job if the job is unsafe 4.56 0.57 
Note. Each of these items were measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree,  
3 = neutral/unsure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
 
Table 5 shows means and standard deviations for core Zero Harm questions.  In response to 
the question ‘Why do you believe your company has a focus on Zero Harm?’ participants, were 
most likely to agree with the response ‘My company cares about their workers safety’ (M = 4.49, 
SD = 0.56). For the question ‘Which of the following groups have a major role in determining the 
zero harm policy of your company?’ participants were most likely to agree with the response 
‘Company senior management’(M = 4.51, SD = 0.62). For ‘What do you believe is the meaning 
of zero harm?, participants, on average, were most likely to agree with the response ‘No harm 
to anyone, anytime while at work (M = 4.73, SD = 0.52).   For ‘In your opinion how does your 
company measure zero harm?’, participants, on average, were most likely to agree with two 
responses, that were  ‘No Injuries (First aid, Medical Treatment or Lost Time)’ (M = 4.47, SD = 
0.67) and ‘No Lost Time Injuries’ (M = 4.47, SD = 0.67). 
 
Independent-samples t-tests were carried out to determine if there were any significant 
differences between gender and job title on each of the factors.  With regard to gender, a 
significant difference between males and females was found for Factor 2 (i.e., worker self-
efficacy to carry out zero harm principles). Specifically, males scored significantly higher (M = 
4.31, SD = 0.53) than females (M = 4.15, SD = 0.50), t (276) = 2.15, p < .05 (two-tailed).  For 
job position, a significant difference between employees and supervisors/management for 
Factor 4 (i.e., existence of negative work practices).  Specifically, employees scored 
significantly higher (M = 2.62, SD = 0.73) than supervisors/management (M = 2.26, SD = 0.71), 
t (274) = 3.93, p < .001. 
 
Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of the Zero Harm Questions 
Question M (SD) 
Why do you believe your company has a focus on Zero Harm? 
     My company cares about their workers safety 
     My company does not want to be prosecuted 
     Community expectations 
     Company promotion 
     Shareholder expectation 
     Union pressure 
 
 
4.49 (0.56) 
4.30 (0.85) 
4.08 (0.74) 
4.08 (0.78) 
4.08 (0.79) 
3.24 (1.08) 
Which of the following groups have a major role in determining the zero harm 
policy of your company? 
     Legislators 
     The community 
     Share Holders 
     Company senior management 
     Union organisations 
 
 
 
3.98 (0.81) 
3.72 (0.94) 
3.83(0.91) 
4.51 (0.62) 
3.39(1.05) 
What do you believe is the meaning of zero harm? 
     No harm to anyone, anytime while at work 
     No Incidents (Environmental impacts) 
     No Lost Time Injuries 
     No Injuries or incidents 
     I do not know 
 
 
4.73 (0.52) 
4.49 (0.75) 
4.55 (0.67) 
4.57 (0.64) 
1.71 (0.94) 
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In your opinion how does your company measure zero harm? 
     No Injuries (First aid, Medical Treatment or Lost Time) 
     No Incidents (Environmental impacts) 
     No Lost Time Injuries 
     No Injuries or incidents 
     I do not know 
 
4.47(0.67) 
4.35 (0.75) 
4.47 (0.67) 
4.46 (0.63) 
1.77 (0.95) 
Note. Each of these items were measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree,3 = 
neutral/unsure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Organisations seeking a paradigm shift in their safety performance have adopted the mantra of 
zero harm as a methodology to eliminate workplace accidents, a philosophy and belief that all 
accidents are preventable (Zwtsloot etal., 2013). This study has reviewed this concept by 
undertaking an exploration from an employees’ perspective, to examine the perceptions and 
exposure to zero harm from a workers’ view point. A central aim of the study was to examine 
the perceived meaning of zero harm.  The majority of the participants agreed that it was no 
harm to anyone, anytime while at work.  This provides support for the assertion that zero harm 
is instrumental in arguing against common fatalism (Zwtsloot etal., 2013).  In contrast, workers 
were less likely to believe the concept emerges from union pressure or shareholder 
expectations.   
 
As demonstrated within the factor analysis, the highest agreement among the participants was 
the company’s commitment to zero harm and this commitment is based on the foundation that 
the company cares about their workers safety. As one would expect, senior management was 
seen as the driving role in determining the zero harm approach for workplace safety within the 
organisation. Interestingly, in regards to how the company measures zero harm, there was an 
equal opinion of ‘no injuries including first aid, medical treatments or lost time injuries’ and ‘no 
lost time injuries’. The latter, demonstrates the importance of reducing lost time injuries from the 
perception of the respondents but may suggest that zero harm can still be achieved if other 
types of injuries that do not include lost time injuries still exist (i.e., first aid or medical treatment 
injuries). It is well established that the reporting of lost time injuries (LTI’s) is problematic 
through misrepresentation and or underreporting (Oleinick 1993; Probst 2008 & Young 2013). 
 
It is also noteworthy that, on average, most participants reported high self-efficacy levels to 
carry out zero harm principles which suggest they are empowered to take responsibility for their 
own safe behaviours. Correspondingly there was a high level of disagreement in relation to 
negative safe work practices suggesting that whilst they may occur, they are not proportionally 
at the same level as workers undertaking safe behaviours. It is also interesting to note that male 
respondents indicated significantly high levels of self-efficacy to carry out zero harm principles 
than females.  Further research is required to determine the origins of such possible gender 
differences.  As one would expect, employees due to their exposure scored significantly higher 
than supervisors and managers on their perceptions of the existence of negative work practices.  
 
There is a lack of scientific evidence to suggest that zero harm is an achievable end state, if a 
concentrated effort on zero harm will lead to an improvement of workplace safety or if 
employees even believe in the concept. Zero harm organisations have demonstrated significant 
improvements in their lagging indicators especially the lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) 
however, underreporting and manipulation of incidents are major obstacles to verifying their 
accuracy. This research paper has moved from an organisational perspective to an employee 
perspective to gain a workers perspective on zero harm. This has demonstrated that within this 
organisation, there is a strong support for the zero harm and its application within the company. 
Although, there is still significant research to be undertaken to see if zero harm can truly be 
understood and achieved. This paper provides a platform for future research and in particular 
the direction for scientific research into the manifestation of zero harm within an organisation 
including its constructs and strategies. Further research is also warranted on the impact of zero 
harm discourse on workers, supervisors and managers. 
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Abstract 
Notwithstanding the Italian strong commitment of recent years, the number of occupational 
fatalities is still impressive, at least in terms of frequency rate; moreover, the recent crisis 
and large-scale job reductions made the data analysis somehow more complex. 
The statistical databases, even if based on the questionable Heinrich assumptions, can be a 
precious instrument for the prevention of work related accidents. Some databases evolved to 
include information on the violations of the safety standards, which play a pivotal role for an 
exhaustive Risk Assessment (in absence of this datum only Attention Indexes can be inferred). 
Anyhow, an unbiased understanding of the embedded causes (Root Causes) of the work-
related accidents is certainly necessary, to integrate and complete the information from 
databases, and attain an effective occupational risk prevention. A limited comprehension of 
the Root Causes laying at the very base of the events chain leading to the accident can in 
fact involve slapdash remedies, occasional audits, and inspections clearly inadequate to 
highlight and control the criticalities of complex activities. 
Since some years, our research team developed the original CCCP (Computer-aided Cause 
Consequence  for Prevention) technique, based on extensive investigation on the different 
approaches to the work-related accident analysis. The CCCP technique focuses on the in-depth 
examination of each accident, and its two-way approach makes possible both a clear 
understanding of the Chain of Intermediate Events up to the Root Causes, and to verify 
and compare the expectable effectiveness of possible preventive measures. 
The research group tested the CCCP technique and software on a number of work related 
accidents, analyzed to support Prosecutor Investigations in different ATECO sectors, gaining 
interesting results, in an analysis environment complete, user friendly and, thanks to its System 
Approach, immune from errors due to subjective judgments or hasty evaluations. The last pages 
summarize and discuss the results of the analysis of some accidents. 
 
Keywords: Occupational Safety and Health, Accident computer-aided analysis for Prevention, 
 
1. FOREWORD 
The use of the statistical data on work related accidents is derived from the Heinrich (1931) 
approach, which suggests that prevention can be implemented based on information on the 
frequency of deviations from a correct working situation: this led to the development of very 
large databases on injuries and fatalities in many industrialized countries. The Heinrich model is 
however based on a “Person Approach” (the misconduct of victims or colleagues is the main 
cause of deviation, in spite of the obvious consideration that they and they only are in direct 
contact with the Hazard Factor): the resulting accident analysis is often incorrect, and useless 
for improvements of the safety system. Therefore, the Heinrich model is not free from criticism, 
both in itself (Reason,2000), and in terms of representativeness of the input data 
(Manuele,2011), and hence at least obsolete for the modern safety science. 
Even so, accident databases can still be of help for prevention: the Attention Index - A.I., 
focusing the inspector’s attention towards the more common direct causes of the event makes 
possible effective inspections. 
However, some common errors and misuses leading to a biased forecasting of expectable 
accident rates, and thus to important distortions in the prevention action should be avoided, the 
most common being: 
1. reduced statistical basis (at regional or even smaller scale, without consideration of the 
local industrial situation), 
2. poor analysis of boundary data (e.g. economical and occupational situation), 
3. wrong range of time for the aggregation of the accident data, so that exceptional events 
may come as a surprise. Worst, the lack of information on the violations of Safety 
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 Standards, the consequent impossibility of a direct calculation of the accident 
Probability of Occurrence, and the misinterpretation of A.I. as a Risk Index lead directly 
to an incorrect Risk Assessment. 
The introduction of a well tested Guideline for an effective and exhaustive Hazard Identification 
and Occupational Risk Assessment and Management (originally discussed in Faina et al, 
1996-97, recently reproposed in Borchiellini et al, 2015) made possible to bypass the 
problem. The general approach of the Guideline, based on the Expected Frequency of 
Occurrence Level -which formalizes the concept that only fulfilling up to date OS&H 
technical standards and regulations can grant a zeroed or minimized risk- is summarized in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Guidelines for Risk Analysis and Management approved by the SCHMOEI EC Commission (1996), 
extensively and successfully tested in a number of activities of different ATECO sectors. 
 
ü Such an approach presents however some limitations: 
ü  an apodictic faith in the updated technical safety standards, TLVs, etc. is necessary, the 
general principles –such as the Commandment thou shalt not kill - being of no technical 
help; 
ü  conditions not covered by detailed technical standards cannot be directly treated: this is 
taken into account in the aforesaid Guidelines, and some analysis techniques are 
suggested, e.g. in terms of Occupational Volumes techniques to manage the 
interferences; 
ü  the management of Residual Risks requires further special analysis covering new 
materials and substances, technical and organization progress, etc. 
On the other hand, the availability of statistical accident databases stimulated attempts of data 
mining and interpretation, covering different aspects and making possible different results. 
Data in general (and work related accident data in our case) consist in fact in the 
information collected along the investigation process. They are pieces of information either 
written, spoken, stored or symbolized, that can be used as a basis for making references or 
inferences, for an in-depth understanding of the chain of causes leading to each event, the final 
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 target being to correctly identify the preventive measures to implement in similar situations. 
Data may be numerical or non-numerical: 
ü numerical data (e.g. age of the worker involved, years of experience, number of lost 
days, etc.) consist of values that can be numerically quantified. Data retrieval is then 
possible in a number of ways (see Figure 2), computers being since many years the 
simplest means. 
 
 
Figure 2 – A step in the history of Cataloging Systems (Jolley,1968). 
 
ü the non-numerical data cannot be directly quantified, the problem being that, while some of 
the non-numerical data can be easily associated to numerical codes (e.g. sex, damaged 
body part, etc.), and then treated as numerical data, this is not the case of the Accident 
Investigation Summaries. Since the reports of investigation contain a large amount of 
information in the form of textual description, a series of attempts researchers tried to 
develop retrieval techniques, sometimes with odd results (e.g. from of unchecked use of 
automatic multiple word search programs). Obviously, the use of keywords can simplify 
the problem, each of them being subsequently associated to a numerical code, but a 
large quantity of information is inevitably lost: the full report can be available only in written 
lines/pages annexed to each form, but not automatically analyzed). 
Nowadays, common approaches are based on advanced data mining and processing 
techniques, and methodologies commonly based on Root Causes Analysis In our experience 
Root Causes Analysis is effective where well-established working context and procedures are 
available (e.g. in surgery operating rooms), but often misleading in ordinary industrial situations, 
since the organizational and technical flaws can be almost completely overlooked. 
A research work care of CS&P (Research Center for Culture of Safety and Prevention) of 
Politecnico di Torino, produced interesting results based on analysis with clustering 
algorithms, fuzzy logic or statistical learning algorithms inspired by biological neural networks 
(e.g. Demichela et al, 2007). Thanks to the substantial evolution of some databases (e.g. US 
DOL OSHA Agency), including information on the violations of the safety standards, in some 
cases a careful analysis of technological modifications can make available useful correlations 
(Camisassi et al., 2004, 2006). In this area, the CCCP (Computer-aided Cause Consequence 
for Prevention) technique, an original evolution from CCA 
- Cause-Consequence Analysis (itself a combination of FTA - Fault Tree Analysis & ETA – 
Event Tree Analysis), represents a result of particular relevance. The CCCP technique is 
special for the in-depth examination of each single accident and countermeasures 
identification, and free from problems due to data availability and quality, 
In the final release (Table 1,right), after evolution and tests (see e.g. Demichela et al, 2011- 
Luzzi et al, 2015), the CCCP approach can effectively support the discussed Guideline. It 
can in fact contribute to correctly understand the preconditions leading to the very Root 
Causes of work-related accidents -a demanding task in complex situations where the most 
serious criticalities may be concealed, the Iceberg analogy common to clarify this 
concept- and in the definition of the preventive countermeasures. 
The software structure is of valuable aid, leaving however the analyst always free to make 
independent decisions, since reduces the possibility of errors due to subjective judgment or 
hasty evaluation, and the too easy conclusion involving some victim’s misbehavior. 
 
2. THE CCCP APPROACH 
The CCCP technique focuses on the Root Causes of work related accidents, the target of the 
analysis being a thorough investigation of the chain of indirect causes, which, in logically 
connected steps from the Top Event to the Root Causes, produced the accident. 
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 Prevention countermeasures are then sought not only for each cause, but also for combinations 
of intermediate causes, so that a number of links can be developed correlating the possible 
indirect causes of the event to the corrective measures. A net of corrective measures is then 
created, among which it is possible to select some of the cause- intervention connections, 
to ensure the safety of the whole system. 
The Root Causes adopted for the model grant the development of the analysis according to a 
System Approach. 
The peculiarity of the technique is the capacity of modeling the system both in backward 
sense following a chain of Intermediate Events in order to identify the Root Causes of a Top 
Event, and in forward sense, starting from the Root Causes, and discussing the most suitable 
prevention measures. Table 1(right) shows a graphical demonstration: the two arrows depict 
the backward path of event causes investigation and the forward path of prevention. The 
construction of the tree is not a linear process, but may imply a number of iterations before 
reaching a final configuration that adapts to the specific case. 
The integrate software environment Infortuni sul lavoro (Work related accidents) & Root Causes 
translates the theoretical model into a useful computer guide. All the occurrences are strictly 
codified to make the analysis objective and free from ambiguity. 
q Infortuni sul lavoro is structured in 11 sections, covering a large number of different 
aspects of the context. The order of filling is dynamic and there is always the possibility to 
add or correct the information previously typed. In addition, the selection of some options 
can condition the filling and determine the request of a more specific description on the 
topic; 
q Root Causes, structured in 8 sections, two of them able to automatically suggest optimized 
solutions, however modifiable by the analyst, is much more rigid, and the order to fill out 
the sections is pre-defined. Moreover, the analyst can make choices only among controlled 
options. These restrictions ensure the total absence  of subjectivity, and provide a valuable 
help to go in deep in the analysis, posing a number of questions and stressing the links 
between different events. 
The codification of options respects as far as possible the ESAW protocol (see Table 2, and 
Figure 3) and drop down menus are extensively used to avoid the possibility that a single 
parameter, defined with different descriptors, could not be univocally recognized. 
An application on a real case follows, complete with the most clarifying forms, as a 
demonstration of the compilation process and the output of the model. 
 
     Table1 – home screen of the CCCP software (left) and flow chart of the accidents analysis two-way approach (right). 
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 Table 2 – Categories of codification. 
Category of events erences at the origin of elaborated 
lists 
Number of possible associations 
Direct Cause ESAW 1 
I level Intermediate Causes ESAW More than one 
II level Intermediate Causes Original elaboration More than one 
Root Causes Original elaboration (Figure 3) More than one 
Macro-categories of Causes Principles of Risk  Assessment & Management 2, also simultaneous 
 
Figure 3 – the classification adopted for the Root Causes. 
 
3. EXTENDED EXAMPLE OF THE CCCP BASED ANALYSIS 
 
3.1. The accident 
The accident selected for the extended example occurred during the realization of a tunnel for an 
hydro plant. During the shotcrete-multiple layers lining phase, a portion of cement detached from 
the high side of the vault struck the operator causing fatal injuries (see Figure 4). 
The analysis made possible both to clarify the circumstances related to the operating 
situation, and to understand in- deep the chain of causes leading to the event: inadequate 
techniques and technologies selection, poor work organization and lacking supervision. 
In detail, the existing document of Risk Assessment appears to be the result of a precompiled 
general form, certainty not special for the operation under exam, so that the Hazard 
Identification Technique used is likely a general-purpose checklist.  The  evaluation  of  both  
Severity  of  Damage (ED)  and  Probability  of  Occurrence  (P)  are the result  of a subjective 
risk matrix, which neglects the Contact Factor (FC). A window of the CCCP-Infortuni sul 
lavoro software (see Figure 5) underlines that the evaluation of the risk is subjective. 
Furthermore, the Exposure Model of workers is absent from the Risk Evaluation Document, and 
the solutions for management of risks cover just a few of processes. 
 
 
Figure 4 – The area of event: the shotcrete machine and (D, top-right) the area interested by the cement fall. 
D 
572
  
Figure 5 – Risk Analysis window from the CCCP-Infortuni sul Lavoro software. Note: a) in the top lines the 11 sections 
covering different aspects of the context, and the command Cause Analysis and Prevention, activating the Root Causes 
subroutine; b) the presence of the LF (load file) and RF (read file) commands, to upload/download extended documents 
in .pdf format, and make comprehensive information available. 
 
3.2. The accident causes 
The compilation of CCCP-Root Causes permits the creation of a cause network, capable to 
represent complex cases, with multiple correlations. Table 3 summarizes the identified causes: 
 
Table 3 – Causes of the accident 
For the falling of the cement block For the presence of the worker in the area of impact 
 General structural aspects; 
 Machine; 
 Supervision of working operations; 
 Procedures for machine operators. 
 General systems for environmental conditions control; 
 Machine (again); 
 Functional volumes; 
 Procedures for workers. 
 
In the screen reproduced in Figure 6, the letters represent the existence of AND-Gates or 
OR-Gates connecting the accident  causes  (the different  condition  derive from the input  data 
introduced).  The  check  indications  define if the causes ARE or ARE NOT necessary to the 
occurrence of the event (this leading to the identification of the Minimal Cut Set). This distinction 
is essential to understand the difference between the possible/essential prevention measures. 
573
  
Figure 6 – Causes Analysis window, form the CCCP-Root Causes software. 
 
3.3. Suggestions on the prevention countermeasures 
As shown in Figure 7, the CCCP-Root Causes presents the possible prevention solutions in a 
general form, in line with which the analyst must define, for each case, the implementation 
issues. These decisions are stored in the software, and with the increase in the number of 
analyzed cases, consequently increases the number of examples to which to refer. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Root Causes detail and linked preventive solutions, as resulting from the last window of the CCCP-Root 
Causes software. 
 
The model proposes two different solutions, not mutually exclusive but complementary (see 
Table 4): on one hand, the minimal cut set is enhanced, and the user can select the minimal 
solution set suitable to break the chain of events that generated the special accident under 
exam. In addition, other possible accident causes solved with the same set of measures are 
enhanced, to underline the convenience in realizing such measures. On the other hand, since 
the software highlighted all the other Root Causes in the scenario under consideration, it is 
important not to neglect any of them and to solve them all to make safe the whole system and 
realize a more complete prevention. 
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 Table 4 – Minimal (left), and Complete (right) Solution Charts. 
ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 
Internal injuries Multiple injuries 
↓ 
DIRECT CAUSE 
Stucking, trapping, crushing under 
↓ 
I LEVEL INTERMEDIATE CAUSE 
-Breakage of material, at joints or connection, of material 
agent 
-Presence of the victim that produces an hazard for himself 
↓ 
MINIMAL SET OF II LEVEL INTERMEDIATE CAUSES 
-General systems 
-Suitability for specific work in the context 
-Moving means/machines/systems/equipment, human 
controlled 
-Procedures for machine operators 
MINIMAL SET OF PREVENTION MEASURES 
-Technical, structural and systemic solutions for work 
environment management 
-Technological/systemic solution to manage residual risks 
of specific working situations 
-Technological/systemic solution to manage interferences: 
specific working situations 
-Operational procedures for specific working situations 
FURTHER CAUSES SOLVED BY THE MINIMAL SET OF 
PREVENTION MEASURES 
-General structural aspects 
-Procedures for workers 
-Information, formation and training 
ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 
Internal injuries Multiple injuries 
↓ 
DIRECT CAUSE 
Stucking, trapping, crushing under 
↓ 
I LEVEL INTERMEDIATE CAUSE 
-Breakage of material, at joints or connection, of material 
agent 
-Presence of the victim that produces an hazard for himself 
↓ 
II LEVEL INTERMEDIATE CAUSES 
-General structural aspects 
-General systems 
-Suitability for specific work in the context 
-Moving means/machines/systems/equipment, human 
controlled 
-Supervision 
-Procedures for workers 
-Procedures for machine operators 
-Information, formation and training 
PREVENTION MEASURES 
-Technological/systemic solution to manage residual risks 
of specific working situations 
-Definition of processes and stages for different workers at 
different levels 
-Operational procedures for specific working situations 
-Procedures for check, control and 
identification/warning/management of basic functional 
deviations 
 
4. COMPENDIUM FORMS ON SOME ACCIDENTS ANALYZED WITH THE CCCP 
TECHNIQUE 
 
Accident    # 1 
ACTIVITY SECTOR: F43 Construction - Specialized NOTES: operation carried out with a rented MEWP 
CONSEQUENCE Non Fatal > 30 ld 
 
gutter collapse 
 
results of the MEPW collapse 
The MEWP lost stability due to incorrect operation 
exceeding the maximum lateral manual force. 
The MEWP basis - positioned without preliminary 
analysis- skidded on cobblestones and got stuck 
against the building wall. 
A progressive deformation of the column on the 
opposite brick fence reduced the falling velocity of 
the platform and the operator survived by clinging 
to an orange tree. 
 
 
 
 
Accident causes chain Possible corrective actions  
 
 
 
 
1 Operator injuries Correct use of the safety belt IX 
2 Platform falling trajectory n.a. VIII 
3 MEWP lose stability and fall beginning, 
stabilizers stuck against a wall, started the 
structure deformation 
n.a. VII 
4 Sudden failure of an element of the gutter See I & RM VI 
5 Incorrect operator behavior, involving lateral 
forces exceeding the machine stability limits 
Monitoring the effectiveness of the training 
courses (ex Italian OS&H law DLgs 81/08 
art 73 c 5) 
V 
RM Poor risk management Resulting from II, III & IV RM 
6 Incomplete on board signs - manual not 
clear and exhaustive 
Careful evaluation of the machine 
stabilizers positioning vs pavement 
 
IV 
7 stabilizers Improvised organization: no 
2nd operator, no supervision 
Responsibilities definition and 
supervising 
III 
8 Incorrect work procedures –
careless positioning of the MEWP 
Revision of the MEWP safety (possible 
incorrect EC labelling is under 
 
II 
 
9 
Non exhaustive hazard identification leading to 
poor risk assessment ( PR > 1 ) 
Even if not officially required by the Italian 
OS&H law, some Risk Analysis and 
Management of yards involving the MEWPs 
    
I 
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 Accident    # 2 
ACTIVITY SECTOR: C24.10-Steel Production  the overhead traveling crane velocity was increased from 3.5 m/s to 5.2 
m/s. NO updated IFT of the operator CONSEQUENCE Fatal - Burns 
 
tilted ladle area of the spill 
 
 
effects of the heat wave 
 in a steel mill, a modification was introduced to 
improve the performances of a  overhead traveling 
crane used for the 160 t ladles handling; 
 the IFT of the crane operator was not updated 
including the new crane performances; 
 due to the excessive descent velocity, the ladle 
interfered with an obstacle, tipped and spilled 
approx..100 tons of molten steel; 
 the consequent thermal wave and steel droplets 
explosion caused impressive consequences and 
fatal burns to a worker operating in the area. 
 
 
 
 
 
Accident causes chain Possible corrective actions  
 
 
 
 
 
1 Fatal burns n.a. IX 
2 Victim reached by the thermal wave from approx. 
100 t of spilled steel 
n.a. VIII 
3 Ladle tilt and molten steel spillage n.a. VII 
4 Excessive velocity in the ladle handling n.a. VI 
 
5 
Modification of the operating parameters of the 
overhead traveling crane Procedures/organization 
of work, Operators IFT 
see III  
V 
RM Poor risk management Resulting from II, III & IV RM 
6 Absence of plant tests after the changes Revision of the modified plant conformity to 
the safety standards 
IV 
7 Absence of supervision and IFT Supervising   and   IFT   even   for 
occasional 
   
III 
8 Operation not analyzed after changes. 
Absence of communication between operators 
Updated technologies for higher and safer 
crane performances and ladle handling. 
Performance and Safety tests on the plant 
II 
9 No revision of the Risk Assessment and 
Management after the crane operating parameters 
modification 
Devoted Risk Assessment and Management 
applied to a plant modification proposal 
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Accident    # 3  
ACTIVITY SECTOR: F42-13 Civil Engineering NOTES: incompatible contemporary operations 
CONSEQUENCE Fatal - Crushed 
 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
area of the accident 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rock fracture systems in the area accident area 
The worker was manually removing 
debris at the basis of the right side of 
the face, and cleaning the lifters with 
C.A.. The jumbo was still drilling the 
last holes of the round in the left side of 
the  face.  A  1  m2 rock 
(D) fell off from the top-right part of the 
face and stroke him. 
 
 
 
Accident causes chain Possible corrective actions  
 
 
1 intrathoracic injury n.a. IX 
2 struck by falling objects n.a. VIII 
3 falling rock from the tunnel face see II VII 
4 general instability of the face systematic inspections of the
 geological characteristics at the 
 
VI 
5 Interference of functional volumes. 
Audit, Supervision, Operating procedures & IFT 
IFT (responsible included!) V 
RM poor Risk Management Resulting from III & IV  
 
RM 
6 no face reinforcement to improve the local 
stability 
functional volumes analysis and work 
scheduling 
IV
7 Careless work organization & inspection organization and supervising III 
8 incorrect procedures, man at work in 
proximity of the drilling machine 
adoption of face reinforcement techniques II 
9 Poor Risk Assessment & Management ( the local 
variability of the rock neglected) 
Hazard Identification, with particular reference to 
the geological conditions, and interference risk 
I 
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Accident    # 4 
ACTIVITY SECTOR: 1234-33 Maintenance NOTES: The victim worked under temporary contract. 
CONSEQUENCE Fatal - Head injury 
 
the machine involved into the event 
 
pressure test evidencing the fault 
in the hydraulic hose of the bucket 
cylinder 
A hose of the hydraulic circuit feeding 
the bucket jacks started leaking. The 
operator tried to intervene, and 
loosened the connection without 
preliminarily securing the bucket in the 
higher position. The bucket fell and 
struck him. No supervisor was present; 
no instructions handbook on board and 
the prop provided by the manufacturer 
had been removed. 
 Accident causes chain Possible corrective actions  
 
 
 
 
1 fatal (head injury) n.a. IX 
2 struck by the falling bucket see III, IV VIII 
3 loosening of the hose connection See IV VII 
4 leakage of the hydraulic hose (machine in very 
poor general conditions) 
See II VI 
5 audit, supervision, operating procedures & IFT. 
revision, updating and maintenance; 
See III, IV V 
RM risk management resulting from II, III & IV RM 
6 poor machine general condition, no 
instructions handbook on board and the prop 
provided by the manufacturer had been 
 
detailed procedures and operator IFT IV 
7 no supervision and lack of General Support 
Services (in particular communication) 
general work organization III 
8 work procedures not exhaustive, no specific 
IFT 
machine maintenance program and 
records 
II 
9 poor Risk Assessment & Management Risk Assessment and Management including 
the equipment conditions and General Support 
Services 
I 
 
Accident    # 5 
ACTIVITY SECTOR: 08-12 Sand and Gravel Quarry NOTES:  poor general maintenance 
CONSEQUENCE Fatal - Drowning 
 
the truck recovery operations 
 
the couple of collapsed leaf springs 
One of the rear right axle leaf springs of 
the truck got broken in the past, and the 
problem was not detected. The accident 
was caused by the collapse of the 2nd 
leaf in the maximum load condition 
during the dumping  phase.  The  truck  
balance  was 
then compromised and the  breaking 
action not sufficient, due to the worn 
treads of the tires of the 2nd axle. No 
protection was installed in the dumping 
area. 
 
 
 
 
Accident causes chain Possible corrective actions  
 
 
1 fatal (drowning) n.a. IX 
2 fall of the truck into a quarry lake see II VIII 
3 collapse of a leaf spring, insufficient breaking action see V, VI VII 
4 undetected broken spring. No protection installed in 
the dumping area 
truck maintenance program and records VI 
5 external/internal structural and plant characteristics; 
machinery, equipment and provisional works; 
do V 
RM Risk Management Resulting from II, III & IV RM 
6 no protection installed in the dumping area procedures for dumping operation IV 
7 no supervision and lack of General Support 
Services (in particular communication: 
researches started with huge delay) 
general coordination and supervision  
III 
8 lacking procedures for the dumping operations 
poor general IFT 
best: a dozer used for the final dumping 
minimum: barriers in the dumping area 
II 
9 poor Risk Assessment & Management ( PR > 1 ) Risk Assessment and Management including 
the equipment conditions. Employers 
 
I 
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 5. CONCLUSION 
The CCCP approach for in depth analysis of work-related accidents, and prevention 
countermeasures definition – an original evolution from CCA - Cause-Consequence Analysis 
(itself a combination of FTA - Fault Tree Analysis & ETA 
– Event Tree Analysis)- is discussed, together with the related computer assisted system, with 
the support also of some practical examples. 
As demonstrated, the technique can be a valid guide for the analyst, and keep him far from 
common errors due to subjective judgments or hasty evaluations. However, the Authors heavily 
stress that the integrate software which translates the theoretical model into a computer guide 
is not intended as a substitute of the analyst in the decision making . 
The software is intuitive and user friendly, thanks to the presence of a number of pre-defined 
selection options (drawn, where possible, from widely used databases) for many of the 
involved parameters, and, asides from some input data necessary to run the root causes 
subroutine, there is large flexibility in the completion of the information to be recorded in the 
various forms, 
Moreover, the user can select the minimal solution set suitable to break the chain of events 
that generated the special accident under exam, or enlarge the risk management to the whole 
system, since also other scenario faults then the ones directly leading to the investigated event 
are brought into evidence. 
Finally, the detailed prevention solutions adopted by the analyst for each event are stored, so 
that with the increase in the number of analyzed cases, consequently increases the number of 
examples to which to refer. 
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Abstract 
The peculiarity of highway maintenance yards can introduce important OS&H (Occupational 
Safety and Health) criticalities. Therefore, lacks in Risk Assessment and Management produce 
a high number of work related accidents, as shown in the national and international accident 
databases. The Risks minimization requires both a through Risk Assessment and Management, 
and an efficient Safety inspection activity. Such problems are particularly relevant in Italy, since 
a number of peculiar parameters makes the Italian highway system subject to frequent 
and important maintenance interventions often in complex scenarios. The present paper 
summarizes the results of  a systematic research work leading to an original approach to the 
Risk reduction, based both on innovative prevention solutions, and on the optimization of the 
Safety inspection activities. 
 
Keywords: Occupational Safety and Health, Highway maintenance yards, Risk Assessment 
and Management 
 
1. FOREWORD 
The Italian Highway System covers more than 6000 km, with 1800 km of tunnels, bridges and 
viaducts, in continuous increase. This involves the necessity of systematic maintenance and 
special interventions, in a particularly relevant number of kilometres due to the highly variable 
Italian climatic conditions, imposing additional wear to structures and materials of large part of 
the highway net. Additional deterioration factors affect some highways stretches, among them 
mean altitude a.s.l., and traffic load. 
A large number of kilometres of Italian highways are located in mountain areas, where the 
atmospheric agent actions become relevant, and cause additional stresses on structures and 
materials. 
Moreover, the predominance of freight transportation by motorways and the presence of 
crucial nodes in the Italian highway network, produce high and intense load of heavy vehicles 
on the involved stretches with similar consequences. To evaluate the traffic load on the Italian 
highway system, the Authors gathered information from the Aiscat (Italian Association of 
Highway and Tunnel Companies) database. The Aiscat data show that in a large part of the 
Italian highway net circulate hundreds of millions of vehicles per km, most of which heavy 
vehicles. 
Table 1 summarizes the “total” and “heavy vehicles” traffic rates (number of vehicles per km). 
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 Table1 – Italian highway system Traffic rate (n° of vehicles per km), from the Aiscat 2015 database. 
Cumulative data January-March 2015 (millions of vehicles per km) 
Italian highway 
 Stretches 
 (companies) 
Total Heavy 
vehicles 
n highway stretches 
(companies) 
Total Heavy 
traffic 
Autostrade per l’Italia, 9340.1 2307.4 Centro Padane 215.2 74.5 
Traforo Monte Bianco 2.43 0.85 Brescia-Padova 1134 321.2 
Traforo S.Bernardo 1.54 0.15 C.A.V. 369.3 95.6 
R.A.V. 24.2 6.6 Brennero 959.8 284.2 
S.I.T.A.F. 78.3 21.1 Autovie venete 521.3 169.1 
S.A.V. 78.8 17.3 Autostrada dei fiori 240.7 63.2 
A.TI.VA. 113.2 19.4 Aut.le della Cisa 136.3 41 
Asti-Cuneo 29.6 7.1 S.A.L.T. 352.2 79.7 
S.A.T.A.P. A 4 511 128.2 S.A.T. 38.7 8.5 
S.A.T.A.P. A 21 426 147.7 Strada dei parchi 459.1 63.5 
Torino-Savona 177.9 130.9 Tang.le di Napoli 221 18.3 
Milano Serravalle- 
MI.Tang.li 
320.9 65.7 Aut. Meridionali 353.3 32.8 
Società di progetto 
BREBEMI 
51.9 12.2 Consorzio Aut. 
Siciliane 
330.4 52 
Tang.le Esterna di 
Milano 
4.5 1.0 Total 16491.6 4074.2 
 
2. OS&H - OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DATA FOR HIGHWAY 
MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES 
In the highway maintenance operations limited spaces, high power complex and peculiar 
equipment, haste to complete the work, and some misconducts of the users lead to a significant 
number of accidents, often characterized by dramatic Severity Rates. The multitude of work-
related accidents recorded in the Official Italian database of Inail (National Institute for Work 
Injury Insurance) confirms the high criticality of this kind of yards. The Inail database made 
possible the characterization of the most frequent causing deviations. 
The following graphs summarize the data on events occurred in Italian highway maintenance 
yards during six years, from January 2008 until May 2013: information are codified according to 
the ESAW (European Statistics  and Accidents at Work) methodology, and consider the main 
characteristics of each event, the involved people, and the causes and circumstances. 
In the Italian highway maintenance yards occurred, in the considered time span, 5562 non-
fatal accidents and 87 fatal accidents (the 1.5% of the total). It is noteworthy that 86% of the 
fatal accidents are officially classified as “in itinere” (during trips to and from the yard) due to 
vehicle loss of control, and causing neck, spine, vertebrae traumas; the remaining 14 % is 
bound with the specific yards activities (Figure 1). 
 
  
Figure 1 (left) – consequences of work-related accidents involving highway maintenance operations; Figure 1 (right) – 
relevance of the fatal “in itinere” events. 
 
580
 Figure 2 summarizes the main causes, and some details of non-fatal accidents in the highway 
maintenance yards. 
 
  
Figure 2 (left) – non-fatal accidents occurred during highway maintenance operations: in particular, the 19% are due to 
causes typical of similar temporary or mobile construction sites (slipping, tripping, materials and equipment, etc.), whilst 
the 55% are partly due to the special criticalities of highway yards (limited spaces, high power complex and peculiar 
equipment, etc.); 
Figure 2 (right) – seriousness of non-fatal accidents due to the special criticalities of highway yards. 
 
A comparison between Italian and USA data from 2003 to 2007 (sources OSHA 
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration), CFOI (Census of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries)), confirmed the similarity in terms of hazard factors and criticalities of highway 
maintenance yards: limited spaces, high power complex and peculiar equipment, haste to 
complete the intervention, etc., even if the USA highway network and maintenance 
technologies are remarkably different. 
According to the OSHA data, workers run over causes 50 % of the fatal accidents in the 
highway maintenance yards, and it is ascribable to equipment and vehicles belonging directly to 
the construction firm managing the site (54%), or to other companies involved in the work 
(46%) (Pegula, 2010). 
The Inail database contains no information on the accidents caused by interference between 
traffic and maintenance sites; according to the OSHA database the run over of maintenance 
workers due to traffic amounts to approximately 30% of the total. 
Due to the importance of this aspect, the Authors also investigated the ISTAT (National 
Statistical Institute) and ACI (Italian Automobile Association) data, to deepen the violations of 
the Traffic Laws. The result was impressive: the total number of sanctioned violations in 2013 
amounted to more than 900.000 (560.000 due to excessive speed, 35.000 due in general to 
reckless driving). Even if no direct correlation is at present possible, countermeasures are 
certainly necessary. 
 
3. RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE YARDS 
Table 2 summarizes the basic definitions in OS&H (Borchiellini et al., 2015). 
 
Table 2 – basic OS&H definitions 
Risk can be defined as the potential of losing something of value: life, health, property or 
environment can be compromised by a given action, activity or inaction involving a Hazard 
Factor which can cause the Unwanted Event, and expressed according to the following 
relationship: 
RISK = M * P   (predictable damage M due to the Unwanted Event expected frequency of 
occurrence P) 
where: 
M = ED *FC * n 
ED = seriousness of the possible consequence (death, injuries and health impairments, etc...); 
FC = interference (Contact Factor): a function of the percentile exposure time to potentially 
hazardous  operations or situations vs the working cycle (common reference 8h/d); 
n  =  number of exposed workers 
RISK = ED * FC * P * n 
Risk Assessment: the evaluation -pivotal to define a correct prioritization of Risk Management- 
of the levels of risk involved in a situation, due to the associated hazards. Hazard Factors 
Identification and Exposure Models Definition are therefore of utmost importance. 
Risk Management: all the activities which give rise to the elimination or minimization of risks, 
through prevention (i.e. technical, organizational or procedural steps to reduce -and possibly 
set to zero- the expected frequency of occurrence or the contact factor), or protection (general 
or personal), to mitigate the severity of the possible damage. 
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 An accurate and effective Risk Assessment in complex situations, among them the one under 
exam, requires a systematic approach, based on a rigorous schematization of the various 
contexts, scenarios and types of maintenance and improvement yards, to bring into evidence 
the problems which may be added to those typical of similar temporary or mobile construction 
sites. 
Table 3, drawn for the more common yard typologies, and resulting from a throughout analysis 
of the Italian highway network, summarizes the main parameters which can directly or 
indirectly affect and condition the characteristics, the design and the safety of both workers and 
third parties. 
 
Table 3 – highway maintenance yards classified on the basis of the main parameters which can affect their 
characteristics, design and safety (in addition to those typical of a similar temporary or mobile construction site) 
parameter typical criticalities examples 
Type and 
characteristics 
of the yard 
level of urgency, importance,  extension,  
and duration of the activities; 
emergency repairs or activities which can 
planned with no special haste; radical 
renovations and modifications; 
frequency of occurrence: exceptional / 
occasional / systematic; 
parts maintenance due to accidents; 
pavement repair/renovation, etc.; 
position and evolution in space: stationary / 
mobile yards; 
localized embankment maintenance; 
painting of lane markings; 
special yards; 
organized to make possible activities not 
directly related to the normal use of the 
highway; 
“internal” 
parameters: 
unique features of each situation; 
in case of emergency repairs, the 
seasonal conditions can require quite 
different design approaches even for the 
same activity; 
available areas and special constraints, 
possible interference of contemporary 
activities; 
the limited areas usually available can be 
further reduced, e.g. by overbridges, and 
interference problems rise in presence of 
other yards, e.g. for the construction of a 
junction; 
additional problems; 
poor design in terms of maintainability, 
typical of the less recent stretches; 
equipment, materials and parts supplying, 
emergencies management, etc... 
“external” 
parameters 
orographic & geomorphological 
characteristics, mean weather conditions, 
traffic load in general, and light / heavy 
traffic "seasonal" changes,..; 
different traffic load, steeper stretches, 
straights and bend radii, windy conditions 
can  introduce criticalities due to both the 
mean vehicle velocities, and the 
difference in speed between light and 
heavy vehicles, and modify both the 
importance and frequency of the 
maintenance interventions, and the risk of 
interference with the yard; 
 peculiar site characteristics, such as tunnels, viaducts, etc.. 
interventions in tunnels can require 
special ventilation and fittings, criticalities 
from old linings, etc.. 
 
Table 3 brings into clear evidence that every maintenance yard situation, if properly and 
thoroughly analyzed, presents unique features and safety criticalities, and requires a special 
PtD (Prevention through Design) approach for an effective Risk Management aimed to the 
elimination or minimization of the associated risks as suggested by NIOSH (National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health). 
 
The proposed schematization, together with an in deep investigation of the intermediate and 
Root causes of the occurred accidents, can effectively support the Risk Management phase, 
and contribute to identify the most suitable design for each special situation. Even if nowadays 
the analysis of occurred accidents is limited to a general statistical approach, some innovative 
investigation techniques are available, of some help also in the discussion of the best control 
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 measures to interrupt the chain of causes of the event. Table 4 summarizes the results of the 
analysis of an accident, resulting from the use of the CCCP - (Computer-aided Cause 
Consequence for Prevention) technique (Luzzi et al., 2015): 
 
Table 4 – Example: accident occurred in 2001, analyzed with the CCCP technique 
 
 
Table 5 summarizes some possible Risk Management actions on the factors that can 
increase, in the case of highway maintenance yards, the Risk typical of similar temporary or 
mobile construction sites. 
 
Table 5 – possible Risk Management actions to minimize the peculiar risks of highway maintenance yards 
 
 
4. SOME RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH WORK 
Two main topics may condition the safety of both workers and third parties, in general and more 
so in the case of particularly risky and complex activities: 
a) The adoption of a PtD approach, which should consider both Safe Work Organization, 
and the Maximum Safety Technologically Achievable criteria, in coherence with the 
provisions of law (89/391 EEC Directive, enforced in Italy by D.Lgs.81/08), where we can 
read: “Art.6. General Obligations on employers, c.2. The employer shall implement the 
measures referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 (necessary for the safety 
and health protection of workers, including prevention of occupational risks and provision 
of information and training, as well as provision of the necessary organization and means) 
on the basis of the following general principles  of prevention: … (e) adapting to technical 
progress”. The 92/57/EEC Directive special for Temporary or mobile construction sites, 
also included in the Italian Dlgs.81/08, reiterates and details these concepts, and sets this 
task to the 'Coordinator for safety and health matters at the project preparations stage').  
These criteria should then be applied both to operations developed in the maintenance 
yard, and, from a more general point of view, to the context in which the maintenance site 
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 is located. Asides from the well known guidelines and good practices for the “normal” 
linear yard safety, and taken into account the contents of Table 5, the following pages will 
discuss some examples of possible technological improvements on the safety of the 
stretch and of the yard, which already proved effective abroad and are finding growing 
use also in the Italian highways (EU Commission under the transport RTD programme, 
1998). 
b) The minimized Risk level achieved for the system should be preserved and improved 
along the time, nowadays in accordance to quality principia (e.g. according to OHSAS 
18000). The aforementioned 92/57/EEC Directive sets this task to the ‘Coordinator for 
safety and health matters at the project execution stage’. In our case, because of the 
number and complexity of the various different maintenance sites, the task of the 
Coordinator becomes very challenging, since he should deal with both the aspects that 
require high expertise and capacity of judgment, and those of mere routine.  
We will discuss below an original and well-tested approach for Safety Analysis, periodic 
audits and inspections, aimed to optimize the work of the expert evaluator, and to increase 
the safety of workers and third parties. 
 
4.1 Examples of new technologies to support the safety of highway and of the 
maintenance yard workers 
 
4.1.1. Innovative materials and laying technologies for the highway pavement 
A number of innovative materials and laying technologies for the highway pavements are 
nowadays available, this being a promising theme for study and applied research and 
development on bituminous binders, aggregates, additives and related products. The main 
targets are technical and economic efficiency, pavement duration, and environmental issues 
(Nösler, 2008). 
Fiber or steel-net reinforced pavements, flexible and high resistance pavements in 
Polymermodified Binders, and other solutions can in some cases already provide important 
benefits in terms of resistance to stresses induced by heavy vehicles, cracking and cracks 
propagation, together with excellent surface characteristics, improved adherence, reduced 
aquaplaning or splash & spray phenomena and degradation by deicing, and good 
soundproofing. 
The use of such materials and technologies for new highway stretches, or to replace the 
currently existing ones, can enhance the system availability, and then directly reduce the 
number of necessary repair/renovation interventions, i.e. the need of maintenance yards. 
Hence, the FC value decreases, thanks to the increase of 
M.T.B.F. (Mean Time Between failures), the latter being the result of the sum of M.T.T.F. 
(Mean Time To Failure) + M.T.T.R. (Mean Time To Repair). 
Obviously, a preliminary risk analysis is essential, to define the expectable M.T.T.R. value, and 
make sure not to have introduced new hazard factors for the maintenance yard workers. 
 
4.1.2. Technical improvements for the management of possible distributed traffic  yard 
interferences 
In case of mobile linear yards, the usual segregation of the working areas from the traffic, 
based on Jersey barriers, involves that the progressive modification of the yard area makes 
also necessary the modification of the barriers layout. 
The traditional procedure (Figure 3 left) implies that the yard workers manually unfasten each 
module of the barrier, lift it up and move it to the new position by means of a crane; finally, it is 
necessary to reconnect the module to the already moved barrier. Workers and equipment 
operate in immediate proximity of the regular traffic; as sole safety means, signs, flagman 
and light signals are introduced to draw the attention of the highway users. 
Hence, this operation is one of the most critical for the safety of the highway maintenance yards. 
The adoption of the mechanized “Barrier Zipper” technique for Jersey barrier transfer 
(Rathbone, 2000). makes possible a significant Risk reduction for both workers and users, see 
Figure 3 right, and Table 6 which summarizes the results of a PHA (Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis) applied to the traditional and “Barrier Zipper” transfer techniques. 
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Figure 3 (left) – barrier transfer: traditional procedure; Figure 3 (right) – mechanized “Barrier Zipper” technique. 
 
Table 6 – Extract of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis on barrier movement activity 
 
(1) some parameters typical of the Italian highway scenarios can further increase the Risk for both yard workers and 
users. 
 
The Risk reduction possible through the adoption of the described solution results from: 
ü the reduction of P, thanks to the continuous barrier covering the whole length of the yard. 
The safety of drivers is also increased, thanks to the clarity of the situation; 
ü the reduction of F, since the yard workers operate exclusively from the safe side of the 
barrier; 
ü the reduction of n, thanks to the mechanization of the system. 
 
4.1.3. Technical improvements for the management of possible localized traffic  yard 
interferences 
In case of stationary maintenance yards of limited extension and duration, where no Jersey 
barriers are present, the protection of the yard from the hazard of vehicles irruption is 
possible by the positioning of obstacles of adequate size and mass (usually some heavy 
equipment or trucks). Obviously, such an improvised approach, even if somehow effective 
to the purpose, can dramatically worsen the seriousness of the consequences for the driver 
of the impacting vehicle. 
Some Truck Mounted Attenuator (TMA) devices are presently available, specially designed to 
improve the yard protection and reduce the collateral damages. Figure 4 shows the basic idea: 
to increase progressively the resistance to the impacting vehicle momentum, and to handle 
as well as possible the direction of impact, preventing rebounds or uncontrolled deviations. 
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Figure 4 – Truck mounted attenuator, and crash test results. 
 
Granted that, in this case also, the discussed measures signaling the yard are necessary, 
the Risk reduction possible through the adoption of the described solution results from the 
reduction of F, since the possibility of irruption of vehicles out of control into the working area is 
limited; asides, the safety of drivers is somehow increased. 
 
4.2. Original approach to system organization, proposed to support the activity of the 
‘Coordinator for safety and health matters at the project execution stage’ 
According to the aforementioned EEC Directives, the minimized Risk level achieved for the 
system should be preserved, and improved along the time. 
 
In particular, the ‘Coordinator for safety and health matters at the project execution stage’ is 
charged of the tasks listed below (92/57/EEC Directive, Article 6), the main reference for his 
activity being the Safety and Health Plan (drawn by the 'Coordinator for safety and health 
matters at the project preparations stage'). 
 
 
 
Taken into account the typical situation of a large number of construction activities 
summarized in Table 7 (Patrucco, 2008), the ‘coordinator for safety and health matters at the 
project execution stage’ should devote special care in the supervising of the 3rd phase (Risk 
Management). 
 
 
 
 
Project execution stage: duties of coordinators 
The coordinator(s) for safety and health matters during the project execution stage appointed in accordance with 
Article 3 (1) shall: 
(a) coordinate implementation of the general principles of prevention and safety: 
- when technical and/or organizational aspects are being decided, in order to plan the various items or stages of 
work which are to take place simultaneously or in succession, 
- when estimating the period required for completing such work or work stages; 
(b) coordinate implementation of the relevant provisions in order to ensure that employers and, if necessary for the 
protection of workers, self-employed persons: 
- apply the principles referred to in Article 8 in a consistent manner, 
- where required, follow the safety and health plan referred to in Article 5 (b); 
(c) make, or cause to be made, any adjustments required to the safety and health plan referred to in Article 5 (b) and 
the file referred to in Article 5 (c) to take account of the progress of the work and any changes which have occurred; 
(d) organize cooperation between employers, including successive employers on the same site, coordination of their 
activities with a view to protecting workers and preventing accidents and occupational health hazards and reciprocal 
information as provided for in Article 6 (4) of Directive 89/391/EEC, ensuring that self-employed persons are 
brought into this process where necessary; 
(e) coordinate arrangements to check that the working procedures are being implemented correclty; 
(f) take the steps necessary to ensure that only authorized person are allowed onto the construction site. 
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 Table 7 – safety experts and their demanding tasks. The linked pie charts summarize the errors in the Risk Assessment 
 and Management process causing accidents (as resulting from Prosecutor investigations). 
 
 
 
In particular, the ‘Coordinator for safety and health matters at the project execution stage’ 
should evaluate the Safety documentation drawn by the employers and, if necessary, ask for 
amendments (the responsibility of the employers remains in any case unaffected, as provided 
for in Directive 89/391/EEC). 
This also is somehow frustrating, since, as shown in Figure 5, only in a limited number of 
cases the situation results directly acceptable. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Results from a statistical analysis on the congruence between the Safety and Health Plan and the Safety 
documentation drawn by the employers, in a number of real cases. 
 
Where we consider the tasks of the ‘Coordinator for safety and health matters at the project 
execution stage’ in terms of supervising the activities at the yard -an essential step to grant 
real OS&H- it is usually possible to make a distinction between: 
ü an at depth level supervision, involving an accurate and critical appraisal of the general yard 
layout and organization, safety solutions for normal operating conditions and emergency 
situations, cooperation between employers if necessary, equipment selection and their 
safety characteristics included, crew composition and adequacy, etc. essential to investigate 
and control the hidden criticalities, if any; 
ü an elementary level supervision, aimed to verify the evidences in terms of compliance of 
the site, equipment and fittings characteristics, and workers behavior with both the dictates 
of the law, and the provisions of the Safety and Health Plan. It should be emphasized that, 
apart their intrinsic importance, the evident criticalities can be symptomatic of not 
immediately identifiable OS&H problems. 
In our case, because of the number and complexity of the various different highway 
maintenance sites, the task of the Coordinator becomes very challenging, as he should deal 
with the aspects that require both high expertise  and competent judgment, and those of 
mere routine.Moreover, practical experience confirms that the elementary level inspections 
must be frequent, to promote the attention to OS&H of personnel with various qualifications 
working in the yard, while at depth inspections can be sparser, but thoroughly cover the 
critical operations. 
The original and well-tested approach for Safety analysis, periodic audits and inspections, 
aimed to optimize the work of the Coordinator (the expert evaluator), and to increase the 
safety of workers and third parties, expects that the expert evaluator: 
ü carries out personally the in-depth preliminary analysis, and the on-site inspections when 
necessary, and organizes, coordinates and discusses the activities of Fellow evaluators, 
who access the yard frequently, as shown in the following Table 8; 
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 Table 8 – tasks and typology of evaluators 
 
 
ü makes available -to support the work of the Fellow evaluators- adequate data collection 
forms, and evaluation indexes for “weighing” situations and behaviors complying/not 
complying with the basic OS&H regulations and good practices (see Figure 6) 
 
 
Figure 6 – example of Safety Index Datasheet, completed by a Fellow evaluator. 
 
The Safety Index adopted is an evolution of what suggested by Laitinen (Laitinen H. et al, 
1998, 2002) and it is expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
The Safety Index can be directly calculated as a weighted average of the results of all the 
observations made in the yard in relation to the different deviation scenarios under 
observation, or, as we also tested, subject to corrective coefficients ascribed to the various 
deviation scenarios, as a function of the statistical frequency and / or the severity of the 
consequences; 
ü completes the evaluation of all the gathered information, so that an exhaustive and 
structured rating on the OS&H of the yard remains to acts, for the adoption of possible 
improvements of OS&H, and, if it is the case, to support the client on measures to be taken 
against the employers (Figure 7); 
Fellow evaluator 
ü verifies the bureaucratic aspects of contractual regularity and safety; 
ü can tell and annotate the evident non-conformities to the OS&H 
regulations and good practices. 
Expert evaluator 
ü examines and verifies the congruence between the Safety and Health Plan 
and the Safety Documentation drawn by the employers; 
ü makes, or causes to be made, any adjustments required to the Safety and 
Health Plan; 
ü supervises to activities particularly critical for OS&H. 
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Figure 7 – Compendium sheet completed by the expert evaluator, containing his direct observations, and the results of 
the activities of the Fellow evaluators. 
 
The suggested approach represents then an effective tool for: 
ü through inspections of OS&H at highway maintenance yards; 
ü improving the general yard OS&H conditions; 
ü widespread dissemination of the safety culture at all levels, Fellow evaluators included; 
ü the OS&H management in a sound quality approach. 
Thanks to its simple structure, and to the interlinked card logical sequence, the proposed 
approach can be supported by Computer Assisted techniques. A test software proved to be 
of good help for the completeness of the data and observation sheets, the calculation of 
the Safety Index, and for both the creation of an OS&H database for each maintenance 
yard, and for the different yard typologies as previously classified. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The peculiarity of the highway maintenance yards requires a special Risk Assessment and 
Management, and efficient Safety inspection activity, particularly relevant in the case of Italian 
scenarios, whose peculiar characteristics somehow increase the common yard Risks. 
The research work made available some interesting results: 
a) a through categorization of the different maintenance yards, of pivotal importance to 
define the different scenarios and identify the most suitable safety measures to be adopted 
in each situation; 
b) a critical review and some practical examples of innovative techniques and technologies 
currently available, and of their possible effects on the total system efficiency (safety 
included); 
c) the discussion on an original and well-tested approach for Safety analysis, periodic audits 
and inspections, aimed to optimize the results of the work of the ‘Coordinator for safety 
and health matters at the project execution stage’. 
More generally, the research work confirmed that at least in complex situations, among them 
the highway maintenance yards, the Risk Assessment and Management must be absolutely 
specific, each situation requiring special Prevention through Design and Quality Management 
approaches. Moreover, the dissemination of the "Culture of Safety" can play a key role in the 
reduction of risks of workers and third parties. 
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Abstract 
This paper is an extensive review of 235 journal papers addressing HSE culture published 
between 1992 until 2014.  The review was conducted in order to analyse the historical 
development of the concept of HSE culture. The research is related to our previous work 
regarding the use of the concept of “culture” in accident investigations, and is focusing on the 
spread of the term “HSE culture” and its coresponding meaning within the community of safety 
research. 
 
The review of the journal papers has been supported by a statistical analysis of data obtained 
by a structured and systematic registration of information from the 235 journal articles in order to 
analyse the development in the distribution of term “culture” in texts addressing “HSE” within the 
community of HSE researchers, and the function and meaning of the term “culture”. 
 
The analysis has been twofold. Firstly, we have analysed the spread of the term “HSE culture”. 
Then we have looked at the variation in what the term signifies, i.e. how the term is defined and 
used in the articles. The methods used in the statistical analysis has been frequency, table and 
correspondence analysis. The use of correspondence analysis makes it possible to “correlate” 
categorical data. The result of the statistical analysis were then interpreted. In the interpretation, 
we have applied a semiotic perspective, focusing on the distinction between signs (form) and 
the signified (meaning). 
 
Among our findings is that there is a correspondence between the profession of the writers and 
how “culture” is defined and/or used in the texts. Psychologist and engineers tend to treat 
culture as one factor among others, which influence human behaviour, whereas anthropologist 
tends to use culture as a metaphor to signify the holism of an organisation.  
 
More than 70 % of the articles using the term “HSE culture” are only addressing safety. Further, 
almost 30 % of the articles are reviews of other articles, and 23 % of the papers use survey 
data. Almost half of the most cited papers (more than 100 citations) are reviews of other papers.  
 
Keywords: culture; HSE; diffusion of terms; communication; learning 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The history of the concept of culture, or more precisely the concept of “safety culture” have been 
told and retold in several publications addressing “safety culture” or “HSE culture” within the 
community of safety researchers. Common traits in these stories seems to be that (a) safety 
culture is a concept that can be traced back to the accident investigation performed by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, that there (b) is 
a lot of confusions and disagreement regarding how the concept should be defined, and that (c) 
further research on safety culture has to be conducted. 
 
In order to map the articles, we have answered the following research questions: 
 
Theme 1:  
The development in the distribution of term “culture” in text addressing “HSE” within the 
community of HSE researchers. 
1. Who writes about HSE and culture? (professions , nationalities, industries) 
2. Has the popularity of culture changed over time within the community of HSE research? 
[time] 
3. What is the most quoted core references? 
4. Who are the most quoted core references in the papers that are most frequent used as 
core references? 
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5. Which methods have been used in studying “HSE culture”? 
o What is the extent of empirical studies on “HSE culture”? 
6. Is there any correspondence between branch of industries and the year of publication? 
7. Is there any correspondence between core references and professions? 
8. Is there any correspondence between core references and industries? 
 
Theme 2: 
The function and meaning of culture 
1. Are the texts addressing health, safety and/or environment? 
2. Are the texts normative or descriptive? 
3. Are there any coherence between normative or descriptive texts and the distribution of 
text addressing culture? 
4. What does “culture” denote? [type of definitions] 
5. Is there any coherence [eller association] between the definitions of culture and the 
distribution of text addressing culture? 
a. Is there any correspondence between the profession of the writers and the 
definition/use of HSE culture? 
b. Is there any correspondence between the branch of industry addressed and the 
definition/use of HSE culture? 
6. Is there any correspondence between the nationality of the writers and the 
definition/use of HSE culture? 
 
The ambition of this research is to scrutinize the history of the use of “culture” within the 
community of H, S and E researchers. This has been done in order to discuss the function of 
“culture” within the community of HSE researchers, and to discuss the validity of the concept in 
order to understand and explain phenomena relevant for HSE issues. Due to limitations in paper 
length combined with the comprehensive amount of data, this paper first and foremost presents 
some descriptive results findings and core characteristics of the dataset in addition to central 
questions derrived from these findings. These are the basis of which further analysis on the 
discourse of the H, S and E research community is based. 
 
Therefore, the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents research methods, sections 3, 
descriptive data results, and section 4 conclusions.  
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
2.1. Materials and Methods  
We have applied a semiotic approach in this study. This implies that we try to elucidate the 
difference between sign, reference and meaning, relying on the theoretical assumption that the 
relation between the sign (form) and the signified (meaning) is arbitrary Saussure (1974), 
following techniques presented by Bernard (2011). We started out by analysing the actual use 
of the sign “culture” in text written by and for researchers working on health, safety and 
environment. This means that we have identified academic publications where the sign “culture” 
have been used with “HSE” in recognized journals, which then has been collected, analysed 
and categorized against a refined codebook.  
 
2.2. Sampling/Corpus of texts 
The sample of journal papers have been obtained by using the search engines Science Direct, 
Google scholar, and the combination of the signs “culture” and “HSE” as keyword. In other 
words, we have identified only those papers that use both the sign “culture” and “HSE”. We 
have excluded some of the more obscure and obviously irrelevant results, but as we have been 
interested in what kinds of arguments and kinds of discussions that are allowed and are flowing 
within the discourse of HSE culture, we have retained most articles in the corpus of texts. 
 
2.3. Coding information into variables 
A set of variables was defined and constructed in order to obtain coded information from the 
articles, making it possible to conduct statistical analysis. The majority of the variables were 
categorical, but some were string variables that could be transformed into categorical variables 
after the information had been obtained. A few variables, such the year since publication and 
times used as reference, were interval variables. 
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Some of the information was rather easy to code into variables, such as, e.g. name of the 
journal, nationality and profession of the authors, methods used and the industry studied. 
Coding information regarding how the term “culture” was used in the text was more challenging. 
Several variables based on different taxonomies of culture were applied in this coding process. 
 
The coding of the journal articles was conducted by a team of researchers. A test coding was 
performed in order to ensure consistency in coding and as high accuracy as possible, between 
different researchers. The reliability of the data regarding variables i.e. name of authors, year of 
publication, journal, author discipline, nationality of the authors, number of references, branch of 
industries, region of the world, methods applied and the formal definition of “culture” are 
considered as high. The reliability of the data related to the variables regarding the meaning of 
the term “HSE culture” is weaker due to the lack of accuracy between different researchers .  
 
2.4. Statistical analysis 
 
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics represented as frequency and contingency tables has been developed in 
order to inspect the distribution of the data. These analyses gave us information about the 
authors of the text concerning e.g. their profession, nationality, geographic area of the research, 
number of references, definitions of culture etc.  
 
2.4.2. Correspondence analysis 
Factor analysis of simple correspondence analysis was conducted in order to identify possible 
relations between categories of two discrete variables. The advantage with a correspondence 
analysis is that is especially suited for analysis of large contingency tables with many categories 
(Clausen 1998). Checking for relationship can be done by performing e.g. test of Chi-square, 
which in fact is the first step in correspondence analysis. In addition, the correspondence 
analysis provided additional information to what degree the different values of the variables 
contribute to the relationship. This means that we can use the method to reveal if there is an 
association between e.g. specific professions and the use of specific main references, the time 
period when the paper was published, and geographical area of the study etc. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1. Descriptive data 
As this paper presents descriptive data, results are organized as follows; 1) author origin, 2) 
development in the usage of the concepts of culture and HSE between 1993.2013, 3) 
Referencing, 4) methods used, 5) understandings of HSE, 6) understandings of culture, and 
finally 7) understandings of HSE culture.  
 
3.1.1. Author origins 
One obviously important factor in the different ways authors understand and use the concepts of 
culture and HSE, is the originated contexts they write on the basis of. The fields of HSE (and 
especially the that of the S) are multidisciplinary and as we show in Bye, Rosness and Røyrvik 
(2015), the concept of culture can have different referents, and holds different accentuation in 
the various contexts. Thus it is of interest to describe the origin of the authors both in terms of 
geographical, professional and industrial contexts.  
 
The largest category of the authors (33 %) are technologist, holding different engineering 
degrees (chemical engineers, construction engineers etc.). It is reasonable to assume that a 
portion of risk analysis and management specialist (8 %), and the safety advisors (6 %), also 
have a technological background.  Psychologist counts for 22 % of the papers. About 10 % of 
the papers have different types of social scientist as corresponding author. This numbers does 
not take into account that the majority of the papers involves several authors, probably with 
different professional backgrounds. 
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Figure 1 – Author profession 
 
More than 40% of the journal articles originates from Europe, and excluding not specified and 
transnational articles, European authors constitutes about 64%. This indicated a centralization 
of discussions, isolation of discussions on the basis of geographical delimination.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Origin by continent 
 
Broken down to nation-states it is clear that some few nations dominate the picture. US/Canada 
and UK provides the most articles, while relative to the population Norway account for a 
perhaps surprisingly large part of the articles. Based on this picture it is obvious that HSE 
culture is treated academically in a few regions. And as countries such as Norway dominates 
(relatively speaking) in these debates, it points to the relationship those academic debates has 
to the respective countries industry (e.g. oil) and HSE regulations.  
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Figure 3 – Origin by Nation-State 
 
Figure 4 shows that ¼ of the papers are focusing on different sectors of transportation systems 
(Aviation, Railroad, Shipping, Road transportation). Almost ¼ of the sample consist papers 
using the oil and gas industry as the area of research. Almost 14 % of the paper does not 
address any specific industry at all. This paper are discussing and/or presenting theories that 
are not contextualized to any specific activity or industry. Nuclear industry represent the context 
of 7.8 % of the papers. This seems rather astonishing taking into the consideration that the 
nuclear industry often I considered as the “mother of safety culture”.  
 
 
Figure 4 – Origin by industry 
 
3.1.2. Popularity of HSE culture 
Our sample of papers addressing “HSE” and “culture” have been published in the period 1993 
to 2013. The heyday of “culture”, measured in number of publications, seems to be between 
2006 - 2012 (Figure 5). Figure 6 shows that the heyday of culture especially has been 
discussed in relation to Oil and gas, transportation and industrial production (which includes 
several industries – but addresses types of production). Figure 7 shows that this more than 
anything activated discussions within the technological professions as well as psychology. 
Finally, figure 8 shows that it was in Europe that these discussions was activated. All of the 
tables shows relative stability within the other categories.   
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Figure 5 – Total publications per year 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Total publications per year 
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Figure 7 – Professions discussing HSE culture 
 
 
Figure 8 – Geographic development 1993-2013 
 
3.1.3. Referencing  
21  % of the papers do not use any references linked to the use of the term “culture”. This is 
rather astonishing taking into consideration that “culture” is a term that signifies an abstract 
concept.  Further, we observe that there is a large variation in the use of core references when 
addressing “culture”. In 32 % of the papers, the core reference is an author that has not been 
used in more than one other paper in this sample. The most frequently used core references 
when addressing “culture” is Reason , Schein and Hofstede (years excluded here). 
  
3.1.4. Methods used 
The most striking in figure 9 is the number of articles that lack empirical data. Counting only the 
20 most cited articles, more than 50% lacks data. Counting the 116 (N=232) most cited articles, 
43% does not present any data. These findings indicates that a large portion of the debates 
regarding HSE culture  are self-referential thus leading us to question their substance (hence 
the subtitle turtles al the way down).   
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Figure 9 – The different research methods 
 
3.2.1 HSE 
 
One of the clearest results (Figure 10) is that articles labelled as debating HSE first and 
foremost talks about safety.  
 
 
Figure 10 – HSE denotes safety 
 
Figure 11 shows the different referents of HSE – sometimes it denotes practice and sometimes 
a system. Interestingly, as many as 38,8% refer to HSE both as practice and a system.  
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Figure 11 – the referent of HSE 
 
3.2.2. Culture perspectives 
Figure 12, 13 and 14 shows the different and dominating understandings of culture. Psychology 
and engineering (often overlapping) views, understanding culture as a factor located in the mind 
dominates the picture.  
 
 
Figure 12 – Culture understood as discourse of psychology, engineering or anthropology 
 
 
Figure 13 – Holistic or factor perspectives on culture 
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Figure 14 – The location of culture 
 
3.2.3. HSE culture 
As figures 15 and 16 show, many articles are irrelevant when they are to be categorized by 
views on HSE culture, as they are tags as concerning HSEculture but does not discuss it. But 
as figure 15 show, those discussing HSE culture see it as something that could and (figure 16) 
should be improved by management or facilitation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper prioritizes presenting descriptive data, and as such the implications and arguments 
are not developed explicitly throughout the paper. Still the results provide an interesting picture 
of a research community with a surprising degree of self-referential rendering. We have also 
found a vast diversity in types of discussions and referents held by the same concepts. But also 
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we found clear tendencies such as HSE really denoting safety, and centralization in terms of 
contexts debating and references used in these debates.  
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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss airmanship and seamanship, and how these valued qualities are 
transformed or challenged by developments in technology and more detailed governance of 
work and safety. We base our discussion on early data from participatory observation of work 
on ships and planes. We describe some of the changes in the regulation and control of work 
and discuss how this affects key professionals (pilots and ship officers, primarily). We also 
discuss how new technologies relate to and influence airmanship and seamanship. A key 
contribution of this paper is outline a relational and processual understanding of professional 
competence, one in which regulation of work and new technologies aren’t regarded as 
dichotomies to professional competence, rather something with which it is connected and 
integrated and also in co-development with.  
 
Keywords: Professional Competence; Seamanship, Airmanship, Regulation, Skill. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In discussions with practitioners and researchers alike the importance of specific kinds of 
professional competence for safety is often a matter of concern. While new technologies as well 
as regulation and control measures are introduced these discussions often take the form of 
lamenting a loss. Good seamanship, a captain will tell you, isn’t only book knowledge. It is a 
practical competence, involving attitudes and skills, including bodily and tacit components. It is 
something you are.  And it can’t be replaced by rules, checklists and new technologies.  
 
An ongoing research project (PROCOM) takes this interest in professional competence as a 
point of departure. We are studying professional practice on different kinds of ships, airplanes 
and will also include helicopters. We seek to disentangle the phenomenon of professional 
competence from the ever-present discourse of something invisible, almost mythical being lost, 
in the era of de-skilling, technological development and proceduralization, and learn more about 
what it is in itself and also how it is in transformation with the changes in technology and 
regulation of work. 
 
2. METHODS AND MATERIALS 
The paper presents data from an ongoing study. We have conducted field work (participant 
observation and interviews) on anchor handling vessels, supply boats, and on regular 
passenger planes. We will also conduct interviews in small independent helicopter services (we 
have some preliminary basis from other projects. See Bye et al, 2013). In combination, these 
data provides us with a sample of cases in which the nature of the tasks (the complexity of 
work), the degree of regulation and external control and the level of automation is highly 
variable. Still they are all cases where the discussions of seamanship and airmanship are highly 
relevant.  
 
· Anchor handling vessels are immensely strong specialized tug-boats used to move 
floating drilling rigs. The balancing of forces of weather, current, heavy anchors and 
chains in these operations is a demanding and dangerous task both for captains and 
sailors. In the petroleum industry ships are recognized as one of the most demanding 
type of ships to be on. 
· Offshore supply boats. The supply boats also work for the oil rigs and platforms. 
However, their tasks are more routinized and normally less demanding for the crew. 
These ships, too, are impressive, as they are built to endure all sorts of weather and 
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have advanced positioning technologies and strong engines. Their main task is to 
transport necessary goods and equipment to and from the installations.  
· Passenger flights. We have studied regular, national and regional flights with modern 
Boeing 737s. These are highly automatized, with several automatic systems. They 
operate in tightly regulated airspace and are subject to increasing external control in 
terms of environmental monitoring etc. The pilots are still recognized and respected as 
professionals that are important for safety. Increasing international competition from low 
cost airlines has led to some controversy, also regarding the status of the pilots.  
· Independent helicopter services. In Norway these are small independent companies. 
They perform unscheduled flights, transporting people and goods, sometimes lifting 
heavy loads, managing unfamiliar terrain and unpredictable weather, and at least to 
compare to scheduled passenger flights, the formal safety management systems to 
support them are slender.  
  
Combined these cases give us examples of different situations where airmanship and 
seamanship are regarded as important, but where the technologies involved, the organization of 
work, the nature of the tasks to be performed are different, and where the professional 
competence is in transition.   
 
3. THEORETICAL OUTLINE  
Airmanship, seamanship and professional competence. 
This paper is based on early findings from the project “Professional Competence, 
Standardization and Safety in Aviation and the Maritime Industry”, funded by the Norwegian 
Research Council. The project started out after a series of projects on maritime safety in which 
discussions of good seamanship had been an ever present topic in interviews and discussions 
among seamen and regulators. We wanted to address this phenomenon explicitly and included 
airmanship as a comparative case. Though the term professional competence can have other 
meanings in other contexts, in this paper we mean good seamanship and good airmanship 
unless something else is stated. The discourses of good sea/airmanship are well established in 
the fields we have studied.  
'Competence' is a term with many academic and common-sense connotations. There is no 
single, canonical definition or interpretation of competence, and it is understood differently in 
different disciplines such as management research, psychological, sociological and educational 
research (Håland and Tjora, 2006). Competence is often linked to qualifications, knowledge, 
skills and practice (Høyrup and Pedersen, 2002). Jensen and Prahl (2000) see competence as 
an intersubjective phenomenon, suggesting that it is related to dynamic interaction between 
individuals not only an individual capacity. Professional competence includes formal training and 
strictly regulated task execution but it also involves skills of a more experience based and 
embodied nature.1  
As work is routinized and tasks replaced by new technology, theoreticians on modernity have 
discussed different modalities of deskilling2 (Marx 2005, Braverman 1974) as consequences. 
This doesn’t only refer to the effect that the individual worker loses competence because his 
tasks are simpler, but also to a more general reorganization of work in which skill and 
craftsmanship is less important and control is centralized.  
A relational and processual approach.  
We understand professional competence as a relational and processual concept. As a 
consequence, we regard competence not as a static asset held by individuals, but see that it 
can be influenced by (or situated in) different conditions, e.g. technological developments, 
regulations, safety management systems, economic conditions/demands for efficiency etc. The 
relational approach means that we see how practice is interwoven with technology. (See 
Haavik, 2014 for a discussion of relational approaches in safety research.) Several independent 
research strands, in which we do not need to delve in for this paper, has inspired our view on 
                                                     
1 See for example Palsson’s discussion of enskilment at sea (1994) and more generally Ingold’s (1993, 
2000) discussions of skill and its relation to different technologies.  
2 Manifestations of deskilling are 1) Decline in craftsmen, 2) Increasing separation of mental and physical 
labor, 3) Decline in levels of training, and 4) Increase in the interchangeability of labor. See Braverman, 
1974 or Røyrvik, 2012. 
603
the inter-relations between human practice and competence and technology and 
representational artifacts on the other hand. The research strand on distributed cognition 
(Hutchins, 1995), Ingold’s (1993) discussions of technologies and skilled practice, Latour’s (e.g. 
1995) actor-network theory also stresses these interrelations. More recently the socio-material 
theory forwarded by Orlikowski and Scott (2008) and Suchman (2007), also stresses the 
“constitutive entanglement” of technology and practice. In sum these provide inspiration to 
inspect the dynamics in the interrelationships between procedures, technologies and work, to 
see how they are entangled, rather than searching for deterministic or social constructivist 
accounts of these relations. Technology and regulation change, and so does professional 
competence. These are the inter-relations we seek to understand. 
Regulative and technological change.  
Both in the air and on sea developments of a technical and organizational/regulative nature 
change the framework conditions in which the professionals conduct their work. To some extent 
key skills are rendered unnecessary by new technologies and procedures.  
Also the role of some professions is losing some of its status as technology and/or 
standardization. Almklov et al (2014) discuss how a convergence of trends − 
internationalization, standardization, self-regulation, and a growing consultancy business− leave 
the practitioners’ perspectives on what safe work practice is less influential. These 
developments lead to an increased weight on the general over the particular and experience 
based in the safety field. This, in turn, gives stronger discursive power to generic models of 
safety vis-à-vis perspectives grounded in practical experience in specific industries. At the same 
time, competence beyond what is described in formal documentation is found to be a key 
resource for resilience, the dynamic situational adjustments performed by professionals in 
practice (see e.g. Rasmussen, 1997; Hollnagel et al 2006; Roe and Schulman, 2008; Haavik, 
2013). Almklov and Antonsen (2014) argue that key competencies in this respect are often 
situational dependent and “invisible” to formal systems. Efforts to improve safety through rules, 
standardization and regimes of accountability, may threaten the leverage for professionals to 
develop, perfect and utilize skill.  
 
Procedures and systems that regulate work can (and should) be seen as technologies or tools. 
As Suchman (2007) reminds us, the procedures or plans aren’t just representations, but they 
are resources employed by people in concrete situations. Barley and Kunda (2001:76) observe 
that “digital technologies seem to be eliminating some types of work, creating others, and 
transforming a significant portion of what remains”. Much of the regulation of work (checklists, 
reporting systems, procedures etc) is inscribed in technical systems, making the boundary 
between procedures and technologies even more blurred.3 A particular class of technologies 
that are relevant for the discussion of good seamanship and airmanship are systems that 
automate parts of the work of our informants, like dynamic positioning systems and autopilots.  
 
3. SOME EARLY RESULTS 
While proceduralization, standardization and control measures from the organization outside the 
plane/boat on one hand may challenge the autonomy of captains and pilots, automation may 
replace them (for some tasks) and transform their work. Though sweeping deterministic 
accounts about deskilling may be tempting4 we will seek to disentangle these changes based on 
our empirical observations and interviews. In this, the variation between the nature of work, and 
organization of work, in our cases are resources for discussion. In our presentation we compare 
the professions by the dimensions of 1) task complexity and 2) extent of rules governing work 
practice, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
                                                     
3 The difference between a digital procedure/checklist and a paper based one is interesting in itself.  The 
digital systems are often designed to have agency beyond what the paper based list has: The drop-down 
menu leaves you with a finite number of choices. In some cases checklists are inscribed in systems in a 
way that you cannot proceed with your primary work before the “paperwork” is done. This difference in 
performativity between ICT based administrative systems may be elusive and subtle, but important.  
4 For example, on how automation and proceduralization erodes seamanship and disempowers seamen, an 
entirely plausible and arguable account.  
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Figure 1 – Tentative placement of cases along the degree of rule based regulation, and the degrees of complexity (and 
(un)predictability) of tasks. 
 
Note that both the axes and the placement of the cases are highly tentative and simplified. The 
figure still serves to illustrate some of the task differences that we will discuss in the following 
pages. Note that by interactive complexity we also imply a certain amount of uncertainty or 
uncontrollability of the work.  
 
In our maritime cases, the observation was clear: Both onboard anchor handling vessels and 
the supply boats our informant agreed that the need for (what they regard as) good seamanship 
was most important on AHVs. The job on these ships was more unpredictable and complex. 
The forces involved are immense. The ships we studied5 belonged to the same company and 
was contracted to the same oil company. Their work was heavily regulated through procedures, 
formal meetings, documentation, safety programs, reporting etc, and our informants noted a 
marked transformation in this respect both on AHVs and supply boats. In normal operations the 
advanced technology also alleviated much of the need for the intervention of people. On both 
ships, it was commented by our informants that normal sailing was simple, and not something 
that required all that much skill. They did a lot of paperwork on the bridge, ticking off checklists, 
emailing the head office, calculating fuel usage etc. The marked difference occurred when the 
AHV was using its enormous winches to lift anchors, move chains and tow rigs.6 When doing 
this the external forces exerted on the ship are dangerous both for the ship itself (it may 
capsize) and in particular for the sailors on deck handling wires and chains there.  
 
Several serious accidents have occurred in relation to these activities during the last two 
decades, also involving several fatalities. In these operations one of the chief officers on the 
ship (captain or first officer) and his second in command on the shift sit turned backwards in 
adjacent seats, one operating the engine, rudder and thrusters and the other the winch system. 
They also have the sailors on deck, the rig and other boats involved in the operation on radio. In 
these situations external forces are literally pulling the vessel. Everyone onboard feels the boat 
moving about and hears the noise from winches and chains. The officers are conducting a joint 
balancing act, one determining the positioning of the ship, the other the pull and release of the 
winch. Both, of course, influenced by weather and currents, the weight of the load lifted, the 
                                                     
5 The project group also has an extensive experience with supply boats and AHVs from other projects. 
One participant has his PhD based on field work on an AHV (Røyrvik, 2012). 
6 This change is also observed by Røyrvik et al (2015) that distinguishes between two modes of operation 
aboard AHVs. Their paper also describes the anchor operations in some more detail.  
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situation on deck and orders and advice received on the radio from the rig or other AHVs 
involved in the operation. They also have to know the capacity of the ships own systems. For 
example, pulling the winch too hard with the ship angled incorrectly can be dangerous.7 
Interestingly, few procedures or checklists are used in this kind of work. It deviated from the 
“normal” situation in this respect. It seemed to us, and the informants concurred, that this 
required extraordinary skills.  
 
That kind of skill can only be achieved by experience. Interestingly, the formal requirements for 
promotion (in terms of experience) are overrun by informal organization (a control mechanism 
first reported by W. Lloyd Warner in the famous Hawthorne experiments)8 among the shipping 
companies, officers and officers to be. Our informants state that the formal required nr of runs to 
be qualified for promotion are way too low to be safe and even taken serious by peers and 
sailors. Thus, no candidates will seek promotion before they have experience enough to be 
accepted and respected by AHV crews as competent.  
 
A few things can be learned from this. While much of the regular work on an AHV is predictable 
and controllable, thus possible to regulate or even automate, the balancing of forces (and 
coordination with other parties) real time during operations required skills way beyond the 
procedural. The need for experience and seamanship was also explicitly recognized with 
respect to these operations. The regulatory regimes for AHVs and supply boats are almost 
identical. It seemed to us that the anchor operation was too complex to regulate in the same 
way as their normal work. Some causes for this can be proposed: 1. The complexity of the work. 
Several uncontrollable external influences affect the situation (the load, weather, situation on 
deck and in the engine room, the rig, other ships etc) in a dynamic manner. 2) Temporality: 
Action must often be taken in a split second. The understanding of the operation and the ability 
to stay ahead of possible problems, the prospective sensemaking (Rosness et al, 2015), is 
crucial to handling this. 
 
New technologies are enrolled in this work. The workstations for the officers are highly 
instrumented, and they will sometimes use automatic or semi-automatic positioning, depending 
on their preferences and the specific situation. Also, it is interesting to note that the two officers 
running the operation need to have a very holistic understanding of the operation at hand, but 
also of technical issues (on deck and in the engine) and of the surrounding organization.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 The sailors on deck have connected a chain. Seen from the bridge. As the winch starts to pull, the ship must be 
positioned correctly to balance the forces from the heavy load, weather and currents. 
 
                                                     
7 The Bourbon Dolphin accident in 2007 cost eight lives. The vessel was turned over by the weight of the 
anchors and chains. Part of the reason was that the ship was too small to handle the operation safely.  
8 Too read more about the informal organization of Hawthorne workers, see Schwartzmann 1993, about 
Warners role see Baba 2009 and Røyrvik 2012.  
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This brings us to the developments in the cockpit of airplanes. In a similar manner, the work of 
pilots is increasingly subject to both increasing regulation and increasing automation. Autopilots 
and improved support systems at most airfields make “hand-flying” and local knowledge less 
neccesary. In contrast to the maritime industry, airlines and airports have been heavily regulated 
and standardized for several decades. Though individual planes may have their minor 
idiosyncrasies, and airfields certainly have some local variety, the extensive standardization 
basically provides for an interchangeability of pilots. The contextual variability of their work is 
reduced to a minimum.  
The company in our case has recently renewed the fleet, so that most of the older aircrafts 
(737-300) has been replaced by newer (737-800). A new electronic system for flight planning 
has replaced more time and space (paper) consuming manual calculations. This has reduced 
the workload for the pilots substantially, particularly before take-off. At the same time, less time 
needed has resulted in the companies tightening the schedules, so the time margins have not 
necessarily increased. 
The accomplishment of flights is highly influenced by weather conditions. For example, sight, 
temperature, wind, thunderclouds and runway conditions are conditions that make every flight a 
unique experience that must be dealt with uniquely. Some of these conditions are entered in a 
standardized manner into equations that are managed by the flight management computer 
(FMC), and hence are included into the envelope of standard operation, for example in the 
calculation of take-off and landing. Other times the conditions require human interpretation and 
needs to be manipulated before entered into the FMC, or to be discretionary assessed and 
dealt with, for example when changing the descent due to thunderclouds.  
The tight scheduling of flights introduces time pressure as a factor affecting the flights. In case 
of delays, pilots may choose to alter the flights in order to gain time. For example, the chosen 
descends may deviate from the one suggested by the FMC. 
 
While check lists and procedures to a large extent seemed little relevant on the AHVs and 
supply boats, some are an intrinsic part of the pilot’s profession. Both for pilots and captains 
automation (autopilots, dynamic positioning systems) have eased some of their work. Also both 
professions have been to a larger extent been involved in “external” initiatives. For example, 
both sea captains and pilots are now subject to regulation seeking to reduce fuel consumption. 
Thus, an airline pilot includes this in his decision making. Maybe trying to catch up with a delay 
will increase fuel consumption. Similarly, the captain on our AHV had to notify the management 
on land that he wanted to cruise above the recommended speed from the harbor to the rig. 
Talking to the other captains, and based on his experience, he had some concerns that there 
might arise some delays in the rig move operation. By arriving a bit earlier, he hoped to be able 
to give some slack to the operation. This evaluation, as the pilot’s inclusion of environmental 
factors in their flying patterns may indicate that airmanship and seamanship to a greater extent 
includes interaction with the external organization and organizational goals beyond just 
operating the vessel or airplane.  
 
We have not yet conducted the last case in our study, individual helicopter services. Based on 
interaction with the industry in previous research we know that they conduct several complex 
tasks, e.g. when lifting poles for electricity grids, and that the small businesses (quite 
understandably) have only cursory safety management systems. We thus regard this to be a 
case where the complexity and unpredictability of work can be high whereas the formal control 
systems are few. This case is placed as having high interactive complexity/uncertainty due to 
the unpredictability when lifting heavy loads in different terrains. In many ways somewhat similar 
to the AHVs.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Airmanship and seamanship is changing. In this paper we have inspected how these qualities 
relate to technological and organizational/regulatory changes. 
We have suggested that airmanship and seamanship is about handling complexity and 
variability. Our case in anchor handling9 showed situations where such dynamic management 
                                                     
9 Similar skill based operations are also expected to be prevalent in many independent helicopter 
operations, like services on electricity grids.  
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still exists, though changing with technology. However, we also note increasing 
bureaucratization of work and external control. This may lead to changes in professional identity 
and loss of status and autonomy. In particular the recent decades of deregulation and increased 
competition has reduced the status of pilots. Handling this external influence, embedding it in 
operational decisions, exemplified with our discussion of environmental considerations, also 
shows that airmanship and seamanship relates to an organizational field, including procedures 
and reporting systems, not only as oppositions, but as something with which it co-operates. The 
cockpit and bridge are more connected to the rest of the organization, and new skills in handling 
these connections are developing.  Like the pilots have done for decades, seamen today to a 
greater extent define (some) of the rules and regulations, some paperwork, as parts of their skill. 
In a similar manner, automation and positioning technologies definitely changes the required 
skills involved in seamanship and airmanship. Our informants, both on sea and in the air, 
develop a competence in how and when to use it, its limitations and strengths.  
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Abstract 
Nowadays, the security aspects are very important to enterprises, because the number of the 
labor accidents increased, bringing losses to the organizations and damaging the health and the 
life quality of the employees.  The advantages acquired for the organizations that worry about 
this subject are motivation employees, to know that they work in a secure environment and to 
know that they have good situation to work with tranquility. Avoiding damage to their health and 
generating greater confidence for the same, increased of productivity and the improvement of 
the company image, which has strengthened with all its partners and society. Therefore, the 
regulatory standard has the objective of standardize and help the enterprises with the security 
procedures, with the objective of conserve the health and the life quality of the employees and 
protect them of possible accidents of work.  The finality of this report is exhibit the secure 
measures that are used of the organization located in the Midwest of Minas Gerais that works 
only with slaughter and storage of pigs in the cold chamber. It perform a search literature that 
covers all involved topics of this report.  Furth more, are used, with analysis procedure the direct 
observation to identify all the risks that the work environment cause to their employees. With the 
purpose of providing information about the working conditions of the employees, were realized 
interviews conducted with employees about the risks according to their perception, they are 
exposed. The conformity of the enterprise with the thirty-six regulatory, which deals with safety 
and health at work of slaughter and processing of meat and meat products companies, standard 
are checked and the nonconformity, are checked too. Based on the items of this standard were 
analyzed all conformities and non-conformities of each of these items according to what was 
envisaged by standard and which can be seen in company. According to the articles of the 
thirty-six regulatory standard, there are twenty-nine conformities and seventy-two 
nonconformities, of the one hundred and one. The articles that are comply according to the 
thirty-six regulatory standard, are very important, like and in relation to platforms, walkways and 
platforms the company follows all the requirements thereof, thus offering greater security for 
workers to carry out the fridge activities. Already, the non-conformities, the enterprise does not 
practice most of the requirements of the thirty-six regulatory standard, like with machinery and 
temporal organization of work, which do not have any item that was conformity. It is possible 
realize that the enterprise has more non-conformities than conformities, even now adopting 
various requirements compatible with the standard. It causes risks to the health and secure of 
the employees.  The problem is that violation of the thirty-six regulatory standard increases the 
chances of the employees of that company to be victims of accidents and there is the possibility 
of the employees of they have diseases because of work. This enterprise should have a 
program to health at work to prevention of accidents. 
 
Keywords: Risks; accidents, slaughter. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The work more than a way to ensure financial stability is the expression of useful of the people 
for business and for society. Besides people spend most of their adult life in the workplace, 
exercising their functions, receiving interference from other persons, the interference of factors 
related to working environment and the imposed rules and regulations according to the criteria 
defined by the organization where they operate. 
According to all these precepts related to work, it is critical that companies understand the 
complexity that all these factors result in the realization of the work and provide a safe 
environment, and is a facilitator of health and well-being of their employees. 
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The benefits obtained by the organizations concerned and work are numerous and range from 
satisfaction and motivation that the employee has to know that working in a safe environment 
and it has all the support to carry out their activities in the best possible way. Avoiding damage 
caused to their health and generating greater confidence for the same, until the issue of 
increasing worker productivity and the company's image has strengthened against all its 
partners and society. Thus, to assist Brazilian companies to obtain these results there are the 
regulatory standards that provide information on what are the appropriate procedures related to 
medicine and work safety according to the type of company where employees work and 
activities that they play. 
Among these regulatory standards NR is located (Regulatory Standard) - 36 (2003) which deals 
with the safety and health of workers at work in slaughter and processing companies of meat 
and meat products. The existence of this rule is extremely important, because the work of these 
organizations exposes employees to various risks due to the work environment in which they 
live, as well as the requirements emanating from the functions performed by them. 
This article aims to analyze if the work done by the nine employees of the slaughter area of a 
refrigerator located in the Midwest region of Minas Gerais, it has conformities and 
nonconformities according to NR 36 (2003). 
The fridge in question works with the slaughter of pigs, which occurs about two to three times a 
week according to the demand. The company carries out its activities from fertilization swine, 
maternity, nursery and fattening to slaughter process that is the focus of study of this work. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
As an analytical procedure was used direct observation with the purpose of providing information 
about the working conditions that which employees are exposed and the interview with the workers 
about the risks that according to their perception, they are exposed. 
The method used to carry out these analyses was the case study. According to Yin (2005) case 
study as research, strategy comprises a method that encompasses everything - dealing with the 
planning logic, data collection techniques and approaches specific to their analysis. In this sense, the 
case study is neither a tactic to data collection nor merely a feature of planning itself, but a 
comprehensive research strategy. 
The materials used were a camera to record the working conditions to which employees during the 
execution of their activities and a computer to store the information obtained. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
For the study became subject to comparison with standard regulatory 36 (2003) it was necessary 
prior knowledge of the process that is performed by the company, where the focus for the verification 
of the requirements was the slaughter of pigs. 
The process begins with forwarding the pig to the scale where it done weighing the animal so that it 
is determined whether it is fit for slaughter, if it has the minimum weight required by the company 
that is 150 kg. Whereas if the animal is not fit it is forwarded to the pens for fattening being 
slaughtered in later processes. 
After the pig, weighing he is sent to a location where a clerk causes an unconscious state in the 
animal, through an electronic device that is positioned below the ear, in the head region, that is five 
to eight seconds for total faintness animal. 
In order to cause the death of the animal, an employee inserts a knife in the pig artery, so that all the 
blood of the animal drain. 
Later the official position the feet of the animal in a hook for transporting the same to the place where 
the first part of the cleaning process will be will happen, by washing with a water hose. 
The animal goes to the tank containing water at a temperature ranging between 68 and 72 degrees, 
where it is for one minute, until all the pig hair disappear. 
During the next process, the employee removes the nails and the rectum of the animal and he 
passing the torch around the animal's body. To finish this step, the employee cleans the animal 
carcass. 
Finally the animal is opened, have their organs removed and is routed to the cold room, where he 
remained for twelve hours before being transported to the truck for shipment of all its parts, and the 
housing and the liver goes to the butchers and a bellyful for further manufacturing poultry feed. 
After studying the whole process, both the physical and organizational, has made the comparison of 
the activities that being carried out in the fridge with the regulatory requirements of the standard 36 
(2003), which established that the company adopts various security requirements. They are 
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extremely important to the quality of life of workers. However many requirements are in non-
compliance with the standard. 
The first approach to standard regulatory 36 (2003) to be analysed is on the furniture and jobs. The 
company complies with most of the items related to this topic, but also has some non-conformities. 
The company adopts requirements as work surface height and features compatible with the type of 
activity to perform by employees, dimensional characteristics of jobs that allow the placement and 
movement of body segments properly and work area within the manual range area, in order to avoid 
the adoption of inappropriate postures and excessive range of motion. 
The company also offers to workers who perform their activities exclusively on foot, enough legroom 
and feet at the base of the work plan in order to allow for maximum approximation thereof to the 
operating points, avoiding the adoption of extreme positions. 
The jobs are also suitable, because they have floors with non-slip characteristics, constant cleaning 
and environmental hygiene, and provide flow of water and waste system. 
Finally, still according to the conformity of the standard 36 (2003), the company has devices that 
enable the opening of the doors from the chamber through the interior without much effort and alarm 
which can be activated in case of emergency, ensuring the reduction of risk of accidents to workers 
that location. 
Regarding the non-compliance of securities and jobs, the standard defines the benches, treadmills, 
Norias, tables or machines must have no sharp edges. There are sharp edges on all sides and 
equipment, generating constant risk of accidents, injuries, injuries, infections and illnesses to 
workers. 
Also according to the furniture item and jobs, it found that the refrigerator does not have seats or 
benches near the workplace to the allowed breaks, which provided, since all activities in the 
refrigerator made exclusively standing. Disagreement with this item of the rule can bring serious 
damage to the worker, since it can result in serious injury due to static posture of the lower limbs. It 
also found that the areas of work and movement sized to allow the safe movement of people and 
materials needed to perform the service. 
 Due to bad environmental design, employees often have to pass beneath pallets and platforms to 
perform transportation of materials and tools necessary craft appropriate to them, which generates a 
very high risk of accidents and submit the employee adoption of postures, damaging your health and 
your well-being. 
Anyway, according to this topic from the norm, jobs must have weather protection when activities 
occur in the outer area, which does not occur, since, especially in the unloading of animals, the place 
has no signage. The company does not offer collective protection equipment and no employee has 
personal protective equipment, leaving them at the mercy of possible accidents that caused by 
animal handling still alive. 
The next topic in the standard regulatory 36 (2003) concerns the platforms, walkways and platforms. 
The same shows only conform to the norm, since the company uses suitable pallets will then work 
plan with dimensions, depth, width and height to allow safe handling and platforms with height, 
positioning and sizing to ensure safety worker. 
The fourth item of NR 36 (2003) points out the specifications for the handling of products, and 
establishes specifications and dimensions for transport systems, in order to avoid the adoption of 
excessive and sustained postures of the upper limbs and neck. 
The standard also stipulates the implementation of control measures to refrain workers from 
prolonged exposure to vibration and immersion or constant contact of the hands of the same with 
water. 
The company adopts both points discussed above in order to ensure comfort and safety to 
employees who carry out activities directly related to the handling of products. 
Nonconformities this topic are inherent in the implementation of control measures in order to prevent 
effete workers continuously and repetitively sudden movements and overuse of muscle strength. 
However, what the norm provides contradicts what done in the refrigerator, where employees need 
to resort to using excessive force to perform the animal carcass transportation to the cargo truck, 
and the same activity requires movement’s sudden and high impact on the shoulders, neck and 
back due to the large load to transport. 
The standard also mentions measures adopted for the lifting and transportation of goods and cargo, 
in this regard, the company has a greater number of non-compliances than compliances, and the 
only line is on the floors and walkways, which hosts withdrawals, transport and loading weight, which 
are in perfect condition. 
Regarding non-conformities, the first of this topic deals with the technical and organizational 
measures that the employer must undertake to provide the means to reduce the need for constant 
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manual loading of products and loads of great weight. However, we realize that this requirement 
does not apply because the fridge does not have a measure or means to reduce the effort made by 
the worker, especially in the clean animal transportation for cargo trucks. 
The second non-compliance refers to those activities, in accordance with the standard; they 
performed so that the employee's physical effort is consistent with their strength capacity, safe and 
healthy way. This does not observe, since the load, transported on-site service is much greater than 
the individual capacity, since the physical effort is visible through the facial expression and body 
behaviour of workers to perform the activity. 
Already as a third point, there is the ergonomic analysis of the work, which aims to assess the 
compatibility between the permissible efforts and adopted by employees in the heavier activities. 
The company’s manager does not hold that, since workers adopt postures and transport loads very 
inadequate for the type of office held by each, which avoided through this analysis, which provides 
results that help in taking corrective and preventive measures aimed at the welfare of the worker. 
The task switching between employees or adequate breaks for the manual loading of work is the 
fourth and final topic not as the norm related to lifting goods and loads. The same is not met given 
that does not happen any turnover among workers and breaks not respected, leaving workers in the 
same position and without pause throughout the workday. 
The reception and unloading of animals is another important item which is also present in the 
standard, and on which the company adopts requirements consistent with the provisions of the 
latter. The box of stunning animals is one of those items, and allocated to ensure the safe execution 
of the activity, as well as having restraints in the event of faulty stunning. 
Already based on non-compliant requirements, the standard deals with the planning and 
organization of activities, which shall comply with requirements concerning the guidance of 
contractors about the occupational hazards. As well as information on prevention measures at work 
with live animals, where the company must provide to workers who deal directly with the reception 
and unloading of animals specific procedures and safety rules. The signage in the areas of passage 
of animals, vehicles and people and the protection of jobs against weather, with circulation walkways 
for workers alongside or above the platform are also the company's responsibility. 
As could be observed through the workplace analysis, none of these met, since the workers do not 
receive any specific instruction or procedure on the activities developed by them, getting the mercy 
of the environmental risks posed by the environment. 
The seventh item addressed by standard regulatory 36 (2003) relates to machinery, and the 
company has only non-compliance in this regard. 
One of the requirements contained in it is about the use of emergency stop devices, where they do 
not find in the refrigerator, causing major accident risks to workers, as the stop devices are an 
important measure of safety and prevention. 
Another condition imposed by the standard, but it is not adopted by the company is the use of 
control measures to protect against issuance or release of physical, heated fumes from machinery 
and equipment, and worker contact with hot surfaces. Employees do not have any protective 
equipment is individual or collective, and the company does not keep track of risks. 
Regarding the use of equipment and tools, which is the eighth topic of the standard, there is a 
balancing enters the compliant and non-compliant measures have adopted by the refrigerator. 
Items related to the provision of equipment and tools, favouring the adoption of appropriate postures 
and movements and ease of use comply with the standard, as well as knives, the company offers 
and that are appropriate for the tasks and hand workers with formats suitable for each function. 
Also present agreement with the NR 36 (2003), tools and equipment in the item specification and 
suitability for each type of activity, being the same as light as possible and with constant 
maintenance system. 
In relation to non-concordance with the eighth topic of the standard, are present items relating to 
training and employee orientation, which should, but does not happen in no time from work the 
employee inside the refrigerator in order to enable them to exercise its function safely and healthily. 
Grounding and periodic reviews of wires and cables an item in the standard that is not being done 
by the company. This procedure is extremely important because it allows the prevention of the risk 
of serious and fatal accidents involving electricity, as well as the protection of employees, bringing 
comfort and safety to the desktop. 
Finally, employers must educate supervisors about the importance of restoring the sharp knives, and 
the company about it verified the non-adoption of this measure through interviews with employees 
who claimed to know about the importance of restoring the sharp knives, but without education. 
The environmental working conditions provided for in NR 36 (2003) are noise, air quality in artificially 
climate-controlled environments, chemical agents, biological agents and thermal comfort. Since the 
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studied company are irregularities in relation to noise, biological agents, chemical agents and 
thermal comfort. 
Regarding the noise officials responsible for weighing pigs and forward them to the corridor that 
leads to the location where they will be slaughtered report that the noise is a factor that bother them 
during the period of the slaughter that lasts four hours. The company has no program to reduce 
worker noise during exposure time, and employees do not use any personal protective equipment in 
order to mitigate the damage caused by excessive noise they exposed. 
All employees involved in the slaughtering process from what is responsible for weighing up which 
removes the animal's carcass viscera, are susceptible to biological hazards due to the high contact 
with swine or the carcass of it. 
The company does not carry out any study to identify potential pathogens, the means of 
transmission does not offer any training or information about them, and the employees do not use 
gloves. 
The company uses ammonia in the refrigeration process, but does not follow most of the measures 
of collective prevention to adopt due to the use of this chemical agent, which are maintaining the 
environmental concentrations to the lowest possible levels, implementation mechanism for detecting 
leaks, control panel installation of cooling system and signalling emergency exits. 
The employee responsible for passing the torch in the animal housing back subjected to excessive 
heat, as noted in Figure 10, and the worker who directs the animal's carcass until the cold chamber 
exposed to a very low temperature. Both report that these two situations create discomfort for them, 
using no personal protective equipment or adequate equipment compatible with the room 
temperature and the activity performed, as the company does not perform this analysis. 
Furthermore, there is no task switching, searching for the reduction of employee exposure to heat in 
handling the torch, and is followed by four hours exposed to this elevated temperature. 
The company does not provide for employees no hearing protection equipment, gloves and no 
proper attire to the local temperature and available as established by standard garments that can 
change daily with sanitation being this employer; they can replace when it is necessary and the 
company supplies more than one-piece dress meeting the hygienic-sanitary characteristics. 
In relation to risk management the employer does not put into practice any planned approach, 
structured and comprehensive prevention through the management of risk factors Safety and Health 
at Work and has no program evaluation actions, control and monitoring of risks. 
The company has no program for the prevention of environmental risks and medical control of 
occupational health. Thus, there are technical and administrative controls of noise exposure, 
periodic monitoring of exposure and control measures, training and information to employees, 
determination of personal protective equipment and no history of occupational diseases worker. 
Employees do not realize breaks during the work lasts four hours. Therefore, the company does not 
comply with item 36.13 of NR 36 (2003) which states that for workers who develop activities 
performed directly in the production process, from receiving to shipping. They are also required 
repeatability or static muscular overload or dynamics of the neck, shoulders, back and arms and 
legs, pauses must assure twenty minutes for up to six hours of work. 
With regard to the way the company organizes the work, they are not adopted technical engineering 
measures, organizational and management in order to eliminate or reduce risks. The employer does 
not implement casters within the working hours, which is extremely harmful to workers because it 
does not provide for change the sitting position to standing posture. In addition, it does not help to 
minimize the most frequent static and dynamic forces and does not allow the worker alternating with 
activities of environmental exposure to noise, humidity, cold and heat more comfortable. The 
company carries out according to the rules established by the standard cleaning of the tables and 
has a number of workers compatible with the demands and production requirements. 
The company does not perform ergonomic analysis of the work and does not follow any of the 
following rules established by the standard: discussion and dissemination of results with workers and 
their supervisors, specific ergonomic recommendations for activities performed, evaluation of 
interventions carried out and evaluating the effectiveness of recommendations. 
Employees do not receive any information on the risks related to work, their potential causes and the 
effects that these cause health thereof, as well as the recommended prevention measures for each 
activity. Control measures are also not report for workers. 
 
Workers are not subject to the postural changes that help prevent musculoskeletal overload and 
reduce fatigue and they do not informed about the use of personal protective equipment and its 
limitations. They do not well informed about the chemical, physical and biological agents to which 
they are exposed, the biomechanical risks, risks from machinery and its components and 
613
precautions concerning communicable diseases. They also do not receive annual recurrent training, 
which according to NR 36 (2003) should be at least two hours. 
 
 
Figure 1  – Verification of Compliance of Standard Items Analyzed with Labor. 
 
The results found in this study are willing, in Figure 1, below which translates into figures the 
percentage of items that were analysed (101 items), which comply with the provision in question (29 
items) and which do not conform (72 items): 
Thus, according to it seems it is clear that the company does not follow most of the rules established 
by the standard regulatory 36 (2003). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Through the study of the principles established in the standard regulatory 36, along with the 
observation and analysis of the work environment, we found that the company analysed presents 
both compliance, as non-conformities with the standard. 
As compliant, it adopts important requirements, and in relation to platforms, walkways and platforms 
the company meets all requirements of the same, thus offering greater security for workers to carry 
out the refrigerator activities. 
Regarding the non-compliance, it was found that it does not practice most of the requirements set in 
the standard regulatory 36 (2003), particularly with regard to machinery and temporal organization of 
work, which do not have any as. 
It conclude that even now adopting various requirements compatible with the standard, the non-
conformities are in a much higher number, bringing risks to health and worker safety. Failure to 
comply with the requirements established by this standard increases the chances of the employees 
of this company to be victims of accidents and long-term contracting diseases because of 
inadequate working conditions. In addition, the incorrect way employees perform their activities can 
cause accidents and the company needs to take responsibility and can suffer financial losses and be 
subject to lawsuits. 
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Abstract 
A strong effort is to be done by engaging psychosocial factors with our working conditions 
framework, where uprising of mental disorders and psychosocial illness and diseases actually 
brings and will bring in a short future new challenges for workers health, safety and wellbeing. 
Our actual legal range shouldn´t stop in social security compensation, it should focus on a 
complete and holistic compensation of the harm suffered (including in personal aspects 
such as dignity, integrity, workers honour and non discrimination practices). This whole 
approach is nowadays necessary from EU policies, but it’s also an issue to be faced by non-
legislative instruments. 
In this paper we may see some good examples of countries that are trying to adapt their 
national regulation to their working conditions framework to face regulation in a climate of 
general deregulation, representing how psychosocial regulation is evolving to a new concept. 
EU latest drafts on occupational health and safety policy are still not tackling properly these 
contingencies. Social dialogue at different levels and professionals, EU regulation adaptation 
and business involvement is more than ever required. Further developments and research in 
this topic should continue, especially in countries where policies are still less developed. 
 
Keywords: Regulation; Psychosocial, Compensation, EU Law, Working conditions. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The safety and health at work is regulated by the EU Framework Directive which was adopted in 
1989. The law obliges employers to put in place measures to protect workers against accidents 
and diseases. 
 
EU countries are required to implement the Directive in their national law but in this paper I will 
refer those who have chosen the most appropriate method of achieving the Directive’s goals in 
tackling with psychosocial factors in the last years. 
 
In addition, the European social partners signed Framework Agreements on Work-related 
Stress in 2004 and on Harassment and Violence at Work in 2007 which today become 
inefficient to face the complexity of these factors in working conditions. 
 
The European Commission strategy Europe 2020 makes employment and workers’ well-being a 
priority, including psychosocial protection. To better protect the more than 217 million workers 
in the EU from work-related accidents and diseases, the European Commission has adopted a 
new Strategic Framework on Health and Safety at Work 2014-2020, which identifies key 
challenges and strategic objectives for health and safety at work, presents key actions and 
identifies instruments to address these. 
 
One of the main goals to achieve is to improve the prevention of work-related diseases by 
tackling new and emerging risks without neglecting existing risks 
 
The Strategic Framework identifies three major health and safety at work challenges: 
· Improving enforcement by Member States for example by evaluating the performance 
of national labour inspectorates. 
· Simplifying existing legislation where appropriate to eliminate unnecessary 
administrative burdens, while preserving a high level of protection for workers’ health and 
safety. 
· Improving statistical data collection to have better evidence and developing monitoring tools. 
 
This new strategic framework was an incredible opportunity to tackle psychosocial factors from 
a legal and regulation aspects, nevertheless EU legislation is far from solving this problem, 
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community regulation hasn´t face this question properly; that’s why a legal-regulation 
psychosocial risks definition can´t be found if we study EU Justice tribunal psychosocial 
related latest declarations except for EU mental stress agreement and violence harassment 
Directives. 
 
The actual strategy follows the indeterminate strategy of not going deeper into the problem it 
just tackles with general concepts such as simplifying existing legislation (where most of the 
times psychosocial issues are not treated) or by improving statistical data, as we may see one 
of the main issues of psychosocial diseases are its mis-declaration (report cases of certain 
diagnosed reportable diseases which are linked with occupational exposure to specified 
hazards). 
 
The potential consequences of psychosocial burdens (pressure, isolation and loss of social 
support, new communication technologies, flexible working time, impossible deadlines, 
restructuring…) include cardiovascular diseases, musculoskeletal disorders, dermatologic 
problems, suicide, relationship problems with colleagues, family and social networks, and 
increased risk of violence, with consequences for both physical and mental health. In the 
medium term, companies suffer from absenteeism due to lengthy illnesses, and turn-over 
and productivity are damaged. It’s not anymore an issue just related to harassment and 
violence at work as main EU regulation cover. 
 
Innovative regulatory approaches, challenges and developments in EU regulations beyond EU 
Directives. Psychosocial regulation in Belgium: 
Recent changes defines psychosocial risks range from an innovative point of view, putting 
them on the same level as traditional risks; it defines the key actors role associated to this 
issue, and modifies the intern procedures related to intervention, complaint and refers to 
victims possibility to ask for a compensation when infringement occurs. 
The original regulation figures as follow (come into force 1st September 2014): 
 
Act 28 February 2014 Wellbeing related to violence, sexual and moral harassment Act 28 March 
2014 
Order April 2014 related to psychosocial work related risk prevention. 
 
Even if it may seem surprising, this regulation puts end to the indetermination that have 
ruled in the latest national European regulations (EU framework exception, where this 
definition is more specific) in psychosocial risks/diseases definition. 
That´s why this regulation considers a new definition of what it´s understood as work 
psychosocial risks, not limiting the ambit of the definition to aspects associated with work-
related violence such as mobbing or harassment. 
This innovative regulation becomes more familiar with Nordic countries legal treatment, by 
defining with accuracy the key actors and their role in the business structure. 
Sexual and moral harassment treatment also suffers several changes, according to justice 
reparation and compensation economic terms. These aspects widely develops European legal 
framework when talking about workers protection. 
 
Key roles are better defined: this regulation defines the role that should play managers, Health 
and Safety Committee, safety practitioners, and work health professionals. The whole related 
participant integration is developed, while   most of EU countries are still obsessed in health and 
security business integration this Belgium regulation as well as Nordic countries regulation go 
ahead by focusing the key participants and its roles within business organization. 
 
It’s also defined a new role known as “confident person” who will informally participate in the 
processes. A formal intervention mechanism will be set up (professional advisor participation 
that will analyse the situation, will report and make a proposal during the process) and informal 
intervention (interviews, conciliation, third parties involved). 
In this integration and key actors definition technical training will be highlighted, as we may 
see in other regulations there’s always a lack of training in related actors (psychologists, health 
professionals, etc…) 
 
Workers compensation will also be improved in terms of violence and sexual harassment legal 
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claims, by improving the compensation terms for moral and material harms. European and main 
national security systems framework also lacks of this legal treatment when talking about 
compensation, reparation and protection where the issue had been tackled partially and 
unequal. 
 
Psychosocial regulation in Denmark: 
 
Working on this whole approach concept, this regulation will include prevention of violence 
against workers outside of working hours and workplaces, adapting their regulation to new 
forms of work (glocalisation, new models of work and organisations) 
A law enacted on 1 February 2015 will oblige employers to prevent the risks of violence 
perpetrated by people outside the firm against their employees, outside of their working hours 
and workplaces. 
The functions performed by the employee, especially if, as part of his duties, the employee 
takes decisions that could have very significant consequences for customers, private individuals 
or users. 
Nordic countries such as Denmark have in recent years emphasised that employers must 
also be aware of the use of digital platforms in their business and they should have an active 
policy on the prevention of sexual harassment using such media. They should also have clear 
procedures for dealing with cases of sexual harassment and threats via digital platforms 
Cyberbullying is an emerging issue because of the increasing pervasiveness of ICT and mobile 
devices in  the workplace. New forms of work and jobs are obliging to include cyberbullying 
as one new form of violence and harassment at work. 
 
Croatian Psychosocial legislation: 
A new law has introduced measures to protect people from stress at work in Croatia. 
As Eurofound refers the Law on Occupational Safety (OG 71/14) came into force on 19 June 
2014. It has a similar structure to the previous Law on Safety at Work adopted in 1996. 
This is the first time in Croatia that a law has introduced measures to protect workers from 
psychosocial risks (stress) and psychophysiological strain at work. 
The act introduces a general principle of risk prevention and protection of health at work. It 
brings in rules on the elimination of risk factors, procedures for the training of workers and 
procedures for providing information and consultation. 
This regulation has appeared to fight the actual framework that places the country as one of 
the EU partners with the highest number of workers who perform monotonous and repetitive 
jobs. Almost 65% of their labour force is involved in such tasks every day. 
 
United Kingdom Psychosocial non-legislative approach: 
The way we work is changing and in-demand skills such as teamwork, collaboration, joint 
problem solving, flexible, lone working and staff development all require employees who are 
mentally healthy, resilient, motivated and focused. Open and supportive workplaces benefit 
everyone; employees, employers and the bottom line. 
 
Mental Health Campaign and Business agreement: We’re ready to talk. Rethinking the 
approach to mental wellbeing in the workplace. Time to Change is England’s biggest 
programme to end the stigma and discrimination faced by people with mental health problems. 
Over 200 organisations have made a public commitment to tackle mental health stigma. 
 
This innovative business agreement tries to overcome the regulation barriers in this issue. Yet 
there remains a culture of silence around mental health at work and businesses are reluctant to 
report publicly on the proactive steps that are being taken to foster mental wellbeing. 
Employers and employees are unwilling to talk about stress, anxiety and depression openly 
hiding an issue with economic, health and legal consequences. 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHOD 
EU Strategic Framework on Health and Safety at Work 2014-2020 EU framework directive 
(89/391/EEC) 
EU mental stress agreement and violence harassment Directives EU national regulations 
 
Literature review and legal compared analysis. 
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This paper is placed within a PhD Project related to a law comparative researching project 
in the exciting area of psychosocial work related illness and risks under University Carlos III 
and IOSH Institution of Occupational Safety and Health collaboration and support. 
This paper work may entail national and international expert contacts, it will also imply a 
deep legislation study including several countries; it will also require an immersion through 
different legislation, judicial sentences and  legal or courts affairs. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
On 6 June 2014, the European Commission adopted a Communication on an EU strategic 
framework on health and safety at work for the years 2014-2020. It shows new emphasis on 
work-related diseases, tackling new risks but the treatment is as complete as it should 
considering that we are talking of a 6 years strategy. The new strategy will also grant specific 
attention to the impact of changes in work organisation on physical and mental health which 
could result in psychosocial work related disorders, stress, anxiety and depression, 
nevertheless it only cover general issues  lacking a deeper analysis. 
 
As EUOSHA states, nature of many of the complex interactions between work-related 
psychosocial risk factors, risk behaviours and chronic diseases and health conditions, 
including occupational diseases and disorders, is not well studied or understood. A better 
understanding of the links between work related psychosocial risk factors and morbidity and 
mortality is needed for the development of evidence-based policies and effective prevention 
strategies. Further research in this issue will be needed in the following years. 
 
At the moment we are attending to new work processes which turn into new work related 
illness, where victims are totally unconscious till nowadays, related to emerging psychosocial 
risks produced by work environments deterioration when pernicious practices arises such as 
violence at work, mobbing, harassment or stress factors. Taking this for granted it may be 
understand, though not justify, the unsatisfactory work related illness protection and 
regulation, the updating lack, concerning to occupational illness list, and its lack of adaptation to 
technological changes, new ways of work, new productive processes and new psychosocial 
risks. 
 
There´s an urgent necessity to adapt the actual occupational illness list to the theoretical or 
ideal occupational illness system according to EU criteria, by updating the list and establishing 
not only a mandatory list but a complementary or optional list in order to consider these kind of 
psychosocial risks as occupational illness. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Nowadays none of the EU countries has specific regulations on work-related stress, but all 
countries general legal frameworks refer to psychosocial risk factors that are the cause of 
work-related stress. In some countries, the legal provisions go further than the framework 
directive but specifying the need for employers to act against factors considered to be 
psychosocial risks that cause work-related stress. This is the case in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. 
 
Analysing Health and Safety at work 2014-2020 framework it doesn’t represent from legal 
scope the strong OSH strategy that Europe needed in terms of psychosocial knowledge. 
More efforts on development of psychosocial factors regulation are required. Despite the 
EC Strategic Framework 2014-2020 focuses in better protecting workers against traditional 
accidents at work and occupational diseases, it still doesn’t tackle breaking down European 
legislation in psychosocial aspects. 
 
The Commission’s traditional action try to avoid making any legislative proposal in 
psychosocial risk regulation until the evaluation of the entire body of EU OSH legislation has 
been completed. This delay have provoked a legislation blocking as a result which will not 
benefit EU working conditions scene. 
 
According to EU authorities, work-related diseases linked to psychosocial risk factor, won´t 
collect enough scientific evidence in order to be admitted in the privileged occupational illness 
catalogue regulated by a list,  open or close system. 
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It can´t be denied that this EU legal debate is associated to a great concern to fix this issue to 
the emerging social reality and for the latest years solutions had not appeared from EU 
Commission. 
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Abstract 
Construction work involves many dynamic and hazardous processes that are adapted to the 
project-specific requirements and context.  Combined with high production pressures and 
workload, these processes create high potential for errors and accidents.   Successful 
operational performance requires both high production and high safety performance.  Thus, a 
significant challenge for construction researchers and practitioners is to develop resilient 
production systems that are simultaneously highly productive and highly safe under the 
demanding, complex, and dynamic conditions of construction projects.  Towards this aim, this 
study investigated the work practices and principles of exceptional field supervisors who 
consistently achieve very high levels of both productivity and safety. The research used a case 
study approach. In-depth field studies documented the work management practices of 
exceptional supervisors in four high-risk construction trades—residential framing, masonry, 
concrete, and roofing).  In each case, these practices were compared with the practices of an 
average performing supervisor from the same organization.  The findings indicate that the 
exceptional supervisors used a combination of strategies that aimed primarily at preventing 
errors, rework and incomplete work.  Their strategies included: (1) task management strategies 
that mitigated the task demands on the workers, and (2) crew management strategies that 
enhance the work group’s ability to cope with high demands.  The findings provide significant 
empirical evidence that the production practices that prevent errors are essential in preventing 
accidents, as they create “high quality work assignments.”  As a result, the safety performance 
can be considered “an emergent property” of the production system.   
 
Keywords: construction safety; Production system design; High performance supervisors; 
Production safety trade-off; Production practices. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Construction work involves dynamic and hazardous processes that are adapted to project-
specific requirements and context.  The very dynamic environment is considered a key feature 
of hazardous work environments (Scarf et al 2001).  The hazardous work processes combined 
with high production pressures and workload, create high potential for errors and accidents.  In 
2013 the US construction industry employed 6% of all industries and had 20% of the fatal work 
injuries (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015).   
In the construction sector, compliance with safety standards are the most commonly considered 
antecedents of safety performance.  Safety Management Systems (SMS) aim at preventing 
incidents by increasing the workers’ levels of compliance with advocated safety conditions and 
behaviors (Garner 2004, Vredenburgh 2002).  Safety Management Systems emphasize 
training, organizational support (such as management, resources, etc.), inspections and 
enforcement, and workers’ motivation (Garner 2004, Manscini and Bacharias 2012).  Safety 
culture and behavior-based safety also aim at increasing the workers’ compliance with safety 
rules and procedures (Choudry et al 2007, Cooper and Philips 2004, Gundelmund 2007, Flin et 
al 2000).  This approach to safety has contributed to the reduction of accidents, but it also has 
limitations as it neglects the important role of production processes in the production of 
accidents.  
Successful operational performance requires both high production and high safety performance.  
Thus, an important challenge for construction researchers and practitioners is to develop 
production systems that are highly productive and safe, and can function effectively in the 
dynamic and complex conditions of construction projects—in other words, they are resilient.  
In construction, the organization of the production is typically performed by field supervisors (a. 
k. a. foremen) who operate within organizational, financial, and project constraints.  The 
supervisors determine to a large extent the work structure, task allocation, sequencing, 
workload and pace, work coordination, controls, etc.  In order to identify production practices 
that support both high production and high safety performance, this research investigated the 
work practices of exceptional field supervisors—that is supervisors who consistently achieve 
very high levels of both productivity and safety.  
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2.  BACKGROUND 
 
2.1.  Safety paradigms 
Rasmussen and colleagues (1994) identify three paradigms of safety research: (1) normative 
paradigm, (2) human error paradigm, and (3) the cognitive engineering paradigm. The 
normative paradigm focuses on prescriptive theories concerning the way people ought to act 
with regards to hazards.  Efforts to prevent occupational accidents focus on safe rules of 
conduct. The human error paradigm focuses on deviations from the normative, “best way” of 
working, and views errors and violations as a human “malfunction.”  This paradigm includes 
studies of errors (Rasmussen et al.1982), management errors and resident pathogens (Reason 
1990). The cognitive engineering paradigm is concerned with the characteristics of the work 
system (the features of the task, tools and operating environment) that shape the decisions, 
behaviors and the possibility of errors and failures (Rasmussen et al. 1994, Woods and 
Wreathall 2003, Hollnagel 2009, Dekker 2006).  From a cognitive perspective, an error is not 
simply a human failure but a symptom of a problem in the work system.  The cognitive approach 
to safety attempts to prevent accidents by designing work systems that are adapted to people 
and avoid operators’ overload and errors.  
In construction, the primary approach to accident prevention is based on the normative 
paradigm and focuses on compliance with rules and procedures.  Safety programs focus on the 
control of hazards and aim primarily at compliance with safety rules though training, inspections 
and enforcement, management support and workers’ motivation (Garner 2004, Manscini and 
Bacharias 2012).   Efforts towards safety culture and behavior-based safety also aim at 
increasing the workers’ compliance with prescribed hazard controls (Choudry et al 2007, 
Cooper and Philips 2004, Gundelmund 2007, Flin et al 2000).  This approach has contributed to 
the reduction of accidents, however it also has important limitations as it does not address the 
important role of the production system in the production of accidents.  For example, 
compliance with safety requirements is influenced by the production system elements that 
shape the work situations and worker behaviors (McLain and Jarrell 2007; Mitropoulos et al. 
2009, Mitropoulos and Memarian 2013, Veltri et al 2013).   
 
2.2  Influence of production system on safety 
Safety and operations have developed separate areas of research, and the interaction of 
operations and safety has received limited attention.  However, conflicting safety and production 
demands can negatively affect production, safety or both.  Production–safety trade-offs are an 
important element of the safety of production operations (Hollnagel 2009, Rasmussen 1997, 
Reason 1997, Mikkers et al 2014).  Production employees make many large and small trade-off 
decisions every day (Woods et al 2010).  Woods and Wreathal (2003) call them “sacrifice 
decisions.”  Hollnagel 2009 refers to the “Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade Off” (ETTO). The 
safety climate literature also recognizes the trade-offs between safety and production (Zohar 
2000, Ford and Tetrick 2008, Das et al. 2008).  Zohar (2000) posits that there is a trade-off 
between production goals such as quality improvement and cost reductions, and safety goals 
such as accident reduction.  Ford and Tetrick (2008) argued that workers either avoid errors or 
maximize production by taking short cuts and working around the safety system to meet 
production goals.  McLain and Jarrell (2007) found that reduced compatibility between 
production and safety demands influences safe work behavior. 
From a cognitive perspective, Rasmussen et al. (1994) describe how the production system 
shapes the behaviors and performance of the individuals in the system.  Workers’ behaviors 
tend to migrate closer to the ‘boundary of loss of control’ due to the production pressures for 
increased efficiency, and the tendency for least effort, which is a response to increased 
workload.  Safety programs attempt to counter the above pressures and prescribe “safe 
behaviors” away from the boundary.  However, the continuous pressures due to efficiency and 
workload result in a “systematic migration toward the boundary of acceptable performance 
(Rasmussen et al. 1994).   
The construction literature provides extensive evidence that the production system has a strong 
effect on safety performance.  Suraji et al. (2001) argued that project conditions, design 
decisions or management decisions can cause responses that may lead to accidents.  Hinze 
and Parker (1978) suggested that job pressures are more important than safety policies in 
preventing accidents.  Studies of construction operations identified how project features and 
production practices influence the level of task demands on the workers (Saurin et al. 2008, 
Memarian & Mitropoulos in press).  
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The literature recognizes the potential conflict and trade-offs between production and safety.  
However, successful project performance requires achieving both efficient production and high 
levels of safety.   Research in operations productivity and safety are typically conducted 
independent of each other and their interaction has received limited attention. As a result, there 
is significant lack of studies on the practices that support at the same time both safety and 
production.   
The aim of this study is to investigate what production and safety practices support both high 
production and high safety performance.  The approach used was to identify exceptional 
supervisors in high-risk construction trades who consistently achieve high levels of production 
and safety, and investigate how they organize and manage the production system—including 
their production practices, safety practices, crew management practices, etc.  The practices of 
these supervisors successfully manage or mitigate the efficiency-safety trade off in their 
operations. 
 
3.  METHOD 
The practices of exceptional supervisors were investigated using in-depth field studies of 
selected supervisors.  The practices of each exceptional supervisor were compared to the 
practices of an average-performing supervisor from the same contractor.  This involved 
extensive observations, interviews and discussions with many project participants (supervisors, 
workers, managers, safety professionals, etc.).   
 
3.1.  Research Activities 
To identify exceptional supervisors, each participating contractor evaluated their supervisors 
based on the following: (1) Safety incident rate and severity over the previous three years, 
which was calculated based on the labor hours each foreman supervised, the number of 
incidents that occurred under their supervision, and the direct cost of incidents. (2) Production 
performance during the previous three years.  This was evaluated using actual cost data (if 
available) or subjective data using the evaluation of the foremen by the company’s operations 
manager.  The assessment was based on the difficulty of the projects the foreman managed, 
and the foremen’s productivity and schedule performance. 
Interviews with the operations manager and safety manager were conducted to understand the 
organizational context, including the safety management policies, hiring policies, foremen and 
crew training, compensation and bonuses, work method selection, and foremen’s level of 
decision-making regarding the work process. Safety incidents over the previous three years 
were reviewed to identify hazards and high-risk activities. 
After securing the necessary permissions, the researchers performed extensive field 
observations and interviews with the selected supervisors, their crew members and other 
project personnel.  About 20 site visits were conducted for each trade, including observations of 
average performing foremen.  Operations were observed and often videotaped.  The foremen 
were interviewed multiple times regarding all aspects of the work organization.  
 
3.2.  Cases 
The study focused on trades with significant safety risk, as reflected in high rates of injuries and 
fatalities.  This paper summarizes the findings from (1) residential framing, (2) concrete and (3) 
masonry supervisors.   
The residential contractor employed about 85 framing crews. All crews performed very similar 
work in terms of complexity, size and schedule.  The exceptional foreman was the one with the 
highest production score and zero incidents. The average foreman had productivity slightly 
above average, and incident rate just above the company average, and average workers’ 
compensation cost.  Both crews had 7 crew members.   
The masonry contractor performs residential, commercial and industrial work.  The company 
employed more than 700 workers including about 60 foremen.  The exceptional foreman was 
observed on a large project that involved several buildings.  Another foreman was also on this 
project.  Each foreman was assigned different buildings and each had a crew of 45-55 workers 
(2 masons to 1 laborer). The project had a complex design and an accelerated schedule.   
The concrete company was a large contractor who performs primarily commercial and industrial 
work. The contractor had about 20 supervisors.  The selected supervisor was observed on a 
project that involved the construction of a 10-story office building, with a cast-in-place concrete 
frame and post-tensioned concrete slab.  Each floor was 2,500 Square Meters.  The design 
complexity was low.  The main challenges were the tight schedule of 13 weeks and the high 
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temperature.  The supervisor was in charge of the entire concrete operation that included a 
deck crew (19 members), a wall crew (9) and a night crew (8).   
 
4.  FINDINGS 
Table 1 summarizes the key findings from the cases, which include: the guiding principle, a set 
of task management strategies, and a set of crew management strategies.  The findings 
indicate that the primary focus of exceptional supervisors was to prevent errors, rework and 
incomplete work.  All their practices and strategies supported this guiding principle.  Their 
strategies mitigated and balanced the demands of the task, as well as the capacity of their crew.  
An unexpected finding was that the safety practices of high-performance foremen did not 
always involve extensive control of hazards and exposures.   
 
Table 1.  Production practices of high performance supervisors 
Guiding principle Prevent errors, rework and incomplete work 
Task management 
strategies 
· Organized the process for speed by completing smaller batches of 
work, overlapping activities and managing the dependencies. 
· Actively looked for production difficulties and risks, while the average 
supervisors operated largely based on repetition (do as before). 
· Simplified and standardized the activities to reduce complexity and 
physical demands. 
· Prepared the activities in detail to avoid production surprises and 
interruptions. 
· Mitigated the production pressures on their crews to prevent rushing 
and errors. 
Crew management 
strategies 
· Secured adequate manpower. 
· Kept the crews informed and focused. 
· The task assignments matched the crew capabilities with the 
demands of the operation.   
· The task assignments balanced the need for efficiency with workers’ 
learning and development. 
· Continuously monitored for errors, threats and difficulties, and 
responded fast to excessive workload and problems. 
 
3.1.  Guiding principle:  Focus on preventing errors, rework and incomplete work 
All high performing foremen had a strong focus on preventing errors, rework and incomplete 
work.  For the framing foreman, the largest productivity losses happen when he has to go back 
and fix something.  The masonry foreman emphasized that it is critical to have everything 
correct when he is finishing each area. Problems and mistakes are identified and corrected 
immediately and he rarely had any punchlist items. For the concrete supervisor, it was critical to 
avoid mistakes and delays, and to complete all the planned activities every day, in order to meet 
the aggressive schedule.  This emphasis on avoiding mistakes and rework guided most of their 
work practices.   
 
4.2.  Task management strategies 
 
4.2.1.  Organized the process for speed 
The foremen organized the work process for speed by reducing the batch size, overlapping 
operations, and managing the dependencies.  The masonry foreman divided the crew in smaller 
groups, who worked at different locations on the same floor.  He focused on completing each 
area fast by assigning several masons in one area—masons were working closer together, 
which also reduced their walking “empty-handed.  To accelerate the concrete operation, the 
supervisor divided each floor in two sections so the deck and walls operations could overlap.  
This overlapping created new resource dependencies: the concrete crews and crane.  Each 
operation was assigned to a different crew so they could proceed independently.  The 
dependency due to the crane was managed with better planning to reduce the number of lifts, 
and allocate the crane time to the different crews.   
 
4.2.2.  Anticipated threats and difficulties 
The HR foremen were constantly looking for potential problems—difficult work areas, missing 
resources, coordination difficulties, mistakes and omissions. The framing foreman was always 
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looking for details or options that his crew was not familiar with.  He discussed them with the 
crew and asked them to wait for him before they start working on those areas, to prevent errors.  
The masonry foreman was checking for complex block patterns, penetrations, and changes in 
the block that the crew needed to be aware of.  The concrete supervisor was considering the 
potential difficulties of every activity, and actions to reduce them. 
 
4.2.3.  Designed the activities to reduce complexity and physical demands 
The foremen were looking for opportunities to simplify and standardize the work methods.  The 
concrete supervisor selected methods and components that required less onsite assembly 
(aluminum tables configured for ease of installation), and less measuring and cutting (“Z metal” 
for the beam forms).  He had the crew pre-mark the table legs to reduce measuring and prevent 
errors. When a wall involved complex block patterns, the masonry foreman had the block laid 
out in the correct order, to reduced complexity for the masons and prevent errors.    
To reduce physical demands, the masonry foreman raised the scaffold more frequently to 
reduce cutting block due to rebar.  The concrete crew used rubber mallets that deliver a softer 
blow and reduce the workers’ discomfort.  The framing foreman had little discretion regarding 
the material, method or tools—even then, he was using longer than usual temporary braces for 
truss erection that made the installation easier. These strategies reduced the physical demands, 
and task complexity, which reduces the potential for errors. 
 
4.2.4.  Made extensive preparations to reduce disruptions and delays 
All high performance foremen put significant effort to ensure that the crew had all the material 
and resources needed to perform the work as planned.  This was critical in order to avoid 
interruptions and incomplete work.  The framing foreman checked if the lumber, hardware and 
trusses packages were complete and that no components were missing. The concrete 
supervisor assigned crew members dedicated to preparing the material, equipment, tools, for 
the activities. The masonry foreman checking all the material delivered, “knowing” that there 
was always something missing.  He was also checking if the crew had on the scaffold 
everything they needed—the right block (type and color) and mortar, inserts, wire, ties, 
projection pieces, lintels or steel beam with all stirrups, etc.  According to the masonry foreman, 
the ability to prepare the activities determined the number of work areas where he could work.  
 
4.2.5.  Mitigated production pressures  
To prevent excessive pressures and workload the high performance foremen: (1) Set realistic 
production goals and tried to establish a pace that was not rushed.  Having adequate manpower 
was an important consideration. The framing and concrete foremen had the authority to 
determine their crew size, and emphasized low absenteeism. Absenteeism was high in the 
masonry operation—the crew was “over-manned” by the management which was very tolerant 
to absenteeism. (2) Prepared tasks ahead of time (organized material in the order needed, pre-
measured and pre-marked) to reduce pressures during installation. (3) “Shielded” the crew from 
being rushed by the following activities.  The framing foreman was ordering the crane with a 
small time buffer to prevent it from arriving early and rushing his crew. The goal of these 
practices was to reduce excessive workload, rushing and fatigue, and reduce mistakes.  
However, when high pressures could not be avoided, the close monitoring enabled fast 
adaptations. 
 
4.3.  Crew management practices 
 
4.3.1.  Secured adequate manpower 
The crew management practices of the high performing foremen aimed at preventing excessive 
workload, rushing and mistakes.  Preventing absenteeism was critical for the concrete crew, as 
they were under time pressure and working overtime, and every absence would mean 
excessive workload for the rest of the crew. Absenteeism was high in the masonry operation, 
where the crew was “over-manned” by the management which was very tolerant to 
absenteeism.   
 
4.3.2.  Kept the crew informed and focused  
Crew planning was essential in keeping the crew informed and aware of their next step.  Every 
day, the concrete crews reviewed the timetable, specifying what time each task had to be 
finished.  The crew had a clear work plan which specified when, where, and how to do the work.  
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To keep the crew focused, the workers were assigned one task at a time.  In the masonry crew, 
the foremen and leadmen had very clear plans about what work to do, and they crew had clear 
directions and production goals. 
 
4.3.3.  Task assignment matched capabilities with task demands 
The task assignments balanced the demands of the task with the crew capabilities.  In the 
concrete crew, task rotation was used for some physically demanding tasks.  Tasks that 
required high accuracy (in areas with low tolerance) were assigned to the most skilled 
carpenters.  A leadman with strong engineering skills was performing the layout.  A dedicated 
grader was used to set the table legs at the correct elevations.  In the framing crew, only the 
leadman and another carpenter were allowed to perform the high risk tasks (setting trusses and 
install the first row of plywood).  The masonry leadman and foreman prepared and checked the 
layout, and a dedicated group of four laborers was responsible for the scaffold.  
 
4.3.4.  Task assignment balanced efficiency and learning 
The task assignments also supported workers’ development.  The masonry foreman was 
assigning the same tasks to the new workers as the experienced workers, so the new workers 
can learn how to perform all tasks.  At the same time, he was assigning an experienced worker 
to monitor and correct the inexperienced ones.  He also gave opportunities to crew members to 
take more responsibilities (e.g. oversee the rebar).  The framing foreman framed the complex 
details himself and used them as an opportunity to train his crew members.  the In the concrete 
operation, because of the very high schedule pressures, the supervisor assigned tasks based 
on the workers’ capabilities, rather than learning opportunities.   
 
4.3.5.  Monitoring and cross-monitoring 
The exceptional supervisors had close monitoring of both the task performance (in terms of 
progress and quality) and workers’ conditions (such as fatigue, frustration, attention).  They 
established multiple checks especially for critical operations where errors would be very costly.  
The framing foreman double checked the walls before they were lifted in place, and personally 
released the trusses during truss erection to ensure they were installed correctly.  For the 
masonry foreman, layout, block patterns and openings, and raising the scaffold were the 
activities with the high consequences of errors. He was continuously checking to identify and 
correct any mistakes before the crew left the work area.  The concrete supervisor had 
established multiple checks for the elevation of the tables, and embeds, as well as several daily 
milestones to check progress.  
Cross monitoring by the crew members was another strategy for identifying threats and 
difficulties. The concrete supervisor trained the crew to recognize the symptoms of dehydration 
and asked them to cross monitor each other for symptoms.   Early recognition of mistakes and 
difficulties combined with a clear plan to address the problems made it possible for the crew to 
correct errors quickly or redistribute the workload.  To prevent problems in one task affecting 
other tasks, the concrete crew was instructed to not stop their activity and help with production 
problems, but to notify the deck foreman immediately.  The foreman knew the status of all tasks 
and redistributed the workload so that other tasks were not delayed. 
 
4.4 Differences in safety management 
Although all three supervisors had excellent safety performance, the three cases had significant 
differences in terms of the safety risks and control of hazards.  The framing crew had limited 
safety measures and high exposure to hazards.  Their most significant risks were falls from 
elevation, saw cuts and nailgun injuries. At the time of the study, the residential framing sector 
was exempt from conventional fall protection requirements. Consequently, the protection from 
hazards was limited and the exposures were high.  The jobsites did not have a dedicated safety 
professional and the crew did not have safety toolbox talks.   
For the masonry crew the most significant safety concerns were scaffold safety, saw cuts and 
heavy load lifting.  A safety manager was assigned part-time on the project and safety toolbox 
talks were held once a week. For the tower scaffolds the masonry foreman had four laborers 
dedicated to inspecting, monitoring and raising the scaffold.  Overall, the safety efforts were 
good but the remaining exposures to hazards were considerable.  Scaffold inspection was 
performed daily.   
The concrete operation had extensive safety measures to reduce exposures.  The main safety 
concerns were falls, crane safety, falling objects during removal of the table forms, and 
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dehydration. The crew had daily planning and safety meetings.  Perimeter railing and 100% tie-
off policy with zero tolerance were used to reduce exposures to falls.  Crane activities were 
planned extensively and monitored closely. The risk of dehydration was mitigated by providing 
extra water and rotating workers to work in shaded areas.  The safety measures significantly 
reduced the workers’ exposures to hazards, and the exposures were relatively low.   
The study resulted in some surprising findings with regards to safety management.  First, 
although the high performing supervisors had exceptional safety, safety was not in all cases 
their top priority.  Second, high safety performance was achieved even with minimal safety rules 
and controls, as the residential framing case highlights.  Thus, high levels of safety were 
consistently achieved with greater emphasis on production controls, rather than hazard controls.   
 
5. DISCUSSION  
The study of high performance supervisors identifies production system design principles and 
strategies that are important for achieving at the same time high production performance and 
high safety performance in construction operations.  The findings provide the basis for the 
following suggestions: 
  
5.1. The high performance supervisors achieve exceptional performance on both 
production and safety by creating high quality work situations.  
The critical common characteristic in the three cases was that the high performance supervisors 
emphasized the quality of work assignments in order to avoid errors, defects and incomplete 
work.  To reduce the likelihood of errors, exceptional supervisors used multiple strategies that 
(1) mitigate the task demands on the workers, and (2) kept the crew informed, focused, and 
attentive.  As a result, their work practices produced “high quality” work situations.  The 
extensive preparations minimized unpredictable situations, and reduced unexpected problems 
(such as not having the right tools and material), frustration, rushing and errors.  The 
management of production pressures reduced rushing, and the need for shortcuts or violations 
to meet production goals. At the same time, the crew management strategies prevented 
excessive workload and reduced distractions and frustration. The assignment of more capable 
personnel to more demanding tasks prevented overloading crew members with excessive task 
difficulty. The extensive monitoring increased the ability to recognize excessive workload and 
threats (such as fatigue or dehydration) and redistribute the load. 
 
5.2. The production practices that prevented errors also prevented accidents.   
The high quality of work assignments appears to reduce the likelihood of accidents in several 
ways: it mitigated the task demands on the workers (i.e. prevent excessive efforts, complexity or 
fatigue), it reduced the need for shortcuts and violations due to production reasons (such as not 
having the correct tools, manpower, rushing, etc.), and it reduced the likelihood of errors even 
when the workers were exposed to hazards.   
This underlies the nature of accident prevention as error prevention rather than hazard controls.  
In dynamic, uncertain work situations as in construction, where exposures to hazards are 
unavoidable, the ability to avoid errors is critical.  
 
5.3. The quality of the work situations may be more important determinant of safety than 
the safety management system.   
The study of residential framing illustrated that high levels of safety can be consistently 
achieved even with very limited safety regulations and hazard controls.  Informal discussions 
with construction practitioners tend to support this argument—the practitioners indicated that if 
the quality of work assignments was poor, it would be very difficult to achieve high safety 
performance even with extensive safety management efforts.   
 
In summary, the findings support that safety is an emergent outcome of the production system 
design, rather than an outcome of compliance, or control of hazards.  This investigation found 
that the production system design is critical for safety performance because it generates the 
work situations that workers face.   An ineffective production control system generates low 
quality work situations with excessive task difficulty and increased opportunities for errors and 
violations.  Even with significant safety effort, there will be extensive friction with production, and 
the safety outcomes are likely to be poor.  This is not to say that strong safety efforts are not 
important, but they are not sufficient to overcome the problems of an ineffective production 
control system.   
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Abstract 
This work presents a proposal of projective guidelines for the structuring and organization of the 
space regarding the treatment of recyclable material (paper, glass, plastic and aluminum) to be 
implemented on sorting centers. The guidelines were based on visits and interviews made in 
intermediate companies and recycling cooperatives from Recife - Brazil, and also the analysis of 
the Brazilian Technical and Regulatory Standards that regulates construction, facilities and 
health requirements, safety and comfort for workers. By applying the guidelines to a studied 
cooperative, it was possible to simulate an operation flow of logistics in a environment capable 
of receiving, triage, pressing and trade up to 22 tons of recyclable material per day. In addition, 
it allows 160 collectors to be distributed in 3 shifts, and comfortable facilities for meals, toilets, 
changing rooms with double closets, storage for personal protective equipment, and appropriate 
lighting, ventilation, parameterized exhaustion and minimum height for the ceiling, according to 
the present regulatory requirements for living areas. The proposal aims to elaborate adequate 
screening centers and to contribute to emancipate the health, safety and dignity of workers in 
this sector. 
 
Keywords: Recycling, Solid Waste, Waste Collectors, and Health and Safety Work. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The waste collectors have great collaboration in current society because, in addition to 
environmental benefits, the scavenging activity also exempts the local government with 
considerable part of urban waste (Alencar, 2008). However, the industries that purchase 
recyclable materials, acquire through intermediates, also known as “aparistas” (chippers). 
These play the main role to intermediate recyclable raw materials, leading directly and indirectly 
an extensive network which include small and medium traders, and a huge contingent of waste 
collectors. For collectors entities, the intermediates end up with much of a profit on resale 
process. It is assumed that the low volume of direct sales between collectors and industries lies 
in the fact that political, social and productive organization of recycling cooperatives is recent in 
Brazil and so many still failed to fit the requirements imposed by buyers, such as legal 
registration and own transportation. 
The recyclable waste collectors originated from a group of workers what were jobless. Now they 
seek to organize in cooperatives and associations as a way to provide to their families and to 
improve their working conditions and quality of life; market a larger volume of recyclables; have 
access to negotiation with the Government; seek autonomy in selling recyclables; defend their 
rights and receive investments that benefit all members (Public Ministry of Minas Gerais 
[MPMG], 2013). The profession was officially incorporated into the Brazilian Classification of 
Occupations (CBO) in 2002 through specific ordinance n° 5.192-05. 
However, despite the gains arising with waste collectors, associated with the figure of the 
collector, the professional is banned from the conventional production system, which keeps 
most often unhealthy and dangerous working conditions (Ramos 2012). According to Hoefel et 
al. (2013): “Accidents in such an environment usually happen as a result of insecurity and lack 
of adequate working conditions, translated in injury and loss of members, by running over and 
pressed in compression equipment and motor vehicles, and animal bites (dogs, rats) and insect 
bites.” 
The doctoral thesis of Alencar (2008) was presented a study on the production of collectors. 
This study analyzed the physical efficiencies, economic and 20 cooperatives market. Physical 
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efficiency is measured by the average productivity (kg per month); economic efficiency is 
measured by the value traded of physical production (Brazilian real per month); and market 
efficiency is the ratio of economic efficiency and physics. The study showed that "a cooperative 
that does not have constructed space per capita suitable for receiving, sorting, processing, 
packing, storage and marketing, as well as social and physiological living space, lost in 
efficiency". This study identified a number of 160 collectors to be an efficient cooperative. 
To improve safety, health and dignity of collectors, guidelines are presented to simplify 
structures of sorting centers, that will enable the segregation of activity and proper disposal of 
recyclable materials. The result was applied in a study case in a Recife’s collectors' cooperative, 
evaluating its peculiarities, production potential and adequacy of their physical infrastructure, 
considering constructive and regulatory requirements of Work Health and Safety (WHS). 
 
2. GENERATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SOLID WASTE OVERVIEW 
The total of local solid waste - LSW in Brazil in 2013, is estimated to be 76.387.200 tons, has 
increased in a 4,1% rate compared to 2012, representing a higher rate than population growth 
in the same period, which was 3,7% (Abrelpe, 2014). In Pernambuco, the numbers are no 
different, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Collection and generation of LSW in the State of Pernambuco (day) by Abrelpe (2014) 
Total Population LSU Coletado LSU Gerado (t/day) (Kg/hab./day) (t/day) 
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
8.931.028 9.208.550 0,797 0,804 7.118 7.401 8471 8561 
 
 
The final disposal of solid waste in the state of Pernambuco occurs in landfill site, controlled 
landfill and dump in the proportions shown in Figure 1. 
 
     landfill site        controlled landfill         dump  
Figure 1 - Disposal of LSW in the state of Pernambuco by Abrelpe (2014) 
 
The city of Recife produces the equivalent to 66 thousand tons of waste. Of these it is estimated 
that a portion of 25% to 35% could be recycled, but unfortunately this number does not reach 
10% (Revista Algo Mais, 2011). If the amount to be recycled reached 35%, the average reused 
would be around 23,100 tons per month. From the monthly volume of waste produced in the 
city, it would be required 35 sorting centers, with the ability to receive up to 22 tons of material 
per day, preventing the dumping of this material on landfills. 
 
2.1. Technical requirements and regulatory 
To define the constructive aspects in work environments, the guidelines set out in the 
Regulatory Norm nº 24 (NR-24) of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and Job should be followed, 
because they contain adequacy guidelines for sanitation and comfort in the workplace. This 
standard establishes criteria for the toilets, changing rooms, accommodations, dining, kitchen 
and recreation areas that must be met in order to ensure obtaining the Operating License (LO), 
required by local government agencies. In reform works, one must still adopt the Brazilian 
Association of Technical Standards (BATS) NBR 16280:2014, which establishes the obligation 
of compliance with current legislation and the adoption of management systems and 
requirements processes, projects, performance and security buildings reforms. For the following 
steps, it is necessary that other policy recommendations are obeyed, such as: ISO/CIE 8995-1 
for illumination of workplaces; NBR 5410 for Electrical Installations; NBR 12693 for protection 
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systems for fire extinguisher; NBR 9077 for emergency exits in buildings; NBR 14432 that 
establishes the fire resistance requirements of constructive elements of buildings; and the Law 
11.186 of 1994 of the State of Pernambuco, which defines criteria about the fire safety systems 
for buildings. 
 
2.2. Identification of environmental hazards present in recycling cooperatives 
According to the regulation P4.261 of the Environmental Company of São Paulo (CETESB, 
2011), risk is the "measure of harm to human life resulting from the combination of frequency of 
occurrence of one or more accident scenarios and magnitude of physical effects associated with 
these scenarios". Environmental risks are physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic and 
accidents that present in the workplace, that are capable of causing damage to workers' health. 
For NR-9, "are considered environmental risks the physical, chemical and biological agents 
existing in the workplace which, because of their nature, concentration or intensity and 
exposure time, are capable of causing damage to workers' health. "(Ministério do Trabalho e 
Emprego [MTE], 1978a) 
The activity of collecting, performed in the screening centers, has a maximum degree of 
unhealthy character according to Annex 14 - Biological Agents – of the Regulatory Standard n° 
(NR-15), because the worker is in permanent contact with urban waste (collection and 
industrialization) (MTE, 1978b). 
Due to unhealthy work, if the collectors were formally linked to the National Institute of Social 
Security (NISS) of the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Federal Government of Brazil, they 
would be entitled to receive payment of a benefit of 40% of base salary, according to labor laws. 
Besides the exposure to biological agents, Ramos (2012) and Hoefel et al. (2013) have 
identified chemical, physical, biological, ergonomic and accidents in the activities performed in 
the sorting centers. 
According to Ramos (2012), the most frequent accidents of collecting activities are: cuts and 
punctures with sharp objects such as thorns, nails, needles and syringes skewer, as well as 
other accidents and occupational diseases linked to biological and physical hazards. 
The contact with substances from hazardous residues mixed with recyclables that arrive at 
sorting centers in local selective collection trucks or in the trucks of sorting centers, can 
contaminate recyclable waste with hazardous chemicals such as mercury, cadmium, lead, 
beryllium, insecticides, fungicides, oils composed of toluene, benzene, dust and sawdust, glass 
powder, aluminum powder that can cause numerous negative health impacts on workers. 
Other diseases such as fungal meningitis, leptospirosis, tuberculosis, malaria and possible 
poisoning by venomous animal bites such as snakes, spiders, centipedes and scorpions are 
examples of accidents that can affect workers linked to scavenging activity within the sorting 
centers. 
 
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Visits were made to two intermediate companies and a cooperative of waste pickers in Recife to 
identify the activities carried out by the collectors, their working conditions, raising the necessary 
infrastructure and specify the equipment necessary for the operation of a sorting center. In 
addition to the observation and photographic records, interviews were held with the directors of 
the two companies and the administrators of the cooperative. 
The rules and laws used in the preparation of the guidelines included: Regulatory Standard nº 9 
(NR-9) -classification of environmental agents and risks, the NR-15 - classification on the 
hazard degree of collecting activity, the NR-17 - Ergonomics, and NR-24 for adequacy 
guidelines on sanitary conditions and comfort in the workplace. For the reform planning was 
considered that the procedures of the Brazilian Association of Technical Standards (BATS) NBR 
16280:2014, prior consultation with the state standards by the Fire Department and BATS 
concerning standards regarding the resistance of materials against fire in construction elements 
and fire extinguishers. Lighting and electrical installations should be consulted and applied in 
posterior steps for an effective implementation of the guidelines suggested here. 
 
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE ANALYZED COOPERATIVE  
The Cooperative of Professional Recyclers in Recife (“Cooperativa de Catadores Profissionais 
do Recife”, Pro-Recife), study object, started its operation in April 2006, with 42 cooperatives the 
slum of “Caranguejo Tabaiares”. Currently has 28 collectors, 20 women and 8 men working on 
average 48 hours per week. Aged 18 to 70 years, only 3 to 8 have the 1st degree range (as 
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illustrated in Figures 2 and 3) and none of the cooperative is linked to social security for 
retirement purposes and other labor rights. 
According to the cooperative representative, the Brazilian average in the collecting activity is 
60% of women and 40% of men.  
 
  
           Figure 2 -  Age range of members of the Pro-
Recife. 
Figure 3 -  The level of education of members of the Pro-
Recife. 
The material that reaches the cooperative goes through a sorting according to their 
composition. According to data, the cooperative receives around 50-60 tons of waste per month, 
and from this total about 30% is rejected, i.e. material that is not meant to be recycled and 
therefore needs to be separated and placed in the outer area of the Cooperative to be collected 
once again by the responsible urban company. 
In collecting activities the workers wear uniforms and gloves. The lunch meals are made within 
the cooperative, in the same area for education and meetings with companies and government 
officials. The following risk factors were observed: shed discharge material with inappropriate 
lighting, small space for the volume of material collected, risk of cuts and punctures caused by 
materials found in waste, ergonomic strain on the body due to manual lifting, heavy physical 
work, poor posture, repeatability, work standing or squatting, trunk twisting and spinal flexion, as 
well as an accumulation of disordered material, especially tailings (unprofitable for recycling), 
within the receiving material shed can lead to the proliferation of synanthropic vectors, and 
diseases and accidents at the workplace. 
On the day of the visit, the Pro-Recife: 1 press, with over 10 years of use; 1 electronic scale; 3 
screening tables; 1 truck and 2 machines to grind glass. The cooperative operates on the lower 
floor, as well as workflow, represented in Figure 4. 
  
 
Figure 4 – Lower Floor Plan of the Pro-Recife Cooperative 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Constructive Guidelines and Reform to the Screening Center 
Given the observed aspects, it is understood the need for standardization of the design 
specification guidelines for both the desktop, as well as living areas for workers. Thus, they 
encompass the recommendations of national and international Technical Standards for 
Electrical Installations, Sanitary Conditions and Comfort in the Workplace, ensuring appropriate 
conditions for meals; minimum areas for health facilities; changing rooms with double closets; 
places to keep personal protective equipment (PPE); lighting, ventilation; exhaustion and 
parameterized minimum height for ceiling, according to the living area. 
The guidelines for sorting centers behave 160 workers, distributed in three shifts of 8 hours of 
work per day, according to results presented by Alencar (2008). The considered demand in the 
calculations was of 22 tones per day (which would correspond to the recyclable waste for a 
population of approximately 47,000 inhabitants), and the proportion of men and women 
considered was of 40% and 60% respectively, by the national average. 
The project layout should be designed so that the processing path of the various materials 
(receiving and sorting, pressing and storage) occurs in a covered area. 
For an efficient cooperative, the amount of equipment for every 160 pickers should be of 3 
mechanical scales (capable of weighing up to 1 ton); 10 mats for screening; 6 balers; and 03 
forklifts. Predict sectors for each type of material, including sub-sectors for paper, which are 
divided into: white paper, corrugated, paper magazines, catalogs, and newspapers and graph 
paper. 
It is suggested the use of simple trapezoidal galvanized with thermo and acoustic isolation, e.g. 
with expanded polystyrene filling, between the two tiles at the ceiling, because its retardant 
action on flames and do not absorb water; or the use of a green roof, which affords indoor 
thermal and acoustic comfort. 
As instrument of social inclusion, it is suggested the creation of a cultural and educational open 
space for tours. A classroom space can be created for conducting workshops for manufactured 
goods using recycled materials; this location can be set in the same space for the meetings. A 
sales stand can be placed in the reception area or living for manufactured products. These 
areas can be viewed in Figure 3. 
Based on the presented case study, it defined the main environments that a screening center 
should house as well as the minimum and equipment needed areas, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Detailed structure of the Screening Center 
ENVIRONMENT AREA AMBIENCE EQUIPMENT QUANTITY AREA (m²) 
GROUND Screening Center 
Electronic 
Department 
- - 12,37 
  
Shed for 
receiving 
material 
Glass Crusher 2 
355,36 
   Hidraulic Press 2  
   Mat for screening material 3 
 
  Weighing Scale 1 51,20 
   Forklift 1  
  Deposit - - 27,30 
  First Aid - - 2,00 
 Collector’s support Men’s locker. - - 35,67 
  Women’s’ locker - - 45,52 
  Living Area - - 43,15 
  Closets for PPE - - 8,20 
  Cafeteria - - 15,70 
  Kitchen - - 12,37 
 Public WC - - 2,12 
  WC - - 2,12 
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  Reception - - 9,63 
 Restricted Employees Administration - - 16,86 
   TOTAL AREA BULIT 639,57m² 
 
5.2. Occupational Safety Guidelines for construction and / or renovation of the sorting 
center 
According to the NR-24, the establishments where there are from 30 to 300 employees, 
although it is not required a cafeteria, there should be guaranteed for workers sufficient 
conditions for comfortable meals. The cafeteria should be built in an appropriate place, not 
communicating directly with health facilities and workplaces. The tables should have flat tops 
and waterproof material, banks and chairs should be kept clean, the area should be ventilated 
and with good illumination, and tables and chairs in number corresponding to amount of users, 
and have a device to warm the food, stove or similar (MTE, 1978c). 
Guidelines for the storage and maintenance of PPE are regulated in the  NR-06 that considers 
"PPE, every device or product, for individual use used by the worker, for the protection of 
susceptible risks to threaten the safety and health at work". 
To guarantee the conditions of use of PPE is suggested the adequacy to the regulation NR-06, 
regarding the obligation to use it only for what it is intended and be responsible for its care and 
conservation. Thus, it is proposed to have suitable areas for the custody of PPE, in individual 
single cabinets, located in the living area to better assist the conservation of the protective 
equipment (MTE, 1978d). 
According to the NR-24 (1978c) in unhealthy activities, as well as in activities incompatible with 
body cleanliness, the cabinets should be of dual compartments. It was chosen for the case 
study, which has the following minimum dimensions: 0.80m in height and 0.50m wide and 
0.40m deep, with a vertical division, so that the compartments with a width of 0.25m establish, 
rigorously, the isolation of the common use of clothes and work. 
In addition to the guidance in the areas of health, locker rooms, cafeterias, considering the 
luminance of the site, ventilation and cabinets, the NR-24 specifies parameters of water 
consumption for per worker, for toilets and for consumption during daily work, as well as the 
amount of drinking fountains, sinks, and showers per worker. It is recommended the use of 
shower for decontamination and first aid box in accessible locations, without obstruction by 
equipment or materials for urgency and emergency situations, and the adequacy of signaling 
standards and fire protection in screening centers. Table 3 shows the quantitative dimensions 
based on NR-24 for the living areas and sorting center. 
 
Table 3 - Guidelines for the design of the living areas of the sorting center 
LIVING AREAS 
NR 24 - HEALTH CONDITIONS AND 
COMFORT THE WORKPLACE FOR 
SCREENING CENTER 
 
PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE SCREENING CENTER 
 
Sanitary Facilities  
Sanitary with 1m² minimum area for each 
group of 20 workers 
Ensure health with 1m² minimum area 
for each group of 20 workers 
Toilets separated by sex 
Build toilets separated by sex in the 
changing rooms and sign to divide by 
sex in public toilets 
Carp windows and glass inclined c / 45 
degrees with 1/8 of the floor area 
Provide 1/8 area of the floor area in 
WCs Male, Female and to the public 
toilets  
Provide 60 liters / day / worker  
 
Provide 9600 liters of water per day for 
160 workers 
Guarantee a minimum illuminance of 100 
lux, with light bulbs of 100W/8.00 m² with 
ceiling height of 3.00 m maximum, or other 
lamp with the same effect 
Provide electronic fluorescent lamp 
compatible with the luminance 
requested by standard 
 
Washbasins 
1 washbasin for 10 workers if conditions 
are unhealthy 2  (two) washbasins for male bathrooms 
Space between taps 0.60 m 
4 (four) washbasins for female 
bathrooms 
Shower 1 shower for 10 workers 2  (two) showers for male bathrooms 
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4 (four) showers for female bathrooms 
Sinks 
Automatic flush Install automatic flush on toilets 
Minimum height of 2,10m from the division 
between sink areas 
Minimum height of 2,10m from the 
division between sink areas  
Lockers 
Minimum area of 1,5 m² for each worker 
Minimum area of 33  m² for male lockers 
Minimum area of 48  m² for female 
lockers 
The windows must have carp windows, 
with fixed inclination of 45°, with an area of 
1/8 from the floor area 
Minimum area of 4,2 m² for the male 
lockers windows 
Minimum area of 6 m² for the female 
lockers windows 
Illumination of mín de 100 Lux, with 
encandescent lights of 100W/8m², with 
ceiling of 3,00m 
4 bulbs of 100 Lux on male’s lockers  
6 bulbs of 100 Lux on female’s lockers  
Individual double closets with dimensions 
(d) (1,20x0,30x040) or (0,80x0,50x0,40) 
with screens or air vent 
66 lockers with d=(0,80x0,50x0,40) on 
male’s lockers 
94 lockers with com d=(0,80x0,50x0,40) 
on female’s lockers 
Fountain 
Fresh and potable water for the 
consumption on the proportion of 1 
fountain for every 50 employees 2 fountains 
Potable water disposal: 1/4 liter of water 
every hour/person/day/shift 106 liters  
Cafeteria 
In establishments where work more than 
30 to 300  employees ensure sufficient 
conditions of comfort for the occasion 
meals 
Tables and chairs in sufficient numbers 
to accommodate 53 employees / shift 
 
Figure 5 shows the first floor plan according to the guidelines applied to the cooperative. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Floor Plan Reform for the Pro-Recife Cooperative 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained in this study aim to organize the workflow and higher profits for the 
recycling cooperatives, through the construction of sorting centers, where workers, using the 
same space and uninterrupted shifts, can carry out the screening activities, pressing, storage 
and distribution ofrecyclable materials pressed to industries with more comfort and safety, while 
the employee category can be recognized by the Brazilian legislation. 
The idea of structured recycling centers, permeates the concepts of citizenship, living in groups, 
decent work, physical structure, cleanliness, organization, preservation of health and protection 
from occupational diseases in the recycling area. From this perspective, the guidelines 
proposed can positively contribute to the sustainable aspect, not just in the structuring of 
sanitation and decent work, as well as in the recovery of citizenship for both the collectors and 
the communities in its surroundings. 
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Abstract 
This work presents guidelines proposals for creating environmental and social indicators 
applicable to public and private companies. The guidelines were design considering visits, 
interviews and documentary analysis carried out in a public company in Pernambuco - Brazil. 
From the analysis on building maintenance activities and equipment, restoration, traffic control 
and environmental management, environmental management activities and maintenance of 
equipment were chosen. To validate these indicators, they were analyzed along with regulatory 
occupational health and safety requirements. To assist in data collection of environmental 
indicators, softwares for mapping processes were used for planning and imagining the flow of 
activities. The guidelines proposals aims to serve as an indicator for any public or private 
company, with or without profits, allowing to measure and compare how the funds have been 
distributed, representing a practical way to influence the equilibrium of sustainable development. 
 
Keywords: sustainable development, social aspects, environmental aspects, occupational 
health and safety. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, organizations have tried to validate their commitment to environmental 
preservation, quality, safety and health at workplaces. These actions are intended to present a 
good corporate image, engaging employees, customers, shareholders, all in accordance to the 
regulations, thus developing an organizational culture dedicated to the social and environmental 
issues demanded by society, valuing their products and services. Furthermore, enhanced by the 
global economic crisis, it is observed an increase in temporary works, an aging workforce and 
migratory fluxes, favoring the acceptance of unsafe conditions, no health monitoring, the lack of 
verification of environmental working conditions, absence of proper records and reports of 
occupational diseases. 
Therefore, what elements of these systems in the so-called “sustainable companies” consider 
the health and safety of their employers (HSE) in the workplace? And which management tools 
could help these public and private companies to evaluate and monitor the HSE as an intrinsic 
element of sustainability? 
For Elkington (2015), founder of the British sociologist Sustainability NGOs and creator of 
Triple-bottom line expression, social and economic dimensions need to be more integrated to 
the environmental issues. The social aspect is concerned with the present and future 
generations, as the labor that supports development. In this scenery, progress verses 
sustainability, government, business and society have the same directive, demanding from each 
other involvement and commitment, urging a long term planning, under the risk of compromising 
the upcoming generations. There is no consensus of the meaning of “sustainability” and the 
operationalization of strategic plans to face this reality. Thus, one method to get a broader 
understanding of Sustainable Development (SD) is the establishment of operational tools to 
measure, evaluate, monitor and indicate the development progress verses sustainability. 
According Kohlman Rabbani et al. (2013, p.95), indicators are generally used to simplify and 
communicate complex information that can be used to access, diagnose, monitor and, for 
example, compare the various aspects of sustainability. This paper proposes to analyze 
quantitative and qualitative indicators for workplace security that can be incorporated into the 
evaluation of the social aspect of SD. 
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2. SUSTAINABLE INDICATORS 
"The purpose of the indicators is to aggregate and quantify information so that its significance 
becomes more apparent" (Bellen apud Fonseca et al., 2008, p. 42). To create tools to 
synthesize complex data, it is necessary to establish criteria to make it easily understood, 
unambiguous and practical. 
Currently, there are some indicators that measure the SD of private and public organizations, 
profitable or non-profitable, through the use of Global Reporting Initiative – GRI, and the 
Genuine Progress Indicator - GPI, which demonstrate the questions of civil society beyond the 
Policy Performande Index - PPI used to check the performance of governments. According to 
Fernandez-Feijoo & Romero (2014), the GRI indicators have great coverage, because they can 
be applied in different sectors and sizes of organizations. In its fourth version (G4), the GRI has 
international recognition, and it’s used in more than two thousand companies in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, America and Oceania. 
Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero and Ruiz (2014), comment that GRI indicators are reliable and 
leaders in the international market have been using it to portray the sustainability of companies 
in economic, environmental and social categories. Table 1 shows some features of the GRI. 
 
Table 1 - GRI features adapoted by the author based on Table 1 of Fonseca et al. (2008, p.13). 
INDICATORS GRI (GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE) 
Indicator’s Objective  To develop and disseminate guidelines that can 
harmonize the reports of accepted organizations 
according sustainability criteria. 
Target Organizations from different sectors and sizes, 
corporate, public, or non-profit, but it is in the 
private sector that takes its greatest application 
Sustainable 
Development  Concept 
Balance between economic, social and 
environmental development 
Data gathering and 
processing 
Report issued regularly by the organization, so 
that one can compare the evolution of its 
performance, as well as in relation to other 
organizations. The report contains questions 
relating to/or by a specific segment proposed by 
the general program indicators. 
Periodicity  The most widely used is the yearly, but larger or 
smaller periods can be used. It is recommend the 
use of a uniform regularity, depending on the 
comparison. 
 
The GRI Report provides a guide for mapping and preparation of indicators. The environmental 
dimension covers the organization's impacts on natural systems including ecosystems, land, air 
and water; for these indicators will be evaluated if the organization's practices are in compliance 
with laws and efforts for the preservation, recovery and conservation of the environment. For 
social aspects, are considered the organization's impacts related to labor practices, the 
relationship between workers and management, health and safety, training and retraining, 
including subcontractors. (Glogal Reporting Initiative [GRI], 2015a). 
In GRI standards, the indicators are composed of acronyms, which G4 means the version used, 
and the remaining letters indicate the category of the indicator. For example, a company that 
wants to display to society its social and environmental responsibility, could choose the 
following criteria for measuring and monitoring in the Environment Category - EN 
(ENVIRONMENTAL): percentage of used materials that are recycled (G4-EN2) , energy 
consumption reduction (G4-EN6), total water withdrawal by source (G4-EN8), percentage and 
volume of recycled and reused water (G4-EN10), and total environmental expenditures by type 
(G4-EN31) . 
For social class indicators - LA (LABOR PRACTICES AND DECENT WORK), a possible choice 
would be the following criteria: total number and rate of new jobs, hires and turnover by age 
group, gender (G4-LA1); type of injury and injury rates, occupational diseases, lost days, 
absenteeism and work-related fatalities by region and by gender (G4-LA6); workers with high 
incidence or high risk of diseases related to occupation (G4-LA7); average hours of training per 
year per employee, by gender and employee category (G4-LA9); programs for skills 
management and lifelong learning that support the continued employability of employees and to 
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manage career endings (G4-LA10), and the proportion of basic salary and remuneration of 
women to men by employee category (G4-LA13) (GRI, 2015a). 
 
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
In order to validate the collection and analysis of indicators chosen, it was applied the same to 
air company in Pernambuco - Brazil. The used methods were: visits interviews, document 
analysis, description of the programs applied in environmental areas and man support, 
photographic documentation and information gathering information between April and August 
2015. 
The GRI was chosen for its international recognition, applicability to different segments of the 
economy, and its foundation in the principles of quality, clarity and consistency report. These 
standardization features facilitate understanding and comparison reports for all the countries 
and institutions that follow their directives. 
For this work, analyzes were made from collected data and, for example purposes, only 
environmental indicators were chosen (EN2-G4 and G4-EN8 indicators). For social category - 
LA, it was chosen the G4-LA9 indicator. 
In order to assist in the imagining, data collection frequency and interrelation of external sectors 
involved used the environmental management activities software, Bizage Modeler free version. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The studied organization has its headquarter in Pernambuco – Brazil. It has about a thousand 
employees, spread in 10 states in northeastern Brazil. Concerned to adapt it self to the SD, the 
company has developed projects that support the improvement of the environmentm and its 
social and environmental responsibility. A case study was not accomplished specifically in this 
company, but was only observed among the processes of their action fields. 
 
4.1 Social Indicators 
For the proposed social indicators was created flowchart of its activities in Figure 1, of the areas 
of maintenance operations, renovation work (performed by third party companies), traffic control 
and environmental management. For building cleaning and reform activities, Brazilian law states 
that companies that hire and contractors have a relationship of co-responsible for damage to 
health and safety of employees and the environment. 
 
Figure 1 - Proposed activities for data collection 
 
Among the activities described above, it is suggested the design of indicators by mapping the 
environmental conditions as discriminated in Figure 2. Other suggested indicator is the G4-L2, 
concerning the working conditions of general services teams (outsourced companies), with 
information as to respect for labor rights compared them with those accorded to employees of 
the company's own staff. 
For traffic control activity, the main branch of the institution, suggests the creation of indicators 
(G4-LA7) that specifies the number of workers with high incidence risk of occupational diseases. 
Such indicator is suggested, because this activity demand periods of extreme concentration and 
mental stress, object of study of ergonomics area. 
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Figure 2 - Proposals for items to be analyzed for mapping environmental conditions 
 
Subtitle: 
Environmental Risk Prevention Program – ERPP 
Collective Protection Equipment - CPE 
Individual Protection Equipment - IPE 
Medical Control of Occupational Health Program – MCOHP 
Musculoskeletal Disorders Related to Work - MDRW 
Repetitive Strain Injury – RSI 
The management training in companies that develop activities with environmental risks is an 
item that deserves special attention, because can contribute to the decision making on how to 
spend on acquiring training, warn about the validity of applied training, the dates for revision 
training, and new training needed to improve functional performance. The management of 
training, besides training employees preventively, avoids accidents, helps to prevent possible 
costs with legal skills and labor penalties. For this theme, it is suggested the creation of an 
indicator (G4-LA9) to quantify the average hours of training per year, per employee, by gender 
and job category. 
For the training for the item, it can be mentioned the obligatory application of basic training and 
biennial periodic review courses, with at least 8 hours required to work at height, according to 
Regulatory Standard 35 (NR 35). To analyse the G4-LA9 indicator, it was held in April 2015, an 
assessment of training for working at heights in the studied company. The activities of building, 
preventive and corrective maintenance already discriminated previously in Figure 2 are 
essentially performed by males; such activity sometimes subjects employees to heights above 
the limit set by NR 35, (Brazil, 1978). During the evaluation, it was noted that from the 50 
employees who performed these activities, only 12 had basic training. And even so, such 
officials had their qualifications outdated since May 2013. 
On the data collected and plotted indicators, actions were taken by senior management. In the 
graphs below, it is shown the amount of training conducted and planned for the second half of 
2015. According to the guidelines of the G4-LA9 indicator (average hours of training per year, 
per employee, by gender and job category) were plotted in Figure 3, the training carried out and 
planned and the goal of training for the year 2015. Figure 4 shows the minimum hours required 
by the NR-35, the actual amount applied hours, and the average hours per year per employee; 
Figure 5 shows the number of employees trained by education level and hours of applied 
training. 
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Figure 3 - Number of male employees trained 
 
 
Figure 4 - Average hours of training in NR 15 applied in 2015 
  
 
Figure 5 - Staff Trained by Education Level for hours of training per year 
  
To analyze the environmental employment conditions, there shall be guaranteed environmental 
measuring instruments to verify agents, such as light meter, thermometer, sound level meter are 
properly calibrated and calibration performed by laboratories that they are accredited by national 
and international organization. This is a positive item for the studied company, because it is 
certified by INMETRO, Brazilian agency with international accreditation to calibrate instruments. 
 
4.2 Environmental Indicators 
Public and private companies generate daily waste of different types. Wastes such as: cooking 
oil, residual oil machinery and equipment, fluorescent tubes, scrap tires, printer cartridges and 
batteries must be managed and properly disposed by organizations. Proper disposal should be 
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considered because many materials have in their composition toxic elements, and once in 
nature can contaminate soil and groundwater and still pose chemical risks to workers. Thus, the 
amount of management indicators and compliance could be plotted to point environmental 
liabilities that could have a material impact on the financial, environmental and social situation of 
the institutions. In order to map the processes of generation, collection and disposal of waste, it 
is suggest the use of modeling softwares, such as Bizage Modeler, which have free versions on 
internet that can perform effectively the mapping process. 
To illustrate the process of data collection for the creation of the G4-EN2 indicator, modeling 
was performed with the Bizage software, that presents possible flows to the Waste 
Management Program (RMP) in any institution. For creating the hypothetical flow, it was 
considered an establishment that discards recyclable (plastic, paper, cardboard, glass, iron, 
aluminum); 
 
 
Figure 6 - Management Mapping Program for data collection and creation of G4-EN2 indicators (percentage of materials 
used that are recycled) 
 
In Brazil, the Federal Public Institutions must comply with Decree 5.940 of 2006, which is set up 
"the separation of recyclable waste discarded by the organs and entities of the direct and 
indirect federal public administration, at the source, and its allocation to associations and 
cooperatives of waste collectors" (Brazil, 2006). As an example of good practice, some 
companies, regardless of the obligation, have adopted such a position, destining their 
recyclable waste to recycling cooperatives and associations; this consideration was made in 
Figure 6 for the creation of G4-EN2 indicator. 
The total consumption of water withdrawal by source and potability analyzes can also be 
indicators of object. To create the G4-EN8 indicator, a specific program can be created to 
perform modeling of these processes, as seen in Figure 7. The analysis of potable water 
consumption, can consider the indication of water parameters used for human consumption in 
accordance with the standards set by environmental and public health agency. 
641
 
Figure 7 - Management Mapping Program for creation of G4-EN8 indicator (total water withdrawal by source) 
 
Moreover, investments in proper disposal and technologies to minimize impacts to the 
environment and occupational health, and other investments in the environment, can be 
quantified as: Biodiversity indicators G4-EN13, that indicate protected and restored habitats, in 
actions such as Recovery degraded areas, measuring the costs of hiring specialized man-hour, 
compost, earth, water, plants, gardening supplies, and composting machines. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The creation of indicators of environmental and social management aims to guide any public or 
private company, with or without profits, in order to identify working conditions, training, 
collective and individual security devices, greeting legal obligations and other aspects relating to 
the social and environmental aspects of the DS in organizations. The proposal for the 
institutions that adopt these indicators is that investments made in the aspects of the DS allow 
comparisons between companies, and that these can be verify the application of resources are 
distributed in a way that represents in practice that their greatest asset are the people's lives 
that compose it. 
Given the above, it is suggested to future completion of the study, performing the diagnosis of 
the environmental conditions experienced by evaluating working conditions, follow the safety 
guidelines for labor stated in contracts and prevailing norms. It is recommended the completion 
of the study through other programs to evaluate costs, conducted in the company, in order to 
effectively compare the cost invested in the environmental and social aspects of sustainable 
development. 
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Abstract 
An effective warning sign for railroad crossings that had an alarm but not a gate bar was designed 
and examined, in order to reduce risk-taking behavior of drivers at the crossings. Based on 
psychological perspectives and the analyses of past accidents at railroad crossings without gate 
bars, four different warning signs were developed. A questionnaire inquiring about risk-taking 
process was also developed to assess effective designs of the warning signs. Participants in the 
study drove in a driving simulator. In the simulator program, they encountered a railroad crossing 
without a gate bar. After they finished driving, the participants responded with their impressions 
of the warning signs seen in the simulator program using the provided questionnaire. The 
analyses of their responses indicated that two designs were effective: the sign “Train is right here,” 
which tells drivers the “trains are already in front of them when they hear the alarm,” and the sign 
“Thank you for stopping,” which shows the driver “appreciation.” These two signs could have 
affected different psychological characteristics to provoke intentions of performing safety 
behaviors. Following the risk-taking process, the “Train is right here” sign prompts risk 
perception, resulting in drivers’ intention to behave safely. On the other hand, the “Thank you for 
stopping” sign provided kind appreciation of drivers, resulting in drivers intending to drive safely 
because of the norm of reciprocity. 
 
Keywords 
risk-taking, railroad crossings, pictogram 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to “information regarding train transportation safety 2014” published by The Japanese 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism, 248 accidents occurred at railroad 
crossings in the last year in Japan, showing a yearly decreasing trend. However, fatal accidents at 
railroad crossings account for 32.1% of all driving related fatal accidents, signifying the necessity 
for the prevention of accidents at railroad crossings for railroad safety [The Japanese Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism, 2015]. 
 
When looking at accidents by the type of railroad crossings, 212 accidents occurred at Class I 
railroad crossing, and 9 accidents at Class III railroad crossings. (Class I railroad crossings are 
crossings with gate bars to intercept traffic, whereas there are no gate bars at Cass III railroad 
crossings, but only an alarm warning passing trains and cars [Railway Technical Research 
Institute, 2006]). Although the accidents rate seems higher at Class I railroad crossings when 
glancing at the number, the accident rate per 100 railroad crossings in the past five years 
reveals that the Class III crossings resulted in 1.03 accidents per 100 railroad crossings whereas 
Class I crossings resulted in 0.82 accidents. That is, Class III railroad crossings have a higher 
accident rate than Class I railroad crossings at which there is more traffic and more trains 
crossing at a faster speed. 
 
At Class III railroad crossings, drivers are required to make a stop regardless of the presence of 
trains. However, it is possible for drivers to drive without stopping, engaging in risk-taking 
behavior, because there is no gate bar and trains rarely pass the crossings. An effective warning 
sign at crossings without gate bars that would be effective for making drivers stop would be 
beneficial for preventing accidents. 
 
A small number of studies have examined the effects of warning signs at railroad crossings on 
drivers’ risk-taking behavior. For example, Tey, Ferreira, and Wallace [2011] examined the 
effectiveness of three types of warning signs using a driving simulator: a stop sign generally 
seen in Australia, a stop sign with a blinking red light, and a stop sign with a short gate bar. The 
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 results indicated that the stop sign with a blinking red light prompted drivers to slow down more 
gradually and stop at a safer position before the stop line, when compared to conventional stop 
signs. 
 
On the other hand, other studies have indicated contradictory results. For example, Lenne et al. 
[2011] developed three types of stop signs, a conventional stop sign, a stop sign with a flashing 
red light, and a stop sign with three-color traffic lights, and examined which stop sign was most 
effective using a driving simulator. The results indicated that participants decelerated the vehicle 
most gradually when they saw the conventional stop signs, as compared to the other types of 
signs. 
 
The findings of these studies suggest that the implementation of LED and traffic lights at stop 
signs do not guarantee the inhibition of drivers’ risk-taking behavior. Thus, we limited our design 
to signs without devices such as LEDs, and examined designs that would modify driver’s risk-
taking behaviors by using a questionnaire. 
 
It is imperative to design warning sign that prevent drivers from engaging in risk-taking behavior. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire has to assess the process of risk-taking behavior, that the 
“underestimation of a risk leads to risk-taking behavior,” when assessing the effectiveness of a 
design. Thus, in addition to the design of a warning sign, we developed a questionnaire that 
integrates the process of risk-taking behavior. Using this questionnaire, we examined whether the 
intention for risk-taking differed depending on a warning sign seen by drivers. 
 
2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
The participants of the present study were 41 men (M = 30.5 years old, age range: 23 to 34 years) 
who holds driver’s license for ordinary vehicles. The participants took part in the study for 
monetary reward. The recruiting criteria for participants included vision better then 0.7, more 
than one year of driving experience, and driving least 2, 3 times a month, no susceptibility to 
motor sickness, no history of psychiatric disorders, and normal hearing ability. 
 
2.2 Criteria for sign development 
Of that four signs that were developed, two signs reminded of dangerous behaviors in front of 
railroad crossings, one sign contained an appreciative message for safe behaviors, and one sign 
showed an image of being monitored. Figure 1 shows the signs that were developed. 
 
 
 
 
(a) Train is in front of you         (b) Release your gas pedal  
when you hear the alarm             when you hear the alarm            
 
 
(C)SlowLife (C)SlowLife 
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(c) Thank you for stopping (d) Be aware of the alarm 
 
Figure 1. The develop signs 
 
Two signs that contain remainders to drivers were developed based on the analysis of past 
accidents reported in the section on “accidents at railroad crossings by objects, causes, and 
types of railroad crossings (2010-2014)” reported in “information regarding safe railroad 
transportation (2014)” [The Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and 
Tourism, 2015]. According to this report, 42 accidents occurred at the Class III railroad 
crossings (Class III railroad crossings are currently placed at 775 locations) from 2010 to 2014. 
Of these accidents, 28 cases (66.7%) involved vehicles, and 25 cases (59.5%) happened 
because drivers had crossed the railroad immediately before the trains passed. Therefore, the 
warning signs in the present study were designed to target vehicle drivers and to contain 
pictograms and messages to stop immediate crossing. The first sign was created to tell drivers 
that trains are already right in front of them when they hear the alarm, showing a pictogram and 
the message “Train is in front of you when you hear the alarm (train is right here).” See Figure 
1(a). The second sign was designed to alert drivers that accelerate and try to cross railroads when 
they hear the alarm. Thus, the sign contained the message and pictogram to release the gas 
pedal when they hear the alarm, “Release you gas pedal when you hear the alarm (Release your 
pedal).” See Figure 1(b). 
 
The next signs showed appreciation to drivers for their safe behaviors. To date, a number of signs 
and messages for stopping nuisance behaviors have included prohibition or punishment 
[Kitaori & Yoshida, 2000]. However, previous studies suggest that messages with prohibition and 
punishments trigger negative feelings and offend recipients [Yuo & Yoshida, 2012]. Thus, we 
developed a sign that shows appreciations to drivers for their safe behaviors. Of particular, the 
sign included a pictogram a message that appreciated drivers for stopping before the stop line, 
“Thank you for stopping (appreciation).” See Figure 1(c). 
 
The next sign showed drivers being monitored. A number of studies have indicated that gaze, 
whether it is real or a picture, automatically catches people’s attention [Friesen & Kingston, 
1998; Driver, Davis, Ricciardelli, Kidd, Maxwell, & Baron-Cohen, 1999]. Moreover, angry facial 
expressions are detected more quickly than other facial expressions, which is a phenomenon 
known as the anger superiority effect [Fox, Lester, Russo, Bowles, Pichler, & Dutton, 2000]. 
Furthermore, previous studies have indicated a stimulus that seems like a person’s eye can 
provoke cooperative behaviors including real life prompts [Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; 
Burnham & hare 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005]. Based on these studies, we created a sign 
imitating a human face to express staring eyes. Of particular, the sign indicated two eyes 
monitoring the drivers listening to the alarm the a message, “Be aware of the alarm (monitoring).” 
See Figure 1(d). 
 
We requested the co., Office Slow Life, which is a professional graphic design company, to create 
the signs in Figure 1 (a), (b), and (c). 
 
2.3 Procedure before responding to the questionnaire 
The present study required participants to experience real feeling when crossing the railroad 
crossings without gate bars. Therefore, one participant at a time sat in the driving simulator 
[i-Drive (PR-R-PW-AT-100)] that was placed in a room and repeatedly drove to the railroad 
crossing at which one of the warning signs was posted. The driving scene was projected onto 
three 42-inch smart televisions screens (42LA6650) from LG electronics. 
(C)SlowLife 
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In this procedure, the participant drove 20 trials per session for a total of 2 sessions with a break in 
between. One trial was consisted of gradual curve and straight courses for 900 meters, and they 
were required to cross the railroad crossings without a gate bar with one of the designed warning 
signs placed right in front of the crossing. The order of presentation of warning signs was 
random, however, each sign was controlled to appear an equal number of times in one session. 
The participants responded the questionnaire after driving for two sessions. 
 
2.4 Questionnaire assessing warning signs 
In order to assess the effectiveness of warning signs that aimed to reduce risk-taking 
behaviors, a questionnaire was developed to reflect the process of risk-taking behavior that 
emphasized “underestimation of risk leads to risk-taking behaviors.” Therefore, the questionnaire 
was developed based on the questionnaire used to assess animal warning signs in a study 
conducted by Noro, Shimmori, and Hara [2004]. 
 
In their study, a questionnaire was created to assess the effectiveness of animal warning signs 
placed in roads where animals may suddenly cross. The questionnaire included questions to 
assess risk cognition, how much drivers recognize the danger of collision with animals, and to 
assess implementation intention, and the degree of intentions drivers have for decreasing 
their speed, instead of increasing the speed. These questions are similar to the process of risk-
taking behavior, in which the perception of risk precedes risk-taking behavior. We referred to this 
questionnaire when developing the questionnaire for the present study. The developed 
questionnaire included three questions assessing risk perception: how much danger drivers 
recognize at railroad crossings, and two questions assessing intentions for implementation, or 
how much drivers intend to behave safely at railroad crossings. The effective railroad 
crossing signs were assumed to indicate higher intentions for implementation scores. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to these two types of questions, we created questions to assess attitude 
about safety. Risk perception that determines risk-taking behavior is not only affected by gender, 
but also the attitude about safety of individuals [e.g., Cooper, 2003]. 
 
Therefore, we developed three questions assessing individual’s attitude about safety and 
examined whether safety attitude affects risk perception and implementation intentions. The 
Table 1 shows the developed questionnaire. The participants in the present study responded to 
one set of questionnaires for each type of signs, responding to a total of four sets of questionnaires. 
Each question was randomized, and they responded to the questions by using a 5-point scale. 
 
Table 1. Items in the questionnaire assessing the effectiveness of railroad crossing warning signs 
Types of questions Question 
 
Risk perception 
Do you think many trains pass this railroad crossing? 
Do you think there is a possibility of collision with a train? 
Can you imagine the damage to cars and trains in case of a collision? 
lementation intention Do you stop in front of railroad crossings? 
Do you look left and right at railroad crossings? 
 
Safety attitude 
Do you drive without attending to trains and train alarms? 
Do you try to avoid collisions with trains and drive safely? 
Do you try to avoid collisions with trains and drive so as to protect yourself? 
 
3. RESULT 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted with designs of the warning signs (4 levels: train is right 
here, release your pedals, appreciation, monitoring) and types of questions (3 levels: risk 
perception, implementation intention, safety attitude) as independent variables and average 
scores for each type of question as the dependent variable. 
The result indicated a significant interaction effect of the designs and types of questions, F(6,240) 
= 5.749, p < .001, p2 = .126. The pairwise comparison revealed a simple main effect of the 
design for risk perception and implementation intention, F(3,120) = 7.450, p < .001, p2 = 
.157； F(3,120) = 8.155, p < .001, p2 = .169, respectively. 
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 Furthermore, a multiple comparisons using Bonferroni method was conducted for risk 
perception and implementation intention. The results indicated that the average score for risk 
perception was significantly higher for “train is right here” sign, than for the “release your pedal” 
and “appreciation,” signs. Moreover, risk perception score for the “appreciation” sign was 
significantly lower than for the “monitoring” sign (all p values > 0.05). The “train is right here” had 
the highest risk perception score among the four types of warning signs, and the “appreciation” sign 
scored the lowest for risk perception. On the other hand, the “train is right here” and 
“appreciation” signs scored significantly higher for implementation intention than for the "release 
your pedal" (p> 0.05). Both the “train is right here” and “appreciation” scored high in the 
implementation intention. Figure 2 shows the average score for each sign. 
 
Figure 2. The average scores of each sign 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The results indicated that the sign “train is right here” scored the highest for risk perception, and 
the “appreciation” sign scored the lowest. On the other hand, the score for implementation 
intention was highest for the “train is right here” and “appreciation” signs. 
 
In the general risk-taking process, when the risk for railroad crossings was estimated high, one 
would translate the estimation to a particular safety behavior (in this case, the stopping in front of 
crossings). Following this process, the sign “train is right here” scored the highest for risk 
perception among the four designs, leading to high implementation scores. Therefore, the “train 
is right here” was the most effective sign among the four signs that were developed after 
considering the process of risk-taking. 
 
On the other hand, the “appreciation” sign scored the lowest for risk perception; however, its 
implantation intention score was high, indicating that in this case, a risk-taking process did not 
take place. Drivers did not assess the crossing as being dangerous, however, they decided to 
stop in front of the crossings. Thus, this result implies that different psychological characteristics 
from the risk-taking process prompted the safe behavior. 
 
The present result in which drivers behaved safely to gain appreciation can be explained in terms 
of norms of reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity is a psychological model that one should return the 
same degree of goodwill gained from others [Gouldner, 1960]. For example, Yuo and Yoshida 
[2009] created the imaginative situation in which the sign “thank you for recycling” was placed in 
front of the trash bins. As a result, participants had higher intention to separate trash for 
recycling compared to when messages other than those of appreciation were placed in front of 
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 trash bins. They described that appreciative messages triggered the norm of reciprocity. 
Applying this finding to the results of the present study, the “appreciation” sign prompted the 
norm of reciprocity leading to higher intentions to behave safely. 
 
Moreover, prohibiting negative behaviors could offend individuals, resulting in weaker long-term 
effects on desirable behavioral modification [Yuo & Yoshida, 2013]. The appreciative message is 
known to trigger positive feeling [Yuo & Yoshida, 2009]. One study compared the effects of 
prohibiting and appreciative messages in a computer task that elicited numerous illegal 
movements. The study not only indicated that the effects of inhibiting illegal movements was 
larger, when participants saw the appreciative message than the prohibiting message, but also 
that they made less and less illegal moves from middle to the end of the task as comparison to the 
beginning of the task [Igarashi, 2015]. 
 
These previous studies show that the “appreciation” sign promoted safe behaviors based on 
different psychological factors related to the risk-taking process. Moreover, the scores for 
implementation intention of the “train is right here” and “appreciation” signs were not different, 
however, the continuous inhibition of the prohibited behavior might be higher for the 
“appreciation” sign among of the four signs developed in the present study, as a result, the 
“appreciation” sign was the most effective railroad crossing warning signs. 
 
Furthermore, the present analyses did not reveal significant differences in attitudes about safety 
between the four types of signs, indicating that glancing at a sign affected risk perception and 
implementation intentions, but not attitudes about safety. The present result showed 
contradictory results from previous studies that had indicated that attitudes about safety affected 
risk perceptions. At least, the warning signs for railroad crossing did not affect attitudes about 
safety, but affected risk perception and intentions of implementation. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The result of the present study indicated that, four warning signs designed for railroad crossings 
without gate bars, the “train is right here”, and “appreciation” signs scored higher for risk 
perception and implementation intention. Since the implementation intention score shows the 
intention to engage in particular safe behaviors, the “train is right here”, and “appreciation” signs 
were more effective than the other two signs. 
However, these two signs affected different psychological characteristics when participants 
behaved safely. The “train is right here” sign elicited risk perception following the risk-taking 
process, whereas, the “appreciation” sign elicited norm, or reciprocity, and both signs lead drivers 
to engage in safe behaviors. Therefore, both signs are effective, however, with consideration to 
continuous inhibition effects triggered by the appreciative message suggested by previous 
studies, the “appreciation” sign could be the most effective sign. 
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